National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-
Slot Hardware Encryption Layer version 5.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11096-2020
Dated: September 2, 2020
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerry Myers
The Aerospace Corporation
John Butterworth
The MITRE Corporation
Anne Gugel
Richard Toren
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Kevin Cummins
John Messiha
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 4
4.3 Security management.......................................................................................... 4
4.4 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 4
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 4
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 5
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 5
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 6
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 6
8 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 6
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 6
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 6
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 7
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................... 7
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 7
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 7
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.......................................................................... 8
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................... 8
10 Annexes....................................................................................................................... 9
11 Security Target............................................................................................................ 9
12 Glossary ...................................................................................................................... 9
13 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 10
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
validation team of the evaluation of Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer solution provided by Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not
an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
July 2020. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation
determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant,
and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive
Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 and
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0
+ Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions
of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive
versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security
Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of
the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Curtiss-Wright Defense
Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
(FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.2, August 13, 2020 and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment
Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
Protection Profile (Specific models identified in Section 8)
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0, 09 September 2016 and collaborative Protection Profile for Full
Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0, 09 September 2016
ST Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
(FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.2, August 13, 2020
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot
Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, August 13, 2020
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Developer Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators Jerry Myers, The Aerospace Corporation
John Butterworth, The MITRE Corporation
Anne Gugel, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
Richard Toren, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Layer (hereafter
referred to as the TOE) is a hardware encryption layer that is used for Data-At-Rest (DAR)
encryption as part of the underlying rugged Network Attached Storage (NAS) file server,
denoted as the Curtiss-Wright DTS1 CSFC/ECC Cryptographic Data Transport System (DTS)
(hereafter referred to as the DTS1). The underlying DTS1 is intended for use in Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), and Intelligence Surveillance
Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. Easily integrated into network centric systems, the DTS1 is an
easy to use, turnkey, rugged network File Server that houses one Removable Memory Cartridge
(RMC) that provides quick off load of data. The RMC can be easily removed from one DTS1
and installed into any other DTS1 providing full, seamless data transfer between one or more
networks in separate locations (e.g. ground => vehicle => ground). In addition to the software-
based FDE layer provided by the DTS1 (see the separate ST corresponding to that evaluation),
the DTS1 provides a hardware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drive
within the RMC.
The DTS1 supports protocols including CIFS, NFS, FTP, HTTP, DHCP, SNMP, and iSCSI.
The DTS1 enables CIFS and NFS disables all other protocols by default. The TOE also supports
SSH, which is always enabled. The administrator can enable or disable the desired protocols to
support their use-case and application. It is suggested that a customer using the product consider
the impact of utilizing remote administration via SSH across the network (rather than through the
console) based upon their specific use case. The customer should factor into their risk
management decision the environment in which TOE operates (dedicated, segregated, private
network versus residing in a DMZ accessible to the Internet), and the value of data to be
protected.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a hardware Full Drive Encryption solution that can accept a Removable
Memory Cartridge (RMC) which contains a data drive within.
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3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides a
ruggedized solution to secure Data at Rest (DAR).
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Protection of the TSF
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and
block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption,
cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation.
These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt
generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These
primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and
protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on the entire drive (so that no plaintext exists) and
does so without user intervention.
4.3 Security management
The TOE provides each of the required management services necessary to manage the full drive
encryption using a command line interface.
4.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity
of its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-
tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be
corrupt. If any of the self-tests fails, the TOE will not go into an operational mode.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
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 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version
2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
That information has not been reproduced here and the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should
be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions
can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the Full Drive Encryption Protection Profiles and performed by the
evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and hardware as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and applicable Technical Decisions.
Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by
this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Curtiss-Wright DTS1 Data Transport System (Network File System) User Guide,
DDOC0099-000-AH
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E)
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for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.2,
August 13, 2020 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification document
and ran the tests specified in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E including the tests associated
with optional requirements.
8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Data Transport System 1-
Slot Hardware Encryption Layer TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in
the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E.
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot
Hardware Encryption Layer product that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the assurance
activities specified in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E related to the examination of the
information contained in the TSS.
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
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(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 08/13/2020 with the following search terms: "disk encryption",
"drive encryption", "key destruction", "key sanitization", "Opal management software", "SED
management software", "Password caching", "Key caching", "Curtiss Wright", "DTS1",
"Defense Solutions Data Transport System", "Curtiss Wright Crypto Firmware", "NXP (Phillips)
ARM7 Processor P/N LPC2368FBD100", "Maxim Integrated DS3645, Rev A4", "Microchip
ATECC508A", "Enova X-Wall MX-256C ".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the
claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
As was noted in the Architectural Information and Clarification of Scope sections of this report,
the devices provide more functionality than was covered by the evaluation. Only the
functionality claimed in the SFR’s in the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions should be
drawn as to their effectiveness, nor can any claims be made relative to their security based upon
this evaluation.
The validation team advises that special care be taken in a networked environment; the
protection profile does not take into consideration the case for Network Attached Storage. Thus,
the application of the network-related protocols themselves are not part of this evaluation.
The DTS1 supports protocols including SSH, CIFS, NFS, FTP, HTTP, DHCP, SNMP, and
iSCSI. It is recommended that the administrator enable or disable the supported protocols to
support their use-case and application.
It is recommended that a customer using the product consider the impact of utilizing remote
administration via SSH across the network (rather than through the console) based upon their
specific use case.
The customer should factor into their risk management decision the environment in which the
TOE operates (dedicated, segregated, private network versus residing in a DMZ accessible to the
Internet), and the value of data to be protected.
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In addition to the hardware-based FDE layer provided by the DTS1 (see the separate ST
corresponding to that evaluation), the DTS1 provides a software-based Full Drive Encryption
(FDE) layer to encrypt the drive within the RMC, evaluated in VID11097.
10 Annexes
Not applicable
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.2, August 13,
2020.
12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are
justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the
Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more
TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
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13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2107.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version
2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.
[6] Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
(FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.2, August 13, 2020 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) for Curtiss-Wright Data
Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, August 13, 2020
(AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) for Curtiss-Wright Data
Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, August 13, 2020
(DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, August 13, 2020 (ETR)