ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
NXP ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84 in SSCD Configuration
Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 Security Target Lite
Document information
Info Content
Keywords Common Criteria, ASE, Security Target Lite, Lynx CNS, SSCD
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 20164. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 2 of 58
Contact information
For more information, please visit: http://www.nxp.com
Revision history
Rev Date Description
1.0 20160428 Release, redacted version of Security Target
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 3 of 58
1. Introduction
1.1 ST Identification
Table 1. Security Target Identification
ST Title NXP ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84 in SSCD Configuration
on
NXP P60D080PVG Dual Interface Microcontroller
Authors NXP Semiconductors
Status Release
ST Reference STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01
Version Rev. 1.0
Date 28th April 2016
Common
Criteria
CC version 3.1
[1] Part 1: CCMB 2012-09-001 revision 4
[2] Part 2: CCMB 2012-09-002 revision 4
[3] Part 3: CCMB 2012-09-003 revision 4
PP Claim [4] Protection profiles for Secure Signature Creation Device —
Part 2: Device with key generation
Version: 2.0.1, EAL 4+
Identification: BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01
[5] Protection profiles for Secure Signature Creation Device —
Part 3: Device with key import
Version: 1.0.2, EAL 4+
Identification: BSI-CC-PP-0075
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 4 of 58
1.2 TOE Identification
Table 2. TOE Identification
Title NXP ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84 in SSCD Configuration on NXP
P60D080PVG Dual Interface Microcontroller
TOE Reference IC Platform
ID NXP P60D080PVG
Rev G
Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014 (October 24 2014)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014-MA-01 (June 15 2015)
Assurance EAL 6+
Firmware - Crypto Library
ID Crypto Library V1.0 on P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG
Rev 1.0
Certificate NSCIB-CC-12-36243-CR2
Assurance EAL 6+
Application
ID ASEPCOS-CNS
Version 1.84
ROM Mask ASEPCOS-CNS_V1.84_b001
1.3 Composite TOE
In this Security Target, the name of the composite TOE developer will be referenced as
NXP.
ASEPCOS-CNS native platform is embedded on NXP P60D080PVG Integrated Circuit.
The composition analysis conducted in this section will use the words Platform to
designate the NXP P60D080PVG IC [8] & [9], Application to designate the ASEPCOS-
CNS software, and Composite Product to designate the TOE.
According to the Composite product documentation [7], the different roles considered in
the composition activities are associated as follows:
Table 3. Composition Role Allocation
Role Identity
Platform Developer NXP
Platform Evaluator TUV-IT
Platform Certification Body BSI
Application Developer NXP
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 5 of 58
Role Identity
Composite Product Integrator NXP
Composite Product Evaluator Thales
Composite Product Certification Body ANSSI
Composite Product evaluation Sponsor NXP
The platform IC was evaluated to CC EAL 6+ according to BSI-PP-0035-2007 [6] (see
Security Target [11], the IC certification report [10-1] and its maintenance report [10-2]).
Integration of the composite product by the IC manufacturer is guided by delivery
procedures enforced by NXP.
1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE implements a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) in accordance with
the European Directive 1999/93/EC [12] as a smart card which allows the generation and
importation of signature creation data (SCD) and the creation of qualified electronic
signatures. The TOE protects the SCD and ensures that only an authorized Signatory
can use it.
ASEPCOS is a multi-application ISO-7816 compatible smartcard product, which supports
RSA cryptography up to 2048 bits.
The TOE meets all the following requirements as defined in the European Directive
(article 2.2):
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent
change of the data is detectable
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 6 of 58
2. Target of Evaluation
The TOE for this security target, specified in European standards prEN 14169-2 and
prEN 14169-3 for Secure Signature Creation Devices with Key Generation and Key
import respectively is a combination of hardware and software configured to securely
create, use and manage signature-creation data (SCD). The SSCD protects the SCD
during its whole life cycle as to be used in a signature-creation process solely by its
signatory.
NOTE: In this clause the term TOE is used as reference to the target of evaluation for the
protection profiles (PP0059 [4] and PP0075 [5]) specified in the European standard prEN
14169. The term SSCD is used to refer to a product that incorporates the TOE.
The TOE comprises all IT security functionality necessary to ensure the secrecy of the
SCD and the security of the digital signature.
2.1 Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)
An SSCD provides the following functions:
- to generate or import signature-creation data (SCD) and the correspondent
signature-verification data (SVD),
- to export the SVD for certification if this has been created by the device and
optionally receive and
- store certificate info,
- to initialize user authentication data (RAD),
- to switch the SSCD from a non-operational state to an operational state, and
- if in an operational state, to create digital signatures for data with the following
steps:
(a) select an SCD if multiple are present in the SSCD,
(b) receive data to be signed or a unique representation thereof
(DTBS/R)
(c) authenticate the signatory and determine its intent to sign,
(d) apply an appropriate cryptographic signature-creation function using
the selected SCD to the DTBS/R.
An SSCD shall only be switched to an operational state if it is properly prepared for the
signatory's use and sole control by
— generating at least one SCD/SVD pair, and
— personalising for the signatory by storing in the TOE:
(a) the signatory’s reference authentication data (RAD)
(b) optionally, certificate info for at least one SCD in the TOE.
Upon receiving an SSCD the signatory shall verify that any SCD it contains is in a non-
operational state.
If so configured an SSCD may provide management functions for key generation or
import initiated by the user as specified in 2.1.1.2.
2.1.1 Additional Functions
2.1.1.1 User Authentication
An SSCD may provide functions to enable the user to
(1) Unblock the RAD,
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 7 of 58
(2) Change the value of the RAD,
(3) Add or modify user information to be included in signatory identification data in
a SVD certificate.
2.1.1.2 User Management of Signing Key
An SSCD may provide functions to enable the user to
(1) Install an SCD, generated outside the device in a trusted environment and
communicated over a secure communication link 2.1.1.3(2)
(2) Generate an SCD,
(3) Disabling an SCD it holds, e.g. by erasing it from memory,
(4) Create, extend or modify certificate info stored in the device, and
(5) Create SVD for an SCD stored and export it for certification by a certificate
generating application protected by trusted communication (2.1.1.3 (1)).
2.1.1.3 Secure Communication
An SSCD may provide functions to establish a trusted, cryptographically protected
communication with
(1) A certificate-generation application,
(2) An SVD-generating application, and
(3) A signature-creation application.
The supported function may include functions for management of the cryptographic keys,
parameters and configuration used to establish the trusted communication.
2.2 SSCD Product Lifecycle
The life cycle of a generic SSCD product is given here, in Fig 1, to introduce the role of
the SSCD Provisioning service. The SSCD Life-cycle distinguishes stages for
development, production, preparation and operational use. Development and production
of the SSCD together constitute the development phase of the TOE. The development
phase is subject of CC evaluation according to the assurance life cycle (ALC) class. The
development phase ends with the delivery of the TOE to an SSCD-provisioning service
provider. The functional integrity of the TOE shall be protected in delivering it to an
SSCD-provisioning service provider.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 8 of 58
Fig 1. SSCD Product Life-Cycle
2.2.1 SSCD Preparation Stage
An SSCD-provisioning service provider having accepted it from a manufacturer prepares
the TOE for use and delivers it to its legitimate user. The preparation phase ends when
the legitimate user of the TOE, having received it from an SSCD provisioning service
enables an SCD it holds for use in signing.
During preparation of the TOE, an SSCD-provisioning service provider performs the
following tasks:
- Obtain information on the intended recipient of the device as required for the
preparation process and for identification as a legitimate user of the TOE;
- Generate a PIN and/or obtain a biometric sample of the legitimate user, store
this data as RAD in the TOE and prepare information about the VAD for delivery
to the legitimate user;
- Generate a certificate for at least one SCD either by:
(a) The TOE generating an SCD/SVD pair and obtaining a certificate for the
SVD exported from the TOE, or
(b) Initializing security functions in the TOE for protected export of the SVD and
obtaining a certificate for the SVD after receiving it from the TOE;
- Optionally, present certificate info to the SSCD;
- Deliver the TOE and the accompanying VAD info to the legitimate user.
The SVD certification task (third list item above) of an SSCD-provisioning service provider
as specified in this PP may support a centralised, pre-issuing key generation process, with
at least one key generated and certified, before delivery to the legitimate user.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 9 of 58
Alternatively, or additionally, that task may support key generation by the signatory after
delivery and outside the secure preparation environment. A TOE may support both key
generation processes, for example with a first key generated centrally and additional keys
generated by the signatory in the operational use stage.
Data required for inclusion in the SVD certificate at least includes (The Directive:Annex II):
- The SVD;
- The name of the signatory either:
(a) A legal name, or
(b) A pseudonym together with an indication of this fact.
The data included in the certificate may have been stored in the SSCD during
personalization.
Before initiating the actual certificate signature the certificate-generating application
verifies the SVD received from the TOE by asserting:
− the sender as genuine SSCD
− the integrity of the SVD to be certified as sent by the originating SSCD,
− that the originating SSCD has been personalized for the legitimate user,
− correspondence between SCD and SVD, and
− that the signing algorithm and key size for the SVD are approved and
appropriate for the type of certificate.
The proof of correspondence between an SCD stored in the TOE and an SVD may be
implicit in the security mechanisms applied by the CGA. Optionally, the TOE may support
a function to provide an explicit proof of correspondence between an SCD it stores and
an SVD realized by self-certification. Such a function may be performed implicitly in the
SVD export function and may be invoked in the preparation environment without explicit
consent of the signatoryi. Security requirements to protect the SVD export function and
the certification data if the SVD is generated by the signatory and then exported from the
SSCD to the CGA are specified in part 4 of this series of European standards
Prior to generating the certificate the certification service provider shall assert the identity
of the signatory as the legitimate user of the TOE.
After preparation the intended, legitimate user should be informed of the signatory’s
verification authentication data (VAD) required for use of the TOE in signing. If the VAD
is a password or PIN, providing this information to the legitimate user shall protect the
confidentiality of the corresponding RAD.
2.2.2 SSCD Operational Use Phase
In the operational-use stage the signatory can use the TOE to create advanced
electronic signatures.
The signatory can render an SCD in the TOE permanently unusable. Rendering the last
SCD in the TOE permanently unusable may end the life of the TOE as SSCD.
NOTE: An SSCD that supports key generation in the operational-use stage does not end
its life when it no longer has a usable SCD.
The TOE may support functions to generate signing keys in the operational stage
(6.2.2.3(2)). For an
additional key the signatory may be allowed to choose the kind of certificate (qualified, or
not) to obtain for the SVD of the new key. The signatory may also be allowed to choose
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 10 of 58
some of the data to be incorporated in the certificate, for instance to use a pseudonym
instead of the legal name4. If the conditions to obtain a qualified certificate are met the
new key can also be used to create advanced electronic signatures. The optional TOE
functions for additional key generation and certification may require additional security
functions in the TOE and an interaction with the SSCD-Provisioning service provider in
an environment that is secure or using trusted communication.
2.3 TOE Scope
The TOE is a secure signature-creation device (combination of SSCD type 2 and type 3)
according to Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13
December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [12]. The
destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the TOE generates a new pair SCD/SVD or
loads a new pair SCD/SVD.
The TOE provides a Human Interface (HI) for user authentication:
(i) by the TOE itself or
(ii) by a trusted human interface device connected via a trusted channel with the
TOE.
The human interface device is used for the input of VAD for authentication by knowledge.
The TOE holds RAD to check the provided VAD. The human interface implies
appropriate hardware. The second approach allows to reduce the TOE hardware to a
minimum e. g. a smart card.
The TOE facilitates the ability to interface with a Human Interface (HI) for user
authentication:
(i) by the TOE itself or
(ii) by a trusted human interface device connected via a trusted channel with the
TOE.
The human interface device is used for the input of VAD for authentication by knowledge.
The TOE holds RAD to check the provided VAD. The human interface requires
appropriate hardware. The second approach allows to reduce the TOE hardware to a
minimum e. g. a smart card.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 11 of 58
Fig 2. SSCD Scope, Structural View
Fig 2 shows the PP scope from the structural perspective. The SSCD, i.e. the TOE,
comprises the underlying hardware, the operating system (OS), the SCD/SVD
generation, SCD storage and use, and signature-creation functionality. The SCA and the
CGA (and possibly other applications) are part of the immediate environment of the TOE.
They shall communicate with the TOE over a trusted channel, a trusted path for the
human interface provided by the SCA, respectively.
The TOE described in this ST is a smart card operating system implemented on a smart
card IC which is certified CC EAL 6+. The TOE includes embeddable software in the
NVM of the IC and a file system including the digital signature application stored in
EEPROM. Parts of the operating systems may be stored in EEPROM. NVM (Non Volatile
Memory) corresponds to ROM memory for the NXP P60D080PVG IC [8] & [9].
2.3.1 TOE Security Functionality
The TOE is a combination of hardware and software configured to securely create, use
and manage signature-creation data (SCD). The SSCD protects the SCD during its
whole life cycle as to be used in a signature-creation process solely by its signatory.
The TOE provides the following functions:
— to generate signature-creation data (SCD) and the correspondent signature-
verification data (SVD),
— to export the SVD for certification,
— to, optionally, receive and store certificate info,
— to switch the TOE from a non-operational state to an operational state, and
— if in an operational state, to create digital signatures for data with the following
steps:
(a) select an SCD if multiple are present in the SSCD,
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 12 of 58
(b) receive data to be signed or a unique representation thereof (DTBS/R)
(c) authenticate the signatory and determine its intent to sign,
(d) apply an appropriate cryptographic signature-creation function using the
selected SCD to the DTBS/R.
The TOE may implement its function for digital signature creation to also conform to the
specifications in ETSI TS 101 733 (CAdES)[22], ETSI TS 101 903 (XAdES)[23] and ETSI
TS 102 778 (PAdES) [24]. In this case the TOE may provide additional supporting
functions, e.g. to support receiving and/or validating a time stamp.
The TOE comprises all IT security functionality necessary to ensure the secrecy of the
SCD and the security of the digital signature.
The TOE is prepared for the signatory's use by
- generating at least one SCD/SVD pair, and
- personalizing for the signatory by storing in the TOE:
(a) the signatory’s reference authentication data (RAD)
(b) optionally, certificate info for at least one SCD in the TOE.
After preparation the SCD shall be in a non-operational state. Upon receiving a TOE the
signatory shall verify its non-operational state and change the SCD state to operational.
After preparation the intended, legitimate user should be informed of the signatory’s
verification authentication data (VAD) required for use of the TOE in signing. If the VAD
is a password or PIN, providing this information shall protect the confidentiality of the
corresponding RAD.
If continued use of an SCD is no longer required the TOE will disable an SCD it holds,
e.g. by erasing it from memory.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 13 of 58
2.3.2 TOE Logical Boundaries
The TOE boundaries are illustra
ted in Fig 3.
Fig 3. TOE Boundaries
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 14 of 58
2.3.3 TOE Form Factor & Physical Interfaces
Typically the TOE is provided as an ISO-7816 module or card, which could be dual-
interface, contact only or contactless only, with the antenna required for contactless
operation embedded within the card.
The TOE is linked to a card reader/writer via its HW and physical interfaces.
 The contact type interface of the TOE smartcard is ISO/IEC 7816 compliant.
 The contactless type interface of the TOE smartcard is ISO/IEC 14443 compliant.
 The Engineering packages may be combined with NXP carrier boards to provide
ISO-7816 compliant interface.
There are no other external interfaces of the TOE except the ones described above.
The antenna and the packaging are both out of the scope of this TOE.
The card reader/writer is connected to a computer such as a personal computer and
allows application programs (APs) to use the TOE.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 15 of 58
2.4 TOE Guidance
The TOE guidance comprises the following documentation:
Table 4. TOE Guidance
Applicable Guidance Documents
Title Date Version
NXP_ASEPCOS_CNS - ADM generic.doc Consult certification
report for applicable
dates and versions
NXP_ASEPCOS_CNS - ADM dedicated.doc
NXP_ASEPCOS_CNS - USR.doc
2.5 TOE Life-cycle
The TOE lifecycle is shown in Fig 4.
The integration phase is added to the PP generic lifecycle as this particular TOE requires
that card production phase is refined.
HW Fabrication
CNS SW Implementation
Loading of General Application Data
Loading of Personal data
SCD/SVD import or generation
Signature-creation
Optional SCD/SVD generation
SSCD Destruction
Design
Fabrication
Initialisation
Personalisation
Usage
Development
Phase
Operational
Phase
IC Manufacturing
IC Packaging
Card Manufacturing
Integration
HW Design CNS Design
Fig 4. TOE Life-Cycle
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 16 of 58
2.5.1 Design
The TOE is developed in this phase. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit,
the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
HW Design – NXP
CNS Design – NXP Development departments – Livingston, Scotland
2.5.2 Fabrication
HW Fabrication – NXP
CNS SW implementation – NXP Development departments – Livingston, Scotland
IC Manufacturing – NXP
The CNS Software parts of the TOE which are developed by NXP are transferred in a
secure way for masking in ROM. In addition to the TOE, the mask contains confidential
data, knowledge of which is required in order to initialize and personalize the chip.
2.5.3 Integration
IC Manufacturing – NXP
IC Packaging – NXP
Card Manufacturing – NXP
This phase corresponds to the integration of the hardware and firmware components into
the final product body. The TOE is protected during transfer between various parties.
IC Packaging and Card Manufacturing are not part of the scope of this TOE.
2.5.4 Initialisation
Initialization – NXP Initialization facility
The TOE and the confidential information required to complete this phase are transferred
securely between the NXP sites. Initialization is done within NXP facilities used for the
Common Criteria certified ICs (here the P60D080) production, under the governance of
NXP.
The initialization phase consists in the CNS application configuration and could include
patching (in EEPROM) if required. During this phase, the SSCD File System is initiated
and the General Application Data are loaded (EEPROM).
The product becomes operational and is delivered after this initialization phase.
2.5.5 Personalisation
Personalization – NXP or 3rd Party Personalization facility
This phase includes the loading of Personal Application Data and optional generation of
the SCD/SVD pair if loading does not include importing an SCD/SVD pair.
The product is considered in use phase.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 17 of 58
2.5.6 Operational
This ST addresses the functions used in the operational phases but developed during
development phase.
Usage – Where upon the card is delivered from the Customer (the Card Issuer) to the
End User and the End User may use it for signature-creation including all supporting
functionality (e.g., SCD storage and SCD use) but only following a correct verification of
the initial PIN-Activate PIN which allows the End User to make sure that he is the first
user to ever use this SCA for electronic signature.
The product is considered in use phase.
2.5.7 Application Note: Scope of SSCD PP application
This ST refers to qualified certificates as electronic attestation of the SVD corresponding
to the signatory's SCD that is implemented by the TOE.
While the main application scenario of a SSCD will assume a qualified certificate to be
used in combination with a SSCD, there still is a large benefit in the security when such
SSCD is applied in other areas and such application is encouraged. The SSCD may as
well be applied to environments where the certificates expressed as 'qualified certificates'
in the SSCD do not fulfil the requirements laid down in Annex I and Annex II of the
Directive [12].
When an instance of a SSCD is used with a qualified certificate, such use is from the
technical point of view eligible for an electronic signature as referred to in Directive [12],
article 5, paragraph 1. This Directive does not prevent TOE itself from being regarded as
a SSCD, even when used together with a non-qualified certificate.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 18 of 58
3. Conformance Claims
3.1 CC Conformance claims
The ST claims compliance with the following references:
- Common Criteria Version 3.1 Part 1 [1] revision 4
- Common Criteria Version 3.1 Part 2 [2] revision 4 extended
- Common Criteria Version 3.1 Part 3 [3] revision 4 conformant
Extensions are based on the Protection Profiles (PP [4] and PP [5]) presented in the next
section:
- FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
The assurance level for this ST is EAL 4 augmented with:
- AVA_VAN.5
- ALC_DVS.2
3.2 PP Claim
This ST claims strict compliance to the following SOGIS Protection Profiles:
[4] Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 2
Document ID prEN 14169-2:2012 (E)
Version 2.0.1
Date 2012-01-23
Sponsor CEN/ISSS
Certification Body Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01
[5] Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3
Document ID prEN 14169-3:2012 (E)
Version 1.0.2
Date 2012-07-24
Sponsor CEN/ISSS
Certification Body Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0075
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 19 of 58
4. Security Problem Definition
4.1 Assets
SCD
Private key used to perform a digital signature operation. The confidentiality, integrity
and signatory’s sole control over the use of the SCD must be maintained.
SVD
Public key linked to the SCD and used to perform digital signature verification. The
integrity of the SVD when it is exported must be maintained.
DTBS and DTBS/R
Set of data, or its representation, which the signatory intends to sign. Their integrity
and the unforgeability of the link to the signatory provided by the digital signature
must be maintained.
Signature-creation function
Code of the SSCD dedicated to the generation of digital signature of DTBS using the
SCD (The integrity of the function must be maintained so that it can participate to the
legal validity of electronic signatures)
4.2 Subjects
This Security Target considers the following users and subjects representing users:
Table 5. Users & Subjects
Users Subjects Definition
User S.User
End user of the TOE which can be identified as S.Admin or
S.Signatory.
The subject S.User may act as S.Admin in the role
Administrator or as S.Signatory in the role Signatory.
Administrator S.Admin
User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialization, TOE
personalization or other TOE administrative functions.
The subject S.Admin is acting in the role Administrator for this
user after successful authentication as Administrator
Signatory S.Signatory
User who holds the TOE and uses it on his own behalf or on
behalf of the natural or legal person or entity he represents.
The subject S.Signatory is acting in the role Signatory for this
user after successful authentication as Signatory.
4.3 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used:
A.CGA Trustworthy certification-generation application
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 20 of 58
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the SVD in the
qualified certificate by an advanced electronic signature of the CSP.
A.SCA Trustworthy signature-creation application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the
DTBS/R of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the
TOE.
A.CSP Secure SCD/SVD management by CSP
The CSP uses only a trustworthy SCD/SVD generation device and ensures that this
device can be used by authorised user only. The CSP ensures that the SCD
generated practically occurs only once, that generated SCD and SVD actually
correspond to each other and that SCD cannot be derived from the SVD. The CSP
ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE, does
not use the SCD for creation of any signature and irreversibly deletes the SCD in the
operational environment after export to the TOE.
4.4 Threats
4.4.1 Threat Agents
S.OFFCARD
Attacker. A human or process acting on his behalf being located outside
the TOE. The main goal of the S.OFFCARD attacker is to access
Application sensitive information or to falsify the electronic signature. The
attacker has a high level potential attack and knows no secret.
4.4.2 Threats to Security
T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
An attacker interacts with the TOE interfaces to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in
arbitrary security compromises. This threat addresses all the assets.
T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation data
An attacker can store, copy, the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can obtain the
SCD during generation, storage and use for signature-creation in the TOE.
T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature-creation data
An attacker derives the SCD from public known data, such as SVD corresponding to
the SCD or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data
communicated outside the TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.
T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature-verification data
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the CSP to the CGA. This results in loss of
SVD integrity in the certificate of the signatory.
T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS/R
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 21 of 58
An attacker modifies the DTBS/R sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS/R used by the
TOE for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intended to sign.
T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE
An attacker misuses the signature-creation function of the TOE to create SDO for
data the signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks
by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security
principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature
An attacker forges the signed data object maybe together with its electronic signature
created by the TOE and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not
detectable by the signatory or by third parties. The signature generated by the TOE
is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with
advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 22 of 58
4.5 Organizational Security Policy
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as
security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its
operations.
P.CSP_QCert Qualified certificate
The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate a qualified certificate or non-qualified
certificate (The Directive: 2:9, Annex I) for the SVD generated by the SSCD. The
certificates contain at least the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD
implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that
the use of the TOE as SSCD is evident with signatures through the certificate or
other publicly available information.
P.QSign Qualified electronic signatures
The signatory uses a signature-creation system to sign data with an advanced
electronic, which is a qualified electronic signature if it is based on a valid qualified
certificate. The DTBS are presented to the signatory and sent by the SCA as
DTBS/R to the SSCD. The SSCD creates the digital signature created with a SCD
implemented in the SSCD that the signatory maintains under his sole control and is
linked to the DTBS/R in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is
detectable.
P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature-creation device
The TOE implements the SCD used for signature creation under sole control of the
signatory. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once.
P.Sig_Non-Repud Non-repudiation of signatures
The lifecycle of the SSCD, the SCD and the SVD shall be implemented in a way that
the signatory is not able to deny having signed data if the signature is successfully
verified with the SVD contained in their unrevoked certificate.
5. Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment.
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
OT.EMSEC_Design Provide physical emanations security
The TOE shall be designed and built such a way as to control the production of
intelligible emanations within specified limits.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 23 of 58
OT.Lifecycle_Security Lifecycle security
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialization, personalisation and operational
usage. The TOE shall provide functionality to securely destroy the SCD on demand of
the signatory.
Application note 1: The TOE may contain more than one set of SCD. There is no need
to destroy the SCD in case of repeated SCD import. The signatory shall be able to
destroy the SCD stored in the SSCD, e.g. after the (qualified) certificate for the
corresponding SVD has been expired.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorized SCD/SVD generation
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke
the generation of the SCD and the SVD.
OT.SCD_Secrecy Secrecy of the signature-creation data
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature generation) is reasonably assured against
attacks with a high attack potential.
Application note 2: The TOE shall keep the confidentiality of the SCD at all times, in
particular during SCD import, signature creation operation, storage and secure
destruction.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by
the TOE. This includes unambiguous reference of a created SVD/SCD pair for export of
the SVD and in creating an electronic signature creation with the SCD.
OT.Tamper_ID Tamper detection
The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering of a system
component, and use those features to limit security breaches.
OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance
The TOE shall prevent or resist physical tampering with specified system devices and
components.
OT.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature-creation data
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified
electronic signature. The SCD used for signature generation shall practically occur only
once and shall not be reconstructable from the SVD. In that context ‘practically occur
once’ means that the probability of equal SCDs is negligible low.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE Verification of the DTBS/R integrity
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 24 of 58
The TOE must not alter the DTBS/R. As by definition of the DTBS/R this may consist of
the DTBS themselves, this objective does not conflict with a signature creation process
where the TOE hashes the provided DTBS (in part or entirely) for signature creation.
OT.Sigy_SigF Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only
The TOE shall provide the signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only
and protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high
attack potential.
OT.Sig_Secure Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
The TOE shall create electronic signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of
the SCD through robust encryption techniques. The SCD shall not be reconstructable
using the electronic signatures or any other data exportable from the TOE. The electronic
signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even when executed with a high
attack potential.
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp Authorized SCD import
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorized users only may invoke
the import of the SCD.
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Security objectives for the operational environment which are independent from the fact
whether SCD are imported from the operational environment or generated by the TOE
itself are OE.SVD_Auth, OE.CGA_QCert, OE.SSCD_Prov_Service, OE.HID_VAD,
OE.DTBS_Intend, OE.DTBS_Protect and OE.Signatory. The remaining four security
objectives OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, OE.SCD_Secrecy, OE.SCD_Unique and
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp only apply if the TOE supports key import, which this TOE does.
OE.SVD_Auth Authenticity of the SVD
The operational environment shall ensure the authenticity of the SVD sent to the CGA of
the CSP. The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the
signatory and the SVD in the qualified certificate.
OE.CGA_QCert Generation of qualified certificates
The CGA generates a qualified certificate that includes, inter alias
(a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE,
(b) the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and controlled by the signatory,
(c) the advanced signature of the CSP.
The CGA confirms with the generated certificate that the SCD corresponding to
the SVD is stored in a SSCD.
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisioning Service
The SSCD-provisioning service shall initialise and personalise for the signatory an
authentic copy of theTOE and deliver this copy as SSCD to the signatory.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 25 of 58
OE.HID_VAD Protection of the VAD
If an external device provides the human interface for user authentication, this device
shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication
method employed from import through its human interface until import through the TOE
interface. In particular, if the TOE requires a trusted channel for import of the VAD, the
HID shall support usage of this trusted channel.
OE.DTBS_Intend SCA sends data intended to be signed
The signatory shall use a trustworthy SCA that
(a) generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which
the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE,
(b) sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the
DTBS/R by the TOE,
(c) attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.
Application note 3: The SCA should be able to support advanced electronic signatures.
Currently, there exist three formats defined by ETSI recognized as meeting the
requirements needed by advanced electronic signatures: CadES [22], XadES [23] and
PadES [24]. These three formats mandate to include the hash of the signer’s public key
certificate in the data to be signed. In order to support for the mobility of the signer, it is
recommended to store the certificate info on the SSCD for use by SCA and identification
of the corresponding SCD if more than one SCD is stored on the SSCD.
OE.DTBS_Protect SCA protects the data intended to be signed
The operational environment shall ensure that the DTBS/R cannot be altered in transit
between the SCA and the TOE. In particular, if the TOE requires a trusted channel for
import of the DTBS/R, the SCA shall support usage of this trusted channel.
OE.Signatory Security obligation of the Signatory
The Signatory checks that the SCD stored in the SSCD received from SSCD provisioning
service is in non-operational state. The Signatory keeps his or her VAD confidential.
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorized SCD/SVD generation
The CSP shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke
the generation of the SCD and the SVD.
OE.SCD_Secrecy SCD Secrecy
The CSP shall protect the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the
TOE. The CSP shall not use the SCD for creation of any signature and shall irreversibly
delete the SCD in the operational environment after export to the TOE.
OE.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature-creation data
The CSP shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair, which is generated
in the environment, for the qualified or advanced electronic signature. The SCD used for
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 26 of 58
signature creation shall practically occur only once, i.e. the probability of equal SCDs
shall be negligible, and the SCD shall not be reconstructable from the SVD.
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The CSP shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by
the CSP. This includes the correspondence between the SVD send to the CGA and the
SCD exported to the TOE of the signatory identified in the SVD certificate.
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
All the security objectives described in the ST are traced back to items described in the
TOE security environment and any items in the TOE security environment are covered
by those security objectives appropriately.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 27 of 58
5.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage
Table 6. Security Environment to Security Objectives Mapping
5.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency
5.3.2.1 Policies and Security Objective Sufficiency
P.CSP_QCert (CSP generates qualified certificates) establishes the CSP generating
qualified certificate or non-qualified certificate linking the signatory and the SVD
implemented in the SSCD under sole control of this signatory. P.CSP_QCert is
addressed by
- OT.Lifecycle_Security, which requires the TOE to detect flaws during the
initialisation, personalisation and operational usage,
- OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which ensures that the SCD/SVD generation can be
invoked by authorized users only,
- OT.SCD_Auth_Imp which ensures that authorised users only may invoke the
import of the SCD,
- OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which requires the CSP to ensure the correspondence
between the SVD and the SCD during their generation, and
- OE.CGA_QCert for generation of qualified certificates or non-qualified
certificates, which requires the CGA to certify the SVD matching the SCD
implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory.
P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be
employed to sign data with an advanced electronic signature, which is a qualified
electronic signature if based on a valid qualified certificate. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures
signatory’s sole control of the SCD by requiring the TOE to provide the signature
generation function for the legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against the
Threats
Assumptions
Policies
/
Security
objectives
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Gen
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
OE.CGA_Qcert
OE.SVD_Auth
OE.HID_VAD
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service
OE.DTBS_Intend
OE.DTBS_Protect
OE.Signatory
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OE.SCD_Secrecy
OE.SCD_Unique
T.Hack_Phys x x x x
T.SCD_Divulg x x x x
T.SCD_Derive x x x
T.SVD_Forgery x x x
T.DTBS_Forgery x x x
T.SigF_Misuse x x x x x x x
T.Sig_Forgery x x x x
A.CGA x x
A.SCA x
A.CSP x x x x
P.CSP_Qcert x x x x x x
P.Qsign x x x x
P.Sigy_SSCD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
P.Sig_Non-Repud x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 28 of 58
use of others. OT.Sig_Secure ensures that the TOE generates digital signatures that
cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD through robust encryption techniques.
OE.CGA_QCert addresses the requirement of qualified or non-qualified electronic
certificates building a base for the electronic signature. The OE.DTBS_Intend ensures
that the SCA provides only those DTBS to the TOE, which the signatory intends to sign.
P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as secure signature-creation device) requires the TOE to meet
Annex III. This is ensured as follows:
- OT.SCD_Unique meets the paragraph 1(a) of Annex III, by the requirements that
the SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once;
- OT.SCD_Unique, OT.SCD_Secrecy and OT.Sig_Secure meet the requirement in
paragraph 1(a) of Annex III by the requirements to ensure secrecy of the SCD.
OT.EMSEC_Design and OT.Tamper_Resistance address specific objectives to
ensure secrecy of the SCD against specific attacks;
- OT.SCD_Secrecy and OT.Sig_Secure meet the requirement in paragraph 1(b) of
Annex III by the requirements to ensure that the SCD cannot be derived from
SVD, the digital signatures or any other data exported outside the TOE;
- OT.Sigy_SigF meets the requirement in paragraph 1(c) of Annex III by the
requirements to ensure that the TOE provides the signature generation function
for the legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others;
- OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE meets the requirements in paragraph 2 of Annex III as
the TOE must not alter the DTBS/R.
Paragraph 2 of Annex III, requires that an SSCD does not prevent the data to be signed
from being presented to the signatory prior to the signature process is obviously fulfilled by
the method of TOE usage: the SCA will present the DTBS to the signatory and send it to
the SSCD for signing.
The usage of SCD under sole control of the signatory is ensured by
- OT.Lifecycle_Security requiring the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation,
personalisation and operational usage,
- OT.SCD/SVD_Gen, which limits invoke the generation of the SCD and the SVD to
authorised users only,
- OT.Sigy_SigF, which requires the TOE to provide the signature generation
function for the legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of
others.
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service ensures that the signatory obtains a TOE sample as an
authentic, initialised and personalised SSCD from an SSCD provisioning service.
P.Sig_Non-Repud (Non-repudiation of signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed
data by the signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the
SVD contained in his certificate valid at the time of signature creation. This policy is
implemented by the combination of the security objectives for the TOE and its
operational environment, which ensure the aspects of signatory’s sole control over and
responsibility for the digital signatures generated with the TOE. OE.SSCD_Prov_Service
ensures that the signatory uses an authentic TOE, initialised and personalised for the
signatory. OE.CGA_QCert ensures that the certificate allows to identify the signatory and
thus to link the SVD to the signatory. OE.SVD_Auth and OE.CGA_QCert require the
environment to ensure authenticity of the SVD as being exported by the TOE and used
under sole control of the signatory. OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that the SVD
exported by the TOE corresponds to the SCD that is implemented in the TOE.
OT.SCD_Unique provides that the signatory’s SCD can practically occur just once.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 29 of 58
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, OE.SCD_Secrecy and OE.SCD_Unique ensure the security
of the SCD in the CSP environment. OE.SCD_Secrecy ensures the confidentiality of the
SCD during generation, during and after export to the TOE. The CSP does not use the
SCD for creation of any signature and deletes the SCD irreversibly after export to the
TOE. OE.SCD_Unique provides that the signatory’s SCD can practically occur just once.
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that the SVD in the certificate of the signatory
corresponds to the SCD that is implemented in the copy of the TOE of the signatory.
OE.CGA_QCert ensures that the certificate allows to identify the signatory and thus to
link the SVD of the signatory. OE.SVD_Auth and OE.CGA_QCert require the
environment to ensure the authenticity of the SVD as being exported by the TOE under
sole control of the signatory. OE.CGA_QCert ensures that the certificate allows to
identify the signatory and thus to link the SVD of the signatory. OE.SVD_Auth and
OE.CGA_QCert require the environment to ensure the authenticity of the SVD as being
exported by the TOE under sole control of the signatory.
OE.Signatory ensures that the Signatory checks that the SCD, stored in the SSCD
received from an SSCD provisioning service is in non-operational state (i.e. the SCD
cannot be used before the Signatory takes sole control over the SSCD). OT.Sigy_SigF
provides that only the signatory may use the TOE for signature creation. As prerequisite
OE.Signatory ensures that the Signatory keeps his or her VAD confidential.
OE.DTBS_Intend, OE.DTBS_Protect and OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE ensure that the
TOE generates digital signatures only for a DTBS/R that the signatory has decided to
sign as DTBS. The robust cryptographic techniques required by OT.Sig_Secure ensure
that only this SCD may generate a valid digital signature that can be successfully verified
with the corresponding SVD used for signature verification. The security objective for the
TOE OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security), OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of the
signature-creation data), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security),
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) and OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance)
protect the SCD against any compromise.
5.3.2.2 Threats and Security Objective Sufficiency
T.SCD_Divulg (Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation data) addresses
the threat against the legal validity of electronic signature due to storage and copying of
SCD outside the TOE, as expressed in recital (18) of The European Directive. This
threat is countered by
- OE.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD in the CSP
environment, and
- OT.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD during use by the TOE
for signature creation.
Furthermore, generation and/or import of SCD known by an attacker is countered by
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which ensures that only authorized SCD generation in the
environment is possible, and OT.SCD_Auth_Imp, which ensures that only authorised
SCD import is possible.
T.SCD_Derive (Derive the signature-creation data) deals with attacks on the SCD via
public known data produced by the TOE, which are the SVD and the signatures created
with the SCD. OT.SCD/SVD_Gen counters this threat by implementing cryptographic
secure generation (as well as OE.SCD_Unique)of the SCD/SVD-pair. OT.Sig_Secure
ensures cryptographic secure digital signatures.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 30 of 58
T.Hack_Phys (Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities) deals with physical attacks
exploiting physical vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of
the SCD. OT.EMSEC_Design counters physical attacks through the TOE interfaces and
observation of TOE emanations. OT.Tamper_ID and OT.Tamper_Resistance counter
the threat T.Hack_Phys by detecting and by resisting tampering attacks.
T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of the signature-verification data) deals with the forgery of the
SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA to generation a certificate. T.SVD_Forgery is
addressed by OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp or OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (depending if
SCD/SVD generation occurs in the SSCD Type 1 or in the TOE), which ensure
correspondence between SVD and SCD and unambiguous reference of the SVD/SCD
pair for the SVD export and signature creation with the SCD, and OE.SVD_Auth that
ensures the integrity of the SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA. T.SVD_Forgery is
also addressed by OE.SVD_Auth, which ensures the authenticity of the SVD given to
the CGA of the CSP.
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE) addresses the
threat of misuse of the TOE signature-creation function to create SDO by others than the
signatory to create a digital signature on data for which the signatory has not expressed
the intent to sign,. OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) requires the TOE to detect
flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage including secure
destruction of the SCD, which may be initiated by the signatory. OT.Sigy_SigF
(Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) ensures that the TOE
provides the signature-generation function for the legitimate signatory only.
OE.DTBS_Intend (Data intended to be signed) ensures that the SCA sends the DTBS/R
only for data the signatory intends to sign and OE.DTBS_Protect counters manipulation
of the DTBS during transmission over the channel between the SCA and the TOE.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) prevents the DTBS/R from
alteration inside the TOE. If the SCA provides a human interface for user authentication,
OE.HID_VAD (Protection of the VAD) provides confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as
needed by the authentication method employed. OE.Signatory ensures that the
Signatory checks that an SCD stored in the SSCD when received from an SSCD-
provisioning service provider is in non-operational state, i.e. the SCD cannot be used
before the Signatory has control over the SSCD. OE.Signatory ensures also that the
Signatory keeps his or her VAD confidential.
T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS/R) addresses the threat arising from
modifications of the data sent as input to the TOE's signature creation function that does
not represent the DTBS as presented to the signatory and for which the signature has
expressed its intent to sign. The TOE IT environment addresses T.DTBS_Forgery by the
means of OE.DTBS_Intend, which ensures that the trustworthy SCA generates the
DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to
sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE, and by means of OE.DTBS_Protect,
which ensures that the DTBS/R cannot be altered in transit between the SCA and the
TOE. The TOE counters this threat by the means of OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE by
ensuring the integrity of the DTBS/R inside the TOE.
T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the digital signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the
digital signature. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Unique and OE.CGA_Qcert address this
threat in general. The OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the digital signature)
ensures by means of robust cryptographic techniques that the signed data and the digital
signature are securely linked together. OT.SCD_Unique ensures that the same SCD
cannot be generated more than once and the corresponding SVD cannot be included in
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 31 of 58
another certificate by chance. OE.CGA_Qcert prevents forgery of the certificate for the
corresponding SVD, which would result in false verification decision on a forged
signature. OE.SCD_Unique ensures that the same SCD cannot be generated more than
once and the corresponding SVD cannot be included in another certificate by chance.
OE.CGA_QCert prevents forgery of the certificate for the corresponding SVD, which
would result in false verification decision concerning a forged signature.
5.3.2.3 Assumptions and Security Objective Sufficiency
A.SCA (Trustworthy signature-creation application) establishes the trustworthiness of the
SCA with respect to generation of DTBS/R. This is addressed by OE.DTBS_Intend
(Data intended to be signed) which ensures that the SCA generates the DTBS/R for the
data that has been presented to the signatory as DTBS and which the signatory intends
to sign in a form which is appropriate for being signed by the TOE.
A.CGA (Trustworthy certification-generation application) establishes the protection of the
authenticity of the signatory's name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by the
advanced signature of the CSP by means of the CGA. This is addressed by
OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates), which ensures the generation of
qualified certificates and by OE.SVD_Auth (Authenticity of the SVD), which ensures the
protection of the integrity and the verification of the correspondence between the SVD
and the SCD that is implemented by the SSCD of the signatory.
A.CSP (Secure SCD/SVD management by CSP) establishes several security aspects
concerning handling of SCD and SVD by the CSP. That the SCD/SVD generation device
can only be used by authorized users is addressed by OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
(Authorized SCD/SVD Generation), that the generated SCD is unique and cannot be
derived by the SVD is addressed by OE.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature
creation data), that SCD and SVD correspond to each other is addressed by
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD), and that the SCD
are kept confidential, are not used for signature generation in the environment and are
deleted in the environment once exported to the TOE is addressed by OE.SCD_Secrecy
(SCD Secrecy).
6. Extended Components Definition
This ST contains the following extended component defined as extension to CC part 2 in
the claimed PPs [4] & [5]:
- SFR FPT_EMS.1 ‘TOE emanation’ (denoted as FPT_EMSEC in PP[4])
6.1 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the
TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The
TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is
based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such
attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation etc. This family
describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The
family FPT_EMS belongs to the Class FPT because it is the class for TSF protection.
Other families within the Class FPT do not cover the TOE emanation.
FPT_EMS TOE Emanation
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 32 of 58
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
 FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
 FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU_GEN Security
audit data generation is included in a PP or ST using FPT_EMS.1.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in
excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to
use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to
gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
7. Security Requirements
This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance
requirements for the TOE.
Security functional requirements components given in section 7.1, except FPT_EMS.1
which is explicitly stated, are drawn from Common Criteria part 2 v3.1.
Some security functional requirements represent extensions to [2]. Operations for
assignment, selection and refinement have been made and are designated by an
underline, in addition, where operations that were uncompleted in the PPs (performed in
this ST) are also identified by italic underlined type.
The TOE security assurance requirements statement given in section is drawn from the
security assurance components from Common Criteria part 3 [3].
FPT_EMS TOE emanation 1
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 33 of 58
7.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
7.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
7.1.1.1 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate an SCD/SVD pair in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and
specified cryptographic key sizes between 1024 bit and 2048 bit
that meet the following: Algorithms and parameters for
algorithms [13].
7.1.1.2 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in case of re-
importation and regeneration of a new SCD in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key destruction method overwriting old
key with new key that meets the following: none.
Application note:
The destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the SCD/SVD pair is re-generated by
the TOE.
Re-importation is not supported by the TOE.
7.1.1.3 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform digital signature-generation in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA and
cryptographic key sizes 1024 bit, 1536 bit and 2048 bit that meet
the following: RSA CRT with hashing SHA-1 or SHA-256 and
with padding PKCS#1 v1.5 as per Algorithms and parameters
for algorithms [13].
FCS_COP.1.1/
ENC
The TSF shall perform data encryption/decryption for
Administrator and Signatory authentication and Secure
Messaging in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm TDES CBC and cryptographic key sizes 16 bytes that
meet the following: FIPS PUB 46-3 Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [20].
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC
The TSF shall perform Message Authentication Code for Secure
Messaging in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm TDES MAC and cryptographic key sizes 16 bytes that
meet the following: FIPS PUB 46-3 Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [20].
7.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
The security attributes for the user, TOE components and related status are defined in
Table 7
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 34 of 58
Table 7. Security Attributes for Access control
Subject / Object Attribute Status
General Attribute
S.User Role Administrator, Signatory
Initialisation Attribute
S.User SCD / SVD management Authorized, Not Authorized
SCD Secure SCD import
allowed
No, Yes
SCD SCD Identifier Arbitrary Value (2 bytes)
Signature-Creation Attribute Group
SCD SCD operational No, Yes
DTBS, DTBS/R sent by an authorized SCA No, Yes
The verification of the Security attributes for Access control is covered by SF.Access
Control.
7.1.2.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SVD_Transfer_SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: SVD
(3) operations: export
Application note:
FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP is only required to protect the exportation of the SVD as
the SVD is never imported from an SSCD type 1 into the TOE.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP on
(1). subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: DTBS/R, SCD,
(3) operations: import of SCD
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP
on
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: SCD, SVD,
(3) operations: generation of SCD/SVD pair
FDP_ACC.1.1/ Signature-
creation_SFP
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 35 of 58
(2) objects: DTBS/R, SCD,
(3) operations: signature creation.
7.1.2.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
SVD Generation SFP
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation_
SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP
to objects based on the following: S.User is associated
with the security attribute “SCD / SVD Management “.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SCD/SVD_Generation_
SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if
an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD
Management” set to “authorised” is allowed to generate
SCD/SVD pair.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SCD/SVD_Generation_
SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SCD/SVD_Generation_
SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects based on the rule:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD
management” set to “not authorised” is not allowed to
generate SCD/SVD pair.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 36 of 58
SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SVD_Transfer_SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to objects based
on the following: 1) the S.User is associated with the security
attribute Role, 2) the SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SVD_Transfer_SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator”
or to “Signatory” is allowed to export SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SVD_Transfer_SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SVD_Transfer_SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the rule: none.
SCD Import SFP
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to objects based on
the following: the S.User is associated with the security attribute
“SCD/SVD
Management.”
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to
“authorised” is allowed to import SCD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the rule:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set to
“not authorised” is not allowed to import SCD.
Signature-creation SFP
FDP_ACF.1.1/
Signature-Creation
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to
objects based on the following:
(1) the S.User is associated with the security
attribute “Role” and
(2) the SCD with the security attribute “SCD
Operational”
FDP_ACF.1.2/
Signature-Creation
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects
is allowed:
User with the security attribute “role” set to “Signatory” is
allowed to create digital signatures for DTBS/R with SCD
which security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “yes”
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 37 of 58
FDP_ACF.1.3/
Signature-Creation
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
Signature-Creation
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the rules:
S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for
DTBS/R with SCD which security attribute “SCD
operational” is set to “no”.
7.1.2.3 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)
FDP_ITC.1.1/
SCD
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP when importing user
data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/
SCD
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the
SCD when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/
SCD
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing SCD
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: SCD shall be sent
by an authorised SSCD of Type 1.
Application note:
An SSCD of Type 1 is authorised to send SCD to an SSCD of Type 2, if it is
designated to generate the SCD for this SSCD of Type 2 and to export the SCD for
import into this SSCD of Type 2. Authorised SSCD of Type 1 is able to establish a
trusted channel to the SSCD of Type 2 for SCD.
7.1.2.4 Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
FDP_UCT.1.1/
SCD
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to be able to receive
SCD in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
7.1.2.5 Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the
resource from the following objects: SCD, VAD, RAD.
7.1.2.6 Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)
The following data persistently stored by TOE have the user data attribute "integrity
checked persistent stored data" (integrity redundancy code):
1. SCD
2. RAD
3. SVD (if persistently stored by TOE)
FDP_SDI.2.1/
Persistent
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by
the TSF for integrity error on all objects, based on the following
attributes: integrity checked persistent data.
FDP_SDI.2.2/
Persistent
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
1. prohibit the use of the altered data,
2. inform the Signatory about integrity error.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 38 of 58
The DTBS/R temporarily stored by TOE has the user data attribute "integrity checked
stored data":
FDP_SDI.2.1/
DTBS
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by
the TSF for integrity error on all objects, based on the following
attributes: integrity checked stored data.
FDP_SDI.2.2/
DTBS
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
1. prohibit the use of the altered data
2. inform the Signatory about integrity error.
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
7.1.3.1 Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 10 consecutive unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to: RAD authentication and
PUK authentication.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall block RAD.
7.1.3.2 Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. Self test according to FPT_TST.1
2. Identification of the user by means of TSF required by
FIA_UID.1.
3. Establishing a trusted path between the TOE and a SSCD of
Type 1 by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Application note:
The user mentioned in component FIA_UAU.1.1 is the local user using the trusted path
provided between the SGA in the TOE environment and the TOE.
7.1.3.3 Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. Self test according to FPT_TST.1
2. Establishing a trusted channel between the TOE and a SSCD
of Type 1 by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 39 of 58
7.1.4 Security Management
7.1.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1/
Sign
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions signature-
creation function to Signatory.
7.1.4.2 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
FMT_MSA.1.1/
Admin
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP and SCD/SVD
generation SFP to restrict the ability to modify the security attributes
SCD/SVD management to Administrator.
FMT_MSA.1.1/
Signatory
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to restrict the
ability to modify the security attributes SCD operational to
Signatory.
7.1.4.3 Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2)
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
SCD/SVD Management and SCD operational.
7.1.4.4 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP, SCD/SVD_Generation
SFP, SVD_Transfer SFP and Signature-creation SFPs to provide
restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the Administrator to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
7.1.4.5 Static attribute value inheritance (FMT_MSA.4)
FMT_MSA.4.1 The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security
attributes:
i. If Administrator successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair
without Signatory being authenticated the security attribute
“SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set to “no” as a single
operation.
ii. If Signatory successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair the
security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set
to “yes” as a single operation.
iii. If Administrator imports SCD while Signatory is not currently
authenticated, the security attribute “SCD operational” of the
SCD shall be set to “no” after import of the SCD as a single
operation
iv. If Administrator imports SCD while Signatory is currently
authenticated, the security attribute “SCD operational” of the
SCD shall be set to “yes” after import of the SCD as a single
operation.
7.1.4.6 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1/Admin The TSF shall restrict the ability to create the RAD to
Administrator.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 40 of 58
Application note:
The RAD can be unblocked by the Signatory after presentation of the PUK by the
Signatory. In case of a PIN. In case of a DES Key, the RAD cannot be unlocked.
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify or unblock the RAD
to Signatory.
7.1.4.7 Security Management (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
i. Creation and Modification of the RAD
ii. Enabling the signature creation function,
iii. Modification of the security attribute SCD/SVD
management, SCD
iv. operational,
v. Change the default value of the security attribute SCD
Identifier, Access Condition Management
7.1.4.8 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles Administrator and Signatory.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
7.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
7.1.5.1 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information of IC Power consumption in
excess of State of the Art values enabling access to RAD and
SCD.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any user is unable to use the following
interface physical chip contacts and contactless I/O to gain access
to RAD and SCD.
Application note:
The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack
is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may
be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may origin from internal operation of the
TOE or may origin by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the
TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the
technology employed to implement the TOE. Examples of measurable phenomena are
variations in the power consumption, the timing of transitions of internal states,
electromagnetic radiation due to internal operation, radio emission.
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause such
emanations, evaluation against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies
employed by the TOE is assumed. Examples of such attacks are, but are not limited
to, evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 41 of 58
7.1.5.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
i. failure from self-test under FPT_TST
ii. IC Environmental sensors detection (Temperature out of
range, Supply Voltage of chip),
iii. IC Internal error detection sensors failure (Parity, RNG
operation)
7.1.5.3 Passive detection of physical attack (FPT_PHP.1)
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical
tampering that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
7.1.5.4 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist Environment attacks (clock frequency and
voltage tampering) and Intrusive attacks (penetration of the module
protective layers) to the IC Hardware by responding automatically
such that the SFRs are always enforced.
7.1.5.5 TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up or
before running a secure operation to demonstrate the correct
operation of the TSF.
Application-note: Crypto Self-tests are performed by the Operating
System during start-up.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify
the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify
the integrity of TSF (stored executable code).
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 42 of 58
7.1.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
7.1.6.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1/
SCD
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
SCD
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
SCD
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
i. Data exchange integrity according to FDP_UCT.1/SCD,
ii. SCD Import,
iii. transfer of SVD,
Refinement:
The mentioned remote trusted IT products are: an SSCD type 1 for SCD import, the
CGA for the SVD export, and the SCA for DTBS Import.
7.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
TOE Security Assurance Requirements as stated in the claimed protection profiles BSI-
CC-PP0059-2009-MA-01– Protection profiles for Secure Signature Creation Device —
Part 2: Device with key generation [4] (section 9.2) and BSI-CC-PP0075-2012–
Protection profiles for Secure Signature Creation Device — Part 3: Device with key
import [5] (section 10.3)
ALC_DVS is augmented from 1 to 2, and AVA_VAN is augmented from 3 to 5, compared
to the CC V3.1 package for EAL4.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 43 of 58
7.2.1 SARs Measures
Table 8. Assurance Requirements: EAL4 augmented
7.2.2 SARs Rationale
The EAL4+ was chosen to permit the developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices. EAL4 is
the level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product
line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
Assurance Class Component Description
ADV:
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC:
Lifecycle support
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem of Tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined lifecycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well defined development tools
ASE:
Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE:
Test
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA:
Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 44 of 58
Augmentation results from the selection of:
1. ALC_DVS.2 Life-cycle support- Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the
security of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure
handling of the MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
2. AVA_VAN.5 Vulnerability Assessment - Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the
security by vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks
performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability
analysis is necessary to fulfil the TOE security objectives.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
a. ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
b. ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
c. ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
d. ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation
e. AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
f. AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
g. ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale
7.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage
The following table indicates the association of the security requirements and the security
objectives of the TOE. Some requirements correspond to the security objectives of the
TOE in combination with other objectives.
TOE SFRs
/
TOE Security objectives
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
FCS_CKM.1 X X X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1 X X
FDP_ACC.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP x x
FDP_ACC.1/ SVD_Transfer_SFP x
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import x X
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation_SFP x x
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 45 of 58
TOE SFRs
/
TOE Security objectives
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
FDP_ACF.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP x x
FDP_ACF.1/ SVD_Transfer_SFP x
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import X X
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation X X
FDP_ITC.1/SCD X
FDP_UCT.1/SCD X X
FDP_RIP.1 X X
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent X X X
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS X X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X
FIA_UID.1 X X X
FMT_MOF.1 X X
FMT_MSA.1/Admin X X
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory X X
FMT_MSA.2 X X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X X
FMT_MSA.4 X X X X
FMT_MTD.1/Admin X X
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X
FPT_EMSEC.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
FPT_TST.1 X X X
FTP_ITC.1/SCD X X
7.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) is provided by the SFR as follows.
The SCD import is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import,
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import and FDP_ITC.1/SCD. The confidentiality of the SCD is
protected during import according to FDP_UCT.1/SCD in the trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1/SCD.
For SCD/SVD generation FCS_CKM.1, SCD usage FCS_COP.1 and SCD destruction
FCS_CKM.4 ensure cryptographically secure lifecycle of the SCD. The SCD/SVD
generation is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP
and FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP. The SVD transfer for certificate generation
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 46 of 58
is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer_SFP and
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer_SFP.
The secure SCD usage is ensured cryptographically according to FCS_COP.1. The SCD
usage is controlled by access control FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation_FSP,
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation_FSP which is based on the security attribute secure
TSF management according to FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.4, FMT_MTD.1/Admin,
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory. The FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 defines security management
rules and functions. The test functions FPT_TST.1 provides failure detection throughout
the lifecycle. The SFR FCS_CKM.4 ensures a secure SCD destruction.
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp (Authorized SCD import) is provided by the security functions
specified by the following SFR. FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 ensure that the user is
identified and authenticated before SCD can be imported. FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import and
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import ensure that only authorised users can import SCD.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of a
SCD/SVD pair requires proper user authentication. The TSF specified by FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1 provide user identification and user authentication prior to enabling access to
authorised functions. The SFRFDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP and
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP provide access control for the SCD/SVD
generation. The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided by
FMT_MSA.1/Admin, FMT_MSA.2, and FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute initialisation. The
SFR FMT_MSA.4 defines rules for inheritance of the security attribute “SCD operational”
of the SCD.
OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature-creation data) implements the
requirement of practically unique SCD as laid down in Annex III, paragraph 1(a), which is
provided by the cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the
SVD corresponds to the SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the
algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1 to generate corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. The
security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that the keys are not
modified, so to retain the correspondence. Moreover, the SCD Identifier allows the
environment to identify the SCD and to link it with the appropriate SVD. The
management functions identified by FMT_SMF.1 and by FMT_MSA.4 allow R.Admin to
modify the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier.
OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of signature creation data) is provided by the security
functions specified by the following SFR. FDP_UCT.1/SCD and FTP_ITC.1/SCD ensures
the confidentiality for SCD import. The security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and
FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual information on SCD is destroyed after the SCD has
been use for signature creation and that destruction of SCD leaves no residual
information.
FCS_CKM.1 ensures the use of secure cryptographic algorithms for SCD/SVD
generation. Cryptographic quality of SCD/SVD pair shall prevent disclosure of SCD by
cryptographic attacks using the publicly known SVD.
The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical data is
modified which could alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information of
the SCD. FPT_TST.1 tests the working conditions of the TOE and FPT_FLS.1
guarantees a secure state when integrity is violated and thus assures that the specified
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 47 of 58
security functions are operational. An example where compromising error conditions are
countered by FPT_FLS.1 is fault injection for differential fault analysis (DFA).
The SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 and FPT_PHP.3 require additional security features of the TOE
to ensure the confidentiality of the SCD.
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by
the cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_COP.1, which ensure the cryptographic
robustness of the signature algorithms. FDP_SDI.2/Persistent corresponds to the
integrity of the SCD implemented by the TOE and FPT_TST.1 ensures self-tests
ensuring correct signature creation.
OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) is
provided by SFR for identification authentication and access control.
The FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 that ensure that no signature creation function can be
invoked before the signatory is identified and authenticated. The security functions
specified by FMT_MTD.1/Admin and FMT_MTD.1/Signatory manage the authentication
function. The SFR FIA_AFL.1 provides protection against a number of attacks, such as
cryptographic extraction of residual information, or brute force attacks against
authentication. The security function specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS ensures the integrity
of stored DTBS.
FDP_RIP.1 prevents misuse of any resources containing the SCD after de-allocation
(e.g. after the signature-creation process).”
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory restricts the ability to modify the security attributes SCD
operational to the signatory.
The security functions specified by FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation_SFP and
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation_SFP provide access control based on the security
attributes managed according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/Signatory,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_MSA.4. FMT_MOF.1
ensures that only the signatory can enable/disable the signature creation function. The
SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 list these management functions and the roles.
These ensure that the signature process is restricted to the signatory.
Furthermore, the security functionality specified by FDP_RIP.1 will ensure that no
attacker can get hold of the SCD (to create signatures outside the TOE) once SCD have
been deleted by the legitimate signatory.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensures that the DTBS/R
is not altered by the TOE. The verification that the DTBS/R has not been altered by the
TOE is provided by integrity functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS.
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security) covers that no intelligible
information is emanated. This is provided by FPT_EMSEC.1.1.
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT_PHP.1 by the means of passive
detection of physical attacks.
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT_PHP.3 to resist
physical attacks.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 48 of 58
8. TOE Summary Specification
This set of TSFs manages the identification and/or authentication of the external user
and enforces role separation.
8.1 SF.Access Control
This function checks that for each operation initiated by a user, the security attributes for
user authorization (FMT_SMR.1) and data communication required are satisfied.
8.2 SF.Signatory Authentication
This TSF manages the identification and authentication of the Signatory and enforces
role separation (FMT_SMR.1) between the Signatory and the Administrator.
8.3 SF.Signature Creation
This TSF is responsible for signing DTBS data using the SCD by the Signatory, following
successful authentication of the Signatory.
The SF generates digital signatures using RSA 1024 to 2048 bit (FMT_MSA.2,
FCS_COP.1) and SHA-1, SHA-256 hashing calculated by the host. The signature is
calculated based on PKCS#1 version 1.5 [14].
8.4 SF.Secure Messaging
Commands and responses are exchanged between the TOE and the external device.
This function is responsible for confidentiality and data authentication. Confidentiality is
ensured through the encryption of communication data by symmetric cryptography by the
use 3DES operations. Data authentication and integrity is achieved by calculating of a
cryptographic checksum (MAC).
8.5 SF.Crypto
This Security Function is responsible for providing cryptographic support to all the other
Security Functions including secure key generation, secure random generator, and data
hashing.
8.6 SF.Protection
This Security Function is responsible for protection of the TSF data, user data, and TSF
functionality. The SF. Protection function is composed of software implementations of test
and security functions including self-tests, secure deallocation, card content loading and
installation and patching services.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 49 of 58
9. Conventions & Terminology
9.1 Legislative References
This European standard reflects the requirement of a European directive in the technical
terms of a protection profile. The following terms are used in the text to reference the
directive:
9.1.1 The Directive
Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999
on “a Community framework for electronic signatures” [12],
9.1.2 Annex
One of the annexes, Annex I, Annex II or Annex III of The Directive
9.2 Symbols & Abbreviated Terms
Table 9. Symbols & Abbreviations
Term Definition
Administrator
User who performs TOE initialization, TOE personalization, or
other TOE administrative functions
ADF Application Dedicated File
aka Also Known As
CC Common Criteria
CGA
Certification generation application (CGA) means a collection
of application elements which requests the SVD from the
SSCD for generation of the qualified certificate. The CGA
stipulates the generation of a correspondent SCD / SVD pair
by the SSCD, if the requested SVD has not been generated by
the SSCD yet. The CGA verifies the authenticity of the SVD by
means of the SSCD proof of correspondence between SCD
and SVD and checking the sender and integrity of the received
SVD.
CSP
Certification-service-provider (CSP) means an entity or a legal
or natural person who issues certificates or provides other
services related to electronic signatures (defined in the
Directive, article 2.11).
CVM Cardholder Verification Method
DI Dual Interface
Directive
The Directive; DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 December 1999
on a Community framework for electronic signatures
DTBS
Data to be signed (DTBS) means the complete electronic data
to be signed (including both user message and signature
attributes)
DTBS/R
Data to be signed representation (DTBS/R) means the
representation data sent by the SCA to the TOE for signing
and is
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 50 of 58
Term Definition
- a hash-value of the DTBS or
- an intermediate hash-value of a first part of the DTBS
and a remaining part of the DTBS or
- the DTBS
The SCA indicates to the TOE the case of DTBS/R, unless
implicitly indicated. The hash-value in case (a) or the
intermediate hash-value in case (b) is calculated by the SCA.
The final hash-value in case (b) or the hash-value in case (c) is
calculated by the TOE.
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Non Volatile Memory
MAC Message Authentication Code
MF Master File (aka Root File)
Retail MAC
Commonly used DES based MAC, aka ISO 9797-1 mode 3
with DES
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PUK PIN Unlock Key
ROM Read Only Memory
OS Operating System
Qualified Certificate
Means a certificate which meets the requirements laid down in
Annex I of the Directive and is provided by a CSP who fulfils
the requirements laid down in Annex II of the Directive.
(defined in the Directive, article 2.10)
RAD
Reference authentication data (RAD) means data persistently
stored by the TOE for verification of the authentication attempt
as authorised user.
RNG Random Number Generator
HRNG Hardware Random Number Generator
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
SCA
Signature-creation application (SCA) means the application
used to create an electronic signature, excluding the SSCD.
i.e., the SCA is a collection of application elements.
- to perform the presentation of the DTBS to the signatory
prior to the signature process according to the signatory's
decision,
- to send a DTBS/R to the TOE, if the signatory indicates by
specific non mis-interpretable input or action the intend to
sign,
- to attach the qualified electronic signature generated by
the TOE to the data or provides the qualified electronic
signature as separate data.
SCD
Signature-creation data (SCD) means unique data, such as
codes or private cryptographic keys, which are used by the
signatory to create an electronic signature. (defined in the
Directive, article 2.4)
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 51 of 58
Term Definition
SDO
Signed data object (SDO) means the electronic data to which
the electronic signature has been attached to or logically
associated with as a method of authentication.
Signatory
Signatory means a person who holds a SSCD and acts either
on his own behalf or on behalf of the natural or legal person or
entity he represents. (defined in the Directive, article 2.3)
SSCD
Secure signature-creation device (SSCD) means configured
software or hardware which is used to implement the SCD and
which meets the requirements laid down in Annex III of the
Directive. (SSCD is defined in the Directive, article 2.5 and 2.6)
SSCD-Provisioning
Service
Service to prepare and provide an SSCD to a subscriber and
to support the signatory with certification of generated keys
and administrative functions of the SSCD
SVD
Signature-verification data (SVD) means data, such as codes
or public cryptographic keys, which are used for the purpose of
verifying an electronic signature. (defined in the Directive,
article 2.7)
VAD
Verification authentication data (VAD) means authentication
data provided as input by knowledge or authentication data
derived from user’s biometric characteristics.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 52 of 58
10. References
Certification References
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
CCMB-2012-09-001 - Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
CCMB-2012-09-002 -Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
CCMB-2012-09-003 -Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] BSI-CC-PP0059-2009-MA-01– Protection profiles for Secure Signature
Creation Device — Part 2: Device with key generation – Version: 2.01,
01/2012 (prEN 14169-2:2012)
[5] BSI-CC-PP0075-2012– Protection profiles for Secure Signature Creation
Device — Part 3: Device with key import - Version: 1.0.2, 07/2012
(prEN 14169-3:2012)
[6] BSI-PP-0035-2007 – Security IC Platform Protection Profile – version 1.0
– EAL4+
[7] CCDB-2007-09-001 – Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices – Version: 1.0, revision 1, September 2007
IC Platform References
[8] Product Data Sheet SmartMX2 family P60x040/052/080 VC/VG, Secure
high-performance smart card controller; Version 5.2; 27 June 2014
[9] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x040/052/080VC Guidance
and Operation Manual; Version 1.1; 26 June 2014
[10-1] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014 – for NXP Secure Smart
Card Controller P60D080/052/040PVG–including IC dedicated software
[10-2] Assurance continuity maintenance report BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014-
MA-01 – for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040PVG–
including IC dedicated software
[11] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG
Security Target Lite Rev. 2.1 — 19 August 2014;
BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2
Standards References
[12] DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures
[13] Algorithms and parameters for algorithms, list of algorithms and
parameters eligible for electronic signatures, procedures as defined in the
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 53 of 58
directive 1999/93/EC, article 9 on the ‘Electronic Signature Committee’ in
the Directive.
[14] PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 1.5
[15] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques —
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key
establishment, 2002
[16] ISO/IEC 9796-2: Information technology — Security techniques —
Signature Schemes giving message recovery — Part 2: Integer
factorization based mechanisms, 2002
[17] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
[18] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO
15946.TR-ECC, BSI 2006.
[19] FIPS PUB 180-2, FIPS Publication – Secure hash standard (+ Change
Notice to include SHA-224), 2002, NIST
[20] FIPS PUB 46-3, FIPS Publication – Data Encryption Standard (DES),
Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S. Department of Commerce/NIST
[21] IEEE 1363-2000 – IEEE Standard Specification for Public-Key
Cryptography
[22] ETSI Technical Specification 101 733, CMS Advanced Electronic
Signatures (CAdES), v2.2.1, 2013-04
[23] ETSI Technical Specification 101 903, XML Advanced Electronic
Signatures (XAdES), v1.4.2, 2010-12
[24] ETSI Technical Specification 102 778: PDF Advanced Electronic
Signatures (PAdES), v1.1.2, 2009-12
Additional References
[25] CCDB-2012-04-004 - Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for
smart cards and similar devices - Appendix 1
[26] Crypto Library V1.0 on P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG
Security Target Lite; Rev. 2.1 — 19 August 2014
BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2
[27] FIPS PUB 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication, October 2008, US Department of
Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 20164. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 54 of 58
11. Legal information
11.1 Definitions
Draft — The document is a draft version only. The content is still under
internal review and subject to formal approval, which may result in
modifications or additions. NXP Semiconductors does not give any
representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of
information included herein and shall have no liability for the consequences
of use of such information.
11.2 Disclaimers
Limited warranty and liability — Information in this document is believed to
be accurate and reliable. However, NXP Semiconductors does not give any
representations or warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or
completeness of such information and shall have no liability for the
consequences of use of such information. NXP Semiconductors takes no
responsibility for the content in this document if provided by an information
source outside of NXP Semiconductors.
In no event shall NXP Semiconductors be liable for any indirect, incidental,
punitive, special or consequential damages (including - without limitation -
lost profits, lost savings, business interruption, costs related to the removal or
replacement of any products or rework charges) whether or not such
damages are based on tort (including negligence), warranty, breach of
contract or any other legal theory.
Notwithstanding any damages that customer might incur for any reason
whatsoever, NXP Semiconductors’ aggregate and cumulative liability
towards customer for the products described herein shall be limited in
accordance with the Terms and conditions of commercial sale of NXP
Semiconductors.
Right to make changes — NXP Semiconductors reserves the right to make
changes to information published in this document, including without
limitation specifications and product descriptions, at any time and without
notice. This document supersedes and replaces all information supplied prior
to the publication hereof.
Suitability for use — NXP Semiconductors products are not designed,
authorized or warranted to be suitable for use in life support, life-critical or
safety-critical systems or equipment, nor in applications where failure or
malfunction of an NXP Semiconductors product can reasonably be expected
to result in personal injury, death or severe property or environmental
damage. NXP Semiconductors and its suppliers accept no liability for
inclusion and/or use of NXP Semiconductors products in such equipment or
applications and therefore such inclusion and/or use is at the customer’s own
risk.
Applications — Applications that are described herein for any of these
products are for illustrative purposes only. NXP Semiconductors makes no
representation or warranty that such applications will be suitable for the
specified use without further testing or modification.
Customers are responsible for the design and operation of their applications
and products using NXP Semiconductors products, and NXP
Semiconductors accepts no liability for any assistance with applications or
customer product design. It is customer’s sole responsibility to determine
whether the NXP Semiconductors product is suitable and fit for the
customer’s applications and products planned, as well as for the planned
application and use of customer’s third party customer(s). Customers should
provide appropriate design and operating safeguards to minimize the risks
associated with their applications and products.
NXP Semiconductors does not accept any liability related to any default,
damage, costs or problem which is based on any weakness or default in the
customer’s applications or products, or the application or use by customer’s
third party customer(s). Customer is responsible for doing all necessary
testing for the customer’s applications and products using NXP
Semiconductors products in order to avoid a default of the applications and
the products or of the application or use by customer’s third party
customer(s). NXP does not accept any liability in this respect.
Export control — This document as well as the item(s) described herein
may be subject to export control regulations. Export might require a prior
authorization from competent authorities.
Translations — A non-English (translated) version of a document is for
reference only. The English version shall prevail in case of any discrepancy
between the translated and English versions.
Evaluation products — This product is provided on an “as is” and “with all
faults” basis for evaluation purposes only. NXP Semiconductors, its affiliates
and their suppliers expressly disclaim all warranties, whether express,
implied or statutory, including but not limited to the implied warranties of non-
infringement, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The entire
risk as to the quality, or arising out of the use or performance, of this product
remains with customer.
In no event shall NXP Semiconductors, its affiliates or their suppliers be
liable to customer for any special, indirect, consequential, punitive or
incidental damages (including without limitation damages for loss of
business, business interruption, loss of use, loss of data or information, and
the like) arising out the use of or inability to use the product, whether or not
based on tort (including negligence), strict liability, breach of contract, breach
of warranty or any other theory, even if advised of the possibility of such
damages.
Notwithstanding any damages that customer might incur for any reason
whatsoever (including without limitation, all damages referenced above and
all direct or general damages), the entire liability of NXP Semiconductors, its
affiliates and their suppliers and customer’s exclusive remedy for all of the
foregoing shall be limited to actual damages incurred by customer based on
reasonable reliance up to the greater of the amount actually paid by
customer for the product or five dollars (US$5.00). The foregoing limitations,
exclusions and disclaimers shall apply to the maximum extent permitted by
applicable law, even if any remedy fails of its essential purpose.
11.3 Licenses
Purchase of NXP <xxx> components
<License statement text>
11.4 Patents
Notice is herewith given that the subject device uses one or more of the
following patents and that each of these patents may have corresponding
patents in other jurisdictions.
<Patent ID> — owned by <Company name>
11.5 Trademarks
Notice: All referenced brands, product names, service names and
trademarks are property of their respective owners.
<Name> — is a trademark of NXP Semiconductors N.V.
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 55 of 58
12. List of figures
Fig 1. SSCD Product Life-Cycle..................................8
Fig 2. SSCD Scope, Structural View.........................11
Fig 3. TOE Boundaries .............................................13
Fig 4. TOE Life-Cycle................................................15
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 56 of 58
13. List of tables
Table 1. Security Target Identification.............................3
Table 2. TOE Identification .............................................4
Table 3. Composition Role Allocation .............................4
Table 4. TOE Guidance ................................................15
Table 5. Users & Subjects ............................................19
Table 6. Security Environment to Security Objectives
Mapping ..........................................................27
Table 7. Security Attributes for Access control .............34
Table 8. Assurance Requirements: EAL4 augmented ..43
Table 9. Symbols & Abbreviations ................................49
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
Please be aware that important notices concerning this document and the product(s)
described herein, have been included in the section 'Legal information'.
© NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
For more information, visit: http://www.nxp.com
Date of release: 28th April 2016
Document identifier: STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01
14. Contents
1. Introduction .........................................................3
1.1 ST Identification .................................................3
1.2 TOE Identification...............................................4
1.3 Composite TOE..................................................4
1.4 TOE Overview....................................................5
2. Target of Evaluation............................................6
2.1 Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)........6
2.1.1 Additional Functions...........................................6
2.1.1.1 User Authentication............................................6
2.1.1.2 User Management of Signing Key......................7
2.1.1.3 Secure Communication......................................7
2.2 SSCD Product Lifecycle.....................................7
2.2.1 SSCD Preparation Stage ...................................8
2.2.2 SSCD Operational Use Phase ...........................9
2.3 TOE Scope.......................................................10
2.3.1 TOE Security Functionality...............................11
2.3.2 TOE Logical Boundaries ..................................13
2.3.3 TOE Form Factor & Physical Interfaces...........14
2.4 TOE Guidance .................................................15
2.5 TOE Life-cycle..................................................15
2.5.1 Design..............................................................16
2.5.2 Fabrication .......................................................16
2.5.3 Integration ........................................................16
2.5.4 Initialisation ......................................................16
2.5.5 Personalisation.................................................16
2.5.6 Operational.......................................................17
2.5.7 Application Note: Scope of SSCD PP application
.........................................................................17
3. Conformance Claims ........................................18
3.1 CC Conformance claims ..................................18
3.2 PP Claim ..........................................................18
4. Security Problem Definition .............................19
4.1 Assets ..............................................................19
4.2 Subjects ...........................................................19
4.3 Assumptions.....................................................19
4.4 Threats.............................................................20
4.4.1 Threat Agents...................................................20
4.4.2 Threats to Security ...........................................20
4.5 Organizational Security Policy..........................22
5. Security Objectives ...........................................22
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE .......................22
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment .....................................................24
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale...........................26
5.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage ..........................27
5.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency ........................27
5.3.2.1 Policies and Security Objective Sufficiency......27
5.3.2.2 Threats and Security Objective Sufficiency ......29
5.3.2.3 Assumptions and Security Objective Sufficiency
.........................................................................31
6. Extended Components Definition ....................31
6.1 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1) .........................31
7. Security Requirements......................................32
7.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ...........33
7.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)............................33
7.1.1.1 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1) ...33
7.1.1.2 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)...33
7.1.1.3 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)............33
7.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)..............................33
7.1.2.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) ...............34
7.1.2.2 Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)....................................................35
7.1.2.3 Import of user data without security attributes
(FDP_ITC.1).....................................................37
7.1.2.4 Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1) ...................................................37
7.1.2.5 Subset residual information protection
(FDP_RIP.1).....................................................37
7.1.2.6 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
(FDP_SDI.2).....................................................37
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)..............38
7.1.3.1 Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1).....38
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Security Target Lite
Please be aware that important notices concerning this document and the product(s)
described herein, have been included in the section 'Legal information'.
© NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
For more information, visit: http://www.nxp.com
Date of release: 28th April 2016
Document identifier: STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01
7.1.3.2 Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)..............38
7.1.3.3 Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1) .................38
7.1.4 Security Management ......................................39
7.1.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour
(FMT_MOF.1) ..................................................39
7.1.4.2 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
.........................................................................39
7.1.4.3 Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2) .........39
7.1.4.4 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) .......39
7.1.4.5 Static attribute value inheritance (FMT_MSA.4)
.........................................................................39
7.1.4.6 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) .........39
7.1.4.7 Security Management (FMT_SMF.1) ...............40
7.1.4.8 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)............................40
7.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .............................40
7.1.5.1 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1).........................40
7.1.5.2 Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1) ....................................................41
7.1.5.3 Passive detection of physical attack
(FPT_PHP.1)....................................................41
7.1.5.4 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3).....41
7.1.5.5 TSF testing (FPT_TST.1).................................41
7.1.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) ..........................42
7.1.6.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)............42
7.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements...........42
7.2.1 SARs Measures ...............................................43
7.2.2 SARs Rationale................................................43
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale.....................44
i Self-certification of the SVD is effectively computing a
digital signature with the corresponding SCD. A signing
operation requires explicit sole signatory control, however
this specific case, if supported, provides an exception to
7.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage ......................44
7.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency...................45
8. TOE Summary Specification.............................48
8.1 SF.Access Control............................................48
8.2 SF.Signatory Authentication.............................48
8.3 SF.Signature Creation......................................48
8.4 SF.Secure Messaging ......................................48
8.5 SF.Crypto .........................................................48
8.6 SF.Protection....................................................48
9. Conventions & Terminology.............................49
9.1 Legislative References .....................................49
9.1.1 The Directive ....................................................49
9.1.2 Annex ...............................................................49
9.2 Symbols & Abbreviated Terms.........................49
10. References .........................................................52
11. Legal information ..............................................54
11.1 Definitions.........................................................54
11.2 Disclaimers.......................................................54
11.3 Licenses ...........................................................54
11.4 Patents .............................................................54
11.5 Trademarks ......................................................54
12. List of figures.....................................................55
13. List of tables ......................................................56
14. Contents.............................................................57
this rule as,before being delivered to the signatory, such
control is evidently impossible.