BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
for
STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015(*)
STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1
from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
PP Conformance: Card Operating System Generation 2 (PP COS G2),
Version 1.9, 18 November 2014,
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2-2014
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2 and
ALC_DVS.2
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 29 December 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................17
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................18
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................18
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................19
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................19
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................24
11. Security Target............................................................................................................28
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................28
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................30
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................35
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................35
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................36
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................43
6 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. This Domain is linked to
a conformance claim to one of the related SOGIS Recommended Protection Profiles. In
addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on
08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles
(cPP) (exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2
or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up
to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components
AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2 and ALC_DVS.2 that are not mutually recognised in accordance
with the provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of
these assurance families are relevant.
8 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 was conducted by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 11 December
2015. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant and sponsor is: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The product was developed by: Giesecke & Devrient GmbHGiesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 29
December 2015 is valid until 28 December 2020. The validity date can be extended by
re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report and the
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
9 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any
applicant of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the product's evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and
production sites or processes, occur or the confidentiality of documentation and
information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation
and certification procedure is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the
dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or
resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the
product deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where
no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body
at BSI has to be informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity
(i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the
procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
81677 München
Deutschland
10 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 developed by
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The TOE is a smart card product according to the G2-COS specification [21] from gematik
and is implemented on the hardware platform Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 from
Infineon Technologies AG ([refer to [18], [19]).
The TOE is intended to be used as a card operating system platform for different card
types and applications of the card generation G2 in the framework of the German health
care system.
For this purpose, the TOE serves as secure data storage and secure cryptographic service
provider for card applications running on the TOE and supports them for their specific
security needs related to storage and cryptographic functionalities. In particular, these
storage and cryptographic services are oriented on the card type eHC (electronic Health
Card) as currently specified for a card product of the generation G2 within the German
health care system. These TOE's storage and cryptographic services that are provided by
the TOE and invoked by the human users and components of the German health care
system cover the following issues:
● authentication of human user and external devices,
● storage of and access control on user data,
● key management and cryptographic functions,
● management of TSF data including life cycle support,
● export of non-sensitive TSF and user data of the object system if implemented.
The TOE comprises
● the circuitry of the contact-based chip including all IC Dedicated Software being active
in the Smart Card Initialisation Phase, Personalisation Phase and Usage Phase of the
TOE (the integrated circuit, IC),
● the IC Embedded Software (STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 Operating System),
● the Wrapper (TOE specific SW tool for interpretation of exported TSF and User data),
and
● the associated guidance documentation.
The TOE is ready for the installation and personalisation of object systems (applications)
on the TOE that match the G2-COS specification [21], but does not contain itself any
object system (applications). However, the delivered product can comprise beside the TOE
also an object system already installed on the TOE.
In functional view, the TOE with its IC Embedded Software (STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1
Operating System) is implemented according to the G2-COS specification [21] from
gematik. Hereby, the TOE implements the mandatory part of the G2-COS specification [21]
with the base functionality of the operating system platform. None of the optional packages
defined in the G2-COS specification [21] as Crypto Box, Contactless, Logical Channels,
PACE for Proximity Coupling Device and USB are implemented in the TOE.
12 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
The TOE provides the commands CREATE and PSO HASH (refer to the user guidances
[12], chapter 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 and [15], chapter 2.3) that are outlined as optional in the
G2-COS specification [21]. Furthermore, the TOE provides specific initialisation and
personalisation commands (refer to the user guidance [15], chapter 2.4).
The TOE's Wrapper is implemented according to the Wrapper specification [22] from
gematik.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Card Operating System Generation 2 (PP G2 COS), Version 1.9, 18
November 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2-2014 [8]. The Security Target [6] and [7] uses the
mandatory parts of the PP, but none of the PP's optional packages.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C below or [1], Part 3 for
details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
● SF_AccessControl:
The TOE provides access control mechanisms that allow the restriction of access to
only specific users (world, human users, device) based on different security attributes.
● SF_Authentication:
The TOE supports user and device authentication: symmetric authentication
mechanisms based on 3TDES and AES and asymmetric authentication mechanisms
based on RSA and ECC.
● SF_AssetProtection:
The TOE supports the calculation of block check values for data integrity checking.
The TOE hides information about IC power consumption and command execution
time ensuring that no confidential information can be derived from this information.
● SF_TSFProtection:
The TOE detects and resists physical tampering of the TSF with sensors for operating
voltage, clock frequency and temperature.
● SF_KeyManagement:
The TOE supports onboard generation of cryptographic keys based on the ECDH as
well as generation of RSA and ECC key pairs.
● SF_CryptographicFunctions:
The TOE supports secure messaging for protection of the confidentiality and the
integrity of the commands. The TOE supports asymmetric and symmetric
cryptographic and hashing algorithms to perform authentication procedures, signature
computation and verification, data encryption and decryption. The TOE implements a
DRG.4 random number generator.
13 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
For more details on the TOE Security Functionality please refer to the Security Target [6]
and [7], chapter 6.1 and 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [7],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Identifier Release Type / Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW Infineon Security Controller
M7892 B11 including its IC
Dedicated Software
(Firmware)
(refer to the Certification
Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015
([19]))
Infineon Security
Controller M7892 B11
Contact-based chip.
Delivery as module of type:
T-M4.8-8-1.
The hardware part of the TOE is
delivered to Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH for further production of
the TOE according to the
delivery procedures specified in
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015
([19]).
2 SW IC Embedded Software
(STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV
C1 Operating System)
STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV
C1
OS Identification:
‘47 44 00 B6 03 01 02’
(refer to Table 2)
Implemented in the flash of the
IC.
The TOE covering the IC and
the IC Embedded Software is
delivered without any object
system (first production variant)
or alternatively with an already
installed object system (second
production variant). Refer for this
to the description of the TOE's
life cycle model below under this
Table.
The TOE respective product is
delivered as module or smart
card.
The delivery of the TOE
respective product is performed
14 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
No. Type Identifier Release Type / Form of Delivery
by Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
3 DOC Guidance Documentation
STARCOS 3.6 – Main
Document [11]
Version 1.7 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
4 DOC Guidance Documentation
for the Usage Phase
STARCOS 3.6 COS [12]
Version 2.5 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
5 DOC Guidance Documentation
for the Initialization Phase
STARCOS 3.6 COS [13]
Version 2.11 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
6 DOC Guidance Documentation
for the Personalisation
Phase STARCOS 3.6 COS
[14]
Version 2.0 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
7 DOC STARCOS 3.6 Functional
Specification - Part 1:
Interface Specification [15]
Version 1.19 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
8 DOC STARCOS 3.6 Internal
Design Specification [16]
Version 1.3 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
9 SW Wrapper Version 1.6.17 File ZIP-archive:
egkwrapper-v1.6.17.rar
consisting of the jar files:
• wrapper.jar (main file)
• gdoffcard.jar (helper
library)
• gdoffcardstarcos.jar
(helper library)
(encrypted and signed)
The integrity and authenticity of
the Wrapper is given by the
following SHA-256 hash value:
C9665672E2767A3A44C2D065
CBFBBDE3463398B33BFD219
1888B4777B4CB253E
10 DOC STARCOS 3.6 COS C1/2
Guidance Documentation
for the Wrapper [17]
Version 1.4 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
11 DATA Cryptographic keys for the
TOE's personalisation
---
(customer-specific
personalisation keys)
Items in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE
The commercial numbering of the TOE by Infineon Technologies AG is as follows:
● Product Code: M7892-B508-11
● Product Type: Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11
● RMS Version: 15b14_78.015.14.2
15 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
The TOE STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 is as well known under the following product
identificator:
Manufacturer: '44 45 47 2B 44' (DEG+D)
Product: '53 33 36 4F 53 47 30 31' (S36OSG01)
OS Version Number: '01 00 02' (1.0.2)
According to the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 1.2.2 the life cycle model of the TOE
consists of the following four phases:
Phase 1: Development Phase
Phase 2: Initialisation Phase (loading of the STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 Operating
System and installation of an object system)
Phase 3: Personalisation Phase (loading of personalisation data into the installed object
system)
Phase 4: Usage Phase
Two different production variants can be distinguished:
In the first production variant, the STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 Operating System is loaded
in the framework of the Initialisation Phase (Phase 2) by Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
Hereby, the TOE delivery in the sense of the CC takes place in Phase 2 after loading of
the IC Embedded Software by the Initialisation Data Manager (Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH). The delivered product is the TOE without any object system installed on the TOE.
The TOE is delivered by Giesecke & Devrient GmbH to the Initialiser (Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH or third party) for installing an object system on the TOE. In this production variant,
loading of an object system is carried out in Phase 2 after TOE respective product delivery
by loading a so-called Initialisation Table that is generated by Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
and that contains an object system.
In the second production variant, the STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 Operating System is
completely loaded in the framework of the Initialisation Phase (Phase 2) by Giesecke &
Devrient GmbH. Furthermore, in the framework of this initialisation in Phase 2 an object
system is loaded onto the TOE. Hereby, the TOE delivery in the sense of the CC takes
place at the end of Phase 2. The delivered product is the TOE supplemented with an
object system installed on the TOE. In this production variant, the product (including the
TOE) is delivered by Giesecke & Devrient GmbH directly to the Personalisation Agent
(Giesecke & Devrient GmbH or third party) for personalisation.
The TOE respective product can be delivered as module or smart card (only
contact-based).
In order to verify that the user uses a certified TOE, the TOE can be identified using the
means described in the user guidance [14], chapter 5.7. The TOE can be identified by
using the command GET PROTOCOL DATA. Via the command GET PROTOCOL DATA
(CLA = ‘A0’, INS = ‘CA’ with specific P1 and P2 values, see Table 2) the user can read out
the chip information and identify the underlying chip as well as the STARCOS 3.6
COSGKV C1 Operating System and its configuration embedded in the chip.
The following identification data can be retrieved within byte strings responded by the
command GET PROTOCOL DATA in different command variants:
16 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
Command Parameters Identifier Length Description
P1 = '9F’ P2 = ’6B’ 8 bytes Chip manufacturer data
P1 = ’9F’ P2 = ’6A’ 7 bytes Identification of the operating system (OS)
P1 = ‘9F’ P2 = ’6F’ 7 bytes Fabkey key material identification
Table 2: TOE Identification via the command GET PROTOCOL DATA
The command GET PROTOCOL DATA with its parameters is described in [14], chap 5.7.
The following table describes the concrete values identifying the TOE:
Data Type Tag in the ProtocolData DO Data
Chip manufacturer data '9F 6B' '05 78 00 01 00 0D 00 00'
Identification of the operating system (OS) '9F 6A' '47 44 00 B6 03 01 02'
Fabkey key material identification '9F 6F' Second byte = '13’
Table 3: TOE Identification data retrieved by the command GET PROTOCOL DATA
3. Security Policy
The TOE is a composite smart card product, based on the hardware platform Infineon
Security Controller M7892 B11 from Infineon Technologies AG and with IC Embedded
Software (STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 Operating System) implemented by Giesecke &
Devrient GmbH according to the G2-COS specification [21] from gematik.
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE is intended to be used as a card operating system platform for applications of the
card generation G2 in the framework of the German health care system. For this purpose,
the TOE serves as secure data storage and secure cryptographic service provider for card
applications running on the TOE and supports them for their specific security needs related
to storage and cryptographic functionalities. In particular, these storage and cryptographic
services are oriented on the card type eHC (electronic Health Card) as currently specified
for a card product of the generation G2 within the German health care system.
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data and TSF data stored and operated on the smart card when used in a hostile
environment. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and data
stored in its memories and the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for
configuration and memory access and for integrity, the correct operation and the
confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE's overall
policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage, physical manipulation and probing.
Besides, the TOE's life cycle is supported as well as the user Identification whereas the
abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore, specific cryptographic services including
random number generation and key management functionality are being provided to be
securely used by the smart card embedded software.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.
17 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment.
The following topics are of relevance:
Security Objectives
for the operational
environment defined
in the Security Target
Description according to the ST
OE.Plat-COS Usage of COS
To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the object system
shall be designed such that the requirements from the following
documents are met: (i) user guidance of the COS, (ii) application notes
for the COS (iii) other guidance documents, and (iv) findings of the TOE
evaluation reports relevant for applications developed for COS as
referenced in the certification report.
OE.Resp-ObjS Treatment of User Data
All User Data and TSF Data of the object system are defined as required
by the security needs of the specific application context.
OE.Process-Card Protection of Card during Personalisation
Security procedures shall be used after delivery of the TOE during
Phase 6 Smartcard personalisation up to the delivery of the smartcard to
the end-user to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and to
prevent any theft, unauthorised personalization or unauthorised use.
Table 4: Security Objectives for the operational environment
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is set up as a composite product. It is composed of the Integrated Circuit (IC)
Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 from Infineon Technologies AG and the IC
Embedded Software with the STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 Operating System developed by
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The TOE does not use the cryptographic software libraries of the Infineon hardware
platform, but provides its cryptographic services by the cryptographic library developed by
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
For details concerning the CC evaluation of the underlying IC see the evaluation
documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015 ([18], [19]).
According to the TOE design the Security Functions of the TOE as listed in chapter 1 are
implemented by the following subsystems:
● System Library: Contains the application framework
● Chip Card Commands: Pre-processor and processor of all implemented commands
18 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
● Security Management: Manages the security environment, security states and rule
analysis
● Key Management: Search, pre-processing, use and post-processing of keys
● Secure Messaging: SM handling
● Crypto Functions: Library with an API to all cryptographic operations
supported by the Runtime System, File System, Non-Volatile Memory Management,
Transport Management and the Wrapper subsystems.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 1 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target [6] and [7].
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with simulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs are tested and all functions are tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests was performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by APDU command sequences, the
evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.
Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions
where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing.
During their independent testing, the evaluators covered
● testing APDU commands related to Key Management and Crypto Functions,
● testing APDU commands related to NVM Management and File System,
● testing APDU commands related to Security Management,
● testing APDU commands related to Secure Messaging,
● testing APDU commands related to Runtime System and System Library,
● penetration testing related to the verification of the reliability of the TOE,
● source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
● side channel analysis for RSA, ECC, AES and SHA (including ECC key generation),
● fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
● testing APDU commands for the initialisation, personalisation and usage phase,
● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms,
● fuzzy testing on APDU processing.
19 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE as outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7]:
STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1
There is only one configuration of the TOE. Refer to the information provided in chapter 2
of this Certification Report.
The TOE is installed on a contact-based interface chip of type Infineon Security Controller
M7892 B11 from Infineon Technologies AG. This IC is certified under the Certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015 (refer to [19]).
The TOE does not use the cryptographic software libraries of the Infineon hardware
platform, but provides its cryptographic services by the cryptographic library developed by
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The TOE covering the IC and the IC Embedded Software is delivered as a module or
smart card without any object system (first production variant) or alternatively with an
already installed object system (second production variant). For details refer to chapter 2
of this Certification Report.
The user can identify the certified TOE by the TOE response to specific APDU commands,
more detailed by using the command GET PROTOCOL DATA in different command
variants according to the user guidance [14], chapter 5.7. See chapter 2 of this
Certification Report for details.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform (refer to the guidance documents covered by [19]) and the document ETR
for composite evaluation from the platform evaluation ([20]) have been applied in
the TOE evaluation.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation.
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (see AIS 26).
20 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
(iv) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic
random number generators.
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36
(see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme interpretation AIS 20 and AIS 31
were used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the Certification Body for approval subsequently.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report).
● The components AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the change of the
underlying IC and the reduction of the TOE functionality to the mandatory parts of the
G2-COS specification [21].
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System Generation 2 (PP G2 COS),
Version 1.9, 18 November 2014,
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2-2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2 and ALC_DVS.2
The Security Target [6] and [7] use the mandatory parts of the PP and do not make use of
the optional packages of the PP.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authenticity RSA signature
generation
[24], [25] (RSA)
[26] (SHA)
Modulus length
= 2048, 3072
[21], chap.
6.6.3.1
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.RSA.S
(PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL
21 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
(RSASSA-PSS-SI
GN with SHA-256,
RSASSA
PKCS1-V1_5,
RSA ISO9796-2
DS2 with
SHA-256)
[23] SIGNATURE)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
2 RSA signature
verification
(RSA ISO9796-2
DS1)
[24], [25] (RSA)
[26] (SHA)
Modulus length
= 2048
[21], chap.
6.6.4.1
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.RSA.V
(PSO VERIFY
CERTIFICATE)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
3 ECDSA signature
generation using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
[27] (ECDSA)
[28]
[26] (SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 [32]
and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [34]
[21], chap.
6.6.3.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.ECDS
A.S
(PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL
SIGNATURE)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
4 ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
[27] ECDSA)
[28]
[26] (SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 [32]
and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [34]
[21], chap.
6.6.4.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.ECDS
A.V
(PSO VERIFY
CERTIFICATE
PSO VERIFY DIGITAL
SIGNATURE)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
5 SHA-256 based
fingerprint
[26] - [21], chap.
6.6.1.3
FPT_ITE.1
(FINGERPRINT)
6 Authentication AES in CBC mode [30] (AES)
[21]
|k|=128, 192,
256
|challenge|=64
[21], chap.
6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.AES
(MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE)
7 AES in CMAC
mode
[23], chap. 3.2.2
[33]
[21]
|k|=128, 192,
256
|challenge|=64
[21], chap.
6.6.1, 6.6.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.CMAC
(MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE)
8 TDES in CBC
mode
[29] (TDES) |k|=168 [23], chap.
3.3.1
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.3TDE
S
(MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE)
9 TDES in Retail
MAC
[21] |k|=168
|challenge|=64
[21], chap.
6.6.1, 6.6.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC
(MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE)
10 RSA signature
generation
[24], [25] (RSA)
[26] (SHA)
Modulus length
= 2048, 3072
[21], chap.
6.6.3.1
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.RSA.S
(INTERNAL
22 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
(RSASSA-PSS-SI
GN with SHA-256,
RSASSA
PKCS1-V1_5,
RSA ISO9796-2
DS1 with
SHA-256)
[23] AUTHENTICATE)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
11 RSA signature
verification
(RSA ISO9796-2
DS1)
[24], [25] (RSA)
[26] (SHA)
Modulus length
= 2048
[21], chap.
6.6.4.1
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.RSA.V
(EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
12 ECDSA signature
generation using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
[27] (ECDSA)
[28]
[26] (SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 [32]
and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [34]
[21], chap.
6.6.3.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.ECDS
A.S
(INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
13 ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
[27] (ECDSA)
[28]
[26] (SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 [32]
and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [34]
[21], chap.
6.6.4.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.ECDS
A.V
(EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
14 Key
Agreement
Key Derivation
Function for TDES
based on SHA-1
[28], chap. 5.6.3
[26] (SHA)
|k|= 168 [21], chap.
6.2.1
[23]
FCS_CKM.1.1/3TDES_SM
(within authentication)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
15 Key Derivation
Function for AES
based on SHA-{1,
256}
[27], chap. 4.4.3
[30]
[26] (SHA)
|k|= 128, 192,
256
[21], chap.
6.2.2, 6.2.3,
6.2.4
FCS_CKM.1.1/AES.SM
(within authentication)
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
16 Confidentiality AES in CBC mode [30] (AES) |k|=128, 192,
256
[21], chap.
6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
[23], chap.
3.3.1
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.AES
(Secure messaging)
17 TDES in CBC
mode
[29] (TDES) |k|=168 [23], chap.
3.3.1
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.3TDE
S
(Secure messaging)
18 RSA encryption
and decryption
(RSAES-PKCS1-v
1.5
RSAES-OAEP)
Transcipher RSA
to ELC and ELC to
[21]
[31], chap. 7.1.1,
7.1.2, 7.2.1,
7.2.2
Modulus length
= 2048, 3072
for RSA private
key operation
and 2048 for
RSA public key
operation
[21], chap.
6.8.1, 6.8.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.RSA
(PSO ENCIPHER
PSO DECIPHER
PSO TRANSCIPHER)
For the ELC part of PSO
TRANSCIPHER see
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.ELC in
23 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
RSA row 19.
19 ELC encryption
and decryption
Transcipher RSA
to ELC and ELC to
RSA
[27]
[21]
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 [32]
and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [34]
[21], chap.
6.8.1, 6.8.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.ELC
(PSO ENCIPHER
PSO DECIPHER
PSO TRANSCIPHER)
For the RSA part of PSO
TRANSCIPHER see
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.RSA in
row 18.
20 Integrity AES in CMAC
mode
[23], chap. 3.2.2
[33]
[21]
|k|=128, 192,
256
|challenge|=64
[21], chap.
6.6.1, 6.6.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1.1/COS.CMAC
(Secure messaging)
21 TDES in Retail
MAC
[21] |k|=168
|challenge|=64
[21], chap.
6.6.1, 6.6.2
[23]
FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC
(Secure messaging)
22 Cryptographic
Primitive
Hybrid
deterministic RNG
DRG.4
[4, AIS 20] n.a. [23] FCS_RNG.1
23 Physical RNG
PTG.2
[4, AIS 31] n.a. [23] FCS_RNG.1/SICP
24 SHA-{1, 256, 384,
512}
[26] - [21], chap.
3.2.1
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
25 SHA-{1, 224, 256,
384, 512}
[26] - [21] FCS_COP.1.1/CB_HASH
(PSO HASH)
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to [21] and [23] the algorithms are suitable for securing integrity, authenticity
and confidentiality of the data stored in and processed by the TOE as a card operating
system platform that is intended to be used for different card types and applications of the
card generation G2 in the framework of the German health care system. The validity
period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [23].
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 1 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
24 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Application Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see Table 1) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top.
In particular, the following aspects from the TOE user guidance documentation [11] to [17]
need to be taken into account when using the TOE and when designing and implementing
object systems (applications) intended to be set up on the TOE, especially in view of later
TR-conformity testing of card products according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144
([35]):
● Security requirements and hints for designing and implementing object systems
(applications) intended to be set up and running on the TOE.
This concerns on the one hand the design and generation of Initialisation Tables
(production variant 1) respective product flash images (production variant 2)
containing such object systems by the Initialisation Data Manager. As well this
concerns on the other hand after TOE delivery the application developers and card
management e.g. by using the commands LOAD APPLICATION and CREATE.
For an object system, one has to take care of the choice of the access rules and flag
described in chapter 2.5 of [16] for the object system's objects. In particular, this
concerns key and PIN objects including their related files for the key and PIN data and
assigned security attributes.
For the choice of the access rules and flag described in chapter 2.5 of [16] for the
object system's objects one has to consider that the TOE's Wrapper is only able to
export security attributes and public key data of the object system and its objects if
their access rules and flags are set appropriately for read access.
For card products that undergo a later TR-conformity testing according to the
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([35]) it is strongly recommended to care for the
appropriate choice of the access rules and the flag described in chapter 2.5 of [16] for
all the object system's objects. It shall be possible for the Konsistenz-Prüftool
according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03143 ([36]) that is used for conformity
testing to get a complete picture of the object system installed in the card product for
further comparison against the respective object system specification.
The specific life cycle state concept of the TOE for objects managed and processed by
the TOE as the MF, folders, files, key and PIN objects has to be taken into account.
Especially, the concept of physical and logical life cycle states and their specific
processing by the TOE are of relevance for object systems intended to run on the TOE
(refer to [21]).
Any object system set up on the TOE shall only make use of the TOE's functionality as
described in the G2-COS specification [21] and the user guidance [15]. The object
system has to be checked for taking this requirement into account by using the TOE's
25 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
Wrapper and following the requirements outlined in the user guidance [12], chapter
5.1.1.1. Card products with an object system that do not fulfil the requirement run out
of the scope of the certified TOE and shall not be delivered respective used.
An object system running on the TOE shall for its ECC related cryptographic
functionality only make use of the elliptic curves brainpoolP{256, 384, 512}r1 [32] and
ansix9p{256, 384}r1 [34]. Refer to the user guidance [12], chapter 6. The related curve
parameter files in the object system (application) have to be set and filled according to
the requirements in the user guidance [16], chapter 2.5.2.4. Card products with an
object system that do not fulfil the requirement run out of the scope of the certified
TOE.
Refer to the user guidance documentation [12], chapter 5.1.1.1 and 6, [13], chapter
4.2.1 and 4.2.2, [15] and [16], chapter 2.5 (in particular 2.5.2.4) and following
sub-chapters.
● Restrictions for key usage.
The usage of symmetric authentication keys for the command MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE ([21], chapter 14.7.1.2) shall be limited by using a key usage
counter. For details refer to the user guidance [13], chapter 4.2.1.
The usage of Secure Messaging keys in a Secure Messaging secured session shall
be limited to a payload of 100 kBytes (including command message and answer).
When this limit is reached the external entity which established this Secure Messaging
session, e.g. a card management system, shall establish a new Secure Messaging
session with new Secure Messaging keys. Refer to the user guidance [12], chapter
5.1.3.
For restrictions on the usage of DES Retail-MAC keys refer to the user guidance [12],
chapter 5.1.1.2.
● Security requirements and hints for the Initialisation Phase / Phase 2 (concerning the
loading and installing of object systems (applications) on the TOE by the Initialiser via
Initialisation Tables), for the Personalisation Phase / Phase 3 (concerning the
personalisation of installed object systems (applications) by the Personalisation Agent)
and for the Usage Phase / Phase 4 of the TOE's life cycle model.
Refer to the user guidance documentation [11], [12], [13], [14] and [15].
● The TOE's Wrapper and its specifics beyond the Wrapper specification [22], in
particular concerning the exceptions that are thrown by the Wrapper.
Refer to the user guidance [17].
● The command PSO HASH shall not be used for processing of confidential data.
Refer to the user guidance [12], chapter 5.2.2.
● For the design and generation of Initialisation Tables (production variant 1) respective
product flash images (production variant 2) by the Initialisation Data Manager for card
products that undergo a later TR-conformity testing according to the Technical
Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([35]) it is strongly recommended to care for that via the
TOE's specific personalisation commands initialised security attributes and public key
data of the object system and its objects cannot be overwritten (except for where
explicitly intended by the object system's intention and design).
26 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
For a TR-conformity testing of a card product set up on the TOE according to the Technical
Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([35]) the following specific aspects and issues have to be taken
into account:
● The card product shall be checked that the export of the security attributes and public
key data of the object system and each of its objects via the TOE's Wrapper is
possible without any restriction and therefore fulfills the requirements for data export in
the Wrapper specification [22]. This means that a check has to be performed to
ensure that there is no restriction for read access to all the related files in the object
system because of an inappropriate choice of the access rules and the flag described
in chapter 2.5 of [16]. It shall be possible for the Konsistenz-Prüftool according to the
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03143 ([36]) that is used for conformity testing to get a
complete picture of the object system installed in the card product for further
comparison against the respective object system specification. Refer to the user
guidances [12], chapter 5.1.1.1, [13], chapter 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 and [16], chapter 2.5 and
following sub-chapters.
Note: If such export property cannot be checked in the card product or if read access
for the export of the security attributes and public key data of the object system and
each of its objects via the TOE's Wrapper is not given the card product will be rejected
for a TR-certificate according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([35]).
● Any object system set up on the TOE shall only make use of the TOE's functionality as
described in the G2-COS specification [21] and the user guidance [15].
The card product's object system has to be manually checked for taking this
requirement into account by using the TOE's Wrapper and following the requirements
outlined in the user guidance [12], chapter 5.1.1.1. Refer to the user guidance [13],
chapter 4.2.2.
Note: If there is any object found for which the TOE's Wrapper throws an exception
the card product will be rejected for a TR-certificate according to the Technical
Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([35]).
● The card product's object system (application) running on the TOE shall for its ECC
related cryptographic functionality only make use of the elliptic curves brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 [32] and ansix9p{256, 384}r1 [34]. Refer to the user guidance [12],
chapter 6. All related curve parameter files contained in the object system have
therefore to be manually checked that only the elliptic curves as mentioned above are
used and that the curve parameters are correctly set according to the requirements in
the user guidance [16], chapter 2.5.2.4. Refer to the user guidance [13], chapter 4.2.2.
Note: If a curve parameter file cannot be read out, if elliptic curves beyond those
mentioned above are used in the card product's object system or if a curve is
incorrectly coded in the related curve parameter files the card product will be rejected
for a TR-certificate according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([35]).
● For the card product, it has to be checked that via the TOE's specific personalisation
commands initialised security attributes and public key data of the object system and
its objects cannot be overwritten (except for where explicitly intended by the object
system's intention and design). Refer to the user guidance [13], chapter 4.2.2.
Note: If overwriting of initialised security attributes and public key data of the object
system and its objects via the TOE's specific personalisation commands is possible
and not technically suppressed (except for data where overwriting is explicitly intended
27 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
by the object system's intention and design) the card product will be rejected for a
TR-certificate according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([35]).
● If in the framework of the TR-conformity testing of a card product according to the
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([35]) the Konsistenz-Prüftool according to the
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03143 ([36]) depicts in its test report within an access rule
of an object a wild card or an APDU header lying outside the G2-COS specification
[21] or the user guidance [15] this has to be manually examined and valuated. Refer to
the user guidance [13], chapter 4.2.2.
● The card product shall be checked that the usage of symmetric authentication keys for
the command MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE ([21], chapter 14.7.1.2) is limited via
implementation of a key usage counter. Refer to the user guidance [13], chapter 4.2.1
and 4.2.2 on how to perform such check.
Note: If such check of the implementation of a key usage counter is not possible or if
the check shows that the required key usage counter is not implemented the card
product will be rejected for a TR-certificate according to the Technical Guideline BSI
TR-03144 ([35]).
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target Lite [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE)
is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version
of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPU Central Processing Unit
DEMA Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DES Data Encryption Standard
3TDES Three Key DES
DFA Differential Fault Analysis / Attack
28 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
eHC electronic Health Card
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
gSMC-K gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type K (Konnektor)
gSMC-KT gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type KT (Kartenterminal)
HPC Health Professional Card
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Physical Random Number Generator
RFU Reserved for Future Use
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SEMA Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Secure Messaging
SMC-B Security Module Card Type B
SPA Single Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TR Technische Richtlinie (Technical Guideline)
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
29 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - Named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements.
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (CC-Produkte) and Requirements regarding the
Evaluation Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites
under the CC and ITSEC (CC-Prüfstellen)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
8
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 8, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
30 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0976, Security Target STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1,
Version 1.0.7, 10 December 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential
document)
[7] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0976, Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.6
COSGKV C1, Version 1.0.1, 10 December 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
(sanitised public document)
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Card Operating System Generation 2 (PP COS
G2), Version 1.9, 18 November 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2-2014, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[9] ETR BSI-DSZ-CC-0976, Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary for
STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1, Version 1.3, 11 December 2015, SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-0976, Configuration List STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV
C1, Version 1.2, 11 December 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential
document)
[11] Guidance Documentation STARCOS 3.6 – Main Document, Version 1.7, 25 July
2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[12] Guidance Documentation for the Usage Phase STARCOS 3.6 COS, Version 2.5,
10 December 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[13] Guidance Documentation for the Initialization Phase STARCOS 3.6 COS,
Version 2.11, 10 December 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[14] Guidance Documentation for the Personalisation Phase STARCOS 3.6 COS,
Version 2.0, 14 August 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[15] STARCOS 3.6 Functional Specification - Part 1: Interface Specification,
Version 1.19, 31 July 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[16] STARCOS 3.6 Internal Design Specification, Version 1.3, 31 July 2015, Giesecke &
Devrient GmbH
[17] STARCOS 3.6 COS C1/2 Guidance Documentation for the Wrapper, Version 1.4,
24 August 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
• AIS 23, Version 3, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
31 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
[18] Security Target of the underlying hardware platform, Security Target M7892 B11,
Version 0.3, 13 October 2015, Infineon Technologies AG,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015
[19] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015 for Infineon Security Controller
M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01
and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from Infineon Technologies AG, November 2015, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[20] ETR for Composite Evaluation of the underlying hardware platform Infineon Security
Controller M7892 B11 from certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015,
Version 7, 21 October 2015, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[21] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte, Spezifikation des Card Operating System (COS),
Elektrische Schnittstelle, Version 3.7.0 vom 26.08.2014, gematik Gesellschaft für
Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH
Errata zu Release 1.4.0, Kartenspezifikationen und Konnektor, Version 1.0.0 vom
02.10.2014, gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte
mbH
2. Errata zu Release 1.4.0, Spezifikation des Card Operating System und
Spezifikation Wrapper, Version 1.0.0 vom 06.10.2014, gematik Gesellschaft für
Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH
Errata zu Release 1.4.2, Störungsampel, Zertifikate, Testkarten und COS-Wrapper,
Version 1.0.1 vom 08.12.2014, gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der
Gesundheitskarte mbH
[22] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte, Spezifikation Wrapper, Version 1.6.0, 26.08.2014,
gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH
[23] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-1 Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung Teil 1 – Telematikinfrastruktur, Version 3.18, 30.01.2014,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[24] PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard, 27 October 2012, RSA Laboratories
[25] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Information technology – Security techniques – Digital
signature schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorization based
mechanisms, 2010-12, ISO
[26] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 180-4,
Specifications for the Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, U.S. Department
of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[27] Technical Guideline TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0, 2013-03,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[28] American National Standard X9.63-2001, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography, 16 November 2005
[29] Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher,
NIST Special Publication 800-67, Revised January 2012, 2012-01, National Institute
of Standards and Technology
32 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
[30] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), 2001-11-26, U.S. Department of Commerce/National
Institute of Standards and Technology
[31] Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1, RFC 3447, 2003-02, J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, IETF
[32] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve
Generation, RFC 5639, 2010-03, M. Lochter, J. Merkle, IETF
[33] ISO 15946 Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques – Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC
Mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005, National
Institute of Standards and Technology
[34] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital
Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. Department of Commerce/National
Institute of Standards and Technology
[35] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03144 eHealth – Konformitätsnachweis für
Karten-Produkte der Kartengeneration G2, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[36] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03143 eHealth G2-COS Konsistenz-Prüftool,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[37] Certification Report for Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Development Centre Germany
(DCG), BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0017-2014, August 2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[38] Certification Report for Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Dienstleistungscenter (DLC,
Production Site), BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0029-2014, September 2014, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[39] Certification Report for Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Slovakia s.r.o. (GDSK),
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0031-2014, April 2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
33 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
34 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
35 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
36 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
37 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
38 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
39 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
40 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
41 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
42 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target [6] provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment.
43 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
44 / 46
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product STARCOS 3.6 COSGKV C1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 29 December 2015, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Development Centre Germany (DCG), Zamdorfer
Strasse 88, 81677 München, Germany (Development / Testing). Refer to the
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0017-2014 ([37]).
b) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Dienstleistungscenter (DLC, Production Site),
Prinzregentenstrasse 159, 81677 München, Germany (Production /
Initialisation). Refer to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0029-2014
([38]).
c) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Development Slovakia s.r.o. (GDSK), Dolné Hony
11, SK - 949 01 Nitra, Slovakia (Initialisation). Refer to the Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0031-2014 ([39]).
d) For development and production sites regarding the platform please refer to
the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015 ([19]).
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] and [7]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security
objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the
Security Target [6] and [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
45 / 46
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
46 / 46