BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016
for
TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0
Release 2/P60C144PVE
from
T-Systems International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016 (*)
TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release
2/P60C144PVE
from: T-Systems International GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart
Meter Gateway (Security Module PP) - Schutzprofil
für das Sicherheitsmodul der
Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten
Messsystems für Stoff- und Energiemengen Version
1.03, 11 December 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 18 November 2016
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11. Security Target............................................................................................................22
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................22
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................28
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this
certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including CC
part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-2015. Specific results from the evaluation process
BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-2015 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release
2/P60C144PVE was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 27 October 2016. SRC Security Research & Consulting
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: T-Systems International
GmbH.
The product was developed by: T-Systems International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18
November 2016 is valid until 17 November 2026. Validity can be re-newed by
re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to provide latest at of half of the certificate's validity period unsolicitedly and at his
own expense current qualified evidence to the Certification Body at BSI that
demonstrates that the requirements as outlined in the Security Target are up-to-date
and remain valid in view of the respective status of technology. In general, this
evidence is provided in the form of a re-assessment report according to the rules of
the BSI Certification Scheme.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
T-Systems International GmbH
Untere Industriestraße 20
57250 Netphen
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version
1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE developed by T-Systems International GmbH. The TOE is a
Smart Meter Security Module according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03109-2 [18]
intended to be used by a Smart Meter Gateway in a Smart Metering System. The TOE
serves as cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway and supports the
Smart Meter Gateway for its specific cryptographic needs. These cryptographic services
that are invoked by the Smart Meter Gateway for its operation in a Smart Metering System
cover the following issues:
● Digital Signature Generation,
● Digital Signature Verification,
● Key Agreement for TLS,
● Key Agreement for Content Data Encryption,
● Key Pair Generation,
● Random Number Generation,
● Component Authentication via the PACE Protocol with Negotiation of Session Keys,
● Secure Messaging, and
● Secure Storage of Key Material and further data relevant for the Gateway.
The TOE comprises
● the circuitry of the contact-based chip including all IC Dedicated Software being active in
the Integration Phase and Operational Phase of the TOE (the integrated circuit, IC),
● the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
● the IC Application Software (file system including the Smart Meter application), and
● the associated guidance documentation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security Module PP)
- Schutzprofil für das Sicherheitsmodul der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten
Messsystems für Stoff- und Energiemengen Version 1.03, 11 December 2014,
BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Digital Signature Generation The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
generates digital signatures based on elliptic curve
cryptography for different purposes (commands PSO
COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE, INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE).
Digital Signature Verification The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
verifies digital signatures based on elliptic curve cryptography
for different purposes (commands PSO VERIFY DIGITAL
SIGNATURE, EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, PSO VERIFY
CERTIFICATE).
Key Agreement for TLS The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
supports the cryptographic protocol ECKA-DH up to the
generation of the shared secret value (command GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE / variant ECKA-DH).
Hint: The key derivation function is not part of the TOE's
functionality and has to be realised by the external world (here:
Smart Meter Gateway). The session keys derived from the
shared secret value by the key derivation function are used in
the framework of the so-called TLS handshake.
Key Agreement for Content Data
Encryption
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
supports the cryptographic protocol ECKA-EG up to the
generation of the shared secret value (command GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE / variant ECKA-EG).
Hint: The key derivation function is not part of the TOE's
functionality and has to be realised by the external world (here:
Smart Meter Gateway). The session keys derived from the
shared secret value by the key derivation function are used in
the framework of content data encryption.
Key Pair Generation The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
generates asymmetric key pairs based on elliptic curve
cryptography for different purposes (keys for signature, TLS,
content data encryption).
Random Number Generation The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
generates random numbers by providing a deterministic
random number generator of class DRG.4 (command GET
CHALLENGE). Furthermore, the TOE generates random
values for internal purpose and the purpose of key generation.
Component Authentication via the PACE
Protocol with Negotiation of Session
Keys
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) implements the PACE
protocol (command GENERAL AUTHENTICATE / variant
PACE). The protocol provides component authentication
between the TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) and the
external world (here: Smart Meter Gateway) and includes the
negotiation of session keys that will be used afterwards for
Secure Messaging between these two components.
Secure Messaging The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) provides Secure
Messaging according to ISO 7816-4 based on AES for
securing the data transfer between the TOE (Smart Meter
Security Module) and the external world (here: Smart Meter
Gateway) for confidentiality and integrity.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Hint: The session keys used for Secure Messaging are
negotiated in the framework of the PACE protocol between the
TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) and the external world
(here: Smart Meter Gateway).
Secure Storage of Key Material and
further data relevant for the Gateway
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as device for
secure storage of keys and further data relevant for the
external world (here: Smart Meter Gateway).
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) provides mechanisms
for the access control to User Data stored in and processed by
the TOE. Furthermore, the TOE (Smart Meter Security Module)
provides mechanisms for the management and access to the
TSF and TSF Data.
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) provides security
mechanisms serving for the accuracy and reliability of the TOE
security functionality. This includes in particular self-protection,
secure failure status and resistance against side channel and
fault injection attacks.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1 and 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60C144PVE including its IC
Dedicated Software
(refer to the Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0978-2016 [11])
P60C144PVE
ROM Mask:
SmartMeter01BB_ID1.4
_ROM_Daten_01.hex
HN1: SMD Package
HVQFN32 (SOT617-3) on
multiple tray
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
2 SW IC Embedded Software (TCOS
operating system)
TCOS Smart Meter
Security Module
Version 1.0 Release 2
OS Version: '01 BB'
Completion Code
Version: '01'
(refer to Table 3)
Implemented in
ROM/EEPROM of the IC
3 SW IC Application Software (file system
including the Smart Meter
application)
FSV01
File System Version:
'01'
(refer to Table 3)
Implemented in EEPROM
of the IC
4 DOC Operational Guidance for users and
administrators, Guidance
Documentation of TCOS Smart
Meter Security Module Version 1.0
Release 2 [10]
Version 1.4 Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
5 DATA Text file with FORMAT-command
APDUs (for opening of Phase 5 of
the TOE's life cycle model)
--- Text file in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
6 DATA Authentication Key
(customer-specific)
--- Text file in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The customer-specific ROM mask for the TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0
Release 2/P60C144PVE is labelled by NXP as A8003SMHN1/9E34. The name of the
ROM file transferred from T-Systems International GmbH to NXP is
SmartMeter01BB_ID1.4_ROM_Daten_01.hex.
The commercial numbering of the TOE by NXP is as follows:
● Application: SmartMeter_01BB_ID1.4
● Final Product: A8003SMHN1/9E34AF
● 12NC: 9353 383 21157
The certified file system for the TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release
2/P60C144PVE has the version '01'.
According to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.4 the life cycle model of the TOE consists
of the following 6 phases: Phase 1: Security Module Embedded Software Development /
Phase 2: IC Development / Phase 3: IC Manufacturing, Packaging and Testing / Phase 4:
Security Module Product Finishing Process / Phase 5: Security Module Integration
(Integration Phase) / Phase 6: Security Module End-Usage (Operational Phase).
The TOE delivery takes place after Phase 4 so that the evaluation process is limited to
Phases 1 to 4. The TOE is delivered from NXP to the Integrator who is responsible for the
integration of the TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) and the Smart Meter Gateway and
loading of initial key and certificate material into the TOE in the framework of the
integration of the TOE in Phase 5. The TOE is as well delivered to the developers of Smart
Meter Gateways in order to support their implementation activities.
In order to verify that the user uses a certified TOE, the TOE can be identified using the
means described in the user guidance [10], chapters 8.3.30 and 8.4.1.1. The TOE can be
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identified by using the command FORMAT (only in Phase 5 of the TOE's life cycle model)
respective the command GET CARD INFO (in Phase 5 and 6 of the TOE's life cycle
model). Via the command FORMAT (P1 P2 = '00 00') respective the command GET CARD
INFO (P1 P2 = '06 00') the user can read out the chip information and identify the
underlying chip as well as the TCOS operating system and initialised file system installed
in the chip. To open the integration phase (Phase 5 of the TOE's life cycle model) a mutual
authentication via the command FORMAT as described in the user guidance [10], chapter
8.4.1.3 is necessary, therefore the authenticity of the TOE is verified before further usage
of the TOE.
The following identification data can be retrieved within a 16 byte string responded by the
commands FORMAT respective GET CARD INFO:
Byte Product information Value
1 Indicator of the chip manufacturer according to ISO 7816-6 '04'
2 Chip type (type ID of the chip manufacturer) '14'
3 - 8 Unique identification number for the chip -
9 Card type '10'
10 -11 Operating system version (ROM mask version) '01 BB'
12 Version of the pre-completion code / completion code for finalizing
the operating system
'01'
13 File system version '01'
14 '00' (RFU) -
15 '00' (RFU) -
16 Authentication key identifier '11'
Table 3: TOE identification data
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The Security Policy of the TOE as
a Smart Meter Security Module consisting of an underlying contact-based IC and an
operating system and (initial) file system according to TR-03109-2 [18] and to the TOE
user guidance [10] is to provide secure cryptographic functionalities and related key
management functions for usage by the Smart Meter Gateway and its Gateway
Administrator. The TOE serves as a cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter
Gateway with provisioning of overall system security in view of Smart Meter Gateway
needs.
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data stored and operated on the module when used as part of the Smart Meter Gateway in
a hostile environment. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and
data stored in its memories and the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for
configuration and memory access and for integrity, the correct operation and the
confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE's overall
policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage, physical manipulation and probing.
Besides, the TOE's life cycle is supported as well as the user Identification whereas the
abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore, specific cryptographic services including
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016 Certification Report
random number generation and key management functionality are being provided to be
securely used by the TOE embedded software.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Integration: Integration phase of the Gateway and TOE
● OE.OperationalPhase: Operational phase of the integrated Gateway
● OE.Administration: Administration of the TOE
● OE.TrustedAdmin: Trustworthiness of the Gateway Administrator
● OE.PhysicalProtection: Physical protection of the TOE
● OE.KeyAgreementDH: DH key agreement
● OE.KeyAgreementEG: ElGamal key agreement
● OE.PACE: PACE
● OE.TrustedChannel: Trusted channel
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2 respective in the PP [7], chapter
4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is set up as a composite product. It is composed from the Integrated Circuit (IC)
P60C144PVE from NXP, the IC Embedded Software consisting of the TCOS operating
system and the IC Application Software comprising a specific file system developed by
T-Systems International GmbH.
For details concerning the CC evaluation of the underlying IC see the evaluation
documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0978-2016 [11].
According to the TOE design the Security Functions of the TOE as listed in chapter 1 are
enforced and implemented by the following subsystems:
● Hardware: Underlying IC including its IC Dedicated Software.
● Kernel: Manages the interfaces between all components.
● Crypt Component: Processes the cryptographic functions.
● Admin Component: Processes administrative base functions. Contains as well the
TOE's file system.
● IO Component: Controls the input and output.
● ROM TCOS-Type Task: APDU processing (system, applications).
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with simulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by APDU command sequences, the
evaluators performed these tests with real samples. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.
Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions
where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing.
During their independent testing, the evaluators covered
● testing APDU commands related to Key Management and Crypto Functions,
● testing APDU commands related to NVM Management and File System,
● testing APDU commands related to Security Management,
● testing APDU commands related to Secure Messaging,
● penetration testing related to the verification of the Reliability of the TOE,
● source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
● side channel analysis for ECC (including ECC key generation) and hash calculation,
● fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
● testing APDU commands for the Integration Phase and Operational Phase (including
personalisation and end-usage of the TOE),
● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms,
● fuzzy testing on APDU processing.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE as outlined in the Security
Target [6]:
TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE
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There is only one configuration of the TOE.
The TOE is installed on a contact-based chip of type P60C144PVE from NXP. The
underlying IC is certified under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0978-2016 (refer to [11]).
The TOE does not use the cryptographic software libraries of the hardware platform, but
provides its cryptographic services by the crypto library developed by T-Systems
International GmbH.
The TOE is delivered as already initialised module, i.e. the chip contains the complete IC
Embedded Software (TCOS operating system) and IC Application Software (file system
including the Smart Meter application) and is embedded into a module of type HVQFN32.
The user can identify the certified TOE by the TOE response to specific APDU commands,
more detailed by using the command FORMAT (only in Phase 5 of the TOE's life cycle
model) respective the command GET CARD INFO (in Phase 5 and 6 of the TOE's life
cycle model) according to the user guidance [10], chapters 8.3.30 and 8.4.1.1. See
chapter 2 for details.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the document ETR for Composition from the platform evaluation (i.e.
on hardware [11] and [13]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (see AIS 26)
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36
(see [4]) were used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretation AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the Certification Body for approval subsequently.
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As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report).
● The component AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-2015, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on penetration testing
of the implemented crypto functionality.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway
(Security Module PP) - Schutzprofil für das Sicherheitsmodul der
Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems für Stoff- und
Energiemengen Version 1.03, 11 December 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
Additionally, the requirements of the Technical Guideline TR-03109-2 [18] are met. This is
part of the qualification of the TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release
2/P60C144PVE intended to be used by Smart Meter Gateways in the Smart Metering
System.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy8
:
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authenticity ECDSA-signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
ANSI X9.63
(ECDSA),
FIPS 180-2
(SHA),
TR-03111, chap.
4.2
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves
P-{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_COP.1/IMP
import of keys
2 Authentication ECDSA-signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
ANSI X9.63
(ECDSA),
FIPS 180-2
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
external
authentication
8
For references to crypto standards please refer to TR-03109-3 [19] respective TR-03116-3 [20].
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# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
512} (SHA),
TR-03111, chap.
4.2
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves
P-{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186
(Gateway
Administrator)
3 Authenticated
Key
Agreement
PACE-KA with
SHA-{1, 224,
256}
TR-03110-2,
chap. 3.2
(PACEv2)
|Nonce| = 128 bit TR-03110-2,
TR-03116-2,
chap. 3.2,
4.2
FCS_CKM.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1/GWA,
FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5
4 Confidentiality AES in CBC
mode
FIPS 197 (AES),
SP800-38A
(CBC)
|k| = 128, 192,
256,
|challenge|=64
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.1
FCS_COP.1/PACE-
ENC
FCS_CKM.1/PACE
5 Integrity AES in CMAC
mode
FIPS 197 (AES),
SP800-38B
(CMAC)
|k| = 128, 192,
256
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.1
FCS_COP.1/PACE-
MAC
6 Trusted
Channel
Secure
messaging in
ENC_MAC mode
(established
during PACEv2)
ISO 7816-4
TR-03110-2,
chap. 3.2
(PACEv2)
TR-03110-2,
TR-03116-2,
chap. 3.2,
4.2
FTP_ITC.1
trusted channel
between the TOE
and the Smart
Meter Gateway
7 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
verification /
generation
without Hash
TR-03111, chap.
4.2
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves
P-{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_COP.1/VER-
ECDSA
FCS_COP.1/SIG-
ECDSA
Deterministic
RNG
DRG.4
AIS 20 n.a. TR-03116-3,
chap. 1.3.3,
8.3, 8.4
FCS_RNG.1
ECKA-DH TR-03111 (EC
Diffie-Hellman)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves
P-{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-
DH
used by the Smart
Meter Gateway for
TLS handshake
ECKA-EG TR-03111 (EC
ElGamal)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-
EG
used by the Smart
Meter Gateway for
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# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves
P-{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186
content data
encryption
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
All cryptographic algorithms listed in table 4 are implemented by the TOE on the base of
the Technical Guidelines TR-03109-2 [18], TR-03109-3 [19] and TR-03116-3 [20]. For that
reason an explicit validity period is not given.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to the Technical Guidelines
TR-03109-3 [19] and TR-03116-3 [20], the algorithms are suitable for securing integrity,
authenticity and confidentiality of the data stored in and processed by the TOE as a Smart
Meter Security Module that is intended to be used by the Smart Meter Gateway in the
Smart Metering System. For the validity period of each algorithm refer to the Technical
Guideline TR-03116-3 [20].
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
In addition, the following requirements need to be fulfilled when using the TOE's
cryptographic functionality: Refer to the user guidance [10], chapter 9.3.1.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
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APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-based MAC
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECKA Elliptic Curve Key Agreement
ECKA-DH Elliptic Curve Key Agreement - Diffie-Hellman
ECKA-EG Elliptic Curve Key Agreement - ElGamal
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ID Identifier
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KA Key Agreement
MAC Message Authentication Code
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RFU Reserved for Future Use
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016, Specification of the Security Target
TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE, Version
1.0.2/20161026, 26 October 2016, T-Systems International GmbH
[7] Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security
Module PP) - Schutzprofil für das Sicherheitsmodul der Kommunikationseinheit
eines intelligenten Messsystems für Stoff- und Energiemengen Version 1.03, 11
December 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016, TCOS Smart Meter
Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE, Version 1.2, 27 October
2016, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
9
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[9] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016, Konfigurationsliste von TCOS Smart
Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE, Version 1.3, 25
October 2016, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Guidance Documentation BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016, Operational Guidance for
users and administrators, Guidance Documentation of TCOS Smart Meter Security
Module Version 1.0 Release 2, Version 1.4, 12 September 2016, T-Systems
International GmbH
[11] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0978-2016 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60x144/080yVA/yVA(Y/B/X)/yVE with IC Dedicated Software, 5 February 2016,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[12] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0978, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60x144/080yVA/yVA(Y/B/X)/yVE, Version 2.61, 14 October 2015, NXP
Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[13] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60x144/080yVA/yVA(Y/B/X)/yVE, BSI-DSZ-CC-0978, Version 2, 17
December 2015, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[14] Product Data Sheet, SmartMX2 family P60x080/144 VA/VE, Secure high
performance smart card controller, Release 5.4, 14 August 2015, NXP
Semiconductors
[15] Instruction Set for the SmartMX2 family, Secure smart card controller, Release 3.1,
2 February 2012, NXP Semiconductors
[16] Information on Guidance and Operation, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60x080/144P VA/VE, Release 2.7, 12 November 2015, NXP Semiconductors
[17] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1: Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an
die Interoperabilität der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems,
Version 1.0, 2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[18] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-2: Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an
die Funktionalität und Interoperabilität des Sicherheitsmoduls, Version 1.1, 2014,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[19] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben für die
Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsystemen, Version 1.1, 2014, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[20] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung – Teil 3: Intelligente Messsysteme, April 2016, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE
(Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for
the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 November 2016, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) T-Systems International GmbH, Untere Industriestraße 20, 57250 Netphen
(development and test).
b) For development and production sites regarding the platform and wafer
initialisation please refer to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0978-2016
([11]).
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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