BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019
for
IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11)
Firmware identifier '2b638e8e' (4768)
from
IBM Research & Development Germany
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019 (*)
IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11)
Firmware identifier '2b638e8e' (4768)
from IBM Research & Development Germany
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 2 August 2019
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................16
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................18
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................18
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................19
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................19
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................20
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................22
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................23
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11), Firmware identifier '2b638e8e' (4768) has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-1002-2018. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018 were
re-used.
The evaluation of the product IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11), Firmware identifier
'2b638e8e' (4768) was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 29 July 2019. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Research &
Development Germany.
The product was developed by: IBM Research & Development Germany.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 2 August
2019 is valid until 1 August 2024. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11), Firmware identifier '2b638e8e' (4768) has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
IBM Research & Development Germany
Schönaicher Straße 220
71032 Böblingen
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 firmware (EP11),
identified as ‘2b638e8e’, running on the IBM CryptoExpress 6 (4768) cryptographic
coprocessor, respectively. It is an implementation of the industry-standard PKCS#11
cryptographic service provider API version v2.20 with some modifications and algorithmic
extensions, adapted to requirements typical in enterprise servers. The EP11 firmware
provides a stateless backend, relying mainly on host-resident, encrypted datastores to
maintain sensitive state, while presenting services as a regular HSM-based PKCS#11
implementation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus, the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Secure key management Keys generated by, or imported to the TOE, are always associated with
their attributes. The TOE uses several attributes that affect the key
management, e.g., CKA_MODIFICABLE allows to change the key
attributes, while CKA_IBM_RESTRICTABLE allows attribute changes but
no addition of new attributes.
Key or state exported to the host is protected with regards to integrity and
confidentiality using authenticated encryption using wrapping keys and
MAC keys that are maintained within the TOE ("maintenance of host-
based keystore"). Optionally, exported objects can be associated with
session identifiers.
Cryptographic operations The following groups of functional services are offered to users:
• Generate or derive keys: AES, TDES, RSA, EC (elliptic curve,
prime field, NIST P-curves, or BP curves), DSA, generic secret
keys
• Generate or verify digital signatures with asymmetric keys: RSA,
ECDSA, DSA
• Key agreement: ECDH
• Encrypt or decrypt data with asymmetric keys: RSA
• Encrypt or decrypt data with symmetric keys: AES, TDES
• Cryptographic hash functions: SHA-1 and SHA-2 family of hash
functions (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)
• Random-number generation: DRNG (HASH_DRBG)
• Storage, use, and disposal of secrets within the TOE
Application identification and
authentication
The TOE distinguishes applications using its services based on either
proof of possession, or cryptographic authentication, in the cases where
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
users of services need to be identified.
Non-administrative services are available without authentication, unless
they reference host-resident state, which involves sessions. Objects
bound to sessions are usable as long as the corresponding session is
registered within the TOE.
Administrators are identified and authenticated through their X.509 public-
key certificates, which are loaded into the TOE with the corresponding
private keys resident outside the TOE. Administrators are identified
through signatures on state-changing administrative commands. Lists of
administrators are maintained for the whole card, and separate lists exist
for each internal domain. There are several administrative commands that
require the signatures of more than one administrator (with the number of
signatures being configurable).
Policy enforcement Usage restrictions combine object-level attributes and those of the domain
where the request is executed.
Objects feature fundamental functional restrictions, such as allowing
encryption/signature generation/etc. by a given object, with the
capabilities stored as attributes within each object, for instance encrypt or
sign data.
Domain restrictions can be defined through control points which represent
a diverse set of functional-level usage restrictions, e.g., key types, key
strength, but also the use of certain group of algorithms.
Objects must be allowed for each of these restrictions to become eligible
for use.
Administrative services Administrative commands includes queries and commands. Queries are
allowed for everyone, while administrative commands that change state
need to be signed by an administrator. The TOE provides different groups
of administrative commands, e.g., administrator management, key or
state import/export, management of control points, etc.
Selftests During startup, or upon demand, a set of known-answer tests are
executed. Failure prohibits subsequent cryptographic operations, and may
be remedied by restarting the module.
Audit Security-relevant operations within the TOE are audited through an HSM-
resident audit subsystem. It is based on a hash chain and , therefore,
immune to insertion or deletion.
Audit records may contain fields, which are public, and indirect, non-
sensitive information derived from keys, but NEVER sensitive values.
Indirect information, such as types, sizes, or truncated hashes of keys,
MAY be logged.
Audit records, when queried through non-administrative query, are
returned without additional signatures. Administrative query responses are
returned digitally signed, signing the same audit-record content, when
requested.
Actually recorded events are for example startup/shutdown of the TOE,
time updates, selftest completion, import/export keys, etc.
Random-number generation The TOE uses a hybrid random-number generation process. A hardware-
provided “true-random” (TRNG) provides a seed, which is conditioned and
then post-processed with a stateful pseudo-random generator (DRNG).
The TRNG seed is obtained from the HSM-internal entropy source.
The DRNG is based on a non-invertible, cryptographic hash function
(SHA-256), instantiating the DRBG structure from ISO 18031:2011, C.2.2.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019 Certification Report
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11), Firmware identifier '2b638e8e' (4768)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
IBM Crypto Express 6 EP11 (4768)
1 FW Segment 0 32f1f0ac-fe328a14 ecc8c022 8a1199e1
3368b47b bc2bd7f2 888e0566 bfdfd73f
Embedded in HSM
2 FW Segment 1 d608bcad-ec5513fd a6f6a026 03f241c9
dd935178 b2d07745 54089693 f7bbcbe3
Embedded in HSM
3 FW Segment 2 b7961613-dae86fe5 301054d7 3b1e24c6
764dfb28 45e7e4b3 fc04fc01 e25bc6de
Embedded in HSM
4 FW Segment 3 7ce8e3c2-e5988088 62e9cda8 e5acff4f
9eb58eb9 87bd1eff d0a7dbea 46e2e02c
Embedded in HSM
5 FW Enterprise PKCS#11 2b638e8e-74ec55f7 8477a357 9331f437
db66b9d5 3523ecbb a377420b 7b9fd046
Embedded in HSM
6 HW Crypto Engines
hardcoded in the
Andretta ASIC
Instantiated in the IBM 4768 Cryptographic
Coprocessor
Embedded in HSM
TOE guidance
7 DOC Enterprise PKCS#11
(EP11) Library
structure
2019-03-06
SHA256 sum:
9bf799c3b02d709dc4b86d7596ca2b292e4b
e2c237c8570b4b9bc2566eb1d7ef9
Download:
https://www.ibm.com/do
wnloads/cas/WXRDPR
AN
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
8 DOC 4767 PCIe
Cryptographic
Coprocessor
Installation Manual
First edition, Sept 2016
SHA256 sum:
1f6d91ae7465f3d7562bfa6b715872fa02b52
391412000c530760e515013b777
Download:
https://www.ibm.com/do
wnloads/cas/RMQG64A
V
9 DOC Trusted Key Entry
Workstation (TKE)
2019-02-16
SHA256 sum:
95bef88d6927c2179af3ead51d7e34e371ef3
10543315e907ea5e3fb9ac0e8dc
Download: https://www-
01.ibm.com/servers/res
ourcelink/svc00100.nsf/
pages/zosv2r3izst100/$
file/izst100_v2r3.pdf
HSM-enclosures (containing the TOE and non-TOE parts)
10 HW IBM 4768 PCIe
Cryptographic
Coprocessor
001 By service personnel
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered as part of the HSM-enclosure, which is part of the TOE environment
(except for the hardware parts listed as #5 in Table 2). The TOE is exclusively delivered to
the end user by dedicated IBM personnel that will also install the PCIe card in the user's
environment (typically a z System). The developer does not offer the product containing
the TOE by any other delivery procedure. The guidance can be obtained via https-secured
download and verified using the SHA-256 hash values listed in Table 2.
The end user is able to identify the TOE by inspecting details of the cryptographic
coprocessor or accelerator using the toolset of the operating system that operates the
HSM device. Each of the FW segments is identified by name and by a SHA-256 hash
value. The expected hash values are the ones listed in Table 2.
Please note that the TOE does not comprise the complete Cryptographic Coprocessor, but
rather its firmware running inside the HSM, as well as cryptographic algorithms
implemented in an ASIC and ASIC/FPGA, respectively. The evaluation of those hardware
parts of the TOE was based on a VHDL code review, aspects of the life cycle (ALC) have
not been examined regarding the hardware production.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Cryptographic services
The TOE provides cryptographic services for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers, including
key generation and key destruction policies.
User identification and authentication
The TOE provides user authentication (via sessions) and administrator authentication (via
certificates).
Domain control point access control policy
The TOE enforces an access control policy that affects the functions (mainly allowing or
disallowing a function) that are triggered by requests for TOE keys or state.
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Object security attribute access control policy
The TOE enforces an access control policy, which allows or disallows an operation
triggered by a session request on TOE objects based on the attributes bound on that
object.
Session object access control policy
The TOE enforces an access control policy, which allows or disallows an operation
triggered by a session request on a TOE key or state based on the existence and validity
of a session, and the association of a TOE key or state with a session.
Domain access control policy
The TOE verifies the attributes of user data when imported or exported from outside the
TOE. The control is based on domain identifiers and does not allow usage of objects from
one domain in another except if the related operation is a card-level administrative
request.
This includes the consistent interpretation of attributes of cryptographic keys when shared
with an external entity.
Inter-TSF detection of modification
The TOE rejects TSF data transmitted from an external IT product if the data integrity
check fails. That includes signature verification of administrator commands.
Auditing
The TOE creates audit events for its operation (e.g. startup) as well as key management
and administrator operation, including a timestamp from a reliable time source. The audit
events are provided in a user-interpretable format, and the audit trail is protected against
unauthorized deletion, and prevents overwriting of recent audit events when the audit trail
becomes full.
Residual information protection
Previous information from a resource is made unavailable upon deallocation.
Management of TSF
The TOE provides management functions to administrators:
• manage administrators
• manage control points
The TOE provides management functions to users:
• manage their session data
• manage their object key attributes
TSF protection through self-tests
The TOE runs self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the cryptographic
primitives, and ensures a secure state through prohibiting further operation in case the self
tests fail.
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• Key generation by IT environment
• Analysis of TOE audit data
• Personal security
• Availability of cryptographic key and key material
• Physical protection
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
Internal software is divided into four layers, i.e. the segments 0 to 3. The base two layers,
and a stub in the third layer control security and configuration of the module:
• Layer 0: Permanent POST 0 (Power-on Self Test) and Miniboot 0 (security
bootstrap). This code is in ROMmed flash, bootstrapping the entire module,
effectively non-modifiable.
• Layer 1: Rewritable POST 1 and Miniboot 1, responsible for self-test and some
card-level management functionality. The upper two layers customize the operation
of each individual device.
• Layer 2: System software. Supervisor-level code, including any system-provided
device drivers, but excluding the startup stub.
• Layer 3: Application code, including userspace drivers, if any.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer testing
379 automated tests have been executed on the 4768 CryptoExpress card.
All tests were successfully executed with the results being consistent with the expected
results.
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7.2. Evaluator testing and penetration testing
The evaluator repeated all automated developer tests on the 4768 model. In addition, 10
new additional functional evaluator tests have been executed on the 4768 model.
All test were executed successfully with no relevant deviations from the expected function
behavior.
7.3. Evaluator penetration testing
The evaluator performed 8 penetration tests on the 4768 model.
All test were executed successfully with no relevant deviations from the expected function
behavior that could be exploitable in the intended environment of the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated configuration requires the TOE (or rather its enclosing HSM) to be installed
in an IBM zSeries mainframe that runs a Common Criteria evaluated version of the z/OS
operating system. The TOE is accessed via ICSF and TKE.
Function-wise, the guidance documentation provides configuration requirements specific
to the evaluated configuration through mandatory control point settings. Details of the
required control point settings are documented in [9], Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11) Library
structure, appendix ‘Wire format’, section 8.3.
Furthermore, the following activities are not allowed in the evaluated configuration:
• manual key import
• key transport with enforced attribute binding (no separation of keys and attributes)
• firmware updates
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on firmware changes and card
4768 as new platform.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target ’
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex B of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available, the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime, a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ASIC Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
FW Firmware
HSM Hardware Security Module
HW Hardware
ICSF Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TKE Trusted Key Entry
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
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Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019, Version 1, Rev. 288, 2019-03-20, IBM
Enterprise PKCS#11, IBM Research Zürich and IBM Böblingen/Poughkeepsie
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2019-07-10, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration lists for the TOE:
Configuration list of static content measured by SHA256 hashes, Version 1.0, 2016-
12-12, IBM (confidential document)
EP11 configuration list BOE, Version 1, 2019-03-27, IBM (confidential document)
EP11 configuration list (BOE) for documentation files, Version 1, 2017-07-14, IBM
(confidential document)
Configuration list from git, Charlotte part; Version 1, Date 2019-03-14, IBM
(confidential document)
Notes for the configuration list from git, Charlotte part; Version 1, Date 2019-03-14,
IBM (confidential document)
Hardware configuration list for IBM 4765 and 4767 EP11 HSMs, Version 1.0, 2017-
08-31, IBM (confidential document)
[9] Guidance documentation of the TOE:
Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11) Library structure, 2019-03-06, IBM
4767 PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual, First edition, September
2016, IBM
Trusted Key Entry Workstation (TKE), z/OS Version 2 Release 3 , 2019-02-16, IBM
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1094-2019
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
1 Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES encryption and
decryption
(ECB and CBC mode)
FIPS 46-3
NIST SP 800-38A
(2001 Edition)
168 No
2 Cryptographic
Primitive
AES encryption and
decryption
(ECB and CBC mode)
FIPS 197
NIST SP 800-38A
(2001 Edition)
128, 192, 256 No (EBC)
Yes (CBC)
3 Cryptographic
Primitive
SHA-1 FIPS 180-4 N/A No
4 Cryptographic
Primitive
SHA-{224, 256, 384,
512}
FIPS 186-4 N/A Yes
5 Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA encryption,
decryption, signature
generation, and
signature verification
RFC 3447
(PKCS#1 V2.1)
2048, 3072, 4096 Yes
6 Cryptographic
Primitive
DSA signature
generation and
verification
FIPS 186-4 {L=2048, N=224}
{L=2048, N=256}
{L=3072, N=256}
Yes
7 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
(NIST curves)
ANSI X9.62-2005
FIPS 186-4
192 No
224, 256, 320,
384, 521
Yes
8 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
(Brainpool curves)
ANSI X9.62-2005
RFC 5639
192 No
224, 256, 320,
384, 512
Yes
9 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
(secp256k1 curve)
ANSI X9.62-2005
SEC2 v2
256 Yes
10 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDH
(NIST curves)
ANSI X9.62-2001
FIPS 186-4
192 No
224, 256, 320,
384, 521
Yes
11 Cryptographic ECDH ANSI X9.62-2001 192 No
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Primitive (Brainpool curves) RFC 5639 224, 256, 320,
384, 512
Yes
12 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDH
(secp256k1 curve)
ANSI X9.62-2001
SEC2 v2
256 Yes
13 Key Generation RSA FIPS 186-4
(algorithm C9)
2048, 3072, 4096 Yes
14 Key Generation DSA FIPS 186-4
Section (4.4.1)
{L=2048, N=224}
{L=2048, N=256}
{L=3072, N=256}
Yes
15 Key Generation ECDSA
(NIST and Brainpool
curves)
FIPS 186-4
(Section 6.2.1)
FIPS 186-4
RFC 5639
192 No
224, 256, 320,
384, 512, 521
Yes
16 Random
Number
Generation
Hash_DRBG with SHA-
256
(seeded by an internal
noise source)
NIST SP 800-90A
(revision 1)
FIPS 186-4
N/A N/A
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Note: End of report
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