Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
for
S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card, Version 5
from
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.31
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card, Version 5
from
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4 augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states),
ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation)
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 21. February 2007
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
1
Under the BSIG Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance
with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components
of these assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version 5
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card, Version 5 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
San24, Nongseo-dong, Giheung-gu, Yongin-City, Gyeonggido
449-711, Korea
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 21. February 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-24 and D-1 to D-4.
The product S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version 5
has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111.
7
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
San24, Nongseo-dong, Giheung-gu, Yongin-City, Gyeonggido
449-711, Korea
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 11
3 Security Policy 12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 13
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
10 Results of the Evaluation 16
10 Comments/Recommendations 19
11 Annexes 20
12 Security Target 20
13 Definitions 20
14 Bibliography 22
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The product type of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the S3CC9GW 16-Bit
RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version 5.
The TOE, the S3CC9GW microcontroller featuring the TORNADO™
cryptographic co-processor, is a Smart Card integrated circuit which is
composed of a processing unit, security components, contactless and contact
based I/O ports and volatile and non-volatile memories (hardware).
The TOE comprises the hardware of the smart card security controllers, type
S3CC9GW and IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software
required for operation. Such software (also known as IC firmware) is mainly
used for testing purpose during production only but also provides additional
services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or additional services
including a RSA asymmetric cryptography library and an AIS20 [4] compliant
random number generation library. All other software is called Smart Card
Embedded Software, which is not part of the TOE.
Regarding the RSA crypto library the user has the possibility to tailor this IC
Dedicated Software part of the TOE during the manufacturing process by
deselecting the RSA crypto library. Hence the TOE can be delivered with or
without the functionality of the RSA crypto library what is resulting in two TOE
configurations. If the user decides not to use the RSA crypto library the library is
not delivered to the user. In this case, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) is not
provided by the TOE. Deselecting the RSA crypto library means excluding the
code implementing functionality, which the user decided not to use. Excluding
the code of the deselected functionality has no impact on any other security
policy of the TOE, it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides
just not to use the functionality.
The TOE S3CC9GW is manufactured in IC fabrication of Samsung in Giheung,
Korea, indicated by the production line indicator “14” as hex (see part D, Annex
A of this report).
The hardware part of the TOE is the complete chip, composed of hardware and
software parts.
• The TOE hardware consists of: 144K bytes EEPROM, 8K bytes RAM, 2K
bytes Crypto RAM, 384K User ROM, 12K Test ROM, 16-bit Central
Processing Unit (CPU), Internal Voltage Regulator (IVR), Detectors &
Security Logic, a non-deterministic random number generator (RNG, this
non-deterministic part is only tested according to seed generation for
conformance to AIS20 [4]), Memory Protection Unit (MPU), Triple DES
cryptographic coprocessor with 112 or 168 bits key size, AES cryptographic
coprocessor with 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits key size, TORNADO™
modular multiplier supporting up to 2048-bit RSA, Hardware UART for
contact and contactless I/O modes (Radio Frequency power and signal
interface (RF Interface), Address & data buses, Internal Clock and Timers.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
• The TOE firmware and software consist of Test ROM code (that is used for
testing the chip during production), the TORNADO RSA secure
cryptographic library v3.5S (optional), a Deterministic Random Number
Generator (DRNG) that fulfils the requirements of AIS20.
The functions of the library included in the TOE are TND_RSA_SigSTD_Secure
(RSA signature generation with straightforward method),
TND_RSA_SigCRT_Secure (RSA signature generation with CRT method),
TND_RSA_SigCRT_Secure3 (RSA signature generation with CRT method),
TND_RSA_Verify (RSA signature verification) and RSA_Key_Generation (RSA
key generation). The library supports operation size from 32 bits to 2048 bits by
step of 2 bits. However, only key sizes from 1024 bits up to 2048 bits are within
the scope of this evaluation.The Smart Card Embedded Software is not part of
the TOE (for more details see Security Target [7]).
The TOE is intended to be used in a range of high security applications like
banking and finance applications, communication highways (Internet access
and transaction processing), Transport and ticketing applications (access
control cards) and Governmental cards (ID cards, health cards, driving
licenses). Several security features independently implemented in hardware or
controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and the
integrity and confidentiality of stored data. This includes measures for memory
protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only under
specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Smart card IC Platform Protection
Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9]. With
reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is described
in 7 phases. The development, production and operational user environment
are described and referenced to these phases. TOE delivery is defined at the
end of phase 3 as wafers.
The assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile [9] are
used. To address additional security features of the TOE (e.g cryptographic
services), the security environment as outlined in the PP [9] is augmented by an
additional policy, an assumption and security objectives accordingly.
The IT product S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version
5 was evaluated by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 09. February 2007. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
San24, Nongseo-dong, Giheung-gu, Yongin-City, Gyeonggido
449-711, Korea
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1],
part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance
level EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table
shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+: ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF (TSF: TOE Security Functions)
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation ST
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation ST
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control ST
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control ST
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control PP
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes ST
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation ST
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions ST
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state PP
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection PP
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack PP
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
Security
Functional
Requirement
Source
from PP or
added in ST
Identifier
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation PP
FRU Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance PP
Table 2: SFRs taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Source
from PP or
added in ST
Identifier
FAU Security Audit
9
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage PP / ST
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers PP / ST
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP
Table 3: SFRs CC part 2 extended
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 5.1 and 7.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security
Functions
Description
SF1 Environmental Security violation recording and reaction
SF2 Access Control
SF3 Non-reversibility of TEST and NORMAL modes
SF4 Hardware countermeasures for unobservability
SF5 Cryptography
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
SF1: Environmental Security violation recording and reaction
This function records in registers the events notified by the detectors.
The integrated detectors are frequency detector, voltage detector,
temperature detector, light detector, inner insulation removal detector,
9
PP/ST: component is described in the PP but operations are performed in the ST.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
active shield removal detector and power glitch detector.
The filters integrated are used for preventing noise, glitches and
extremely high frequency in the external reset or clock pad from causing
undefined or unpredictable behavior of the chip.
SF2: Access Control
This security function manages access to the security control registers
through access control security attributes. The user mode (NORMAL
mode) has another function, which is write-enabled bit for security related
registers. If the user does not enable this bit in 128 cycles after the reset,
the user cannot write security control registers any more (for more details
refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1).
SF3: Non-reversibility of TEST and NORMAL modes
The NORMAL mode of the TOE consists of privilege mode and user
mode. This function disables the TEST mode and enables the NORMAL
mode of the TOE. This function ensures the non-reversibility of the
Normal mode. This function is used once during the manufacturing
process only (for more details refer to the Security Target [7], chapter
6.1).
SF4: Hardware countermeasures for unobservability
This function protects the memory and the address/data bus from
probing attacks. This security function protects also the memory contents
of the TOE from data analysis on the stored data as well as on internally
transmitted data. The algorithms used for encryption are proprietary. The
ROM scrambling is static key while the RAM and the EEPROM
scrambling are dynamic key. RAM scrambling is performed automatically
while EEPROM scrambling is defined and managed by the embedded
software. The Central Processing Unit (CPU) of the TOE is synthesizable
with glue logic, which makes reverse engineering and signal identification
more difficult. Most sensitive hardware components such as buses are
also hidden and implemented in deepest layers. The TOE operations can
be made asynchronous by using the Internal Variable Clock and the
Random Wait Generator security features. They make a full range of
intrusive (e.g. probing attacks) and non intrusive attacks (e.g. side-
channel attacks) more complex and difficult.
SF5: Cryptography
This function is used for encrypting and decrypting data using the Triple
DES symmetric algorithm. A Random Number Generator is used for
generating random numbers for security processes in smart card
applications and provides a mechanism to generate random numbers. It
includes two functions: A random SEED Generation algorithm that
generates a truly random number and a Deterministic Random Number
Generator (DRNG) algorithm compliant with AIS 20 [4] (class K3 SOF
High requirements). TORNADO RSA Cryptographic Library (optional)
assists in the acceleration of modulo exponentiations required in the RSA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
encryption/decryption algorithm. TORNADO is a high speed modular
multiplication coprocessor for RSA public key asymmetric cryptographic
support. The TORNADO RSA Library is a software built for the
TORNADO coprocessor it provides high level interfaces for RSA based
algorithms (for more details please refer to the Security Target [7],
chapter 6.1).
As the final transition from test mode to normal mode is performed before TOE
delivery, all TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE delivery at the end
of phase 3 (except SF3).
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [7].
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the Organisational Security Policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [7] and can be summarised as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
So-called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[9] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (Phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
• manipulation of User Data and of the Smart Card Embedded Software (while
being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories),
• disclosure of User Data and of the Smart Card Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
• deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [9] and
used by the Security Target [6] by defining threats on a more technical level for
• Inherent Information Leakage,
• Physical Probing,
• Physical Manipulation,
• Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
• Forced Information Leakage,
• Abuse of Functionality and
• Deficiency of Random Numbers.
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an Organisational Security Policy outlining that the IC
Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
A specific additional security functionality Triple-DES, Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA, if selected) must be
provided by the TOE according to an additional security policy defined in the
Security Target [7].
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, normal mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process
(Phase 3). At this point in time the operating system is already stored in the
non-volatile memories of the chip and the test mode is disabled.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the Smart Card Finishing Process, Personalisation and the
delivery of the smart card to an end user, have to be organised in a way that
excludes all possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE.
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating
conditions and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as
described in the user documentation and chapter 10 of this Report.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [9], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security
Target, Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
The developer of the Smart card Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
• the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that the software
fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In particular the
assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop software that fulfils
the assumptions.
• the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the TOE
(especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed that the
Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of the
environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE. Only
appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE
have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
• It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by
the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-user to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data
(to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised
use).
• All User Data are owned by Smart Card Embedded Software. Therefore, it
must be assumed that security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic
keys) are treated by the Smart Card Embedded Software as defined for the
specific application context.
• The developer of the Smart Card Embedded Software must ensure the
appropriate “Usage of Keydependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while
developing this software in Phase 1. Key-dependent functions (if any) shall
be implemented in the Smart Card Embedded Software in a way that they
are not susceptible to leakage attacks.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version 5
The following tables outline the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
1 HW S3CC9GW Vers. 5 Wafer
2 SW DRNG V2.0 Source code in
electronic form
3 SW Secure Crypto Library (optional) V3.5S Source code in
electronic form
4 DOC User's manual [11] V3.1 In electronic form
5 DOC Security Application Note [12] V1.5 In electronic form
6 DOC RSA Application Note [13] V1.8 In electronic form
7 DOC DRNG Application Note [14] V2.0 In electronic form
8 DOC S3CC9GW Delivery Specification [15] V1.3 In electronic form
Table 5: Delivered documents of the TOE
The delivered micro chips contain the actual TOE and the embedded software.
They are delivered in form of wafers from the TOE Manufacturer (logistics
warehouse in Onyang) to the Card Manufacturer.
The TOE’s confidentiality and availability should be protected during the
delivery. The user software (operating system) will be loaded on the delivered
TOE. Then the TOE is under the control of the user software and the TOE
manufacturer (Samsung) can guarantee the integrity up to the delivery process.
A processing step during wafer testing incorporates the chip-individual features
into the TOE. Each individual TOE is uniquely identified by its product code.
This product code in the EEPROM Security area is TOE specific as among
others. It includes the core, application category, serial number, version, internal
development code, and customer ROM code. It is described how the customer
can retrieve this information. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced
unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development and production
process (compare Table 6).
The TOE is identified by S3CC9GW revision 5. Another characteristic of the
TOE is the product code. This information is stored in the EEPROM and can be
read out by the user of the card via the normal EEPROM read command. It
contains the following information at which among others the production line
indicator is part of the serial number. Here the hex value “14” at the beginning of
the serial number indicates that the TOE is produced in Giheung wafer line 5.
Address Contents Data
80000h – 80001h Chip status information
Samsung’s
value
internal management
80002h – 80003h ROM code number ROM code number
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80004h – 80005h Device Type 1020 h
80006h – 8000Fh Available for customer All FF h
80010h – 8001Bh Serial number
Samsung’s internal management
value beginning with 14 h
8001Ch – 8001Dh IC Fabricator 4250 h
8001Eh – 8001Fh IC Fabrication Date
YDDD h (where Y is the last digit of
the year and DDD is the number of
the day within the year)
80020h – 80021h IC Module Fabricator 4252 h
80022h– 80023h
IC
date
Module Packaging
YDDD h (where Y is the last digit of
the year and DDD is the number of
the day within the year)
80024h – 80027h IC Serial Number A proprietary binary number
80028h – 80029h IC Batch number A proprietary binary number
8002Ah IC Version 05 h
8002Bh Test ROM Code Version 10 h
8002Ch – 8002Dh Crypto. Library Version 035C h
8002Eh DRNG Library Version 02 h
80030h – 8007Fh Available for customer All FF h
Table 6: TOE version information
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus provi-
ding an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a deterministic random number generator. If the user decides not
to use the RSA crypto library the library is not delivered to the user. Hence the
TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the RSA crypto library
what is resulting in two TOE configurations.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during Triple-DES and RSA cryptographic
functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against
malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of
the TOE and
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• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The TOE, the S3CC9GW microcontroller featuring the TORNADO™
cryptographic coprocessor, is a Smart Card integrated circuit which is
composed of a processing unit, security components, contactless and contact
based I/O ports and volatile and non-volatile memories (hardware). The TOE
comprises the hardware of the smart card security controllers, type S3CC9GW
and IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software required for
operation. Such software (also known as IC firmware) is mainly used for testing
purpose during production only but also provides additional services to facilitate
the usage of the hardware and/or additional services including a RSA
asymmetric cryptography library and an AIS20 compliant random number
generation library. All other software is called Smart Card Embedded Software,
which is not part of the TOE.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the Security Functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
Security Functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environ-
mental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Samsung Electronics is the TOE developer and
manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded
smart card application software in its development and production environment.
For those aspects refer to part B, chapter 9.2 of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable only for TOE chips from the
semiconductor factory in Giheung, labelled by the production line indicator „14“
as hex.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version 5 is
an integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating system
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and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6].
The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE
is to be found in guidance documents delivered to the customer, see table 5.
The TOE consists of the 19 subsystems (16 hardware / 3 software) as defined
in evaluation documentation. For the implementation of the TOE Security
Functions basically the components processing unit (CPU) with ROM,
EEPROM, RAM, I/O, Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG),
TORNADO, Clock, Timer / 16-bit Timer and 20-bit Watchdog, Detectors and
Security Control, RESET, Address and Data Bus, DES, AES, Power Control,
MPU / Memory Protection Unit, Testrom_code, RSA Crypto Library and DRNG
Library are used.
Security measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of the
whole circuitry. The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the
various on-chip memories provide the interface to the software using the
Security Functions of the TOE.
The subsystem Testrom_code stored on the chip, is used for testing purposes
during production only and is completely separated from the use of the
embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
6 Documentation
The documentations [11] – [15] are provided with the products by the developer
to the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hard-
ware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into five categories:
(i) Simulation tests: These tests are performed before starting the
production to develop the technology for the production and to define the
process parameters.
(ii) Qualification tests: These tests are performed after the first production of
chips.The tests are performed in test mode. With these tests the
influence of temperature, frequency, and voltage on the security
functions are tested in detail.
(iii) Verification tests: These tests are performed in normal mode and check
the functionality in the end user environment. The results of the
qualification and verification tests are the basis on which it is decided,
whether the TOE is released to production.
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(iv) Security evaluation tests: These tests are performed in normal mode and
check the security mechanisms aiming on the security functionality and
the effectivness of the mechanisms. The random numbers are tested as
required by AIS 20 and fulfil the criteria.
(v) Production tests: These tests are performed at each TOE before
delivery. The aim of the production tests is to check whether each chip is
functioning correctly.
(vi) Penetration Tests: Penetration Tests are performed to find security flaws
in the product.
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification, the high level design and the low
level design. Chips from the production site in Giheung (see part D, annex A of
this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators testing effort can be summarised into the following classes of
tests: Module tests, Simulation tests, Emulation tests, Tests in normal mode,
Tests in test mode and Hardware tests. The evaluators performed independent
tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer
by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the developers tests, test parameters
were varied and additional analysis was done. With these kind of tests
performed in the developer’s testing environment the entire security functionality
of the TOE was verified. Overall the evaluators have tested the TSF
systematically against the functional specification, the high-level design and the
low-level design.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual version of the TOE with
production line indicator “14” as hex in Giheung provides the Security Functions
as specified.
Intensive penetration testing was performed at that time to consider the physical
tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expertised
know-how. Specific additional penetration attacks were performed in the course
of this evaluation.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version
5. In the broader sense, the production of the mask sets for the chip production
may be looked upon as the procedure for the system generation. The TOE can
be delivered in two configurations:
• Smart Card IC S3CC9GW Revision 5,
• Smart Card IC S3CC9GW Revision 5 with Secure Crypto Library V3.5S.
No further generation takes place after delivery to the customer. After delivery
the TOE only features one fixed configuration (normal mode), which cannot be
altered by the user. The TOE was tested in this configuration. All the evaluation
and certification results therefore are only effective for this version of the TOE.
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For all evaluation activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why
the results are valid for the normal mode, too.
Every information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the
software is provided within the user documentation.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards and
(see [4, AIS 25 and AIS 26]) and [4, AIS 31] (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for deterministic random number generators) were
used. The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed
in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Semiformal high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Formal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Standardised life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA.1 PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 7: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that
• the TOE is conform to the Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-
PP-0002-2001 [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
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• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF3 – Non-reversibility of TEST and NORMAL modes.
SF5 – Deterministic Random Number Generator.
The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 20 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
(i) the TOE Security Function SF5 which is the Triple DES encryption and
decryption by the hardware co-processor and TORNADO™ coprocessor for
RSA Asymmetric Cryptographic Support including RSA Library.
(ii) for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE is used by the TOE manufacturer to
check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was considered as part of the
evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for relevant procedures and
under ATE for testing.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as identified in table
5, produced in the semiconductor factory in Giheung, labelled by the production
line indicator „14“ as hex within the chip identification number in the EEPROM,
and the firmware and software versions as indicated in table 5.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the
modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Additional Evaluation Results
• The evaluation confirmed specific results of a previous smart card IC
evaluation regarding assurance aspects for the development and production
environment. This is outlined in part D of this report, annex A.
• To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific smart
card embedded software additional evaluator actions were performed during
the TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the ETR-lite [10]
according to [4, AIS 36]. Therefore, the interface between the smart card
embedded software developer and the developer of the TOE was examined
in detail.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The TOE is delivered to Card Manufacturer and the Smart Card Embedded
Software Developer. The actual end user obtains the TOE from the operating
system producer together with the application which runs on the TOE.
The Smart Card Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary
recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered
documentation.
• All security hints described in [11] and the delivered documents [12], [13],
[14] have to be considered.
In addition the following assumptions and requirements concerning external
security measures, explicitly documented in the singles evaluation reports, have
to be fulfilled:
• Requirement resulting from ADV_LLD:
Since the hardware cannot guarantee the storage of correct data in case of
power loss during memory write operations the software has to implement
appropriate measures to check if security relevant data are correctly written.
• Requirement resulting from ADO_DEL:
• As the TOE is under control of the user software, the chip manufacturer
can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the
responsibility of the Smart Card Embedded Software Developer to
include mechanisms in the implemented software which allows detection
of modifications after the delivery.
• TOEs which failed the production tests are also delivered, as they are
inked (marked my black dots) and remain physically on the wafer. The
Card Manufacturer has to follow the procedure described in [15] to
handle these chips in a secure manner.
In addition the following assumptions and requirements concerning external
security measures, explicitly documented in the singles evaluation reports, have
to be fulfilled:
• TOEs which failed the production tests are also delivered, as they are
inked (marked my black dots) and remain physically on the wafer. The
Card Manu-facturer has to follow the procedure described in [15] to
handle these chips in a secure manner.
• Requirement resulting from AVA_MSU:
During an evaluation of the Smart Card Embedded Software the following
has to be checked:
• Application of the security advices given in [12] especially the rec-
ommendations for secure usage in [12, chapter 4].
• Requirement resulting from AVA_VLA:
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• The TOE is protected by light sensors against light injection attacks (e.g.
with laser). Nevertheless the performed penetration tests show that it is
still possible to manipulate a running program with a focussed laser. The
Smart Card Embedded Software Developer has to implement sufficient
counter-measures in his software to counter such attacks, too.
The Card Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to
develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
• All security hints described in [15] have to be considered.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACE Advanced Crypto Engine
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electrical Code Block
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro magnetic analysis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adelmann – a public key encryption algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
- AIS 20 Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) AIS 20,
Version1, Date: 2 December,1999, Status: Mandatory, Subject:
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for, deterministic
random number generators, Publisher: Certification body of the BSI,
Section II 2, as part of the certification scheme
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- AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, - The
Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July 2002
- AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July 2002
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter
CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC
Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 36 Version 1, 29 July 2002 for CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation,
Version 1.2, March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target, Security Target of S3CC9GW 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Cards – Project Comanche, Version 1.7,
31.January 2007
[7] Security Target Lite of S3CC9GW 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Cards – Project Comanche, Version 1.0, 31. January 2007
[8] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), Version 3, 09.02.2007 for the
product S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version
5 (confidential document)
[9] Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10] ETR-lite for composition, Version 2, 09.02.2007 for the product
S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version 5
(confidential document)
[11] User’s manual S3CC9GC/GW 16-Bit CMOS Microcontroller for Smart
Card Version 3.1, 03.2006
[12] Security Application Note, S3CC9GC/S3CC9GW Version 1.5,
18.12.2006
[13] Application Note RSA Crypto Library with TORNADO V3.5S, Version 1.8,
04.07.2006
[14] Application Note DRNG Software Library Version 2.0, 13.12.2006
[15] S3CC9GW Chip Delivery Specification Version 1.3, 12.2006
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007 Certification Report
Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0400-2007
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT products S3CC9GW 16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version
5 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) have been evaluated at an accredited and
licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005), extended by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific
guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC15408: 2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 21. February 2007, the following
results regarding the development and production environment apply. The
Common Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfiled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd. San24, Nongseo-dong, Giheung-gu,
Yongin-City, Gyeonggido , 449-711, Korea (Development, Production,
Mask House)
b) Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd. San #16, Banwol-Ri, Hwasung-Eup,
Gyeonggi-Do, 445-701, Korea (Development)
c) Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd., San #74, Buksoo-Ri, Baebang-Myun,
Asan-City, Chungcheongnam-Do, 449-711, Korea (Onyang plant,
Delivery)
d) PKL Co., Ltd. Plant, 493-3 Sungsung-Dong, Cheonan-City,
Choongcheongnam, 330-300, Korea (Mask House)
The hardware part of the TOE produced in the semiconductor factory in
Giheung, Korea, is labelled by the production line indicator „14“ as hex.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for
each site and in accordance with Security Target, Security Target of S3CC9GW
16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards – Project Comanche, Version 1.7,
31.January 2007
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
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The evaluators verified, that the threats and the security objective for the life
cycle phases 2, 3 up to delivery at the end of phases 3 as stated in the Security
Target [6] are fulfiled by the procedures of these sites.
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