BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
for
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1
from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
PP Conformance: Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration,
Version 3.0, May 2012, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03-M01
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 22 December 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication......................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11. Security Target............................................................................................................22
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................22
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................28
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. This Domain is linked to
a conformance claim to one of the related SOGIS Recommended Protection Profiles. In
addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the
assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and
for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014,this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up
to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components
ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3
and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1, was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 15 December 2014. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The product was developed by: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1, has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
81677 München
Deutschland
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1 described in the Security
Target is a dual-interface, contact based or a pure contactless smart card with a Java card
operating system (OS). The TOE is a multi-purpose Java card where applets of different
kind can be installed. Pre- or post-issued applets are not part of the TOE. The Security
Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile
Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, Version 3.0, May 2012,
ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03-M01 [8] (strict conformance). The Remote Method Invocation
(RMIG) package and the External memory (EMG) package as defined in the Protection
Profil as optional packages are not part of the TOE. The TOE was subject to a composite
evaluation according AIS 36 [4].
Since a post-issuance installation of applets is possible, the TOE corresponds to an open
configuration, as defined in the Protection Profile [8]. The platform is the Integrated Circuit
(IC) M7892 B11 (certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-2012) manufactured by Infineon ([13]
to [16]). Depending on the installed applets, the entire product (consisting of the TOE plus
applets) could be used as a government card (like an ID card or a passport), a payment
card, a signature card and other purposes.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 8. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.TRANSACTION This security function provides atomic transactions according to
the Java Card Transaction and Atomicity mechanism with
commit and rollback capability ([JCRE304], Section 7) for
updating persistent data in flash memory.
SF.ACCESS_CONTROL This security function provides control for the TOE. It is in
charge of the FIREWALL access control SFP and the JCVM
information flow control SFP.
SF.CRYPTO This security function controls all the operations related to the
cryptographic key management and cryptographic operations.
SF.INTEGRITY This security function provides a means to check the integrity of
check-summed data stored in flash memory.
SF.SECURITY This security function ensures a secure state of information, the
non-observability of operations on it and the unavailability of
previous information content upon deallocation.
SF.APPLET This security function ensures the secure loading of a package
or installing of an applet by S.CAD and the secure deletion of
applets and/or packages by S.ADEL.
SF.CARRIER This security function ensures secure downloading of
applications on the card.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] or [7], chapter 9.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [7],
chapter 4 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7], chapter 5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW ICC including the Software part of
the TOE
Infineon
M7892 B11
with
Sm@rtCafé®
Expert 7.0 C1
Sealed boxes by courier to
Composite Product Integrator
2 DOC Preparative Procedures
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 [11]
1.6 Via email PGP RSA 2048 Bit or
2048/1024 DH/DSS signature /
encryption to Composite
Product Integrator
3 DOC Operational User Guidance
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 [12]
2.3 Via email PGP RSA 2048 Bit or
2048/1024 DH/DSS signature /
encryption to Composite
Product Integrator
4a8
DATA Initial Card Manager Keys
(SCP02/SCP03)
and
Personalization PIN (TOE
configuration 2 and 4) or
SCP02- and SCP03-based
authentication keys (TOE
configuration 1 and 3)
- To Composite Product Integrator
via email PGP RSA 2048 Bit or
2048/1024 DH/DSS signature /
encryption
8
Alternatively to 4b
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
4b9
DATA Customer specific Card Manager
Keys (SCP02/SCP03)
and
Personalization PIN (TOE
configuration 2 and 4) or
SCP02- and SCP03-based
authentication keys (TOE
configuration 1 and 3)
- From Composite Product
Integrator to HW Manufacturer
via email PGP RSA 2048 Bit or
2048/1024 DH/DSS signature /
encryption
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
According to the Security Target chp. 2.4.1 the life cycle of the TOE consists of 7 phases:
Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development / Phase 2: IC Development, / Phase 3: IC
Manufacturing / Phase 4: IC Packaging, / Phase 5: Composite Product Integration / Phase
6: Personalisation / Phase 7: Operational Usage. The TOE delivery takes place after
Phase 4 so that the evaluation process is limited to Phases 1 to 4. The TOE is delivered to
the Composite Product Integrator, which is responsible for loading the Card Manager keys
and works on behalf of the Card Issuer. In case of customer specific personalization
authentication, the Composite Product Integrator delivers the customer specific
personalization PIN (for TOE Config 2 and 4) or the SCP02- and SCP03-based
authentication keys (for TOE Config 1 and 3) to the embedded SW developer or the HW
manufacturer, before the TOE is delivered to him (Table 2, 4b). Otherwise the Composite
Product Integrator receives the initial Card Manager keys and personalization PIN from
G&D (Table 2, 4a). For two of the four TOE configurations (Config 2 and 4) the Composite
Product Integrator can authenticate himself by input of a PIN. For the other two of the four
TOE configurations (Config 1 and 3) the Composite Product Integrator can authenticate
himself by using either the SCP02 or SCP03 keys (see also Table 2).
The Composite Product Integrator has to verify that he has received the correct versions of
the TOE documentation.
The correctness of the TOE can be verified by checking the GET DATA APDU command
response. For two of the four TOE configurations (Config 2 and 4) the Composite Product
Integrator can authenticate himself by input of a PIN. This PIN is different from the
cardholder Global PIN. The secure transfer of the PIN is handled as described in the
preparational guidance under Key/PIN Delivery. This PIN (alphanumeric and/or numerical
input possible) has to be chosen so that the strength of the authentication mechanism is
adequate for the chosen use case (with a minimum of 6 bytes and a maximum of 16
bytes).
For the other two of the four TOE configurations (Config 1 and 3) the Composite Product
Integrator can authenticate himself by using either the SCP02 or SCP03 keys.
The Composite Product Integrator delivers the customer specific personalization PIN (for
TOE configuration 2 and 4) or the SCP02- and SCP03-based authentication keys (for TOE
configuration 1 and 3) to the embedded SW developer or the HW manufacturer before
TOE production.
In order to verify that the user uses a certified TOE and certified configuration, the TOE
can be identified using the means described in the guidance [12] chapter 7. The TOE can
be identified using the command GET DATA. The configuration data is retrieved using
9
Alternatively to 4a
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
GET DATA (80 CA 00 C8 06). All listed items below must have the following expected
value(s) after TOE delivery:
TOE Configuration Get Data Response
Config 1 and Config 2 51 05 3E F6
Config 3 and Config 4 85 81 DC 32
Table 3: TOE configuration identification by get data and verify response status
In order to verify that the user receives a certified TOE in the certified configuration, the
TOE can be identified using the means described in the guidance [12] chp. 7.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The Security Policy of the TOE as
a dual-interface, contact based or a pure contactless smart card with a JavaCard operating
system (OS) is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the smart card
applications thus providing an overall smart card system security.
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data stored and operated on the smartcard when used in a hostile environment. Hence the
TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories and the
different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access
and for integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality
provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOEs policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage,
physical manipulation and probing. Besides, the TOE's life-cycle is supported as well as
the user Identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore,
random number generation as well as specific cryptographic services are being provided
to be securely used by the smartcard embedded software.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in section
8 of the Security Target [7].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment
the user or the risk manager of the applications.
In particular the following security objectives for the environment have to be followed and
considered (Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.2):
• OE.APPLET: No applet loaded post-issuance shall contain native methods.
• OE.VERIFICATION: All the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the
loading, before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card
capabilities, in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time. See
#.VERIFICATION in the PP [8] chp. 4.4 for details.
Additionally, the applet shall follow all the recommendations, if any, mandated in the
platform guidance for maintaining the isolation property of the platform.
Application Note: Constraints to maintain the isolation property of the platform are
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provided by the platform developer in application development guidance. The
constraints apply to all application code loaded in the platform (described in [12]
chp. 3.1.5, Recommendations for maintaining the isolation property of the platform).
• OE.CODE-EVIDENCE: For application code loaded pre-issuance, evaluated
technical measures implemented by the TOE or audited organizational measures
must ensure that loaded application has not been changed since the code
verifications required in OE.VERIFICATION.
For application code loaded post-issuance and verified off-card according to the
requirements of OE.VERIFICATION, the verification authority shall provide digital
evidence to the TOE that the application code has not been modified after the code
verification and that he is the actor who performed code verification.
For application code loaded post-issuance and partially or entirely verified on-card,
technical measures must ensure that the verification required in OE.VERIFICATION
are performed. On-card bytecode verifier is out of the scope of this Security Target.
Application Note: For application code loaded post-issuance and verified off-card,
the integrity and authenticity evidence is achieved by electronic signature of the
application code, after code verification, by the actor who performed verification.
Details can be found in the user guidance [11] and [12] chapters 5.1 and 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The global structure of the TOE is as shown in the Security Target [7] Figure 1. The TOE
design adopts this structure and follows this approach by defining subsystems and
modules. The subsystems again are logically grouped together and compose four
subsystems of the TOE: APDU, Application Programmers Interface, Virtual Machine and
Hardware platform (composite evaluation).
For each subsystem, the TOE design breaks its structure further down into modules.
However, this does not include the Hardware subsystem, since it is already covered by the
underlying hardware certification. The following table shows the modules and subsystems
defined by the TOE design:
Subsystem Module Description
APDU Applet Module Applet contains Issuer Security Domain applet and
Security Domain applet according GlobalPlatform Card
Specification GP [18].
APDU Dispatcher Module Dispatcher implements Transport Management
including protocols T=0, T=1 (ISO7816) and T=CL
(ISO14443). Thus it receives all APDU commands provided
by CAD via APDU interface.
Application
Programmers
Interface
Javacard Module Javacard implements all functions required by the
Java Card API Specification
Application
Programmers
Interface
Global Platform Module Global Platform implements content management
functions according to GP [18] and chapter 11 of the Java
Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification to load
packages, install applets and delete applets and packages.
Content on card and additional information is managed in
Registry as defined in GP. Additionally it defines interfaces
which enable applets to provide and use the further services.
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Subsystem Module Description
Virtual Machine Bytecode Interpreter Module Bytecode Interpreter implements Javacard Virtual
Machine according to the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
Specification. This includes: bytecodes as defined in chapter
7 of the JCVM Specification, Exception Handling as defined in
chapter 7 of the JCVM Specification, Firewall checks as
defined in chapter 6 of the JCRE Specification.
Virtual Machine Memory Management Module Memory Management implements interfaces to copy
data in memory providing tear save writing according the
JCRE Specification
HW - See platform certificate [13], [16]
Table 4: Subsystems of the TOE
For detail on the versions of the specification JCRE and JCVM please refer to the Security
target.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The TOE, the composite smartcard product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1 was tested in all
four configurations. The pin variants Config 2 (std_pin) and Config 4 (idconfig_scp03_pin)
differ just in the PIN Authentication procedure at the beginning. So certain tests could be
reused.
There are two kinds of tests: System tests and simulator tests. The system tests are
divided in system tests categories:
• JCB tests: JCB is a proprietary script language to send APDU sequences to the
card. The scripts will be interpreted by a JCTS (Java Card Test Suite).
• TRex tests: TRex is a test framework which runs together with Eclipse and is used
for system tests.
• Secure Messaging tests.
The Simulator tests are implemented as a module test suite, consisting of the following
components:
• A JUnit testsuite (called 'ModuleTestSuite') implements all module testing
functionality.
• Eclipse is used to implement and adapt, but also to control and debug the testsuite,
allowing to start the complete testsuite, bundles of test classes (e.g. all JC-API
tests), single test classes (e.g. all OwnerPin tests) and single test cases.
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• The Primerose module test suite uses Keil μVision IDE Simulation of different
Smartcafe configurations as a test target.
• The JUnit testsuite uses the javax.smartcardio library to send/receive APDUs
from/to the Keil simulation and Keil's debug socket interface to control the
simulation (start/stop, set breakpoints, read/write memory, etc.).
TOE test configurations:
• Tests were performed with different TOE configurations, i.e. with different TOE
interfaces (contactless, contact based) as well as with the TOE simulator.
• The TOE has been tested in the following configurations: C1: Config 1 (std_tcl); C2:
Config 2 (std_pin); C3: Config 3 (Idconfig_scp03) and C4: Config 4
(Idconfig_scp03_pin).
• Tests were done in different life-cycle phase (e.g. Global Platform life cycle states
SECURED, OP_READY, etc.).
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN:
Test approach: According to the description of the TSFI in the Functional Specification, the
following kinds of APIs and TSFI were tested (Note that not all parts of the packages or
interfaces are implemented): a) GlobalPlatform API (Package org.globalplatform), b)
JavaCard API (Packages javacard.security, javacardx.crypto, javacard.framework), c) G&D
Proprietary API (5 packages). d) Java Card Virtual Machine TSFI (a subset of the Java
Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) Interface, i.e. all SFR relevant bytecodes), e) A subset of the
Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) Interface, i.e. of all SRF relevant bytecodes, f) APDU
Interface, g) Electrical Interface.
Generally, two kinds of tests are differentiated, system tests and simulator tests (so called
module tests).
TOE configurations tested: According to the security target the TOE can be used in four
different configurations as outlined in chaper 8 below. All configurations have been tested,
whereby certain reuse of test results between the configuration could be made or where
certain aspects of GP are not implemented.
Test results: The tests mainly run automatically and perform all test steps including
installation of test applets, test scripting, result checking and clean-up procedures. Test
documentation including test case description, tests steps, expected and actual results are
partially generated automatically. Actual results and details from test execution from
Module testing can be gained from prepared logs. ATE_COV and ATE_DPT were taken
into account and all mappings to interfaces and modules of the TOE are covered by the
tests.
The testing approach covers all TSFI as described in the functional specification and all
subsystems and modules of the TOE design adequately. All configurations as described in
the ST are covered. All test results collected in the test reports are as expected and in
accordance with the TOE design and the desired TOE functionality.
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND:
Approach for independent testing: a) Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth
and coverage analysis and of the developer’s test goals and plan for identification of gaps;
b) Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment, is operating as specified
using iterations of developer’s tests; c) Independent testing was performed at the
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Evaluation Body with the TOE developer test environment and additional Evaluation Body
test equipment using tests applets, test scripts and simulation tools.
TOE test configurations: Tests were performed with different TOE configurations, i.e. with
different TOE interfaces (contactless, contact based) as well as with the TOE simulator.
According to the security target the TOE can be used in four different configurations as
outlined in chaper 8 below. All configurations have been considered,Tests were also done
in different life-cycle phase (e.g. Global Platform life cycle states SECURED, OP_READY,
etc.).
Where the test samples used for repeating developer’s tests and for setting up evaluator
created tests were not identical to final delivered TOE cards, these samples were brought
in the state and configuration as desired and it was ensured that these tests apply to the
final TOE, too.
Subset size chosen: During sample testing of developer tests the evaluator chose to
repeat all developer functional tests. During independent testing the evaluator used test
applets and test scripts to invoke and test functionality given by the API and APDU
interfaces.
Interfaces tested: The selection criteria for the interfaces of the composed subset consider
simply the security functionality that is available from these interfaces. Focus was laid
upon interfaces that are in particular security sensitive for JavaCard platform, such as
firewall mechanisms, atomic transactions, PIN mechanisms or key handling. The tested
subset comprises the APDU and the API interfaces available to users. While the physical
IC interface relies on the platform certification, the independent testing focussed on the
APDU interface (based on the Global Platform specification) and the API interface (which
provides packages from JavaCard API, Global Platform API and proprietary API).
During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified. No unexpected
behaviour was observed, particularly related to different TOE configurations. The evaluator
verified the developer’s test results by executing a sample of the developer’s tests and
verifying the test log files for successful execution.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN:
The TOE in different configurations covered by the current evaluation was assesed and
tested.
Penetration testing approach: Based on a list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the
TOE in its operational environment the evaluators devised the attack scenarios for
penetration tests. The aspects of the security architecture described in ADV_ARC were
considered for penetration testing as well as all other evaluation evidence. Source code
reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the development of
test cases and were used to find input for penetration testing. The code inspection also
supported the testing activities because they enabled the evaluator to verify
implementation aspects that could hardly be covered by test cases.
In addition the evaluator applied tests and performed code reviews during the evaluation
activity of composition tests to verify the implementation of the requirements imposed by
the ETR for Composition and the guidance of the underlying platform. This ensured
confidence in the security of the TOE as a whole.
TOE test configurations: The evaluators used TOE samples for testing that were
configured according to the ST. The tests were performed in different test scenarios: a)
TOE smart cards tested using specialized test tools for smart cards, Java cards and for
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LFI testing; b) A simulator was used for test cases, which were not possible to perform with
a real smart card TOE, e.g. memory manipulation; c) Different life-cycles and life-cycle
management were tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in Security Target [6] provided
that all measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The Security Target [6] has identified the following configurations of the TOE under
evaluation.
• Config 1: TOE is compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card Configuration [18],
• Config 2: TOE is compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card Configuration [18] with
authentication of the personalizer with the verify PIN command,
• Config 3: TOE is compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration [19],
• Config 4: TOE is compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration [19] with
authentication of the personalizer with the verify PIN command.
All configurations can either be installed on a dual-interface, contact based chip or on a
pure contactless smart card platform (SCP).
The User can identify the specific TOE configuration by the TOE response to a specific
APDU, specified in the Operative Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1. The TOE does
not use the software libraries of the hardware platform, but provides cryptographic services
by the G&D crypto library and enhanced G&D APIs. The Biometric API is not part of the
TOE and can be part of the product or not.
The different configurations can be differentiated through the GET DATA APDU command
response status and the VERIFY APDU command response status. However the VERIFY
APDU command is only functional in the personalisation phase. Therefore in the usage
phase the configurations 1 and 2 and the configurations 3 and 4 are not distinguishable.
See Table 3 for details.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The TOE was subject to a composite evaluation according AIS 36 [4]. The platform
certificate for the Integrated Circuit (IC) M7892 B11, certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-2012, was used ([13] to [16]).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
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(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (see AIS 26)
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The concept „Collection of Developer Evidence” according to AIS 23 [4] was applied in the
context of test coverage with a specific approach agreed with the certification body.
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the certification body for approval subsequently if needed.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
• The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• PP Conformance: Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, Version 3.0,
May 2012, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03-M01 [8]
• for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex C in part D of this report outlines the rating of the cryptographic
mechanisms implemented in the TOE. Any cryptographic functionality that is marked in the
column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of that table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 100 Bits (in general context).
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10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table
2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top
on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in
order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of
the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required
measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DAP Data Authentication pattern
DLC Giesecke & Devrient Dienstleistungscenter
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
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GDC Giesecke & Devrient Development Center
GP Global Platform Specification
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCS Java Card System
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Smart Card Platform
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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Deterministic (RNG) - An RNG that produces random numbers by applying a
deterministic algorithm to a randomly selected seed and, possibly, on additional external
inputs.
Random number generator (RNG) - A group of components or an algorithm that outputs
sequences of discrete values (usually represented as bit strings).
True RNG - A device or mechanism for which the output values depend on some
unpredictable source (noise source, entropy source) that produces entropy.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0, Version 3.8, 11 December 2014,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Security Target Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0, Version 3.6, 11 December 2014,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (sanitised public document)
[8] Common Criteria Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, Version 3.0,
May 2012, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03-M01
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 11 December 2014, for Sm@rtCafé® Expert
7.0 C1, BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014, TÜViT GmbH and Evaluation Technical Report
Summary Errata Statement, Version 1, 15 December 2014, for Sm@rtCafé® Expert
7.0 C1, BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014, TÜViT GmbH (confidential documents)
10
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 23, Version 3, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 47, Version 1.1, Regelungen zu Site Certification
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[10] Configuration List SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C1, Version 2.4, 11 December 2014,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Preparative Procedures Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0, Version 1.6, Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH
[12] Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0, Version 2.3, Giesecke &
Devrient GmbH
[13] Certification Report – for Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013
libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware), 11 September 2012,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782, BSI
[14] ETR for Composition (ETR-COMP), M7892 B11, BSI-DSZ-CC-0782, Version 5, 20
March 2014, TÜViT (confidential document)
[15] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual, Revision 2012-06-27,
Infineon Technologies AG
[16] Security Target Lite M7892 B11 including optional Software Libraries RSA – EC –
SHA-2 – Toolbox, Version 1.1, 2012-08-28, Infineon Technologies AG
[17] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102-1, Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen
und Schlüssellängen, Version 2014-01, 10.2.2014, BSI, https://www.bsi.bund.de/TR
[18] GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2.2.1, January 2011
[19] GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration, Version 1.0 Member Release, December
2011, Document Reference: GPC_GUI_039
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Rating of cryptographic mechanisms implemented in the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C1, (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 22 December 2014, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Giesecke & Devrient Development Center, Zamdorfer Strasse 88, 81677
München, Germany (Development/Testing)
b) Giesecke & Devrient Dienstleistungscenter (Production Site),
Prinzregentenstrasse 159, 81677 München, Germany (Production)
c) For development and production sites regarding the platform please refer to
the certification reports BSI-DSZ-CC-0782 [13]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
Rating of cryptographic mechanisms implemented in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Sec.
Level
abov
e 100
Bits
Comments
1. Authenticity RSA signature
verification using
SHA-1
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
_5)
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
1024 - 2048
no FCO_NRO.2
.1/CM [ST,
8.1.5]
(DAP-Verific
ation, [GP],
App. C.2,
C.3, C.6)
2. Authenticity 3DES in Retail-MAC
mode using SHA-1
[FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[ISO9797-1]
(Retail-MAC),
FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
|k|=112 no FCO_NRO.2
.1/CM [ST,
8.1.5]
(DAP-Verific
ation [GP],
App. C.2,
C.3, C.6)
3. Authentication 3-DES in CBC mode [FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
|k|=112,
|host-
challenge|=64,
|card-challenge|
=48
no [GP], App.
E.4.2
4. Authentication KDF in counter mode
with CMAC as PRF
[SP 800-108]
(KDF),
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC)
|k|=128,
|host-
challenge|=
|card-challenge|
=64
no11
[GP_AM_D],
sec. 6.2.2.2,
6.2.2.3, 4.1.5
5. Key Agreement 3-DES in CBC mode
with ICV=0
[FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
|k|=112 no [GP], App.
E.4.1
6. Key derivation KDF in counter mode
with CMAC as PRF
[SP 800-108]
(KDF),
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC)
|k|=128 yes [GP_AM_D],
sec. 6.2.1
7. Confidentiality 3-DES in CBC mode [FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
|k|=112 no [GP], App.
E.3.4, E.4.2
8. Confidentiality AES in CBC mode [FIPS 197]
(AES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
|k|=128 yes [GP_AM_D],
sec. 4.1.2,
6.2.6, 6.2.7
11
Because of challenge length
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Sec.
Level
abov
e 100
Bits
Comments
9. Integrity 3DES in Retail-MAC
mode
[FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[ISO9797-1]
(Retail-MAC)
|k|=112 no [GP], App.
E.4.4 (on
unmodified
and modified
APDU),
E.4.5
10. Integrity AES in CBC-MAC
and CMAC mode
truncated to 64 bits
[FIPS 197]
(AES),
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC)
|k|=128 no12
[GP_AM_D],
sec. 6.2.4,
6.2.5
11. Trusted Channel SCP02 [GP], App. E1
additionally cf.
lines 3, 5, 7, 9
no [GP], App.
E1,
supported
parameter 'i':
15, 55 [FSP,
4.3.2]
12. Trusted Channel SCP03 [GP_AM_D]
additionally cf.
lines 4, 6, 8, 10
no13
[GP_AM_D],
supported
parameter 'i':
10,30, 70
[FSP, 4.3.2]
13. Cryptographic
Primitive
SHA-1 [FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
None no -
14. Cryptographic
Primitive
SHA-{224, 256, 384,
512}
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
None yes -
15. Cryptographic
Primitive
3-DES in ECB mode [FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[SP800-38A]
(ECB)
|k|=112, 168 no -
16. Cryptographic
Primitive
3-DES in CBC mode [FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
|k|=112 no -
17. Cryptographic
Primitive
3-DES in CBC mode [FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
|k|=168 yes -
18. Cryptographic
Primitive
3DES in CBC-MAC
and Retail-MAC
mode
[FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[ISO9797-1]
(CBC-MAC,
Retail-MAC)
|k|=112 no -
12
Because of truncation
13
Only because of authentication and integrity
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Sec.
Level
abov
e 100
Bits
Comments
19. Cryptographic
Primitive
3DES in CBC-MAC
and Retail-MAC
mode
[FIPS 46-3]
(3DES),
[ISO9797-1]
(CBC-MAC,
Retail-MAC)
|k|=168 yes -
20. Cryptographic
Primitive
AES in ECB mode [FIPS 197]
(AES),
[SP800-38A]
(ECB)
|k|=128, 192,
256
no -
21. Cryptographic
Primitive
AES in CBC mode [FIPS 197]
(AES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
yes -
22. Cryptographic
Primitive
AES in CBC-MAC
and CMAC mode
[FIPS 197]
(AES),
[ISO9797-1]
(CBC-MAC),
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
yes -
23. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA encryption and
decryption with
encoding
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_
5) and without
encoding
(RSASP1,RSAVP1)
[RFC3447]
(RSA)
moduluslength=
512 - 1975
no -
24. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA encryption and
decryption with
encoding
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_
5) and without
encoding
(RSASP1,RSAVP1)
[RFC3447]
(RSA)
moduluslength=
1976 - 2048
yes -
25. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA-CRT decryption
with encoding
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_
5) and without
encoding
(RSASP1,RSAVP1)
[RFC3447]
(RSA)
moduluslength=
512 - 1975
no -
26. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA-CRT decryption
with encoding
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_
5) and without
encoding
(RSASP1,RSAVP1)
[RFC3447]
(RSA)
moduluslength=
1976 - 4096
yes -
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Sec.
Level
abov
e 100
Bits
Comments
27. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA signature
generation according
scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2] chapter
8.2 and [RSA]
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
5) chapter 8 using
SHA-{1}
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
512 - 2048
no -
28. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA signature
generation according
scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2] chapter
8.2 and [RSA]
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
5) chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256, 384,
512}
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
512 - 1975
no -
29. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA signature
generation
according scheme 1
of [ISO9796-2]
chapter 8.2 and
[RSA]
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
5) chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256, 384,
512}
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
1976 - 2048
yes -
30. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA-CRT signature
generation with
encoding scheme 1
of [ISO9796-2]
chapter 8 and [RSA]
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
5) chapter 8 using
SHA-{1, 224, 256,
384, 512}
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
512 - 1975
no -
31. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA-CRT signature
generation according
scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2] chapter
8 and [RSA]
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
5) chapter 8 using
SHA-1
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
1976 - 4096
no -
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Sec.
Level
abov
e 100
Bits
Comments
32. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA-CRT signature
generation according
scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2] chapter
8 and [RSA]
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
5) chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256, 384,
512}
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
1976 - 4096
yes -
33. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA signature
verification according
scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2] chapter
8.2 and [RSA]
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
5) chapter 8 using
SHA-{1, 224, 256,
384, 512}
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
512 - 1975
no -
34. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA signature
verification according
scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2] chapter
8.2 and [RSA]
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
5) chapter 8 using
SHA-1
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
1976 - 2048
no -
35. Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA signature
verification according
scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2] chapter
8.2 and [RSA]
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1
5) chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256, 384,
512}
[RFC3447]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
moduluslength=
1976 - 2048
yes -
36. Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves
secp{160,192}r1
[SEC2] and
brainpoolP{160,
192}r1 ] and
brainpoolP{160,
192}t1
[RFC5639]
no -
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Sec.
Level
abov
e 100
Bits
Comments
37. Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves
secp{224,256,32
0, 384, 521}r1
[SEC2] and
brainpoolP{224,
256,320,384,512
}r1 and
brainpoolP{224,
256,320,384,512
}t1 [RFC5639]
yes -
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality14
14
Technical references related to Table 5
[TR-03111] Technical Guideline TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, version 2.0,
28.06.2012, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[FIPS46-3] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46-3: Data Encryption Standard
(DES), U.S. Department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology, reaffirmed October
25th, 1999
[FIPS180-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 180-4, Secure Hash
Standard (SHS), March 2012, Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001, Announcing
the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[ISO9796-2] ISO/IEC9796-2 Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signature schemes
giving message recovery — Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms, Second edition 2002-10-0,
ISO/IEC.
[ISO_9797-1] Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes (MACs) -
Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 1999-12, ISO/IEC.
[RFC3447] RFC 3447 Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1, February 2003 — available at: http://www.rfc-base.org/rfc-3447.html
[RFC5639] RFC 5639 ECC Brainpool Standard Curves & Curve Generation, March 2010 — available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5639
[GP] GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2.2.1, January 2011
[GP_AM_D] GlobalPlatform Card Technology, Secure Channel Protocol 03, Card Specification v 2.2 –
Amendment D, Version 1.1, September 2009
[SP800-38A] NIST. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques,
Special Publication SP800-38A, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Technology Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce, 2001.
[SP800-38B] NIST. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, Special Publication SP800-38B, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Technology
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2005.
44 / 44