Hitachi Unified Storage VM
Security Target
Issue date: Apr. 18, 2016
Revision: 4.8
Prepared by: Hitachi, Ltd.
This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese.
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Copyright
Microsoft and Windows are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corp. in the United States and other
countries.
Solaris is the registered trademark or trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other
countries.
HP-UX is the registered trademark of Hewlett-Packard Company.
RedHat is the registered trademark or trademark of RedHat, Inc. in the United States and other countries.
Linux is the registered trademark or trademark of Linus Torvalds in the United States and other countries.
AIX is the registered trademark or trademark of IBM Corporation.
All other company names and product names are the registered trademark or trademark of their respective
owners.
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- Table of Contents -
1 ST OVERVIEW........................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 ST REFERENCE........................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 TOE REFERENCE........................................................................................................................................ 1
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................................................... 2
1.3.1 TOE type.......................................................................................................................................... 2
1.3.2 Environment where TOE is used ..................................................................................................... 2
1.3.3 Relevant personnel........................................................................................................................... 3
1.3.4 How to use TOE and major security feature.................................................................................... 4
1.3.5 TOE and other configuration components....................................................................................... 5
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION ..................................................................................................................................... 7
1.4.1 Control system ............................................................................................................................... 10
1.4.2 Administration system.................................................................................................................... 10
1.4.3 Other disk storage systems ............................................................................................................ 11
1.4.4 TOE functions................................................................................................................................ 11
1.4.4.1 Basic functions TOE provides..............................................................................................................11
1.4.4.2 Security functions TOE provides .........................................................................................................12
1.4.5 Guidance documentation............................................................................................................... 16
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIM ...................................................................................................................... 19
2.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM....................................................................................................................... 19
2.2 PP CONFORMANCE ................................................................................................................................... 19
2.3 PACKAGE NAME CONFORMANT................................................................................................................ 19
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION................................................................................................... 20
3.1 TOE ASSETS............................................................................................................................................. 20
3.2 THREATS.................................................................................................................................................. 20
3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES..................................................................................................... 20
3.4 ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................................................................................................... 21
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES....................................................................................................................... 22
4.1 TOE SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................................... 22
4.2 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SECURITY OBJECTIVES.............................................................................. 23
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE............................................................................................................ 24
4.3.1 Security objective rational for assumption .................................................................................... 24
4.3.2 Security objective rationale for threat........................................................................................... 25
4.3.3 Security objective rationale for organizational security policy..................................................... 27
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION......................................................................................... 28
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENT ................................................................................................................. 29
6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................................. 29
6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................... 46
6.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENT RATIONALE ...................................................................................................... 47
6.3.1 Security requirement rationale ...................................................................................................... 47
6.3.2 Security requirement internal consistency rationale ..................................................................... 54
6.3.3 Security requirement rationale ...................................................................................................... 57
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ...................................................................................................... 58
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTION ....................................................................................................................... 58
7.1.1 SF.LM ............................................................................................................................................ 59
7.1.2 SF.FCSP ........................................................................................................................................ 60
7.1.3 SF.SN............................................................................................................................................. 60
7.1.4 SF.ROLE........................................................................................................................................ 61
7.1.5 SF.HDD......................................................................................................................................... 62
7.1.6 SF.AUDIT...................................................................................................................................... 63
8 REFERENCE............................................................................................................................................. 67
8.1.1 Terms and definitions .................................................................................................................... 68
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8.1.1.1 Glossary for ST....................................................................................................................................68
8.1.1.2 Abbreviation ........................................................................................................................................69
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List of tables
Table 1-1 Basic functions provided by TOE................................................................................................ 12
Table 1-2 Role category and operation ........................................................................................................ 13
Table 1-3 TOE components used for evaluation.......................................................................................... 17
Table 1-4 Physical components of Hitachi Unified Storage VM used for evaluation ................................. 17
Table 1-5 Host for Evaluation...................................................................................................................... 18
Table 1-6 Management PC for Evaluation................................................................................................... 18
Table 1-7 Maintenance PC for Evaluation................................................................................................... 18
Table 1-8 External Authentication Server for Evaluation............................................................................ 18
Table 1-9 Fibre Channel Switch for Evaluation........................................................................................... 18
Table 1-10 Fibre Channel Connection Adapter for Evaluation ................................................................... 18
Table 4-1 Relationship between TOE security problem and security objective .......................................... 24
Table 4-2 Validity of the security objectives for the assumptions............................................................... 24
Table 4-3 Validity of the security objectives to cope with threats............................................................... 25
Table 4-4 Validity of the security objectives for organizational security policy ......................................... 27
Table 6-1 Individually defined items to be audited...................................................................................... 29
Table 6-2 Audit Information ........................................................................................................................ 31
Table 6-3 Generation of encryption key ...................................................................................................... 33
Table 6-4 Encryption key destruction method ............................................................................................. 34
Table 6-5 Operations between subjects and objects..................................................................................... 34
Table 6-6 SFP-relevant security attribute..................................................................................................... 35
Table 6-7 Rules between subjects and objects............................................................................................. 36
Table 6-8 List of functions restricting operations for roles.......................................................................... 39
Table 6-9 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for security attributes of
processing act for host.......................................................................................................................... 40
Table 6-10 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for security attribute (user
group information) of processing act for Storage Navigator (storage management UI software)....... 40
Table 6-11 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for user account................... 42
Table 6-12 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for fibre channel switch
authentication data ............................................................................................................................... 42
Table 6-13 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for encryption key for data
encryption ............................................................................................................................................ 42
Table 6-14 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for user authentication method
............................................................................................................................................................. 43
Table 6-15 Correspondence between security objectives and security function requirements.................... 47
Table 6-16 Validity of security function requirements for TOE security objectives ................................... 48
Table 6-17 Dependencies of security function requirements....................................................................... 54
Table 6-18 Consistency between security function requirements................................................................ 55
Table 7-1 Correspondence relation between TOE security functions and security function requirements . 58
Table 7-2 Encryption-relevant algorithm used by SSL................................................................................ 61
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Table 7-3 Output content of basic information ............................................................................................ 63
Table 7-4 Output content of detailed information........................................................................................ 66
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List of figures
Figure 1-1 General system configuration that contains disk storage system ................................................ 2
Figure 1-2 Disk storage system configuration ............................................................................................... 9
Figure 1-3 Relationship between user, user group, role and resource group ............................................... 13
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1 ST overview
This chapter describes Security Target (hereinafter referred to as “ST”) reference, TOE reference, TOE
overview and TOE description.
1.1 ST reference
This section describes ST identification information.
Title : Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target
Version : 4.8
Issue date : Apr. 18, 2016
Created by : Hitachi, Ltd.
1.2 TOE reference
This section describes TOE identification information.
TOE : Hitachi Unified Storage VM Control program
TOE version : 73-03-09-00/00(H7-03-10_Z)
It consists of the following programs
 DKCMAIN micro-program 73-03-09-00/00
 SVP micro-program 73-03-06/00
(Including Storage Navigator program (Storage management user
interface software))
 JDK 1.6.0_45
 Apache 2.2.24
 Apache Tomcat 6.0.16
 OpenSSL 1.0.1g
 ActivePerl 5.10.0.1004
 Flash Player 10.1.53.64
TOE consumer : Domestic TOE consumers are defined as people who purchase disk storage
products including TOE. The distribution procedure until the products are
provided to end-users is guaranteed. Overseas TOE consumer is the
customer, Hitachi Data Systems. The distribution procedure until TOE is
provided to the end-user is guaranteed.
Keyword : Disk storage, SAN, RAID, Virtualization, Role-base access control
Developed by : Hitachi, Ltd.
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1.3 TOE overview
1.3.1 TOE type
TOE is the control program (software) that runs the disk storage system of Hitachi, Ltd., “Hitachi
Unified Storage VM” (hereinafter called “HUS VM”).
1.3.2 Environment where TOE is used
Figure 1-1 General system configuration that contains disk storage system
The following describes devices in the environment shown in Figure 1-1.
(1) Disk storage system
Normally the disk storage system in which TOE is installed is installed in a secure area where entry
and exit are managed.
(2) SAN and host
Various open-system servers, such as Windows, HP-UX, and Solaris (These devices are referred to
collectively as “hosts” in this ST) and disk storage systems are connected via SAN (Storage Area
Network). SAN is a network dedicated to storage system that connects hosts and the disk storage
system using a fibre channel.
Management PC
External authentication server
SAN
Host
Secure area: Generally disk storage system, hosts, fibre channel switch, and
external authentication server are installed in a secure area where entry and
exit are managed.
Fibre channel switch
LAN
Disk Storage System
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To connect the host to SAN, it is necessary to install the fibre channel connection adapters
(hardware, software) in the host. The disk storage system identifies the host by using the identification
information in the fibre channel connection adapter. The identification information in the fibre
channel connection adapter is set by the storage resource administrator (see 1.3.3) when connecting
the host to the disk storage. Normally the host is installed in a secure area where entry and exit are
managed.
Also, if required based on the security policy of the organization, TOE can identify/authenticate the
fibre channel switch that is connected with the disk storage system. In this case, the fibre channel
switch needs to identify/authenticate the connected host. The disk storage system identifies the fibre
channel switch by using the identification information in the fibre channel switch. The identification
information in the fibre channel switch is set by the security administrator (see 1.3.3) when
connecting the fibre channel switch to the disk storage system. Normally the fibre channel switch is
installed in a secure area where entry and exit are managed.
(3) Management PC
The management PC is used to set the configuration information of disk storage system remotely. It
runs the program to enable the administrator of the disk storage system to set the configuration
information in the management PC. The management PC and the disk storage system are connected
via LAN (Local Area Network).
(4) External authentication server
The external authentication server is used to identify/authenticate the user when the administrator
of the disk storage system accesses the disk storage system. Just like the disk storage system and hosts,
it is installed in a secure area where entry and exit are managed.
1.3.3 Relevant personnel
The ST intends for the following users as relevant personnel to disk storage systems.
 Security administrator:
The security administrator can register, modify and delete administrator accounts using the storage
management user interface (UI) software called Storage Navigator program (see 1.4.2). Also, the
administrator can assign the management authority of the group of storage resources, called “resource
group” to a specific user. In addition to the above, the administrator can make an identification setting
of the host, make identification and authentication settings of the fibre channel switch, and perform an
encryption operation of stored data.
 Storage resource administrator:
The administrator can manage resources assigned to the security administrator (such as port, cache
memory, and disk) by using Storage Navigator program (Storage management UI software).
 Audit log administrator:
The audit log administrator can manage audit logs obtained in disk storage systems. The
administrator can refer and download the audit logs and make setting related to syslog using the
Storage Navigator program (Storage management UI software).
 Maintenance personnel
The maintenance personnel belong to an entity specialized in maintenance with whom customers
who use the disk storage system sign contracts concerning maintenance. They are responsible for
initial startup process in installing the disk storage system, changing settings required in maintenance
activities such as parts replacement or addition, and disaster recovery.
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Maintenance personnel access PC called SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) (see 1.4.2)
that provides interface for maintenance/management of disk storage system from a PC for
maintenance person (maintenance PC) to perform maintenance operations. Only maintenance
personnel can directly contact parts inside the disk storage system and operate devices connected to
the internal LAN. All resources of the disk storage system are assigned to the maintenance personnel
and they can perform operations allowed by maintenance role (see Table 1-2). The TOE recognizes
person who uses an interface to access SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) from the
maintenance PC (see 1.4.2) as “the maintenance personnel” role.
 Storage user:
It is a user of disk storage system (represents a host) who uses data stored in the disk storage
system through the host connected to the disk storage system.
The security administrator, storage resource administrator and the audit log administrator are
hereinafter collectively called the storage administrator.
1.3.4 How to use TOE and major security feature
HUS VM is a disk storage system for companies that require multi-platform, high performance, high
response and large capacity. It provides expandable connectivity, virtualization of external storages, logical
resource partitioning, remote copy function and expandable disk capacity in environment of different
system.
To a disk storage system, many hosts of variety type of platforms will be connected via the SAN
environment or the IP network environment (In this ST, how to operate the disk storage system using the
SAN environment is described). If an unauthorized operation is done in this disk storage system
connection, it may result in unintended accesses to user data in the disk storage system. For this, the access
control is required for the user data in disk storage system.
Under the condition that multiple storage resource administrators manage resources in a disk subsystem
(such as port, cache memory and disk) a setting beyond the authority is made. The TOE therefore divides
the port, disk (parity group (see 8.1.1)) and cache memory into multiple resource groups, and the multiple
resource groups are assigned to each storage resource administrator. The assignment of authority for
resource management allows each storage resource administrator to access the resource without affecting
other resources. The control program for HUS VM, the TOE, consists of DKCMAIN micro-program, SVP
program, Storage Navigator program (Storage management UI software), JDK, Apache, Apache Tomcat,
OpenSSL, Flash player, and ActivePerl. The DKCMAIN micro-program controls resources in the disk
storage system while the SVP program does authorities for administrators of disk storage system. The
Storage Navigator program (Storage management UI software) is contained in the SVP program and can
be used by downloading it from SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) to a management PC.
Hereinafter the Storage Navigator program (Storage management UI software) is called Storage Navigator
(Storage management UI software). JDK, Apache, Apache Tomcat, OpenSSL, Flash player, and
ActivePerl are software (application/library) that are installed to realize the functions provided by SVP PC
(Management maintenance IF PC).
This ST describes the security features to protect confidentiality and integrity of user data on HUS VM
by providing functions to prevent unauthorized access to storage resources assigned to specific storage
users from other storage users, and to encrypt and shred the user data in disk drive.
(a) to (h) show the security features provided by the TOE.
[Security features TOE provides]
(a) Access control of storage administrator and maintenance personnel:
Accounts of storage administrator and maintenance personnel who access the TOE belong to groups.
More than one role (see 1.4.4.2.1) and more than one resource group are assigned to a group. The
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resource group is of divided storage resource into multiple groups, and each account can execute
control operations allowed by the role for resource in the assigned resource group.
(b) Host access control:
It performs access control to LDEV (logical volume) in the disk storage system from the host.
(c) Identification and authentication of fibre channel switch:
It identifies and authenticates fibre channel switches to prevent accesses from an unauthorized host to
the disk storage system.
(d) Identification and authentication of storage administrator and maintenance personnel:
It controls, identifies, and authenticates storage administrator and maintenance personnel who access
the TOE. It also can identify and authenticate storage administrator and maintenance personnel by
using an externally connected authentication server (external authentication server).
(e) Encrypted communication between Storage Navigator (Storage management UI software) and SVP
PC (Management maintenance IF PC), and between SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) and
external authentication server:
It encrypts the communication between Storage Navigator (Storage management UI software) and
SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC), and between SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC)
and external authentication server.
(f) Encryption of stored data:
It encrypts user data to be stored in the disk storage system.
(g) Shredding:
It shreds user data in the disk storage system.
(h) Audit log:
It collects, refers and manages logs of configuration change and update for the disk storage system.
1.3.5 TOE and other configuration components
This section describes configuration components of hardware and software, and shows which one is
included in the TOE or operating environment respectively. The hardware and software built in the disk
storage system are installed at the factory shipment, and storage administrator and storage users (see 1.3.3)
are not required to prepare or change them.
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1.3.5.1 Hardware components
The table below shows necessary hardware components and whether each component is included in the
TOE. The environment means that items are the component of other than TOE.
TOE/
environment
Configuration component Description
Environment Hitachi Unified Storage VM It is the name of the disk storage system and consists of
hardware and software, such as TOE, that constitutes
the disk storage system. Parts excluding TOE are used
in the environment.
Environment Host Computers that access the disk subsystem. Windows,
HP-UX, Solaris, Linux and AIX are expected as host
OS.
Environment Fibre channel connection adapter An adapter equipped in computer to connect to SAN.
Environment Fibre channel switch A switch to connect host with disk storage system,
which constitutes the SAN. Connection between the
hosts and the disk storage system equipped with TOE
requires the fibre channel switch.
Environment Management PC Computers to administer the TOE.
Requirements for the computer are;
 CPU: Pentium 4 640 3.2GHz and higher
Recommended: Core 2 Duo E6540 2.33GHz
and higher
 RAM: 2GB or larger Recommended: 3GB
 Available HDD capacity: 500 MB and larger
 Monitor: True Color 32 bit and higher;
Resolution: 1280x1024 and higher
 LAN card: 100Base-T
Environment SAN High speed network connecting disk storage system and
computers by using fibre channel technology.
Environment Other disk storage system Other disk storage system connected with the disk
storage system equipped with TOE. The other disk
storage system is limited to the one equipped with TOE.
Environment Maintenance PC A computer used by maintenance personnel at
maintenance, which is prepared by maintenance
personnel.
Environment External authentication server A server that identifies and authenticates users by using
LDAP server, and RADIUS server.
- LDAP server is equipped with LDAPv3
- RADIUS server conforms to RFC2865
Environment External LAN LAN to connect disk storage system, management PC
and external authentication server.
Environment Internal LAN LAN to connect package in the disk storage system and
maintenance PC.
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1.3.5.2 Software components
The table below shows necessary software components and whether each component is included in the
TOE.
TOE/
environment
Configuration component Description
TOE DKCMAIN micro-program
Version 73-03-09-00/00
The TOE is embedded in the disk storage system at
factory shipment.
TOE SVP program
Version 73-03-06/00
It runs on SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC)
and Storage Navigator (storage management UI
software) runs on management PC.
The TOE is embedded in the disk storage system at
factory shipment.
TOE JDK
Version 1.6.0_45
It runs on SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC).
The TOE is embedded in the disk storage system at
factory shipment.
TOE Apache
Version 2.2.24
It runs on SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC).
The TOE is embedded in the disk storage system at
factory shipment.
TOE Apache Tomcat
Version 6.0.16
It runs on SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC).
The TOE is embedded in the disk storage system at
factory shipment.
TOE OpenSSL
Version 1.0.1g
It runs on SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC).
The TOE is embedded in the disk storage system at
factory shipment.
TOE ActivePerl
Version 5.10.0.1004
It runs on SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC).
The TOE is embedded in the disk storage system at
factory shipment.
TOE Flash Player
Version 10.1.53.64
It runs on SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC).
The TOE is embedded in the disk storage system at
factory shipment.
Environment SVP PC (Management
maintenance IF PC) OS
SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) OS
 Windows Vista Business US version (64bit
version) SP2
It is embedded in the disk storage system at factory
shipment.
Environment Management PC OS OS of management PC.
 Windows 7 (SP1)
Environment OS of maintenance PC OS of maintenance PC.
 Windows 7 (SP1)
Environment Web browser Web browser works on management PC.
The following browser is supported.
 Internet Explorer 8.0
Environment Flash Player It operates on management PC as a plug-in of web
browser. The following version is used.
 Flash Player witch can execute Action
Script until Flash Player 10.1
Environment Java runtime environment Java runtime environment operates on management
PC.
 JRE 6.0 Update 20 (1.6.0_20)
1.4 TOE description
The TOE consists of DKCMAIN micro-program, SVP program, Storage Navigator (storage
management UI software), “JDK”, “Apache”, “Apache Tomcat”, “OpenSSL”, “Flash player”, and
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“ActivePerl”.
The DKCMAIN micro-program is installed on multiple MP blades (see 1.4.1) in a disk storage system
and has a role of controlling data transfer between the disk storage system and a host connected with the
disk storage system. The SVP program is a program to execute operations and maintenances of the disk
storage system. Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) provides the user interface function
of SVP program.
Figure 1-2 illustrates hardware components constituting the disk storage system and shows that on
which components the identified TOE sub set works.
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Figure 1-2 Disk storage system configuration
The disk storage system can be divided into the control system that includes channel blade (CHB),
cache memory (CACHE), disk blade (DKB), MP (microprocessor) blade, and memory device, and
administration system that includes SVP (service processor). The control system controls data input and
LDEV LDEV LDEV
LU LU
Memory device
DKCMAIN
microprogram
(including OS)
MP Blade
Internal
LAN
Maintenance
PC
External
authentication server
SVP program
SVP PC
(Management
maintenance IF PC)
Management PC
External LAN
Other storage
system
Host
SAN SAN
Disk Storage Array
Cache memory
(CACHE)
Configuration
information
CHB
DKB
Storage Navigator program (Storage Management UI software) consists of the Flex application and the
Java applet and runs in the SVP PC and the management PC.
LU：Logical unit. The minimum unit of storage area accessed by the host. It consists of one or multiple
LDEVs (logical devices).
Storage Navigator
program
(Storage management
UI software)
JDK
Apache OpenSSL
Apache Tomcat
SVP PC OS
(Windows Vista)
Flash
Player
Active
Perl
Fibre Channel Switch
Web browser
Storage Navigator
プログラム
Storage Navigator
program
(Storage management
UI software)
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output to and from memory device while the administration system does maintenance and management of
the disk storage system. The configuration components are as follows.
The control network (CHB, CACHE, DKB, and MP blade together connected by high-speed crossbar
switch) and administration network (internal LAN and external LAN) are completely independent each
other. This configuration does not allow direct access from SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC),
management PC, and maintenance PC connected either to the internal LAN or external LAN, to the cache
and memory device.
1.4.1 Control system
(1) Channel blade
Channel blade (CHB) processes a command from other disk storage system and hosts, which are
connected through a fibre channel switch, to a local disk storage system and controls data transfer. Other
disk storage system and a fibre channel switch are connected to a fibre port on the CHB.
(2) Disk adapter
Disk adapter (DKB) controls data transfer between the cache and memory device. The DKB is equipped
with LSI to encrypt and decrypt the stored data as encryption function.
(3) Cache memory
Cache memory (CACHE) is located between CHB and DKB and is commonly accessible from
DKCMAIN micro-program. The configuration information to access the data through CHB and DKB is
stored in it to be used for data reading and writing. The configuration information on the memory can be
accessed only through the DKCMAIN micro-program.
(4) MP blade
One quad core CPU is equipped in one blade for DKCMAIN micro-program to work.
(5) Memory device
Memory device consists of multiple disk drives and is used to store user data. In the memory device, an
LDEV (logical volume) which is a volume to store user data is created. Access to the user data is
controlled per LDEV (logical volume), and done via DKCMAIN micro-program. A part of or all data in
the LDEV (logical volume) can be allocated to cache memory so as to enable high speed data access.
An LU (logical unit), which is an access unit from a host, is mapped to one or more LDEV (logical
volume).
LDEVs (logical volumes) are created on a parity group in the memory device. The parity group is a
series of disk drives handled as one data group, and composes RAID by storing the user data and parity
information. This RAID configuration enables accesses to the user data even when one or more drive in the
parity group is unavailable, which improves the reliability.
CHB, CACHE, DKB and MP blade are connected each other by the high-speed crossbar switch.
1.4.2 Administration system
(1) SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC)
The SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) is PC that provides interface for
maintenance/management for disk storage system. It operates as a service processor embedded in the disk
storage system to manage the entire disk storage system, and SVP program, which is a part of TOE, runs
on it. The SVP program is the software to manage configuration information and maintenance function of
the disk storage system, and has a function to send DKCMAIN micro-program a command to set
configuration information received from Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) that works
on management PC. It also has a function related to operations of security function in the disk storage
system. JDK, Apache, Apache Tomcat, OpenSSL, Flash player, and ActivePerl are software
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(application/library) installed to realize functions provided by SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC).
(2) Maintenance PC
The maintenance PC is the PC used by maintenance personnel at maintenance. It is connected to the
SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) by remote desktop function via internal LAN which is the
network in the disk storage system.
(3) Management PC
Management PC is a customer’s PC used by the storage administrator (see 1.3.3) for disk storage
system operations and maintenance. Storage Navigator (storage management UI software), which is a part
of TOE, works on it. The management PC and the SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) are
connected via the external LAN.
(4) External authentication server
The external authentication server identifies and authenticates users by a request from the SVP program
when the storage administrator (see 1.3.3) accesses TOE using Storage Navigator (storage management UI
software), and returns to the SVP program the authentication result and user group information (see
1.4.4.2.1) that is a basis of approval information when the authentication succeeds. The communication
between the SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) and the external authentication server is
encryption communication.
(5) Storage Navigator program (storage management UI software)
Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) is software used by the storage administrator (see
1.3.3) to manage configuration information of disk storage system.
Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) consists of Flex application and Java applet. The
Flex application executes operations specified from Web browser on the management PC on the SVP PC
(Management maintenance IF PC), and displays the result on the Web browser of the management PC Java
applet on the other hand downloads programs from the SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) to the
management PC. The programs run on the management PC. The communication between the SVP PC
(Management maintenance IF PC) and Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) uses SSL.
The storage administrator interacts with Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) using the
web browser of the management PC to perform setting operations of the disk storage system.
In order to prevent unauthorized use of Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) by any
malicious third party (see 3.1), Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) identifies and
authenticates users in collaboration with the SVP program.
1.4.3 Other disk storage systems
To a port of channel adapter mounted on the disk storage system, an external disk storage system can be
connected other than hosts. Sending and receiving commands to and from another disk storage system via
the channel adapter enables data copy and backup between disk storage systems. When data copy is
executed on the data sending side, backup is executed on the data receiving side. Copy operations executed
from another disk storage system is executed by a reliable storage resource administrator. In addition, as
the disk storage system and another one shares their own data each other, a reliable storage resource
administrator is essential. Therefore, other disk storage system connected with the disk storage system is
limited to the one with the TOE installed.
1.4.4 TOE functions
Basic function and security function the TOE provides are as follows.
1.4.4.1 Basic functions TOE provides
Table 1-1 shows a part of the basic functions provided by the TOE.
Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target V4.8
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Table 1-1 Basic functions provided by TOE
Function Description
Customized volume size
function
The customized volume size function can regard multiple LDEVs (logical
volumes) as free space and create multiple customized volumes in arbitrary
size, which enables effective use of disk capacity.
Cache memory
management function
Specific data in an LDEV (logical volume) is resident in cache memory. The
resident data can always be accessed by memory access function.
Performance information
management function
Monitoring Resource usage rate in disk subsystem, disk load and port load
measurement are enabled.
External storage
management function
The function realizes virtualization (virtualization technology) of disk
storage. By using the external storage management function, multiple disk
subsystems including HUS VM can be handled as one disk subsystem. It
also allows the system administrator to easily manage multiple disk storage
systems in different types.
Remote copy function In HUS VM, replica volumes can be created at remote site without passing
through a server. The replica can be used for backup as a measure for not
only local/regional but also large-scale disasters.
Without passing through a host, by updating the replica volume in
synchronization with update at the main site, remote copy between disk
subsystems is realized. For the connection between disk subsystems, fibre
channel is used.
Asynchronous remote
copy function
This is an asynchronous remote copy function with a new technology.
Adapting the technology to accumulate update records (journal) in a disk
drive with capacity larger than cache can realize stable copy which is less
affected by fluctuations of bandwidth and operation traffic.
Local copy function Volume replication to create a replica of logical volume in a disk subsystem
without passing through a host is enabled. Using the replica allows obtaining
backup in the same database and concurrent processing such as batch
processing while continuing online operation for the data base and
minimizing the impact on operating performance.
Virtual volume
management function
With the virtual volume management function, the data of volume in a pool
is accessed via a virtual volume. For the virtual volume and pool volume,
thresholds are set to continuously monitor overflow of the area, which
eventually brings the following effects.
- Cost reduction at implementation by reducing operating rate of volumes.
- Prevention of increases in management cost and time period of no
operation due to the stop of operation while establishing the system.
1.4.4.2 Security functions TOE provides
1.4.4.2.1 Access control function of storage administrator and maintenance personnel
In an intensive environment with large-scale storage where data of multiple companies, departments,
systems and applications exist in a disk subsystem, so-called Multi-tenancy function to manage storage
operations individually by assigning storage resource administrators per company or department is
required. The Multi-tenancy function promises cost reduction by effective use of resource and management
simplification by dividing.
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In Multi-tenancy environment, a security mechanism not to destroy the data of other organization by
mistake, not to leak the data to other organization, and not to affect operations by other storage resource
administrator is necessary.
Access control function of storage administrator and maintenance personnel is per user group. A role
and a resource group, a group of resources which can be controlled by the role, are assigned to the user
group. Figure 1-3 shows the relationship between user (administrator), user group, resource group and role.
This function enables each user to perform flexible resource allocation and realizes the above security.
Figure 1-3 Relationship between user, user group, role and resource group
A user belongs to one or more user group. The user group is assigned roles and resource groups and uses
them as approved information. The user group information is obtained from SVP PC (Management
maintenance IF PC) or external authentication server to be used. Each account can execute management
operation allowed by the assigned role for the assigned resource.
(1) Role
The security administrator creates a user account using Storage Navigator (storage management UI
software) and registers it to a user group.
Permission of which operation is assigned to a user is determined based on the role assigned to the user
group. The role has categories as follows.
Table 1-2 Role category and operation
Role Allowed operation
Security administrator role A role that is assigned to security administrator and can perform
user management operations, resource management operations,
identification and authentication setting operations of host and
fibre channel switch, encryption of stored data, and management
of external authentication server.
Audit log administrator role A role that is assigned to audit log administrator and can execute
operations related to audit logs.
Storage administrator role A role that is assigned to storage resource administrator and can
perform storage management operations in the permitted
resource group.
Maintenance role A role that is assigned to maintenance personnel and can perform
maintenance operations of the disk storage system.
(2) Resource group
Dividing storage resource into multiple groups is called resource group (RSG). Each resource group is
assigned a number (RSG number) for identification. Also, each resource group is assigned to a user group
and each storage resource administrator can perform management operation within the range of resource
group assigned to the user group the administrator belongs to. As all resource groups are assigned to
User1 User Group1 Role
Resource Group
..
0..y
1..n
1 0..x
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maintenance personnel, they can perform maintenance for all storage resources.
1.4.4.2.2 Host access control
LDEV (logical volume) that stores user data is created by using Storage Navigator (storage management
UI software). In order to access the LDEV (logical volume) from a host, the LDEV (logical volume) needs
to be associated with a port on CHB connected to the host. In particular, LU number is assigned to
associate the host and the LDEV (logical volume) to be accessed to set LU path. Data reading and writing
for the corresponding LDEV (logical volume) is enabled only from the host with the LU path setting. In
other words, data reading and writing from hosts without LU path setting are not allowed.
1.4.4.2.3 Identification and authentication of fibre channel switch connected with hosts
When connecting a host to SAN, the connection management is done in a customer operation to prevent
unauthorized host connection. If the prevention of impersonation is required to further ensure safety based
on the organization’s security policy, identification and authentication by the FC-SP function (see 8.1.1) is
available for the communication between the fibre channel switch and the port of the disk subsystem. The
port of the disk subsystem can identify and authenticate the fibre channel switch, and the fibre channel
switch can identify and authenticate the disk subsystem port as well. For the fibre channel switch
identification and authentication setting, a security administrator uses the access control function of the
fibre channel switch and sets each fibre channel whether to identify and authenticate the fibre channel
switch. Also, the security administrator registers to the disk subsystem the authentication data (WWN,
secret) of the fibre channel switch to identify and authenticate. The secret is a password for authentication
and consists of 12 to 32 characters of alphanumeric and symbols.
1.4.4.2.4 Identification and authentication of storage administrator and maintenance personnel
Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) is used by customers to manage disk subsystem
including security setting. The TOE executes user identification and authentication at disk subsystem
management (configuration of each function and setting change) using Storage Navigator (storage
management UI software) and remote desktop connection to SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC)
by maintenance personnel. If the identification and authentication fails three times in a row, the
identification and authentication of the user is rejected for one minute.
As user authentication, the following 2 methods are supported.
(1) SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) internal authentication
Management
User Group (UG) 1
Recourse
User Group 1 User Group 2
Resource group(RSG)
Management
Management
Storage
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ID and password of users are registered in the SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC), and
the TOE authenticate. The password used for user authentication is 6 to 256 letters with a
combination of alphanumeric characters and symbols. (The password of maintenance personnel is
127 letters)
(2) External authentication server
The SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) does not manage ID and password but the ID
and the password are sent to an external authentication server and the authentication result is sent
back. After the success of authentication by the external authentication server, the user group
information is obtained from the server and used as approved information. As protocols for user
authentication, LDAP (Encryption supports LDAPS, starttls), and RADIUS (authentication
protocol is CHAP) are supported.
1.4.4.2.5 Encrypted communication between Storage Navigator (storage management UI software)
and SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC), and between SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC)
and external authentication server
To prevent the falsification and leakage of communication data between disk storage system and the
management PC, the communication between Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) and
SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) is encrypted by SSL. In addition, one of LDAPS, starttls, and
RADIUS (authentication protocol is CHAP) protocols is employed for the communication between the
SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) and the external authentication server to protect passwords of
the storage administrator and maintenance personnel.
1.4.4.2.6 Encryption of stored data
The TOE can encrypt the data stored in a volume in the storage system. For encryption and decryption,
LSI mounted in DKB is used. Encrypting data can prevent the information from being leaked at
replacement of disk drive in the storage system or when the data is stolen. In addition, the following key
management functions are available.
 Encryption key creation
 Encryption key deletion
 Encryption key backup and restoring
Only security administrator with user account can operate the encryption of stored data function.
1.4.4.2.7 Shredding
This is a function to disable to restore data by writing dummy data over all the data in a volume, so as to
avoid data leakage and unauthorized use at reuse of the volume.
When the Shredding is executed, dummy data is written in the volume containing user data and the user
data cannot be restored. The function complies with DoD5220.22-M, recommends writing dummy data at
least 3 times. The dummy data is overwritten 3 times in the volume as default setting.
Only storage administrator with user account can operate the Shredding function.
1.4.4.2.8 Audit log
The audit log function is provided by SVP program (including Storage Navigator (storage management
UI software)) and DKCMAIN micro-program. Storage Navigator (storage management UI software)
records events related to the security such as success/fail of login and configuration/setting change.
The maximum number of letters in a line of audit log is 1,024 (single byte), and up to 250,000 lines
Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target V4.8
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information is stored on the HDD in SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC). Storage Navigator
(storage management UI software) provides the interface to refer audit logs.
1.4.5 Guidance documentation
Guidance documents for the TOE are as follows.
(1) Users guide for security function
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM ISO15408 Function of Acquiring Authentication; Instruction manual Ver.
2.9
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Storage Navigator User Guide 8th
edition
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Storage Navigator Messages 8th
edition
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Provisioning Guide 10th
edition
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Encryption License Key User Guide Second edition
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Volume Shredder User Guide 4th
edition
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Audit Log User Guide 6th
edition
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Operations Using Spreadsheets 3rd
edition
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM User Guidance Ver.1.8
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Manual for Obtaining ISO15408 Certification Ver. 1.9
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Block Modular Hitachi Storage Navigator User Guide MK-92HM7016-
06
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Block Modular Hitachi Storage Navigator Messages MK-92HM7017-
03f
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Block Modular Provisioning Guide MK-92HM7012-07
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Block Modular Hitachi Encryption License Key User Guide MK-
92HM7051-00
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Block Module Hitachi Volume Shredder User Guide MK-92HM7021-03
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Block Modular Hitachi Audit Log User Guide MK-92HM7009-03d
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Hitachi System Operations Using Spreadsheets MK-92HM7015-01
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM User’s Guidance Ver.1.5
(2) Disk subsystem maintenance manual
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM ISO15408 Function of Acquiring Authentication; Maintenance manual
Ver. 2.3
 HT-40SA Disk Array System Maintenance ManualREV.4.5
 Hitachi Unified Storage VM Obtaining ISO15408 Certification Maintenance Manual Ver. 1.6
 DW700 Maintenance Manual REV. 4.5
1.5 Evaluation Environment
The TOE evaluation environment is as follows. The following management PC, fibre channel switch,
fibre channel connection adapters are used in the TOE evaluation.
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Table 1-3 TOE components used for evaluation
No. Component Software/OS
1 Hitachi Unified Storage VM DKCMAIN micro-program: 73-03-09-00/00
2 SVP SVP micro-program: 73-03-06/00
JDK: 1.6.0_45
Apache: 2.2.24
Apache Tomcat: 6.0.16
OpenSSL: 1.0.1g
ActivePerl: 5.10.0.1004
Flash Player: 10.1.53.64
Table 1-4 Physical components of Hitachi Unified Storage VM used for evaluation
No. Component Number Description
1 Hitachi Unified Storage VM 1
1-1 MP blade 2
1-2 CHB 4
1-3 Encryption DKB 2
1-4 Cache 4G×16
1-5 2.5-inch Disk Drive 12 Three RAID1(2D+2D) parity groups
Host (Windows)
SAN
Fibre Channel Switch
External Authentication server
Management PC
Maintenance PC
External LAN
Internal LAN
Storage Array (HUS VM)
Self loop setting
for copy function evaluation
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Table 1-5 Host for Evaluation
No. Host OS
1 Windows 2008 Server
Table 1-6 Management PC for Evaluation
No. Management PC OS Java runtime environment Web browser and Plug-in
1 Windows7 (SP1) JRE 1.6.0_20 Internet Explorer 8.0
Flash Player 10.1
2 Windows7 (SP1) JRE 1.6.0_20 Internet Explorer 8.0
Flash Player 16.0
Table 1-7 Maintenance PC for Evaluation
No. Maintenance PC OS Java runtime environment Web browser and Plug-in
1 Windows7 (SP1) JRE 1.6.0_20 Internet Explorer 8.0
Flash Player 10.1
Table 1-8 External Authentication Server for Evaluation
No. External Authentication Server OS Software
1 Windows 2008 Server Active Directory
LDAP v3 support
RFC2865 compliant
Table 1-9 Fibre Channel Switch for Evaluation
No. Switch Model Name FW version
1 Brocade300 BR-360-0008 Fabric OS v6.4.1b
2 Brocade6505 ER-7000-0340 Fabric OS v7.2.0c
Table 1-10 Fibre Channel Connection Adapter for Evaluation
No. Fibre Channel Connection Adapter Model Driver Version
1 Qlogic Fibre Channel Adapter QLE2564-CK Fibre Channel
Adapter
STOR miniport
driver
3.14.0.0
or
9.1.4.6
2 Brocade 16G FC HBA BR-1860-2P00 bfa 3.2.1.0
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2 Conformance claim
2.1 CC conformance claim
This ST complies with the following standards.
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part1: Introduction and general model Version 3.1 Revision 4
Part2: Security functional components Version 3.1 Revision 4
Part3: Security assurance components Version 3.1 Revision 4
Security functional requirements: Part2
Security assurance requirements: Part3
2.2 PP conformance
This ST does not claim compliance with any PP.
2.3 Package name conformant
This ST complies with package: EAL2. Assurance component of ALC_FLR.1 is added.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 TOE assets
The most important asset for disk storage system is the user data of storage user stored in disk drives. In
order to maintain integrity and confidentiality of the user data, the user data is protected from unauthorized
access by a third party, and from setting change outside authority by the storage administrator. In addition,
for sniffing of communication data between Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) and
SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) and between SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) and
external authentication server by a third party who can connect to external LAN, TSF data (user ID and
password) contained in the communication data must be protected by utilizing high reliable channel.
In the ST, the user data of storage user exists in a resource group is the asset subject to protection in the
environment of large-scale storage with data of multiple companies, departments, systems and applications
in disk subsystem, and the asset is protected from unauthorized accesses by a third party.
3.2 Threats
The TOE counters threats shown below. A third party in the following description means a person who
is none of storage administrator, storage user, and maintenance personnel, and is not authorized to use the
disk storage system.
T.TSF_COMP A third party may impersonate the storage administrator by obtaining the
communication data including ID and password of the storage administrator
wrongly from external LAN to change disk storage system setting and may
access the LDEV (logical volume) where user data is stored.
T.LP_LEAK In a SAN environment where multiple hosts are connected to the same port, a
third party may be able to leak, falsify, and delete user data by accessing LDEV
(logical volume) of a specific host from other host.
T.CHG_CONFIG A third party may be able to leak, falsify, and delete user data by wrongly
changing the access setting for LDEV (logical volume) in the disk storage
system.
T.HDD_THEFT When returning a disk drive to the vendor for preventive maintenance or failure,
the disk drive may be stolen while it is delivered, and the user data could be
leaked.
T.HDD_REUSE The user data in the disk drive may be leaked to a third party due to reuse of the
disk storage system or reuse of the disk drive.
3.3 Organizational security policies
P.MASQ If a customer requests identity authentication of a fibre channel switch that is
connected to hosts, the fibre channel switch that is connected to hosts is identified
and authenticated.
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3.4 Assumptions
A.NOEVIL Within storage administrators, the security administrator and audit log
administrator are assumed to be the qualified person who is capable of
operating and managing the entire disk storage system, executes proper
operations as specified by manuals, and never commit any wrongdoing.
The storage resource administrator is assumed to be the qualified person
who is capable of managing and operating a disk subsystem to the range
permitted by the security administrator and executes proper operations as
specified by manuals and never commits any wrongdoing.
A.PHYSICAL_SEC The security administrator installs the disk storage system, host (including
fibre channel connection adapter), devices that constitute the SAN
environment (fibre channel switch, cable), other disk storage system, and
external authentication server in a secure area where entry and exit are
managed. Operation and management are performed, so that the setting
values (such as WWN) that are set in each device and the connection status
(connection status to SAN) would be maintained properly.
A.MANAGE_SECRET The secret for fibre channel switch authentication that is set in the fibre
channel switch connected to hosts is assumed to be controlled under the
security administrator’s responsibility to protect it from the use by
unauthorized person.
A.MANAGEMENT_PC The storage administrator is assumed to install and manage the management
PC at a secure area to protect it from unauthorized use.
A.MAINTENANCE_PC When the responsible official of the organization signs a maintenance
contract, accept maintenance personnel and the maintenance PC. Allow
maintenance personnel in a secure area and permit maintenance personnel to
install the maintenance PC. Also people other than maintenance personnel
do not use the maintenance PC wrongly.
A.CONNECT_STORAGE Other disk storage systems connected to TOE are assumed to be limited to
those TOE is embedded.
A.EXTERNAL_SERVER An external authentication server is assumed to be capable of using
authentication protocol (LDAPS, starttls and RADIUS (authentication
protocol is CHAP)) which can protect communication with SVP PC
(Management maintenance IF PC) supported by the TOE, and registering
and managing user identification information and user group information
while keeping consistency with the TOE.
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4 Security objectives
This chapter describes TOE security objective, operational environment security objective, and security
objective rationale.
4.1 TOE security objectives
The TOE security objectives are as follows.
O.ADM_AUTH The TOE must succeed the identity authentication of storage administrator and
maintenance personnel before the storage administrator and maintenance
personnel execute the management operations of disk subsystem.
O.ADM_ROLE The TOE must control the management operations done by the storage
administrator and maintenance personnel as follows.
- Security administrator can perform user management operation, resource
management operation, host and fibre channel switch identification and
authentication setting, encryption of stored data, and management operations
of the external authentication server.
- Audit log administrator can perform operations related to audit log.
- Storage resource administrator can perform storage management operation
within the permitted resource group.
- Maintenance personnel can perform disk storage system maintenance
operations.
O.SEC_COMM The TOE must provide the communication function which is secured by the
encrypted data on the channel between Storage Navigator (storage management
UI software) and SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC), and between SVP
PC (Management maintenance IF PC) and external authentication server to
protect from sniffing of the data from the communication path between Storage
Navigator (storage management UI software) and SVP PC (Management
maintenance IF PC) and between SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) and
external authentication server.
O.SWITCH_AUTH The TOE must perform identity authentication of the fibre channel switch that is
connected with hosts by the FC-SP function when the fibre channel switch is
connected.
O.HOST_ACCESS The TOE must identify hosts to control that only the host which is allowed to
connect to the disk storage system can access the permitted LDEV (logical
volume).
O.HDD_ENC The TOE must manage encryption key to encrypt the stored data to prevent the
user data from being leaked from the disk drive taken out of the disk storage
system.
O.HDD_SHRED The TOE must shred the user data to make sure that the user data does not remain
in the disk drive when the disk drive in the disk storage system is replaced or
stops to be used.
O.AUD_GEN The TOE must track events regarding the security such as identity authentication
and setting change operation.
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4.2 Operational environment security objectives
The operational environment security objectives are as follows.
OE.NOEVIL The representative of organization must assign person who is capable of
managing and operating the entire disk storage system, executes proper
operations as specified by manuals, and never commits any wrongdoing to
security administrator and audit log administrator within storage
administrators.
The storage resource administrator must be assigned to the qualified
person who has been trained to execute proper operations as specified by
manuals and never commits any wrongdoing to manage and operate disk
subsystem to the range permitted by the security administrator.
OE.PHYSICAL_SEC The security administrator installs a disk storage system, host (including
fibre channel connection adapter), devices that constitute a SAN
environment (fibre channel switch, cable), other storage system and
external authentication server in a secure area where only storage
administrator and maintenance personnel are allowed. They must be
completely protected from unauthorized setting changes and switching the
connection target.
OE.MANAGE_SECRET The security administrator must control the secret for fibre channel switch
authentication set in the fibre channel switch to protect it from the use by
unauthorized person.
OE.MANAGEMENT_PC The storage administrator must properly install and manage the
management PC to protect it from unauthorized use.
OE.MAINTENANCE_PC Maintenance personnel install the maintenance PC in a secure area
appropriately according to instructions of the responsible official of the
organization. The maintenance PC must be protected, so that other people
than maintenance personnel cannot use it.
OE.CONNECT_STORAGE Other disk storage systems connected to the TOE must be limited to those
with TOE embedded
OE.EXTERNAL_SERVER The security administrator must use protocol (LDAPS, starttls, and
RADIUS (authentication protocol is CHAP)) which can protect the
communication with SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) supported
by the TOE for external authentication server, and properly register and
control the user identification information and user group information
while keeping the consistency with TOE.
OE.FC-SP_HBA When identification and authentication of fibre channel switch connected
hosts is required, a fibre channel connection adapter with the FC-SP
function and a fibre channel switch with the FC-SP function must be used.
OE.HDD_ENC In operational environment, a disk storage system which is capable of
encrypting user data by using LSI equipped in DKB must be used to
prevent the user data from being leaked from disk drive.
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4.3 Security objective rationale
The security objective must be to address to assumptions stipulated in Security problem definition, to
counter threats or to realize organizational security policy. Table 4-1 shows relationships between
security objective and corresponding assumption, threats to counter, and organizational security policy.
Table 4-1 Relationship between TOE security problem and security objective
Security objectives
O.ADM_AUTH
O.ADM_ROLE
O.SEC_COMM
O.SWITCH_AUTH
O.HOST_ACCESS
O.AUD_GEN
O.HDD_ENC
O.HDD_SHRED
OE.NOEVIL
OE.PHYSICAL_SEC
OE.MANAGE_SECRET
OE.MANAGEMENT_PC
OE.MAINTENANCE_PC
OE.CONNECT_STORAGE
OE_EXTERNAL_SERVER
OE.FC-SP_HBA
OE.HDD_ENC
TOE
security
problem
A.NOEVIL X
A.PHYSICAL_SEC X
A.MANAGE_SECRET X
A.MANAGEMENT_PC X
A.MAINTENANCE_PC X
A.CONNECT_STORAGE X
A.EXTERNAL_SERVER X
T.TSF_COMP X X
T.LP_LEAK X X
T.CHG_CONFIG X X X
T.HDD_THEFT X X
T.HDD_REUSE X
P.MASQ X X
4.3.1 Security objective rational for assumption
Table 4-2 shows that the assumptions are addressed by the security objectives
Table 4-2 Validity of the security objectives for the assumptions
Assumptions Rationale that assumptions are addressed
A.NOEVIL A.NOEVIL, as the description of OE. NOEVIL shows, assigns
Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target V4.8
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a reliable person to the security administrator and audit log
administrator respectively for managing or operating the whole
disk storage system. This can be realized by assigning a reliable
person to the storage resource administrator for managing and
operating the storage system in the ranged authorized by the
administrator who has the authority.
A.PHYSICAL_SEC A.PHYSICAL_SEC can be realized by ensuring that disk
storage systems, host (including fibre channel connection
adapter), devices that constitute a SAN environment (fibre
channel switch, cable), other disk storage system and external
authentication server are installed in a secure area where only
security administrator, storage resource administrator, audit log
administrator and maintenance personnel can access, and
completely protected from unauthorized change of setting
values and switching the connection target as the description of
OE.PHYSICAL_SEC shows.
A.MANAGE_SECRET A.MANAGE_SECRET can be realized by ensuring that the
secret for authentication of the fibre channel switch connected
with hosts is managed not to be used by a person who is not
authorized by the security administrator as the description of
OE.MANAGE_SECRET shows.
A.MANAGEMENT_PC A.MANAGEMENT_PC can be realized by ensuring that the
storage administrator correctly installs and manages the
management PC to prevent unauthorized use as the description
of OE.MANAGEMENT_PC shows.
A.MAINTENANCE_PC A.MAINTENANCE_PC can be realized by managing the
maintenance PC by maintenance personnel, so that people other
than maintenance personnel cannot use it as the description of
OE.MAINTENANCE_PC shows.
A.CONNECT_STORAGE A.CONNECT_STORAGE can be realized by limiting that other
disk storage system to be connected with the TOE must be the
one consists of TOE as the description of
OE.CONNECT_STORAGE shows.
A.EXTERNAL_SERVER A.EXTERNAL_SERVER can be realized by ensuring that the
external authentication server is capable of using authentication
protocol that can protect the communication with SVP PC
(Management maintenance IF PC) supported by the TOE and
registering and managing user identification information and
user group information correctly while keeping the consistency
with the TOE as the description of OE.EXTERNAL_SERVER
shows.
4.3.2 Security objective rationale for threat
Table 4-3 shows that the security objectives can help to cope with threats.
Table 4-3 Validity of the security objectives to cope with threats
Threats Rationale that threats are being addressed
T.TSF_COMP T.TSF_COMP is addressed by O.SEC_COMM and
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Threats Rationale that threats are being addressed
OE.EXTERNAL_SERVER as follows.
 The encrypted communication is employed for the
communication between Storage Navigator (storage
management UI software) and SVP PC (Management
maintenance IF PC), which can reduce the threats, such as
sniffing by connecting unauthorized devices.
 The encrypted communication is employed for the
communication between SVP PC (Management
maintenance IF PC) and an external authentication server,
which can reduce threats such as sniffing by connecting
unauthorized devices.
 One of LDAPS, starttls, and RADIUS (authentication
protocol is CHAP) is used for the protocol of
communication between SVP PC (Management
maintenance IF PC) and an external authentication server to
manage the user identity information and group information
registered in the external authentication server while
keeping consistency with the TOE, which can reduce the
threats to leakage of storage administrator and maintenance
personnel user ID and password, and of group information.
T.LP_LEAK T.LP_LEAK is addressed by O.HOST_ACCESS and
OE.PHYSICAL_SEC as follows.
 The TOE identifies and controls host so to ensure that the
authorized host only can access the authorized LDEV
(logical volume), which can reduce threats.
 Disk storage system, host (including fibre channel
connection adapter), fibre channel switch, other disk
storage system and external authentication server are
installed in a secure area where only security administrator,
storage resource administrator, audit log administrator and
maintenance personnel are allowed to access and are
completely protected from unauthorized physical access,
which can reduce threats.
T.CHG_CONFIG T.CHG_CONFIG is addressed by O.ADM_AUTH,
O.ADM_ROLE, and O.AUD_GEN as follows.
 The TOE authenticates Storage Navigator (storage
management UI software) user before management
operation of disk subsystem and reject them if the identity
authentication fails, which reduces unauthorized accesses
by the third party.
 The TOE identifies and authenticates storage administrator
and maintenance personnel and limits the management
operations performed by storage administrator and
maintenance personnel to reduce threats.
 Security administrator is able to perform user
management operations, resource management
operations, identification and authentication setting
operations of fibre channel switch and host,
encryption operations of stored data, and operations of
external authentication server.
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Threats Rationale that threats are being addressed
 Audit log administrator is able to perform operations
related to audit logs.
 Storage resource administrator is able to perform
storage management operations in the permitted
resource group.
 Maintenance personnel can perform maintenance
operations of disk storage system.
 The TOE can trace security related issues when the identity
authentication fails, which can reduce unauthorized
accesses by the third party.
T.HDD_THEFT T.HDD_THEFT is addressed by O.HDD_ENC and
OE.HDD_ENC as follows.
 The TOE manages encryption key used to encrypt user data
in a disk drive, which can reduce threats such as leakage of
user data from the disk drive.
 The user data is encrypted by using LSI equipped in DKB
of disk storage system, which can reduce threats to user
data leakage from the disk drive that is taken out of the disk
storage system.
T.HDD_REUSE T.HDD_REUSE is addressed by O.HDD_SHRED as follows.
 The TOE shreds the user data in disk drive of disk storage
system when the use of disk drive stops, which can reduce
the threat to the user data leakage from the disk drive.
4.3.3 Security objective rationale for organizational security policy
Table 4-4 shows that the organizational security policy is realized by the security objective.
Table 4-4 Validity of the security objectives for organizational security policy
Organizational security policy Rationale for the fact that organizational security policy is realized
P.MASQ P.MASQ is realized by O.SWITCH_AUTH and OE.FC-SP_HBA as
follows.
 For identification and authentication of the fibre channel switch
that is connected with a host, the fibre channel connection adapter
with the FC-SP function needs to be installed in the host, the fibre
channel switch with the FC-SP function needs to be used.
 The TOE performs identity authentication of the fibre channel
switch by the FC-SP function before the port is accessed through
the fibre channel switch.
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5 Extended components definition
This ST complies with CC Part2 and CC Part3, and does not define any extended components.
Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target V4.8
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6 Security requirement
This section describes security requirements.
6.1 Security functional requirements
Security requirements provided by the TOE are as follows.
All the following components are included in CC Part 2.
Notation system on the operation of functional requirements (selection, assignment and detailed) is
described below.
When selecting: [selection: Description of functional requirements]: Chosen contents.
When assigning: [assignment: Description of functional requirements]: Assigned contents.
When refining: [refinement: Description of functional requirements]: Refined contents.
The letters at the end of duplicated defined functional requirements means as follows.
a: The functional requirement related to access restriction, and identification and authentication of
storage administrator and maintenance personnel.
b: The functional requirements related to host access control and fibre channel switch identity
authentication.
- Security audit (FAU)
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed,
not specified] level of audit; and
c) [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit relevant
information].
[selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]: Not specified.
[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]: Auditable event to be
described in “Audit Items” on Table 6-1.
[assignment: other audit relevant information]: None
Table 6-1 Individually defined items to be audited
Required
functions
Audit Items
FAU_GEN.1 None.
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Required
functions
Audit Items
FAU_GEN.2 None.
FAU_SAR.1 None.
FAU_STG.1 None.
FAU_STG.3 None.
FAU_STG.4 None.
FCS_CKM.1  Record success or failure of the creation of encryption key for data encryption, in
the log file.
FCS_CKM.4  Record success or failure of the deletion of encryption key for data encryption, in
the log file.
FDP_ACC.1 None.
FDP_ACF.1 None.
FDP_RIP.1  Record success or failure of start or stop of user data shredding, in the log file.
FIA_AFL.1 None. Reaching threshold of authentication try is not recorded in log file.
FIA_ATD.1a None.
FIA_ATD.1b None.
FIA_SOS.1a None. Unmatched metric is not recorded.
FIA_SOS.1b None. Unmatched metric is not recorded.
FIA_UAU.2  Record the success or failure of identity authentication of storage administrator
and maintenance personnel in the log file.
 Record the result of identity authentication of the fibre channel switch that is
connected with hosts by FC-SP in the log file.
FIA_UID.2  Record the success or failure of identity authentication of storage administrator
and maintenance personnel, in the log file.
 Record the result of fibre channel switch identity authentication by FC-SP, in the
log file.
FIA_USB.1a None.
FIA_USB.1b None.
FMT_MOF.1  Record the enabled or disabled setting of stored data encryption function, in the
log file.
 Record the setting change of fibre channel switch authentication by FC-SP, in the
log file.
 Record the start or stop of shredding function, in the log file.
FMT_MSA.1  Record LU path information creation and deletion, in the log file.
 Record that user account is added to or deleted from user group, in the log file.
 Record that role is added to or deleted from user group, in the log file.
 Record that resource group is added to or deleted from user group, in the log file.
FMT_MSA.3 None.
FMT_MTD.1  Record creation or deletion of user ID for user account and change of password, in
the log file.
 Record fibre channel switch WWN, secret creation, change, or deletion, in the log
file.
 Record creation, deletion, backup or restore of encryption key for data encryption,
in the log file.
 Record the change of user authentication method, in the log file.
FMT_MTD.3  Record that encryption key for data encryption is restored, in the log file.
FMT_SMF.1  Record creation or deletion of user ID for user account, change of password, or
change of belonged user group, in the log file.
 Record creation, change, or deletion of fibre channel switch WWN or secret.
FMT_SMR.1  Record change of user group where the user account belongs to, in the log file.
 Record that role is added to or deleted from user group, in the log file.
FPT_STM.1 None.
FTP_ITC.1  Record the success or failure of identity authentication of storage administrator
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Required
functions
Audit Items
and maintenance personnel, in the log file.
FTP_TRP.1  Record the success or failure of identity authentication of storage administrator
and maintenance personnel, in the log file.
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read
[assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret
the information.
[assignment: authorised users]: Audit log administrator
[assignment: list of audit information]: It describes in the Audit Information on Table
6-2.
Table 6-2 Audit Information
Audit event Audit Information
Identity authentication of
storage administrator
 Success or failure of the identity authentication of storage
administrator, executed date and time of the identity authentication,
user ID of the Storage Navigator (storage management UI software),
IP address of the management PC.
Identity authentication of the
maintenance personnel
 Success or failure of the identity authentication of maintenance
personnel, executed data and time, user ID of the maintenance
personnel, and IP address of maintenance PC.
Creation, modification and
deletion of user account of
storage administrator and
maintenance personnel
 User ID of security administrator who creates or deletes a user ID of
user account, executed date and time, user ID of the operation target,
authentication method, operation (creation, modification, deletion),
operation result (success or failure)
Change of user account
password of storage
administrator and maintenance
personnel
 User ID of the storage administrator and maintenance personnel who
change user account password, executed date and time, user ID of
operation target and operation result (success or failure).
Change of user group where
the user account of storage
administrator and maintenance
 User ID of the security administrator who changes user group,
executed date and time, name of user group, name of role, name of
resource group, operation (role addition, deletion, RSG # addition,
and deletion), and operation results (success or failure).
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Audit event Audit Information
personnel belongs to
Creation and deletion of LU
path information
 User ID of the storage resource administrator who creates or deletes
the LU path information, executed date and time, operation (creation
or deletion), port number, host WWN, LU number, LDEV (logical
volume) number and operation result (success or failure).
Addition, modification and
deletion of fibre channel
switch WWN and secret
 User ID of the storage resource administrator, security administrator,
or maintenance personnel who create, modify or delete the fibre
channel switch WWN and secret (in this case security administrator
only), executed date and time, port number, fibre channel switch
WWN, operation (creation, modification, deletion) and operation
result (success or failure).
Setting change of existence or
nonexistence of fibre channel
switch identity authentication
by FC-SP
 User ID of the security administrator who changes existence or
nonexistence of fibre channel switch identity authentication by FC-
SP, executed date and time, fibre channel switch WWN, existence of
authentication, operation (change), and operation result (success or
failure).
Fibre channel switch identity
authentication by FC-SP
 WWN of fibre channel switch whose identity is authenticated,
executed date and time and authentication result.
Setting for encryption of
stored data
 User ID of the administrator who per forms the setting to enable or
disable encryption of stored data, executed date and time, parity
group number, encryption setting status (enable/disable), the number
of setting parity groups, and operation result (success or failure).
Generation, deletion, backup
and restoring of encryption
key for encryption of stored
data
 User ID of the security administrator who performs generation,
deletion, backup and restoring of encryption key for data encryption,
executed date and time, operation (generation, deletion, backup or
restoring), encryption key number, the number of operated
encryption keys, and operation result (success or failure).
Start or stop of shredding
 User ID of the storage resource administrator who performs volume
shredding, executed date and time, operation (start or stop), written
data, the number of writing operations, target LDEV (logical volume)
number, the number of target LDEVs (logical volumes), the
execution order of shredding, and operation result (success or
failure).
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorised
modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
[Selection: choose one of: prevent, detect]: prevent
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
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FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [assignment: actions to be taken in case of possible audit storage
failure] if the audit trail exceeds [assignment: pre-defined limit].
[assignment: pre-defined limit]: 175,000 lines
[assignment: actions to be taken in case of possible audit storing failure]: Give a
warning on Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) screen.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention for audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited
events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the
oldest stored audit records”] and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of
audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full.
[selection: choose one of: “ignore audit event”, “prevent audit events, except those
taken by authorized user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit
records”]: overwrite the oldest stored audit records
[assignment: actions to be taken when storing audit records fails]: None
- Cryptographic support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key
generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[refinement: cryptographic key]: Encryption key for data encryption
[assignment: list of standard]: Shown in “Standard” on Table 6-3.
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]: Shown in “Algorithm on
Table 6-3.
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]: Shown in “Key size(bit) on Table 6-3.
Table 6-3 Generation of encryption key
Encryption key Standard Algorithm Key size(bit)
Encryption key for data encryption FIPS PUB 197 AES 256
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
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FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction
method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[refinement: cryptographic key]: Encryption key for data encryption
[assignment: list of standards]: None
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]: shown in “Encryption
destruction method on Table 6-4. Encryption key destruction method.
Table 6-4 Encryption key destruction method
Encryption key Destruction method
Encryption key for data
encryption
According to an instruction of security administrator, destroy the
specified encryption key information and release the memory
where the information is stored.
- User data protection (FDP)
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list
of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the
SFP].
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects
covered by the SFP]
Subject: Shown in “Subject” on Table 6-5.
Object: Shown in “Object” on Table 6-5.
List of operations between subjects and objects handled by SFP: Shown in
“Operations between subjects and objects on Table 6-5.
[assignment: access control SFP]: LM access control SFP
Table 6-5 Operations between subjects and objects
Subject Object Operation between subject and
object
Processing acts for host LDEV (logical volume)  Access to LDEV (logical
volume)
Processing acts for Storage
Navigator
(storage management UI software)
LDEV (logical volume)  LDEV (logical volume)
creation and deletion
RSG  RSG creation and deletion
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on
the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the
indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named
groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rules
governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects].
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that
explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly
deny access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and
for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant
security attributes]:
Subjects: Processing acts for host, processing acts for Storage Navigator (storage
management UI software)
Objects: LDEV (logical volume), RSG
The SFP-relevant security attribute or groups with name of SFP-relevant security
attribute: Shown in “Security attribute of subject” and “Security attribute of
object” on Table 6-6.
Table 6-6 SFP-relevant security attribute
Subject Security attribute of subject Security attribute of object
Processing acts for host WWN, LU number LU path information (host WWN, LU
number, LDEV (logical volume)
number)
Processing acts for
Storage Navigator
(storage management
UI software)
User group information (role, RSG
number)
Resource group information (RSG
number)
LU path information (host WWN, LU
number, LDEV (logical volume)
number)
[assignment: access control SFP]: LM access control SFP
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled
objects using controlled operations on controlled objects]: Rules described in
“Rule” on Table 6-7.
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of
subjects to objects]: None
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of
subjects to objects]: None
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Table 6-7 Rules between subjects and objects
Subjects Rules Objects
Processing acts for
host
Allow access to objects if the WWN and LU number given from
a host to the processing acts for host, and the LU path
information that is the security attribute of corresponding
objects match each o.
Refuse access if the above do not match each other.
LDEV
(logical
volume)
Processing acts for
Storage Navigator
(storage management
UI software)
Rule to create or delete the objects by the processing acts for
Storage Navigator (storage management UI software).
1) In case of security administrator role
Creation allows if RSG number is not duplicated, while
deletion is allowed if RSG number exists.
RSG
Rule to create or delete objects by the processing acts for
Storage Navigator (storage management UI software).
1) In case of storage administrator role
Creation of the LDEV (logical volume) is allowed if a
resource group of RSG number allocated to the storage
resource administrator contains the LDEV (logical volume)
number to be created.
Deletion of the LDEV (logical volume) is allowed if a
resource group or RSG number allocated to the storage
resource administrator contains LDEV (logical volume)
number to be deleted and the information of LU path
associated with the LDEV (logical volume) does not exist.
LDEV
(logical
volume)
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the
resource from] the following objects: [assignment: list of objects].
[assignment: list of objects]: LDEV (logical volume)
[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]:
resource allocation release from
- Identification and authentication (FIA)
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an
administrator configurable positive integer within[assignment: range of acceptable
values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of
Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target V4.8
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authentication events].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection:
met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[assignment: list of authentication events]: Authentication by Storage Navigator
(storage management UI software), or that when connecting to SVP PC
(Management maintenance IF PC) via remote desktop.
[refinement: administrator]: Security administrator
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable
positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]: 3
[selection: met, surpassed]: surpassed
[assignment: list of actions]: refuse the login of the user for a minute, and then the
number of unsuccessful authentication attempts cleared to be 0.
FIA_ATD.1a User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1a The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes].
[assignment: list of security attributes]: Role, RSG number
FIA_ATD.1b User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1b The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes].
[assignment: list of security attribute]: WWN, LU number
FIA_SOS.1a Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1a The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: a
defined quality metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric]: at least 6 characters and no more than 256
characters (password for maintenance personnel is 127 characters) containing
one-byte upper-case alphabet, one-byte lower-case alphabet, one-byte number,
and any of the following 32 symbols; !”#$%&’()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{|}~.
FIA_SOS.1b Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1b The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: a
Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target V4.8
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defined quality metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric]: at least 12 characters and no more than 32
characters containing one-byte upper-case alphabet, one-byte lower-case alphabet,
one-byte number, one-byte space and any of the following 12 symbols;.-
+@_=:/[],~.
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1Timing of authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
[refinement: user]: Storage administrator, maintenance personnel, or fibre
channel switch
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
[refinement: user]: Storage administrator, maintenance personnel, host, or fibre
channel switch
FIA_USB.1a User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1a The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting
on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].
FIA_USB.1.2a The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules
for the initial association of attributes].
FIA_USB.1.3a The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security
attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment:
rules for the changing of attributes].
[assignment: list of user security attributes]: Role, RSG number
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]: None
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]: None
FIA_USB.1b User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1b The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting
Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target V4.8
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on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].
FIA_USB.1.2b The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules
for the initial association of attributes].
FIA_USB.1.3b The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security
attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment:
rules for the changing of attributes].
[assignment: list of user security attributes]: WWN, LU number
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]: None
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]: None
- Security management (FMT)
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable,
enable, modify the behaviour of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to
[assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: list of functions]: Shown in “Function” on Table 6-8.
[selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of]:
disable, enable
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]: Shown in “Role” on Table 6-8.
Table 6-8 List of functions restricting operations for roles
No Roles Functions
1 Security administrator  Encryption of stored data function
 FC-SP authentication function
 External authentication server
connection function
2 Storage resource
administrator
 Shredding function
3 Maintenance personnel ---
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow
control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify,
delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of
security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: list of security attributes]: LU path information, user group
information
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
operations]]: Operations described in “Operations for LU path information” on
Table 6-9, and in “Operations for user group information” on Table 6-10.
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]: Described in “Roles” on Table 6-9.
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]: LM access
control SFP
Table 6-9 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for security attributes
of processing act for host
Roles Operations for LU path information
RSG number = n RSG number ≠ n
host WWN LU number LDEV
(Logical
volume)
number
host WWN LU number LDEV
(Logical
volume)
number
Storage resource
administrator
(RSG number = n)
Query,
creation,
deletion
Query,
creation,
deletion
Query,
creation,
deletion
- - -
Security
administrator
- - - - - -
Audit log
administrator
- - - - - -
Maintenance
personnel
(All resource groups
are assigned to
maintenance
personnel)
Query,
creation,
deletion
Query,
creation,
deletion
Query,
creation,
deletion
-: No operation
Host WWN of LU path information is used for host identification.
Table 6-10 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for security attribute
(user group information) of processing act for Storage Navigator (storage management UI software)
Roles Operations for user group information
Roles RSG number
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Roles Operations for user group information
Roles RSG number
Security
administrator
 Addition
 Deletion
 Query
 Addition
 Deletion
 Query
Storage resource
administrator
 (own) Query  (own) Query
Audit log
administrator
 (own) Query  (own) Query
Maintenance
personnel
 (own) Query  (own) Query
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow
control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive,
[assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorised identified roles] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]:
restrictive
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]: LM access
control SFP
[assignment: the authorized identified role]: None
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify,
delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data]
to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: list of TSF data]:
User ID and password of storage administrator and maintenance personnel
Fibre channel switch WWN, secret
Encryption key for data encryption
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User authentication method
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other
operations]]: Operations for “User account” on Table 6-11, operations for “Fibre
channel switch authentication data” on Table 6-12, operations for “Encryption
key for data encryption” on Table 6-13, operations for “User authentication
method” on Table 6-14.
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]: Roles described in “Roles” on Table
6-11, Table 6-12, Table 6-13 and Table 6-14.
Table 6-11 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for user account
Roles
User account of storage administrator and maintenance
personnel
User ID Password
Security administrator Query, creation, deletion Modification
Storage resource
administrator
(own) Query (own) Modification
Audit log
administrator
(own) Query (own) Modification
Maintenance
personnel
(own) Query (own) Modification
Table 6-12 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for fibre channel
switch authentication data
Role fibre channel switch authentication data
fibre channel switch WWN fibre channel switch secret
Security administrator Query, creation,
modification, deletion
Creation, modification,
deletion
Storage resource
administrator
Query, creation,
modification, deletion
-
Audit log
administrator
- -
Maintenance
personnel
Query, creation,
modification, deletion
-
-: No operation
Table 6-13 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for encryption key for
data encryption
Roles Encryption key for data encryption
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Roles Encryption key for data encryption
Security administrator Creation, deletion, query, modification
Storage resource
administrator
-
Audit log
administrator
-
Maintenance
personnel
-
-: No operation
Table 6-14 Operations of storage administrator and maintenance personnel for user
authentication method
Roles User authentication method
Security administrator Query, modification
Storage resource
administrator
-
Audit log
administrator
-
Maintenance
personnel
-
-: No operation
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for [assignment: list of
TSF data].
[assignment: list of TSF data]: Encryption key for data encryption
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF].
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]: The
following functions are provided.
 Function to manage user ID of user account and host identification
 Function to manage password for user ID of user account
Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target V4.8
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 Function to manage fibre channel switch authentication data
 Function to manage role of user account
 Function to manage security attribute of processing acting for fiber channel
switch
 Function to manage security attribute of processing acting for Storage
Navigator (storage management UI software)
 Function to manage operations by storage administrator and maintenance
personnel for user account
 Function to manage operations by storage administrator and maintenance
personnel for authentication data of the fibre channel switch that is
connected with the host
 Function to manage operations by storage administrator and maintenance
personnel for encryption key for data encryption
 Function to stop and activate data encryption function
 Function to stop and activate FC-SP authentication function
 Function to stop and activate shredding function
 Function to stop and activate external authentication server connection
function
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]:
 Security administrator
 Storage resource administrator
 Audit log administrator
 Maintenance personnel
 Storage user
- Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
- Trusted path/channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies..
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FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel
data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: list
of functions for which a trusted channel is required].
[refinement: another trusted IT product]: External authentication server
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]: TSF
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]: Sending
password and user ID of user account used for identification and authentication
(external authentication server method) of storage administrator and maintenance
personnel.
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection:
remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
communicated data from [selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other
types of integrity or confidentiality violation]].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user
authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]].
[selection: remote, local]: remote
[selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or
confidentiality violation]]: disclosure
[selection: the TSF, local users, remote users]: remote user
[selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which
trusted path is required]]:
[assignment: other services the reliable path is required]: Communication using
Storage Navigator (storage management UI software)
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6.2 Security assurance requirements
The TOE security assurance requirements are as follows.
The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL2, and the added assurance component is ALC_FLR.1.
All security assurance requirements directly use security assurance components stipulated in CC Part3.
(1) Development (ADV)
ADV_ARC.1 : Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 : Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 : Basic design
(2) Guidance document (AGD)
AGD_OPE.1 : Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 : Preparative procedures
(3) Life cycle support (ALC)
ALC_CMC.2 : Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 : Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 : Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.1 : Basic flaw remediation
(4) Security target evaluation (ASE)
ASE_CCL.1 : Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 : Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 : ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 : Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 : Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 : Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 : TOE summary specification
(5) Test (ATE)
ATE_COV.1 : Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 : Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 : Independent testing - sample
(6) Vulnerability evaluation (AVA)
AVA_VAN.2 : Vulnerability analysis
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6.3 Security requirement rationale
6.3.1 Security requirement rationale
Table 6-15 shows correspondence relation between security function requirements and TOE security
objectives. Each security function requirement corresponds to at least one TOE security objective.
Table 6-15 Correspondence between security objectives and security function requirements
TOE security objectives
O.ADM_AUTH
O.ADM_ROLE
O.SEC_COMM
O.SWITCH_AUTH
O.HOST_ACCESS
O_HDD_ENC
O_HDD_SHRED
O.AUD_GEN
TOE
security
function
requirements
FAU_GEN.1 X
FAU_GEN.2 X
FAU_SAR.1 X
FAU_STG.1 X
FAU_STG.3 X
FAU_STG.4 X
FCS_CKM.1 X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FDP_ACC.1 X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X
FDP_RIP.1 X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_ATD.1a X
FIA_ATD.1b X
FIA_SOS.1a X
FIA_SOS.1b X
FIA_UAU.2 X X
FIA_UID.2 X X X
FIA_USB.1a X
FIA_USB.1b X
FMT_MOF.1 X
X
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TOE security objectives
O.ADM_AUTH
O.ADM_ROLE
O.SEC_COMM
O.SWITCH_AUTH
O.HOST_ACCESS
O_HDD_ENC
O_HDD_SHRED
O.AUD_GEN
FMT_MSA.1 X
FMT_MSA.3 X
FMT_MTD.1 X X
FMT_MTD.3 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FPT_STM.1 X
FTP_ITC.1 X
FTP_TRP.1 X
Table 6-16 shows that the TOE security objectives are realized by the TOE security function
requirements.
Table 6-16 Validity of security function requirements for TOE security objectives
TOE security
objectives
Rationale that TOE security objectives are realized
O.ADM_AUTH O.ADM_AUTH requires performing identification and authentication of Storage
Navigator (storage management UI software) user before the Storage Navigator user
performs management operation of disk subsystem.
The details of necessary measures and required functions for the above request are as
follows.
a. Maintaining Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) user
The TOE must define user accounts, associate users with the user accounts, and
maintain them to identify Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) users. In
other words, it enables identification of Storage Navigator (storage management UI
software) users. The security requirements corresponding to the requirement are
FIA_ATD.1a and FIA_USB.1a.
b. Identity authentication of Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) user
account before using the TOE
Before the TOE is used, the TOE must identify user accounts. Therefore, performing
identity authentication of user accounts before execution of any of all Storage Navigator
(storage management UI software) functions is required. The security function
requirements corresponding to the requirement are FIA_UID.2 and FIA_UAU.2.
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TOE security
objectives
Rationale that TOE security objectives are realized
c. Managing password
The password for the TOE to authenticate user accounts must be at least 6 characters
and no more than 256 characters (the password for maintenance personnel is 127
characters) consist of combination of one-byte upper-case alphabet, one-byte lower-case
alphabet, one-byte number, and any of the following 32 symbols; !”#$%&’()*+,-
./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{|}~. If authentication fails 3 times in a row due to entering incorrect
password, login of the user ID is refused for a minute, which can decrease the possibility
of breaking password. The security function requirements corresponding to the function
are FIA_AFL.1 and FIA_SOS.1a.
O.ADM_AUTH can be satisfied by achieving all of a, b, and C.
And that is, meeting FIA_ATD.1a, FIA_USB.1a, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1a,
FIA_UAU.2, and FIA_UID.2, which are necessary security requirements, can realize
O.ADM_AUTH.
O.ADM_ROLE O.ADM_ROLE requires be able to restrict management operations by storage
administrator and maintenance personnel based on roles of identified and authenticated
user ID.
The details of necessary measurement and required functions for the above request are as
follows.
a. Restricting operations of role and RSG number
The TOE must restrict addition and deletion of role of user account and RSG number,
and creation and deletion of RSG according to the role of user account. The TOE
therefore restricts the change for user account based on the rule defined as [LM access
control SFP]. The security function requirement corresponding to the requirement is
FMT_MSA.1.
b. Managing identity authentication information
The TOE must restrict change of password and user ID of user account, authentication
method, fibre channel switch WWN, and secret according to the role of user account.
This can prevent unauthorized change of password and user ID of user account,
authentication method, fibre channel switch WWN, and secret. The security function
requirement corresponding to the requirement is FMT_MTD.1.
c. Holding management function
The TOE must have a function to manage Storage Navigator (storage management UI
software) user account, role of user account, fibre channel switch identification and
authentication information, LU path information, and user group information.
The TOE must have a function to manage operations by storage administrator and
maintenance personnel. Also, it must have a function to stop and activate the data
encryption function, the FC-SP authentication function, the shredding function, and the
external authentication server connection function. The security function requirement
corresponding to the above requirements is FMT_SMF.1.
d. Maintaining role
The TOE must maintain the roles of security administrator, storage resource
administrator, audit log administrator, maintenance personnel and storage user, and
associate them with users. The security function requirement corresponding to the above
requirement is FMT_SMR.1.
e. Managing behavior of security function
The TOE must restrict activation and stop of stored data encryption/decryption, fibre
channel switch authentication, connection with external authentication server, and
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TOE security
objectives
Rationale that TOE security objectives are realized
shredding function according to roles of user account. It can prevent unauthorized
change to use or stop each function. The security function requirement corresponding to
the above function is FMT_MOF.1.
f. Defining and executing access control
The TOE must create and delete RSG and LDEV in accordance with the rule defined as
[LM access control SFP] for storage administrator and maintenance personnel. It enables
the storage resource administrator to create and delete LDEVs (logical volumes) in the
allocated RSG. Also, restrictive default value can be assigned as access attribute at
LDEV (logical volume) creation. It means that accesses are limited because LU path
information does not exist at the LDEV (logical volume) creation. The security function
requirements corresponding to the above requirement are FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1 and
FMT_MSA.3.
O.ADM_ROLE is satisfied by achieving the above a, b, c, d, e, and f.
And that is, achieving FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MOF.1, FDP_ACC.1, and FDP_ACF.1, which are necessary
security function requirements for each measurement, can realize O.ADM_ROLE.
O.SEC_COMM O.SEC_COMM requires providing a secure communication function by encrypting
communication data between Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) and
SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC), and between SVP PC (Management
maintenance IF PC) and external authentication server to prevent sniffing.
The detail of necessary measurement and required function for the above request are as
follows.
a. Protecting communication data between Storage Navigator (storage management UI
software) and SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC)
Reliable path is used for the communication between Storage Navigator (storage
management UI software) and SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) to protect the
data from sniffing. The security function requirement corresponding to the function is
FTP_TRP.1.
b. Protecting communication data between SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC)
and external authentication server
When an external authentication server is used for identity authentication (the external
authentication server method), reliable channel is used for the communication between
SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) and the external authentication server. It
can protect the communication data from sniffing. The security function requirement
corresponding to the function is FTP_ITC.1.
O.SEC_COMM can be satisfied by achieving all of the above a and b.
And that is, achieving FTP_TRP.1 and FTP_ITC.1, which are the necessary security
function requirements for each measurement, cam realize O.SEC_COMM.
O.SWITCH_AUTH After the setting of fibre channel switch identification and authentication,
O.SWITCH_AUTH requires identification and authentication of a fibre channel switch
when the cable connection of the appropriately set fibre channel switch and TOE is
detected. The details of necessary measurement and required function for the above
requirement are as follows.
a. Executing the FC-SP function
The TOE sends the command of security authentication to a fibre channel switch and
identifies and authenticates the fibre channel switch by using the DH-CHAP
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TOE security
objectives
Rationale that TOE security objectives are realized
authentication code. The security requirements corresponding to the function are
FIA_UID.2 and FIA_UAU.2.
b. Managing secret
A secret for the TOE to authenticate a fibre channel switch is at least 12 characters and
no more than 32 characters containing one-byte upper-case alphabet, one-byte lower-
case alphabet, one-byte number, one-byte space and any of the following 12 symbols; .-
+@_=:/[],~. It can decrease the possibility of breaking password. The security function
requirement corresponding to the function is FIA_SOS.1b.
O.SWITCH_AUTH can be satisfied by achieving both of above a and b.
And that is, achieving FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, and FIA_SOS.1b, which are the
necessary security function requirements, can realize O.SWITCH_AUTH.
O.HOST_ACCESS O.HOST_ACCESS requires performing identification of host and access control to
allow the host to access only LDEVs (logical volumes) allocated to the host when the
host accesses the user data of LU that is the protection target property of the TOE.
The detail of necessary measurement and required functions for the above request are as
follows.
a. Maintaining host
The TOE must define host attribute information (WWN, LU number), associate the
attribute to the host, and maintain them. The security function requirements
corresponding to the requirement are FIA_ATD.1b and FIA_USB.1b.
b. Identifying host before using TOE
Before the TOE is used, the TOE must identify host. The security function
requirement corresponding to the request is FIA_UID2.
c. Defining and executing access control
For each host, the TOE determines access to LDEV (logical volume) according to the
rule defined as [LM access control SFP] and must exactly perform the access control so
that the host can access user data in allocated LDEVs (logical volumes). The security
function requirements corresponding to the request are FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.
O.HOST_ACCESS can be satisfied by achieving all of a, b, and c.
And that is, achieving FIA_ATD.1b, FIA_USB.1b, FIA_UID2, FDP_ACC.1, and
FDP_ACF.1 which are the necessary security function requirements can realize
O.HOST_ACCESS.
O.HDD_ENC O.HDD_ENC requires managing encryption key for data encryption to prevent user data
in a disk drive taken out of disk storage system from being leaked.
The detail of necessary measure and required function for the request are as follows.
a. Generating and deleting encryption key for data encryption
User data stored in a disk drive needs to be encrypted to prevent the user data from
being leaked from the disk drive replaced as preventive maintenance. For encryption and
decryption, LSI embedded in DKB is used. The TOE generates encryption keys to user
for encryption and deletes them after user. The security function requirements
corresponding to the above function are FCS_CKM.1, and FCS_CKM.4.
b. Restricting operations for encryption key for data encryption
The TOE needs to restrict operations for encryption keys according to user account
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TOE security
objectives
Rationale that TOE security objectives are realized
roles. In addition, it manages encryption keys so that keys other than those with backup
cannot be restored. This prevents unauthorized modification for encryption keys. The
security function requirements corresponding to the request are FMT_MTD.1 and
FMT_MTD.3.
O.HDD_ENC can be satisfied by achieving all of the above a and b.
And that is, achieving FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MTD.3 which
are necessary security function requirements can realize O.HDD_ENC.
O.HDD_SHRED O.HDD_ SHRED requires shredding old user data in a disk drive before re-using the
disk drive of disk storage system to prevent the user data from being leaked.
The detail of necessary measurement and required function for the request are as follows.
a. Protecting user data in disk drive
When a disk drive becomes disuse, the user data stored in the disk drive needs to be
shred so as to protect the user data from being leaked from the disk drive. The security
function requirement corresponding to the above function is FDP_RIP.1.
O.HDD_ SHRED can be satisfied by achieving the measurement.
And that is, achieving FDP_RIP.1 that is the necessary function requirement for the
measurement can realize O.HDD_ SHRED.
O.AUD_GEN O.AUD_GEN requires observing unauthorized creation, modification and deletion of
security related information.
The detail of necessary measurement and required function for the above request are as
follows.
a. Generating audit log of security function related issues
If identity authentication by Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) or
falsifications of user account, role, or RSG occurs, SVP PC (Management maintenance
IF PC) must generate audit log of the issue for identification from the audit log if such
information is incorrectly falsified. The security function requirement corresponding to
the request is FAU_GEN.1. Because FAU_GEN.1 obtains audit logs of identity
authentication issue, operating issues of setting change, encryption, and user data
shredding, the security objective is satisfied.
Items without audit item in Table 6-1 of FAU_GEN.1 have no problem if there are no
items to be audited since no efficacy is expected from the trace, or they are included in
other audit target and can be surely traced.
In addition, in the state of no LU path information setting, because a host cannot
recognize the corresponding LDEV (logical volume) as a logical device, therefore
cannot access the LDEV (logical volume), not to obtain the audit issue related to the
security function requirement of access from host to LDEV (logical volume) does not
cause any problem.
Because time stamps provided by FPT_STM.1 are those for SVP PC (Management
maintenance IF PC) OS and cannot be modified by other than maintenance personnel,
logs for issue such as time setting change do not need to be obtained.
When generating audit log, the date and time the issue occurs and user ID of user who
performs the operation need to be put in the audit log so that occurrence date and time
and the user who operates can be identified. The security function requirements
corresponding to the request are FAU_GEN.2 and FPT_STM.1.
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TOE security
objectives
Rationale that TOE security objectives are realized
b. Restricting reference to audit log
To refer audit records, the audit record in SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC)
needs to be downloaded from Storage Navigator (storage management UI software).
Downloading the audit record is limited to a user account with audit log administrator
role to protect the audit logs from unauthorized reference. The security function
requirement corresponding to the request is FAU_SAR.1.
c. Protecting the audit log from falsification
The TOE must prevent deletion and falsification of audit logs by an unauthorized user.
Downloading the audit logs is limited to a user account with audit log administrator role.
The TOE itself does not have a function to modify the audit logs to protect the audit logs
from unauthorized deletion or modification. The security function requirement
corresponding to the request is FAU_STG.1.
d. Warning risk of loss of audit log
Up to 250,000 lines audit logs can be created but when the number of audit logs exceeds
the maximum, the oldest audit log is erased. To avoid the loss of audit logs, when the
number of audit logs goes over 175,000, a warning to indicate the exceedance is
displayed on Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) window to persuade
downloading the audit logs. The security function requirements corresponding to the
request are FAU_STG.3 and FAU_STG.4.
O.AUD_GEN can be satisfied by achieving all the above measurements a, b, c, and d.
And that is, achieving FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3, and FAU_STG.4 which are the security function requirements
can realize O.AUD_GEN.
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6.3.2 Security requirement internal consistency rationale
Table 6-17 shows dependencies of security requirement components.
Table 6-17 Dependencies of security function requirements
No
TOE/IT
environment
Security function requirements
Dependencies defined
in CC Part2
Function requirement
addressed by this ST
1 TOE FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1
2 TOE FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2 *1
3 TOE FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
4 TOE FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
5 TOE FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1
6 TOE FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1
7 TOE FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1
None *3
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
8 TOE FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1
9 TOE FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
10 TOE FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3
11 TOE FDP_RIP.1 None -
12 TOE FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2 *2
13 TOE FIA_ATD.1a None -
14 TOE FIA_ATD.1b None -
15 TOE FIA_SOS.1a None -
16 TOE FIA_SOS.1b None -
17 TOE FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2 *1
18 TOE FIA_UID.2 None -
19 TOE FIA_USB.1a FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1a
20 TOE FIA_USB.1b FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1b
21 TOE FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
22 TOE FMT_MSA.1 FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
23 TOE FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
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No
TOE/IT
environment
Security function requirements
Dependencies defined
in CC Part2
Function requirement
addressed by this ST
24 TOE FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
25 TOE FMT_MTD.3 FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1
26 TOE FMT_SMF.1 None -
27 TOE FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2 *1
28 TOE FPT_STM.1 None -
29 TOE FTP_ITC.1 None -
30 TOE FTP_TRP.1 None -
*1: Dependency is satisfied by FIA_UID.2 which is the upper hierarchy to FIA_UID.1.
*2: Dependency is satisfied by FIA_UAU.2 which is the upper hierarchy to FIA_UAU.1.
*3: Because the TOE is software, and encryption and decryption are fulfilled by hardware, there is no
corresponding function requirement.
Table 6-18 shows the rationale that the definition maintains consistency of function requirements in the
same category for each TOE security function requirements.
Table 6-18 Consistency between security function requirements
No Category
Security function
requirements
Rationale of consistency
1 Access control FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_RIP.1
Access control is defined based on these
function requirements. Because they require
applying the same SFP to the same object and
subject, there is no confliction or
inconsistency, but the whole contents are
consistent.
2 Management FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_MTD.3
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
Security management is defined based on
these function requirements. There is no
confliction or inconsistency for target
security attribute or action and the whole
contents are consistent.
3 Identification
and
authentication
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_ATD.1a
FIA_ATD.1b
FIA_SOS.1a
FIA_SOS.1b
FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UID.2
FIA_USB.1a
These function requirements realize the
identification and authentication. As TSF, (1)
Storage Navigator (storage management UI
software) user ID and password, (2) fibre
channel switch WWN and secret, and (3) host
WWN are separately defined, and there is no
confliction or inconsistency. The whole
contents are consistent.
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No Category
Security function
requirements
Rationale of consistency
FIA_USB.1b
4 Audit FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.3
FAU_STG.4
Audit log is defined based on the function
requirements, and there is no confliction or
inconsistency. The whole contents are
consistent.
5 Encryption key
management
and operation
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
These function requirements define
operations of encryption key used to encrypt
stored data, and there is no confliction or
inconsistency. The whole contents are
consistent.
6 Reliable
path/channel
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_TRP.1
There function requirements define
communication paths and channels between
Storage Navigator (storage management UI
software) and SVP PC (Management
maintenance IF PC), and between SVP PC
(Management maintenance IF PC) and
external authentication server, and there is no
confliction or inconsistency. The whole
contents are consistent.
7 Complementary FPT_STM.1 This function requirement is to complement
other function requirements. From the fact
that FPT_STM.1 is requirement for time
stamp of audit log, it is obvious that there is
no confliction or inconsistency between
function requirements in this category and the
whole contents are consistent.
8 Between
categories
#1 - #2 Because requirements for access control
defines the control for user data in LU which
is protection target property, and the
requirement for management is to define the
management TSF data, there is no confliction
or inconsistency between them.
#1- #3
#2- #3
There is no confliction or inconsistency
between identification requirement and
access control or management requirement.
#1 - #4
#2 - #4
#3 - #4
They are to record audit for requirements of
access control, management, identification
and authentication, and there is no confliction
or inconsistency.
#1 - #5
#2 - #5
#3 - #5
#4 - #5
There is no confliction or inconsistency
between requirements for access control,
management, identification and
authentication, and audit log.
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No Category
Security function
requirements
Rationale of consistency
#1 - #6
#2 - #6
#3 - #6
#4 - #6
#5 - #6
There is no confliction or inconsistency
between requirements for access control,
management, identification and
authentication, audit log, and encryption key
management and operation.
#1 - #7
#2 - #7
#3 - #7
#4 - #7
#5 - #7
#6 - #7
FPT_STM.1is to provide FAU_GEN.1 with
time information and there is no confliction
or inconsistency with other requirements.
As stated below, mutual support is established by security function requirements which do not have
interdependence.
- For FIA_UID.2 and FIA_UAU.2, FMT_MOF.1 limits operations to start or stop the security
function according to roles, and operations can be allowed only from Storage Navigator (storage
management UI software). The security function cannot be started or stopped by any other method
to prevent deactivation.
As aforementioned, IT security requirements described in the ST establish the whole with internal
consistency by mutual support in integrated manner.
6.3.3 Security requirement rationale
Disk storage system including the TOE is installed in a secure area and does not expect other than attack
path using LAN. As shown in Section3.2, attacks from communication path between Storage Navigator
(storage management UI software) or management PC and disk storage system, and between the disk
storage system and external authentication server. The attacks do not require special knowledge, skill and
tool.
Beside, as installation of unauthorized software on the management PC where Storage Navigator
(storage management UI software) works is prohibited, potential threat based on the detailed interface to
the disk storage system is excluded from supposition. Evaluating [certain vulnerability] can achieve the
balance against the expected threat.
Even though the TOE has a function to encrypt user data stored in a disk drive using LSI embedded in
DKB, implementation of encryption key is done by a reliable security administrator at the installation. For
this, there is no security characteristic such that not to handle as confidential leads to vulnerability of TOE.
The TOE is software which can ensure to be able to counter expected threats by implementation of
security functions based on design documents and evaluation by testing, accordingly classifying it in EAL2
of evaluation assurance level is reasonable. Note that by the distribution procedure of TOE, security is
maintained in TOE distribution for consumers shown as TOE consumers in TOE reference.
In addition, it is important to address security vulnerability issues these days. This product takes charge
of important part that manages disk storage system and is required to track security defects and take actions
for vulnerability immediately. It is important to provide assurance for security defects to secure
reassurance for users, and thus ALC_FLR.1 component is applied.
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7 TOE summary specification
This chapter describes summary specification of security functions provided by the TOE.
7.1 TOE Security function
Table 7-1 shows correspondence relation between TOE security functions and security function
requirements (SFR). As shown here, security functions explained in this section meet all SFRs described in
section 6.1.
Table 7-1 Correspondence relation between TOE security functions and security function
requirements
TOE IT security function
SF.LM
SF.FCSP
SF.SN
SF.ROLE
SF.HDD
SF.AUDIT
TOE
security
function
requirements
FAU_GEN.1 X
FAU_GEN.2 X
FAU_SAR.1 X
FAU_STG.1 X
FAU_STG.3 X
FAU_STG.4 X
FCS_CKM.1 X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FDP_ACC.1 X
FDP_ACF.1 X
FDP_RIP.1 X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_ATD.1a X
FIA_ATD.1b X
FIA_SOS.1a X
FIA_SOS.1b X
FIA_UAU.2 X X
FIA_UID.2 X X X
FIA_USB.1a X
FIA_USB.1b X
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TOE IT security function
SF.LM
SF.FCSP
SF.SN
SF.ROLE
SF.HDD
SF.AUDIT
FMT_MOF.1 X
FMT_MSA.1 X
FMT_MSA.3 X
FMT_MTD.1 X X
FMT_MTD.3 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FPT_STM.1 X
FTP_ITC.1 X
FTP_TRP.1 X
The following states each TOE security functions and the specific method to realize SFR corresponding
to the security functions.
7.1.1 SF.LM
The TOE is connected with a host via SAN environment. SAN is the dedicated network for disk storage
system that connects hosts and disk storage systems via the fibre channel. The TOE performs access
control by SF.LM while the host accesses LDEVs (logical volumes) in the disk storage system.
[Satisfied Requirements] FIA_ATD.1a, IA_USB.1a, FIA_ATD.1b, FIA_USB.1b, FIA_UID.2,
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, and FMT_MSA.3
The TOE maintains user group information (such as role and RSG number) and associates them with
processing acting for Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) (FIA_ATD.1a and
FIA_USB.1a).
The TOE maintains the attribute information of host (such as WWN and LU number) and associates
them with processing acting for the host (FIA_ATD.1b and FIA_USB.1b).
The TOE identifies the host before an operation of security function related to access from host using
host WWN of LU path information. this operates after identity authentication of fibre channel switch when
fibre channel switch identity authentication is required. (FIA_UID.2).
The TOE performs [LM access control SFP] when the processing acting for a host accesses an LDEV
(logical volume) or the processing acting for Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) creates
or delete the LDEV (logical volume).
[LM access control SFP] consists of the following rules (FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, and FMT_MSA.3)
 When WWN and LU number passed over to the processing acting for the host are consistent with LU
path that is the security attribute of the corresponding object, the access to the LDEV (logical volume)
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is allowed while it is rejected if the LU path information is not consistent.
 When the processing acting for Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) creates or
deletes RSG, only the security administrator can create or delete the RSG according to [User group
information of Storage Navigator (storage management UI software)] (such as role and RSG) passed
over to the processing acting for Storage Navigator (storage management UI software).
 When the processing acting for Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) creates or
deletes LDEV (logical volume), according to [User group information of Storage navigator (storage
management UI software)] (such as role and RSG) passed over to the processing acting for Storage
Navigator (storage management UI software), the storage administrator can create or delete LDEV
(logical volume) in a resource group only when RSG number assigned to the user group where the
storage resource administrator belongs matches with the RSG number of the LDEV (logical volume).
 Condition when deleting LDEV (logical volume): Delete an LDEV (logical volume) when there is no
LU path associated with the LDEV (logical volume).
 When storage resource administrator creates LDEV (logical volume), a restrictive default value is
given as the access attribute. It means that the access from the host is restricted because there is no LU
path information at the LDEV (logical volume) creation. (FMT_MSA.3)
7.1.2 SF.FCSP
The TOE executes identity authentication of fibre channel switch if the organization’s security policy
requires. DH-CHAP with NULL DH Group authentication is used for this authentication.
[Satisfied requirements] FIA_SOS.1b,FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2
If fibre channel switch authentication is required, the TOE performs identity authentication when the
cable connection of the fibre channel switch and TOE is detected. The TOE checks whether the fibre
channel switch requires the authentication or not. When it requires the authentication, the TOE identifies
and authenticates the fibre channel switch by using DH-CHAP with fibre channel switch port's WWN and
secret (FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2). The connection between the fibre channel switch and the disk storage
system is allowed when a secret received from the host matches a secret that the TOE has (FIA_UAU.2).
The TOE restrict the entry of secret used for fibre channel switch identity authentication by FC-SP to be
at least 12 characters and no more than 32 characters consists of one-byte upper-case alphabet, one-byte
lower-case alphabet, one-byte number, one-byte space and any of the following 12 symbols; .-+@_=:/[],~.
(FIA_SOS.1b)
7.1.3 SF.SN
[Satisfied requirements] FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1a, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, FTP_TRP.1, and
FTP_ITC.1
The TOE executes identity authentication at remote desktop connection to Storage Navigator (storage
management UI software) and SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) using user ID and password
before any operations of other security functions. If the identity authentication fails 3 times in a row, the
identity authentication of the user is refused for one minute. (FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, and FIA_AFL.1)
The TOE restricts the entry for password used for storage administrator or maintenance personnel
authentication to be at least 6 characters and no more than 256 characters (127 characters for maintenance
personnel password) consists of one-byte upper-case alphabet, one-byte lower-case alphabet, one-byte
number, any of the following 32 symbols; !”#$%&’()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{|}~. (FIA_SOS.1a)
The TOE employs SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) internal authentication method for
identity authentication of storage administrator and maintenance personnel. If the entered user ID does not
exist in the TOE, external authentication server method is used.
When identity authentication of storage administrator and maintenance personnel is executed by the
external authentication server method, TOE starts communication between SVP PC (Management
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maintenance IF PC) and external authentication server using one of LDAPS, starttls, and RADIUS
(authentication protocol is CHAP) and sends user ID and password of user account to be used for
identification and authentication of storage administrator and maintenance personnel. Using LDAPS,
starttls, and RADIUS (authentication protocol is CHAP) for the communication between the SVP PC
(Management maintenance IF PC) and the external authentication server can prevent TSF data from being
sniffed. (FTP_ITC.1)
The TOE allows starting communication when storage administrator activates Storage Navigator
(storage management UI software) on management PC. For the communication between Storage Navigator
(storage management UI software) and SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC), SSL is used to prevent
the TSF data from being sniffed. (FTP_TRP.1)
The SSL used for the communication between Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) and
SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) supports [TLSv1.0]. Table 7-2 shows Encryption-relevant
algorithm used by SSL.
Table 7-2 Encryption-relevant algorithm used by SSL
Standard Algorithm Key size
(bit)
Encryption
operation
How to use
ANSI X9.30 Part1-
1997
DSA 1024 Authentication To be used as certificate to
prove SVP PC
(Management maintenance
IF PC) against management
PC (server authentication)
RSA Security Inc.
Public-Key
Cryptography
Standards(PKCS)#1
v2.1
RSA 512 or more Authentication
Key exchange To be used at session key
exchange.
FIPS PUB 197 AES 256
128
Communication
data encryption
and decryption
To select algorithm used
for session key by hand-
shake protocol in version of
[TLSv1.0]
FIPS PUB 46-3 3DES 168
FIPS PUB 180-2 SHA-256 256 Hash To be used at hash value
calculation
IEEE P1363 G.7 SHA1PRNG 64 Random digit To be used as key
information at session key
creation
7.1.4 SF.ROLE
[Satisfied requirements] FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, and FMT_MOF.1
The TOE executes [LM access control SFP] for the access from the processing acting for Storage
Navigator (storage management UI software) to SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC).
[LM access control SFP] consists of the following rules.
 [LM access control SFP] restricts operations to create, delete and refer LU path information (host
WWN, LU number, LDEV (logical volume) number) based on roles and RSG numbers.
(FMT_MSA.1). Table 6-9 shows operations each role can perform for the LU path information.
 [LM access control SFP] restrict operations to add, delete and refer user group information (role and
RSG number) based on roles (FMT_MSA.1). Table 6-10 shows operations each role can perform for
the user group information.
The TOE manages the following TSF data. (FMT_MTD.1)
 The account management function of Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) manages
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user ID, password, role and RSG number of storage administrator and maintenance personnel. Table
6-10 and Table 6-11 show management operations each role can perform.
 The FC-SP function of Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) manages WWN and
secret which are authentication data of fibre channel switch. Table 6-12 shows management operations
each role can perform.
 The stored data encryption function of Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) manages
encryption key used for user data encryption. Table 6-13 shows management operations each role can
perform.
 The access control function of Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) manages user
authentication method. Table 6-14 shows management operations each role can perform.
The TOE has the following management functions (FMT_SMF.1).
 The function to manage user account of Storage Navigator (storage management UI software), role of
user account, fibre channel switch authentication information, WWN authentication information, LU
path information, and user group information.
 The function to manage operations by storage administrator and maintenance personnel.
 The function to manage functions for stored data encryption, FC-SP authentication function, shredding
function, management function for starting or stopping connection to external authentication server.
The TOE restricts an operation to set whether the fibre channel switch that is connected with the host is
authenticated by FC-SP based on roles. Table 6-8 shows operations each role can perform (FMT_MOF.1).
The TOE restricts setting operation to use or not to use the stored data encryption function based on
roles. Table 6-8 shows operations each role can perform (FMT_MOF.1).
The TOE restricts setting operation to user or not to use connecting function of external authentication
server (including connection setting parameter) based on roles. Table 6-8 shows operations each role can
perform (FMT_MOF.1).
The TOE restricts operations to start and stop shredding function based on roles. Table 6-8 shows
operations each role can perform (FMT_MOF.1).
The TOE maintains and associate roles (security administrator, storage resource administrator, audit log
administrator, maintenance personnel, and storage user). (FMT_SMR.1)
7.1.5 SF.HDD
[Satisfied requirements] FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MTD.3, and FDP_RIP.1
The TOE encrypts user data when storing it in a disk drive. For encryption and decryption, LSI
embedded in DKB is used. The TOE creates encryption key for data encryption. Table 6-3 shows the
algorithm for encryption key generation and Table 6-4 shows method to remove encryption key
(FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4).
The TOE limits administrators who can perform operations for encryption key used for data encryption.
Only security administrator can create, delete, backup (inquiry) and restore (inquiry and modification) the
encryption keys (FMT_MTD.1).
The TOE can make backup of encryption key for data encryption in management PC. It also can restore
the backup encryption key from the management PC to disk storage system. At the restoring, a hash value
set in the backup data at the backup is verifies with a hash value of data to be restored. Only when the hash
values are consistent, the encryption key can be restored. As the hash value contains serial number of the
disk storage system, the encryption key can be restored only in the backed up disk storage system.
(FMT_MTD.3)
The TOE shreds user data in LDEV (logical volume) which becomes disuse. (FDP_RIP.1)
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7.1.6 SF.AUDIT
[Satisfied requirements] FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_STG.1,
FAU_STG.3 and FAU_STG.4
The TOE has the following audit functions.
 When an audit issue related to the security function in the TOE occurs, an audit log is generated. The
user ID of user account that causes each audit issue is added to the audit log. In addition, for the date
used when the audit log is generated, the time managed by OS on SVP PC (Management maintenance
IF PC) is used. Table 6-2 describes the audit information.
 There is no role which can modify and delete audit logs.
 Up to 250,000 lines audit logs can be created. When the number of audit logs exceeds the maximum,
the oldest audit log is erased by returning to the line where the storing starts (wraparound method).
When the number of audit logs goes over 175,000, a warning to indicate the exceedance is displayed
on Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) window to persuade audit administrator to
download the audit logs. If the audit logs are downloaded, the number of lines is reset and audit log
starts at the first line.
 Only audit log administrator can download audit logs.
 Starting and ending audit function works in conjunction with TOE activation and termination.
The audit logs the TOE obtains consists of basic information and detailed information. Table 7-3 and
Table 7-4 show contents of output basic information and detailed information respectively.
Table 7-3 Output content of basic information
No Item Description
1 Date Date when issue occurs
2 Time Time when issue occurs
3 Time zone Time difference with GMT (Greenwich Mean Time)
4 User ID Storage Navigator (storage management UI software) user ID
5 Function name Character string indicates function which executes setting operation
Function names
Name of function for identity authentication of storage
administrator and maintenance personnel
Name of function to create, change and delete user account,
to change password, and to change user group.
Name of function to create and delete LU path information,
to create, change and delete WWN and secret of fibre
channel switch, and to change setting for fibre channel
switch authentication by FC-SP.
Name of function for fibre channel switch authentication by
FC-SP.
Name of function to enable and disable data encryption, to
create, delete, backup and restore encryption keys.
Name of function for shredding
6 Operation name or issue Abbreviation of operation name of each function
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No Item Description
name
Operation names
Identity authentication of storage administrator and
maintenance personnel
User account creation
User account change
User account deletion
User account password change
Role addition to user group
Role deletion from user group
RSG number addition to user group
RSG number deletion from user group
Lu path information creation
LU path information deletion
Fibre channel switch WWN and secret creation
Fibre channel switch WWN and secrete change
Fibre channel switch WWN and secret deletion
Setting change for host authentication by FC-SP
Fibre channel switch authentication by FC-SP
Setting to enable/disable data encryption
Generation of encryption key for data encryption
Deletion of encryption key for data encryption
Backup of encryption key for data encryption
Restoring encryption key for data encryption
Starting shredding
Stopping shredding
7 Parameter Parameter for executed setting operation
8 Operation result Operation result
9 Identity information of
source host
IP address of management PC or maintenance PC
In case of fibre channel switch authentication by FC-SP, fibre channel
switch WWN is output.
10 Serial number of log
information
Serial number of log information stored
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Table 7-4 Output content of detailed information
No Audit issue Detailed information
1 Identity authentication of
storage administrator
 None
2 Identity authentication of
maintenance personnel
 None
3 Creation, modification, deletion
of user account of storage
administrator and maintenance
personnel
 User ID of operation target, enable/disable setting
information, authentication method, user group name,
operation result (success or failure)
4 Password change of user
account of storage administrator
and maintenance personnel
 User ID of operation target, operation result (success or
failure)
5 Change of user group where
storage administrator and
maintenance personnel belong to
 User ID of operation target, user group name, role, RSG
number, operation result (success or failure)
6 Creation and deletion of LU
path information
 Port number, host WWN, LU number, LDEV (logical
volume) number
7 Creation, modification, deletion
of fibre channel switch WWN
and secret
 Port number, fibre channel switch WWN, the number of
ports
8 Setting change of fibre channel
switch authentication by FC-SP
 Port number, port WWN, whether to execute authentication,
operation (change), the number of ports
9 Fibre channel switch
authentication by FC-SP
 None
10 Setting to enable/disable data
encryption
 Parity group number, setting to enable/disable encryption,
operated encryption key number, the number of setting
parity group
11 Generation, deletion, backup,
and restoring of encryption key
for data encryption
 Encryption key number, the number of operated encryption
keys
12 Start or stop shredding  Written data , the number of writing, target LDEV (logical
volume) number, the number of target LDEVs (logical
volumes), execution order or shredding processing
Hitachi Unified Storage VM Security Target V4.8
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8 Reference
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part1: Introduction and general model Version 3.1 Revision 4
CCMB-2012-09-001
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part2: Security functional components Version 3.1 Revision 4
CCMB-2012-09-002
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part3: Security assurance components Version 3.1 Revision 4
CCMB-2012-09-003
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Evaluation methodology Version 3.1 Revision 4
CCMB-2012-09-004
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4 Final
CCMB-2012-09-001, September 2012, Japanese translated version 1.0, November 2012,
Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 2: Security functional requirements, September 2012, Version3.1, Revision 4 Final
CCMB-2012-09-002, Japanese translated version 1.0, November 2012 Final
Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan
Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 3: Security assurance requirements, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 3 Final
CCMB-2012-09-003 Japanese translated version 1.0 Final November 2012,
Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Evaluation methodology September 2012, Version3.1 Revision 4, Final
CCMB-2012-09-004
Japanese translated version 1.0 Final November 2012
Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan
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8.1.1 Terms and definitions
For CC terms used commonly, see CC Par1 Section 4.
8.1.1.1 Glossary for ST
Terms Definition
Disk subsystem Disk storage system, Hitachi Unified Storage VM
Redundant Array of
Independent Disks
(RAID)
A technology which can recover damaged data by spreading or duplicating to
multiple disk drives, improve the performance, and keep redundancy of data.
There are RAID0 (data striping), RAID 1 (disk mirroring) and RAID5 (data
striping with distributed parity added) as commonly used raid types.
Storage Navigator The program which provides GUI for disk storage system setting. It consists of
Flex application and Java applet, works on SVP PC (Management maintenance
IF PC) and management PC. It is used by storage administrator and maintenance
personnel.
Parity group A group of disk drives to realize RAID system (see above).
A parity group consists of multiple disk drives where user data and parity
information are stored. The user data can be accessed even if one or more drive in
the group becomes unavailable.
SAN Abbreviation for Storage Area Network. It is a network dedicated to storage that
connects a disk storage system and a host computer by using a fibre channel.
High-speed/Highly-reliable data communications are available by fibre channels.
Fibre channel High speed network technology to build Storage Area Network (SAN).
Fibre channel switch A switch to connect each device of fibre channel interface. Using the fibre
channel switch enables to build SAN (Storage Area Network) by connecting
multiple hosts and disk storage systems in high speed.
LDEV (Logical
volume)
Abbreviation of logical device and a unit of volume created in a user area in disk
storage system. It is also called as logical volume.
LDEV (Logical
volume) number
Unique number assigned to logical device at creation.
Logical unit (LU) The LDEV (logical device) used from a host of Open system is called LU. On the
Open system fibre channel interface, access to LU mapped with one or more
LDEV (logical device) is enabled.
LU path Data input/output channel connecting Open system host and LU.
LU number (LUN) LDEV (logical device) which is associated with fibre channel port and accessible
from host. Or it is an address allocated to volume for Open system.
Port The end of fibre channel. Each port is identified by port number.
Fibre Channel
Security Protocol
(FC-SP)
A protocol to execute authentication each other at communication between host
and fibre channel switch and fibre channel switch and disk storage system. DH-
CHAP with NULL DH Group authentication is used.
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Terms Definition
Connection setting
parameter for
external
authentication server
A parameter to be set in SVP PC (Management maintenance IF PC) for
identification and authentication by using external authentication server. It
contains the following information.
Type of external authentication server (LDAP, RADIUS), address of external
authentication server, certificate of external authentication server, protocol
(LDAPS, starttls, CHAP), and port number and so on.
starttls A protocol to encrypt TCP session connecting with LDAP.
RADIUS A protocol to realize authentication and accounting.
CHAP A protocol to encrypt password to be sent from client to server at authentication.
DH-CHAP A protocol used for FC-SP. It uses CHAP protocol for key exchange.
HT-40SA Model name of Hitachi Unified Storage VM for Japan.
DW700 Model name of Hitachi Unified Storage VM for overseas.
8.1.1.2 Abbreviation
In this document, the following abbreviations are used.
CACHE CACHE memory
CC Common Criteria
CHB Channel Blade
CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
DH-CHAP Diffie Hellman - Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
DKB Disk Blade
DKC Disk Controller
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FC-SP Fibre Channel Security Protocol
HDD Hard disk drive
JRE Java Runtime Environment
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LDAPS LDAP over TLS
LDEV Logical Device
LSI Large Scale Integration
LU Logical unit
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LUN Logical Unit Number
PC Personal Computer
PP Protection Profile
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
SAN Storage Area Network
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
SVP Service Processor
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
HUS VM Hitachi Unified Storage VM
WWN World Wide Name