MINISTERIO DE PRESIDENCIA Y PARA LAS AATT
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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REF: 2016-26-INF-1864 v1
Target: Público
Date: 30.05.2017
Created by: CERT11
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File: 2016-26 Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W version D
Applicant: Winbond Electronics Corporation
References:
[EXT-3010] Certification request of Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W
version D
[EXT-3335] Evaluation Technical Report of Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory
W75F32W version D.
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W
version D, as requested in [EXT-3010] dated 01/05/2016, and evaluated by the
laboratory Applus Laboratories, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-
3335] received on 03/04/2017.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................ 3
TOE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS......................................................... 4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................ 4
IDENTIFICATION....................................................................................................... 5
SECURITY POLICIES................................................................................................ 5
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT........................................... 6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS............................................... 7
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY.............................................. 8
ARCHITECTURE ....................................................................................................... 9
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................... 9
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................. 9
DOCUMENTS .......................................................................................................... 11
PRODUCT TESTING............................................................................................... 11
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION............................................................................. 12
EVALUATION RESULTS......................................................................................... 12
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM............. 13
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 13
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................. 13
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 14
SECURITY TARGET................................................................................................ 14
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W version D.
Developer/manufacturer: Winbond Electronics Corporation.
Sponsor: Winbond Electronics Corporation.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profile: No.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 - EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5.
Evaluation end date: 03/04/2017.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 (augmented
with augmented with AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis and
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict.
Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL5 +
ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation v3.1 R4.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W version D, a positive
resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The Target of Evaluation is a Memory Flash IC. The TOE is dedicated to be
embedded into highly critical hardware devices such as smart card, secure element,
USB token, secure micro SD, etc. These devices will embed secure applications
such as financial, telecommunication, identity (e-Government), etc and will be
working in a hostile environment. In particular, the TOE is dedicated to the secure
storage of the code and data of critical applications.
The security needs for the TOE consist in:
- Maintaining the integrity of the content of the memories and the confidentiality
of the content of protected memory areas as required by the critical HW
products (e.g. Security IC) the Memory Flash is built for.
- Providing a secure communication with the Host device that will embed the
TOE in a secure HW product such as Security IC.
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SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level
EAL5 and the evidences required by the additional components ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R4.
Assurance Class Assurance components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional
specification with additional error information
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.5 development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standars
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE:Tests
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodological vulnerability
analysis
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R4:
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TOE Security Functional
Requirements
Description
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
FPT_FLS.1/Detectors Failure with preservation of secure state
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
FDP_SDI.2 Stored integrity monitoring and action
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer
protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
FPT_FLS.1/Binding_Key Failure with preservation of secure state
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W version D
Security Target: Security Target of W75F32W 32M-bit Secure Serial Flash Memory,
version 1.18. 30/03/2017.
Protection Profile: No.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 - EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W version D
shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards
and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target. In short, it
establishes the need of implementing organisational policies related to the following
aspects.
Policy 01: A.Secure-Channel External protection during the secure
channel
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It is assumed that U.Host-Device supports the trusted communication channel with
the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted data.
In particular, U.Host-Device is assumed to correctly protect the secure channel in
order to prevent data modification, disclosure, insertion, deletion and replaying.
Policy 02: A.Binding-Process Protection during Binding process
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE
Manufacturer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE (to prevent any
possible copy, modification, or unauthorised use).
This means that the binding process (i.e. generating a unique and random key Kb for
U.Host-Device and the TOE) is assumed to be done in a secure environment where
the communication between U.Host-Device and the TOE is protected.
Furthermore, U.Host-Device is assumed to provide a secure random source for
generating a fresh Binding key (Kb) for the TOE.
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
Assumption 01: A.Secure-Channel External protection during the
secure channel
It is assumed that U.Host-Device supports the trusted communication channel with
the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted data.
In particular, U.Host-Device is assumed to correctly protect the secure channel in
order to prevent data modification, disclosure, insertion, deletion and replaying.
Assumption 02: A.Binding-Process Protection during Binding
process
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE
Manufacturer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE (to prevent any
possible copy, modification, or unauthorised use).
This means that the binding process (i.e. generating a unique and random key Kb for
U.Host-Device and the TOE) is assumed to be done in a secure environment where
the communication between U.Host-Device and the TOE is protected.
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Furthermore, U.Host-Device is assumed to provide a secure random source for
generating a fresh Binding key (Kb) for the TOE.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Winbond Secure Serial
Flash Memory W75F32W version D, although the agents implementing attacks have
the attack potential according to the high of EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 and
always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product
security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are categorized below.
Threat 01: T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
An attacker may physically modify the Memory Flash in order to
- modify User Data stored in the TOE;
- modify TSF Data stored in the TOE;
- modify or deactivate the security services of the TOE (provided by TSF logic);
- modify the security mechanisms of the TOE (provided by TSF logic) to enable
attacks disclosing or manipulating User Data, for example the integrity
protection mechanism.
Threat 02: T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
An attacker may perform physical probing of the TOE in order to disclose User Data
and TSF Data while stored in Memory Flash.
Threat 03: T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF logic by applying environmental stress
in order to deactivate or affect security mechanisms of the TOE. This enables
attacks disclosing or manipulating User Data.
This may be achieved by operating the Memory Flash outside the normal operating
conditions.
Threat 04: T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery
in order to
- disclose or manipulate User Data (user data or code stored in the TOE) or
- enable an attack disclosing or manipulating User Data.
Threat 05: T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage of
the Memory Flash in order to disclose confidential User Data.
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Threat 06: T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage of
the Memory Flash in order to disclose confidential User Data even if the information
leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker.
Threat 07: T.Abuse-Communication Communication Probing and
Manipulation
An attacker may probe and modify the communication between the TOE and U.Host-
Device in order to manipulate User/TSF Data or disclose User/TSF Data read from
the TOE.
Threat 08: T.Host-Forging Forge the functionality of an authorized
Host device
An attacker may access to the User data currently stored in the TOE by:
- illegally establishing a secure channel with the TOE (e.g. by tampering the
Binding key or by forging the secure channel without knowing the Binding key)
in order to execute the Flash commands;
- binding the TOE with another Host device in order to execute the Flash
commands;
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are
categorized below.
Environment objective 01: OE.Secure-Channel Secure
communication with the TOE
The authorized U.Host-Device shall support the trusted communication channel with
the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted data.
In particular, U.Host-Device shall correctly protect the secure channel in order to
prevent data modification, disclosure, insertion, deletion and replaying.
Environment objective 02: OE.Binding-Process Protection during
Binding process
Security procedures shall be used after the TOE delivery to maintain confidentiality
and integrity of the TOE (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft
or unauthorised use).
In addition, U.Host-Device shall provide a secure random source for generating a
fresh Binding key (Kb) for the TOE.
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The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and
organisational security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in
the associated security target.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The main security features of the TOE are described as follows:
- Secure separation between Test mode and User mode. More precisely,
o The switch from User mode to Test mode can only be done after
completely erasing the flash content.
o The confidentiality and the integrity of the flash content are protected in
both Test mode and User mode.
- The confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted data from/to the Host
device are protected by a secure channel;
- Integrity protection of the flash content by error detection codes (CRC-32);
- Confidentiality protection of the flash content by memory scrambling with
diversified key;
- Security sensors or detectors including power glitch detector and out-of-
specified operating conditions (voltage, temperature, clock frequency);
- Active Shields against physical intrusive attacks (e.g. reverse-engineering,
probing);
- State machine protection to counter fault injection;
- Dual Flip-Flops and Path-Differential signaling to counter fault injection and
side-channel attacks;
- Failure counter to detect and react to tamper attempts;
The logical interface of the TOE is made of Flash commands.
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The architecture of the Memory Flash is described in Figure 1. The TOE is delimited
by the Red box.
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The TOE consists of the following Hardware components
- Auxiliary array contains the flash specific data: the binding key (and its digest
value), the failure and session counters;
- Flash array stores the User data (i.e. the mass data including executable
codes) and translates SPI commands into Flash operations;
- SFF (Secure Flash Front-end) which implements encrypted and authenticated
interface for Flash operation and supports Flash memories up to 4GB;
- Detectors of abnormal operating conditions;
The physical interface of the TOE with the external environment is the entire surface
of the Memory Flash module.
The electrical interface of the TOE with the external environment is made of the
chip’s pads including the data pins for SPI bus:
- Standard SPI: CLK, /CS, DI_IO0, DO_IO1
- Quad SPI: CLK, /CS, DI_IO0, DO_IO1, IO2, IO3
- Octal: CLK, /CS, DI_IO0, DO_IO1, IO2, IO3, IO4, IO5,
- IO6, IO7
The TOE comprises:
- All security functionality necessary to ensure the secure execution of the
Memory Flash,
The guidance for the secure usage of the TOE:
- Operational User Guidance [OPE]
- Preparative Procedure [PRE]
- Datasheet [DTS].
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DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version.
- [OPE] TrustME™ W75F32W Secure Flash Operational User Guidance,
revision F. 02/04/2017.
- [PRE] TrustME™ W75F32W Secure Flash Preparative User Guidance,
revision G. 02/04/2017.
- [DTS] TrustME™ 1.8V 32M-BIT Secure Serial Flash Memory With Octal SPI
Interface, revision B. 01/04/2015.
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been
performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result. During the
evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate
to the function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the
established architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the
obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has applied sampling
strategy and has concluded that the information is complete and coherent enough to
reproduce tests and identify the functionality tested. Moreover, the evaluation team
has planned and executed additional tests independently of those executed by the
developer.
In addition, the lab has devised a test for each of the security function of the product
verifying that the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained by the
developer.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in
the cases where a deviation respect to the expected results was present, the
evaluator has confirmed that this variation neither represents any security problem
nor a decrease in the functional capacity of the product.
PENETRATING TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in is operational
environment [JILAAPS], the evaluation team has devised vulnerability analysis and
attack scenarios for penetrations testing according to JIL supporting documents
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[JILAAPS] and [JILAVDARC]. Within these activities all aspects of the security
architecture which were not covered by functional testing have been considered.
No attack scenario with the attack potential high according to CC v3.1 R4 has been
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target and
the operational guidance [OPE] when all security measures required by the
developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE is defined by its commercial name and version number:
- Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W version D.
The acceptance procedure for the evaluated configuration of the TOE is described in
section 2 “Acceptance procedure” of the preparative user guidance [PRE]. The
identifiers used to mark the evaluated configuration of the TOE are:
Type Identifier Form of delivery Identifier
HW Package top marking Known Good Die W75F32W
HW Die Marking Known Good Die
AAG0546PDCC
(corresponds to TOE)
SW SFI IP RTL Tar file Version 0
The TOE also includes the documents identified in section DOCUMENTS of this
certification report that shall be distributed and made available together to the users
of the evaluated version.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W version D has been
evaluated against the Security Target Security Target of W75F32W 32M-bit Secure
Serial Flash Memory, version 1.18. 30/03/2017.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2
+ AVA_VAN.5 have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory
Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all
the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 +
AVA_VAN.5, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation v3.1 R4.
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COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These
have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered
when using the product.
1. The evaluator encourages users to follow the SECURITY RULES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS specified in the operational guidance.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product Winbond Secure Serial Flash Memory W75F32W version D, a positive
resolution is proposed.
The certifier strongly recommends to the TOE consumer to strictly follow the security
recommendations that can be found on Appendix 1 “Security rules and
recommendations” of [OPE] and to observe the operational environment
requirements and assumptions defined in the applicable security target.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
OC Organismo de Certificación
PP Protection Profile
SFF Secure Flash Front-End
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[JILAAPS] Applications of Attack Potential to Smartcards, version 2.9. Jan. 2013.
Joint Interpretation Library.
[JILADVARCS] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for Smart Cards and
similar devices, version 2.0. Jan. 2012. Joint Interpretation Library.
[OPE] TrustME™ W75F32W Secure Flash Operational User Guidance, revision F.
02/04/2017. Winbond Electronics Corporation.
[PRE] TrustME™ W75F32W Secure Flash Preparative User Guidance, revision G.
02/04/2017. Winbond Electronics Corporation.
[DTS] TrustME™ 1.8V 32M-BIT Secure Serial Flash Memory With Octal SPI
Interface, revision B. 01/04/2015. Winbond Electronics Corporation.
[CCDB-2006-04-004] ST sanitising for publication. CCMC. April 2006.
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is
stored and protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified
as:
- Security Target of W75F32W 32M-bit Secure Serial Flash Memory, version
1.18. 30/03/2017. Winbond Electronics Corporation.
The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also
been reviewed for the needs of publication according to [CCDB-2006-04-004], and it
is published along with this certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA
websites. The ST Lite identifier is:
- Security Target Lite of W75F32W 32M-bit Secure Serial Flash Memory,
version B. April 2017. Winbond Electronics Corporation.