CyberArk Software, Ltd.
Privileged Account Security Solution v9.1
Security Target
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL): EAL2+
Document Version: 1.8
Prepared for: Prepared by:
CyberArk Software, Ltd. Corsec Security, Inc.
57 Wells Avenue, Suite 20A
Newton, MA 02459
United States of America
13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America
Phone: +1 (888) 808-9005 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
Email: info@cyberark.com Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.cyberark.com http://www.corsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................4
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCES......................................................................................................4
1.3 PRODUCT OVERVIEW..........................................................................................................................................5
1.3.1 Privileged Account Security Solution Components .......................................................................................6
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................................................8
1.4.1 TOE Environment................................................................................................................................................10
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION............................................................................................................................................11
1.5.1 Physical Scope.......................................................................................................................................................11
1.5.2 Logical Scope ........................................................................................................................................................12
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE.................................14
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ..................................................................................................15
3 SECURITY PROBLEM ..........................................................................................................16
3.1 THREATS TO SECURITY......................................................................................................................................16
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..........................................................................................................17
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS.....................................................................................................................................................17
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES......................................................................................................18
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE..............................................................................................................18
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT..................................................................19
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives.........................................................................................................................................19
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives ...............................................................................................................................19
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS ..............................................................................................20
5.1 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS...........................................................................20
5.1.1 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.....................................................................................................................20
5.2 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE COMPONENTS..............................................................................21
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................22
6.1 CONVENTIONS...................................................................................................................................................22
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................22
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit..................................................................................................................................24
6.2.3 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support .................................................................................................................26
6.2.4 Class FDP: User Data Protection....................................................................................................................28
6.2.5 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication................................................................................................31
6.2.6 Class FMT: Security Management.................................................................................................................32
6.2.7 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.....................................................................................................................37
6.2.8 Class FRU: Resource Utilization......................................................................................................................38
6.2.9 Class FTA: TOE Access ......................................................................................................................................39
6.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................................40
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .....................................................................................41
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS.............................................................................................................................41
7.1.1 Security Audit........................................................................................................................................................42
7.1.2 Cryptographic Support.......................................................................................................................................43
7.1.3 User Data Protection..........................................................................................................................................44
7.1.4 Identification and Authentication....................................................................................................................44
7.1.5 Security Management........................................................................................................................................45
7.1.6 Protection of the TSF..........................................................................................................................................45
7.1.7 Resource Utilization............................................................................................................................................45
7.1.8 TOE Access............................................................................................................................................................46
8 RATIONALE..........................................................................................................................47
8.1 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS RATIONALE.............................................................................................................47
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8.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE..................................................................................................................47
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats ....................................................................................47
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions...........................................................................49
8.3 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ......................................................50
8.4 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................50
8.5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ...........................................................................................................50
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives............................................50
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale...............................................................................................54
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale.......................................................................................................................................55
9 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................57
9.1 ACRONYMS .........................................................................................................................................................57
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 TOE BOUNDARY 9
List of Tables
TABLE 1 ST AND TOE REFERENCES......................................................................................................................................4
TABLE 2 TOE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................................................ 10
TABLE 3 CC AND PP CONFORMANCE.............................................................................................................................. 15
TABLE 4 THREATS ................................................................................................................................................................. 16
TABLE 5 ASSUMPTIONS......................................................................................................................................................... 17
TABLE 6 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.................................................................................................................. 18
TABLE 7 IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................................... 19
TABLE 8 NON-IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................... 19
TABLE 9 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................. 22
TABLE 10 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................................................ 26
TABLE 11 SAFE ACCESS CONTROL PERMISSIONS.............................................................................................................. 29
TABLE 12 MANAGEMENT OF VAULT SECURITY FUNCTION BEHAVIOR BY ROLE......................................................... 32
TABLE 13 MANAGEMENT OF SAFE SECURITY FUNCTION BEHAVIOR BY ROLE............................................................. 32
TABLE 14 MANAGEMENT OF VAULT SECURITY ATTRIBUTES .......................................................................................... 34
TABLE 15 MANAGEMENT OF SAFE SECURITY ATTRIBUTES.............................................................................................. 35
TABLE 16 EAL2 ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................................... 40
TABLE 17 MAPPING OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.......................... 41
TABLE 18 AUDIT RECORD CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................. 42
TABLE 19 THREATS: OBJECTIVES MAPPING ....................................................................................................................... 47
TABLE 20 ASSUMPTIONS: OBJECTIVES MAPPING............................................................................................................... 49
TABLE 21 OBJECTIVES: SFRS MAPPING............................................................................................................................... 50
TABLE 22 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES................................................................................................ 55
TABLE 23 ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................................... 57
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1 Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the organization of the
ST. The TOE is the CyberArk Privileged Account Security Solution v9.1, and will hereafter be referred to
as the TOE throughout this document.
The TOE is software-based solution for Privileged Account Security management in the enterprise. The
Privileged Account Security (PAS) Solution enables organizations to secure, provision, control, and
monitor all activities associated with privileged identities used in enterprise systems and applications.
1.1 Purpose
This ST is divided into nine sections, as follows:
 Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and describes the
organization of other sections within this document. It also provides an overview of the TOE
security functions and describes the physical and logical scope for the TOE, as well as the ST and
TOE references.
 Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common Criteria (CC),
Protection Profile, and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package claims. It also identifies
whether the ST contains extended security requirements.
 Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security policies, and
assumptions that pertain to the TOE and its environment.
 Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE
and its environment.
 Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)) that are not
included in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3.
 Security Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE.
 TOE Summary Specification (Section 7) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE
that satisfy the security functional requirements and objectives.
 Rationale (Section 8) – Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and SFR
dependencies as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
 Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target and TOE References
Table 1 below shows the ST and TOE references.
Table 1 ST and TOE References
ST Title CyberArk Software, Ltd. Privileged Account Security Solution v9.1 Security
Target
ST Version Version 1.8
ST Author Corsec Security, Inc.
ST Publication Date 2015-04-24
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ST Title CyberArk Software, Ltd. Privileged Account Security Solution v9.1 Security
Target
TOE Reference CyberArk Software, Ltd. Privileged Account Security Solution v9.1
 Enterprise Password Vault v9.1; Build 9.10.0.141
 Password Vault Web Access v9.1; Build 9.10.0.275
 PrivateArk Client v8; Build 8.00.4.10
 Privileged Session Manager v9.1; Build 9.10.0.30
 Privileged Session Manager SSH Proxy v7.2.14; Build 7.20.140.29
 Central Policy Manager v9.1; Build 9.10.0.98
 On-Demand Privileges Manager v7.2.11; Build 7.20.110.8
 Application Identity Manager v7.2.13; Build 7.2.130.10
FIPS1
140-2 Status FIPS 140-2 Validation Certificate #: 1747 and 1051
1.3 Product Overview
The Product Overview provides a high level description of the product that is the subject of the evaluation.
The following section, TOE Overview, will provide the introduction to the parts of the overall product
offering that are specifically being evaluated.
CyberArk’s PAS Solution v9.1 is a full, software-based solution for managing the most privileged accounts
in the enterprise. The solution enables organizations to secure, provision, control, and monitor all activities
associated with enterprise systems and applications. At the heart of the PAS Solution lies a Patented
Digital Vault™ which is designed to meet the highest security requirements. The Digital Vault, also
known as the Enterprise Password Vault (EPV), provides numerous security capabilities for authentication,
encryption, tamper-proof audit, and data protection. The EPV provides secure storage and sharing of
privileged account credentials, audit data, and recorded privileged account sessions, using multiple layers
of encryption and security.
The EPV is run on a dedicated server and is protected by the Windows firewall, which only allows
communication to and from the vault via CyberArk’s proprietary communications channel. Access to the
PAS Solution can be controlled by one or more authentication methods including: LDAP2
authentication,
PKI3
digital certificates, RSA4
SecurID tokens, two-way authentication, RADIUS5
, USB6
tokens, and
Windows Authentication. Once logged in, users will only see the privileged accounts they have permission
to see, completely unaware of other privileged accounts.
The EPV uses multiple layers of encryption to provide maximum security of the contents of each safe.
Each data7
file within a safe is encrypted with a unique file encryption key. Those file encryption keys are
stored within the safe and encrypted with a safe encryption key unique to the safe. The safe encryption
keys stored within the vault are encrypted with a unique vault encryption key. All of these keys are only
delivered to those users with appropriate access control rights. Administrators can define access to safes
and data within the safes so that users must be manually confirmed by a Safe Supervisor before they can
access the safe and its contents.
1
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standards
2
LDAP – Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
3
PKI – Public Key Infrastructure
4
RSA – Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
5
RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial In User Server
6
USB – Universal Serial Bus
7
The term “data” constitutes all privileged user accounts, audit data, recorded sessions, and miscellaneous files
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The Privileged Account Security Solution is comprised of multiple, standalone CyberArk products which
help to protect, manage, and audit user and application credentials and monitor all privileged activity. Each
product works together to provide a complete, secure solution to solve the different requirements for
privileged account security. The PAS Solution is a plug-and-play, ready-to-use solution that implements its
security features immediately after component installation. The following sections describe each of the
products which make up the Privileged Account Security Solution.
1.3.1 Privileged Account Security Solution Components
The Privileged Account Security Solution provides a secure environment within an enterprise where all
administrative passwords can be securely archived, transferred, and shared by authorized users (such as IT8
Staff, on-call administrators, and local administrators in remote locations). Access to and management of
the PAS Solution is provided by a Windows client, a Web interface, and a variety of other APIs9
. Each
component of the PAS Solution solves the different requirements for privileged account security.
1.3.1.1 Enterprise Password Vault (EPV)
The EPV is deployed on a dedicated standalone server running a hardened version of Microsoft Windows
Server. This ensures the most isolated and secure storage possible for EPV contents. The EPV may be
deployed as a high-availability cluster, where the standby EPV will immediately take over if the production
EPV fails to process requests. A Disaster Recovery instance of the EPV may also be used to replicate EPV
data and immediately fail-over if the production EPV instances stop processing requests.
The Digital Vault secures privileged credentials based on the privileged account security policy, or Master
Policy™, and controls who can access which passwords and when. The Master Policy Engine enables
administrators to set, manage, and monitor a single privileged account security policy. This enables fast
implementation and flexibility to set an enterprise-wide policy.
The EPV is designed to continually discover changes to the IT environment with its Discovery Engine. As
new servers and workstations are added or removed, changes in the privileged accounts are automatically
discovered and updated. The EPV is accessed and managed through the various Client interfaces. These
interfaces include a Windows client-based interface (known as the PrivateArk Client) as well as a web-
based Graphical User Interface (GUI) (known as the PrivateArk Web Client).
1.3.1.2 Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) Interface
The Password Vault Web Access Interface is a fully-featured web interface that provides a single console
for requesting, accessing, and managing privileged account credentials passed throughout the enterprise by
both end-users and administrators. The PVWA dashboard enables users to see an overview of activities in
the PAS Solution, as well as statistics about all the activities that have taken place.
1.3.1.3 PrivateArk Client
The PrivateArk Client is a regular Windows application that is used as the administrative client for the PAS
Solution. The Client can be installed on multiple remote computers and can access the EPV via LAN10
,
WAN11
, or through the Internet via the Web version of the client. From this interface, users can define a
vault hierarchy and create safes and users. Access to the EPV via the PrivateArk Client requires a user to
be authenticated by the Digital Vault.
1.3.1.4 Privileged Session Manager (PSM)
The Privileged Session Manager enables an organization to secure, control, and monitor privileged access
to a network device. The PSM acts as a gateway to facilitate the communication with remote devices. The
8
IT – Information Technology
9
API – Application Programming Interface
10
LAN – Local Area Network
11
WAN – Wide Area Network
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PSM controls user access to privileged accounts and automatically initiates privileged sessions to third-
party devices over a variety of connection protocols such as RDP12
. The PSM separates the end-users from
targets, enabling connections to privileged devices without having to divulge the passwords to the end-user.
The PSM can record all activities that occur in a privileged session and can provide a playback of each
recorded session to authorized auditors. Recorded sessions are securely stored and protected in the EPV.
The PSM is integrated transparently and seamlessly into existing enterprise infrastructures.
1.3.1.5 Privileged Session Manager SSH Proxy (PSMP)
The PSMP is a Linux-based application similar to the PSM, but acts as a proxy for SSH13
-enabled devices.
PSMP controls access to privileged sessions and initiates SSH connections to remote devices on behalf of
the user without the need to disclose SSH credentials. PSMP records text-based sessions which are stored
in the EPV, later to be viewed by an authorized auditor. Unique to the PSMP are the Single Sign-On
capabilities, which allow users to connect to target devices without being exposed to the privileged
connection password.
1.3.1.6 Central Policy Manager (CPM)
The Central Policy Manager automatically enforces enterprise security policy by automatically changing
passwords on remote machines and storing the new passwords in the EPV, all without any human
interaction. The CPM is capable of generating new random passwords and replacing existing passwords on
remote machines, and saving the new passwords in the EPV. Passwords monitored and generated by the
CPM conform to the Master Policy created by the enterprise. Administrators will be notified via the
PVWA when passwords are about to expire, are expired, or do not meet the Master Policy criteria.
Administrators can also implement a one-time password policy, which requires a password to be changed
each time a user logs in with the existing password.
1.3.1.7 On-Demand Privileges Manager (OPM)
The On-Demand Privileges Manager enables organizations to secure, control, and monitor access to
privileged UNIX/Linux commands. Users can perform super-user tasks with their own personal account,
all while maintaining the least-privilege concept.
1.3.1.8 Application Identity Manager (AIM)
The Application Identity Manager is a Windows- and Linux- based application that facilitates access to
privileged passwords and eliminates the need to hard-code plaintext passwords in applications, scripts, or
configuration files. As with all other credentials stored in the EPV, AIM passwords are stored, logged, and
managed securely. AIM is separated into two components: a Provider, which securely retrieves and caches
passwords and provides immediate access to the calling application; and the SDK, which provides a set of
APIs for Java, .NET, COM14
, CLI15
, and C/C++. In the evaluated configuration, the AIM Provider for
Windows and SDK are excluded.
1.3.1.9 PrivateArk Vault Command Line Interface (PACLI)
The PACLI enables users to access the PAS Solution from any location using automated scripts, in a
command line environment. Users accessing the PAS solution via the PACLI have access to a limited
interface for management, control, and audit features. The PACLI is not included in the evaluated
configuration of the TOE.
12
RDP – Remote Desktop Protocol
13
SSH – Secure Shell
14
COM – Component Object Model
15
CLI – Command Line Interface
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1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. The TOE Overview
provides a context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type, describing the product, and
defining the specific evaluated configuration.
The TOE is software-based identity management solution for managing privileged accounts in the
enterprise. The PAS Solution v9.1 is comprised of multiple standalone software and interfaces modules
which enable organizations to secure, provision, control, and monitor all activities associated with
enterprise systems and applications. The software components of which the TOE is comprised of are:
 Enterprise Password Vault
 PrivateArk Client
 Privileged Session Manager
 Privileged Session Manager SSH Proxy
 Central Policy Manager
 On-Demand Privileges Manager
 Application Identity Manager
 Password Vault Web Access
Each component of the TOE and its functionality is described in Section 1.3 (Product Overview) above.
TOE components and the TOE boundary are represented in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1 TOE Boundary
The TOE includes all of the components and functionality described above and in section 1.3.1. The
features and functionality listed below in Section 1.4.1 are not included in the TOE, but are vital for the
complete functionality of the TOE. Section 1.4.1 identifies any major non-TOE hardware and software that
is required by the TOE including the TOE minimum requirements.
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1.4.1 TOE Environment
The Enterprise Password Vault is installed on a hardened16
version of Microsoft Windows Server. Access
to and from the Windows server is available to only components of the Privileged Account Security
Solution via a proprietary access protocol. Local storage for the password vault is provided by the
Windows Server host device hardware. EPV contains its own LDAP client and can access a local LDAP
server, which is used for TOE user authentication.
Access to the PrivateArk Web Client as well as access to the Password Vault Web Access requires the TOE
user to have access to the Internet and a compatible web browser. Compatible web browsers that can be
used to access these components are listed in Table 2 below. Access to the PrivateArk Web Client and
PVWA also requires that they be installed on a machine with access to the network.
A TOE user can access the PSM through a remote desktop client such as Windows Remote Desktop
Connection. The client must implement the RDP protocol. Access to the PSMP can be obtained by a TOE
user either directly accessing the Linux Shell system or through a third-party Windows Shell application,
such as Putty.
All other components of the TOE must be installed onto hardware devices running either a Windows or
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating System (OS). All TOE components require access to the same
network in which the EPV was installed order to interact with it. Remote devices wishing to use the PSM,
PSMP, or CPM also require access to the network through a secure VPN17
session.
It is assumed that there will be no untrusted users or software on the TOE Server components. Access to
the TOE environment OS’s must be limited to authorized users and secured with an authentication method.
In addition, the TOE Server components are intended to be deployed in a physically secured cabinet, room,
or data center with the appropriate level of physical access control and physical protection (e.g. badge
access, fire control, locks, alarms, etc.).
Table 2 defines the minimum system requirements and supported platforms for installing and accessing the
PAS Solution v9.1.
Table 2 TOE Minimum Requirements
Requirement
TOE Hardware Requirements (for all TOE components):
 Quad Core Processor (Intel)
 8 GB18
RAM19
 2x 80 GB SATA20
/SAS21
hot-swappable drives
 RAID22
Controller
 1Gb23
Network Adapter
16
Protected by a firewall which only allows remote communications from CyberArk applications via their proprietary
communications protocol.
17
VPN – Virtual Private Network
18
GB – Gigabyte
19
RAM – Random Access Memory
20
SATA – Serial Advanced Technology Attachment
21
SAS – Serially Attached SCSI (Small Computer System Interface)
22
RAID – Redundant Array of Independent Disks
23
Gb – Gigabit
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Requirement
TOE Operating System Requirements:
 Windows 2012 R2 - Hardened
o EPV
 Windows 2012 R2 (64-bit)
o PSM
o PVWA
o CPM
 Red Had Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 5.3 (64-bit)
o AIM
o OPM
o PSMP
Operating System (PrivateArk Client): Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 (32 or 64-bit)
LDAP Directory: MS24
Active Directory
Browser: Microsoft Internet Explorer 10.0
Prerequisites:
 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1
 Microsoft IIS25
7.5 or later
 RDP ActiveX Client 5.2 or higher
 Java Runtime Environment (JRE) 1.4 or higher
 Adobe Flash Player 10.0 or higher
 Remote Desktop Services (RDS) Session Host
In the evaluated configuration, the EPV, PSM, PVWA, and CPM components are installed on Windows
Server 2012 R2. The AIM, OPM, and PSMP components are installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3.
The PrivateArk Client is installed on Windows 7 Enterprise. The web browser used to access the PVWA is
Internet Explorer 10.0. The authentication server used is Windows 2012 R2 Active Directory Domain
Services.
1.5 TOE Description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE included in the
evaluation.
1.5.1 Physical Scope
Figure 1 in Section 1.4 illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the overall solution and
ties together all of the components of the TOE and the constituents of the TOE Environment.
The TOE is a software-only Privileged Account Security solution that runs on both Windows and Linux
operating Systems. The Windows and Linux Operating Systems can be installed on any server hardware
that meets the hardware criteria listed in Table 2 above. The EPV must be installed on its own, separate
Windows server device. Each of the other TOE components are standalone software components and may
be in installed onto the same sever appliance or separate server appliances. The servers must have access to
the same network on which the EPV is installed.
The TOE Boundary includes all the CyberArk developed parts of the Privileged Account Security Solution
v9.1 product. Any third-party source code or software that PAS Solution v9.1 has modified is considered
24
MS – Microsoft Services
25
IIS – Internet Information Services
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to be TOE Software. The TOE Boundary specifically does not include any of the third party software that
the TOE relies upon as described in Section 1.4.1. The TOE Boundary also does not include the third-party
LDAP server, which stores authentication data for the TOE.
1.5.1.1 Guidance Documentation
The following guides are required reading and part of the TOE:
 Privileged Account Security Installation Guide
 Privileged Account Security End User Guide
 Privileged Account Security Implementation Guide
 Privileged Account Security Reference Guide
 Privileged Account Security System Requirements
 Privileged Account Security Release Notes
 Application Identity Management Implementation Guide
1.5.2 Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE will be broken down into the following security classes which are further
described in sections 6 and 7 of this ST. The logical scope also provides the description of the security
features of the TOE. The security functional requirements implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped
under the following Security Function Classes:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF26
 Resource Utilization
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channel
1.5.2.1 Security Audit
The Security Audit function provides the TOE with the functionality of generating audit records. Typical
audit records that can be accessed by a user with the correct authorizations include Privileged Account
Inventory, Safe Lists, User Lists, and User Activities. As TOE users access, manage, and configure the
TOE, their activities are tracked. When an Auditor user (TOE user with the “View audit” authorization)
generates an “Activity Log”, it will be saved locally. The Auditor will see the various activities performed
by TOE users in an organized list. Once an Activity Log has been generated, the results can be filtered
with general filters, filters by target system, activities, and history of the activity. Only users with the
correct authorizations and permission are capable of accessing the contents of the safe. Unauthorized
access, deletion, and modification of the records is not possible.
1.5.2.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements FIPS 140-2 Approved cryptographic algorithms to support cryptographic activities
such as encryption, decryption, and hashing. The cryptographic module within the TOE generates a unique
AES27
256-bit key for each individual safe located in the EPV. Additionally, each account and file located
within each safe is protected by a unique AES 256-bit key. AES, RSA, and HMAC28
are all used by the
TOE when performing a TLS or SSH session with a remote machine. All AES, RSA, and HMAC keys are
generated with an SP 800-90 DRBG29
, or in some cases, ANSI30
X9.31.
26
TSF – TOE Security Functionality
27
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
28
HMAC – (keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
29
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
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Each of the cryptographic algorithms supported by the TOE have been tested and certified by the CAVP31
.
Each algorithm has been awarded a certificate number. The TOE performs FIPS 140-2 Approved methods
for encryption, decryption, hashing, random number generation, and key transport. The TOE is responsible
for destroying all ephemeral keying material generated within the TOE boundary.
1.5.2.3 User Data Protection
The TOE enforces two access control policies which limit access to the safes located on the EPV (Vault
Access Control Policy) and further limit access to the accounts and files stored within the safes (Safe
Access Control Policy). Access to the vault and safes are enforced by user account authorizations and
permissions. Once granted access to the EPV, the users with the correct authorizations can manage the
vault and the safes within the vault. This includes the creation of safes and the management of file types
allowed within each safe.
In order for a user to access the contents within a safe, they must be added as a safe member by a safe
member with the “Manage Safe Members” permission. Each safe member is given safe permissions which
allow them to read, write, and remove accounts and files located within the safe.
1.5.2.4 Identification and Authentication
TOE users must provide the correct username and password associated an external LDAP account. The
TOE must successfully identify users prior to allowing any actions on their behalf. The TOE identifies the
user by passing the username and password combination to the LDAP server for validation.
1.5.2.5 Security Management
Management of the TOE can be defined as “granular”. Each TOE user that is granted access to the TOE is
provided with a profile which defines the user’s access rights, management rights, and action rights within
the TOE. When first creating a user in the vault and when providing them access to a safe, the TOE
enforces restrictive default values by not providing the user with any authorizations or permissions.
Security roles can also be defined for a TOE user based on a collection of vault authorizations and safe
permissions given to the user.
1.5.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE employs a multi-layered encryption scheme in order to protect the credentials stored within the
EPV. The three layers of encryption employed by the EPV are the vault layer, safe layer, and account/file
layer. All accounts, files, safes, and even the vault itself are encrypted with unique encryption keys.
The PAS Solution v9.1 components all communicate with one another through CyberArk’s patented
communications protocol, which employs AES-256 for confidentiality and HMAC SHA-1 for integrity.
The TOE provides seamless switching between the main EPV and a back-up (Disaster Recovery) Vault if a
failure to the main EPV occurs.
1.5.2.7 Resource Utilization
The TOE provides seamless switching between the main EPV and a back-up (Disaster Recovery) Vault if a
failure to the main EPV occurs. Types of failures include physical and logical destruction of the EPV (or
its host server) or loss of network connectivity. This transparent failover ensures that regular access to the
TOE and its functions is maintained.
1.5.2.8 TOE Access
TOE users attempting to access the TOE through the PVWA or PrivateArk client will encounter a display
banner prior to being able to log into the TOE. The banner provides access to an advisory warning
30
ANSI – American National Standards Institute
31
CAVP – Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program.
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message regarding the unauthorized use of the TOE. Access to the TOE will be limited to users that
provide the correct username and password combination. Restrictions can be placed on a TOE user which
will deny them access to the TOE. Users must actively interact with the TOE in order to avoid session
termination. If the user has not interacted with the TOE for 10 minutes via the PVWA, or for an
administrator-defined inactivity period (default of 30 minutes) via the PrivateArk Client, the session will
terminate and the user will be logged out of the TOE.
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not
included in the TOE
Features/Functionality that are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE are:
 Supported Windows Operating Systems other than those listed in Table 2
 CyberArk Events Notification Manager
 AIM Provider for Windows
 AIM SDK32
 Web Services (WS) API
 PACLI
 CyberArk Remote Control
 Multiple PSM Implementations
 Multiple CPM Implementations
 Mobile PVWA
 Local user authentication
 NT/Windows Authentication
 RADIUS Authentication
 RSA SecurID Authentication (in PVWA)
 PKI Authentication (Personal Certificate)
 Oracle SSO33
(in PVWA)
 High Availability mode
32
SDK – Software Development Kit
33
SSO – Single Sign-On
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2 Conformance Claims
Table 3 provides the identification for any CC, Protection Profile (PP), and EAL package conformance
claims. Rationale is provided for any extensions or augmentations to the conformance claims. Rationale
for CC and PP conformance claims can be found in Section 8.1.
Table 3 CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria
(CC) Identification
and Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012; CC Part 2 extended; CC Part 3 conformant; PP
claim (none); Parts 2 and 3 Interpretations of the CEM as of 2014/05/02 were
reviewed, and no interpretations apply to the claims made in this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation
Assurance Level
EAL2+ Augmented with Flaw Remediation ALC_FLR.2
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3 Security Problem
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the
manner in which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statement of the TOE security
environment, which identifies and explains all:
 Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment
 Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply
 Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel and connectivity
aspects
3.1 Threats to Security
This section identifies the threats to the IT34
assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by
the security environment. The threat agents are divided into four categories:
 Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and are
assumed to possess a low skill level, limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings or
parameters and no physical access to the TOE.
 TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess
a high skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings or parameters and
physical access to the TOE. (TOE users are, however, assumed not to be willfully hostile to the
TOE.)
 TOE failure: The threat of the TOE failing in its operations or exhausting its resources which leads
to a failure of TOE operations.
 External IT Entities: External IT entities that are being used by malicious attackers to adversely
affect the security of the TOE.
Both are assumed to have a low level of motivation. The IT assets requiring protection are the TSF35
and
user data saved on or transitioning through the TOE and the hosts on the protected network. Removal,
diminution and mitigation of the threats are through the objectives identified in Section 4 Security
Objectives. The threats listed in Table 4 are applicable.
Table 4 Threats
Name Description
T.ADMIN_ERROR An administrator may incorrectly configure the TOE resulting in
ineffective security mechanisms.
T.AUDIT_COMPROMISE A malicious user or process may view audit records, cause audit
records to be lost or modified, or prevent future records from being
recorded, thus masking a user’s actions.
T.DATA_COMPROMISE An unauthorized user may read, modify, delay, or destroy security
critical TOE data stored on the TOE or being transmitted between
physically separated parts of the TOE.
T.MASQUERADE A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may masquerade as an
authorized entity to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE
resources.
T.UNAUTHORIZED _ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access (view, modify, delete) to user
34
IT – Information Technology
35
TSF – TOE Security Functionality
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Name Description
data.
T.UNIDENTIFIED _ACTIONS The administrator may fail to notice potential security violations, thus
preventing the administrator from taking action against a possible
security violation.
T.DISASTER Operation or access to the TOE may suddenly fail, rendering the TOE
useless
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
An Organizational Security Policy (OSP) is a set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed by an
organization on the operational environment of the TOE. There are no OSPs defined for this ST.
3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. The
operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for
delivery, operation, and user guidance. Table 5 lists the specific conditions that are required to ensure the
security of the TOE and are assumed to exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Table 5 Assumptions
Name Description
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.PROTECT The TOE software will be protected from unauthorized modification.
A.TIMESTAMP The IT environment provides the TOE with the necessary reliable
timestamps.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are non-hostile and are trusted to follow and
apply all administrator guidance.
A.HARDEN The EPV component of the TOE will be installed on a hardened
instance of Windows
A.ACCESS Access to the TOE will be provided by a reliable network connection
A.INSTALL TOE components will be installed onto a compatible Operating
System
A.INTERNAL_SERVICES All LDAP and remote systems that the TOE communicates with
should be located on the same internal network as the TOE. Users
on this network are assumed to be non-hostile.
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4 Security Objectives
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by the
security problem definition (see Section 3). The set of security objectives for a TOE form a high-level
solution to the security problem. This high-level solution is divided into two part-wise solutions: the
security objectives for the TOE, and the security objectives for the TOE’s operational environment. This
section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The specific security objectives for the TOE are listed in Table 6.
Table 6 Security Objectives for the TOE
Name Description
O.ACCESS The TOE will ensure that only authorized users may gain access to it
and the resources that it controls.
O.AUDIT The TOE will provide the capability to detect security relevant events
and record them to the audit trail.
O.AUDIT_REVIEW The TOE will provide the capability for only authorized users to view
audit information.
O.AUDIT_STORAGE The TOE will provide a secure method of storing local audit records.
O.CRYPTO The TOE will provide FIPS 140-2 Approved cryptographic algorithms
and procedures to TOE users during operation of the TOE.
O.USER_AUTHEN The TOE will uniquely identify and authenticate users prior to
allowing access to TOE functions and data.
O.PROTECT_COMM The TOE will provide protected communication channels for parts of
the distributed TOE.
O.BANNER The TOE will present an access banner to TOE users prior to
accessing the TOE that defines acceptable use of the TOE
O.TOE_ADMIN The TOE will provide mechanisms to ensure that only authorized
administrators are able to configure the TOE security functions
attributes.
O.ROBUST_ACCESS The TOE will implement mechanisms that can deny or suspend
session establishment
O.FAIL_SECURE The TOE will provide a method to continue secure operations during
a catastrophic TOE failure
O.VAULT The TOE will provide mechanisms to ensure that stored credentials
are not stored in plaintext and are protected from unauthorized
access
O.PERMISSIONS The TOE will provide a method to separate and restrict the abilities
of individual TOE users
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
The IT security objectives listed in Table 7 are to be satisfied by the environment:
Table 7 IT Security Objectives
Name Description
OE.PROTECT The TOE environment must protect itself and the TOE from external
interference or tampering.
OE.TIME The TOE environment must provide reliable timestamps to the TOE.
OE.HARDENED The TOE environment must provide a hardened version of Windows
for the installation of EPV.
OE.NETWORK The TOE environment must provide a consistent network connection
to the TOE.
OE.OS The TOE environment must provide a compatible Windows or Linux
Operating System version for the installation of TOE components.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Trusted TOE Administrators must follow and apply all administrator
and configuration guidance.
OE.INTERNAL_SERVICES LDAP servers and remote systems accessed by the TOE are located
on the same internal network as the TOE. Users on this network are
non-hostile.
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
The non-IT environment security objectives listed in Table 8 are to be satisfied without imposing technical
requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE
hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or
administrative measures.
Table 8 Non-IT Security Objectives
Name Description
NOE.PHYSICAL The TOE environment must provide physical security commensurate
with the value of the TOE and the data it contains.
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5 Extended Components
This section defines the extended SFRs and extended SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are
presented following the conventions identified in Section 6.1.
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional
Components
This section specifies the extended SFRs for the TOE.
5.1.1 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
This class contains families of functional requirements that relate to the integrity and management of the
mechanisms that constitute the TSF and to the integrity of TSF data.
5.1.1.1 FPT_APW_EXT Protection of Stored Credentials
Family Behavior
The requirements of this family ensure that the TSF will protect credential data from disclosure. This
family is not modeled after any families in Common Criteria Part 2. There is only one component in this
family, FPT_APW_EXT.1. This component requires the TOE to store credentials in non-plaintext form
and to prevent the reading of plaintext credentials.
Component Leveling
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: This SFR describes the behavior of the TOE when it must store credentials –
either credentials for administrative users or credentials for enterprise users. An explicit requirement was
required as there is no equivalent requirement in the Common Criteria. This SFR is defined in the Standard
Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Identity and Credential Management. The SFR was
further modified from the Protection Profile to reflect the functionality of the TOE.
Management: FPT_APW_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_APW_EXT.1
a) There are no audit activities foreseen.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Stored Credentials
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall store credentials in non-plaintext form
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext credentials from unauthorized users.
FPT_APW_EXT: Protection of Stored Credentials 1
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5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance
Components
There are no extended TOE Security Assurance Components.
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6 Security Requirements
This section defines the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are presented following the
conventions identified in Section 6.1.
6.1 Conventions
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to
aid the Security Target reader.
The CC allows for assignment, refinement, selection and iteration operations to be performed on security
functional requirements. All of these operations are used within this ST. These operations are performed
as described in Part 2 of the CC, and are shown as follows:
 Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
 Completed selection statements are identified using [underlined text within brackets]. In keeping
with these conventions, in the event an assignment is within a selection, it will be depicted as
italicized, underlined text.
 Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken (Example: TSF Data)
and should be considered as a refinement.
 Extended Functional and Assurance Requirements are identified using “_EXT” at the end of the
short name.
 Iterations are identified by appending a number in parentheses following the component title. For
example, FDP_ACC.1(1) Audit Data Generation would be the first iteration and FDP_ACC.1(2)
Audit Data Generation would be the second iteration.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 9
identifies all SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each
requirement.
Table 9 TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 

FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association  
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review  
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review  
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review  
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Storage 

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation  
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation  

FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control (Vault)  
 
FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset Access Control (Safe)  
 
FDP_ACF.1(1) Security attribute based access control (Vault)  
 
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Name Description S A R I
FDP_ACF.1(2) Security attribute based access control (Safe)  
 
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action    
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action    
FMT_MOF.1(1) Management of security function behavior (Vault) 

 
FMT_MOF.1(2) Management of security function behavior (Safe) 

 
FMT_MSA.1(1) Management of security attributes (Vault) 

 
FMT_MSA.1(2) Management of security attributes (Safe) 

 
FMT_MSA.3(1) Static attribute initialization (Vault) 



FMT_MSA.3(2) Static attribute initialization (Safe) 



FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions  
 
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles  
 
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Stored Credential    
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state  
 
FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection 
  
FRU_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance  
 
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-Initiated Termination  
 
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banner    
FTA_TSE.1 TOE Sessions Establishment  
 
Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
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6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events, for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [Privileged account access, approval workflow, privileged account management,
privileged account auto-detection, safe management, member management, user login,
user/group/location management, Vault system administration, reports management, file
access, file management].
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [safe, target system, reason, alert].
Application Note: The TSF is comprised of several components that are registered as Windows services
and therefore the start-up and shutdown events are captured in the Windows Event Log.
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [users with the “View audit” safe authorization] with the capability to read
[operational reports and audit/compliance reports] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1
The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been
granted explicit read-access.
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1
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The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [filters] of audit data based on [general filters, target
systems, activities, and history].
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG1.2
The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the
audit trail.
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6.2.3 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [Hash DRBG, HMAC DRBG, CTR DRBG] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [256-bit (AES), 2048-bit (RSA), 160-bit (SHA-1), and 128-bit (HMAC)] that meet the
following: [SP 800-90].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method [zeroization] that meets the following: [FIPS 140-2 zeroization requirements].
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [the operations listed in Table 10 below] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [algorithms listed in Table 10 below] and cryptographic key sizes [key
sizes listed in Table 10 below] that meet the following: [standards listed in Table 10 below]
Table 10 Cryptographic Algorithms
Cryptographic
Operation
Cryptographic
Operation
Key/Digest
Size
Standard Certificate
Number
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
AES-CBC 256-bit FIPS PUB 197 695,
1884,
2116,
2234,
2342,
2394,
2484,
2824,
2929
Asymmetric
encryption/decryption
RSA 2048-bit 2048-bit PKCS36
#1 v1.5 323,
960,
1086,
1145,
1205,
1273,
1477,
1535
36
PKCS – Public Key Cryptography Standards
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Cryptographic
Operation
Cryptographic
Operation
Key/Digest
Size
Standard Certificate
Number
Hashing SHA-1 160-bit FIPS PUB 180-4 723,
1655,
1840,
1923,
2019,
2056,
2102,
2368,
2465
Message authentication HMAC SHA-1 160-bit FIPS PUB 198-1 373,
1126,
1288,
1363,
1451,
1485,
1526,
1768,
1856
Random number
generation
Hash DRBG,
HMAC DRBG,
CTR DRBG (AES)
N/A NIST SP 800-90 157,
229,
264,
292,
316,
342,
485,
540
ANSI X9.31
(AES)
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
ANSI X9.31 407
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6.2.4 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control (Vault)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1(1).1
The TSF shall enforce the [Vault Access Control Policy] on [
 Subjects: users accessing EPV
 Objects: safes
 Operations: view, create].
FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset access control (Safe)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1(2).1
The TSF shall enforce the [Safe Access Control Policy] on [
 Subjects: users accessing an EPV-hosted safe (safe members)
 Objects: accounts/passwords, files
 Operations: read, write, and remove].
FDP_ACF.1(1) Security attribute based access control (Vault)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3(1) Static attribute initialization (Vault)
FDP_ACF.1(1).1
The TSF shall enforce the [Vault Access Control Policy] to objects based on the following: [
 Subject attributes (users)
o User ID
o Password
o Access type
o Authorization
o Location
o Access time
o Vault user account expiration date
 Object attributes (safes)
o Name
o File types].
FDP_ACF.1(1).2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: [
 Access to view the safes can be limited to users based on
o The IP37
address (location) which they are accessing the vault from
o The time of day that they are accessing the vault from
o The expiration date of the account
 Users with the “Add safes” authorization can view and create safes from the vault
 Users with the “Manage Server File Categories” can view the file types allowed within a
safe
FDP_ACF.1(1).3
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [
37
IP – Internet Protocol
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 Users that supply the correct UserID and password combination and have the correct
vault authorizations can view safes in the vault
 Users with the following access types can view safes in the vault
o EPVUser
o PVWA
o PSM
o PSMUser
o PSMPServer
o CPM
o ENE38
o AIMAccount
o AppProvider
o OPMProvider
o OPMUser
o PIMProvider
o POCAdmin].
FDP_ACF.1(1).4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [
 IP address (location) on which they are attempting to access the vault
 time of day on which they are attempting to access the vault
 the expiration date of the account when attempting to access the vault].
FDP_ACF.1(2) Security attribute based access control (Safe)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3(2) Static attribute initialization (Safe)
FDP_ACF.1(2).1
The TSF shall enforce the [Safe Access Control Policy] to objects based on the following: [
 Subject attributes (safe members)
o User ID
o Permissions
 Object attributes (accounts/passwords and files)
o account name
o value/data
o access rules].
FDP_ACF.1(2).2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: [Users with the permissions listed in the “Permissions” column
of Table 11 can act upon the accounts and their values as stated in the “Object Operations
(Account Name)” and “Object Operations (Value/Data)” columns in Table 11].
Table 11 Safe Access Control Permissions
Permission Object Operations
(Account name)
Object Operations
(Value/Data)
Use Accounts Read None
Retrieve Accounts Read Read
List Accounts Read None
Add accounts Read, write, remove None
Update password value Read Read, write
38
ENE – Event Notification Engine
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Permission Object Operations
(Account name)
Object Operations
(Value/Data)
Update password properties Read None
Initiate CPM password
management operations
Read Read, write
Specify next password value Read Read, write
Rename Accounts Read, write None
Delete Accounts Read, remove None
Unlock Accounts Read, write None
Manage Safe Read, write, remove None
Manage Safe Members Read None
Backup Safe Read None
Move accounts/folders Read None
FDP_ACF.1(2).3
The TSF shall explicitly authorized access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [users must supply the correct UserID and password in order to access the contents of the
safe].
FDP_ACF.1(2).4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [the UserID and explicit
access rules for each account/password given to that UserID].
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6.2.5 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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6.2.6 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1(1) Management of security function behaviors (Vault)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1(1).1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the
behavior of] the functions [listed under the ‘Security Functions Behavior Permissions’ column of
Table 12] to [the authorizations listed under the ‘Authorizations’ column of Table 12].
Table 12 Management of Vault Security Function Behavior by Role
Authorizations Security Function Behavior Permissions
Add Safes Add safes to the vault
Audit Users Track user activities in the vault
Add/Update Users Add and update users, manage network areas, manage locations
Reset Users’ Passwords Reset a user’s password
Activate Users Activate or deactivate trusted network areas for users
Add Network Areas Add, update, and remove network areas that specify where the vault
can be accessed
Manage Directory
Mapping
Add, update, and remove directory maps that manage users
transparently
Manage Server File
Categories
Add, update, and remove file categories
Backup All Safes Run backup procedures
Restore All Safes Run restore procedures
FMT_MOF.1(2) Management of security function behaviors (Safe)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1(2).1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the
behavior of] the functions [listed under the ‘Security Functions Behavior Permissions’ column of
Table 13] to [the permissions listed under the ‘Permissions’ column of Table 13].
Table 13 Management of Safe Security Function Behavior by Role
Permissions Security Function Behavior Permissions
Use Accounts Access and use the accounts saved within a safe
Retrieve Accounts Access and use the accounts saved within a safe; View the plaintext
version of a password associated with the account; Save files to the
safe; Open files located in the safe
List Accounts View the accounts and files located on the safe; Cannot access the
account or file
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Permissions Security Function Behavior Permissions
Add Accounts Add accounts and associated passwords to the safe; Update account
properties
Update Password Value Change the password associated with an account; Undelete an
account; Save files to the safe;
Update Password
Properties
Update account properties (does not include password)
Initiate CPM Password
Management Operations
Initiate password management operations through the CPM –
includes changing, verifying, and reconciling passwords
Specify Next Password
Value
Specify the next password to be used when the CPM changes the
password value
Rename Accounts Rename existing accounts in the safe
Delete Accounts Remove existing accounts in the safe
Unlock Accounts Unlock existing accounts and files in the safe
Manage Safe Update, recover, and remove a safe from the vault
Manage Safe Members Add, remove, and update members of the safe; Manage account
permissions
Backup Safe Create a backup of a safe and its contents
View Audit Log View account and user activity in the safe; Does not have
permissions to view or use accounts
View Safe Members View members of the safe and their permissions
Authorize Password
Request
Give confirmation to a user requesting access to the safe; View the
accounts and files located on the safe;
Access Safe without
Confirmation
Access a safe without being a member of the safe and no need to
request permission
Create Folders Create folders on the safe
Delete Folders Delete folders on the safe
Move accounts/folders Move accounts and folders in the safe
FMT_MSA.1(1) Management of security attributes (Vault)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1(1).1
The TSF shall enforce the [Vault Access Control Policy] to restrict the ability to [selection: query,
modify, delete, create] the security attributes [security attribute listed in the “Attributes” column
of Table 14] to [the users with the authorizations listed in the “Authorizations” column of Table
14].
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Table 14 Management of Vault Security Attributes
Operation Attributes Authorizations
Query UserID Audit Users
Add/Update Users
Access type
Authorization
Location
Access time
Account expiration date
Modify Password Audit Users
Reset Users’ Passwords
Activate Users
Account expiration date
Modify Access type Add/Update Users
Authorization
Access time
Account expiration date
Modify Location Add Network Areas
Modify Safe file type Manager Server File Categories
Delete UserID Add/Update Users
Create Safe name Add Safes
FMT_MSA.1(2) Management of security attributes (Safe)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1(2).1
The TSF shall enforce the [Safe Access Control Policy] to restrict the ability to [selection: query,
modify, delete, create] the security attributes [security attribute listed in the “Attributes” column
of Table 15] to [the users with the permissions listed in the “Permissions” column of Table 15].
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Table 15 Management of Safe Security Attributes
Operation Attributes Permissions
Query User ID Manage Safe Members
View Safe Members
User Permissions
Query Account name Use Accounts
Retrieve Accounts
List Accounts
Add Accounts
Update Password Value
Update Password Properties
Initiate CPM Password Management
Operations
Rename Accounts
Delete Accounts
Unlock Accounts
Move Accounts/Folders
Query Value/Data Retrieve Accounts
Update Password Value
Initiate CPM Password Management
Operations
Query/Modify Permissions Manage Safe Members
Access rules
Modify Account name Rename Accounts
Modify Value/Data Update Password Value
Initiate CPM Password Management
Operations
Delete Account name Delete Accounts
Manage Safe
Value/Data
Delete User ID Manage Safe Members
Create User ID Manage Safe Members
Create Account name Add Accounts
Create Value/Data Add Accounts
Specify Next Password Value
Create Access rules Manage Safe Members
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FMT_MSA.3(1) Static attribute initialization (Vault)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1(1) Management of security attributes (Vault)
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3(1).1
The TSF shall enforce the [Vault Access Control Policy] to provide [restrictive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP39
.
FMT_MSA.3(1).2
The TSF shall allow users with the [Add Safe authorization] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.3(2) Static attribute initialization (Safe)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1(2) Management of security attributes (Safe)
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3(2).1
The TSF shall enforce the [Safe Access Control Policy] to provide [restrictive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3(2).2
The TSF shall allow users with the [Manage Safe permission] to specify alternative initial values
to override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [User management,
authentication management, access control management, audit log management, vault
management, configuration management, safe management, account management, file
management].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [custom roles with administrator-defined permissions].
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
39
SFP – Security Functional Policy
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6.2.7 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Stored Credentials
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall store credentials in non-plaintext form
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext credentials from unauthorized users.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [
 Destruction of the vault (physical or logical)
 Loss in network connectivity].
FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FPT_ITT.1.1
The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure, modification] when it is transmitted between
separate parts of the TOE.
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6.2.8 Class FRU: Resource Utilization
FRU_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLT.1.1
The TSF shall ensure the operation of [access to the EPV, its safes, and the accounts and files
within the safes] when the following failures occur: [
 Destruction of the vault (physical or logical)
 Loss in network connectivity].
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6.2.9 Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-Initiated Termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after:
 For the PrivateArk Client: [a default period of 30 minutes of inactivity or an
administrator-defined period of inactivity];
 For the PVWA Interface: [a non-configurable period of 10 minutes of inactivity].
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning message regarding
unauthorized use of the TOE.
FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FTA_TSE.1.1
The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [
 Incorrect User ID
 Incorrect Password
 Attempting to access the TOE through an interface while having the incorrect access type
 Location (IP Address) of attempted session establishment
 Account expiration date]
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6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements listed in Table 16
are taken from the CC Part 3 and are EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2.
Table 16 EAL2 Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Class ALC : Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM Coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
Class ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
Class AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Class ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
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7 TOE Summary Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in
previous sections of this ST.
[If ASE_TSS.2 is found to apply to the evaluation, provide a description of how TOE protects itself against
interference and logical tampering, and bypass.]
7.1 TOE Security Functions
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to the security functions.
Hence, each function is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This
serves to both describe the security functions and rationalize that the security functions satisfy the
necessary requirements. Table 17 lists all SFRs claimed within this Security Target.
Table 17 Mapping of TOE Security Functions to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Functionality SFR ID Description
Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Storage
Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
User Data Protection FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control (Vault)
FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset Access Control (Safe)
FDP_ACF.1(1) Security attribute based access
control (Vault)
FDP_ACF.1(2) Security attribute based access
control (Safe)
Identification and Authentication FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any
action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any
action
Security Management FMT_MOF.1(1) Management of security function
behavior (Vault)
FMT_MOF.1(2) Management of security function
behavior (Safe)
FMT_MSA.1(1) Management of security attributes
(Vault)
FMT_MSA.1(2) Management of security attributes
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TOE Security Functionality SFR ID Description
(Safe)
FMT_MSA.3(1) Static attribute initialization
(Vault)
FMT_MSA.3(2) Static attribute initialization (Safe)
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Protection of the TSF FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Stored Credential
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of
secure state
FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer
Protection
Resource Utilization FRU_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance
TOE Access FTA_SSL.3 TSF-Initiated Termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banner
FTA_TSE.1 TOE Sessions Establishment
7.1.1 Security Audit
The Security Audit function provides the TOE with the functionality of generating audit records. Typical
audit records that can be accessed by a user with the correct authorizations include Privileged Account
Inventory, Safe Lists, User Lists, and User Activities. As TOE users access, manage, and configure the
TOE, their activities are tracked. When an Auditor user (TOE user with the “View audit” authorization)
generates an “Activity Log”, the Auditor will see the various activities performed by TOE users in an
organized list. The audit list contains the columns and information listed in Table 18.
Table 18 Audit Record Contents
Field Content
Time The time the activity was performed
(The date and time are displayed in the time zone of the
EPV)
User The full name of the user who performed the activity
Action The activity performed by the user
Safe The safe where the privileged account is stored
Target The privileged account that was used in the activity
Target Platform The unique ID of the platform that was allocated to the
privileged account used in the activity.
Target System The remote system where the privileged account was
used.
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Field Content
Target Account The name of the target account where the privileged
account was used.
New Target The new location/name of an account on which the
activity was performed and extra details about the
activity that was performed.
Reason The reason given by the user for performing the activity
Alert An indication that this activity prompted an alert
Request ID The unique ID of the request that was created in order
to retrieve the privileged account used in the activity
Client ID The unique ID of the client used in the activity
Furthermore, once an Activity Log has been generated, the results can be filtered with general filters, filters
by target system, activities, and history of the activity. Each item listed in Table 18 above can be
individually filtered. A filter can be placed on each individual action taken by the TOE user. Those actions
include:
 privileged account access,
 approval workflow,
 privileged account management,
 privileged account auto-detection,
 safe management,
 member management,
 user login,
 user/group/location management,
 vault system administration,
 reports management,
 file access, and
 file management
When an audit record is requested, it will be generated by the TOE and stored on the local host server
within a reports safe dedicated for audit records. Only users with the correct authorizations and permission
are capable of accessing the contents of the safe. The records safe and its contents are secured by the EPV
by individual encryption keys. Each individual file is encrypted with its own, unique encryption key. Then
the records safe is encrypted with its own, unique encryption key. This will prevent any unauthorized
access, deletion, or modification to the records.
The start-up and shut down events of the TOE are provided with the support of the TOE environment.
Each TOE component is registered as an OS service. Upon start-up and shutdown, events are stored in the
OS event logs. These logs are viewed by authorized administrators using the appropriate tools.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1
7.1.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements FIPS 140-2 Approved cryptographic algorithms to support cryptographic
functionality such as encryption, decryption, and hashing. The cryptographic module within the TOE
generates a unique AES 256-bit key for each individual safe located in the EPV. Additionally each account
and file located within each safe is protected by a unique AES 256-bit key. AES, RSA, and HMAC are all
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used by the TOE when performing a TLS or SSH session with a remote machine. All AES, RSA, and
HMAC keys are generated either with an SP 800-90 DRBG, or with the ANSI X9.31 RNG40
.
Each of the cryptographic algorithms supported by the TOE have been tested and certified by the CAVP41
.
Each algorithm has been awarded a certificate number. Table 10 above lists each algorithm in use by the
TOE and their associated algorithm certificate.
The TOE is responsible for destroying all ephemeral keying material generated within the TOE boundary.
The TOE uses FIPS 140-2 Approved zeroization methods in order to destroy all keys and other critical
parameters generated by the TOE at the appropriate time.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1
7.1.3 User Data Protection
The TOE provides the User Data Protection security function to manage user access and interaction with
safes and accounts stored on the EPV. The TOE enforces two access control policies which limit access to
the safes located on the EPV (Vault Access Control Policy) and further limit access to the accounts and
files stored within the safes (Safe Access Control Policy). Access to the vault and safes are enforced by
user account authorizations and permissions. An operator attempting to access the EPV or Safes with the
incorrect authorizations and permissions will be denied access.
Operators can access the safe through one of the many TOE component interfaces including: PrivateArk
Client and Web Client, PVWA, PSM, PSMP, CPM, AIM, and OPM. Access to the EPV through these
interfaces requires the correct access type associated with each TOE user. Once granted access to the EPV,
the users with the correct authorizations can manage the vault and the safes within the vault. This includes
the creation of safes and the management of file types allowed within each safe. TOE users can be denied
access to the vault if they are attempting to access the vault from an interface in which they do not have the
correct access type for. Additionally, vault access can be limited to TOE user based on the time of day,
location of access, or account expiration date.
In order for a user to access the contents within a safe, they must be added as a safe member by a safe
member with the “Manage Safe Members” permission. Each safe member is given safe permissions which
allow them to read, write, and remove accounts and files located within the safe. Some safe members will
be allowed to view detailed account information while others may only be able to run an audit report on the
safe. Users can be denied access to specific accounts and files located within a safe based on the access
rules given to an account or file.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_ACC.1(1), FPD_ACC.1(2), FDP_ACF.1(1),
FDP_ACF.1(2)
7.1.4 Identification and Authentication
TOE users must provide the correct username and password associated with an external LDAP account.
The TOE must successfully identify and authenticate a user prior to allowing any actions on their behalf.
The TOE identifies and authenticates the user by passing the username and password combination to the
LDAP server for validation.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2
40
RNG – Random Number Generator
41
CAVP – Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program.
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7.1.5 Security Management
Management of the TOE can be defined as “granular”. Each TOE user that is granted access to the TOE is
provided with a profile, which defines the user’s access rights, management rights, and action rights within
the TOE. Within the EPV, a list of authorizations provided to each user defines the actions that they can
take within the vault. Further, within each safe, a safe member is granted a list of permissions which
controls how they can interact with the accounts and files within the safe. When first creating a user in the
vault and when providing them access to a safe, the TOE enforces restrictive default values by not
providing the user with any authorizations or permissions. Authorizations are added by the TOE user
creating the new user within the EPV and permissions are given to the new user when adding them as a
safe member to one or many safes.
Due to the granular control of TOE user authorizations and permissions, the TOE does not inherently
define security roles.
The TOE defines restrictive default values for the Vault Access Control Policy and Safe Access Control
Policy. Only users explicitly granted permissions have access to safes and account/password files.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_MOF.1(1), FMT_MOF.1(2), FMT_MSA.1(1),
FMT_MSA.1(2), FMT_MSA.3(1), FMT_MSA.3(2), FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1.
7.1.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE employs a multi-layered encryption scheme in order to protect the credentials stored within the
EPV. The three layers of encryption employed by the EPV are the vault layer, safe layer, and account/file
layer. All accounts, files, safes, and even the vault itself are encrypted with unique encryption keys. Each
account and file stored within a safe is encrypted with its own file encryption key. Each safe is encrypted
with its own safe key. Then the vault itself is encrypted with a vault key. Each key is stored within the
vault in its own safe, providing further protection of the encryption keys. Access to the plaintext version of
the credentials stored within a vault is limited to the authorized users of the safe with the “Retrieve
Accounts” safe privilege.
The TOE provides a trusted internal channel for all components of the TOE. The TOE utilizes a patented
communications protocol developed by CyberArk, which employs AES-256 for confidentiality and HMAC
SHA-1 for integrity. The TOE components all communicate with one another through a variety of ports
which ensures that all of their communication is secure and logically separate.
The TOE provides seamless switching between the main EPV and a back-up (Disaster Recovery) Vault if a
failure to the main EPV occurs. Types of failures include physical and logical destruction of the EPV (or
its host server) or loss of network connectivity. This transparent failover preserves a secure state of the
TOE.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPT_APW_EXT.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_ITT.1
7.1.7 Resource Utilization
The TOE provides seamless switching between the main EPV and a back-up (Disaster Recovery) Vault if a
failure to the main EPV occurs. Types of failures include physical and logical destruction of the EPV (or
its host server) or loss of network connectivity. This transparent failover ensures that regular access to the
TOE and its functions is maintained.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FRU_FLT.1.
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7.1.8 TOE Access
TOE users attempting to access the TOE through the PVWA or PrivateArk client will encounter a display
banner prior to being able to log into the TOE. The banner provides access to an advisory warning
message regarding the unauthorized use of the TOE. Access to the TOE will be limited to users that
provide the correct username and password combination.
Restrictions can be placed on a TOE user, which will deny them access to the TOE. The location from
which a TOE user is attempting to access the TOE can be used to limit access to the TOE. Administrators
can also place an account expiration date onto a user account. Once the account has expired, the user will
not be allowed to access the TOE. Lastly, if the user does not have the correct access type to access the
TOE from a given interface, they will be denied access to the TOE.
Users must actively interact with the TOE in order to avoid session termination. If the user account has not
interacted with the TOE for 10 minutes via the PVWA, or for an administrator-defined inactivity period
(default of 30 minutes) via the PrivateArk Client, the session will terminate and the user will be logged out
of the TOE. The user must proceed with the login process in order to regain access to the TOE.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTA_SSL.3. FTA_TAB.1, FTA_TSE.1
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8 Rationale
8.1 Conformance Claims Rationale
This Security Target conforms to Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant of the Common Criteria Standard
for Information Technology Security Evaluations, Version 3.1 Revision 3. This ST does not conform to a
PP.
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each threat, policy statement, and assumption that
compose the Security Target. Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 demonstrate the mappings between the threats,
policies, and assumptions to the security objectives are complete. The following discussion provides
detailed evidence of coverage for each threat, policy, and assumption.
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Table 19 maps all threats to all objectives.
Table 19 Threats: Objectives Mapping
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.ADMIN_ERROR
An administrator may incorrectly
configure the TOE resulting in
ineffective security mechanisms.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
Trusted TOE Administrators must
follow and apply all administrator
and configuration guidance.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN counters
this threat by ensuring that
administrators follow all
administrative guidance.
T.AUDIT_COMPROMISE
A malicious user or process may
view audit records, cause audit
records to be lost or modified, or
prevent future records from being
recorded, thus masking a user’s
actions.
O.AUDIT
The TOE will provide the
capability to detect security
relevant events and record them
to the audit trail.
O.AUDIT counters this threat by
ensuring that unauthorized
attempts to access the TOE are
recorded.
O.AUDIT_STORAGE
The TOE will provide a secure
method of storing local audit
records.
O.AUDIT_STORAGE counters
this threat by ensuring that only
authorized users are allowed to
access stored audit records, and
that audit records are encrypted
within local storage.
T.DATA_COMPROMISE
An unauthorized user may read,
modify, delay, or destroy security
critical TOE data stored on the
TOE or being transmitted between
physically separated parts of the
TOE.
O.CRYPTO
The TOE will provide FIPS 140-2
Approved cryptographic
algorithms and procedures to
TOE users during operation of
the TOE.
O.CRYPTO counters this threat
by providing encryption services
available to authorized users
and/or user applications.
O.PROTECT_COMM
The TOE will provide protected
communication channels for parts
of the distributed TOE.
O.PROTECT_COMM counters
this threat by providing protected
communication channels for parts
of the distributed TOE.
O.TOE_ADMIN
The TOE will provide mechanisms
to ensure that only authorized
O.TOE_ADMIN counters this
threat by ensuring that only
trusted administrators are able to
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Threats Objectives Rationale
administrators are able to
configure the TOE security
functions attributes.
change the security functions and
attributes stored on the TOE.
O.VAULT
The TOE will provide mechanisms
to ensure that stored credentials
are not stored in plaintext and are
protected from unauthorized
access
O.VAULT counters this threat by
encrypting all stored credentials.
T.MASQUERADE
A malicious user, process, or
external IT entity may masquerade
as an authorized entity to gain
unauthorized access to data or
TOE resources.
O.USER_AUTHEN
The TOE will uniquely identify and
authenticate users prior to
allowing access to TOE functions
and data.
O.USER_AUTHEN counters this
threat by ensuring that the TOE is
able to identify and authenticate
users prior to allowing access to
TOE administrative functions and
data.
O.BANNER
The TOE will present an access
banner to TOE users prior to
accessing the TOE that defines
acceptable use of the TOE
O.BANNER counters this threat
by providing a warning message to
users about unauthorized use of
the TOE prior to logging in.
T.UNAUTHORIZED _ACCESS
A user may gain unauthorized
access (view, modify, delete) to
user data.
O.ACCESS
The TOE will ensure that only
authorized users may gain access
to it and the resources that it
controls.
O.ACCESS counters this threat
by ensuring that users gain only
authorized access to it and to
resources that it controls.
O.ROBUST_ACCESS
The TOE will implement
mechanisms that can deny or
suspend session establishment
O.ROBUST_ACCESS counters
this threat by ensuring only
authorized users are allowed to
connect to the TOE.
O.ROBUST_ACCESS counters
this threat by automatically closing
inactive sessions.
O.PERMISSIONS
The TOE will provide a method
to separate and restrict the
abilities of individual TOE users
O.PERMISSIONS counters this
threat by assigning users different
permissions which relate to the
data which they are allowed to
access.
T.UNIDENTIFIED _ACTIONS
The administrator may fail to
notice potential security violations,
thus preventing the administrator
from taking action against a
possible security violation.
O.AUDIT_REVIEW
The TOE will provide the
capability for only authorized
users to view audit information.
O.AUDIT_REVIEW counters this
threat by providing the capability
for only authorized administrators
to view audit information.
T.DISASTER
Operation or access to the TOE
may suddenly fail, rendering the
TOE useless
O.FAIL_SECURE
The TOE will provide a method
to continue secure operations
during a catastrophic TOE failure
O.FAIL_SECURE counters this
threat by providing a seamless
transition to a working version of
the TOE.
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Every Threat is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives counter all defined threats.
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Table 20 maps all assumptions to environmental objectives.
Table 20 Assumptions: Objectives Mapping
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security, commensurate
with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is assumed to be
provided by the environment.
NOE.PHYSICAL
The TOE environment must
provide physical security
commensurate with the value of
the TOE and the data it contains.
NOE.PHYSICAL satisfies the
assumption by ensuring that the
TOE environment provides
physical security commensurate
with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains.
A.PROTECT
The TOE software will be
protected from unauthorized
modification.
OE.PROTECT
The TOE environment must
protect itself and the TOE from
external interference or
tampering.
OE.PROTECT satisfies the
assumption by performing
integrity checks to ensure
external interference or
tampering has not occurred.
A.TIMESTAMP
The IT environment provides the
TOE with the necessary reliable
timestamps.
OE.TIME
The TOE environment must
provide reliable timestamps to the
TOE.
OE.TIME satisfies the assumption
by providing reliable timestamps
provided by the TOE environment
hardware clock.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN
TOE Administrators are non-
hostile and are trusted to follow
and apply all administrator
guidance.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
Trusted TOE Administrators must
follow and apply all administrator
and configuration guidance.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN satisfies
the assumption by ensuring that
only trusted administrators follow
and apply all administrator
guidance.
A.HARDEN
The EPV component of the TOE
will be installed on a hardened
instance of Windows
OE.HARDENED
The TOE environment must
provide a hardened version of
Windows for the installation of
EPV.
OE.HARDENED satisfies the
assumption by ensuring a
hardened version of Windows is
provided for the installation of the
EPV.
A.ACCESS
Access to the TOE will be
provided by a reliable network
connection
OE.NETWORK
The TOE environment must
provide a consistent network
connection to the TOE.
OE.NETWORK satisfies the
assumption by ensuring a
consistent network connection to
the TOE will always be provided.
A.INSTALL
TOE components will be installed
onto a compatible Operating
System
OE.OS
The TOE environment must
provide a compatible Windows or
Linux Operating System version
for the installation of TOE
components.
OE.OS satisfies the assumption by
ensuring that a compatible
Window or Linux Operating
System will be provided for the
installation of TOE components.
A.INTERNAL_SERVICES
All LDAP and remote systems that
the TOE communicates with
should be located on the same
OE.INTERNAL_SERVICES
LDAP servers and remote
systems accessed by the TOE are
located on the same internal
OE.INTERNAL_SERVICES
satisfies this assumption by
ensuring that LDAP and remote
systems accessed by the TOE are
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Assumptions Objectives Rationale
internal network as the TOE.
Users on this network are
assumed to be non-hostile.
network as the TOE. Users on
this network are non-hostile.
located within the same internal
network as the TOE. Users on
this network are non-hostile.
Every assumption is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives uphold all defined assumptions.
8.3 Rationale for Extended Security Functional
Requirements
Two extended SFRs were created to support the advanced functionality of the PAS Solution.
FPT_APW was created to specifically address the non-plaintext storage of user credentials on the TOE.
The CC Part 2 FPT SFRs do not cover the non-plaintext storage of user credentials. In this case, all user
credentials are being stored on the TOE in encrypted form. As a result, the FPT SFRs do not apply. The
purpose of this extended requirement is to describe the secure, encrypted storage of user credentials on the
TOE.
This requirement exhibits functionality that can be easily documented in the ADV assurance evidence and
thus does not require any additional Assurance Documentation.
8.4 Rationale for Extended TOE Security
Assurance Requirements
There are no Extended SARs defined for this ST.
8.5 Security Requirements Rationale
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE
Objectives
Table 21 maps all objects to SFRs.
Table 21 Objectives: SFRs Mapping
Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.ACCESS
The TOE will ensure that only
authorized users may gain access
to it and the resources that it
controls.
FDP_ACC.1(1)
Subset access control (Vault)
The requirement meets the
objective by enforcing the Vault
Access Control Policy on all
subjects and all named objects and
all operations among them. The
policy specifies the access rules
between all subjects and all named
objects controlled by the TOE.
While authorized users are
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
trusted to some extent, this
requirement ensures only
authorized access is allowed to
named objects.
FDP_ACC.1(2)
Subset Access Control (Safe)
The requirement meets the
objective by enforcing the Safe
Access Control Policy on all
subjects and all named objects and
all operations among them. The
policy specifies the access rules
between all subjects and all named
objects controlled by the TOE.
While authorized users are
trusted to some extent, this
requirement ensures only
authorized access is allowed to
named objects.
FDP_ACF.1(1)
Security attribute based access
control (Vault)
The requirement meets the
objective by specifying the Vault
Access Control Policy rules that
will be enforced by the TSF and
determines if an operation among
subjects and named objects is
allowed. Furthermore, it specifies
the rules to explicitly authorize or
deny access to a named object
based upon security attributes.
FDP_ACF.1(2)
Security attribute based access
control (Safe)
The requirement meets the
objective by specifying the Safe
Access Control Policy rules that
will be enforced by the TSF and
determines if an operation among
subjects and named objects is
allowed. Furthermore, it specifies
the rules to explicitly authorize or
deny access to a named object
based upon security attributes.
O.AUDIT
The TOE will provide the capability
to detect security relevant events
and record them to the audit trail.
FAU_GEN.1
Audit data generation
The requirement meets this
objective by ensuring that the
TOE maintains a record of defined
events, including relevant details
about the event.
FAU_GEN.2
User Identity Association
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE associates each auditable
event with the identity of the user
that caused the event.
O.AUDIT_REVIEW FAU_SAR.2 The requirement meets the
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
The TOE will provide the capability
for only authorized users to view
audit information.
Restricted audit review objective by ensuring that only
authorized users are able to
review logs.
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE provides the ability to
review logs.
FAU_SAR.3
Selectable Audit Review
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring the TOE
provides an organized method to
review audit records
O.AUDIT_STORAGE
The TOE will provide a secure
method of storing local audit
records.
FAU_STG.1
Protected Audit Storage
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that only
authorized users are allowed to
access stored audit records, and
by encrypting stored audit
records.
O.CRYPTO
The TOE will provide FIPS 140-2
Approved cryptographic algorithms
and procedures to TOE users
during operation of the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE can generate FIPS-Approved
cryptographic keys for use during
cryptographic operations.
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE destroys cryptographic keys
when no longer in use using FIPS-
Approved methods
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE provides FIPS-Approved
confidentiality and integrity
services for the TOE.
O.USER_AUTHEN
The TOE will uniquely identify and
authenticate users prior to
allowing access to TOE functions
and data.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that every
user is authenticated before the
TOE performs any TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any
action
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that every
user is identified before the TOE
performs any TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
O.PROTECT_COMM
The TOE will provide protected
communication channels for parts
of the distributed TOE.
FPT_ITT.1
Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer
Protection
The requirement meets the
objective by protecting data being
transferred between TOE
components from disclosure and
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
modification
O.BANNER
The TOE will present an access
banner to TOE users prior to
accessing the TOE that defines
acceptable use of the TOE
FTA_TAB.1
Default TOE Access Banner
The requirement meets this
objective by presenting an access
banner to all TOE users prior to
being able to login to the TOE
O.TOE_ADMIN
The TOE will provide mechanisms
to ensure that only authorized
administrators are able to
configure the TOE security
functions attributes.
FMT_MSA.1(1)
Management of security attributes
(Vault)
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that only
administrators with the ability to
manage security attributes for the
vault may do so..
FMT_MSA.1(2)
Management of security attributes
(Safe)
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that only
administrators with the ability to
manage security attributes for the
safe may do so.
FMT_MSA.3(1)
Static attribute initialisation
(Vault)
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE provides restrictive default
values for security attributes, and
specifies alternative initial values
to override the default values
when an object or information is
created.
FMT_MSA.3(2)
Static attribute initialisation (Safe)
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE provides restrictive default
values for security attributes, and
specifies alternative initial values
to override the default values
when an object or information is
created.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE includes administrative
functions to facilitate the
management of the TSF.
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE associates users with roles
to provide access to TSF
management functions and data.
O.ROBUST_ACCESS
The TOE will implement
mechanisms that can deny or
suspend session establishment
FTA_SSL.3
TSF-Initiated Termination
The requirement meets the
objective by suspending currently
active sessions that have been
inactive for a configurable amount
of time
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
FTA_TSE.1
TOE Sessions Establishment
The requirement meets the
objective by denying users access
to the TOE based on user
attributes
O.FAIL_SECURE
The TOE will provide a method to
continue secure operations during
a catastrophic TOE failure
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of
secure state
The requirement meets the
objective by providing seamless
failover over when a failure of the
TOE occurs by preserving a
secure state.
FRU_FLT.1
Degraded Fault Tolerance
The requirement meets the
objective by providing seamless
failover over when a failure of the
TOE occurs by preserving an
operational state.
O.VAULT
The TOE will provide mechanisms
to ensure that stored credentials
are not stored in plaintext and are
protected from unauthorized
access
FPT_APW_EXT.1
Protection of Stored Credential
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring all
credentials stored on the TOE are
encrypted. The requirement
restricts unauthorized uses from
viewing the plaintext credentials.
O.PERMISSIONS
The TOE will provide a method to
separate and restrict the abilities of
individual TOE users
FMT_MOF.1(1)
Management of security function
behavior (Vault)
The requirement meets the
objective by providing granular
authorizations, which can be
assigned to each user of the vault.
A user can have none or all of the
authorizations.
FMT_MOF.1(2)
Management of security function
behavior (Safe)
The requirement meets the
objective by providing granular
permissions, which can be
assigned to each member of a
safe. A member can have none or
all of the permissions.
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
The requirement meets the
objective by associating the
accumulated permissions of a
TOE user to a defined role which
provides access to different TSF
management functions and data
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL2 was chosen to provide a low to moderate level of assurance that is consistent with good commercial
practices. As such, minimal additional tasks are placed upon the vendor assuming the vendor follows
reasonable software engineering practices and can provide support to the evaluation for design and testing
efforts. The chosen assurance level is appropriate with the threats defined for the environment. While the
System may monitor a hostile environment, it is expected to be in a non-hostile position and embedded in
or protected by other products designed to address threats that correspond with the intended environment.
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At EAL2, the System will have incurred a search for obvious flaws to support its introduction into the non-
hostile environment. The augmentation of ALC_FLR.1 was chosen to give greater assurance of the
developer’s on-going flaw remediation processes.
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale
This ST does satisfy all the requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria. Table 22 lists each
requirement to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and indicates whether the dependent
requirement was included. As Table 22 indicates, all dependencies have been met, or rationale has been
provided as to why a particular dependency cannot be met.
Table 22 Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency
Met
Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 is not
included because time
stamps are provided by
the environment. An
environmental objective
states that the TOE will
receive reliable
timestamps.
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 
FIA_UID.1  Although FIA_UID.1 is
not included, FIA_UID.2,
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 is included.
This satisfies this
dependency.
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_COP.1 
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_CKM.4 
FDP_ACC.1(1) FDP_ACF.1(1) 
FDP_ACC.1(2) FDP_ACF.1(2) 
FDP_ACF.1(1) FDP_ACC.1(1) 
FMT_MSA.3(1) 
FDP_ACF.1(2) FDP_ACC.1(2) 
FMT_MSA.3(2) 
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SFR ID Dependencies Dependency
Met
Rationale
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1  Although FIA_UID.1 is
not included, FIA_UID.2,
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 is included.
This satisfies this
dependency.
FIA_UID.2 No dependencies 
FMT_MOF.1(1) FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MOF.1(2) FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_MSA.1(1) FDP_ACC.1(1) 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.1(2) FDP_ACC.1(2) 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.3(1) FMT_MSA.1(1) 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.3(2) FMT_MSA.1(2) 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies 
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1  Although FIA_UID.1 is
not included, FIA_UID.2,
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 is included.
This satisfies this
dependency.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 No dependencies 
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies 
FPT_ITT.1 No dependencies 
FRU_FLT.1 FPT_FLS.1 
FTA_SSL.3 No dependencies 
FTA_TAB.1 No dependencies 
FTA_TSE.1 No dependencies 
Security Target, Version 1.8 April 24, 2015
CyberArk PAS Solution v9.1 Page 57 of 60
© 2015 CyberArk Software, Ltd.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
9 Acronyms
9.1 Acronyms
Table 23 lists the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 23 Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIM Application Identity Manager
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
CPM Central Policy Manager
DR Disaster Recovery
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ENE Event Notification Engine
EPV Enterprise Password Vault
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GB Gigabyte
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC (keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTPS Secure Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol
IIS Internet Information Services
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
JRE Java Runtime Environment
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MS Microsoft Services
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
Security Target, Version 1.8 April 24, 2015
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© 2015 CyberArk Software, Ltd.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Acronym Definition
OPM On-demand Privileges Manager
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PACLI PrivateArk Vault CLI
PAS Privileged Account Security
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PSM Privileged Security Manager
PSMP Privileged Security Manager SSH Proxy
PVWA Password Vault Web Access
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Server
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
RAM Random Access Memory
RDP Remote Desktop Protocol
RDS Remote Desktop Service
RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SAS Serially Attached SCSI
SATA Serial Advanced Technology Attachment
SCSI Small Computer System Interface
SDK Software Development Kit
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
SSO Single Sign-On
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transmission Layer Security
Security Target, Version 1.8 April 24, 2015
CyberArk PAS Solution v9.1 Page 59 of 60
© 2015 CyberArk Software, Ltd.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Acronym Definition
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSS TOE Security Specification
UDP User Datagram Protocol
USB Universal Serial Bus
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
WS Web Services
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
13921 Park Center Road
Suite 460
Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America
Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com