TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
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Certification Report
Crypto Library V2.0 on P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Security and Connectivity
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-37812-CR2
Report version: 2
Project number: 37812
Author(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: 8 May 2019
Number of pages: 14
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
International recognition 5
European recognition 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 8
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 8
2.2 Security Policy 8
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
2.4 Architectural Information 9
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 10
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 11
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 12
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 12
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 12
3 Security Target 13
4 Definitions 13
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Crypto
Library V2.0 on P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1. The developer of the Crypto Library V2.0 on
P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1 is NXP Semiconductors GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also
act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
The Target of Evaluation – TOE consists of the Crypto Library V2.0 and the NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1. For ease of reading the TOE is often called “Crypto Library on
SmartMX2”.
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC
evaluation of the underlying NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P61N1M3PVD/VE certified under the
German CC Scheme on 15 March 2019 ([HW CERT]).
The Crypto Library on SmartMX2 is a cryptographic library, which provides a set of cryptographic
functions that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The cryptographic library consists
of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The
Smartcard Embedded Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard
Embedded Software and the whole is subsequently implemented in the arbitrary memory. The NXP
SmartMX2 smart card processor provides the computing platform and cryptographic support by means
of co-processors for the Crypto Library on SmartMX2.
The Crypto Library on SmartMX2 provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation,
RSA public key computation, ECDSA, ECC key generation, ECDH, ECC point addition, ECC curve
parameter verification, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms, HMAC. In
addition, the Crypto Library implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is
initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.
Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine and a secure compare routine and includes internal
security measures for residual information protection. For more details refer to the [ST].
The TOE has been originally evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 25 February 2015. The re-evaluation also took place by Brightsight B.V. and was
completed on 3 April 2019 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with minor changes”.
The minor changes are minor changes to the documentation of the underlying hardware.
Note that in this re-certification of this TOE, the ST has been updated to remove all claims regarding
the security of ECC parameter verification. If the security of a composite or end product relies on this
functionality, appropriate evaluation of the security properties of this functionality is required.
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to
date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Crypto Library V2.0 on P61N1M3PVD/VD-
1/VE-1, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which
the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Crypto Library V2.0 on
P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the
security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6(+)) assurance requirements for the
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw
remediation) and ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary specification with architectural design summary.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Crypto Library V2.0 on P61N1M3PVD/VD-
1/VE-1 from NXP Semiconductors GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components, the hardware (as listed in [HW CERT]) and
the library files:
Type Name Release Date Form of delivery
Library file phSmx2ClAes.lib 1.1 2013-04-08 Electronic file
phSmx2ClDes.lib 1.0 2013-01-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsa.lib 1.1 2013-08-02 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsaKg.lib 1.1 2013-10-29 Electronic file
phSmx2ClEccGfp.lib 1.1 2013-10-29 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha.lib 1.0 2013-01-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha512.lib 1.0 2013-01-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRng.lib 1.1 2013-04-08 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils.lib 1.2 2013-07-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSecSha.lib 1.0 2013-09-19 Electronic file
phSmx2ClHmac.lib 1.0 2013-08-02 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSymCfg.lib 1.0 2013-10-30 Electronic file
Header file phSmx2ClAes.h 1.1 2013-04-08 Electronic file
phSmx2ClDes.h 1.0 2013-01-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsa.h 1.1 2013-08-02 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsaKg.h 1.1 2013-10-29 Electronic file
phSmx2ClEccGfp.h 1.1 2013-10-29 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha.h 1.0 2013-01-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha512.h 1.0 2013-01-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRng.h 1.1 2013-04-08 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils.h 1.2 2013-07-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils_ImportExportFcts.a51 1.2 2013-07-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils_RngAccess.a51 1.2 2013-07-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClTypes.h 1.1 2013-11-15 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSecSha.h 1.0 2013-07-19 Electronic file
phSmx2ClHmac.h 1.0 2013-08-02 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSymCfg.h 1.0 2013-10-30 Electronic file
Source code phSmx2ClUtils_ImportExportFcts.a51 1.2 2013-07-30 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils_RngAccess.a51 1.2 2013-07-30 Electronic file
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Crypto Library
V2.0 on P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1. Details can be found in section ”Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.3.5.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE provides the cryptographic algorithms AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key
generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA, ECC key generation, ECDH, ECC point addition,
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ECC curve parameter verification, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms, and
HMAC, in addition to the functionality described in the Hardware Security Target [ST-HW] for the
hardware platform. The cryptographic algorithms (except SHA) are resistant against Side Channel
Attacks, including Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Differential Fault
Analysis (DFA) and timing attacks. SHA is only resistant against Side Channel Attacks and timing
attacks. Details on the resistance claims are provided in the Security Target [ST], relevant details are
provided in the user guidance documents.
The TOE implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by
the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.
The TOE also a secure copy routine and a secure compare routine and includes internal security
measures for residual information protection.
Note that the TOE does not restrict access to the functions provided by the hardware: these functions
are still directly accessible to the Smartcard embedded Software.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 3.4 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components based on
the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family entitled “TOE design
(ADV_TDS)”. The intent of this chapter is to characterise the degree of architectural separation of the
major components and to show dependencies between the TOE and products using the TOE in a
composition (e.g. dependencies between HW and SW).
The TOE contains a Crypto Library, which provides a set of cryptographic functionalities that can be
used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Crypto Library consists of several binary packages
that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded
Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard Embedded Software and
the whole is subsequently implemented in arbitrary memory. Please note that the crypto functions are
supplied as a library rather than as a monolithic program, and hence a user of the library may include
only those functions that are actually required. However, some dependencies exist; details are
described in the User Guidance.
The TOE is implemented as a set of subsystems. The division into subsystems is chosen according to
the cryptographic algorithms provided. The whole TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA,
RSA key generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA, ECC key generation, ECDH, ECC point
addition, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and HMAC algorithms in addition to the
functionality described in the Hardware Security Target [ST-HW] for the hardware platform. In addition,
the TOE implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by
the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.
The TOE also contains a secure copy routine and a secure compare routine and includes internal
security measures for residual information protection.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer for the
hardware (as listed in [HW CERT]) and the software:
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Type Name Release Date Form of delivery
Documents User Guidance Manual [15] 1.3 2019-03-01 Electronic document
User Guidance: AES [17] 1.0 2014-08-06 Electronic document
User Guidance: DES [18] 1.0 2014-08-11 Electronic document
User Guidance: RSA [21] 1.0 2014-08-08 Electronic document
User Guidance: RSA Key Generation [22] 1.0 2014-08-07 Electronic document
User Guidance: ECC over GF(p) [23] 1.0 2014-08-11 Electronic document
User Guidance: SHA [19] 1.0 2014-08-11 Electronic document
User Guidance: SHA512 [20] 1.0 2014-08-07 Electronic document
User Guidance: RNG [16] 1.0 2014-08-11 Electronic document
User Guidance: Utils [24] 1.0 2014-08-11 Electronic document
User Guidance: Secure SHA [26] 1.0 2014-08-11 Electronic document
User Guidance: HMAC [25] 1.0 2014-08-11 Electronic document
User Guidance: SymCfg [27] 1.0 2014-08-08 Electronic document
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
Testing by both the developer and evaluator was performed on the P61N1M3PVD, which was
analysed by the evaluation lab and was concluded to be applicable to all hardware variations of the
TOE.
The developer did extensive testing on FSP, subsystem and module level. All parameter choices have
been addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified have been tested explicitly, and
additionally the near-boundary conditions have been covered probabilistically. The testing was largely
automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were extensively used to
verify that the functions return the expected values.
The hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations on this hardware TOE, as the
hardware is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided a testing environment. The
evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The evaluator independent penetration tests were devised after performing an Evaluator Vulnerability
Analysis. This was done in the following steps.
1. Inventory of required resistance
This step used the JIL attack list [JIL] as a reference for completeness and studied the ST
claims to decide which attacks in the JIL attack list applied for the TOE, as well as adding the
evaluator’s proprietary attack knowledge.
2. Validation of security functionalities
This step identified the implemented security functionalities and performed evaluator
independent tests to verify implementation and to validate proper functioning of the security
functions.
3. Vulnerability analysis
In this step the design and the implementation of the security functionalities was studied and
an analysis was performed to determine whether the implementation potentially could be
vulnerable against the attacks of step 1. Based on this analysis the evaluators determined
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whether the design and implementation provide sufficient assurance or whether penetration
testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance.
4. Penetration testing
This step performed the penetration tests identified in step 4.
5. Conclusions on resistance
This step performed a [JIL] compliant rating on the results of the penetration tests in relation
with the assurance already gained by the design analysis. Based on the ratings the evaluators
made conclusions on the resistance of the TOE against attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
6. With the maintenance of the hardware, these steps were revisited and a gap analysis was
made, leading to additional analysis and tests.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
Testing by both the developer and evaluator was performed on the P61N1M3PVD, which was
analysed by the evaluation lab and was concluded to be applicable to all hardware variations of the
TOE.
Since the TOE is not an end-user product it is not possible to perform testing without first embedding it
in a testable configuration. To this end, the developer has created a proprietary test operating system.
The main purpose of the test OS is to provide access to the crypto library’s functionality. The test OS,
and its documentation, was provided to the evaluators, and was used in all the testing. See the [ETR]
for details.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account. The TOE supports a wide
range of key sizes (see [ST]), including those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100
bits as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced from an algorithmic security level above 100 bits to a
practical remaining security level lower than 100 bits. As the remaining security level still exceeds 80
bits, this is considered sufficient. So no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent
penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
re-used, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the hardware component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were re-used
by composition.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the software component of the TOE, by use of 8 site certificates (NXP Semiconductors
Hamburg, NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH Styria, NXP Semiconductors Leuven, NXP Bangalore,
NXP IT Eindhoven, HCL (Gothenburg), Datacenter Akquinet Hamburg, Datacenter Colt Hamburg.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
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2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Crypto Library V2.0 on
P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1.
The reference of the hardware part of the TOE is checked in accordance to the hardware guidance
and the [HW CERT],
The reference of the software part of the TOE is checked by calculating the SHA-256 hash value of
the delivered files and comparing them to reference values provided in the user guidance.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
2
which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of the TOE evaluation that have to be considered when this TOE is used as platform
in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Crypto Library V2.0 on
P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 6 augmented with ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product
satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient level of cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. In order to be protected against attackers with a "high attack
potential", appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be
used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).
Note that in this re-certification of this TOE, the ST has been updated to remove all claims regarding
the security of ECC parameter verification. If the security of a composite or end product relies on this
functionality, appropriate evaluation of the security properties of this functionality is required.
2
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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3 Security Target
The Crypto Library V2.0 on the P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1 Security Target, Rev. 2.5, March 1, 2019
[ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
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or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] ETR Crypto Library V2.0 on P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1 EAL6+, 19-RPT-205, 1.0,
19 March 2019.
[ETRfC] ETR for Composite Evaluation Crypto Library V2.0 on P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1
EAL6+, 19-RPT-201, 1.0, 18 March 2019.
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1051-2019, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P61N1M3PVD/VE
including IC Dedicated Software, 15 March 2019.
[HW-ETRfC] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION BSI-DSZ-
CC-1051, version 3, 28 January 2019.
[HW-ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P61N1M3PVD/VE, Security Target Lite,
Revision 2.11, 10 January 2019.
[JIL] Attack methods for Smart cards and similar devices, JIL, version 2.0, January
2013.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.4, 27
September April 2017.
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0,
registered under the reference BSI-PP-0084-2014.
[ST] Crypto Library V2.0 on the P61N1M3PVD/VD-1/VE-1 Security Target, Rev. 2.5,
March 1, 2019.
(This is the end of this report).