LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration with CAM Public Security Target LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 2 | 82 © IDEMIA. All rights reserved. Specifications and information are subject to change without notice. The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement. All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners. - Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled - About IDEMIA OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly digital world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay, connect, travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment. Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By standing for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and protect this asset, whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as well as guarantee secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international clients from Financial, Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors. With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT (Oberthur Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company counts 14,000 employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180 countries. | For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 3 | 82 DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT Business Unit – Department CI – R&D Document type FQR Document Title LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration with CAM – Public Security Target FQR No 550 0078 FQR Issue 4 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 4 | 82 DOCUMENT REVISION Date Revision Modification 2020/02/25 1 Creation of the document 2020/03/06 2 Updated IC reference 2020/04/21 3 Added updated platform certificate 2020/06/03 4 Updated after incorporating ANSSI feedback LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 5 | 82 TABLE OF CONTENTS DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................. 3 DOCUMENT REVISION ..................................................................................................... 4 LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. 8 LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................ 8 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 9 1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE ............................................................................................. 9 1.2 TOE REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 9 1.3 TOE IDENTIFICATION.......................................................................................................10 1.3.1 TOE Identification .................................................................................................10 1.3.2 Platform Identification ...........................................................................................10 1.3.3 Configuration of the platform.................................................................................10 1.4 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................11 2 TARGET OF EVALUATION.................................................................................... 14 2.1 TOE OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................................15 2.1.1 Physical Scope ......................................................................................................15 2.1.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware .....................................................16 2.1.3 TOE Usage and major security features..................................................................16 2.2 TOE DEFINITION ............................................................................................................18 2.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE ........................................................................................................19 2.3.1 Integrated Circuit..................................................................................................19 2.3.2 Java Card Platform................................................................................................19 2.3.3 Application Functionalities......................................................................................19 2.3.4 Mechanism included in the scope of the evaluation .................................................23 2.4 TOE GUIDANCE ..............................................................................................................23 3 TOE LIFE CYCLE .................................................................................................. 24 3.1 TOE LIFE CYCLE OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................24 3.2 PHASE 1 “DEVELOPMENT” .................................................................................................25 3.3 PHASE 2 “MANUFACTURING” ..............................................................................................25 3.4 PHASE 3 “PERSONALIZATION OF THE TRAVEL DOCUMENT”..........................................................26 3.4.1 Loading of application ...........................................................................................26 3.4.2 Applet pre-personalisation (phase 6) ......................................................................26 3.4.3 TOE personalisation (phase 6) ...............................................................................26 3.5 PHASE 4 “OPERATIONAL USE” ............................................................................................27 4 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..................................................................................... 28 4.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE ......................................................................................28 4.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE ...................................................................................28 4.3 PROTECTION PROFILE ADDITIONS........................................................................................28 4.3.1 SFR dispatch versus PP .........................................................................................28 4.3.2 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST...................................................................29 4.3.3 Overview of the additional protocols.......................................................................31 4.3.4 OE for CA rationale ...............................................................................................31 4.3.5 OE for AA rationale ...............................................................................................32 4.3.6 Assumption for AA rationale...................................................................................32 4.3.7 Assumption for CA rationale...................................................................................32 5 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................... 33 5.1 SUBJECTS......................................................................................................................33 5.1.1 PP PACE subjects ..................................................................................................33 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 6 | 82 5.2 ASSETS.........................................................................................................................34 5.2.1 Primary assets ......................................................................................................34 5.2.2 Secondary assets ..................................................................................................35 5.3 THREATS.......................................................................................................................36 5.3.1 Threats from the PP PACE .....................................................................................36 5.3.2 Threats for CA and AA...........................................................................................38 5.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..................................................................................38 5.4.1 OSP from PP PACE ................................................................................................38 5.4.2 OSP for CA ...........................................................................................................39 5.4.3 OSP for AA ...........................................................................................................40 5.5 ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................40 5.5.1 Assumptions from PP PACE....................................................................................40 5.5.2 Assumptions for Active Authentication....................................................................40 5.5.3 Assumptions for Chip Authentication ......................................................................40 6 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................... 42 6.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...................................................................................42 6.1.1 SO from PP PACE ..................................................................................................42 6.1.2 SO for CA .............................................................................................................43 6.1.3 SO for AA .............................................................................................................44 6.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.....................................................45 6.2.1 OE from PP PACE ..................................................................................................45 6.2.2 OE for CA .............................................................................................................47 6.2.3 OE for AA .............................................................................................................47 7 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 48 7.1 EXTENDED FAMILY FAU_SAS - AUDIT DATA STORAGE ..............................................................48 7.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1..........................................................................48 7.2 EXTENDED FAMILY FCS_RND - GENERATION OF RANDOM NUMBERS.............................................48 7.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1...........................................................................48 7.3 EXTENDED FAMILY FIA_API – AUTHENTICATION PROOF OF IDENTITY...........................................48 7.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1.............................................................................48 7.4 EXTENDED FAMILY FMT_LIM - LIMITED CAPABILITIES AND AVAILABILITY ......................................48 7.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1 ...........................................................................48 7.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2 ...........................................................................49 7.5 EXTENDED FAMILY FPT_EMS - TOE EMANATION....................................................................49 7.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1...........................................................................49 8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................ 50 8.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................50 8.1.1 Global SFR............................................................................................................50 8.1.2 Active Authentication SFR......................................................................................51 8.1.3 Chip Authentication SFR ........................................................................................52 8.1.4 PACE SFR .............................................................................................................56 8.1.5 PACE CAM SFR......................................................................................................61 8.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................62 9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION......................................................................... 63 9.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION...........................................................................................63 9.2 LINK BETWEEN THE SFR AND THE TSF .................................................................................65 10 RATIONALES....................................................................................................... 69 10.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ......................................................69 10.1.1 Threats ................................................................................................................69 10.1.2 Organisational Security Policies ..............................................................................70 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 7 | 82 10.1.3 Assumptions .........................................................................................................71 10.1.4 SPD and Security Objectives ..................................................................................71 10.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...............................................................72 10.2.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................72 10.2.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs.....................................................75 10.3 DEPENDENCIES ...............................................................................................................76 10.3.1 SFRs dependencies ...............................................................................................76 10.3.2 SARs dependencies ...............................................................................................78 10.4 EAL RATIONALE ..............................................................................................................78 10.5 EAL AUGMENTATIONS RATIONALE........................................................................................78 10.5.1 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures...........................................................78 10.5.2 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis ...........................................78 11 ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................... 80 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 8 | 82 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: LDS V10.1 on Cosmo V8.2 Overview .................................................................................... 14 Figure 2: Physical Form...................................................................................................................... 16 Figure 3: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE ............................................................................... 24 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: ST Reference ......................................................................................................................... 9 Table 2: TOE References ..................................................................................................................... 9 Table 3: AID LDS V10.1 Security Target PACE Application................................................................... 10 Table 4: Platform Identification............................................................................................................ 10 Table 5: 4 Configurations of the LDS application .................................................................................. 15 Table 6: Ports and Interfaces .............................................................................................................. 16 Table 7: BAC Configuration ................................................................................................................ 20 Table 8: PACE Configuration .............................................................................................................. 21 Table 9: TOE Guidance...................................................................................................................... 23 Table 10: Roles Identification on the life cycle. ..................................................................................... 25 Table 11: Subjects identification following life cycle steps ..................................................................... 25 Table 12: Conformance Rationale ....................................................................................................... 28 Table 13: PP SFR .............................................................................................................................. 29 Table 14: SFR from the PP................................................................................................................. 29 Table 15: Additional SFR.................................................................................................................... 29 Table 16: Global SFR overview........................................................................................................... 30 Table 17: Additional SFR for the Active Authentication ......................................................................... 30 Table 18: PACE SFR overview ........................................................................................................... 30 Table 19: CA SFR overview................................................................................................................ 31 Table 20: Subjects and phases ........................................................................................................... 33 Table 21: User data stored on the TOE ............................................................................................... 35 Table 22: TOE internal secret cryptographic keys................................................................................. 36 Table 23: TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material ..................................................................... 36 Table 24: Travel Document communication establishment authorization data ........................................ 36 Table 25: Link between SFR from PP0068v2 and TSF ......................................................................... 66 Table 26: Link between Additional SFR for CA and TSF ....................................................................... 67 Table 27: Link between SFR for AA and TSF ....................................................................................... 68 Table 28: Link between Additional SFR for PACE_CAM and TSF ......................................................... 68 Table 29: Threats and Security Objectives - coverage .......................................................................... 71 Table 30: OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage ............................................................................ 72 Table 31: Assumptions and OE - Coverage ......................................................................................... 72 Table 32: Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage ............................................................................ 76 Table 33: SFRs dependencies ............................................................................................................ 77 Table 34: SARs dependencies............................................................................................................ 78 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 9 | 82 1 Security Target introduction This Security Target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL5+, augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing the environment in which it operates. The basis for this composite evaluation is the composite evaluation of open platform COSMO V8.2 and configurable Java Card application, LDS V10.1. The LDS V10.1 can have different configurations as described in Section 2.1. The present ST considers configuration 1 defined in Table 5 that supports the following features:  PACE  AA  CA  CAM It is activated in ROM during pre-personalization phase. The LDS works on the ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform. The platform is covered by the Security Target [54]. 1.1 Security target Reference This Security target is identified as follows: Title LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration with CAM – Public Security Target ST Identification FQR 550 0078 Ed 4 CC Version 3.1 Revision 5 Assurance Level EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 ITSEF CEA-LETI Certification Body ANSSI Compliant To Protection Profile PP- PACE [50] Table 1: ST Reference 1.2 TOE References TOE Commercial Name LDS V10.1 in PACE configuration with CAM on ID-One Cosmo V8.2 Applet Code Version 06 70 01 2F Platform Codop Identification 09 47 41 Guidance Documents [60], [61], [55], [56], [57] and [58] Platform Name ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform Platform Certificate ANSSI-CC-2020/26 Communication Protocol Contact, Contactless and Dual IC Identifier NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022Y VB IC Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V3-2019 BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-2018 Table 2: TOE References Note: For the LDS applet to function in the certified configuration, the patch code identified in the table above needs to be present in the platform. Its presence can be checked as described in Section 3.1 of [60] or Section 2.2 of [61]. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 10 | 82 1.3 TOE Identification The aim of the paragraphs is to allow the user to identify uniquely the TOE. The TOE is composed of application [LDS V10.1 in PACE configuration with CAM] and COSMO v8.2 Platform on the IC. 1.3.1 TOE Identification This chapter presents the means to identify the evaluated application and the Platform. The [LDS V10.1 Security Target PACE] installation command shall use the executable load File AID and module AID: Name Value Executable Load File (ELF) AID A0000000770100000710000000000005 Executable Module AID A0000000770100000710000100000005 Application AID A00000024710FF Table 3: AID LDS V10.1 Security Target PACE Application 1.3.2 Platform Identification In order to assure the authenticity of the card, the product identification shall be verified by analysing: Platform Name ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform Mask / Hardware Identification 091121 Label GIT code IDOne_Cosmo_V8.2_091121 IC reference version NXP P60D145 IC configuration NXP P6022y VB IC ST identification 1. NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB Security Target Lite Rev. 2.6 — 23 August 2019 BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V3-2019 2. NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB Security Target Lite Rev. 2.1 - 6 April 2018 BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-2018 IC EAL EAL6 with augmentations: ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2 IC certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V3-2019 BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-2018 Table 4: Platform Identification 1.3.3 Configuration of the platform In the present evaluation, the loading of application (Java Card Applets) on the platform at use phase is allowed. It can be forbidden if requested by the product issuer. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 11 | 82 1.4 References [1] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5. [2] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional requirements", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5. [3] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance requirements", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5. [4] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices”, April 2012, Version 1.2, CCDB-2012-04-001. [5] JIL - Certification of "open" smart card products - Version 1.1 - 4 February 2013 [6] Joint Interpretation Library - Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices Version 1.5.1, May 2018 [7] Global Platform Card Specification – Version 2.2.1 – January 2011. [8] Global Platform Card Mapping Guidelines of existing GP v2.1.1 implementations on v2.2.1 – Version 1.0.1 – January 2011. [9] Global Platform Card Technology, Security Upgrade for Card Content Management, Card Specification v 2.2 – Amendment E – Version 0.14 – October 2011. [10] Global Platform Card Technology, Secure Channel Protocol 03, Card - Specification v 2.2 - Amendment D- Version 1.1 - September 2009. [11] Identification cards - Integrated Circuit(s) Cards with contacts, Part 6: Inter industry data elements for interchange", ISO / IEC 7816-6 (2004). [12] FIPS PUB 46-3 “Data Encryption Standard”, October 25, 1999, National Institute of Standards and Technology [13] FIPS PUB 81 “DES Modes of Operation”, December, 1980, National Institute of Standards and Technology [14] FIPS PUB 140-2 “Security requirements for cryptographic modules”, May 2001, National Institute of Standards and Technology [15] FIPS PUB 180-3 “Secure Hash Standard”, October 2008 , National Institute of Standards and Technology [16] FIPS PUB 186-3 “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, June 2009, National Institute of Standards and Technology [17] FIPS PUB 197, “The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”, November 26, 2001, National Institute of Standards and Technology [18] SP800_90 “Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised)”, March 2007, National Institute of Standards and Technology [19] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block, Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Morris Dworkin, May 2005 [20] CEN/EN14890:2013 Application Interface for smart cards used as Secure Signature Creation [21] ANSI X9.31 “Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA)”, 1998, American National Standards Institute [22] ISO/IEC 9796-1, Public Key Cryptography using RSA for the financial services industry", annex A, section A.4 and A.5, and annex C (1995) [23] ISO/IEC 9797-1, “Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher”, 1999, International Organization for Standardization [24] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function [25] ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002 [26] ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 12 | 82 [27] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002 [28] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993 [29] FIPS Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1 [30] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 September 1998 [31] PKCS#1 The public Key Cryptography standards, RSA Data Security Inc. 1993 [32] IEEE Std 1363a-2004, “Standard Specification of Public Key Cryptography – Amendment 1: Additional techniques”, 2004, IEEE Computer Society. [33] Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 – Annexe B1 – Mécanismes cryptographiques – Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques, Version 2.03 du 21 février 2014 [34] AIS 31 - Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik [35] European Card for e-Services and national e-ID Applications - IAS ECC v1.0.1 [36] ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013, Identification Cards — Integrated circuit cards— Part 4 : Organization, security and commands for interchange [37] ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher [38] ISO 11568-2:2012, Financial services - Key management (retail) - Part 2 : symmetric ciphers, their key management and life cycle [39] Technical Guideline TR-03111- Elliptic Curve Cryptography Version 2.0 [40] Référentiel général de sécurité, version 2.0 du 21 février 2014 - Annexe B1 - Mécanismes cryptographiques [41] ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security techniques – Key management – part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996 [42] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization [43] ‘ICAO Doc 9303’, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015 – Security Mechanisms for MRTDs [44] Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05- 18 [45] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v2.20 [46] Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003 [47] BAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSI- PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009 [48] EAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009 [49] EAC With PACE- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) – BSI-PP-0056 V2 – 2012 [50] Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP) – BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 13 | 82 [51] E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles, SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007 [52] Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, ANSSi- CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009 [53] Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents – version v1.01 [54] FQR 110 9067 Ed 8.0 – ID-ONE COSMO v8.2 – Public Security Target [55] ID-One Cosmo V8.1-n, Application Loading Protection Guidance, FQR: 110 8001, Issue 1 [56] ID-One Cosmo V8.2, Security Recommendations, FQR: 110 8963, Ed 4 [57] ID-One Cosmo V8.2, Pre-Perso Guide, FQR: 110 8875, Ed 9 [58] ID-One Cosmo V8.2, Reference Guide, FQR 110 8885, Ed 8 [59] LDS EAC JAVA Applet SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS –0670012 00 SRS AA [60] FQR 220 1424 Ed5 – AGD_PRE [61] FQR 220 1425 Ed3 – AGD_OPE LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 14 | 82 2 Target of Evaluation The product LDS V10.1 is a multi-applicative Java Card product, embeddable in contact and/or contact- less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the Pre-Personalization/Personalization phases of the product [60]. The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical Data Structure as specified in [44]. It also provides standard authentication protocols, PACE [50], Chip Authentication and Active Authentication. It can host two types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL and MRTD. Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases other than those behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents. This product is loaded on the platform, for details see ST [54]. The LDS V10.1 product architecture can be viewed as shown in the following figure: Figure 1: LDS V10.1 on Cosmo V8.2 Overview LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 15 | 82 2.1 TOE overview The TOE described in this security target is the PACE, conformant to Configuration 1 (below). The product is composed of the functions: AA, CAM, PACE and CA which are all presented in the chapter TOE architecture. Only some parts are in the scope of the evaluation of the present configuration. Different configurations of the TOE are under evaluation. This ST considers only PACE, CA, AA and CAM. Configuration PP Conformity Extensions 1 PP 0068 (PACE) AA CA CAM 2 PP0056v2 (EAC with PACE) AA CAM PACE-CAM/TA without CA BAC de-activation SM (DES + AES) on read DG3+DG4 After EAC 3 PP 0055 (BAC) AA + CA 4 PP0056v1 (EAC with BAC) AA SM (DES + AES) on read DG3+DG4 after EAC Table 5: 4 Configurations of the LDS application The PACE TOE is instantiated during the application Pre-personalization with the creation of the MF / DF required for this configuration. In the use phase of the product, and for interoperability purposes, the MRTD will most likely support BAC, PACE and EAC.  If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing BAC then EAC, the security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described by the ST claiming compliance [54] and the TOE described by the ST claiming compliance to PP EAC assuming PACE is not supported (as not used for the inspection procedure).  If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing PACE then EAC, the security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described by the ST claiming compliance to PP with PACE assuming BAC is not supported (as not used for the inspection procedure). The TOE life cycle is described in § 3. The TOE identification is described in § 1.3.1. The TOE scope encompasses the following features:  Active Authentication  PACE_CAM Authentication  Chip Authentication Nevertheless, the TOE in the LDS application embeds other secure functionalities they are not in the scope of this evaluation and are in the scope of other evaluations. 2.1.1 Physical Scope The TOE is physically made up of several components hardware and software. Once constructed, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for communication. The physical medium on which the LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 16 | 82 microchip is mounted is not part of the target of evaluation because it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE. The TOE may be used on several physical medium within an inlay, or eCover; in a plastic card. The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure below. The cryptographic boundary of the module is the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads, shown as circles in the following figure. Figure 2: Physical Form The contactless ports of the module require connection to an antenna. The module relies on [ISO7816] and [ISO14443] card readers and antenna connections as input/output devices. Port Description Logical Interface Type VCC, GND ISO 7816: Supply voltage Power (not available in contactless‐only configurations) RST ISO 7816:Reset Control in (not available in contactless‐only configurations) CLK ISO 7816: Clock Control in (not available in contactless‐only configurations) I/O ISO 7816: Input/ Output Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (not available in contactless‐only configurations) LA, LB ISO 14443: Antenna Power, Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (Not available in Contact‐only configurations) Table 6: Ports and Interfaces 2.1.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware The TOE is an MRTD. It is an independent product and does not need any additional hardware/software/firmware to ensure its security. In order to be powered up and to be able to communicate the TOE needs a card reader. 2.1.3 TOE Usage and major security features State or organisation issues MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 17 | 82 In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD to the inspection system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorized agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field. The MRTD in context of this security target contains: - Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet - A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area) - And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for contact-less machine reading. The authentication of the holder is based on: - The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and - The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored in the MRTD. When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can perform extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as “visa information”. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization. The MRTD can be viewed as the combination: A physical MRTD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to)  personal data of the MRTD holder  The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book  The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the device  The printed portrait A logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO and extended in [44][45][46] on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to)  personal data of the MRTD holder  The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1)  The digitized portraits  The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both  The other data according to LDS (up to DG24)  The Document security object The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number. The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the physical support. The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip. The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active Authentication of the travel document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 18 | 82 security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303, and Password Authenticated Connection Establishment. The Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment. The Security Target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-only- once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the PACE. This protection profile addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 and Active Authentication. The Active Authentication authenticates the contactless IC by signing a challenge sent by the IFD (inspection system) with a private key known only to the IC. For this purpose the contactless IC contains its own Active Authentication Key pair (KPrAA and KPuAA). A hash representation of Data Group 15 (Public Key (KPuAA) info) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key (KPrAA) is stored in the contactless IC’s secure memory. By authenticating the visual MRZ (through the hashed MRZ in the Document Security Object (SOD)) in combination with the challenge response, using the eMRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair (KPrAA and KPuAA), the inspection system verifies that the Document Security Object (SOD) has been read from the genuine contactless IC, stored in the genuine eMRTD. The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a mandatory security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly conform to the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE considers high attack potential. For the PACE protocol, the following steps shall be performed: (i) The travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived from the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with the domain parameters to the terminal. (ii) The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically) reading the MRZ resp. CAN data. (iii) The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann key agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared secret. (iv) Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and verifies the received token. After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip provide private communication (secure messaging). The Chip Authentication defined in [TR_03110] is a security feature which is optionally supported by the TOE. The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps: (i) the inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging established by Basic Access Control, (ii) the inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object, (iii) the inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and (v) the inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the session keys). The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment. 2.2 TOE Definition The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing and provides standard authentication protocols, namely PACE, Chip Authentication and Active Authentication. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the Pre- Personalization/personalization phases of the product. The TOE comprises at least: Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 19 | 82 IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software Cosmo V8.2 Platform API LDS V10.1 application Associated guidance documentation The platform provides an operational environment for the application: all cryptographic algorithm implementations and associated self-tests, random number and key generation, card lifecycle management, and key storage and protection are provided by the platform. The code for this functionality is contained in the platform ROM. However, the factory configuration of the module constrains the module to the set of services provided by the platform’s Card Manager (implementing a standard set of Global Platform services), The applet may be used on a contact mode compliant to ISO/IEC 7816-3 specification or on contactless mode compliant to ISO/IEC 14443 specification. 2.3 TOE Architecture The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components: 2.3.1 Integrated Circuit The TOE is embedded on NXP chips; more information on the chips is given in the related Public Security Target identified in table 3 of chapter 1.3.2. 2.3.2 Java Card Platform The Operating System is based on Java Card Technology and Global Platform technology. His main responsibilities are:  providing interface between the Integrated Circuit and the applet  providing to the applet, basic services to access to memories and all needed cryptographic operations  ensuring global management of the card (loading, installation and deletion of applets) and monitor the security of the card (data integrity and physical attacks counter-measures). For details, see [54]. 2.3.3 Application Functionalities This application stores the personal information related to the cardholder of an MRTD or an IDL. It also allows governmental organizations to retrieve these pieces of data. The applet supports the authentication mechanisms described in ICAO and EAC specifications and ISO/IEC 18013-3 ISO Compliant Driving License specification with a fully configurable access control management over the EFs (EFs). The applet may be used on a contact mode (compliant to ISO/IEC 7816-3 specification) and/or contactless mode (compliant to ISO/IEC 14443 specification). The compliancy of the applet to LDS, EAC, or IDL, is achieved provided a correct personalization is performed. The correct authentication mechanisms and access conditions over the EFs must be assigned. In summary, the applet supports the following authentication mechanisms stated in the ICAO specifications (for MRTD) and the ISO Compliant Driving License standard (for IDL):  Active Authentication (AA)  Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)  Chip Authentication (CA)  Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM) Each authentication mechanism is presented in the following chapters, all are part of the product but only some are part of the present evaluation. 2.3.3.1 Active Authentication (AA) Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a challenge- response protocol between the IS and the chip. Active Authentication is realized with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. The key and algorithms supported are the following: LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 20 | 82 RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1024 bits, 1536 bits or 2048 bits and hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2. ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 and the key sizes 192 to 512. AES-256 using ISO/IEC 9797-1 M2 padding method. TDES with double and triple length keys using ISO/IEC 9797-1 M2 padding method. 2.3.3.2 Basic Access Control (BAC) The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [47]. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [41] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data. The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection system Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD), Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the logical MRTD (data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication. Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the communication between the chip and the IS. This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol: Configuration Key Algo Key Length Hash Algo MAC Algo BAC 3DES 2Key 16-bytes SHA-1 Retail MAC Table 7: BAC Configuration 2.3.3.3 Terminal Authentication The Terminal Authentication Protocol is a two move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the terminal. This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive data. As the terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST be protected appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an ephemeral public key chosen by the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with Chip Authentication. The MRTD chip MUST bind the terminal’s access rights to Secure Messaging established by the authenticated ephemeral public key of the terminal. 2.3.3.4 Chip Authentication The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip. The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two advantages over the original protocol: Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are non- transferable. Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys. The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys. The protocol in Version 2 provides explicit authentication of the MRTD chip by verifying the authentication token and implicit authentication of the stored data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys. 2.3.3.5 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) PACE is an access control mechanism that is supplemental to BAC. It is a cryptographically stronger access control mechanism than BAC since it uses asymmetric cryptography compared to BAC’s symmetric cryptography. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 21 | 82 PACE is realized through 5 commands: 1. MSE SET – AT command 2. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Encrypted Nonce 3. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Map Nonce 4. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Perform Key Agreement 5. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Mutual Authentication Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the communication between the chip and the IS. This table lists the supported configurations for PACE protocol: Configuration Mapping Key Algo Key Length (in bytes) Secure Messaging Auth. Token Hash Algo PACE–ECDH–GM–3DES Generic 3DES 2Key 16 CBC / Retail MAC Retail MAC SHA- 1 PACE–ECDH–GM–AES– 128 Generic AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 1 PACE–ECDH–GM–AES– 192 Generic AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–GM–AES– 256 Generic AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–IM–3DES Integrated 3DES 2Key 16 CBC / Retail MAC Retail MAC SHA- 1 PACE–ECDH–IM–AES– 128 Integrated AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 1 PACE–ECDH–IM–AES– 192 Integrated AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–IM–AES– 256 Integrated AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–CAM– AES–128 Chip Authentication AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 1 PACE–ECDH–CAM– AES–192 Chip Authentication AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–CAM– AES–256 Chip Authentication AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 Table 8: PACE Configuration 2.3.3.6 Extended Access Control (EAC) EAC is an authentication protocol based on a PKI infrastructure. It further ensures that the IS is authorized to read and/or update data stored in the applet. This authentication mechanism generates a strong secure messaging session through the step of Chip Authentication. This mechanism is realized by the following steps: 1. Chip Authentication (CA) Chip Authentication is achieved by using a MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Key Agreement Template (MSE SET KAT) command or by using a MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Authentication Template (MSE SET AT) command followed by GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command. The Chip Authentication mechanism enables the authentication of the chip by using an authenticated DH scheme. It may be realized in two ways:  Classical DH (DH El Gamal) with key length of 1024, 1536, or 2048 bits  DH over Elliptic curves over prime fields (ECDH) with the key length supported by the underlying Java Card platform. 2. Certificate Chain Handling The certificate chain is processed through a series of MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Digital Signature Template (MSE SET DST) and PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION – Verify Certificate (PSO VERIFY) commands. The chain is done to extract a key from the IS certificate, the key which will be used in the Terminal Authentication. 3. Terminal Authentication (TA) LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 22 | 82 Terminal Authentication is achieved by using an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. The Terminal Authentication mechanism is an authentication of the IS based on a classical challenge/response scheme. The signature scheme may be: ECDSA SHA-1, ECDSA SHA-224, ECDSA SHA-256, ECDSA SHA-384, or ECDSA SHA-512 on elliptic curves over prime field with key length supported by the underlying Java Card platform RSA SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PKCS#1 v2.1 - PSS) with a key length of 1024, 1536, and 2048 bits. 2.3.3.7 PACE-CAM The Chip Authentication Mapping is a new mapping for PACE which extends the Generic Mapping that integrates Chip Authentication into the PACE protocol. This mapping combines PACE and Chip Authentication into one protocol PACE-CAM, which allows faster execution than the separate protocols (i.e. PACE + CA + TA). PACE-CAM is realized the same way as § 2.3.3.6. The only difference is that the chip computes the Chip Authentication Data using the chip’s static private key then sends this data to the terminal. The terminal verifies the authenticity of the chip using the recovered Chip Authentication Data. 2.3.3.8 Match On-Card (MOC) Verification MOC verification may be used to grant some access rights to EFs. This feature relies on the services provided by the CHV Server applet MOC verification is supported if the CHV Configuration is properly configured in the install parameter. Once the MOC verification is allowed the applet will permit the use of CHV-related commands that handles biometric and Global PIN credentials. 2.3.3.9 PIN The product supports the management of card holder credentials such as Cardholder PIN and Global PIN which can be used to grant access rights to EFs or keys. The Cardholder PIN and Global PIN each have its PIN Unblocking Key (Cardholder PUK and Global PUK, respectively). These PINs and corresponding PUKs have to be initialized during personalization if they are used to protect access to EFs and keys. 2.3.3.10 BAC De-Activation The TOE supports the automatic deactivation of BAC protocol at defined date. 2.3.3.11 Watermarking The watermarking feature may be used to restrict the access to the plain image data of particular EF(s). Enabling the watermarking will cause the image data to be corrupted during the reading of the file contents. The de-watermarking conditions should be configured accordingly and these conditions must be satisfied in order to grant access to the plain image data, details are in the dedicated security Target. 2.3.3.12 Secure Messaging The TOE supports the ISO Secure Messaging. It provides a secure channel (i.e. encrypted and authenticated) between application and terminal. Secure Messaging can be set up by Chip Authentication, PACE, or Basic Access Control. The provided security level depends on the mechanism used to set up Secure Messaging. A session is started when secure messaging is established. The session only ends with the release of secure messaging, e.g. by sending a command without secure messaging. 2.3.3.13 IDEMIA library A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by IDEMIA. This cryptographic library is embedded on the TOE to provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It is implemented at the platform level and are already in the scope of the platform evaluation. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 23 | 82 2.3.4 Mechanism included in the scope of the evaluation All TOE functionalities are presented in the previous chapter. The present evaluation includes the listed functionalities:  PACE  PACE-CAM  AA  CA 2.4 TOE Guidance The TOE is identified as follows: Application Guidance TOE name (commercial name) LDS V10.1 on ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform Guidance document for preparation AGD_PRE [60] Guidance document for operational use AGD_OPE [61] Platform Guidance Guidance document for Platform Pre- personalisation COSMO V8.2 Pre-Perso Guide[57] Developer of sensitive applications* COSMO V8.2 Security Recommendations [56] Guidance for application developer* COSMO V8.2 Reference Guide [58] Guidance to Issuer of the platform that aims to load applications* COSMO V8.1-N Application Loading Protection Guidance [55] Table 9: TOE Guidance An ST Lite version of this Security Target will also serve as a guidance document. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 24 | 82 3 TOE Life Cycle 3.1 TOE Life Cycle Overview Figure 3: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE The TOE life-cycle classically described in terms of four life-cycle phases is additionally subdivided into 7 steps. The roles involved in the different steps are listed in the following table: Roles Subjects IC manufacturer NXP Semiconductors TOE developer IDEMIA Manufacturer NXP Semiconductors IDEMIA or another agent Pre-personalizer IDEMIA or another agent LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 25 | 82 Personalization Agent IDEMIA or another agent Table 10: Roles Identification on the life cycle. The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle, the Protection Profile lifecycle in phases, the TOE delivery point and the coverage: Steps Phase Subject Covered by Step 1 Development IDEMIA ALC R&D sites Step 2 Development NXP Semiconductors IC certification Step 3 Manufacturing NXP Semiconductors IC certification TOE delivery point Step 4 Manufacturing MRTD Manufacturer (Pre- personalizer) AGD_PRE Step 5 Manufacturing MRTD Manufacturer (Pre- personalizer) AGD_PRE Step 6 Personalization Personalization Agent AGD_PRE Step 7 Operational Use End user AGD_OPE Table 11: Subjects identification following life cycle steps Details for each phase/step are presented in the following paragraphs. 3.2 Phase 1 “Development” (Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. The TOE includes the LDS V10.1 application and the Platform. The LDS and Platform are both developed at IDEMIA R&D sites. The sites are audited following MSSR last requirements. (Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the eMRTD application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer. 3.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer adds initialization data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK). The end of step 3 is the TOE delivery. (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 26 | 82 (Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data. The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent. 3.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” (Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes: the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use. 3.4.1 Loading of application The platform can host 2 kinds of applications: Evaluated sensitive applications and validated basic applications. Once the application is evaluated or validated, it is securely delivered to manufacturing site. This delivery ensures the integrity and confidentiality of the application code and data. Then applications code and data are securely stored. The delivery, storage and loading of any application are covered by audited Organisational measures (ALC). Applications can be loaded at pre issuance at step 5 or at step 6 or in post issuance. 3.4.2 Applet pre-personalisation (phase 6) This phase is performed by the Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE. During this phase, the Java Card applet is prepared as required by P.TOE_Construction. All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalisation Agent prior to any operation. 3.4.3 TOE personalisation (phase 6) This phase is performed by the Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE, which is in charge of the Java Card applet personalisation. All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalisation Agent prior to any operation. This phase may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be performed anywhere. The Personalisation Agent is responsible for ensuring a sufficient level of security during this phase. The Java Card applet is personalized according to guidance document [57]. At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 27 | 82 3.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use” (Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified. Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 28 | 82 4 Conformance claims 4.1 Common Criteria conformance This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5 ([1][2][3]). The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows: CC Conformance rationale Part 1 Strict conformance Part 2 Conformance to the extended1 part: 1. FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage” 2. FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers” 3. FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities” 4. FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability” 5. FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation” 6. FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity” Part 3 Strict conformance to Part 3. The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented with: 1. ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” 2. AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” Table 12: Conformance Rationale 4.2 Protection Profile conformance The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 3: BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011:”Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE” [50]. 4.3 Protection Profile additions The rationale between the SPD, taking into account the additional elements of the SPD, and the Objectives and Objectives on the operational environment are given in the paragraph Rationales. 4.3.1 SFR dispatch versus PP The following table present a rationale between the SFR driven from the protection profile versus the SFR from this security target: SFR from the PP Dispatch in the ST FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4/Global FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_AES FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES FCS_RND.1 FCS_RND.1/Global FIA_AFL.1/PACE FIA_AFL.1/PACE FIA_UID.1/PACE FIA_UID.1/PACE FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UAU.4/PACE FIA_UAU.4/PACE FIA_UAU.5/PACE FIA_UAU.5/PACE FIA_UAU.6/PACE FIA_UAU.6/PACE FDP_ACC.1/TRM FDP_ACC.1/TRM 1 The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 29 | 82 SFR from the PP Dispatch in the ST FDP_ACF.1/TRM FDP_ACF.1/TRM FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1 FDP_UCT.1/TRM FDP_UCT.1/TRM FDP_UIT.1/TRM FDP_UIT.1/TRM FTP_ITC.1/PACE FTP_ITC.1/PACE FAU_SAS.1 FAU_SAS.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1/Global FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2/Global FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1/PA FMT_MTD.1/PA FPT_EMS.1 FPT_EMS.1/Global FPT_EMS.1/PACE FPT_FLS.1 FPT_FLS.1/Global FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1/Global FPT_TST.1/PACE FPT_TST.1/CA FPT_PHP.3 FPT_PHP.3.1/Global Table 13: PP SFR 4.3.2 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST SFR are presented in § 8.1 Security Functional Requirements: 1. SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE) 2. SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication 3. SFR (/PACE) that are dedicated for PACE protocol 4. SFR (/PACE_CAM) that are dedicated for Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip Authentication Mapping 4.3.2.1 Complete overview of the SFR The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation. SFR from the PP FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE ; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC ; FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC; FCS_RND.1; FIA_AFL.1/PACE; FIA_UID.1/PACE ; FIA_UAU.1/PACE ; FIA_UAU.4/PACE ; FIA_UAU.5/PACE ; FIA_UAU.6/PACE ; FDP_ACC.1/TRM ; FDP_ACF.1/TRM ; FDP_RIP.1 ; FDP_UCT.1/TRM; FDP_UIT.1/TRM ; FAU_SAS.1 ; FMT_SMF.1 ; FMT_SMR.1/PACE ; FMT_LIM.1 ; FMT_LIM.2 ; FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA ; FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/PA ; FPT_EMS.1 ; FPT_FLS.1 ; FPT_TST.1 ; FPT_PHP.3 Table 14: SFR from the PP Section Additional SFR Active Authentication FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ; FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Chip Authentication FIA_API.1/CA ; FSC_CKM.1/CA ; FCS_COP.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.5/CA ; FIA_UAU.6/CA ; FIA_UID.1/CA ; FPT_TST.1/CA ; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ ; FDP_UCT.1/CA ; FDP_UIT.1/CA PACE_CAM FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM; FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Table 15: Additional SFR LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 30 | 82 4.3.2.2 Global SFR overview Global SFR Additional? ST generic notation FCS_CKM.4/Global No FCS_CKM.4 FCS_RND.1/Global No FCS_RND.1 FMT_LIM.1/Global No FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2/Global No FMT_LIM.2 FPT_EMS.1/Global No FPT_EMS.1 FPT_FLS.1/Global No FPT_FLS.1 FPT_TST.1/Global No FPT_TST.1 FPT_PHP.3/Global No FPT_PHP.3 Table 16: Global SFR overview 4.3.2.3 Active Authentication SFR overview Active Auth. SFR Additional? ST generic notation FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Yes FCS_COP.1/AA FDP_DAU.1/AA Yes FDP_DAU.1/AA FDP_ITC.1/AA Yes FDP_ITC.1/AA FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Yes FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ FPT_EMS.1/AA No FPT_EMS.1 FMT_MOF.1/AA Yes FMT_MOF.1/AA FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Yes FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Table 17: Additional SFR for the Active Authentication 4.3.2.4 PACE SFR overview PACE SFR Additional? ST generic notation FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES No FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_AES FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES No FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES No FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC FDP_ACC.1/TRM No FDP_ACC.1/TRM FDP_ACF.1/TRM No FDP_ACF.1/TRM FDP_RIP.1 No FDP_RIP.1 FDP_UCT.1/TRM No FDP_UCT.1/TRM FDP_UIT.1/TRM No FDP_UIT.1/TRM FIA_AFL.1/PACE No FIA_AFL.1/PACE FIA_UAU.1/PACE No FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UAU.4/PACE No FIA_UAU.4/PACE FIA_UAU.5/PACE No FIA_UAU.5/PACE FIA_UAU.6/PACE No FIA_UAU.6/PACE FIA_UID.1/PACE No FIA_UID.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ No FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ FMT_SMR.1/PACE No FMT_SMR.1/PACE FPT_EMS.1/PACE No FPT_EMS.1 FTP_ITC.1/PACE No FTP_ITC.1/PACE FPT_TST.1/PACE No FPT_TST.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/PA No FMT_MTD.1/PA Table 18: PACE SFR overview 4.3.2.5 CA SFR overview CA SFR Additional? ST generic notation FIA_API.1/CA Yes FIA_API.1/CA LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 31 | 82 FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES Yes FCS_CKM.1/CA FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES Yes FCS_COP.1/CA FDP_ITC.1/CA Yes FDP_ITC.1/CA FIA_UAU.1/CA Yes FIA_UAU.1/CA FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Yes FIA_UAU.5/CA FIA_UAU.6/CA Yes FIA_UAU.6/CA FIA_UID.1/CA Yes FIA_UID.1/CA FPT_EMS.1/CA No FPT_EMS.1 FPT_TST.1/CA Yes FPT_TST.1/CA FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Yes FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ Yes FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ FDP_UCT.1/CA Yes FDP_UCT.1/CA FDP_UIT.1/CA Yes FDP_UIT.1/CA Table 19: CA SFR overview 4.3.3 Overview of the additional protocols 4.3.3.1 Chip Authentication The Chip Authentication has been added to this Security Target in order to reinforce the BAC authentication mechanism by ensuring the verification of the Card by the Terminal. For this addition, the TOE SPD has been refined and contains the following additions: 1. Additional Threats: § 6.3.2 2. Additional Objective: § 7.1.2 3. Additional OSP: § 6.4.2 4. Additional Assumptions: § 6.5.3 4.3.3.2 Active Authentication The additional functionality of Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys. It implies the following addition to the standard PP: 1. Additional Threats: § 6.3.3 2. Additional Objective: § 7.1.3 3. Additional OSP: § 6.4.3 4. Additional Assumptions: § 6.5.2 4.3.3.3 Prepersonalization phase The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following elements. This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. Rationale for the additions In order to be compliant with the CEM, a rationale is given for the additional Objectives on the Environment, such as to demonstrate that they neither mitigates a threat nor fulfil an OSP. 4.3.4 OE for CA rationale OE.Exam_MRTD_CA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA and OE.Auth_Key_MRTD define additional requirements on the operational environment for the Chip Authentication Protocol which is not in the original scope of the PP BAC. This OE is only linked to threat and OSP for the Chip Authentication and has no links with those of the PP. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 32 | 82 4.3.5 OE for AA rationale The objectives OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif and OE.Activ_Auth_Sign define additional requirements on the operational environment for the Active Authentication Protocol which is not in the original scope of the PP BAC. This OE is only linked to threat and OSP for the Active Authentication and has no links with those of the PP. 4.3.6 Assumption for AA rationale The A.Insp_Sys_AA is added, this assumption is only linked to Active Authentication mechanism as the Inspection System has to implement the mechanism and shall verifiy the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during Active Authentication. 4.3.7 Assumption for CA rationale The A.Insp_Sys_CA, The assumption A.Insp_Sys_CA serves only the Chip authentication mechanism added in the scope of the evaluation. The inspection system shall implement the CA mechanism. The IS has to verify the authenticity of the MRTD during the inspection by establishing a secure messaging. A.Signature_PKI This assumption is only linked to the Chip authentication as the issuing and receiving States or Organizations shall establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 33 | 82 5 Security problem definition 5.1 Subjects SFR Before phase 5 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 PP PACE subjects Travel Document Holder x Travel Document Presenter x Terminal x x x Basic Inspection System with PACE x Document Signer x x Country Signing Certification Authority x x Personalization Agent x Manufacturer x x Attacker x x x x Table 20: Subjects and phases 5.1.1 PP PACE subjects Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase25. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. This entity is commensurate with ‘Manufacturer’ in [47]. Personalization Agent An organization acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalize the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalization) and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalization) for the travel document holder as defined in [43], (iv) writing the document details data, (v) writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [43] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role ‘Personalization Agent’ may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 34 | 82 This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalization agent’ in [47]. Application Note: Personalization Agent is referred as the Personalizer in the Security Target Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless/contact interface. The role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being recognised by the TOE as not being PACE authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter). This entity is commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in [47]. Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE) A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder). BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication. Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorized by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer Certificate see [43].This role is usually delegated to a Personalization Agent. Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) An organization enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see [43]. Travel document holder (MRTD holder) A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalized the travel document. This entity is commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [47]. Please note that a travel document holder can also be an attacker. Travel document presenter (Traveler) A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity of the travel document holder. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveler’ in [47]. Please note that a travel document presenter can also be an attacker. Attacker A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying to undermine the security policy defined by the current ST, especially to change properties of the assets having to be maintained. The attacker is assumed to possess an at most high attack potential. Please note that the attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role recognized by the TOE. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in [47]. 5.2 Assets 5.2.1 Primary assets All these primary assets represent User Data in the sense of the Common Criteria. Please note that user data being referred in this chapter include, amongst other, individual-related (personal) data of the travel document holder which also include his sensitive (i.e. biometric) data. Hence, the general security policy LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 35 | 82 defined by the current ST also secures these specific travel document holder’s data as stated in this chapter. User data stored on the TOE Protection: Confidentiality, Integrity, Authenticity All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the eMRTD application of the travel document as defined in [53] and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [53]) This asset covers ‘User Data on the MRTD’s chip’, ‘Logical MRTD Data’ and ‘Sensitive User Data’ in [47]. User Data Description CPLC Data Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they enable to track the holder Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4) Contain the fingerprint and the iris picture Chip Authentication Public Key and attributes in EF.DG14 Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to a chip authentication Active Authentication Public Key and attributes in EF.DG15 Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an active authentication Table 21: User data stored on the TOE User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected Protection: Confidentiality, Integrity, Authenticity All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the eMRTD application of the travel document between the TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [53]). User data can be received and sent (exchange <--> [receive, send]). Travel document tracing data Protection: Unavailability Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password. TOE tracing data can be provided / gathered. 5.2.2 Secondary assets Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorized subjects Protection: Availability Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to authorized subjects only. Genuineness of the TOE Protection: Availability Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a proper way. This asset also covers ‘Authenticity of the MRTD chip’’ in [47]. TOE internal secret cryptographic keys Protection: Confidentiality, Integrity Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality. TSF data Description Personalisation Agent reference authentication Data Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation agent Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) Key Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 36 | 82 TSF data Description Chip Authentication private Key Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication Active Authentication private key Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication Session keys for the secure channel Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality and in integrity Table 22: TOE internal secret cryptographic keys TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material Protection: Authenticity, Integrity Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non-secret material (Document Security Object SOD containing digital signature) used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality. TSF data Description Life Cycle State Life Cycle state of the TOE Public Key CVCA Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent memory CVCA Certificate All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name,..) stored in persistent memory Current Date Current date of the travel document Table 23: TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material Travel Document communication establishment authorization data Protection: Confidentiality, Integrity Restricted-revealable authorization information for a human user being used for verification of the authorisation attempts as authorized user (PACE password). These data are stored in the TOE and are not to be send to it. TSF data Description PACE password (MRZ or CAN) Reference information being persistently stored in the TOE and allowing PACE authentication Table 24: Travel Document communication establishment authorization data 5.3 Threats This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE. 5.3.1 Threats from the PP PACE T.Skimming Adverse action An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE. Threat agent Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance. Asset Confidentiality of logical travel document data T.Eavesdropping Adverse action An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected. Threat agent LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 37 | 82 Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance. Asset Confidentiality of logical travel document data T.Tracing Adverse action An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE. Threat agent Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance. Asset Privacy of the travel document holder T.Forgery Adverse action An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by means of changed travel document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives these modified data as authentic one. Threat agent Having high attack potential Asset Integrity of the travel document. T.Abuse-Func Adverse action An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order: (i) To manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE (ii) To manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE (iii) To manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft coded security functionality of the TOE This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational phase after delivery to MRTD holder. Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTD. Asset Integrity and authenticity of logical MRTD, availability of the functionality of the MRTD. T.Information_Leakage Adverse action An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Threat agent Having high attack potential Asset Confidentiality of User Data and TSF data of the travel document T.Phys-Tamper Adverse action An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) Disclose TSF Data or (ii) Disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to alter LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 38 | 82 (i) Its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well) (ii) The user Data or the TSF data stored on the MRTD Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. Asset Integrity and authenticity of logical MRTD, availability of the functionality of the MRTD, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the MRTD T.Malfunction Adverse action An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) Deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE (ii) Circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation. Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTD, having information about the functional operation Asset Integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document 5.3.2 Threats for CA and AA T.Counterfeit Adverse action An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip. Threat agent having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs Asset authenticity of logical MRTD data 5.4 Organisational Security Policies The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations. 5.4.1 OSP from PP PACE P.Manufact The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key. P.Pre-Operational 1) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations. 2) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently stored in the TOE. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 39 | 82 3) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase. 4) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s policy. P.Card_PKI 1) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) 2) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly secure means, see [43]. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the travel document Issuer. 3) A Document Signer shall: (i) Generate the Document Signer Key Pair (ii) Hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification (iii) Keep the Document Signer Private Key secret (iv) Securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents. P.Trustworthy_PKI The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on the travel document. P.Terminal The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as follows: 1) The related terminals shall be used by terminal operators and by travel document holders 2) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [43], of the Passive Authentication [53] and use them in this order. The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann) 3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials 4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [53]) 5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE 5.4.2 OSP for CA P.Chip_Auth The terminal implements the Chip Authentication protocol as described in [48]. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 40 | 82 5.4.3 OSP for AA P.Activ_Auth The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [48]. 5.5 Assumptions The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used. 5.5.1 Assumptions from PP PACE A.Passive_Auth The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) Generates the Document Signer Key Pair (ii) Hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification (iii) Keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret (iv) Uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [43]. 5.5.2 Assumptions for Active Authentication A.Insp_Sys_AA The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during Active Authentication. 5.5.3 Assumptions for Chip Authentication A.Insp_Sys_CA The Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. A.Signature_PKI The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 41 | 82 The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 42 | 82 6 Security Objectives 6.1 Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE. 6.1.1 SO from PP PACE OT.Data_Int The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by protecting these data against unauthorized modification (physical manipulation and unauthorized modifying). The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. OT.Data_Auth The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side. The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE). OT.Data_Conf The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. OT.Tracing The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance. Application note: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-secret based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip Authentication), a security objective like OT.CA_Proof (proof of travel document authenticity) cannot be achieved by the current TOE. OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE operational phase, can be abused in order: (i) To manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE (ii) To manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE (iii) To manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE. OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored and/or processed by the travel document by: 1. Measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines 2. Forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or 3. A physical manipulation of the TOE. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 43 | 82 Application note: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software by means of: 1. Measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or 2. Measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction between electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis) 3. Manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as 4. Controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) With a prior 5. Reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. OT.Prot_Malfunction The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation hves not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature. OT.Identification The TOE must provide means to store Initialization Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory. The Initialization Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). OT.AC_Pers The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according to LDS [43] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. Application note: The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed using write access after personalization. 6.1.2 SO for CA OT.CA_Proof The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip Authentication as defined in [43]. The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. Application note: The objective implies the MRTD’s to have (i) a unique identity as given by the MRTD’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [43] and (ii) the hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer. OT.Data_Int_CA LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 44 | 82 The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication. 6.1.3 SO for AA OT.AA_Proof The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [43]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 45 | 82 OT.Data_Int_AA The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication. 6.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment 6.2.1 OE from PP PACE 6.2.1.1 Travel document Issuer as the general responsible The travel document Issuer as the general responsible for the global security policy related will implement the following security objectives for the TOE environment. OE.Legislative_Compliance The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations 6.2.1.2 Travel document Issuer and CSCA: travel document’s PKI (issuing) branch OE.Pass_Auth_Sign The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being maintained. A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must: (i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key (iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for each data group in use according to [43]. The Personalization Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [43]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organizations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on travel document. OE.Personalization The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on his behalf: (i) Establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical data for the travel document (ii) Enroll the biometric reference data of the travel document holder (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical personalization) and store them in the travel document (electronic personalization) for the travel document holder as defined in [43] (iv) write the document details data (v) write the initial TSF data (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [43] (in the role of a DS). OE.Terminal The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows: 1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [43] LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 46 | 82 2.) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol of the Passive Authentication (by verification of the signature of the Document Security Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonce, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann) 3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials 4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [43]) 5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the current ST. OE.Travel_Document_Holder The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 47 | 82 6.2.2 OE for CA OE.Auth_Key_MRTD The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to: 1. Generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair 2. Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 3. Support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. OE.Exam_MRTD_CA Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Chip Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol. 6.2.3 OE for AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active Authentication Protocol. OE.Activ_Auth_Verif In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD. OE.Activ_Auth_Sign The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 48 | 82 7 Extended requirements 7.1 Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage 7.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1 Description: see [50]. FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: see [50] 7.2 Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers 7.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1 Description: see [50] FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [50] 7.3 Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity 7.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1 Description: see [50] FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [50] 7.4 Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability 7.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1 Description: see [50] FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 49 | 82 Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2) Rationale: See [50] 7.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2 Description: See [50] FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1) Rationale: See [50] 7.5 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation 7.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1 Description: see [50] FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data]. FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [50] LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 50 | 82 8 Security Requirements 8.1 Security Functional Requirements This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: 1. Global SFR that are applicable to all the passports configuration 2. Active Authentication SFR that cover the Active Authentication Protocol 3. CA SFR that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol 4. PACE SFR that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol 5. PACE CAM that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip Authentication Mapping protocol 8.1.1 Global SFR This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are embedded on the product. FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none. FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet 1. Deterministic Hybrid random number as defined in [54] 2. The requirement of FIPS SP800-90 [18] for random number generation. FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow 1. User Data to be manipulated 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated 3. Software to be reconstructed 4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow 1. User Data to be manipulated 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated 3. Software to be reconstructed 4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 51 | 82 FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: 1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur 2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1. FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF, at the conditions: 1. At reset FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. 8.1.2 Active Authentication SFR FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]: Operation Algorithm Key length (bits) Standard Digital Signature Creation RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 1024 to 2048 with a step of 256 bits [24] FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]: Operation Algo Key length (bits) Standard Digital Signature Creation ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 192 to 521 over prime field curves [24][28][29][30] LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 52 | 82 FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself. FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information. Refinement: Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication protocol. FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none. FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to none. FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TSF Active Authentication to Personalization Agent. FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to Personalization Agent. 8.1.3 Chip Authentication SFR FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to [45] to prove the identity of the TOE. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 53 | 82 FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3 112 [43] FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3 128, 192, 256 [43] FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 112 [43] FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 128, 192, 256 [43] FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Standards SHA1 None [29] FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length Standards LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 54 | 82 (bits) SHA1 and SHA256 None [29] FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Standards 3DES CBC mode 112 [29] FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Standards AES 128, 192 and 256 [29] FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Standards 3DES Retail MAC 112 [29] FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Standards AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 [29] FDP_ITC.1/CA Import of user data without security attributes FDP_ITC.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the Chip Authentication Access Control SFP when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.2/CA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.3/CA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 55 | 82 FIA_UAU.1/CA Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow: 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key 4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system FIA_UID.1/CA Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 56 | 82 FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to 1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to 1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF, at the conditions: 1. At Reset FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the CAK to Personalization Agent. FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the CAK to none. FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure after Chip Authentication protocol. FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip Authentication protocol FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication protocol 8.1.4 PACE SFR FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 57 | 82 DH key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3 3DES 2 keys [43] FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDH_PACE_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards DH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 128, 192 & 256 [43] FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Standards AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 [17] FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Standards 3DES in CBC mode 112 [12] FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - Message Authentication Code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Standards CMAC AES 128, 192 and 256 [17] FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - Message Authentication Code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Standards Retail MAC with 3DES 112 [12] FDP_ACC.1/TRM Complete access control FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining access to the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel document LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 58 | 82 FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following 1. Subjects: a. Terminal b. BIS-PACE 2. Objects: a. Data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical MRTD b. Data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD c. Data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD d. All TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document 3. Security attributes: a. Authentication status of terminals FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: 1. A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects from FDP.ACF.1.1/TRM according to [53] after a successful PACE authentication a required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: 1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel document 2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel document FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to and de-allocation of the resource from the following objects: 1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication session) 2. The ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC- PACE (by having generated a DH shared secret) FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure. FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 59 | 82 FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to authentication attempts using the PACE password as shared password FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE [Editorially Refined] When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the PACE authentication attempts. FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [53] 3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. PACE Protocol according to [53] 2. Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide 1. PACE Protocol according to [53] 2. Passive Authentication according to [43] 3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [53] to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rules: 1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by means of the PACE protocol. 2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key(s) FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal. FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [53] LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 60 | 82 3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the 1. PACE passwords 2. Personalization Agent Keys to none. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: 1. Initialization 2. Pre-personalization 3. Personalization 4. Configuration FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Terminal 2. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE 3. Manufacturer 4. Personalization Agent FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FPT_EMS.1/PACE TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/PACE The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to 1. PACE: Session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SKPICC-PACE FPT_EMS.1.2/PACE The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to 1. PACE: Session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SKPICC-PACE FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE The TSF shall enforce communication via the trusted channel for any data exchange between the TOE and the Terminal LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 61 | 82 FPT_TST.1/PACE TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/PACE The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of self tests at the conditions: 1. At reset to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF FPT_TST.1.2/PACE The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/PACE The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Security Objects (SOD) to Personalization Agent. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre- personalization Data to the Pre-personalizer. FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent. FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC Identification Data in the audit records. 8.1.5 PACE CAM SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall allow 1. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [53] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM Single-use authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to Additionally to FIA_UAU.4/PACE 1. PACE CAM Protocol according to [53] FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall provide 1. PACE CAM Protocol according to [53] LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 62 | 82 to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rules: 1. The same rules from FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE applies, with the PACE_CAM protocol FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE CAM protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall allow additionally to FIA_UID.1/PACE: 1. Carrying out the PACE CAM Protocol according to [53] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the 1. PACE passwords 2. PACE CAM Private Key to none. FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the PACE CAM private key to Personalization Agent 8.2 Security Assurance Requirements The security assurance requirement level is EAL5+ augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 63 | 82 9 TOE Summary Specification 9.1 TOE Summary Specification Access Control in reading This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable: 1. PACE keys 2. PACE CAM keys 3. Active Authentication private key 4. Personalization Agent keys 5. MSK 6. CVCA keys It controls access to the CPLC data as well: 1. It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase 2. It ensures it cannot be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step Regarding the file structure: In the operational use: 1. The terminal can read user data (except DG3 & DG4), the Document Security Object, EF.CVA, EF.COM only after PACE authentication and through a valid secure channel 2. When the PACE was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG3 & DG4 provided the access rights are sufficient through a valid secure channel In the personalization phase 1. The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys) It ensures as well that no other part of the EEPROM can be accessed at anytime Access Control in writing This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization phase to be set to “1”. It ensures as well the CPLC data cannot be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it is not possible to change the personalizer authentication keys in personalization phase. Regarding the file structure: In the operational use, it is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any system files. However: 1. The application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs 2. The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application according to the authentication mechanism described in [43]. In the personalization phase 1. The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys) Active Authentication This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [43] (if it is activated by the personalizer). Chip Authentication LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 64 | 82 This security functionality ensures the Chip Authentication is performed as described in [43] (if it is activated by the personalizer). It could be used as an alternative of Active Authentication to reinforce the Authentication of the Chip. It differs from an EAC not performing the Terminal Authentication. PACE mechanism This security functionality ensures the PACE is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the PACE password. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the correct calculation of the PACE session keys. PACE_CAM mechanism This security functionality ensures the PACE_CAM is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with: the chip authentication mapping (CAM) keys the Personalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase 1. the PACE password. Furthermore, this security functionality ensures the correct calculation of the PACE_CAM session keys. Personalization This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. This function allow to configure SM level for biometrical data access and the BAC deactivation mechanism Physical protection This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks. Pre-personalization This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Pre-personalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre-initializing the product. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. Safe state management This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when 1. an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS 2. a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM) This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill card" or becomes mute. Secure Messaging This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the channel the TOE and the IFD are using to communicate. After a successful PACE authentication and successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication , a secure channel is (re)established based on Symmetric algorithms (Triple DES, AES128, 192 or 256) This security functionality ensures: 1. No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow 2. The data exchanged remain confidential 3. The issuer of the incoming commands and the destination of the outgoing data is the one that was authenticated (through PACE) If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed. This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication. This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Pre-personalization or Personalization. Self tests The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity on the TSF data: LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 65 | 82 1. At reset. 9.2 Link between the SFR and the TSF LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 66 | 82 FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC FCS_RND.1 FIA_AFL.1/PACE FIA_UID.1/PACE FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UAU.4/PACE FIA_UAU.5/PACE FIA_UAU.6/PACE FDP_ACC.1/TRM FDP_ACF.1/TRM FDP_RIP.1 FDP_UCT.1/TRM FDP_UIT.1/TRM FTP_ITC.1/PACE FAU_SAS.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1/PA FPT_EMS.1 FPT_FLS.1 FPT_TST.1 FPT_PHP.3 Access Control in reading X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Access Control in writing X X X X X Active Authentication X X X Chip Authentication X X X PACE mechanism X X X X X X X X X X PACE_CAM mechanism X X X X Personalization X X X X X Physical protection X X X X Pre-personalization X X X X X X X X X X Safe state management X X X X X X X Secure Messaging X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Self tests X X Table 25: Link between SFR from PP0068v2 and TSF LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 67 | 82 Table 26: Link between Additional SFR for CA and TSF FCS_COP.1/AA FDP_DAU.1/AA FDP_ITC.1/AA FMT_MOF.1/AA FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Access Control in reading Access Control in writing X Active Authentication X X X X X X Chip Authentication PACE mechanism PACE_CAM mechanism Personalization Physical protection Prepersonalization Safe state management Secure Messaging Self tests FIA_API.1/CA FCS_CKM.1/CA FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC FDP_ITC.1/CA FIA_UAU.1/CA FIA_UAU.5/CA FIA_UAU.6/CA FIA_UID.1/CA FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ FDP_UCT.1/CA FDP_UIT.1/CA Access Control in reading Access Control in writing Active Authentication Chip Authentication X X X X X X X X X X X X X X PACE mechanism PACE_CAM mechanism Personalization X Physical protection Prepersonalization Safe state management Secure Messaging Self tests LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 68 | 82 Table 27: Link between SFR for AA and TSF FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE Access Control in reading X X X X X X Access Control in writing X Active Authentication Chip Authentication PACE mechanism PACE_CAM mechanism X X X X X X X Personalization Physical protection Prepersonalization X Safe state management Secure Messaging X X X X Self tests Table 28: Link between Additional SFR for PACE_CAM and TSF LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 69 | 82 10 Rationales 10.1Security objectives and Security Problem Definition 10.1.1 Threats T.Skimming This threat addresses accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or transferred between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE’s contactless/contact interface. This threat is countered by the security objectives OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Auth and OT.Data_Conf through the PACE authentication. The objective OE.Travel_Document_Holder ensures that a PACE session can only be established either by the travel document holder itself or by an authorized person or device, and, hence, cannot be captured by an attacker. T.Eavesdropping This threat addresses listening to the communication between the TOE and a rightful terminal in order to gain the User Data transferred there. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf through a trusted channel based on the PACE authentication. T.Tracing This threat addresses gathering TOE tracing data identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE, whereby the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the PACE password. This threat is directly countered by security objectives OT.Tracing (no gathering TOE tracing data) and OE.Travel_Document_Holder (the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the shared passwords) T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery "Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip" addresses the fraudulent alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" and OT.Data_Auth respectively. The objectives OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering" and OT.Prot_Abuse-Func contribute to protecting integrity of the User Data or/and TSF- data stored on the TOE. A terminal operator operating his terminals according to OE.Terminal and performing the Passive Authentication using the Document Security Object as aimed by OE.Pass_Auth_Sign will be able to effectively verify integrity and authenticity of the data received from the TOE. Additionally, the examination of the presented eMRTD book according to OE.Terminal “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” and OE.Exam_MRTD_AA shall ensure its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document. T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func addresses attacks of misusing TOE’s functionality to manipulate or to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data as well as to disable or to bypass the soft-coded security functionality. The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func ensures that the usage of functions having not to be used in the operational phase is effectively prevented. T.Information_Leakage The threat T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Phys-Tamper LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 70 | 82 The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering". T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions". T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit "MRTD's chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip and identification and authenticity proof required by OT.CA_Proof and OT.Data_Int_CA using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_MRTD "MRTD Authentication Key". According to OE.Terminal "Examination of the MRTD passport book" the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip. This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip as required by OT.AA_Proof and OT.Data_Int_AA using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public active Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects. OE.Activ_Auth_Verif covers also this threat enabling the possibility of performing an Active Authentication which reinforce the security associated to the communication. 10.1.2 Organisational Security Policies P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact "Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip" requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification. P.Pre-operational This OSP is enforced by the following security objectives: - OT.Identification is affine to the OSP’s property ‘traceability before the operational phase’ - OT.AC_Pers and OE.Personalisation together enforce the OSP’s properties ‘correctness of the User and the TSF data stored’ and ‘authorisation of Personalisation Agents’ - OE.Legislative_Compliance is affine to the OSP’s property ‘compliance with laws and regulations’. P.Card_PKI This OSP is enforced by establishing the issuing PKI branch as aimed by the objectives OE.Pass_Auth_Sign (for the Document Security Object). P.Trustworthy_PKI This OSP is enforced by OE.Pass_Auth_Sign (for CSCA, issuing PKI branch). P.Terminal This OSP is countered by the security objective OE.Terminal which enforces the terminals to perform the terminal part of the PACE protocol. P.Terminal is obviously enforced by the objective OE.Terminal, whereby the one-to-one mapping between the related properties is applicable. P.Activ_Auth The OSP P.Activ_Auth requires the implementation of the Active Authentication protocol as enforced by OT.AA_Proof. P.Chip_Auth LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 71 | 82 The OSP P.Chip_Auth requires the implementation of the Chip Authentication protocol as enforced by OT.CA_Proof. 10.1.3 Assumptions A.Passive_Auth This assumption is directly addressed by OE.Pass_Auth_Sign requiring the travel document issuer to establish a PKI for Passive Authentication, generating Document Signing private keys only for rightful organisations and requiring the Document Signer to sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on travel document. It therefore covers the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. A.Insp_Sys_AA The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys_AA "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD_AA "Examination of the MRTD passport book". The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Active Authentication Protocol and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling. A.Insp_Sys_CA The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys_CA "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD_CA "Examination of the MRTD passport book". The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Chip Authentication Protocol and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling. A.Signature_PKI The assumption is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD_CA “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The threat is also covered by OE.Activ_Auth_Sign covering the necessary procedures for the Active Authentication key pair establishment. 10.1.4 SPD and Security Objectives Threats Security Objectives Rationale T.Skimming OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Auth, OT.Data_Conf, OT.MRTD_Holder Section 10.1.1 T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Conf Section 10.1.1 T.Tracing OT.Tracing, OE.Travel_Document_Holder Section 10.1.1 T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Auth, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Terminal, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRTD_AA Section 10.1.1 T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization Section 10.1.1 T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Section 10.1.1 T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Section 10.1.1 T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Section 10.1.1 T.Counterfeit OT.CA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_CA, OE.Terminal, OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif Section 10.1.1 Table 29: Threats and Security Objectives - coverage OSP Security Objectives Rationale P.Manufact OT.Identification Section 10.1.2 P.Pre_operational OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OE.Legislative_Compliance Section 10.1.2 P.Card_PKI OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Section 10.1.2 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 72 | 82 P.Trustworthy_PKI OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Section 10.1.2 P.Terminal OE.Terminal Section 10.1.2 P.Activ_Auth OT.AA_Proof Section 10.1.2 P.Chip_Auth OT.CA_Proof Section 10.1.2 Table 30: OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage Assumptions OE Rationale A.Passive_Auth OE.Pass_Auth_Sign , OE.Terminal Section 10.1.3 A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA Section 10.1.3 A.Insp_Sys_CA OE.Exam_MRTD_CA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA Section 10.1.3 A.Signature_PKI OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRTD_CA, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign Section 10.1.3 Table 31: Assumptions and OE - Coverage 10.2Security requirements and security objectives 10.2.1 Objectives 10.2.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication of the TOE" addresses the storage of the Initialization and Pre-personalization Data in its non-volatile memory, whereby they also includes the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the TOE’s chip. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre- personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 "Operational Use" violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical travel document” addresses also the access control of the writing the logical travel document. The justification for the SFRs FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS arises from the justification for OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre-personalization Data. FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in generally, personalization data). The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the Personalization Agent Keys. The write access to the logical travel document data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document only once. The SFRs FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict the access to the Personalization Agent Keys and the Chip Authentication Private Key. . The SFR FMT_MTD.1./PACE_CAM_KEY_READ restricts the access to the CAM Private Key. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. OT.Data_Int LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 73 | 82 Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical travel document stored on the travel document’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is addressed by FPT_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored user data is addressed by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. Unauthorized modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ and FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ restrict the access to the PACE passwords and Chip Authentication Private Key. Only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalization Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical travel document data after Chip Authentication. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/CA and FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ requires that the CAM Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalization Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. OT.Data_Auth This objective aims ensuring authenticity of the User- and TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the terminal-side and by an active verification by the TOE itself. This objective is mainly achieved by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM resp. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ requires that the CAM Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 74 | 82 FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalization Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. . OT.Data_Conf This objective aims that the TOE always ensures confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication resp. Chip Authentication, of these data exchanged. This objective for the data stored is mainly achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC resp. FCS_COP.1/CA A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM resp. FIA_UAU.6/CA. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for Kenc). The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalization Agent only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy. The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the general support for cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. OT.Tracing This objective aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless interface of the TOE without a priori knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ). This objective is achieved as follows: (i) While establishing PACE communication with CAN or MRZ (non-blocking authorization data) - by FIA_AFL.1/PACE (ii) For listening to PACE communication (is of importance for the current PP, since SOD is card-individual) - FTP_ITC.1/PACE OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery. OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information Leakage" requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip against disclosure byy: 1. Measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by FPT_EMS.1 2. Forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1 3. Physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by FPT_PHP.3 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering" is covered by FPT_PHP.3. OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions" is covered by: 1. FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 75 | 82 2. FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction OT.AA_Proof The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ. OT.Data_Int_AA The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE. OT.CA_Proof The security objective OT.CA_Proof "Proof of MRTD's chip authenticity" is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1 proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [44] requires additional TSF according to FCS_CKM.1/CA and FCS_COP.1/CA (SHA for the derivation of the session keys and ENC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging). The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. OT.Data_Int_CA The security objective OT.Data_Int_CA is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol that constructs a trusted channel through the following SFR FIA_UID.1/CA, FDP_ITC.1/CA, FIA_UAU.1/CA, FIA_UAU.5/CA, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FDP_UCT.1/CA, FDP_UIT.1/CA and FIA_API.1/CA. 10.2.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs SO SFR Rationale OT.Identification FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE Section 10.2.1 OT.AC_Pers FAU_SAS.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA, FCS_RND.1, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ,FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/PA,FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,FPT_EMS.1 Section 10.2.1 OT.Data_Int FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_RND.1, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_RIP.1, FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM, FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE, FMT_SMF.1, FPT_PHP.3, FTP_ITC.1/PACE Section 10.2.1 OT.Data_Auth FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_RND.1, FDP_RIP.1, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM, FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FTP_ITC.1/PACE Section 10.2.1 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 76 | 82 SO SFR Rationale OT.Data_Conf FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_RND.1, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_RIP.1, FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FTP_ITC.1/PACE, Section 10.2.1 OT.Tracing FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FTP_ITC.1/PACE Section 10.2.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 Section 10.2.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3 Section 10.2.1 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper FPT_PHP.3 Section 10.2.1 OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_TST.1, FPT_FLS.1 Section 10.2.1 OT.AA_Proof FMT_MOF.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Section 10.2.1 OT.Data_Int_AA FMT_MOF.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA Section 10.2.1 OT.CA_Proof FIA_API.1, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/CA, FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1/PACE Section 10.2.1 OT.Data_Int_CA FIA_UID.1/CA, FIA_UAU.1/CA, FIA_UAU.5/CA, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FDP_UCT.1/CA, FDP_UIT.1/CA, FIA_API.1/CA, FDP_ITC.1/CA Section 10.2.1 Table 32: Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage 10.3Dependencies 10.3.1 SFRs dependencies Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies PP 0068 v2 FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4 (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) FCS_CKM.1/CA FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_RND.1 No dependencies FIA_AFL.1/PACE (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UID.1/PACE No dependencies FIA_UAU.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE FIA_UAU.4/PACE No dependencies FIA_UAU.5/PACE No dependencies FIA_UAU.6/PACE No dependencies FDP_ACC.1/TRM (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/TRM FDP_ACF.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3) FDP_ACC.1/TRM, see justification FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies FDP_UCT.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1) FDP_ACC.1/TRM see justification FDP_UIT.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1) FDP_ACC.1/TRM see justification FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies FMT_SMR.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE FMT_LIM.1 (FMT_LIM.2) FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2 (FMT_LIM.1) FMT_LIM.1 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/PA (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies FPT_TST.1 No dependencies FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 77 | 82 Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies FTP_ITC.1/PACE No dependencies AA SFR FCS_COP.1/AA (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FDP_ITC.1/AA, see justification FDP_DAU.1/AA No dependencies FDP_ITC.1/AA (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3) FDP_ACC.1/TRM, see justification FMT_MOF.1/AA (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE PACE CAM FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM No dependencies FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM No dependencies FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM No dependencies FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM No dependencies FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE CA SFR FCS_CKM.1/CA (FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA FCS_COP.1/CA (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/CA FDP_ITC.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3) FDP_ACC. 2/TRM, see justification FIA_UID.1/CA No dependencies FIA_UAU.1/CA (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/CA FIA_UAU.5/CA No dependencies FIA_UAU.6/CA No dependencies FIA_API.1/CA No dependencies FDP_UCT.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1) FDP_ACC. 2/TRM, see justification FDP_UIT.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1) FDP_ACC. 2/TRM, see justification FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE Table 33: SFRs dependencies 10.3.1.1 Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ITC.1/CA and FDP_ITC.1/AA is unsupported. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here. The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM is unsupported. The SFR FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM require the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here. The dependency FCS_CKM.4 of FCS_COP.1/AA is unsupported. Since the key is permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4. The dependency FTP_ITC.1 of FDP_UCT.1/CA and FDP_UIT.1/CA is unsupported. There is no need for FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 78 | 82 10.3.2 SARs dependencies Reqs CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4 ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4 ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2 ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2 ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5 AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5 AGD_PRE.1 No dependencies ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and (ALC_LCD.1) ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 ALC_CMS.5 No dependencies ALC_DEL.1 No dependencies ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies ALC_LCD.1 No dependencies ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1 ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1 No dependencies ASE_INT.1 No dependencies ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1 ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 No dependencies ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1) ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2 ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1 ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2 ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_FUN.1 AVA_VAN.5 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_DPT.1) ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_DPT.3 Table 34: SARs dependencies 10.4EAL rationale This Security Target chooses EAL5 because developers and users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques. EAL5 represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL4 by requiring semiformal design descriptions, a more structured (and hence analyzable) architecture, and improved mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered during development. The assurance components in an evaluation assurance level (EAL) are chosen in a way that they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The requirements chosen for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, these components add additional assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements and the internal consistency is still guaranteed. 10.5EAL augmentations rationale 10.5.1 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical measures that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE. This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (only ALC_DVS.1). Due to the nature of the TOE, there is a need for any justification of the sufficiency of these procedures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE. ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies. 10.5.2 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 79 | 82 Due to the definition of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks. This assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA_VAN.5 component. Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information. The attacker is assumed to be thoroughly familiar with the specific implementation of the TOE. The attacker is presumed to have a high level of technical sophistication. AVA_VAN.5 has dependencies with ADV_ARC.1 "Security architecture description", ADV_FSP.4 "Complete functional specification", ADV_IMP.1 "Implementation representation of the TSF", ADV_TDS.3 "Basic modular design", AGD_PRE.1 "Preparative procedures" and AGD_OPE.1 "Operational user Guidance" and ATE_DPT.1 "Testing: basic design". All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5. LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 80 | 82 11 Acronyms AA Active Authentication BAC Basic Access Control CC Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4 CPLC Card personalization life cycle DF Dedicated File DFA Differential Fault Analysis DG Data Group EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EF Elementary File EFID File Identifier DES Digital encryption standard DH Diffie Hellmann I/0 Input/Output IC Integrated Circuit ICAO International Civil Aviation organization ICC Integrated Circuit Card IFD Interface device LDS Logical Data structure MF Master File MRTD Machine readable Travel Document MRZ Machine readable Zone MSK Manufacturer Secret Key OCR Optical Character Recognition OS Operating System PKI Public Key Infrastructure PP Protection Profile SFI Short File identifier SHA Secure hashing Algorithm SOD Security object Data TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security function LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 81 | 82 Index A A.Insp_Sys_AA ................................................ 40 A.Insp_Sys_CA............................................ 32, 40 A.Passive_Auth ................................................. 40 Access__Control__in__reading ...................... 63 Access__Control__in__writing ........................ 63 Accessibility__to__the__TOE__functions__an d__data__only__for__authorised__subjects ......................................................................... 35 Active__Authentication ..................................... 63 Attacker............................................................... 34 E EAC_mechanism............................................... 64 F FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES.................... 52 FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES ...................... 53 FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES .............. 53 FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES................. 53 FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE ................................... 57 FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES ................. 56 FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES.................... 57 FCS_CKM.4/Global........................................... 50 FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA ................................. 51 FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES................. 54 FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES ................... 54 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES.................. 53 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES .................... 53 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES ................. 54 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES.................... 54 FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES .................... 57 FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES.................... 57 FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES ...................... 57 FCS_RND.1/Global........................................... 50 FDP_ACC.1/TRM.............................................. 57 FDP_ACF.1/TRM .............................................. 57 FDP_DAU.1/AA ................................................. 52 FDP_ITC.1/AA ................................................... 52 FDP_ITC.1/CA................................................... 54 FDP_RIP.1 ......................................................... 58 FDP_UCT.1/BAC............................................... 56 FDP_UCT.1/TRM .............................................. 58 FDP_UIT.1/CA................................................... 56 FDP_UIT.1/TRM................................................ 58 FIA_AFL.1/PACE............................................... 58 FIA_API.1/CA..................................................... 52 FIA_UAU.1/CA................................................... 54 FIA_UAU.1/PACE ............................................. 59 FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM .................................. 61 FIA_UAU.4/PACE ............................................. 59 FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM .................................. 61 FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES ...................................... 55 FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES ........................................ 55 FIA_UAU.5/PACE ............................................. 59 FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM .................................. 61 FIA_UAU.6/CA................................................... 55 FIA_UAU.6/PACE ............................................. 59 FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM .................................. 62 FIA_UID.1/CA .................................................... 55 FIA_UID.1/PACE............................................... 59 FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM.................................... 62 FMT_LIM.1/Global ........................................... 50 FMT_LIM.2/Global ............................................ 50 FMT_MOF.1/AA ................................................ 52 FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ......................... 52 FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE........................ 52 FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ......................... 56 FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ....................... 56 FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS................................ 61 FMT_MTD.1/PA................................................. 61 FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ......... 62 FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ...............60, 62 FPT_EMS.1/AA ................................................. 52 FPT_EMS.1/CA................................................. 55 FPT_EMS.1/Global ........................................... 50 FPT_EMS.1/PACE............................................ 60 FPT_FLS.1/Global ............................................ 51 FPT_PHP.3/Global............................................ 51 FPT_TST.1/Global .......................................51, 56 FPT_TST.1/PACE............................................. 61 FTP_ITC.1/PACE.............................................. 60 G Genuineness__of__the__TOE........................ 35 M Manufacturer...................................................... 33 MRTD_Holder................................................... 34 O OE.Auth_Key_MRTD........................................ 47 OE.Exam_MRTD............................................... 47 OE.Legislative_Compliance............................. 45 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign ......................................... 45 OE.Personalization ........................................... 45 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD................................... 47 OE.Terminal....................................................... 45 OE.Travel_Document_Holder ...................... 46 OT.AA_Proof...................................................... 44 OT.AC_Pers....................................................... 43 OT.CA_Proof ..................................................... 43 OT.Data_Authenticity. ...................................... 42 OT.Data_Int_AA ................................................ 45 OT.Data_Int_CA................................................ 43 OT.Data_Integrity.............................................. 42 OT.Identification ................................................ 43 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func........................................ 42 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak ............................................ 42 OT.Prot_Malfunction ...................................... 43 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper ..................................... 43 LDS V10.1 Applet in PACE Configuration With CAM Public Security Target 82 | 82 P P.Activ_Auth....................................................... 40 P.Card_PKI ........................................................ 39 P.Chip_Auth ....................................................... 39 P.Manufact ........................................................ 38 P.Pre-Operational.............................................. 38 P.Terminal .......................................................... 39 P.Trustworthy_PKI ............................................ 39 Personalisation__Agent__Authentication...... 64 Personalization_Agent...................................... 33 Physical__protection......................................... 64 S Safe__state__management............................. 64 Secure_Messaging ........................................... 64 Self__tests.......................................................... 64 T T.Abuse-Func................................................... 37 T.Counterfeit..................................................... 38 T.Eavesdropping ............................................. 36 T.Forgery........................................................... 37 T.Information_Leakage.................................. 37 T.Malfunction ................................................... 38 T.Phys-Tamper................................................. 37 T.Skimming....................................................... 36 T.Tracing ........................................................... 37 Terminal.............................................................. 34 TOE__internal__non- secret__cryptographic__material................ 36 TOE__internal__secret__cryptographic__keys ......................................................................... 35 travel__document__communication__establish ment__authorisation__data ......................... 36 Travel__document__tracing__data................ 35 Traveler.............................................................. 34 U User__data__stored__on__the__TOE.......... 35 User__data__transferred__between__the__T OE__and__the__terminal__connected ..... 35