BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020
for
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01
from
MaskTech International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.3
BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020 (*)
Security IC with MRTD EAC/PACE Application
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01
from MaskTech International GmbH
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Extended Access Control with PACE,
Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-
V2-2012-MA-02
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 September 2020
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................18
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................18
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................19
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................19
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................20
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................23
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................24
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.13
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
3
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0995-2018.
Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0995-2018 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01 was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 17 September 2020. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)4
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: MaskTech International GmbH.
The product was developed by: MaskTech International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 29
September 2020 is valid until 28 September 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
4
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01 has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer5
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
5
MaskTech International GmbH
Nordostpark 45
90411 Nürnberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
Target of evaluation (TOE) of this evaluation technical report (ETR) is the product MTCOS
Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01 provided by MaskTech International GmbH.
The TOE is an electronic travel document representing a contactless/contact smart card
programmed according to ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control” and
additionally providing the Extended Access Control according to the ’ICAO 9303’ and TR-
03110-1. The communication between terminal and chip shall be protected by Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) according to Electronic Passport using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2. Additionally,
Chip authentication Mapping as an option of PACE (PACE-CAM) and Active Authentication
according to ’ICAO 9303’ is provided.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended
Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-
MA-02 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
F.IC_CL This Security Function covers the security functions of the hardware
(IC) as well as of the cryptographic library.
F.Access_Control This TSF regulates all access by external entities to operations of the
TOE which are only executed after this TSF allowed access.
F.Identification_Authentication This function provides identification/authentication of user roles.
F.Management Provides management and administrative functionalities
F.Crypto This function provides a high-level interface to cryptographic functions.
F.Verification TOE internal functions ensure correct operation by implementing
internal hardware test routines.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
Hardware Platform STMicroelectronics
ST31G480 D01 secure dual-interface
controller including the cryptographic library
NesLib 6.2.1
ST31G480 D01 FW:
2.1.0 CL: NesLib
v6.2.1
SW is implemented in
NVM memory; chip is
initialised and tested
before delivery to
Personalisation Agent.
Delivery type: The OS
and application soft-
ware flashed on the IC
Platform
2 TOE Embedded Software IC Embedded
Software (the operating system MTCOS Pro
2.5, implemented in NVM of the IC)
MTCOS Pro Version
2.5, Build date
28.04.2020
3 TOE Embedded Applications IC Embedded
Software / Part Application Software
(containing the MRTD Application
implemented in the NVM of the IC with the
file system)
MTCOS Pro 2.5
EAC with PACE
4 DOC User Guidance MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with
PACE / ST31G480 D01 [12]
Version 1.4,
09.09.2020
Password protected
Secure Webserver
5 User Guidance – I/P MTCOS Pro 2.5 /
ST31G480 D01 [15]
Version 1.4,
09.09.2020
6 MTCOS MANUAL MTCOS 2.5 on
ST31G480 D01 [10]
Version 1.0,
29.05.2020
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Sensitive electronic documents: delivery of sensitive electronic data is performed via PGP
encrypted via email. The guidance documentation can be obtained by password-protected
download from the MaskTech International GmbH website (http://www.masktech.com).
Flash image production: the developer transfers the flash image (HEX file) PGP-
authenticated and encrypted to the secure webserver of the Manufacturer via an SSL-
protected web access.
TOE for Personalization: Chip card hardware is securely shipped to the Personalisation
Agent.
For the customer to be able to check the correct delivery visually, a delivery note together
with the hardware stating the product type and certification reference number is provided.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020 Certification Report
However, the most important check is done implicitly by means of the personalization
keys. The Personalization Agent must perform a MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command to
authenticate himself against the key. The response of the chip to the command must be
verified, either by using Secure Messaging, which is strongly recommended, or by an
explicit verification. Because the personalization keys are derived from the production key
provided by MaskTech International GmbH and can only be set after authentication against
this production key, the personalization keys will work only with the correct hardware.
Therefore, by being able to perform personalization successfully, the customer has
implicitly checked that the hardware part of the delivery is correct.
Further checks can be done using the GET CHIP ID or GET CHIP INFORMATION
command. They return the chip identifier respectively additional information about the
platform, the operating system and the patch level. Whether the chip contains the correct
file system layout can be verified by checking the product identifier stored in the file
EF.KVC.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The TOE implements physical and
logical security functionality in order to protect user data stored and operated on the smart-
card when used in a hostile environment. Due to the nature of its intended application, i.e.
the TOE may be issued to users and may not be directly under the control of trained and
dedicated administrators. As a result, it is imperative that misleading, unreasonable and
conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance documentation, and that secure
procedures for all modes of operation have been addressed. Insecure states should be
easy to detect. The TOE shall be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks to
meet the security objectives. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security
policies can be found in [6] and [9], chapter 6.3.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key
● OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric
Reference Data
● OE.Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Active Authentication Key
● OE.Exam_Travel_Document Examination of the physical part of the travel
document
● OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document Protection of data from the logical travel
document
● OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection
Systems
● OE.Legislative_Compliance Issuing of the travel document
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● OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Authentication of travel document by
Signature
● OE.Personalization Personalization of travel document
● OE.Terminal Terminal operating
● OE.Travel_Document_Holder Travel document holder Obligations
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit ST31G480
D01, IC Dedicated Software including Test and Support Software, IC Embedded Software
(Operating System) and the MRTD Application. While the IC Embedded software contains
the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.5, the NVM contains the MRTD application. As all
these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its
environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC, the STMicroelectronics
ST31G480 D01 secure dual-interface controller including the cryptographic library NesLib
6.2.1.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The test cases are dedicated to the demonstration of the proper implementation of all
security functions, card commands and operating system functionalities. For all commands
resp. functionality, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate the expected behaviour
including error cases. Each security function is covered by at least one test case. From all
existing file system setups, a representative subset of setups was chosen for evaluator
testing. The conducted tests can be categorized into two groups: tests with the real card
and tests with the emulator. The latter are used for situations where the test result cannot
be verified externally (e.g. the secure deletion of data). For the chosen setups the
evaluators conducted all test cases of the developer’s test suite for non-interactive tests
using the test equipment provided by the developer. The evaluators decided to focus their
own independent tests on tests with real cards, but emulator tests were also conducted.
For these tests the evaluators derived some test ideas from the developer tests under
consideration of the described security functionality.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result. If
necessary the developer gave additional annotations.
The evaluators used fuzzy testing to determine the correct implementation of the TOE. In
the course of the fuzzy testing no results indicating a wrong implementation could be
found.
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The penetration testing was performed using the test environment of the evaluation facility.
All relevant information as well as evaluation documentation was taken into account for the
analysis by the evaluators. For the penetration analysis the evaluator analysed the CC
deliverables for potential vulnerabilities already during the evaluation work for the
corresponding aspects. The evaluators found no exploitable vulnerabilities in the
evaluation deliverables. The evaluator used the potential vulnerabilities from the JIL
document as the lead for further investigations. All possible attack methods against an
authentic operational TOE were analysed. Potential vulnerabilities cannot be exploited
during the phases development, manufacturing and personalization.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6, 9] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE: MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with
PACE / ST31G480 D01 consisting of
● STMicroelectronics ST31G480 D01 secure dual-interface controller
● Cryptographic library NesLib 6.2.1
● Software (Operating System MTCOS Pro 2.5) implemented on the IC
● File system layout
● User guidance
● Initialization/Pre-Personalization Guidance
● Product Manual
The IC embedded software consists of the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.5 and an
application layer, consisting of the MRTD application.
In order to meet customer requirements, the product is provided in various configurations.
These differ in the amount of memory space for user data, the combination of data groups,
the cryptographic method provided for Active Authentication and the Secure Messaging
method used for default Chip Authentication. The configurations are:
LayoutA-80-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 80 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutA-80-AA_RSA-SM_AES_128 80 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutA-80-AA_EC-SM_3DES 80 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutA-80-AA_EC-SM_AES_128 80 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
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LayoutB-80-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 80 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutB-80-AA_RSA-SM_AES_128 80 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutB-80-AA_EC-SM_3DES 80 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutB-80-AA_EC-SM_AES_128 80 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutC-128-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 128 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutC-128-AA_RSA-SM_AES_128 128 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutC-128-AA_EC-SM_3DES 128 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutC-128-AA_EC-SM_AES_128 128 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutD-145-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 145 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutD-145-AA_RSA-SM_AES_128 145 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutD-145-AA_EC-SM_3DES 145 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutD-145-AA_EC-SM_AES_128 145 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutE-40-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 40 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutE-40-AA_RSA-SM_AES_128 40 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
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LayoutE-40-AA_EC-SM_3DES 40 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 3DES for Secure
Messaging
LayoutE-40-AA_EC-SM_AES_128 40 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for
Active Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure
Messaging
Layout0-S 80 kbytes memory space for user data
Layout0-L 145 kbytes memory space for user data
The configuration identifiers indicate the algorithm (RSA, EC) used for Active
Authentication and the algorithm for Secure Messaging with default Chip Authentication
(3DES, AES).
Further details are given in the User Guidance.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
(ii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
(iv) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6,
(v) Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA,
DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations,
(vi) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(i.e. on hardware [15, 16, 17, 18], have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 25, 26, 34, 36, 46).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
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● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0995-2018, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5
December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table presented in appendix A of the Security Target [6, 9] gives an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the
standard of application where its specific appropriateness is stated. The strength of the
these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure
(see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
All cryptographic algorithms listed in the table in appendix A of the Security Target [6, 9]
are implemented by the TOE because of the standards building the TOE application. For
that reason, an explicit validity period is not given for this crypto functionality.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
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the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
3DES Triple-DES
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (Crypto Algorithm)
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
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Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE6
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020, Version 0.15, 09.09.2020, Security Target
– MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01, MaskTech International GmbH
(confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, 11.09.2020, Evaluation Report Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR), SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH, (confidential
document)
[8] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access
Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-
MA-02
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1064, Version 1.4, 09.09.2020, Security Target –
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01, MaskTech International GmbH
(sanitised public document)
[10] MTCOS MANUAL MTCOS 2.5 on ST31G480, Version 1.0, 29.05.2020
[11] Configuration List for MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01, Version
0.4, 09.09.2020, MaskTech International GmbH
[12] User Guidance MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01, Version 1.4,
09.09.2020, MaskTech International GmbH
[13] Rapport de certification ANSSI-CC-2019/12 – ST31G480 D01 including optional
cryptographic library NESLIB v6.2.1 and optional technologies MI-FARE DESFire
EV1 v4.8.12 and MIFARE Plus X v2.4.6, Agence nationale de la sécurité des
systèmes d’information
[14] ETR lite for Composition, Elixir-3 Project, Certification ID ANSSI-CC-2019/12, TOE
ST31G480 D01, Version 1.3, 15.02.2019, Serma Safety & Security
6
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[15] User Guidance – I/P MTCOS Pro 2.5 / ST31G480 D01, Version 1.4, 09.09.2020,
MaskTech International GmbH
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1064-2020
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / ST31G480 D01 (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 29 September 2020, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 45, 90411 Nuernberg, Germany
(Software Developer Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent)
b) Linxens (Thailand) Co Ltd. 142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate Tambon Ban
Laean, Amphor Bang-pa-in 13160 Ayutthaya Thailand (Initialization/Pre-
personalization Agent)
c) HID Global Ireland Teoranta, Pairc Tionscail na Tullaigh, Baile na hAbhann, Co.
Galway, Ireland (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent)
d) HID Global Malaysia, Kulai Johor, HID Global Sdn. Bhd. No. 2, Jalan i-Park 1/1
Kawasan Perindustrian i-Park Bandar Indahpura 81000 Kulai, Johor Malaysia
(Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent)
e) STMicroelectronics 190 Avenue Celestin Coq ZI de Rousset-Peynier 13106
Rousset Cedex France (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent Manufacturer)
f) NedCard BV, Netherlands Bijsterhuizen 2529 NL-6604LM Wijchen Netherlands
(Packaging Agent)
g) NedCard (Shanghai) Microelectronics Co. Ltd., China Standardized Plant
Building #8 No.789 Puxing Road Caohejing Hi-Tech Park, EPZ 201114
Shanghai People’s Republic of China (Packaging Agent)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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