



Cisco Web Security Appliance

Security Target

Version 0.13

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Acronyms

The following acronyms and abbreviations are common and may be used in this Security Target:

Table 1 Acronyms

Acronyms / Abbreviations	Definition
AAA	Administration, Authorization, and Accounting
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CM	Configuration Management
WSA	Web Security Appliance
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
HTTPS	Hyper-Text Transport Protocol Secure
IP	Internet Protocol
IT	Information Technology
NDcPP	collaborative Network Device Protection Profile
PP	Protection Profile
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SHS	Secure Hash Standard
SSHv2	Secure Shell (version 2)
ST	Security Target
TCP	Transport Control Protocol
TCP/IP	Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Function
TSP	TOE Security Policy

Terminology

The following terms are common and may be used in this Security Target:

Table 2 Terminology

Term	Definition
Authorized Administrator	Any user that has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform all TSF-related functions.
Security Administrator	Synonymous with Authorized Administrator for the purposes of this evaluation.
User	Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
Firmware (per NIST for FIPS validated cryptographic modules)	The programs and data components of a cryptographic module that are stored in hardware (e.g., ROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM or FLASH) within the cryptographic boundary and cannot be dynamically written or modified during execution.

DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION

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This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Web Security Appliance (WSA) running WSA AsyncOS 11.8. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the TOE, which meet the set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as Administrators, Authorized Administrators, and Security Administrators in this document.

1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION

The Security Target contains the following sections:

- Security Target Introduction [Section 1]
- Conformance Claims [Section 2]
- Security Problem Definition [Section 3]
- Security Objectives [Section 4]
- IT Security Requirements [Section 5]
- TOE Summary Specification [Section 6]

The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 2.

1.1 ST and TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.

Table 3 ST and TOE Identification

Name	Description
ST Title	Cisco Web Security Appliance Security Target
ST Version	0.13
Publication Date	20 May 2022
Vendor and ST Author	Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference	Web Security Appliance
TOE Hardware Models	S690, S690X, S695, S695F, S680, S390, S380, S395, S190, S195
TOE Software Version	WSA AsyncOS 11.8, build number 11.8.4-004
Keywords	Web, Data Protection, Authentication, Network Device

1.2 TOE Overview

The TOE, Cisco Web Security Appliance, is a network device. WSA is an appliance that provides comprehensive web protection services for a company's Web traffic. It is a web protection product that monitors HTTP/HTTPS network traffic, analyzes the monitored network traffic using various techniques, and reacts to identified threats associated with web traffic (such as blacklisted URLs and inappropriate or malicious content). The TOE includes the hardware models as defined in Table 3 in section 1.1.

1.2.1 TOE Product Type

Cisco WSA is a network device that provides connectivity and security services including the capability to secure and control traffic in one device. WSA serves as a secure web gateway, providing scanning of both inbound and outbound traffic in real time for malware. Even though these scanning and blocking features are contained within the TOE, this functionality was not evaluated.

Cisco WSA provides two management interfaces: Command Line Interface (CLI) and web-based Graphical User Interface (GUI). The GUI contains most of the functionality to configure and monitor the system. However, not all CLI commands are available in the GUI; some features are only available through the CLI.

1.2.2 Supported non-TOE Hardware/ Software/ Firmware

The WSA supports the following hardware, software, and firmware components in its operational environment. Each component is identified as being required or not based on the claims made in this Security Target. All the following environment components are supported by all TOE evaluated configurations.

Table 4 IT Environment Components

Component	Required	Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Management Workstation with SSH Client	Yes	This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a SSH client installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration using the CLI interface through SSH protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used.

Component	Required	Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Management Workstation using web browser for HTTPS/TLS	Yes	This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a web browser installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration using the web GUI interface through HTTPS/TLS protected channels. Any web browser that supports TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 with the supported ciphersuites may be used.
Local Console	Yes	This includes any IT Environment console that is directly connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration.
Router or Switch	Yes	This includes any IT environment router or switch that the TOE receives and sends HTTP/HTTPS traffic. This functionality was not evaluated.
Audit (syslog) Server	Yes	This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would transmit syslog messages over a secure SSH trusted channel.
CA Server	Yes	This includes any IT Environment CA Server to validate X509 certificates
Update Server	Yes	This includes updates for the potentially malicious traffic of various types to filter for restricted content. This functionality was not evaluated.

1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION

This section provides an overview of WSA Target of Evaluation (TOE). WSA is a network device that is installed between an external network and the customer's internal network. Traffic flowing to and from the external network to the internal network is first routed through the TOE.

The Cisco WSA AsyncOS 11.8 is a Cisco-developed highly configurable proprietary operating system that analyzes the characteristics of web requests and responses and makes determinations regarding whether the request or response will be blocked, monitored, or allowed, this TOE only addresses the functions that provide for the security of the TOE itself as described in Section 1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE below.

The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The TOE deployment is WSA running WSA AsyncOS 11.8 software installed on one of the platforms, all of which are described below.

The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment. The TOE boundary is surrounded with a hashed red line.




Figure 1 TOE Example Deployment

The previous figure includes the following devices:

- The TOE WSA appliances include:

- S690, S690X, S695, S695F, S680, S390, S380, S395, S190, S195
- The following are in the IT Environment:
 - Local Console to support local Administration (direct connection)
 - Management Workstation to support remote Administration (secure connection is SSHv2 for the CLI and HTTPS/TLS for the GUI)
 - Syslog Server (secure connection is SSHv2)
 - Update Server
 - Certificate Authority (CA)
 - Firewall
 - Router or Switch

1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration

The TOE consists of one or more appliances as specified in section 1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE below and includes the WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8.

Also, if the TOE is to be remotely administered, then the management workstation must be connected to an internal network, SSHv2 must be used to remotely connect to the appliance for the CLI interface and HTTPS/TLS for the GUI interface.

A remote syslog server is used to store audit records and the connection is secured using SSHv2. It is recommended that these remote syslog servers be installed on the internal (trusted) network. The internal (trusted) network is meant to be separated effectively from unauthorized individuals and user traffic, one that is in a controlled environment where implementation of security policies can be enforced.




1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE



The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the Cisco WSA 11.8. The TOE hardware is comprised of the following platforms: S690, S690X, S695, S695F, S680, S390, S380, S395, S190, S195. The TOE software is the WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8.

The network, on which the TOE reside, is considered part of the environment.




The TOE is comprised of the following physical platform specifications as described in Table 5 Hardware Models and Specifications below.

Table 5 Hardware Models and Specifications

Hardware/ Processor/ Software	Picture	Size	Power	Interfaces
<p>S690</p> <p>Two Intel Xeon E5-2680 v3 (Haswell) processor</p> <p>WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8</p>		<p>2RU: 3.4 x 19 x 29 in. (8.6 x 48.3 x 73.7 cm)</p>	<p>650W 930W – DC</p> <p>Redundant power supply</p>	<p>6 port 1G Base-T copper network interface (NICs)</p> <p>One management interface (RJ-45)</p> <p>RAID mirroring</p> <p>10/100/1000</p> <p>Eight 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 10K SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives</p> <p>Eight- 8GB DDR4-2133 DIMM1</p>
<p>S690X</p> <p>Two Intel Xeon E5-2680 v3 (Haswell) processor</p> <p>WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8</p>		<p>2RU: 3.4 x 19 x 29 in. (8.6 x 48.3 x 73.7 cm)</p>	<p>650W 930W – DC</p> <p>Redundant power supply</p>	<p>5 port 1G Base-T Ethernet LAN ports</p> <p>One management interface (RJ-45), restricted to management use only</p> <p>RAID mirroring</p> <p>10/100/1000</p> <p>Sixteen 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 10K SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives</p> <p>Eight- 8GB DDR4-2133 DIMM1</p>
<p>S695</p> <p>Two Intel Xeon Gold 6126</p>		<p>2RU: 3.5 in. x 17.5 in. x 30.5 in. (8.9 x 44.5 x 77.47 cm)</p>	<p>1050W</p> <p>Redundant power supply</p>	<p>6 port 1G Base-T copper network interface (NICs)</p> <p>One management interface (RJ-45)</p>

Hardware/ Processor/ Software	Picture	Size	Power	Interfaces
(Skylake) processor WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8				45) RAID mirroring 10/100/1000 Sixteen 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 12G 10K SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives Four - 16GB DDR4-2666 DIMM1
S695F Two Intel Xeon Gold 6126 (Skylake) processor WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8		2RU: 3.5 in. x 17.5 in. x 30.5 in. (8.9 x 44.5 x 77.47 cm)	1050W Redundant power supply	6 port 1G Base-T copper network interface (NICs) One management interface (RJ- 45) RAID mirroring 10/100/1000 Sixteen 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 12G 10K SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives Four - 16GB DDR4-2666 DIMM1
S680 Intel Xeon E5- 2620 v3 (Haswell) processor WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8		2RU: 3.5 in. x 19 in. x 29 in. (8.9 x 48.3 x 73.7 cm)	770W Redundant power supply	6 port 1G Base-T copper network interface (NICs) One management interface (RJ- 45) RAID mirroring 10/100/1000 Four 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 10K

Hardware/ Processor/ Software	Picture	Size	Power	Interfaces
				<p>SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives</p> <p>Four - 8GB DDR4-2666 DIMM1</p>
<p>S390</p> <p>Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3 (Haswell) processor</p> <p>WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8</p>		<p>1RU: 1.7 x 19 x 31 in. (4.3 x 48.3 x 78.7 cm)</p>	<p>770W</p> <p>Redundant power supply</p>	<p>6 port 1G Base-T copper network interface (NICs)</p> <p>One management interface (RJ-45)</p> <p>RAID mirroring</p> <p>10/100/1000</p> <p>Four 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 10K SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives</p> <p>Four - 8GB DDR4-2666 DIMM1</p>
<p>S380</p> <p>Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3 (Haswell) processor</p> <p>WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8</p>		<p>2RU: 3.5 in. x 19 in. x 29 in. (8.9 x 48.3 x 73.7 cm)</p>	<p>770W</p> <p>Redundant power supply</p>	<p>6 port 1G Base-T copper network interface (NICs)</p> <p>One management interface (RJ-45)</p> <p>RAID mirroring</p> <p>10/100/1000</p> <p>Four 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 10K SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives</p> <p>Four - 8GB DDR4-2666 DIMM1</p>
<p>S395</p>		<p>1RU: 2 x 17 x 32 in. (5.1 x 43.2 x 81.3</p>	<p>770W</p>	<p>6 port 1G Base-T copper network interface (NICs)</p>

Hardware/ Processor/ Software	Picture	Size	Power	Interfaces
Intel Xeon Gold 5118 processor WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8		cm)	Redundant power supply	One management interface (RJ-45) RAID mirroring 10/100/1000 Four 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 12G 10K SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives Two - 16GB DDR4-2666 DIMM1
S190 One Intel Xeon E5-2609 v3 (Haswell) processor WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8		1RU: 1.7 x 19 x 31 in. (4.3 x 48.3 x 78.7 cm)	770W Redundant power supply	6 port 1G Base-T copper network interface (NICs) One management interface (RJ-45) RAID mirroring 10/100/1000 Two 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 10K SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives One 8GB DDR4-2666 DIMM1
S195 One Intel Xeon Silver 4110 (Skylake) processor WSA AsyncOS software version 11.8		1RU: 2 x 17 x 32 in. (5.1 x 43.2 x 81.3 cm)	770W Redundant power supply	6 port 1G Base-T copper network interface (NICs) One management interface (RJ-45) RAID mirroring 10/100/1000

Hardware/ Processor/ Software	Picture	Size	Power	Interfaces
				Two 600 GB hard disk (2.5" 10K SAS) hot swappable access for SAS drives One 8GB DDR4-2666 DIMM1

For ordering of the TOE hardware and delivery via commercial carriers, visit Cisco.com Support for the specific model. An example of the ordering details for WSA S690X, see <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/security/web-security-appliance-s690x/model.html>

The software is the Cisco AsyncOS software version 11.8. For ordering and downloading the TOE software, see <https://software.cisco.com/#>

The TOE guidance documentation that is also considered to be part of the TOE is the Cisco Web Security Appliance running Async OS 11.8 Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures v1.7. This document is downloadable from the <http://cisco.com> web site at:

<https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/industries/government/global-government-certifications/common-criteria.html>

In Table 1 Common Criteria Certified Product Guidance, enter the certified product name or simply click on the certification date for the product. A PDF version of the document will be displayed, which can be downloaded and saved.

1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management

- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
- Trusted Path/Channels

These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE implements all RFCs of the NDcPP v2.2e as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance measures prescribed therein.

1.6.1 Security Audit

The Cisco Web Security Appliance provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity, and the outcome of the event.

Auditable events include:

- failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination and failure of cryptographic session establishments and connections;
- modifications to the group of users that are part of the Authorized Administrator roles;
- all use of the user identification mechanism;
- any use of the authentication mechanism;
- Administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures;
- any change in the configuration of the TOE;
- changes to time;
- initiation of TOE update;
- indication of completion of TSF self-test;
- maximum sessions being exceeded;
- termination of a remote session;
- attempts to unlock a termination session and
- initiation and termination of a trusted channel

The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to a remote syslog server. Communication with the remote syslog server is protected using SSHv2 and the TOE can determine when communication with the remote syslog server fails. If the connection fails, the session will automatically be reestablished following the configuration settings described

in the Cisco Web Security Appliance running Async OS 11.8 Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures document.

The audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate CLI commands and GUI webpages. The records include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the Authorized Administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.

1.6.2 Cryptographic Support

The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates, based on WSA on the platforms and processors as noted above in Table 5 Hardware Models and Specifications.

The TOE provides cryptography in support of other Cisco WSA security functionality. The WSA software calls the Cisco FIPS Object Module (FOM) v6.2 that has been validated in accordance with the specified standards to meet the requirements listed below and all the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates.

Refer to Table 6 and Table 7 for algorithm certificate references.

NOTE: Models in **bold** are an exact match to the family, model number, and processor provided in the CAVP certificate. Per Policy #5, only one model within the Security Target must have a CAVP certificate that is an exact match with the processor family, model number, and microarchitecture. All other models may match or be considered equivalent to CAVP certificates with the same microarchitecture.

Table 6 Processors and FOM

CPU Family	CPU Model (Microarchitecture)	FOM (CiscoSSL FOM 6.2, CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module 6.2)	Physical Appliances / Platforms	CAVP Certificate#
Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3	Intel Xeon E5-2680 v3 (Haswell)	CiscoSSL FOM 6.2	S690, S690X	A406
	Intel Xeon E5-2609 v3 (Haswell)		S190	A406
	Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3		S680, S390, S380	A406
Intel Xeon Scalable	Intel Xeon Silver 4110 (Skylake)		S195	A397
	Intel Xeon Gold 5118 (Skylake)		S395	A403

CPU Family	CPU Model (Microarchitecture)	FOM (CiscoSSL FOM 6.2, CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module 6.2)	Physical Appliances / Platforms	CAVP Certificate#
	Intel Xeon Gold 6126 (Skylake)		S695, S695F	A402 ¹

Table 7 FIPS References

Algorithm	Description	Supported Mode	CAVP Cert. #	Module	SFR
AES	Used for symmetric encryption/decryption	CBC (128, 256) CTR (128, 256) GCM (128, 256)	A397, A402, A403, A406	CiscoSSL FOM 6.2	FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
SHS (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512)	Cryptographic hashing services	Byte Oriented	A397, A402, A403, A406	FOM	FCS_COP.1//Hash

¹ Certificate A402 lists Intel Xeon Gold 6130 as the processor. The Intel Xeon Gold 6130 is equivalent to the Intel Xeon Gold 6126.

Algorithm	Description	Supported Mode	CAVP Cert. #	Module	SFR
HMAC SHA-1	Keyed hashing services and software integrity test	Byte Oriented	A397, A402, A403, A406	FOM	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
DRBG	Deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011	CTR_DRBG (AES 256)	A397, A402, A403, A406	FOM	FCS_RBG_EXT.1
RSA	Signature Verification and key transport	FIPS PUB 186-4 Key Generation, PKCS#1 v.1.5, 2048 bit key,	A397, A402, A403, A406	FOM	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_COP.1/SigGen
ECDSA	Cryptographic Signature services	FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)	A397, A402, A403, A406	FOM	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2
CVL – KAS-ECC	Key Agreement	NIST Special Publication 800-56Arev3	A397, A402, A403, A406	FOM	FCS_CKM.2
CVL – KAS - FFC	Key Agreement	NIST Special Publication 800-56Arev3	A397, A402, A403, A406	FOM	FCS_CKM.2
CVL SSH	Key Derivation Function	NIST Special Publication 800-135	A397, A402, A403, A406	FOM	FCS_CKM.2

Algorithm	Description	Supported Mode	CAVP Cert. #	Module	SFR
CVL TLS	Key Derivation Function	NIST Special Publication 800-135	A397, A402, A403, A406	FOM	FCS_CKM.2

The TOE provides cryptography in support of remote administrative management via the SSHv2 for the CLI and HTTPS/TLS for the GUI. SSHv2 is used to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote syslog server. In addition, the TOE uses the X.509v3 certificate for securing the TLS connections.

The TOE also authenticates software updates to the TOE using a published hash.

1.6.3 Identification and authentication

The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users connecting to the TOE's secure CLI and GUI administrative interfaces using SSHv2 and HTTPS/TLS respectively to secure the connections. Prior to an administrator logging in, a login banner is presented at both the CLI and GUI interfaces. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to be successfully identified and authenticated prior to being granted access to the TOE and any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as character complexity rules.

The TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of authentication attempts fail has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an Authorized Administrator can re-enable the user account.

The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS connections.

1.6.4 Security Management

The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration

occurs either through a secure SSHv2 (CLI interface) session, via a direct local console connection or HTTPS/TLS (GUI interface). The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using published hash prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters;
- Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
- Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
- Ability to configure the audit behavior and
- Ability to set the time

The CLI is the main interface used to administer the TOE since all functionality to configure, securely manage and to monitor the TOE is available via the CLI. The GUI interface can also be used however not all functionality to configure the TOE is available in the GUI. Therefore, in the evaluated configuration it is recommended to use the CLI to perform all configuration and setting of the security functions and to securely manage the TOE.

The TOE supports the security administrator role and is referred to as the Authorized Administrator. Only the Authorized Administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions.

Authorized Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login and can define an inactivity timeout threshold for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of inactivity has been reached.

1.6.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, Cisco AsyncOS is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco AsyncOS memory space is restricted to only Cisco AsyncOS functions.

The TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the TOE itself and that of the cryptographic module

The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE provides the Authorized Administrators the capability to update the TOE's clock manually to maintain a reliable timestamp.

Finally, the TOE can verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.

1.6.6 TOE Access

The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to successfully be re-identified and re-authenticate to establish a new session. Sessions can also be terminated if an Authorized Administrator enters the "exit" command.

The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI and GUI management interfaces prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.

1.6.7 Trusted path/Channels

The TOE allows trusted path to be established to itself from remote Authorized Administrator over SSHv2 for the CLI and HTTPS/TLS for the GUI. The TOE also uses SCP over SSHv2 to push the audit logs to remote syslog servers.

1.7 Excluded Functionality

The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.

Table 8 Excluded Functionality

Excluded Functionality	Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation	This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed operations
AsyncOS API	Does not include any claimed or in-scope functionality
Automated and offline software updates	In the evaluated configuration, automatic updates are not allowed. All updates must be applied manually by the Administrator

These services can be disabled by configuration settings as described in the Cisco Web Security Appliance running Async OS 11.8 Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures document. The exclusion of this functionality does not affect the compliance to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e.

2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim

The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017. For a listing of Assurance Requirements claimed, see section 5.4.

The TOE and ST are CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.

2.2 Protection Profile Conformance

The TOE and ST are conformant with the Protection Profiles as listed in Table 9 Protection Profiles below. The following NIAP Technical Decisions (TD) as listed in Table 10 NIAP Technical Decisions (TD) have also been applied to the claims in this document. Each posted TD was reviewed and considered based on the TOE product type, the PP claims and the security functional requirements claimed in this document.

Table 9 Protection Profiles

Protection Profile	Version	Date
Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP)	2.2e	23 March 2020

Table 10 NIAP Technical Decisions (TD)

TD Identifier	TD Name	Protection Profiles	References	Publication Date	Applicable?
TD0592	NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records	CPP_ND_V2.2E	FAU_STG	2021.05.21	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0591	NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors	CPP_ND_V2.2E	A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY, ACRONYMS	2021.05.21	No – not a virtual TOE

TD Identifier	TD Name	Protection Profiles	References	Publication Date	Applicable?
TD0581	NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-56Arev3	CPP_ND_V2.2E	FCS_CKM.2	2021.04.09	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0580	NIT Technical Decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e	CPP_ND_V2.2E	FCS_CKM.1.1, FCS_CKM.2.1	2021.04.09	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0572	NIT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers	CPP_ND_V2.1, CPP_ND_V2.2E	FTP_ITC.1	2021.01.29	No – the TOE does not claim FCS_TLSC_EXT
TD0571	NIT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1	CPP_ND_V2.1, CPP_ND_V2.2E	FIA_UAU.1, FIA_PMG_EXT.1	2021.01.29	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0570	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1	CPP_ND_V2.1, CPP_ND_V2.2E	FIA_AFL.1	2021.01.29	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0569	NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7	CPP_ND_V2.2E	ND SD v2.2, FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4	2021.01.28	Yes – TD has been applied
TD0564	NIT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria	CPP_ND_V2.2E	NDSDv2.2, AVA_VAN.1	2021.01.28	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0563	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information	CPP_ND_V2.2E	NDcPPv2.2e, FAU_GEN.1.2	2021.01.28	Yes - TD has been applied

TD Identifier	TD Name	Protection Profiles	References	Publication Date	Applicable?
TD0556	NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question	CPP_ND_V2.2E	NDSDv2.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4, Test 3	2020.11.06	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0555	NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test	CPP_ND_V2.2E	NDSDv2.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4, Test 3	2020.11.06	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0547	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN	CPP_ND_V2.1 CPP_ND_V2.2E	ND SDv2.1, ND SDv2.2, AVA_VAN.1	2020.10.15	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0546	NIT Technical Decision for DTLS - clarification of Application Note 63	CPP_ND_V2.2E	FCS_DTLS_EXT.1.1	2020.10.15	No - Referenced SFR is not being claimed
TD0538	NIT Technical Decision for Outdated link to allowed-with list	CPP_ND_V2.1 CPP_ND_V2.2E	Section 2	2020.07.13	Not applicable to this ST
TD0537	NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3	CPP_ND_V2.2E	FIA_X509_EXT.2.2	2020.07.13	No – the TOE does not claim FCS_TLSC_EXT
TD0536	NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification Inconsistency	CPP_ND_V2.1 CPP_ND_V2.2E	AGD_OPE.1, ND SDv2.1, ND SDv2.2	2020.07.13	Yes - TD has been applied
TD0528	NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4	CPP_ND_V2.1 CPP_ND_V2.2E	FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4, ND SD v2.1, ND SD v2.2	2020.07.13	No - Referenced SFR is not being claimed

TD Identifier	TD Name	Protection Profiles	References	Publication Date	Applicable?
TD0527	Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)	CPP_ND_V2.2E	FIA_X509_EXT.1/REV, FIA_X509_EXT.1/ITT	2020-07-01 2020-12-01	Yes – TD has been applied

2.2.1 Protection Profile Additions

The ST claims exact conformance to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 2.2e. The ST does not include any additions to the functionality described in the ND cPPv2.2e.

2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale

2.3.1 TOE Appropriateness

The TOE provides all the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in the:

- collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e

2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency

The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target represent the Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile Security Problem Definition are included in the Security Target Statement of Security Objectives Consistency.

The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives specified in the NDcPP v2.2e, for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile Statement of Security Objectives is included in the Security Target.

2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency

The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional Requirements specified in the NDcPP v2.2e, for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile Statement of Security Requirements is included in this Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included in this Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in the NDcPP v2.2e.

2.3.4 Statement of Extended Components Definitions Consistency

The Extended Components Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional Requirements specified in the NDcPP v2.2e for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile's Statement of Extended Security Requirements are included in this Security Target.

3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

This section identifies the following:

- Significant assumptions about the TOE's operational environment.
- IT related threats to the organization countered by the TOE.
- Environmental threats requiring controls to provide sufficient protection.
- Organizational security policies for the TOE as appropriate.

This document identifies assumptions as A.assumption with "assumption" specifying a unique name. Threats are identified as T.threat with "threat" specifying a unique name. Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) are identified as P.osp with "osp" specifying a unique name.

3.1 Assumptions

The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE's environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.

Table 11 TOE Assumptions

Assumption	Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION	The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY	The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general-purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION	A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The

Assumption	Assumption Definition
	intent is for the network device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the network device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR	<p>The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.</p> <p>For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g., offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE's trust store (aka 'root store', 'trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g., offline verification).</p>
A.REGULAR_UPDATES	The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE	The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION	The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

3.2 Threats

The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.

Table 12 Threats

Threat	Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS	Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the network device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY	Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS	Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the network device itself.

Threat	Threat Definition
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS	Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE	Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY	Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the network device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE	Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker's credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING	Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.

Threat	Threat Definition
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE	An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

The following table lists the Organizational Security Policies imposed by an organization to address its security needs.

Table 13 Organizational Security Policies

Policy Name	Policy Definition
P.ACCESS_BANNER	The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.

4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE's IT environment in meeting the security needs.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v2.2e does not define any security objectives for the TOE.

4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment

All the assumptions stated in section 3.1 are considered to be security objectives for the environment. The following are the Protection Profile non-IT security objectives, which, in addition to those assumptions, are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures.

Table 14 Security Objectives for the Environment

Environment Security Objective	IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE	There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION	The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN	Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner.

Environment Security Objective	IT Environment Security Objective Definition
	For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE's trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted.
OE.UPDATES	The TOE firmware and software is updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE	The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION	The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017 and all international interpretations.

5.1 Conventions

The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC and claimed PP/EP:

- Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [CC2] or their extended component definition (ECD);
- Refinement made by PP author: Indicated with **bold text** and ~~strikethroughs~~;
- Selection wholly or partially completed in the PP: the selection values (i.e., the selection values adopted in the PP or the remaining selection values available for the ST) are indicated with underlined text
 - e.g., “[selection: *disclosure, modification, loss of use*]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “disclosure” (completion) or “[selection: disclosure, modification]” (partial completion) in the PP;
- Assignment wholly or partially completed in the PP: indicated with *italicized text*
- Assignment completed within a selection in the PP: the completed assignment text is indicated with *italicized and underlined text*
 - e.g., “[selection: *change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]*]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “change_default, select_tag” (completion of both selection and assignment) or “[selection: change_default, select_tag, select_value]” (partial completion of selection, and completion of assignment) in the PP;
- Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g., “FCS_COP.1/Hash”).

Extended SFRs are identified by having a label “EXT” at the end of the SFR name.

Formatting conventions outside of operations and iterations matches the formatting specified within the NDcPPv2.2e.

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The TOE Security Functional Requirements that appear in the following table are described in more detail in the following subsections.

Table 15 Security Functional Requirements

Class Name	Component Identification	Component Name
FAU: Security audit	FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation
	FAU_GEN.2	User Identity Association
	FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS: Cryptographic support	FCS_CKM.1	Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
	FCS_CKM.2	Cryptographic Key Establishment
	FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic Key Destruction
	FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
	FCS_COP.1/SigGen	Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
	FCS_COP.1/Hash	Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	HTTPS
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
	FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	SSH Client Protocol
	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH Server Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	TLS Server Protocol	
FIA: Identification and authentication	FIA_AFL.1	Authentication Failure Handling
	FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password Management
	FIA_UIA_EXT.1	User Identification and Authentication
	FIA_UAU_EXT.2	Password-based Authentication Mechanism
	FIA_UAU.7	Protected Authentication Feedback
	FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	X.509 Certificate Validation
	FIA_X509_EXT.2	X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.3	X.509 Certificate Requests	
FMT: Security management	FMT_MOF.1/Functions	Management of security functions behaviour
	FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Management of security functions behaviour
	FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	Management of TSF Data
	FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	Management of TSF Data
	FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions
	FMT_SMR.2	Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF	FPT_APW_EXT.1	Protection of Administrator Passwords
	FPT_SKP_EXT.1	Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
	FPT_STM_EXT.1	Reliable Time Stamps
	FPT_TST_EXT.1	TSF Testing

Class Name	Component Identification	Component Name
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted Update
FTA: TOE Access	FTA_SSL_EXT.1	TSF-initiated Session Locking
	FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated Termination
	FTA_SSL.4	User-initiated Termination
	FTA_TAB.1	Default TOE Access Banners
FTP: Trusted path/channels	FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel
	FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Trusted Path

5.2.1 Security audit (FAU)

5.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c) *All administrative actions comprising:*
 - *Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for administrators).*
 - *Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).*
 - *Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).*
 - *Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).*
 - *[no other actions];*
- d) *Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 16.*

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and

- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, *information specified in column three of Table 16.*

Table 16 Auditable Events

SFR	Auditable Event	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1	None.	None.
FAU_GEN.2	None.	None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.2	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.4	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	None.	None.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an HTTPS session.	Reason for failure.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session	Reason for failure.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session	Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an TLS session	Reason for failure.
FIA_AFL.1	Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of the identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of the identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7	None.	None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate Any addition, replacement or removal of trust anchors in the TOE's trust store	Reason for failure of certificate validation Identification of certificates added, replaced or removed as trust anchor in the TOE's trust store
FIA_X509_EXT.2	None.	None.

SFR	Auditable Event	Additional Audit Record Contents
FIA_X509_EXT.3	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual update	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	None	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	None	None
FMT_SMF.1	All management activities of TSF data.	None.
FMT_SMR.2	None.	None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time – either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged. See also application note on FPT_STM_EXT.1)	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g., IP address).
FPT_TST_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success and failure)	None.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	Any attempts at unlocking of an interactive session.	None.
FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive session.	None.
FTA_TAB.1	None.	None.
FTP_ITC.1	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted path.	None.

SFR	Auditable Event	Additional Audit Record Contents
	Failures of the trusted path functions.	

5.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association

FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

5.2.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage

FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.

FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself [TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally].

FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [the newest record will overwrite the oldest record] when the local storage space for audit data is full.

5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

5.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [

- RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
- ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;
- FFC Schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B1

] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

5.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall **perform** cryptographic **key establishment** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key **establishment** method: [

- RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1;
- Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography";
- Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography.";

] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].

5.2.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [

- *For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes, a new value of the key]];*
- *For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [*
 - logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes]]]

that meets the following: *No Standard.*

5.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform *encryption/decryption* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *AES used in [CBC, CTR, GCM] mode* and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: *AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116].*

5.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform *cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm

[

- RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (*modulus*) [2048 bits or greater]

that meet the following: [

- For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3,

].

5.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)

FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform *cryptographic hashing services* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [~~assignment: cryptographic key sizes~~] and **message digest sizes** [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004*.

5.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform *keyed-hash message authentication* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1] and cryptographic key sizes [256-bit] and **message digest sizes** [160] bits that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”*.

5.2.2.8 FCS_HTTPS.1 HTTPS Protocol

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3 If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [not establish the connection] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

5.2.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [1 software-based noise source] with minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

5.2.2.10 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client Protocol

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 [4256, 4344, 5656, 6187, 6668, 8268, 8308 Section 3.1, and 8332].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [no other method].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256K] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1] as its data integrity MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and ecdh-sha2-nistp256], [ecdh-sha2-nistp384], and [ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH client authenticates the identity of the SSH server using a local database associating each host name with its corresponding public key and [no other methods] as described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.

5.2.2.11 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 [4256, 4344, 5656, 6187, 6668, 8268, 8308 Section 3.1, and 8332].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password based].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256K] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

5.2.2.12 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

[

- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289

].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and [*none*].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [RSA with key size [2048 bits]; ECDHE curves [secp256r1] and no other curves].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall support [session resumption based on session IDs according to RFC 4346 (TLS1.1) or RFC 5246 (TLS1.2), session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 5077].

5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)

5.2.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling

FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1-3] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to *Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password*.

FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until [an Authorized Administrator unlocks the locked user account] is taken by an Administrator].

5.2.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management

FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: ["!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(,)", [no other characters]];
- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [15] and [128] characters.

5.2.3.3 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
- [no other actions].

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated action on behalf of that administrative user.

5.2.3.4 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based] authentication mechanism, and [no other authentication mechanism] to perform local administrative user authentication.

5.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback

FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only *obscured feedback* to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress **at the local console**.

5.2.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation **supporting a minimum path length of three certificates**.
- The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)] as specified in RFC 6960].
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 - *Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
 - *Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
 - *Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
 - *OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

5.2.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS, HTTPS], and [no additional uses].

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [not accept the certificate].

5.2.3.8 FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests

FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request Message as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and [Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].

FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.

5.2.4 Security management (FMT)

5.2.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behavior

FMT_MOF.1.1/Functions The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour] the functions [transmission of audit data to an external IT entity] to *Security Administrators*.

5.2.4.2 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour

FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual update to Security Administrators.

5.2.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data

FMT_MTD.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

5.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the *cryptographic keys to Security Administrators*.

5.2.4.5 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- *Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;*
 - *Ability to configure the access banner;*
 - *Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;*
 - *Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [hash comparison] capability prior to installing those updates;*
 - *Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;*
 - [
 - Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g., changes to storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full);
 - Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality
 - Ability to manage cryptographic keys;
 - Ability to re-enable an Administrator account
 - Ability to set the time which is used for timestamps;
 - Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;
 - Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
]
-].

5.2.4.6 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles

FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- *Security Administrator.*

FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

- *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;*
 - *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely*
- are satisfied.

5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.2.5.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords

FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.

FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.

5.2.5.2 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)

FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

5.2.5.3 FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable time stamps

FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].

5.2.5.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [

- *RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification)*
- *AES Known Answer Test*
- *SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test*
- *HMAC Known Answer Test*
- *RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test*
- *Software Integrity Test*

].

5.2.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide [*Security Administrators*] the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE firmware/software version].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide [*Security Administrators*] the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [published hash] prior to installing those updates.

5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)

5.2.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [

- terminate the session]

after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

5.2.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination

FTA_SSL.3.1: The TSF shall terminate **a remote** interactive session after a *Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity*.

5.2.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination

FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow **Administrator**-initiated termination of the **Administrator's** own interactive session.

5.2.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing **an administrative user** session the TSF shall display **a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent** warning message regarding use of the TOE.

5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

5.2.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

FTP_ITC.1.1: The TSF shall **be capable of using [SSH] to provide** a trusted communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server**, [no other capabilities] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit **the TSF or the authorized IT entities** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [

- *external audit server using SSH*

].

5.2.7.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path

FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin: The TSF shall **be capable of using [SSH, HTTPS, TLS] to provide** a communication path between itself and **authorized remote Administrators** that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions.

5.3 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in NDcPPv2.2e

The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in this Security Target represent the SFRs identified in the NDcPPv2.2e. As such, the NDcPPv2.2e SFR dependency rationale is deemed acceptable since the PP itself has been validated.

5.4 Security Assurance Requirements

5.4.1 SAR Requirements

The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the NDcPPv2.2e which are derived from Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated April 2017. The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below.

Table 17 Assurance Measures

Assurance Class	Components	Components Description
Security Target (ASE)	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.1	Security objectives for the operational environment
	ASE_REQ.1	Stated security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security Problem Definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
	Development (ADV)	ADV_FSP.1
Guidance Documents (AGD)	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative User guidance
Life Cycle Support (ALC)	ALC_CMC.1	Labeling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM coverage
Tests (ATE)	ATE_IND.1	Independent testing - conformance
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)	AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability analysis

5.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs identified in the NDcPPv2.2e. As such, the NDcPPv2.2e SAR rationale is deemed acceptable since the PP itself has been validated.

5.5 Assurance Measures

The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance Measures applied by Cisco to satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below lists the details.

Table 18 Assurance Measures

Component	How requirement will be met
Security Target (ASE) / ASE_CCL.1 / ASE_ECD.1 / ASE_INT.1 / ASE_OBJ.1 / ASE_REQ.1 / ASE_SPD.1 / ASE_TSS.1	Section 2 of this ST includes the TOE and ST conformance claim to CC Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017, CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant and NDcPPv2.2e and the rationale of how TOE provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in NDcPPv2.2e. Section 2 also includes the consistency rationale for the TOE Security Problem Definition and the Security Requirements to include the extended components definition.
ADV_FSP.1	<p>The functional specification describes the external interfaces of the TOE, such as the means for a user to invoke a service and the corresponding response of those services. The description includes the interface(s) that enforces a security functional requirement, the interface(s) that supports the enforcement of a security functional requirement, and the interface(s) that does not enforce any security functional requirements.</p> <p>The interfaces are described in terms of their:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • purpose (general goal of the interface) • method of use (how the interface is to be used) • parameters (explicit inputs to and outputs from an interface that control the behaviour of that interface) • parameter descriptions (tells what the parameter is in some meaningful way) • error messages (identifies the condition that generated it, what the message is, and the meaning of any error codes) <p>The development evidence also contains a tracing of the interfaces to the SFRs described in this ST.</p>
AGD_OPE.1	<p>The Administrative Guide provides the descriptions of the processes and procedures of how the administrative users of the TOE can securely administer the TOE using the interfaces that provide the features and functions detailed in the ST.</p>
AGD_PRE.1	<p>The Installation Guide describes the installation, generation and startup procedures so that the users of the TOE can setup the components of the TOE in the evaluated configuration.</p>

Component	How requirement will be met
ALC_CMC.1	The Configuration Management (CM) document(s) describes how the consumer (end-user) of the TOE can identify the evaluated TOE (Target of Evaluation).
ALC_CMS.1	
ATE_IND.1	Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1	Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.

6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures

This section identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE.

Table 19 How TOE SFRs Measures

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
FAU_GEN.1	<p>The TOE generates an audit record that is stored internally within the TOE whenever an audited event occurs. Audit records are stored in files within the file system provided by the TOE. The TOE stores auditable events in separate log files containing related types of audited data. The following log files together comprise the TSF audit trail by covering all events listed in Table 16:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audit Logs (default) • CLI Audit Logs (default) • Configuration Logs • GUI Logs (default) • Logging Logs (default) • Authentication Framework Logs (default) • Status Logs (default) • System Logs (default) • Updater Logs (default) <p>The TOE shall ensure that each auditable event is associated with the user that triggered the event and as a result they are traceable to a specific user. For example, a human user, user identity, or related session ID would be included in the audit record. For an IT entity or device, the IP address, MAC address, host name, or other configured identification is presented. Each audit record includes date and time of the audited event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event. The auditable events comprise:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Start-up and shutdown of the audit function - recorded in System Logs • Access to the TOE and System data - recorded in: CLI Audit Logs (for console interfaces) and GUI logs; and Updater logs (TOE updates). • Reading of information from the audit records - recorded in CLI Audit Logs for the CLI events and GUI Logs for the GUI events • Unsuccessful attempts to read information from the audit records - recorded in CLI Audit Logs for the CLI events and GUI Logs for the GUI

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>events</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the audit collection functions are operating - recorded in CLI Audit Logs for the CLI events and GUI Logs for the GUI events • All modifications in the behavior of the functions of the TSF, that include all administrative actions, such as login/logout, generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (including a reference of any associated keys), resetting of passwords- recorded in CLI Audit Logs for the CLI events and GUI Logs for the GUI events • All modifications to the values of TSF data, that include all administrative actions, such as login/logout, generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (including a reference of any associated keys), resetting of passwords - recorded in CLI Audit Logs for the CLI events and GUI Logs for the GUI events • Modifications to the group of users that are part of an Administrator role - recorded in CLI Audit Logs for the CLI events and GUI Logs for the GUI events <p>Authorized Administrators can access all audit information. The Authorized Administrators can manually download the log files by clicking a link to the log directory on the Log Subscriptions page, then clicking the log file to access. Depending on the browser, an Authorized Administrator can view the file in a browser window, or open or save it as a text file. This method uses the HTTP(S) protocol and is the default retrieval method.</p> <p>Example audit events are included below:</p> <p>< Date and time of the event> < type of event> < source IP> <subject identity> <outcome> <url accessed with return HTTP headers></p> <pre>Thu Nov 1 19:03:00 2012 Info: login:10.65.79.90 user:admin session:XtL50wP9GB92YfjVerYb</pre> <pre>Thu Nov 1 19:03:00 2012 Info: req:10.65.79.90 user:- id:XtL50wP9GB92YfjVerYb 303 POST /login HTTP/1.1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4) AppleWebKit/537.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/22.0.1229.94 Safari/537.4</pre> <pre>Thu Nov 1 19:03:02 2012 Info: req:10.65.79.90 user:admin id:XtL50wP9GB92YfjVerYb 200 GET /monitor/user_report HTTP/1.1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4) AppleWebKit/537.4 (KHTML, like Gecko)</pre>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>Chrome/22.0.1229.94 Safari/537.4</p> <p>Thu Nov 1 19:03:03 2012 Info: req:10.65.79.90 user:admin id:XtL50wP9GB92YfjVerYb 200 GET /scfw/1y-8.0.0-366/navigation.css HTTP/1.1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4) AppleWebKit/537.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/22.0.1229.94 Safari/537.4</p> <p>Thu Nov 1 19:03:03 2012 Info: req:10.65.79.90 user:admin id:XtL50wP9GB92YfjVerYb 200 GET /scfw/1y-8.0.0-366/widget/tablecols/table-cols-min.css HTTP/1.1 Mozilla/5.0(Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4) AppleWebKit/537.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/22.0.1229.94 Safari/537.4 Thu Nov 1 19:03:03 2012 Info: req:10.65.79.90 user:admin id:XtL50wP9GB92YfjVerYb 200 GET /yui_webui HTTP/1.1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4) AppleWebKit/537.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/22.0.1229.94 Safari/537.4</p> <p>Thu Nov 1 19:03:04 2012 Info: req:10.65.79.90 user:admin id:XtL50wP9GB92YfjVerYb 200 GET /javascript?CSRFKey=f0fadf9c-fce3-43b6-84ae-3b42f559bcd5&language=en-usHTTP/1.1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4) AppleWebKit/537.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/22.0.1229.94 Safari/537.4</p>
FAU_GEN.2	<p>The TOE shall ensure that each auditable event is associated with the user that triggered the event and as a result they are traceable to a specific user. For example, a human user, user identity, or related session ID would be included in the audit record. For an IT entity or device, the IP address, MAC address, host name, or other configured identification is presented. A sample audit record is below:</p> <p>Fri Jun 6 16:35:22 2014 Info: login:192.168.1.228 user:admin session:fl023Y0gCdc5u4BuWqL8 The HTTPS session has been established successfully.</p>
FAU_STG_EXT.1	<p>The TOE is configured to send the audit log records within each of the log files listed below to a specified, remote syslog server. The TOE protects communications with the remote syslog server via SCP over SSHv2. This must be configured by an Authorized Administrator. Once configured, the TOE can automatically send the audit records to the configured remote syslog server. The log files that must be configured to be sent to the external syslog server are:</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audit Logs (default) • CLI Audit Logs (default) • Configuration History Logs • Connection Management Logs • GUI Logs (default) • Logging Logs (default) • Auth Logs (default) • Status Logs (default) • System Logs (default) <p>Updater Logs (default)</p> <p>The TOE provides the following mechanisms for sending the log files to a remote syslog server:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SCP on Remote [syslog] Server - a remote syslog server that supports a scp command can copy log files from the TOE to the remote syslog server. The user of the scp command on the remote syslog server must be the Authorized Administrator on the TOE, as the TOE will prompt for the Authorized Administrator password before processing the SCP request • SCP Push - additionally, the TOE can be configured to periodically push log files to a SCP server on a remote syslog server <p>The Authorized Administrator can configure the time interval for sending the log files to the remote syslog with a minimum time lapse of 60 seconds and maximum time of 12 days. The time setting is customized based on day, hour, minutes, and seconds. There is also a configurable maximum log file size limit (100KB – 104MB configuration range) for sending logs. If the log file size crosses the limit before the configured time duration has expired, the logs will still get pushed.</p> <p>Both of the above SCP methods are secured by SSHv2. The SCP is the method that periodically pushes log files to an SCP server on a remote syslog server. This method requires an SSH SCP server on the remote syslog server using SSHv2 protocol. The subscription requires a username, SSH key, and destination directory on the remote syslog server. Log files are transferred based on a rollover schedule set by the Authorized Administrator. The TOE generates an email alert to the Authorized Administrator and begins overwriting the oldest stored audit records when the audit trail becomes full. (Note that the TOE does not stop collecting or producing System data). The alert is generated to an Authorized Administrator who has been configured via the Command Line Interface (<i>alertconfig</i> command) to receive email alerts for this event. The TOE does not provide interfaces to modify individual records. When the audit trail becomes full,</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>the TOE ensures that the most recent audit records will be maintained, limited only by the available storage space.</p> <p>The SCP push method periodically pushes log files to an SCP server on a remote syslog server. This method also requires an SSH SCP server on a remote syslog server using SSHv2 protocol to secure the connection. The subscription requires a username (recommend that it is Authorized Administrator on the TOE), SSH key and destination directory on the remote syslog server. Log files are transferred based on a rollover schedule set by the Authorized Administrator.</p> <p>The TOE can detect when the SSH connection fails. If the connection fails, the session will automatically be reestablished following the configuration settings described in the Cisco Web Security Appliance (WSA)running Async OS 11.8 Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures document. The TOE also stores a local set of audit records on the TOE and continues to do so if the communication with the syslog server goes down. Once the connection is restored, the audit records will be sent to the remote syslog server as configured. For example, on the next SCP push based on either the maximum log file size being exceeded or on the time interval, the current log file and the log files previously unsuccessfully transferred will be transferred.</p> <p>The TOE stores the audit logs locally as configured with the <i>logconfig</i> command in the CLI and the Log Subscriptions page in the GUI. The size of the local log files is set by an Authorized Administrator using the 'Rollover by File Size' configuration setting. Once the file reaches the specified size, they are sent to the remote syslog server using SCP. These transfers can also be configured based on configured time intervals.</p> <p>Only Authorized Administrators can clear the local logs, and there is no TOE interface that allows for administrators to modify the contents of the local audit records.</p> <p>The TOE's default installation configures the audit log files to maintain 10 files of no more than 10MB for each log subscription. The Authorized Administrator does not need to configure this setting; however, this value is customizable. The Authorized Administrators can configure each log subscription to allow 1-1000 maximum log files, and each log file can be configurable to a maximum of between 100KB and 100MB. There is no limit to the number of log subscriptions that the Authorized Administrator can create.</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met																			
	<p>With a typical configuration, the log space should not grow beyond a reasonable limit. If through customization of the log limits, the log files grow too much, alerts will be sent to the Authorized Administrators when the log partition grows beyond 90% usage. If the space available for storing audit records is exhausted, the TOE will start to overwrite the oldest records in the audit trail and generate an email alert to this effect and send it to an Authorized Administrators.</p> <p>Refer to the Cisco Web Security Appliance (WSA)running Async OS 11.8 Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for full details and configuration settings.</p>																			
<p>FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2</p>	<p>The TOE implements Diffie-Hellman based key establishment schemes with cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meets FIPS 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”, Appendix B1. The TOE implements and uses the prime and generator specified in RFC 3526 Section 3 when generating parameters for the key exchange. In addition, ECC schemes are used with P-256, P-384, and P-521.</p> <p>The TOE complies with FIPS 186-4 regarding RSA key pair generation. The TOE employs RSA-based key establishment, RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 used in cryptographic operations as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017.</p> <p>The TOE can create an RSA public-private key pair of 2048 bit or greater that can be used to generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). Via offline CSR the TOE can send the CSR to a Certificate Authority (CA) for the CA to generate a certificate; and receive its certificate (including X.509v3) from the CA.</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="532 1100 1325 1707"> <thead> <tr> <th>Scheme</th> <th>SFR</th> <th>Service</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>RSA</td> <td>FCS_TLSS_EXT.1</td> <td rowspan="4">Remote Administration</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DH (group 14)</td> <td>FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RSAES-PKCS1</td> <td>FCS_TLSS_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ECC</td> <td>FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RSA</td> <td>FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1</td> <td rowspan="3">Remote Syslog Server</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DH (group 14)</td> <td>FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ECC</td> <td>FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>The TOE acts as both a sender and recipient in the following SFRs and services:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 (HTTPS Remote Administration) • FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 (SSH Remote Administration) 	Scheme	SFR	Service	RSA	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	Remote Administration	DH (group 14)	FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1	RSAES-PKCS1	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	ECC	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1	RSA	FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1	Remote Syslog Server	DH (group 14)	FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1	ECC	FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1
Scheme	SFR	Service																		
RSA	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	Remote Administration																		
DH (group 14)	FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1																			
RSAES-PKCS1	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1																			
ECC	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1																			
RSA	FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1	Remote Syslog Server																		
DH (group 14)	FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1																			
ECC	FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1																			

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 (Transmit generated audit data to a remote server) <p>The Integrity of the CSR and certificate during transit are assured through use of digital signatures (encrypting the hash of the TOE's public key contained in the CSR and certificate).</p> <p>The TOE can store and distribute the certificate to external entities including Registration Authorities (RA). The TOE can also use X.509v3 certificates for authentication of TLS sessions.</p> <p>The key pair generation portions of "The RSA Validation System" for FIPS 186-4 were used as a guide in testing the FCS_CKM.1.</p> <p>For details on each protocol see the related SFR.</p>
FCS_CKM.4	<p>The TOE meets all requirements as specified by the cryptographic key destruction method of the keys and the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) when no longer required for use.</p> <p>The TOE zeroizes all the cryptographic keys used within the TOE after the key is no longer of use to the TOE. The cryptographic module performs the overwrite of the cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters that are handled by the CiscoSSL library (FOM) are zeroized using a function that will overwrite the memory once they are no longer in use.</p> <p>Swap space is encrypted using AES to avoid accidental leakage of CSPs. As part of the reload command, an option to wipe the data is provided. The wipe option along with the 'wipedata' command will overwrite the hard drive with zeros so that the keys are zeroized within the old core dump files.</p> <p>The information provided in Table 20 TOE Key Zeroization includes all the secrets, keys and associated values, the description, and the method used to zeroization when no longer required for use. This information is provided in the reference section for ease and readability of all the all secrets, keys and associated values, their description and zeroization methods.</p>
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	<p>The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC, CTR, and GCM mode (128 and 256 bits) as described in ISO 18033-3, ISO 19772, and ISO 10116.</p> <p>See CAVP certificate in Table 7 FIPS References for validation details.</p> <p>AES is implemented in the following protocols: TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 and SSHv2.</p> <p>The TOE also provides AES encryption and decryption in support of SSHv2 and TLSv1.1/2 for secure communications.</p> <p>The configuration and management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI, to include the auditing of configuring the options by the</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>Authorized Administrator.</p> <p>The relevant FIPS certificate numbers are listed in Table 7 FIPS References</p>
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	<p>The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with key size of 2048 and greater as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard". The relevant FIPS certificate numbers are listed in Table 7 FIPS References.</p> <p>The TOE provides cryptographic signatures in support of SSHv2 and TLSv1.1/2 for secure communications. The TOE provides the RSA option in support of SSHv2 and TLSv1.1/2 key establishment. RSA 2048-bit is used in the establishment of both TLSv1.1/2 and SSHv2 key establishment. For SSHv2, RSA host keys are supported</p> <p>Management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI with auditing of those commands.</p> <p>The relevant FIPS certificate numbers are listed in Table 7 FIPS References.</p>
FCS_COP.1/Hash	<p>The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as specified in ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004. The TOE provides hashing as part of the TLS session integrity. In addition, SHA-384 hashing is used for verification of software image integrity.</p> <p>The TOE uses server-side X.509v3 certificates for authentication. The digital signature is comprised of an encrypted hash function. Verification of the digital signature includes using the digital signature public key to retrieve the hash value and then verify that the hash is valid. SHA1 may also be used in the keyed hash function of HMAC.</p> <p>The TOE provides Secure Hash Standard (SHS) hashing in support of TLS, for secure communications. Management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI with auditing of those commands.</p> <p>The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-1, key size 256 bits, and message digest sizes 160 bits as specified in ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2". The block size for HMAC-SHA1 is 512 bits.</p> <p>The TOE provides SHS hashing and HMAC message authentication in support of SSHv2, and TLSv1.1/2 for secure communications. Management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI with auditing of those</p>
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>commands.</p> <p>SHS hashing and HMAC message authentication (SHA-1) is used in the establishment of HTTPS, TLS and SSHv2 sessions.</p> <p>The relevant FIPS certificate numbers are listed in Table 7 FIPS References.</p> <p>Refer to the Cisco Web Security Appliance (WSA)running Async OS 11.8 Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Proceduresfor full details and configuration settings.</p>
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	<p>The TOE implements HTTPS over TLS as specified in RFC 2818 and FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.</p> <p>The TSF HTTPS implementation authenticates the TOE to the remote client with an X.509 certificate. Authorized Administrators manage the TOE identity certificates using the Destination Controls page in the GUI or <i>interfaceconfig</i> command in the TOE CLI. HTTPS then uses the Authorized Administrators selected identity certificate.</p> <p>The TSF HTTPS implementation performs server-based authentication using a server X.509v3 certificate to establish the TLS session. The TSF HTTPS implementation does not require client authentication at the TLS level but presents the Web interface logon page for Authorized Administrators to authenticate using their name and password.</p>
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	<p>The TOE implements a NIST-approved AES-CTR Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG), as specified in SP 800-90A seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a TSF-software based noise source as described in FCS_RBG_EXT.1. This output is used directly to seed the DRBG.</p> <p>The deterministic RBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy, which is at least equal to the greatest security strength of the keys and hashes that it will generate.</p>
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	<p>The TOE implements SSHv2 to secure the remote session between the TOE and syslog server. SSHv2 is implemented according to the following RFCs: 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, <u>4256</u>, 4344, 5656, 6187, 6668, 8268, 8308 Section 3.1, and <u>8332</u>.</p> <p>The TOE supports public key-based authentication.</p> <p>The TOE uses a SCP push to securely send the audit logs to a remote syslog</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>server over a secured SSHv2 session. The SSH client (the TOE) authenticates the identity of the SSH server (remote syslog server) using a local database associating each host name with its corresponding public key as described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.</p> <p>SSH connections will be dropped if the TOE receives a packet larger than 256K bytes. Large packets are detected by the SSH implementation and dropped internal to the SSH process. A rekey occurs after a threshold of no longer than one hour and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data.</p> <p>Any session where the SSH server offers only non-compliant algorithms or key sizes will be rejected by the SSH client. SSH sessions can only be established when compliant algorithms and key sizes can be negotiated.</p> <p>The TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • public key algorithms for authentication: <u>rsa-sha2-256</u>, <u>rsa-sha2-512</u>, • public key exchange: <u>diffie-hellman-group14-sha1</u> and <u>ecdh-sha2-nistp256</u>, <u>ecdh-sha2-nistp384</u>, and <u>ecdh-sha2-nistp521</u>. • encryption algorithms, <u>aes128-cbc</u>, <u>aes256-cbc</u>, <u>aes128-ctr</u> and <u>aes256-ctr</u> to ensure confidentiality of the session. • hashing algorithms <u>HMAC-SHA1</u> to ensure the integrity of the session.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	<p>The TOE implements SSHv2 for remote CLI sessions. SSHv2 is implemented according to the following RFCs: <u>4251</u>, <u>4252</u>, <u>4253</u>, <u>4254</u>, <u>4256</u>, <u>4344</u>, <u>5656</u>, <u>6187</u>, <u>6668</u>, <u>8268</u>, <u>8308</u> Section 3.1, and <u>8332</u>. The TOE supports both public key-based and password-based authentication. When establishing a connection to the SSH server using a public key, the public key is compared to the public key stored in the <u>authorized_keys</u> file. If the keys match, the connection is established.</p> <p>The remote CLI SSHv2 sessions are limited to an Authorized Administrators configurable session timeout period and will be rekeyed after a threshold of no longer than one hour, and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data.</p> <p>SSH connections will be dropped if the TOE receives a packet larger than 256K bytes. Large packets are detected by the SSH implementation and dropped internal to the SSH process.</p> <p>Any session where the SSH client offers only non-compliant algorithms or key sizes will be rejected by the SSH server. SSH sessions can only be established</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>when compliant algorithms and key sizes can be negotiated.</p> <p>The TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • public key algorithms for authentication: <u>rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512</u>. • public key exchange: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 • public key-based and password-based authentication for administrative users accessing the TOE's CLI through SSHv2. • encryption algorithms, aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr and aes256-ctr are used to ensure confidentiality of the session. • hashing algorithm, HMAC-SHA1 is used to ensure the integrity of the session.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	<p>An Authorized Administrator can initiate inbound TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 connections using the web-based GUI for remote administration of the TOE.</p> <p>Using wildcards is not supported in identity certificates, such as when you import the certificate and private key into WSA. Certificate pinning is also not supported in the evaluated configuration.</p> <p>Both RSA 2048 and ECDHE using secp 256r1 are being used for key exchange. RSA 2048 is used for authentication. In the TLS_RSA and TLS_ECDHE ciphers the RSA public key is used for authentication and key exchange. Using the below TLS_ECDHE ciphers the standard Diffie-Hellman parameters P, Q, and G are used for key exchange.</p> <p>Following are the supported ciphersuites:</p> <p>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256</p> <p>Once configured, the TOE will not establish TLS v1.0, SSL2.0 or SSL3.0 connections if offered by the client and only the supported/configured TLS ciphersuites will be used to establish the session. In addition, the TOE will only establish a connection if the peer presents a valid X509 certificate during the handshake.</p> <p>The TOE supports TLS session resumption based on session IDs according to RFC 4346 (TLS1.1) or RFC 5246 (TLS1.2) and session resumption based on session</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	tickets according to RFC 5077. Session tickets are encrypted using AESCBC-128- and AESGCM-256. TLS session resumption is enabled by default.
FIA_AFL.1	<p>The TOE provides the Authorized Administrators the ability to specify the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts before Authorized Administrator is locked out through the administrative CLI and GUI interfaces. While the TOE supports a range from 1-60 with a default of 5 attempts, in the evaluated configuration, the maximum number of failed attempts is required to be set to 3.</p> <p>When the Authorized Administrator attempting to log into the administrative CLI or GUI interface reaches the administratively set maximum number of failed authentication attempts, the user will not be granted access to the administrative functionality of the TOE until an Authorized Administrator resets the user's number of failed login attempts through the administrative CLI using the <i>userconfig</i> command or GUI Edit User webpage.</p> <p>The TOE includes the following administrative roles and access:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “admin” default user account that has full access to all system configuration settings. Note, this account is not subject to the lock out at the local console. This is to ensure the administrators do not get totally locked out of the TOE. • “Administrators” have full access to all system configuration settings. This Authorized Administrator account does meet the lockout criteria at the local console and when remotely connected to the TOE via the GUI (secured with HTTPS/TLS) and therefore should be used for the daily management of the TOE.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	<p>The TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords. The passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, and “)”).</p> <p>Minimum password length is configurable by the Authorized Administrator. The TOE supports passwords between 15 and 128 characters; however, in the evaluated configuration the password must be a minimum of 15 characters.</p>
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2	<p>The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any TSF mediated actions to be performed, except for the login banner that is displayed prior to user authentication.</p> <p>Administrative access to the TOE is facilitated through the TOE's CLI and GUI.</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>The TOE mediates all administrative actions through the CLI and GUI. Once the administrative user attempts to access the CLI via either a directly connected console or remotely through SSHv2, the TOE prompts the user for a username and password. Likewise, when the administrative user attempts to access the web-based GUI of the TOE through HTTPS over TLSv1.1/2, the TOE prompts the user for a username and password. Only after the administrative user presents the correct authentication credentials will access to the TOE administrative functionality be granted. No access is allowed to the administrative functionality of the TOE until the Authorized Administrators is successfully identified and authenticated.</p> <p>The TOE provides a local password-based authentication mechanism for the CLI when accessed both locally and remotely as well as the GUI. When the CLI is accessed remotely, the session is secured via SSHv2 and authenticated using SSH public key. The password mechanism can be configured to require passwords to be a minimum of 15 characters from the printable character set. The TOE prevents administrative user actions from being performed prior to successful identification and authentication of the Authorized Administrators.</p> <p>Note, however, that users accessing the CLI via SSHv2 can be authenticated using public key cryptography. This requires the user's public key to be entered into the TOE (using the <i>sshconfig</i> command) and associated with the user's account. If there is no public key configured for the user, the user will instead, be prompted to enter a password to authenticate.</p>
FIA_UAU.7	<p>When a user enters their password at the directly connected local console, the TOE displays only '*' characters so that the user password is obscured.</p> <p>For remote session authentication via SSHv2 or TLSv1.1/2 secured connection, the TOE does not echo any characters as they are entered.</p>
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	<p>The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS connections. The certificate validation checking takes place when the certificate is loaded.</p> <p>The TOE supports the following methods to obtain a certificate from a CA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Manual cut-and-paste - WSA generates the Certificate Request Message as described in RFC 2986 which contains the public key and is displayed via the GUI or CLI interface. This allows the administrator to copy the certificate request and in a secure offline manner send the request to a Certification Authority to be
FIA_X509_EXT.2	
FIA_X509_EXT.3	

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>transformed into an X.509v3 public-key certificate.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both the certificate request message and the certificates themselves provide protection in that they are digitally signed. If a certificate is modified in any way, it would be invalidated. The digital signature verifications process would show that the certificate had been tampered with when the hash value would be invalid. • The certificate chain establishes a sequence of trusted certificates, from a peer certificate to the root CA certificate. Within the PKI hierarchy, all enrolled peers can validate the certificate of one another if the peers share a trusted root CA certificate or a common subordinate CA. When a certificate chain is received from a peer, the default processing of a certificate chain path continues until the first trusted certificate is reached. • The Authorized Administrator can also configure one or more certificate fields as listed below that will be used to compare the imported certificate to specific criteria such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • alt-subject-name (If subject name doesn't match request, then the alternative subject name filed is used) • expires-on (If certificate is expired, rejects certificate) • issuer-name (Is there a trusted root certificate installed for the CA that signed the certificate). • name (Does the name in the request match the name in the certificate) • serial-number (Has the certificate been revoked. Serial number will be in the CRL) • subject-name (Does the name in the request match the name in the certificate) <p>The administrative user manually installs and selects the certificate used by the TOE for each certificate.</p> <p>The TOE evaluates the extended key usage field based on the following rules:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field. • OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>The physical security of the TOE (A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION) protects WSA and the certificates from being tampered with or deleted. In addition, the TOE identification and authentication security functions protect an unauthorized user from gaining access to the TOE.</p> <p>Prior to being loaded into the TOE, all certificates are validated against a revocation list using OCSP. The OCSP service is enabled by default.</p> <p>Checking is also done for the basicConstraints extension and the CA flag to determine whether they are present and set to TRUE. The local certificate that was imported must contain the basic constraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE, the check also ensure that the key usage extension is present, and the keyEncipherment bit or the keyAgreement bit or both are set. If they are not, the certificate is not accepted.</p> <p>All the certificates include at least the following information: public key, Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit and Country.</p> <p>If the connection to determine the certificate validity cannot be established, WSA does not accept the certificate.</p>
FMT_MOF.1/Functions FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate FMT_MTD.1/CoreData FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	<p>The TOE provides administrative users with a CLI and web-based GUI to interact with and manage the security functions of the TOE. The CLI is the main interface used to administer the TOE since all functionality to configure, securely manage and to monitor the TOE is available via the CLI. The GUI interface can also be used however not all functionality to configure the TOE is available in the GUI. Therefore, in the evaluated configuration it is recommended to use the CLI to perform all configuration and setting of the security functions and to securely manage the TOE.</p> <p>No administrative functionality is available prior to the Authorized Administrators logging in.</p> <p>Through the CLI, the TOE provides the ability for Authorized Administrators to manage TOE data, such as audit data to include transmission of audit data to a remote syslog server, configuration settings, cryptographic keys, security attributes and login banners via the CLI and GUI.</p> <p>A subset of functionality is available in the GUI. For example, the TOE can initially be installed and set up using the GUI via the System Setup Wizard and</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>saving the config file, selecting the SCP Push method for sending the log files to the remote syslog server, uploading, and enabling X509 certificates, setting inactive timeout.</p> <p>The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions. Therefore, semi-privileged administrators with only a subset of privileges can also modify TOE data based on if granted the privilege. See FMT_SMR.2 for more details on the TOE roles and related privileges.</p> <p>Manual software updates can only be done by the Authorized Administrator through either the CLI or GUI. These updates include software upgrades.</p> <p>The TOE also provides the ability for Authorized Administrators to generate and manage the cryptographic keys that are used to secure connections on the TOE. Only the Authorized Administrator has access to manage the trust store. The Authorized Administrator accesses the CLI for management of the cryptographic functions.</p>
FMT_SMF.1	<p>The TOE provides all the capabilities necessary to securely manage the TOE. The Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) user can connect to the TOE using the CLI to perform these functions via SSHv2 secured connection, via the GUI over HTTPS/TLS or at the local console. The CLI is the main interface used to administer the TOE since all functionality to configure, securely manage and to monitor the TOE is available via the CLI. The GUI interface can also be used however not all functionality to configure the TOE is available in the GUI. Therefore, in the evaluated configuration it is recommended to use the CLI to perform all configuration and setting of the security functions and to securely manage the TOE.</p> <p>The specific management capabilities available from the TOE include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local and remote administration of the TOE and the services provided by the TOE via the TOE CLI and GUI interfaces, as described above; • The ability to manage the warning banner message and content which allows the Authorized Administrator the ability to define warning banner that is displayed prior to establishing a session (note this applies to the interactive (human) users; e.g., administrative users); • The ability to manage the time limits of session inactivity which allows the Authorized Administrator the ability to set and modify the inactivity time threshold; • The ability to configure the number of failed administrator logon attempts that will cause the account to be locked until it is reset;

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ability to re-enable an administrator’s account that has been locked; • The ability to update the AsyncOS software. The validity of the image is provided using SHA-384 hash prior to installing the update; • The ability to manage audit behavior and the audit logs which allows the Authorized Administrator to configure the audit logs, view the audit logs, and to clear the audit logs; • The ability to manage the cryptographic functionality which allows the Authorized Administrator the ability to identify and configure the algorithms used to provide protection of the data, such as generating the RSA keys to enable SSHv2 and TLSv1.1/2; • Ability to manage cryptographic keys • The ability to configure the SSHv2 functionality which supports the secure connections to the audit server; • The ability to import the X.509v3 certificates and validate for use in authentication and secure connections; • The ability to configure and set the time clock. <p>A subset of functionality is available in the GUI. For example, the TOE can initially be installed and set up using the GUI via the System Setup Wizard and saving the config file, selecting the SCP Push method for sending the log files to the remote syslog server, uploading, and enabling X509 certificates, setting inactive timeout.</p>
FMT_SMR.2	<p>The TOE maintains Authorized Administrators that include privileged and semi-privileged administrator roles to administer the TOE locally and remotely.</p> <p>The terms “Authorized Administrator” and “Security Administrator” may be used interchangeable in this ST to refer to any user that has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions. The assigned role determines the functions the user can perform, hence the Authorized Administrator with the appropriate privileges.</p> <p>The TOE performs role-based authorization, using TOE platform authorization mechanisms, to grant access to the semi-privileged and privileged roles. The default user account for WSA is ‘admin’ and has all administrative privileges. The admin user account cannot be deleted, but an Authorized Administrator can change the password and lock the account, which is recommended. When an Authorized Administrator creates a new user account, they can assign the user to a predefined or a custom user role. Each role contains differing levels of</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>permissions within the system. Although there is no limit to the number of user accounts that an Authorized Administrator can create on the appliance, Authorized Administrator cannot create user accounts with names that are reserved by the system such as “operator” or “root.”</p> <p>The following roles are predefined by the system and can be assigned to user accounts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • admin - default user account that has full access to all system configuration settings. • Administrator - has full access to all system configuration settings. • Operators - are restricted from creating, editing, or removing user accounts and cannot use the following commands: resetconfig, upgradecheck, upgradeinstall, systemsetup or running the System Setup Wizard. <p>The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions.</p> <p>The privilege level determines the functions the user can perform, hence the Authorized Administrator with the appropriate privileges.</p> <p>The TOE can and shall be configured to authenticate all access to the CLI and GUI using a username and password.</p> <p>The TOE supports both local administration via a directly connected console cable and remote administration via CLI using SSHv2 and via the GUI using HTTPS/TLS secure connection.</p>
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 and FPT_APW_EXT.1	<p>In the evaluated configuration, the TOE must run in FIPS mode. To be in FIPS mode, the Authorized Administrator enters the 'fipsconfig' command at the CLI.</p> <p>During the FIPS mode setup, an Authorized Administrator can select the option to have all passwords, authentication information, certificates, and shared keys encrypted using AES256-CBC. In addition, there is a sub-option using the 'saveconfig' command and the save config dialog in the GUI to encrypt the passwords and keys. In the evaluated configuration, these options must be selected and configured as described in the Cisco Web Server Appliance (WSA) Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures.</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>The encrypted passwords and keys are stored in their respective configuration files and there are no administrative interfaces available to access the data.</p> <p>Refer to the Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for command description and usage information.</p>
FPT_STM.EXT.1	<p>The TOE provides a source of date and time information used in audit event timestamps.</p> <p>The clock function is reliant on the system clock provided by the underlying hardware.</p> <p>This date and time is used as the time stamp that is applied to TOE generated audit records and used to track inactivity of administrative sessions. The time information is also used in setting the system time and administrative session timeout.</p> <p>The time can be configured using the CLI commands: "settime" and "settz". In the GUI, the time can be configured under the Time Zone or Time Settings page from the System Administration menu.</p>
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	<p>An Authorized Administrator can query the currently executing software version via the CLI and GUI.</p> <p>An Authorized Administrator can either manually download the updates or WSA can automatically download the updates when "automated updates" has been configured. Note, in the evaluated configuration, automated updates will not be allowed.</p> <p>The Authorized Administrator manually downloads updates directly from the Cisco Update Servers. The Authorized Administrator is responsible for checking to see if an update is available from Cisco.</p> <p>The Authorized Administrator can also verify the downloaded SHA384 hash. Once the file is downloaded to a server, the Authorized Administrator verifies that it was not tampered with prior to moving it to the TOE by using a SHA-384 utility to compute a SHA-384 hash for the downloaded file and comparing this with the SHA-384 hash for the image listed on the download page on Cisco.com.</p> <p>Once the Authorized Administrator has verified the TOE image, the file can be installed.</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>Attempts to perform an illegitimate update onto the system will be logged into updater logs at INFO level. The sample log line will look as follows:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Wed Dec 11 05:50:07 2013 Info: repeng SHA384 Mismatch</p> <p>If there is an issue with the verification of the SHA384 checksum, the software should not be installed and the Authorized Administrator contacts Cisco TAC for assistance.</p> <p>For full details, refer to the Cisco Web Server Appliance (WSA) Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for assistance.</p>
FPT_TST_EXT.1	<p>During the system bootup process (power on or reboot), all Power-on Startup Tests (POST) are performed for all cryptographic modules. Also, during the initialization and self-tests, the module inhibits all access to the cryptographic algorithms.</p> <p>Additionally, the power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the underlying OS initialization of external interfaces; this prevents the security appliances from passing any data before completing self-tests and entering FIPS mode. In the event of a power-on self-test failure of any component, the system crashes and appropriate information is displayed on the screen, and an alert is sent to an administrative email each time a self-test fails for any reason and a failed part of the functionality is disabled until a problem resolution has been accomplished This operation ensures no cryptographic algorithms can be accessed unless all power on self-tests are successful.</p> <p>The tests include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AES Known Answer Test – For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt a known plain text value resulting in an encrypted value. This encrypted value is compared to a known encrypted value to ensure that the encrypt operation is working correctly. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a known key is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value is compared to a known plaintext value to ensure that the decrypt operation is working correctly. • RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification) –

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>This test takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value to verify that encrypt operation is working properly. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the original plaintext value to ensure the decrypt operation is working properly.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test – For this test, known seed values are provided to the DRBG implementation. The DRBG uses these values to generate random bits. These random bits are compared to known random bits to ensure that the DRBG is operating correctly. • HMAC Known Answer Test – For each of the hash values listed, the HMAC implementation is fed known plaintext data and a known key. These values are used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC to verify that the HMAC and hash operations are operating correctly. • SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test – For each of the values listed, the SHA implementation is fed known data and key. These values are used to generate a hash. This hash is compared to a known value to verify they match, and the hash operations are operating correctly. <p>Prior to installing the image, the Authorized Administrator can verify the public hash to ensure the files has not been tampered with prior to installing. Using a SHA-384 utility, the Authorized Administrator can compute a SHA-384 hash for the downloaded file and compare the results with the SHA-384 hash on the Cisco.com download page.</p> <p>The Software Integrity Test is run automatically whenever the AsyncOS system images is loaded and confirms that the image file that's about to be loaded has maintained its integrity with the signature verification of the file image. The Software Integrity Test is also run automatically whenever the AsyncOS system is rebooted.</p> <p>The FOM cryptographic module that is part of the TOE image, performs both power-up self-tests at Module initialization and continuous conditional tests during operation. Input, output, and cryptographic functions cannot be performed</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>while the Module is in a self-test or error state as the Module is single threaded and will not return to the calling application until the power-up self-tests are complete. If the power-up self-tests fail subsequent calls to the Module will fail and thus no further cryptographic operations are possible.</p> <p>Additionally, within the system, /etc/rc.d/init.d/verify_fsic calls verify_file_integ.sh which extracts, validates, and merges hash databases generated and signed at build time. For each file in the database a current hash is calculated and compared to the hash recorded in the database. If any of the cryptographic tests or comparison of the hash values fail, the TOE will enter an error state or reboot in attempts to correct the problem. If the issue is not resolved, the Authorized Administrator contacts Cisco TAC for assistance.</p> <p>If any component reports failure for the POST, the system crashes and appropriate information is displayed on the screen, and an alert is sent to an administrative email each time a self-test fails for any reason and a failed part of the functionality is disabled until a problem resolution has been accomplished.</p> <p>All ports are blocked from moving to forwarding state during the POST. If all components of all modules pass the POST, the system is placed in FIPS PASS state and ports are allowed to forward data traffic.</p> <p>These tests are sufficient to verify that the correct version of the TOE software is running as well as that the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected because any deviation in the TSF behaviour will be identified by the failure of a self-test.</p>
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 and FTA_SSL.3	<p>The Authorized Administrators can configure maximum inactivity times individually for both the CLI and GUI. The Authorized Administrator can specify how long a user can be logged into the GUI before the user is logged out due to inactivity by default it is set to 30 minutes. Once AsyncOS logs a user out, the appliance redirects the user's web browser to the login page.</p> <p>Likewise, the Authorized Administrator can specify how long a user can be logged into the Web Security appliance's CLI before AsyncOS logs the user out due to inactivity.</p> <p>If a local user session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be terminated and will require re-identification and re-authentication to establish a new session. If a remote user session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be terminated and will require re-identification</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	and re-authentication to establish a new session.
FTA_SSL.4	An administrator can exit out of both the CLI and GUI administrative sessions. The Authorized Administrator can log out of the CLI with the 'exit' command. The Web UI also has a logout option via the drop-down menu
FTA_TAB.1	<p>The Authorized Administrator defines a custom login banner that will be displayed at the GUI and the CLI for both local and remote access configurations prior to allowing Authorized Administrator access through those interfaces.</p> <p>A local console includes any IT Environment Console that is directly connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used by the Authorized Administrator to support TOE administration. Whereas a remote console is one that includes any IT Environment Management workstation with one of the supported Web Browsers or any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used by the Authorized Administrator to support TOE administration through HTTPS/TLS or SSH protected channels.</p>
FTP_ITC.1	<p>The TOE protects communications with the syslog server using SSHv2. SSHv2 uses a keyed hash as defined in FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6. This protects the data from modification by hashing the data and verifying the hash on receipt of the data. This ensures that the data has not been modified in transit. In addition, encryption of the data as defined in FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4 is provided to ensure the data is not disclosed in transit.</p> <p>SCP Push is used for sending audit logs securely over SSHv2 to a syslog server. This method periodically pushes log files to a remote Syslog server. It requires an SSH server on the Syslog Server using the SSHv2 protocol. The subscription requires a username, SSH key, and destination directory on the remote computer. Log files are transferred based on a rollover schedule set by an Authorized Administrator.</p>
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	All remote administrative communications take place over a secure encrypted SSHv2 for the CLI or TLS/HTTPS for the GUI sessions. The SSHv2 session is encrypted using AES encryption. The remote users can initiate SSHv2 communications with the TOE for secure CLI access. TLS/HTTPS is used to secure the communications with the TOE and remote web browser for secure GUI access.

7 ANNEX A: KEY ZEROIZATION

7.1 Key Zeroization

The following table describes the key zeroization referenced by FCS_CKM.4 provided by the TOE. As described below in the table, the TOE zeroizes all secrets, keys, and associated values when they are no longer required. The process in which the TOE zeroizes, meets FIPS 140 validation.

Table 20 TOE Key Zeroization

Name	Description	Stored	Zeroization
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret	The value is zeroized after it has been given back to the consuming operation. The value is overwritten by 0's.	This key is stored in DRAM.	Automatically after completion of DH exchange. Overwritten with: 0x00
Diffie Hellman private exponent	This is the private exponent used as part of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.	This key is stored in DRAM.	Zeroized upon completion of DH exchange. Overwritten with: 0x00
SSH Private Key	Once the function has completed the operations requiring the RSA key object, the module overwrites the entire object (no matter its contents).	This key is stored in NVRAM	Zeroized upon deletion of the SSH public/private key pair when no longer needed Overwritten with: 0x00
SSH Session Key	Once the function has completed the operations requiring the RSA key object, the module overwrites the entire object (no matter its contents).	This key is stored in DRAM.	Automatically when the SSH session is terminated. Overwritten with: 0x00
TLS server private key	This key is used for authentication, so the server can prove who it is. The private key used for TLS secure connections.	This key is stored in NVRAM.	Zeroized by overwriting with 0x00
TLS server public key	This key is used to encrypt the data that is used to compute the secret key. The	This key is stored in NVRAM.	Zeroized by overwriting with new key

Name	Description	Stored	Zeroization
	public key used for TLS secure connection.		
TLS pre-master secret	The pre-master secret is the client and server exchange of random numbers and a special number, the pre-master secret, this pre-master secret is using asymmetric cryptography from which new TLS session keys can be created.	This key is stored in SDRAM.	Automatically after TLS session terminated. The value is overwritten with 0x00.
TLS session encryption key	The session encryption key is unique for each session and is based on the shared secrets that were negotiated at the start of the session. The Key is used to encrypt TLS session data.	This key is stored in SDRAM.	Automatically after TLS session terminated. The value is overwritten with 0x00.
TLS session integrity key	This key is used to provide the privacy and TLS data integrity protection.	This key is stored in SDRAM.	Automatically after TLS session terminated. The entire object is overwritten with zeros
User Password	This is a variable 15+ character password that is used to authenticate local users.	The password is stored in SDRAM.	Zeroized by overwriting with new password
AES Encryption Key	This is an AES256-CBC key used to encrypt passwords, authentication information, certificates, and shared keys.	This key is stored in SDRAM.	Zeroized by overwriting with zeroes.

8 ANNEX B: REFERENCES

The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:

Table 21 References

Identifier	Description
[CC_PART1]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017
[CC_PART2]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017
[CC_PART3]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017
[NDcPP]	collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 21 March 2020
[800-56Arev3]	NIST Special Publication 800-56Arev3, April 2018
[800-56Brev2]	NIST Special Publication 800-56Brev2 Recommendation for Pair-Wise, March 2019
[FIPS 140-2]	FIPS PUB 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
[FIPS PUB 186-4]	FIPS PUB 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013
[800-90Arev1]	NIST Special Publication 800-90Arev1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015
[FIPS PUB 180-4]	FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Secure Hash Standard (SHS) August 2015

9 ANNEX C: EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITIONS

The NDcPPv2.2e Author has defined extended components that are claimed in this Security Target (ST). Extended SFRs are identified by having a label “EXT” at the end of the Security Functional Requirement name.

The following are the extended components claimed in this ST:


Table 22 Extended Components

Component Identification	Component Name
FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	SSH Client Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH Server Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	TLS Server Protocol
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password Management
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2	X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.3	X.509 Certificate Requests
FPT_APW_EXT.1	Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1	TSF Testing

FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted Update
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	TSF-initiated Session Locking

9.1 Security Audit (FAU)

9.1.1 Protected audit event storage (FAU_STG_EXT)



Family Behaviour

This component defines the requirements for the TSF to be able to securely transmit audit data between the TOE and an external IT entity.

Component levelling

FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected audit event storage requires the TSF to use a trusted channel implementing a secure protocol.

FAU_STG_EXT.2 Counting lost audit data requires the TSF to provide information about audit records affected when the audit log becomes full.

FAU_STG_EXT.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss requires the TSF to generate a warning before the audit trail exceeds the local storage capacity.

FAU_STG_EXT.4 Protected Local audit event storage for distributed TOEs requires the TSF to use a trusted channel to protect audit transfer to another TOE component.

FAU_STG_EXT.5 Protected Remote audit event storage for distributed TOEs requires the TSF to use a trusted channel to protect audit transfer to another TOE component.

Management: FAU_STG_EXT.1, FAU_STG_EXT.2, FAU_STG_EXT.3, FAU_STG_EXT.4, FAU_STG_EXT.5

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) The TSF shall have the ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.

Audit: FAU_STG_EXT.1, FAU_STG_EXT.2, FAU_STG_EXT.3, FAU_STG_EXT.4, FAU_STG_EXT.5

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) No audit necessary.

9.1.1.1 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage

FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protected Audit Event Storage
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.

FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 *The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition [selection:*

- *The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally,*
- *The TOE shall be a distributed TOE that stores audit data on the following TOE components: [assignment: identification of TOE components],*
- *The TOE shall be a distributed TOE with storage of audit data provided externally for the following TOE components: [assignment: list of TOE components that do not store audit data locally and the other TOE components to which they transmit their generated audit data].*

FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [selection: *drop new audit data, overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [assignment: rule for overwriting previous audit records], [assignment: other action]*] when the local storage space for audit data is full.

9.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

9.2.1 Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for random bit/number generation. This is a new family defined for the FCS class.

Component levelling



FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.

Management: FCS_RBG_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen

Audit: FCS_RBG_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Minimal: failure of the randomization process

9.2.1.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1**Random Bit Generation**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [selection: *Hash_DRBG (any)*, *HMAC_DRBG (any)*, *CTR_DRBG (AES)*].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [selection: [*assignment: number of software-based sources*] *software-based noise source*, [*assignment: number of hardware-based sources*] *hardware-based noise source*] with a minimum of [selection: *128 bits*, *192 bits*, *256 bits*] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

9.2.2 Cryptographic Protocols (FCS_DTLSC_EXT, FCS_DTLSS_EXT, FCS_HTTPS_EXT, FCS_IPSEC_EXT, FCS_NTP_EXT, FCS_SSHC_EXT, FCS_SSHS_EXT, FCS_TLSC_EXT, FCS_TLSS_EXT)

9.2.2.1 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol

Family Behaviour

Components in this family define the requirements for protecting remote management sessions between the TOE and a Security Administrator. This family describes how HTTPS will be implemented. This is a new family defined for the FCS Class.

Component levelling



FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS requires that HTTPS be implemented according to RFC 2818 and supports TLS.

Management: FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

9.2.2.1.1 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	[FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol, or FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol]

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol using TLS.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3 If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [selection: *not establish the connection, request authorization to establish the connection, [assignment: other action]*] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

9.2.2.2 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client**Family Behaviour**

The component in this family addresses the ability for a client to use SSH to protect data between the client and a server using the SSH protocol.

Component levelling



FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client requires that the client side of SSH be implemented as specified.

Management: FCS_SSHC_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_SSHC_EXT.1

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of SSH session establishment
- b) SSH session establishment
- c) SSH session termination

9.2.2.2.1 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1

SSH Client Protocol

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies:

- FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
- FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
- FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption)
- FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
- FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)

FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [selection: 4256, 4344, 5647, 5656, 6187, 6668, 8268, 8308 section 3.1, 8332].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [selection: *password-based, no other method*].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [assignment: *number of bytes*] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [assignment: *list of encryption algorithms*].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [selection: *ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, x509v3-rsa2048-sha256*] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [assignment: *list of data integrity MAC algorithms*] as its data integrity MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [assignment: *list of key exchange methods*] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data. After either of the thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH client authenticates the identity of the SSH server using a local database associating each host name with its corresponding public key or

[selection: *a list of trusted certification authorities, no other methods*] as described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.

9.2.2.3 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

Family Behaviour

The component in this family addresses the ability for a server to offer SSH to protect data between a client and the server using the SSH protocol.

Component levelling



FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server requires that the server side of SSH be implemented as specified.

Management: FCS_SSHS_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_SSHS_EXT.1

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of SSH session establishment
- b) SSH session establishment
- c) SSH session termination

Hierarchical to: No other components

9.2.2.3.1 **FCS_SSHS_EXT.1**

SSH Server Protocol

Dependencies:

- FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
- FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
- FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption)
- FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
- FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
- FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
- FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with: RFC(s) 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [selection: 4256, 4344, 5647, 5656, 6187, 6668, 8268, 8308 section 3.1, 8332].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, password-based.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [assignment: *number of bytes*] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [assignment: *encryption algorithms*].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [selection: *ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, x509v3-rsa2048-sha256*] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [assignment: *list of MAC algorithms*] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [assignment: *list of key exchange methods*] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data. After either of the thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed.

9.2.2.4 FCS_TLSS_EXT TLS Server Protocol

Family Behaviour

The component in this family addresses the ability for a server to use TLS to protect data between a client and the server using the TLS protocol.

Component levelling



FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server requires that the server side of TLS be implemented as specified.

FCS_TLSS_EXT.2: TLS Server requires the mutual authentication be included in the TLS implementation.

Management: FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of TLS session establishment
- b) TLS session establishment
- c) TLS session termination

Hierarchical to: No other components

9.2.2.4.1 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol

Dependencies:

- FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
- FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
- FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption)
- FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
- FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
- FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
- FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [selection: *TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)*, *TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)*] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

- [assignment: *list of optional ciphersuites and reference to RFC in which each is defined*] and no other ciphersuites.

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 and [selection: *TLS 1.1*, *TLS 1.2*, *none*].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [selection: *RSA with key size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits], Diffie-Hellman parameters with size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits, 6144 bits, 8192 bits], Diffie-Hellman groups [selection: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, no other groups], ECDHE curves [selection: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other curves*]].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall support [selection: *no session resumption or session tickets, session resumption based on session IDs according to RFC 4346 (TLS1.1) or RFC 5246 (TLS1.2), session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 5077*].

9.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

9.3.1 Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT)

Family Behaviour

The TOE defines the attributes of passwords used by administrative users to ensure that strong passwords and passphrases can be chosen and maintained.

Component levelling



FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password management requires the TSF to support passwords with varying composition requirements, minimum lengths, maximum lifetime, and similarity constraints.

Management: FIA_PMG_EXT.1

No management functions.

Audit: FIA_PMG_EXT.1

No specific audit requirements.

9.3.1.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management

FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password Management
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No other components.

FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:


- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, [assignment: other characters]];
- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [assignment: minimum number of characters supported by the TOE] and [assignment: number of characters greater than or equal to 15] characters.

9.3.2 User Identification and Authentication (FIA_UIA_EXT)

Family Behaviour

The TSF allows certain specified actions before the non-TOE entity goes through the identification and authentication process.

Component levelling



FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication requires Administrators (including remote Administrators) to be identified and authenticated by the TOE, providing assurance for that end of the communication path. It also ensures that every user is identified and authenticated before the TOE performs any mediated functions

Management: FIA_UIA_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Ability to configure the list of TOE services available before an entity is identified and authenticated

Audit: FIA_UIA_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) All use of the identification and authentication mechanism
- b) Provided user identity, origin of the attempt (e.g. IP address)

9.3.2.1 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;

[selection: *no other actions, automated generation of cryptographic keys, [assignment: list of services, actions performed by the TSF in response to non-TOE requests]*].

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

9.3.3 User authentication (FIA_UAU_EXT)**Family Behaviour**

Provides for a locally based administrative user authentication mechanism

Component levelling



FIA_UAU_EXT.2 The password-based authentication mechanism provides administrative users a locally based authentication mechanism.

Management: FIA_UAU_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) None

Audit: FIA_UAU_EXT.2

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Minimal: All use of the authentication mechanism

9.3.3.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No other components.


FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [selection: *password-based, SSH public key-based, certificate-based, [assignment: other authentication mechanism(s)]*] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

9.3.4 Authentication using X.509 certificates (FIA_X509_EXT)

Family Behaviour

This family defines the behaviour, management, and use of X.509 certificates for functions to be performed by the TSF. Components in this family require validation of certificates according to a specified set of rules, use of certificates for authentication for protocols and integrity verification, and the generation of certificate requests.

Component levelling



FIA_X509_EXT.1 X509 Certificate Validation, requires the TSF to check and validate certificates in accordance with the RFCs and rules specified in the component.

FIA_X509_EXT.2 X509 Certificate Authentication, requires the TSF to use certificates to authenticate peers in protocols that support certificates, as well as for integrity verification and potentially other functions that require certificates.

FIA_X509_EXT.3 X509 Certificate Requests, requires the TSF to be able to generate Certificate Request Messages and validate responses.

Management: FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FIA_X509_EXT.3

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Remove imported X.509v3 certificates
- b) Approve import and removal of X.509v3 certificates
- c) Initiate certificate requests

Audit: FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FIA_X509_EXT.3

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) Minimal: No specific audit requirements are specified.

9.3.4.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

Hierarchical to: No other components
 Dependencies: FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [selection: *the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3, Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5, no revocation method*]
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules: [assignment: *rules that govern contents of the extendedKeyUsage field that need to be verified*].

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

9.3.4.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X509 Certificate Authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components
 Dependencies: FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [selection: *DTLS, HTTPS, IPsec, TLS, SSH, [assignment: other protocols]*],

no protocols], and [selection: *code signing for system software updates, code signing for integrity verification, [assignment: other uses], no additional uses*].

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [selection: *allow the Administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases, accept the certificate, not accept the certificate*].

9.3.4.3 FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and [selection: *device-specific information, Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country, [assignment: other information]*].

FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.


9.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

9.4.1 Protection of TSF Data (FPT_SKP_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for managing and protecting TSF data, such as cryptographic keys. This is a new family modelled after the FPT_PTD Class.

Component levelling



FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading all symmetric keys), requires preventing symmetric keys from being read by any user or subject. It is the only component of this family.

Management: FPT_SKP_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FPT_SKP_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

9.4.1.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No other components.

FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

9.4.2 Protection of Administrator Passwords (FPT_APW_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family ensure that the TSF will protect plaintext credential data such as passwords from unauthorized disclosure.

Component levelling



FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator passwords requires that the TSF prevent plaintext credential data from being read by any user or subject.

Management: FPT_APW_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) No management functions.

Audit: FPT_APW_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) No audit necessary.

9.4.2.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No other components.

FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.

FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.

9.4.3 TSF Self-Test (FPT_TST_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for self-testing the TSF for selected correct operation.

Component levelling



FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Self-Test requires a suite of self-tests to be run during initial start-up in order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.

Management: FPT_TST_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) No management functions.

Audit: FPT_TST_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.2

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Indication that TSF self-test was completed

b) Failure of self-test

9.4.3.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing

Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: No other components.


FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [selection: *during initial start-up (on power on), periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-tests should occur]*] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [assignment: *list of self-tests run by the TSF*].

9.4.4 Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for updating the TOE firmware and/or software.

Component levelling



FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update requires management tools be provided to update the TOE firmware and software, including the ability to verify the updates prior to installation.

FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted update based on certificates applies when using certificates as part of trusted update and requires that the update does not install if a certificate is invalid.

Management: FPT_TUD_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Ability to update the TOE and to verify the updates
- b) Ability to update the TOE and to verify the updates using the digital signature capability (FCS_COP.1/SigGen) and [selection: *no other functions, [assignment: other cryptographic functions (or other functions) used to support the update capability]*]
- c) Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [selection: *digital signature, published hash, no other mechanism*] capability prior to installing those updates

Audit: FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Initiation of the update process.
- b) Any failure to verify the integrity of the update

9.4.4.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted update

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (for Cryptographic Signature and Verification), or FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic hashing)

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: *Administrators*] the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [selection: *the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software; no other TOE firmware/software version*].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide [assignment: *Administrators*] the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [selection: *support automatic checking for updates, support automatic updates, no other update mechanism*].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [selection: *digital signature mechanism, published hash*] prior to installing those updates.

9.4.5 Time stamps (FPT_STM_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family extend FPT_STM requirements by describing the source of time used in timestamps.

Component levelling



FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps is hierarchic to FPT_STM.1: it requires that the TSF provide reliable time stamps for TSF and identifies the source of the time used in those timestamps.

Management: FPT_STM_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Management of the time
- b) Administrator setting of the time.

Audit: FTA_SSL_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Discontinuous changes to the time.

FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components.

FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [selection: allow the Security Administrator to set the time, synchronise time with an NTP server].

9.5 TOE Access (FTA)


9.5.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for TSF-initiated and user-initiated locking, unlocking, and termination of interactive sessions.

The extended FTA_SSL_EXT family is based on the FTA_SSL family.

Component levelling



FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated session locking, requires system initiated locking of an interactive session after a specified period of inactivity. It is the only component of this family.

Management: FTA_SSL_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- c) Specification of the time of user inactivity after which lock-out occurs for an individual user.

Audit: FTA_SSL_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- b) Any attempts at unlocking an interactive session.

9.5.1.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [selection:

- lock the session - disable any activity of the Administrator's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session, and requiring that the Administrator re-authenticate to the TSF prior to unlocking the session;
- terminate the session]

after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.