TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2020-2
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Certification Report
MSP V1.0
Sponsor and developer: HiSilicon
Huawei Industrial Base
Bantian, Longgang
Shenzhen 518129
People's Republic of China
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0138342-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0138342
Author(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: 20 August 2020
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the MSP
V1.0. The developer of the MSP V1.0 is HiSilicon located in Shenzen, China and they also act as the
sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular
requirements.
The TOE is an independent subsystem that is integrated in a system-on-chip (SoC) running closed
security software. The TOE enables system services in mobile phones that require security protection
services such as secure storage for TAs, an anti-rollback counter storage function, a root of trust
function, with key management and cryptographic services, weaver authentication mechanism for
mobile user authentication, storing files encrypted under different class keys, supporting functionality
for biometric authentication (does not include the biometric authentication itself), and functions for PSA
services.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 20 August 2020 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the MSP V1.0, the security requirements, and the
level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security
requirements. Consumers of the MSP V1.0 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the MSP V1.0 from HiSilicon located in Shenzen,
China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery item type Identifier Version
Hardware MSP_HW V100
Firmware
Bootrom V100
UpdateOS V100
Test-software TestOS V100
Software
SEE V100R001
Secure Storage SA V100R001
Anti-rollback SA V100R001
Root of Trust SA V100R001
Weaver authentication SA V100R001
File encryption SA V100R001
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the MSP V1.0. Details
can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.4.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE enables system services in mobile phones that require security protection services such as:
 Secure Storage SA Service: secure storage for TAs.
 Anti-Rollback SA Service: anti-rollback counter storage function.
 Root of Trust SA Service: root of trust function, with key management and cryptographic
services.
 Weaver Authentication SA Service: weaver authentication mechanism for mobile user
authentication.
 File Encryption SA Service: storing files encrypted under different class keys.
 Biometric Authentication Supporting service for TSA: supporting functionality for biometric
authentication (does not include the biometric authentication itself).
 Security functions for PSA services.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
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security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 4.1 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the [ST] clearly states that the biometric authentication supporting function is not an
implementation of the biometric authentication, and that the TOE must be used with a secure flash
component in accordance to OE.Secure-Component.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is an independent subsystem that is integrated in a system-on-chip (SoC) running closed
security software.
The logical architecture of the TOE is as follows (picture from the [ST]):
The TOE has the following features:
 Cryptographic support and random number generation
 Physical protection against non-invasive, semi-invasive, and invasive physical attacks
 Security update and boot
 Secure storage
 SA management
 Secure runtime
 Security services:
o Secure storage SA
o Anti-rollback SA
o Root of Trust SA
o Weaver Authentication SA
o File Encryption SA
o Biometric Authentication Supporting Service for TSA
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
MSP V1.0 on Kirin 9000 Series Preparative Procedures for User V10, dated 2020-07-30
MSP V1.0 on Kirin 9000 Series Preparative Procedures for
Operational User Guidance
V10, dated 2020-07-29
MSP V1.0 IPC Command User Guidance V01, dated 2020-07-22
Secure Flash User Guidance V01, dated 2019-08-23
SA Development User Guidance V02, dated 2020-05-20
Manufacture User Guidance V01, dated 2020-07-29
2.6 IT Product Testing
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The evaluators examined the developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the
developer has met their testing responsibilities.
For the hardware parts of the TOE, the developer performed three categories of testing: simulation,
lab testing, and production testing. These test categories are combined to achieve a good coverage
and depth of testing, both on the design of the hardware parts of the TOE and on each of the
manufactured ICs.
For the software parts of the TOE, the developer performed four categories of testing: unit tests,
system tests, SA-based system tests, and fuzzing tests. These categories were applied to (specific
parts of) the TOE to achieve a good coverage and depth of testing, based on both the new
functionality of the TOE as well as the experience and knowledge gained during previous projects
incorporating existing functionality. The tests were executed using an automated framework.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment on location. The evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well
as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
Penetration testing was performed in accordance with the AVA_VAN level. The penetration test
results confirm that the TOE, in its intended environment, is resistant to the attackers at AVA_VAN
level.
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
 When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
 For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in
JIL document “Application of attack potential”.
 All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes
and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these
potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed by
penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The detailed testing effort is documented in the [ETR]. The total test effort was approximately 21
weeks for the penetration tests, which does not include the verification testing performed on the
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software of approximately 8 weeks to assess whether the logical vulnerabilities were sufficiently
addressed.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The TOE was tested in its evaluated configuration and as open sample (with a test OS providing
triggers and specific operations, and with additional hardware debug features enabled).
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
There is no re-use of evaluation results in this certification.
There has been re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the production of the TOE, by use
of 5 site certificates.
Five sites have been visited as part of this evaluation and STARs have been generated. As part of this
product evaluation, the STARs listed in the bibliography ([STAR-Xi’an], [STAR-WanGuo], [STAR-
Shenzhen], [STAR-Shanghai], and [STAR-TSMC18]) are issued.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR] and Site Technical Audit Reports
2
for the sites ([STAR-Xi’an], [STAR-WanGuo], [STAR-Shenzhen], [STAR-Shanghai], and [STAR-
TSMC18]) which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the MSP V1.0, to be CC Part 2
extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 5 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
2
The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and certification
body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. In order to be protected against attackers with a "high attack
potential", appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be
used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
CA Client Application
DDR Double Data Rate
IPC Inter-Process Communication
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MSP Mobile Security Processor
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OTP One-Time Programmable
PP Protection Profile
PSA Platform security application
REE Rich Execution Environment
SA Security application
SEE Secure Execution Environment
SoC System on Chip
TA Trusted Application
TEE Trusted Execution Environment
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSA Third party security application
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “MSP V1.0” – EAL5+ , 20-RPT-462, version 4.0, 13
August 2020.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[ST] MSP V1.0 on Kirin 9000 Series Security Target, V12, 2020-08-10.
[STAR-Xi’an] Site Technical Audit Report Huawei Xi'an Site v1.0, 20-RPT-699, v1.0
[STAR-WanGuo] Site Technical Audit Report Huawei Shanghai DFWG Site v1.0, 20-RPT-697, v1.0
[STAR-Shenzhen] Site Technical Audit Report Huawei Shenzhen Site v1.0, 20-RPT-696, v1.0
[STAR-Shanghai] Site Technical Audit Report Huawei Shanghai Data Center v1.0, 20-RPT-698, v1.0
[STAR-TSMC18] Site Technical Audit Report TSMC Fab18 Site v1.0, 20-RPT-700, v1.0
(This is the end of this report).