National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
3e Technologies International
9715 Key West Avenue, 5th Floor
Rockville, MD 20850 USA
CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network
Security Devices
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10820-2017
Dated: 09/20/2017
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices Validation Report Version 1.0, September 20, 2017
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Paul Bicknell
Lisa Mitchell
MITRE Corporation
Ken Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Chris Keenan
Ed Morris
Catherine Sykes
Khai Van
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 6
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 7
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
9 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 8
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 9
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 9
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................... 9
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 10
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 10
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 11
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 11
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 11
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 11
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 12
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of 3eTI CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network
Security Devices solution provided by 3e Technologies International. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report
is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government,
and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in August 2017. The information in this report is largely derived from the
proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, as summarized
in the publically available Assurance Activity Report, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.0, 27 February 2015.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the 3eTI CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security
Devices.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team and provided guidance
on technical issues. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct.
The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent
with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the CyberFence 3e-636
Series Network Security Devices (NDcPP10) Security Target, version 0.7, September 19,
2017 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE 3eTI CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.0, 27 February
2015
ST CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices (NDcPP10) Security Target,
version 0.7, September 19, 2017
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security
Devices, version 0.3, September 12, 2017
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor 3e Technologies International
Developer 3e Technologies International
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Paul Bicknell, MITRE Corporation
Lisa Mitchell, MITRE Corporation
Ken Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices.
3eTI’s 636 Series Network Security Devices offer the multiple capabilities necessary for
protecting embedded devices and safety-critical industrial control systems (ICS) against
internal and external attacks. The core capabilities include: network access control, OSI
Layer 2 and Layer 3 packet filtering, industrial control protocols packet inspection and
secured application data transportation (via encryption).
The TOE is composed of both hardware and firmware. All four models of the 3e-636 series
devices share the identical hardware. The 3e-636L3 was evaluated with version 5.1.300.
The evaluated firmware version for 3e-636L2, 3e-636H and 3e-636A is version 5.1.300
with variant product features enabled or disabled based on EEPROM entries created at
manufacturing time for that specific model. The sets of firmware share the same OpenSSL
library and kernel drivers and have the identical software modules that implement the
CPP_ND SFRs such as IPsec and TLS server.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:
Device Name Included Device Product Features
VPN
Encryption
VLAN
Encryption
Access
Control
Industrial Protocol
Packet Inspection
3e-636L3 EtherGuard X X X
3e-636L2 Darknode X X X
3e-636H Ultracrypt X
3e-636A EtherWatch X X
The TOE requires the following Operational Environment support which is not included in
the TOE’s physical boundary.
 Administrator Workstations: Trusted administrators access the TOE through the
TLS/HTTPS protocol.
 Audit Servers: The TOE relies upon the audit server for storage of audit records. The
TOE itself stores limited amount of the audit records in its internal persistence storage.
Those audit records are accessible and exportable through the Web GUI interface.
 NTP Servers: The TOE relies upon an NTP server to provide reliable time. If the time
is configured locally, the TOE will use its own reliable hardware clock to maintain time
as well.
 LDAP Server: The TOE relies on the LDAP server for centralized authentication of
administrator if the security administrator chooses this configuration. The TOE can also
authenticate administrator using local user name and password.
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3.2 TOE Architecture
The figure below illustrates the typical deployment use case and operational environment
for TOE devices.
3 eTI 636L 3 EtherGuard
Network Security
Network
Network Peer
Time Server Audit Log Server
IPsec Tunnels
3e-636L2 DarkNode
Ultracrypt
Network Peer
LDAP Server
3e-636L2 EtherWatch
Network Peer
TOE
TLS
Management Station
All devices operate in the same operational environment. IPsec tunnels are used to secure
the communication between the device and external servers such as NTP server, Audit log
server and LDAP server. All devices offer the same HTTPS/TLS based GUI interface for
device configuration and management.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE physical boundary defines all hardware and firmware that is required to support
the TOE’s logical boundary and the TOE’s security functions. The TOE hardware platform
uses FreeScale MPC8378E CPU and the TOE’s firmware contains an embedded Linux
Kernel customized by 3eTI based on kernel version 4.6. In short, the TOE’s physical
boundary is the physical device for all models.
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4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE generates auditable events for actions on the TOE and is capable of selective
audit record generation. The records of those events can be viewed within the TOE
Management Interface or they can be exported to audit systems in the Operational
Environment. The TOE generates records for its own actions, containing information about
the user/process associated with the event, the success or failure of the event, and the time
that the event occurred. Additionally, all administrator actions relating to the management
of TSF data and configuration data are logged by the TOE’s audit generation functionality.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE uses NIST SP 800-90 DRBG random bits generator and the following
cryptographic algorithms: AES, RSA, ECDSA, SHA, HMAC to secure the trusted channel
and trusted path communication. The TOE is designed to zeroize Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs) to mitigate the possibility of disclosure or modification of those secrets.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE provides Identification and Authentication security functionality to ensure that
authorized users are properly identified and authenticated before accessing TOE
functionality. The TOE enforces a password-based authentication mechanism to perform
administrative user authentication. Passwords are obscured while being entered during any
attempted login. Administrative users can be authenticated via either local user database or
remote LDAP server. The TOE also authenticates its IPsec peers; the authentication is
performed over IKEv2 SA phase of mutual authentication between IPsec peers.
4.4 Security management
The Web Management Application of the TOE provides the capabilities for configuration
and administration. The Web Management Application can be accessed via the dedicated
local Ethernet port configured for “out-of-band” management. There is no local access such
as a serial console port. Therefore, the local and remote management is considered the
same for this evaluation.
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An authorized administrator has the ability to modify, edit, and delete security parameters
such as audit data, configuration data, and user authentication data. The Web Management
Application also offers an authorized administrator the capability to manage how security
functions behave. For example an administrator can enable/disable certain audit functions
query and set encryption/decryption algorithms used for network packets.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
Internal testing of the TOE hardware and software ensures that all security functions are
running and available before the TOE accepts any communications. The TSF prevents
reading of pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, private keys, and passwords. The TOE uses
electronic signature verification before any firmware/software updates are installed to
defend against tampering.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE provides the following TOE Access functionality:
 TSF-initiated session termination when a connection
(remote or local) is idle for a configurable time period
 Administrative termination of own session
 TOE Access Banners
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE uses TLS/HTTPS for integrity and disclosure protection of administrative session
communications.
The TOE uses IPsec to protect communication with network entities, such as a log server,
NTP server and LDAP server. This prevents unintended disclosure or modification of logs
and management information.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.0, 27 February
2015
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP10 should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP10 and supporting technical documentation as described for this TOE in the
Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately,
and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
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6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and
the Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Evaluation Activities for
Network Device cPP, Version 1.0, dated February 27, 2015 as performed by the
evaluation team). All NIAP Technical Decisions related to the protection profile
security functional requirements were considered and applied as necessary.
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP10 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by
this evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 636 Series User Guide, Revision F, August 24, 2017
Please note that any other documentation delivered with the product or that may be
accessible on-line that is not listed above was not included in the scope of the evaluation
nor was it used to set the product into its evaluated configuration, and therefore should not
be relied upon to place the device into the compliant configuration.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report (NDcPP10) for
CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices, Version 0.4, September 12, 2017
(DTR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
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8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP10 including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
Test Environment
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models and the 3eTI user guide
documentation as noted above.
 3e-636L3 EtherGuard
 3e-636L2 Darknode
 3e-636H Ultracrypt
 3e-636A EtherWatch
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the
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CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to
meet the SARs contained in the NDcPP10.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network
Security Devices that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP10 related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that
the TOE was identified.
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The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP10 and recorded the results in a Test
Report; summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover
any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: "ultra electronics", "3eti",
"darknode", "etherwatch", "etherguard", "ultracrypt", "3e-636L3", "3e-636L2", "3e-636H",
"3e-636A", "mpc8378e", "openssl 1.0.2". Based on the results, no vulnerabilities existed in
the TOE at the time of the evaluation that were exploitable.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). Those employing the devices must follow the configuration
instructions provided in the Users Guidance documentation listed above to ensure the
evaluated configuration is established and maintained.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR’s
within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the devices,
to include security based functional features such as VPN and VLAN encryption or
industrial protocol packet inspection, needs to be assessed separately and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
The evaluated version of the products utilizes firmware version 5.1.300 and no earlier or
later versions were evaluated and therefore cannot be considered as compliant.
The TOE stores a limited amount of audit records in its internal persistent storage. It is
recommended that the administrator configure the TOE to export audit logs to a remote
audit storage server.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices
(NDcPP10) Security Target, Version 0.7, September 19, 2017.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
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complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.0, 27 February
2015
[5] Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Evaluation Activities for
Network Device cPP, Version 1.0, dated February 27, 2015
[6] CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices (NDcPP10) Security Target,
Version 0.7, September 19, 2017 (ST)
[7] Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP10) for CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network
Security Devices, Version 0.5, September 19, 2017 (AAR)
[8] Detailed Test Report (NDcPP10) for CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security
Devices, Version 0.4, September 12, 2017 (DTR) <Evaluation Sensitive>
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security
Devices, Version 0.3, September 12, 2017 (ETR)
[10] Ultra Electronics 3ETI 636-Series User’s Guide, Rev F, August 24, 2017