BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018
for
Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based
on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option
from
cv cryptovision GmbH
sponsored by
Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G+D BDR
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018 (*)
Security IC with MRTD BAC Application
Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents
based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option
from cv cryptovision GmbH
sponsored by Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G+D BDR
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25
March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 18 December 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreemen
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................19
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................19
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................19
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................24
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110
for Official Use with BAC option has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1090-2018. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-1090-2018 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card
applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-
03110 for Official Use with BAC option was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH.
The evaluation was completed on 14 December 2018. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is
an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Veridos GmbH - Identity
Solutions by G+D BDR.
The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18
December 2018 is valid until 17 December 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110
for Official Use with BAC option has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The composite TOE is named Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java
Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on
BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option and short named “ePasslet3.0/MRTD-
BAC”. It consists of an applet configuration ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC provided by the
Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite used for electronic travel documents
providing BAC (Basic Access Control), the according guidance documents [10], [11] and
[12], the underlying operating system and the hardware platform with the crypto library.
There is only one certified configuration of the TOE.
The platform comprises the certified integrated circuit Infineon M5073 G11 [13] (certificate
ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015-RA-01) and the certified Java Card operating system
SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3 [14] (certificate ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01) including the
crypto library. The IC provides an interface for contact-based communication and hardware
for contactless communication.
The MRTD contains physically visible data including but not limited to personal data of the
holder as, biographical data, the printed data in the MRZ (Machine Readable Zone) and
the printed portrait. Further, the MRTD contains digital personal data of the MRTD holder,
i.e. the digital MRZ, the digitized portrait, the biometric reference of fingers or iris images,
the document security object and other data according to the LDS (Logical Data
Structure).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic
Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [8].
Please note that in consistency to the claimed protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 the
security mechanism Basic Access Control is in the focus of this evaluation process. The
further security mechanisms Password Authenticated Connection Establishment,
Extended Access Control and Active Authentication are subject of the separate evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-1090-2018.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.2. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF_Access Access Control
TSF_Admin Administration
TSF_Secret Secret key management
TSF_Crypto Cryptographic operations
TSF_SecureMessaging Secure Messaging
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF_Auth Authentication protocols
TSF_Integrity Integrity protection
TSF_OS Java Card OS Security Functionalities
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8 of this
report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for
Official Use with BAC option
As the TOE is an application on top of a composite TOE (certified Java Card OS) there are
deliveries from the application developer to the OS manufacturer (Table 2) and deliveries
to the customer (Table 3).
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables to the OS developer (G+D):
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1. SW Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite 3.0 Delivery from cryptovision
(developer) to G+D
(manufacturer):
The applet and the guidance
documents are delivered by
encrypted e-mail. Thereby
the PGP/GPG encryption
with an at least 2048 bit
asymmetric key and AES 256
2. DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card applet configuration providing an
ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access
Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access Control
(BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC)
Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE) [11]
3.0.5
3. DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID
Documents applications Guidance Manual [10]
3.0.11
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
is used to preserve
confidentiality and integrity.
4. DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card applet configuration providing an
ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access
Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access Control
(BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC)
Preparation Guidance (AGD_PRE) [12]
3.0.12
Table 2: TOE Deliverables from application developer to OS developer
In addition to the above mentioned methods of delivery and the according security
mechanism, the correctness of delivery is proven with a hash over the received decrypted
applet, which is sent back to the developer. The developer then compares the received
hash value with the hash value of the delivered applet. Furthermore, samples are provided
by the manufacturer to the developer for functional testing to verify the correct functionality
of the composite TOE.
The following TOE deliverables are provided to the customer:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1. HW+SW Veridos eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision
ePasslet Suite on platform SmartCafé
Expert 7.0 C3
3.0 The delivery process is
included in the evaluation of
the underlying smartcard OS.
The TOE is already protected
by the OS. The delivery is
performed with sealed boxes
by courier.
2. DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing an ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with
Basic Access Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control (SAC)
Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE) [11]
3.0.5 The delivery process is
included in the evaluation of
the underlying smartcard OS.
Signed and encrypted Email
delivery using PGP RSA
2048bit is used.
3. DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card Applet Suite providing
Electronic ID Documents applications
Guidance Manual [10]
3.0.11
4. DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing an ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with
Basic Access Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control (SAC)
Preparation Guidance (AGD_PRE) [12]
3.0.12
5. DOC Preparative Procedures Sm@rtCafé®
Expert 7.0 C3 [15]
3.6
6. DOC Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé®
Expert 7.0 C3 [16]
5.2
Table 3: TOE deliverables to the customer
The TOE can be identified in accordance with the described processes in [6] and [12],
chapter 2.5.3. After the delivery the TOE can be identified by the command response
sequence as outlined in [6], chapter 1.3.2.1 and [12], chapter 2.5.3, verifying the
configuration and the life cycle of the underlying platform OS, as well as the CPLC-Data.
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After instantiation of the applet it can be selected and the version of the applet can be
verified, as well as the internal version number, see [12], chapter 2.5.3.
The composite TOE consists of the underlying hardware platform, the SmartCafé Expert
7.0 C3 operating system including the crypto library and the Veridos eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite in applet configuration “ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC”. First, the
generated applet suite and the guidance are delivered by encrypted e-mail from the
development to the production site. Either the SmartCafé Expert operating system with the
applet is integrated into the ordered IC by the IC manufacturer, or the smartcard
embedded software developer, here G+D, loads the SW part with the flash loader.
Afterwards the composite TOE is delivered in the sense of Common Criteria. Thereby the
delivery process is the same for the composite product as the delivery process covered by
the certified SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3 composite TOE. The guidance documents [16] and
[17] of the platform outline the delivery procedure. The product is delivered within sealed
boxes by courier and is additionally secured by the operating system security
mechanisms. The TOE guidance is delivered in electronic form (encrypted and signed)
according to defined mailing procedures by G+D. The delivery in sense of CC is fully
covered by the underlying platform certification of the SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• Security Audit,
• Cryptographic Support,
• User Data Protection,
• Identification and Authentication,
• Security Management and
• Protection of the TOE Security Functions
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
6.2 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance and considered in [12],
chapter 2.4:
• OE.MRTD_Manufact,
• OE.MRTD_Delivery,
• OE.Personalisation,
• OE.Pass_Auth_Sign,
• OE.BAC_Keys,
• OE.Exam_MRTD,
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• OE.Passive_Auth_Verif,
• OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD,
• OE.APPLET,
• OE.VERIFICATION and
• OE.CODE_EVIDENCE
5. Architectural Information
The composite TOE, Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110
for Official Use with BAC option, is a Java Card applet based on a certified Java Card
platform comprising eight subsystems, listed with a short description in the following
itemization:
• Platform: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the
composite TOE, which interacts with the application in regards of control, including
the creation and selection of applet instance and the internal life cycle control.
• Operating System: Represents the operating system of the underlying G+D
platform of the composite TOE, which is used by the applications to realize the
functionality. It also comprises the underlying cryptographic library.
• Configuration Manager: Provides services for applet creation and configuration.
This subsystem is called by the platform subsystem each time an application is
instantiated.
• Event Manager: Handles events from internal subsystems and from the underlying
platform and calls other subsystems interfaces to process these events.
• Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the platform by passing
through APDU commands from the terminal to the applet. The subsystem decides if
special APDUs have to be handled by the application and ensures their execution
by the responsible applet. It also provides access controlled execution of
commands covering all applet commands.
• Secure Messaging Manager: Handles the secure channel between the application
and the terminal in accordance with the specified cryptographic mechanisms and
key sizes. The responsibility for secure messaging includes the verification of MAC,
unwrapping messages and security mechanisms for secure messaging.
• File System Manager: Provides an interface for file and object access and
management by a representation of the existing elements.
• State Manager: Handles the internal state of the application and provides update
functionality and access to the current DF, EF, KO, security environment, and the
authentication status of the terminal and the challenge.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 3 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
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Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product “ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC”
on G+D OS SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3, in the one configuration in scope of the certification.
Developer’s testing approach:
The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach:
• Tests to cover all actions defined in [18],
• Good case and bad case tests for each command defined in the document [18] and
executable on the TOE,
• Access rules tests as part of the requirements on TSF data,
• Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design.
Test results:
All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version. The
developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE operates as expected.
Evaluator’s testing approach:
The TOE consists of the ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC application installed on SmartCafé
Expert 7.0 C3 OS. The APDU tests were performed using standard PC Smartcard readers,
a standard PC, test software provided by the developer as well as evaluator’s test
software. Further, for some tests, i.e. fuzzing, B0 card readers (supporting also raw
communication) were used. The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has
been done according to the following approach:
Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation of developer testing
strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases.
Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer’s tests the tests are also
selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and related
functionality.
Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the
interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFIs have been suitably tested.
The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of testing.
Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps
were performed and described for nearly each test case.
The selection process is based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body.
Therefore, all TOE security functionality is included within the subset. All cryptographic
functionality is provided by the platform and was sufficiently tested during platform
evaluation.
Test results:
The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test the related TSFI,
and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional specification.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
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The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜViT in the
evaluator’s test environment with the evaluator’s test equipment. The samples were
provided by the sponsor and by the developer. The test samples were configured and
parametrized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. The one
configuration of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation was
tested. The overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and
the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of
enhanced basic was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined
in [6] provided that all measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
There is only one configuration of the TOE, as described in section 1 above. For all tests
the TOE is configured and parametrized, if necessary, according to the guidance
documents. The ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC TOE configuration is generated out of the applet
suite and loaded in the underlying certified OS platform SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3. The
ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC applet needs to be created according to the guidelines given in
[10] and [12].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
• AIS 1, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des
Herstellers, Version 14, 11 October 2017
• AIS 14, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical
Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 03 August 2010,
• AIS 19, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR
(Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria),
Version 9, 03 November 2014,
• AIS 26, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version
10, 03 July 2017,
• Special Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.4, 08 June
2011,
• AIS 34, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 &
v3.1) and EAL6 (CC v3.1), Version 3, 03 September 2009,
• AIS 36, Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 15 March 2017,
• AIS 37, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3,
17 May 2010,
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(see [4], AIS 26, 34, 36).
Additionally the CC Supporting Mandatory Technical Documents
• Joint Interpretation Library – Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018,
• Joint Interpretation Library – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.1, August 2015 and
• Joint Interpretation Library – Minimum Site Security Requirements, Version 2.1 (for
trial use), December 2017
are considered.
Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36). According
to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform and the
documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. [14, 15, 16, 17]), have
been applied in the TOE evaluation.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control,
Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
The evaluation was performed as a composite evaluation according to AIS 36 and
therefore relies on the platform certifications of the used IC (certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-
0951-2015) [19], [20]. This certified basis was used for SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3
(certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017) [21] Composite TOE with an ETR for Composite
Evaluation [22]. The RSA key generation was evaluated in the course of the evaluation of
the crypto library of the Java Card OS by G+D. The platform IC underwent a Re-
Assessment (certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015-RA-01) [13]. For a transparent
incorporation of updated site certificates in the SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3 software platform
a maintenance procedure resulted in BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01 [14]. This
maintenance was related to ALC only, so the assurance statement of BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-
2017 for the unchanged TOE remains valid. For compositions atop that composite TOE an
ETR for Composite Evaluation addendum was provided [23].
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table in annex C in part D of this report presents an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of
application where its specific appropriateness is stated. The strength of these
cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see
BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). All cryptographic algorithms listed in the table in annex
C in part D of this report are implemented by the TOE because of the standards building
the TOE application. For that reason, an explicit validity period is not given for this
cryptographic functionality.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 and 3 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered
by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
• All requirements and recommendations in the guidance documentation [10], [11]
and [12] shall be followed.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
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DF Dedicated File
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EF Elementary File
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KO Key Object
MAC Message Authentication Code
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Secure Messaging
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TÜViT TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
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Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018, Version 1.2, 06 December 2018, Veridos
Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use
with BAC option, cv cryptovision GmbH
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1091, Version 1, 11 December 2018, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] [PP_BAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-
CC-PP-0055-2009
[9] Configuration List for the TOE BSI-DSZ-CC-1091, 06 December 2018,
1091_MRTD_conflist-SCE.XLSX, cryptovision GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card Applet Suite providing
Electronic ID Documents applications Guidance Manual, Version 3.0.11, 06
December 2018, cryptovision GmbH
[11] Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing an ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with
Basic Access Control (BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC) Operational
Guidance (AGD_OPE), Version 3.0.5, 06 December 2018, cryptovision GmbH
[12] Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing an ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with
Basic Access Control (BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC) Preparation
Guidance (AGD_PRE), Version 3.0.12, 06 December 2018, cryptovision GmbH
[13] Assurance Continuity Reassessment Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015-RA-01,
Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008, EC
v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware) from Infineon Technologies AG, 31 May 2017,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[14] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01
SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3 from Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH, 04
October 2018, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[15] Preparative Procedures SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3, Version 3.6, 10 August 2017,
Giesecke+Devrient GmbH
[16] Operational User Guidance SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3, Version 5.2, 07 August 2017,
Giesecke+Devrient GmbH
[17] Security Target SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3, Version 2.9, 16 August 2017,
Giesecke+Devrient GmbH
[18] Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing an ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with
Basic Access Control (BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC) Functional
Specification ADV_FSP, Version 3.0.1, 12 June 2018, cryptovision GmbH
[19] Certification Report – BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 for Infineon Security Controller
M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008, EC v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01
and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from Infineon Technologies AG, 11 November 2015, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[20] ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), M5073 G11, BSI-DSZ-CC-
0951, Version 4, 18 May 2017, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
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[21] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017 for SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3 from
Veridos GmbH – Identity Solutions by G+D BDR, 08 September 2017, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[22] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation according to AIS 36 for
SmartCafé Expert 7.0 C3, Version 3, 16 August 2017, BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017,
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[23] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation Addendum for SmartCafé
Expert 7.0 C3, Version 1, 18 July 2018, BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110
for Official Use with BAC option (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 December 2018, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2 and ALC_COMP.1) are fulfilled for the
development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) cv cryptovision GmbH, Munscheidstr. 14, 45886 Gelsenkirchen, Germany,
Software Development
b) The development and production sites of the underlying software platform are
listed in [14]
c) The development and production sites of the underlying security IC platform
are listed in [19]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018
Overview of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Evaluator’s
Comments
1 Authentica
tion
Symmetric
Authentication
Mechanism based
on AES for
Personalization
Agent
AES: [FIPS197]
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO10813-3]
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAODoc] but
with AES
FCS_COP.1/AUT
H, cryptographic
primitive for
authentication
attempt of a
terminal as
Personalization
Agent by means
of the symmetric
authentication
mechanism (cf.
FIA_UAU.4)
The basic
cryptographic
function is
provided by the
Java Card OS
platform
(FCS_COP.1.1/A
ES).
2 Basic Access
Control
Authentication
Mechanism for
Basic Inspection
System
[ICAODoc] |k|=112 [ICAODoc] The basic
cryptographic
function is
provided by the
Java Card OS
platform
(FCS_COP.1.1/3
DES).
3 Key
Derivation
SHA-1, SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] – [ICAODoc] FCS_COP.1/SHA
, for Access
Control
Authentication
Mechanism (see
FIA_UAU.4) and
for Secure
Messaging for
personalization.
The basic crypto-
graphic function
is provided by the
Java Card OS
platform, the
protocol
implemented in
the applet.
(FCS_COP.1.1/H
ASH).
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Evaluator’s
Comments
4 Document Basic
Access Key
Derivation
Algorithm
normative
appendix 5 of
[ICAODoc]
– [ICAODoc] The basic
cryptographic
function is
provided by the
Java Card OS
platform, the
protocol
implemented in
the applet.
(FCS_COP.1.1/H
ASH).
5 Confidenti
ality
TDES in CBC
mode
[FIPS46-3] (DES)
[NIST800-38A]
(CBC)
|k|=112 [ICAODoc] FCS_COP.1/ENC
, cryptographic
primitive for
secure
messaging. The
keys are agreed
between the TOE
and the terminal
as part of the
Basic Access
Control
Authentication
Mechanism
according to the
FCS_CKM.1 and
FIA_UAU.4.
The
cryptographic
function is
provided by the
Java card OS
plat-form
(FCS_COP.1.1/3
DES).
6 AES in CBC mode [FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST800-38A]
(CBC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAODoc] but
with AES
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO18013-3]
Secure
Messaging for
personalization.
The
cryptographic
function is
provided by the
Java Card OS
plat-form
(FCS_COP.1.1/A
ES).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1091-2018 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Evaluator’s
Comments
7 Integrity Retail MAC [FIPS46-3] (DES),
[ISO_9797-1]
(MAC algorithm 3,
block cipher DES,
Sequence
Message Counter,
padding mode 2)
|k|=112 bit [ICAODoc] The
cryptographic
function is
provided by the
Java Card OS
platform
(FCS_COP.1.1/M
AC-DES).
8 AES CMAC [FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST800-38B]
(CMAC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAODoc] but
with AES
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO18013-3]
The
cryptographic
function is
provided by the
Java Card OS
plat-form
(FCS_COP.1.1/C
MAC-AES).
9 Trusted
Channel
Secure messaging
in ENC_MAC
mode is
established during
BAC
[ISO_9797-1]
(MAC algorithm 3,
block cipher DES,
Sequence
Message Counter,
padding mode 2)
|k|=112 [ICAODoc] FCS_COP.1.1/M
AC
The
cryptographic
function is
provided by the
Java card OS
plat-form
(FCS_COP.1.1/M
AC-DES).
10 Secure messaging
for personalization
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO18013-3]
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAODoc] but
with AES
The basic
cryptographic
function is pro-
vided by the Java
Card OS
platform. The
protocol itself is
implemented in
the applet. (cf.
Encryption and
Integrity)
11 Crypto-
graphic
primitive
Deterministic RNG
DRG.4
[AIS20] – – FCS_RND.1
The
cryptographic
function is
provided by the
Java card OS
plat-form
(FCS_RNG.1).
The internal state
of the RNG uses
a PTRNG of
class PTG.2 as a
random source
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
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For references used in Table 4 see standards as listed below:
[AIS20] AIS 20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 15 März 2013
[FIPS46-3] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed October 25, 1999, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[FIPS180-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS),
August 2015, Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and
Technology
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Announcing the ADVANCED
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), 2001-11-26, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)
[ICAODoc] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[ISO18013-3] ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009 Information technology – Personal identification - ISO-compliant
driving licence - Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, 2009
[ISO_9797-1] Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part
1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 1999-12, ISO/IEC
[NIST800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,
Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
The CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005, National Institute of Standards and
Technology
Note: End of report
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