Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
for
Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39
as used in the Océ VP 2090 3.3
from
Océ Technologies B.V.
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.23
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
Scanner-Printer-Copier Controller
Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39
as used in the Océ VP 2090 3.3
from
Océ Technologies B.V.
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for compliance
with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, March 21st
, 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
A-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
A-2
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39 was conducted by
TNO-ITSEF BV. The TNO-ITSEF BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Océ Technologies B.V.
P.O. Box 101
5900 MA Venlo
The Netherlands
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on March 21st
, 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-24.
The product Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Océ Technologies B.V.
P.O. Box 101
5900 MA Venlo
The Netherlands
A-4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
- the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 8
3 Security Policy 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 15
8 Evaluated Configuration 18
9 Results of the Evaluation 19
10 Comments/Recommendations 20
11 Annexes 20
12 Security Target 21
13 Definitions 21
14 Bibliography 23
B-2
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
1 Executive Summary
The firm Océ produces a wide range of multifunctional devices (MFDs) for
copying, printing and scanning for various purposes. One of these MFDs: the
VP 2090, uses PC hardware based controller, which is called the Smart Imager
(SI).
The TOE is the Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39 as used with the Océ VP 2090
R3.3.
The Smart Imager is a PC-based MFD-controller. The SI provides a wide range
of printing, scanning and copying functionality to the MFD peripherals to which it
is connected. The SI also provides security functionality to the MFD.
The Smart Imager can operate in two different security modes: ‘High’ and
‘Normal’. The Security Target [7] covers the Smart Imager operating in the
security mode ‘High’ as delivered by Océ to the customer. This mode provides a
restricted set of functionality that is configured to meet the Security Target
claim. Changing the operational mode invalidates the claim made in the
Security Target [7].
The Smart Imager is located internally in the MFD. The internal configuration
helps prevent theft of the Smart Imager, but prevention of theft of the SI is
outside the scope of this evaluation. All logical access points (CD-ROM, floppy
drives, network ports, USB/serial/parallel ports etc.) are protected from physical
access in the internal configuration by a metal casing.
The Smart Imager consists of two parts, the underlying hardware platform which
is not part of the TOE and the software which forms the TOE (for further details
of TOE boundary see chapter 2.1 of this report and chapter 2.1.1 of the ST [7]).
The IT product Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39 was evaluated by TNO-ITSEF BV.
The evaluation was completed on March 08th
, 2006. The TNO-ITSEF BV is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Océ Technologies B.V.
P.O. Box 101
5900 MA Venlo
The Netherlands
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL2 (Evaluation Assurance Level 2) augmented by ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw
Remediation).
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following table.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Table 1 : SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7], chapter 5.1.
B-4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.FILTERING The TOE uses a built-in firewall to block ports that are not
needed for the operation of the TOE. In addition no network
protocols that are not supported by the evaluated
configuration are enabled.
SF.JOB_RELEASE The TOE verifies the identity and associated PIN code that
was sent with the print job when submitted by
S.REMOTE_USER with Username/PIN received from
S.LOCAL_USER via the Smart Imager interface. If verification
is successful, the secure print job is released for printing.
SF.SHREDDING Once a print, copy or scan job has been deleted, the data is
overwritten. It is possible to perform multiple write cycles, with
various patterns being applied. At least three write cycles will
always take place. The first write cycle starts after the job has
been deleted and to improve job throughput performance, all
other remaining cycles are done once the TOE enters an idle
state. The shredding mechanism supports US DOD 5220-22m
and Gutmann algorithms.
SF.MANAGEMENT The TOE can be managed in relation to SF.SHREDDING. In
order to gain access, the S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN or
S.SERVICE_ENGINEER must authenticate themselves to the
TOE. S.SERVICE_ENGINEER does this by entering a PIN.
S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN authenticates himself by entering a
password. The TOE is delivered by Océ with the most
restrictive set of operational settings.
Table 2: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The Strength of Function claim for all the probabilistic functions and
mechanisms provided by the TOE is SOF-basic as indicated in the Security
Target [7], chapter 5.1.6.
B-5
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The following threats and Organisational Security Policies are defined for the
TOE (see also ST [7], chapter 3.3 and 3.4):
Threat Description
T.RESIDUAL_DATA S.THIEF steals the TOE or parts thereof and retrieves
stored or deleted D.SECURE_PRINT_JOB,
D.PRINT_JOB, D.SCAN_JOB and D.COPY_JOB. The
motivation for S.THIEF to attack the TOE is low because it
requires sophisticated data recovery equipment that can
recover data even after the shredding mechanism has
executed to recover data that has little value to the
attacker.
T.NOSY_USER S.LOCAL_USER accesses a D.SECURE_PRINT_JOB
that does not belong to him/her that is stored in the Smart
Imager. The motivation to carry out this attack is low.
T.MALWARE A S.NETWORK_DEVICE is used by malware that may
have entered the TOE’s operational environment to launch
an attack on the integrity of the TOE. The motivation to
carry out this attack is low.
Table 3: Threats
Organisational Security
Policy
Description
P.JOB_DELETE When D.SECURE_PRINT_JOB, D.PRINT_JOB,
D.SCAN_JOB and D.COPY_JOB objects are no longer
needed by the TOE, they will be deleted by the TOE at the
earliest available opportunity in a manner that meets a
recognised standard.
P.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The modification of TOE security settings shall be
restricted to S.SERVICE_ENGINEER and
S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN.
Table 4: Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
For a complete list and definition of the used subjects and objects please refer
to the Security Target [7], chapter 3.1.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
1.5.1 Security mode
By default, Océ delivers the Smart Imager in the highest security mode:
indicated by 'Security level: high (factory default)'. This provides the most
restrictive set of operational settings.
The remote system administrator must not change the security mode. If the
security mode is changed, the Smart Imager is no longer in the certified
B-6
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
configuration and is no longer able to assure the security of its objects and
itself. Once changed, it is not possible to get the Smart Imager back into the
certified configuration (‘high (factory default)’) by changing the security mode
back to 'high'.
1.5.2 E-Shredding
By default, E-shredding is enabled for all data objects.
The following E-shredding settings can be configured:
- Method (U.S. DoD 5220.22-M (Default), Gutmann, Custom) [13]
- Number of overwrite passes (Default:'3 (U.S. DoD 5220.22-M)') [14].
The remote System administrator must not change the 'Sensitive Jobs' settings.
If E-shredding is disabled for 'copy jobs', 'scan jobs‘, 'print jobs' or 'print jobs
with PIN', the SI is no longer in the certified configuration and is no longer able
to assure the security of copy jobs, scan jobs and print jobs.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The TOE is intended to be used within a MFD. The following assumptions for
the environment of the TOE are made:
Assumptions Description
A.DIGITAL_PRINTER Attachment of the TOE to a MFD
A.DIGITAL_SCANNER Attached Digital Scanner
A.LUI Attached Local User Interface
A.ENVIRONMENT Regular office environment
A.SECURITY_POLICY Existing security policy governing the use of IT products in
the customer organisation
A.SLA Any security flaws discovered in the TOE will be repaired
by Océ
Table 5: Assumptions
Note: Only the titles of the assumptions are provided. For more details please
refer to chapter 4 of this report or to the Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
B-7
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39
The TOE is a series of software that runs on a generic off-the-shelf PC
(underlying platform). Together this is called the Smart Imager. The Smart
Imager is a PC-based MFD-controller (Multi Functional Device) that provides a
wide range of printing, scanning and copying functionality to the MFD.
2.1 Physical scope of the TOE
The TOE consists of the software parts of the Smart Imager, i.e. the operating
system (Microsoft Windows 2000), the Smart Imager-specific software (Océ
Smart Imager 8.3.3.39) and the third-party software (Adobe PS3-PDF
Interpreter, Version 3016.103 build #03; PCL5 interpreter, Version ME6.0.1/4;
Microsoft IIS web server with SSL support, Version 5.0). The underlying PC
infrastructure is not part of the TOE (see also figure 1 below).
Figure 1: Physical scope of the TOE
2.2 TOE deliverables
The following TOE deliverables are provided for a customer who purchases the
Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39:
Underlying platform:
1. A generic off-the-shelf PC comprising at a minimum a 1.5GHz Celeron
processor, 512MB internal RAM, a DVI output (graphical I/O), two 40GB
B-8
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
hard drives, two USB ports, one serial port, internal floppy and CD-ROM
drive.
2. Generic graphics card and network card supporting 10/100/1000Mbs
Ethernet UTP.
3. An Océ DP1 card for communication between the Smart Imager and it’s
attached peripherals.
4. Drivers for the PC, graphics card and network card
Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39
1. The Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system with service pack 4
(operating system version 5.00.2195) plus the following patches:
Q823559 (MS03-023), Q828749 (MS03-049), Q835732 (MS04-011),
Q828741 (MS04-012), Q837001 (MS04-014), Q893066 (MS04-010) v2
2. Océ Smart Imager-specific software release 8.3.3.39.
3. Third-party developed software: Adobe PS3-PDF Interpreter, Version
3016.103 build #03; PCL5 interpreter, Version ME6.0.1/4; Microsoft IIS web
server with SSL support, Version 5.0.
Accompanying manuals – administrator guidance:
1. Océ VP2090 Common Criteria certified configuration of the SI v8.3.3.39 [9]
2. The Smart Imager administration guidance for the customer system
administrator takes the form of HTML pages. These are part of the Océ
Smart Imager-specific software, release 8.3.3.39 [10]
3. The Smart Imager administration guidance for the Océ service engineer
takes the form of an application called the Technical Service Manual (TSM)
that is installed on the service engineer’s laptop. The guidance contains an
appendix that is identified as VP 2090 Smart Imager Security Service
documents in the TSM: System Software – Installation and is a frozen
version of the Océ service engineer application made at the time of product
release [12].
Accompanying manuals – user guidance:
1. Océ VP2090 User manual [11]
2. Océ VP2090 Common Criteria certified configuration of the SI v8.3.3.39 [9]
For the delivery the Smart Imager software is installed on the Smart Imager PC
(underlying platform), then the Varioprint 2090 and the SI are packed to one
package and are labeled. When they arrive at the customer the package is
checked by the Océ service engineer and then installed according the
installation guidance.
B-9
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The Smart Imager provides a wide range of printing, scanning and copying
functionality to the MFD peripherals to which it is connected. The Smart Imager
provides security functionality to the MFD.
The TOE protects two assets: itself and the copy, print and scan job data that it
receives. Firstly, the TOE protects it’s own integrity against threats from the
LAN to which it is attached through use of a firewall. Secondly, the TOE
protects the confidentiality of print, copy and scan job data after they are no
longer needed. The Smart Imager does this by e-shredding the data after they
are deleted.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
4.1.1 Remote system administrator
It is assumed that the SI is used in the security level 'High (factory default)'. The
security level will not be changed.
The remote System administrator will read the available System administrator
documentation and must be aware of the security policy of the organisation.
The remote System administrator has to work in a security aware manner with
the SI.
4.1.2 Local and remote users
When secure print jobs are sent to the SI, the user will specify a PIN of at least
4 digits and a maximum of 5 digits and, whether the job is printed or not, will
delete the job on the same working day. Employees are aware of this
requirement.
The user will read the available user documentation and must be aware of the
security policy of the organisation. The user has to work in a security aware
manner with the SI.
4.1.3 E-shredding
It is assumed that the E-shredding operation for all copy, print and scan job data
objects will not be disabled.
B-10
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
4.1.4 Authentication
4.1.4.1 Remote system administrator
The Océ VarioPrint 2090 Settings Editor application is password protected.
For the purpose of configuring the SI prior to deployment, the SI is delivered
with a factory-default password. The remote System administrator must change
the password before the SI is deployed.
The remote System administrator must not use a short or easy-to-guess
password. Use a non-predictable sequence of at least 8 characters
(ASCII[32-127]). Additionally, the remote System administrator is advised to:
- use a long password - up to 50 characters can be used.
- use a mixture of upper and lower case letters, numbers and punctuation.
- change the password every month.
4.1.4.2 Service engineer
These are local administrators, and are typically employed by Océ. They have
access through an USB connection to a wide range of settings on the TOE. The
TOE connection is PIN code protected and service license protected and
access to the management functions provided to the service engineer require
specific hardware and software. It is not possible to access the management
functions made available to the service engineer without the software that is
installed on the service engineer laptop.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
4.2.1 Security Policy
It is assumed that the customer will have a Security Policy governing the use of
IT products by employees in the customer organisation. The TOE assumes that
the network to which it is attached is protected by security measures that are
intended to prevent mal-ware, viruses and network traffic, not related to the
working of the operational environment, entering the network to which it is
attached. Although the Virus database files and various patches are kept up to
date, the policy recognises that new threats emerge over time and that
occasionally they may enter the environment from outside and provides
measures to help limit the damage. The Policy will define how IT products are
protected against threats originating from outside the customer organisation.
The organisation’s employees are aware of, are trained in and operate
according to the terms and conditions of the policy. The policy also covers
physical security and the need for employees to work in a security aware
manner including the usage of the TOE. The Security Policy describes and
requires a low to medium level of assurance (EAL2) for the TOE.
B-11
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
4.2.2 Environment
The TOE assumes that its operational environment is a regular office
environment. Physical access to the operational environment is restricted. The
environment contains non-threatening office personnel (S.LOCAL_USER,
S.REMOTE_USER, S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN and S.SERVICE_ENGINEER).
S.THIEF is only rarely present in this environment and not on a recurring basis.
4.2.3 Attached devices
It is assumed that the TOE has a S.DIGITAL_PRINTER device attached to it.
S.DIGITAL_PRINTER is part of the Océ VarioPrint 2090 MFD. For all print jobs
that are sent to the mailbox, whether the job is printed or not, the job will be
deleted on the same workday. Employees are aware of this requirement. It is
assumed that for EAL2, the interface from the Smart Imager to the
S.DIGITAL_PRINTER will not be used to mount an attack and that the interface
is only used for the purposes of printing.
It is assumed that the TOE has a S.DIGITAL_SCANNER device attached to it.
S.DIGITAL_SCANNER is part of the Océ VarioPrint 2090 MFD. It is assumed
for EAL2, that the interface from the Smart Imager to the
S.DIGITAL_SCANNER will not be used to mount an attack and that the
interface is only used for the purposes of scanning.
It is assumed that the TOE has a S.LUI device attached to it. S.LUI is part of the
Océ VarioPrint 2090 MFD. It is assumed for EAL2, that the interface from the
LUI to the Smart Imager will not be used to mount an attack and that the
interface is only used for the purposes of printing, scanning and copying.
4.2.4 Flaw Remediation
It is assumed that any security flaws discovered in the TOE will be repaired by
Océ (possibly as part of an agreed service level agreement).
B-12
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
5 Architectural Information
The following diagram indicates the subsystems of the TOE that implement the
security functionality.
Figure 2: Overview of the TOE subsystems
Communication Layer: This subsystem provides the communication
functionality between the TOE subsystems and the internal interfaces between
the subsystems. In addition, this subsystem provides the communication
functionality to the MFD Peripheral Interface.
Firewall: The firewall subsystem is part of the Windows 2000 operating system
provided by Microsoft. It provides state-full inspection of the inbound network
packets that pass through the network card. The firewall settings are not user
configurable.
Job Manager: The job manager server manages the print and scan jobs that are
handled by the Smart Imager.
Smart Imager Settings manager: The Smart Imager Settings manager
subsystem manages a number of settings that are related to its operation. This
subsystem manages security related settings of the Smart Imager. There are no
security-related settings that can be changed by the ordinary users in the
configured mode of operation.
E-shred service: The E-shred subsystem provides the shredding of the job data
objects that are handled by the Job Manager subsystem (Standard Print Job,
User associated Print Job, User associated print job with unique PIN, Scan job
and Copy job).
B-13
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
6 Documentation
The documentation [9] – [11] is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target.
The documentation is intended for administrators and users:
The user guidance for the TOE consists of:
- Océ VP2090 User manual [11]
- Océ VP2090 Common Criteria certified configuration of the
SI v8.3.3.39 [9].
The administrator guidance for the TOE consists of:
- Océ VP2090 Common Criteria certified configuration of the
SI v8.3.3.39 [9]
- The Smart Imager administration guidance for the customer system
administrator takes the form of HTML pages. These are part of the Océ
Smart Imager-specific software, release 8.3.3.39 [10].
Additionally the developer has a specific guidance for the Océ service engineer,
which is not provided to the customer. The Smart Imager administration
guidance for the Océ service engineer takes the form of an application called
the Technical Service Manual (TSM) that is installed on the service engineer’s
laptop. The guidance contains an appendix that is identified as:
- VP 2090 Smart Imager Security Service documents in the TSM: System
Software – Installation [12]
and is a frozen version of the Océ service engineer application made at the time
of product release.
B-14
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
7.1.1 TOE Test Configuration
- A VP2090 R3.3 has been used for tests.
- A service laptop running under Windows XP plus relevant cable with USB
to Ethernet adapter
- A PC running under windows XP has been used to scan the SI’s hard
disk.
7.1.2 Testing Approach
Tests are executed according to the tests specifications mentioned in Test
Specification.
The tests are built upon the security functions as defined in the ST. All security
functions have associated tests. The security functions are:
- SF.FILTERING
- SF.JOB_RELEASE
- SF.SHREDDING
- SF.MANAGEMENT
The objectives for the tests are derived from the security functions and are:
- Check that filtering performs conform to the Functional Specification. With
all network functionality enabled in security level High, the firewall should
be properly configured. Check that on the external Ethernet connector the
firewall only allows certain defined ports.
- Check that security printing performs conform to the Functional
Specification.
- Check that shredding performs conform to the Functional Specification.
- Check that System Administrator authentication and Service Engineer
authentication perform conform to the Functional Specification.
7.1.3 Coverage
All testing commensurate with the functional specification and covers all
security functions.
The developer has performed all necessary functional tests for the security
functions. In addition the developer has performed extensive vulnerability test
that exceeds the attack potential required by EAL2.
B-15
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
7.1.4 Results
The results of the developer testing showed that the security functions perform
as expected.
This means that the developer has shown that:
- The TOE protects it’s own integrity against threats from the network to
which it is attached through use of a firewall.
- The TOE protects the confidentiality of secure print jobs once they have
been received by the SI by storing them until the user authenticates
himself to the SI via a user interface on the MFD. The SI shreds the data
after it is deleted.
- The TOE does not form a threat to its environment.
7.2 Independant Testing
7.2.1 Test configuration
Tests are performed with the SI connected to the Océ digital copiers Océ
VarioPrint 2090 R3.3.
The security mode is ‘High’ (factory default).
The following software components are used:
- The Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system with service pack 4
(operating system version 5.00.2195) plus patches (see chapter 2.2)
- Océ Smart Imager-specific software release 8.3.3.39
- Adobe PS3-PDF Interpreter, Version 3016.103 build #03
- PCL5 interpreter, Version ME6.0.1/4
- Microsoft IIS web server with SSL support, Version 5.0
7.2.2 Testing Approach
The tests are built upon the security functions as defined in the ST. The
evaluators ran all of the developer tests specified in the Developer Test
Specification as well and independent evaluator tests.
In total the following security functions have been tested:
- SF.FILTERING,
- SF.JOB_RELEASE,
- SF.SHREDDING,
- SF.MANAGEMENT.
The objectives for the tests are derived from the security functions and are:
- Check that filtering performs conform to the Functional Specification. With
all network functionality enabled in security level High, the firewall should
be properly configured. Check that on the external Ethernet connector the
firewall only allows certain defined ports.
B-16
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
- Check that security printing performs conform to the Functional
Specification.
- Check that shredding performs conform to the Functional Specification.
- Check that System Administrator authentication and Service Engineer
authentication perform conform to the Functional Specification.
7.2.3 Coverage
All testing commensurate with the functional specification and covers all
security functions.
The evaluator has performed all necessary functional tests for the security
functions.
7.2.4 Results
The results of the independant testing showed that the security functions
perform as expected.
This means that the evaluator has shown that:
- The TOE protects it’s own integrity against threats from the network to
which it is attached through use of a firewall.
- The TOE protects the confidentiality of print, copy and scan job data after
they are no longer needed. The SI shreds the data after they are deleted.
7.3 Penetration Testing
7.3.1 Test Configuration
Tests are performed with the SI connected to the Océ VarioPrint 2090 R3.3.
The security mode is ‘High’ (factory default).
The following software components are used:
- The Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system with service pack 4
(operating system version 5.00.2195) plus patches (see chapter 2.2)
- Océ Smart Imager-specific software release 8.3.3.39
- Adobe PS3-PDF Interpreter, Version 3016.103 build #03
- PCL5 interpreter, Version ME6.0.1/4
- Microsoft IIS web server with SSL support, Version 5.0
The test laptop ran Suse 9.3, Nessus 2.2.5 and the Auditor Security Collection
(auditor-200605-02) live CD.
B-17
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
7.3.2 Testing Approach
The evaluators took the functional specification as starting point for the
identification of which interfaces and which functions need to be tested. Based
on the more detailed knowledge of the high-level design some tests are
included additionally.
The evaluators applied a number of publicly available scanners for obvious
vulnerabilities.
7.3.3 Coverage
All testing commensurate with the functional specification and covers all
security functions and included the search for obvious vulnerabilities.
The evaluators have had a meeting in which the (possible) vulnerabilities are
identified. Each evaluator contributed his perspective on the TOE and the
evaluation based on the assurance classes he had executed. The outcome of
this meeting is input for the vulnerability analysis.
The following tests are performed:
- Openssl (auditor-200605-02) Open source ssl implementation
- Nessus 2.2.5 Open Source vulnerability scanner
- Amap (auditor-200605-02) Open source port scanner
- Xprobe2 (auditor-200605-02) Open source OS fingerprint, sends ICMP
- Ethereal (auditor-200605-02) Open Source network sniffer
7.3.4 Results
The TOE behaved as expected:
- The security functionality works as expected.
- The vulnerability test showed that the TOE is resistant against all tested
public known vulnerabilities based on recent Internet scans.
- The vulnerability scans did not reveal vulnerabilities that could be
exploited on the level of EAL2.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by the release Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39
For setting up and running the TOE according to the evaluated configuration all
guidance documents (refer to chapter 6) and the implications given by the
Security Target have to be followed. These implications can also be found in
chapter 1.5, 1.6 and 4 of this report.
B-18
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL2. For the augmented component ALC_FLR.1 the AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation”, 26.07.2002 [6] was
used.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table:
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Configuration Items ACM_CAP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Descriptive high-level design ADV_HLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
B-19
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
- the Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant.
- the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The SFRs FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UAU.2 require the TOE
to provide security functions that provide identification/authentication
functionality that meets a SOF claim of ‘SOF basic’.
A strength of function claim of ‘SOF basic’ is made for the security functions
SF.JOB_RELEASE and SF.MANAGEMENT. These are the security functions
that implement FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UAU.2.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Océ Smart Imager
8.3.3.39 (see also chapter 2 of this report).
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The guidance documentation [9] - [11] (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
11 Annexes
none
B-20
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
LUI Local User Interface
MFD Multifunctional Device
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SI Smart Imager
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
B-21
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
B-22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006, Version 2.1, 16.02.2006,
Security Target, The Océ Smart Imager 8.3.3.39 as used in the Océ VP
2090 3.3, Océ Technologies BV
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, The Océ Smart Imager V8.3.3.39 as used
in the Océ VP 2090 3.3, Version 2.0, 07.03.2006, (confidential
document)
Guidance Documentation
[9] Océ VP2090 Common Criteria certified configuration of the SI v8.3.3.39,
Edition 10-2005
[10] Online Help for Océ VarioPrint® 2090 Settings Editor, Version 10-2005
[11] Océ VarioPrint® 2090 User Manual, Edition 02-2004
[12] VP 2090 Smart Imager Security Service documents in the TSM: System
Software – Installation, 07.12.2005
Technical Papers
[13] Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid State Memory, Peter
Guttman 1996
(http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html)
[14] US Department of Defence Military Standard DOD 5220-22m
(http://www.dss.mil/isecnispom_0195.htm)
B-23
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
This page is intentionally left blank.
B-24
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
C-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and map
C-2
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
C-3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 2: Evaluation assurance level summary
C-4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
C-5
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
C-6
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
C-7
BSI-DSZ-CC-0326-2006 Certification Report
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
C-8