National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Pulse Secure Virtual Appliance 8.2/5.3, Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10829-2018
Dated: 5 April 2018
Version: 1.0b
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Lead Validator, Patrick Mallett, PhD.
Linda Morrison
Jeffrey Dunn
MITRE Corporation
Kenneth Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Pascal Patin
Ray Dai
Zalman Kuperman
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 7
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 10
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................10
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................10
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................12
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 13
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 14
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................14
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................14
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 15
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................15
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................15
8.3 Test Bed Diagram.........................................................................................................................................15
8.4 Test Tools ......................................................................................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 16
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................16
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................17
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................17
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 19
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 20
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 21
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 22
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the PulseSecure Virtual Appliance Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in April 2018. The information in this report
is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v1.0 (NDcPP) as amended by any
NIAP Technical Decisions relevant to the evaluation.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the NDcPP. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Pulse Secure Virtual Appliance 8.2/5.3
Protection Profile NDcPP v1.0
Security Target Pulse Secure Virtual Appliance 8.2/5.3 Security Target
Evaluation Technical
Report
Pulse Secure Virtual Appliance 8.2/5.3 ETR
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor PulseSecure
Developer PulseSecure
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Montgomery Village, MD
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, PhD., Linda Morrison, Jeffrey Dunn, MITRE Corporation;
Kenneth Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
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3 Architectural Information
The TOE is classified as a virtualized network device (a Virtual Appliance that can be connected
to a network). The Virtual Appliance consists of Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 and Pulse
Policy Secure (PPS) 5.3. The appliance’s software is built on IVE OS 2.0. The TOE consists of
the Virtual Appliance, the VM hypervisor VMWare ESXi 6.0, and a hardware platform – a Dell
Power Edge R430/530 with the Intel Xeon E5-2620 v4 processor, all of which are delivered with
the TOE. Thus, the TOE is considered a network device as defined in NDcPP v1.0 as modified
by TDs #0096 and #0023. Note that per the NDcPP, in the evaluated configuration no other guest
VMs that provide non-network device functionality are allowed on the physical platform.
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4 Security Policy
The logical boundary of the TOE includes those security functions implemented exclusively by
the TOE.
Audit
The TOE generates audit records for security relevant events. The TOE maintains a local audit
log as well as sending the audit records to a remote Syslog server. Audit records sent to the
remote server are protected by a TLS connection. Each audit record includes identity (username,
IP address, or process), date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome of the event.
The TOE prevents modification to the local audit log.
Cryptographic Operations
The TOE implements CAVP validated cryptographic algorithms for random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, authentication, and integrity protection/verification. These algorithms are
used to provide security for the TLS and HTTPs connections as well as verifying firmware
updates.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE authenticates administrative users using a username/password or username/X.509
certificate combination. The TOE does not allow access to any administrative functions prior to
successful authentication.
The TOE supports passwords consisting of alphanumeric and special characters and enforces
minimum password lengths. The TSF supports and certificates using RSA or ECDSA signature
algorithms.
The TOE allows only users to view the login warning banner and send/receive ICMP packets
prior to authentication.
Security Management
The TOE allows users with the Security Administrator role to administer the TOE over a remote
web UI or a local CLI. These interfaces do not allow the Security Administrator to execute
arbitrary commands or executables on the TOE.
The TOE can also receive configuration updates from a Pulse One management server.
Protection of the TSF
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The TOE implements a number of self-protection mechanisms. It does not provide an interface
for the reading of secret or private keys. The TOE ensures timestamps, timeouts, and certificate
checks are accurate by maintaining a real-time clock as well as polling an NTP server to
minimize drift. Upon startup, the TOE runs a suite of self-tests to verify that it is operating
correctly. The TOE also verifies the integrity and authenticity of firmware updates by verifying
the digital signature of an update prior to installing it.
TOE Access
The TOE can be configured to display a warning and consent banner when an administrator
attempts to establish an interactive session over the local CLI or remote web UI. The TOE also
enforces a configurable inactivity timeout for remote and local administrative sessions.
Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE uses TLS to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and remote
Syslog servers. The trusted channels utilize X.509 certificates to perform mutual authentication.
The trusted channel with the Pulse One server utilizes HAWK authentication to perform mutual
authentication. The TOE initiates the TLS trusted channel with both types of remote server.
The TOE uses HTTPs/TLS to provide a trusted path between itself and remote administrative
users. The TOE does not implement any additional methods of remote administration. The
remote administrative users are responsible for initiating the trusted path when they wish to
communicate with the TOE.
Unevaluated Functionality
The TOE includes the following unevaluated functionality that is not covered by this Security
Target and the associated evaluation:
• Layer 3 SSL VPN
• Application VPN
• Endpoint Integrity and Assessment
• Layer 7 Web single sign-on (SSO) via SAML
• Mobile Device Management Integration
• Network Security and Application Access Control Integration
• Federation
• Guest Access
• Anti-Malware Protection and Patch Assessment
• Firewall Listening Service
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These features may be used in the evaluated configuration; however, no assurance as to the
correct operation of these features is provided.
Excluded Functionality
The TOE includes the following functionality that must not be enabled nor should it be used in
the CC evaluated configuration:
• DMI Agent
• SNMP Traps
• External Authentication Servers for administrator authentication
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Assumption Description
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational
environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the
security and/or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and
correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect
the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any
requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack
mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical
access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data,
bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core
function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as
general purpose computing. For example the device should not provide
computing platform for general purpose Applications (unrelated to
networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the
network device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is
traversing the network device, destined for another network entity, is not
covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by
cPPs for particular types of network devices (e.g, firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be
trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This
includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to
guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack
malicious intent when administering the device. The network device is not
expected to be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that
actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by
an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product
updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network
device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
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Threat Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINIST
RATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator access to the network device
by nefarious means such as masquerading as an administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an administrator, replaying an administrative
session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle
attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions
between network devices. Successfully gaining administrator access allows
malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and
the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a
cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption
algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the
algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized
access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal
effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICA
TION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use
standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic.
Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key
management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks,
etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the
critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the
network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_E
NDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods
to authenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or
transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed
protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the administrator or another device,
and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform
a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed
and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the
network device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or
firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-
validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography
leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security
functionality of the network device without administrator awareness. This could
result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the
product) to compromise the device and the administrator would have no
knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY
_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued
access to the network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials
include replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying
existing credentials, or obtaining the administrator or device credentials for use
by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords
to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device
provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow
them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY
_FAILURE
A component of the network device may fail during start-up or during operations
causing a compromise or failure in the security functionality of the network
device, leaving the device susceptible to attackers.
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5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the NDcPP.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Pulse Secure Virtual Appliance 8.2/5.3 Security Target, Version 3.2, April 2018.
 Pulse Secure Virtual Appliance Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures,
version 0.4, March 2018
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in those guides. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product,
or that which may be available online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not be relied upon to configure or operate the device in its evaluated
configuration.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is classified as a virtualized network device (a Virtual Appliance that can be connected
to a network). The Virtual Appliance consists of Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 and Pulse
Policy Secure (PPS) 5.3. The appliance’s software is built on IVE OS 2.0. The TOE consists of
the Virtual Appliance, the VM hypervisor and the hardware platform all of which are delivered
with the TOE. The evaluated hardware platform is the Dell PowerEdge R430/R530, with the
Intel Xeon E5-2620 V4 processor, running the VMware ESXi 6.0. The TOE is considered to be a
network device as defined in NDcPP v1.0 as modified by NIAP TDs #0096 and #0023.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The TOE includes the following functionality that may not be enabled nor used in in the CC
evaluated configuration:
• DMI Agent
• SNMP Traps
• External Authentication Servers for administrator authentication
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for PulseSecure Virtual Appliance, which
is not publically available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and
the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the
Assurance Activities Report, which is publically available, and is not duplicated here.
8.3 Test Bed Diagram
Below is a visual representation of the components included in the test bed:
8.4 Test Tools
The following test tools were used as part of the evaluation testing.
 Acumen-tls version 7
 Oswald tlss_tool version 1.0
 Openssl s_client version 1.1.0g
 Openssl s_server version 1.1.0g
 Wireshark version 2.4.5
 Chrome version 65
 Snipping tool Windows 10
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). Those activities are summarized in the available Assurance
Activity Report for the evaluated product. The reader of this document can assume that activities
and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the PulseSecure Virtual
Appliance to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the
evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the PulseSecure Virtual Appliance that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements. Additionally the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities
specified in the NDcPP.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
17
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information contained in the
operational guidance documents.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed
a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any
issues with the TOE.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
18
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
19
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The Pulse Secure products provide additional functionality over and above that which was tested
to ensure compliance with the security functionality as described in the Network Device
Protection Profile. Administrators are cautioned that any additional functionality the products
may provide was not evaluated and no claims or assumptions regarding the proper operation of
those features can be drawn from the testing performed.
Note that virtualization of network device products requires the following configuration
parameter per the protection profile: in the evaluated configuration, no other guest VMs that
provide non-network device functionality are allowed on the physical platform of the evaluated
configuration.
Note that the use of NTP across unprotected channels is disallowed.
20
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
21
12 Security Target
Pulse Secure Virtual Appliance 8.2/5.3 Security Target. Version 3.2, April 2018
22
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
23
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
5. Pulse Secure Security Target Security Target Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.1,
4/5/2018 <evaluation sensitive document>
6. Pulse Secure Virtual Appliance Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, March 2018
<evaluation sensitive document>
7. Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures, Version 0.4, March 2018
8. Common Criteria NDcPP Assurance Activity Report for Pulse Connect Secure 8.2 on
Virtual Appliance and Pulse Policy Secure 5.3 on Virtual Appliance, Version 1.1, March
2018
9. Pulse Secure Virtual Appliance 8.2/5.3 Security Target, Version 3.2, April 2018
10. PulseSecure PCS Test Plan, Version 1.1, March 2018 <evaluation sensitive document>
11. PulseSecure PPS Test Plan, Version 1.1, March 2018 <evaluation sensitive document>