BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including IC
Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or
MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire
EV1
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.0
BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
Smartcard Controller
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG
including IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE
Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 24 October 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
Contents
A Certification.........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure..................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements.................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification...................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result....................................................................................9
5 Publication.....................................................................................................................10
B Certification Results..........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE................................................................................................13
3 Security Policy...............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope........................................................................15
5 Architectural Information................................................................................................16
6 Documentation..............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing..........................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation...............................................................................................19
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE........................................................21
11 Security Target.............................................................................................................21
12 Definitions....................................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography.................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria.................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................28
D Annexes............................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on
September 8, 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles
(cPP) (exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2
or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before September 8, 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on September 8, 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until September 8, 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this
certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including CC
part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ASE_TSS.2, ATE_DPT.3
and AVA_VAN.5, that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including
IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and
MIFARE DESFire EV1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1 was conducted by
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 2 October 2014. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including
IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
MIFARE DESFire EV1 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IC hardware platform NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG with IC Dedicated Software and documentation
describing the Instruction Set and the usage.
The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and
IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of Boot-ROM
Software controlling the boot process of the hardware platform and Firmware Operating
System (FOS) which can be called by the Security IC Embedded Software. The Firmware
Operating System provides an interface for programming of the internal EEPROM
memory, which is mandatory for use by the Security IC Embedded Software when
programming the EEPROM memory. Furthermore FOS provides an interface for the Post
Delivery Configuration functionality. OS Emulation MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or OS
Emulations MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1 are included in the FOS
and are therefore part of the TOE.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SS.RNG Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.HW_AES AES coprocessor
SS.CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
SS.RECONFIG Post Delivery Configuration
SS.MFP_AUTH Authentication
SS.MFP_ENC Encryption
SS.MFP_MAC Message Authentication Code
SS.MFP_ACC_CTRL Access Control
SS.DF_AUTH Authentication
SS.DF_ENC Encryption
SS.DF_MAC Message Authentication Code
SS.DF_ACC_CTRL Access Control
SS.DF_TRANS Transaction mechanism
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
SF.FFW Firmware Firewall
SF.FIRMWARE Firmware Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including IC Dedicated Software
MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A) and NXP Secure Smart
Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVG
nameplate 9049A
and
nameplate 9049B
Wafer, module,
inlay or package
2a SW Test ROM Software (Security IC Dedicated Test
Software), Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
9049A_LA001_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av05_fos_6v10.
hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040MVC
Version 0A.05,
2012-05-07
stored in ROM on
the chip
2b SW Test ROM Software (Security IC Dedicated Test
Software), Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
9049A_LF097_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av09_fos_8v00.
hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040DVC
and P60D080/052/040JVC
Version 0A.09,
2012-12-17
stored in ROM on
the chip
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3a SW Boot ROM Software (part of the Security IC Dedicated
Support Software), Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to
9049A_LA001_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av05_fos_6v10.
hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040MVC
Version 0A.05,
2012-05-07
stored in ROM on
the chip
3b SW Boot ROM Software (part of the Security IC Dedicated
Support Software), Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to
9049A_LF097_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av09_fos_8v00.
hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040DVC
and P60D080/052/040JVC
Version 0A.09,
2012-12-17
stored in ROM on
the chip
4a SW Firmware Operating System FOS including MIFARE
Plus MF1PLUSx0 (part of the Security IC Dedicated
Support Software), Firmware Operating System on the
chip acc. to
9049A_LA001_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av05_fos_6v10.
hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040MVC
Version 06.12 and
06.13,
2012-05-07
stored in ROM on
the chip 2
4b SW Firmware Operating System FOS including MIFARE
Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1Software
(part of the Security IC Dedicated Support Software),
Firmware Operating System on the chip acc. to
9049A_LF097_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av09_fos_8v00.
hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040DVC
and P60D080/052/040JVC
Version 08.00,
2012- 12-17
stored in ROM on
the chip
5 DOC Product Data Sheet, SmartMX2 family
P60x040/052/080 VC/VG, NXP Semiconductors,
Business Unit Identification
Rev. 5.2,
2014-06-27
electronic form
6 DOC Instruction set for the SmartMX2 family, Secure smart
card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit
Identification
Rev. 3.1,
2012-02-02
electronic form
7 DOC NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60x040/052/080VC/VG, Information on Guidance
and Operation, Guidance and Operation Manual
Rev. 1.1,
2014-06-26
electronic form
8 DOC Wafer and delivery specification, SmartMX2 family
P60x040/052/080 VC/VG, Product data sheet
addendum, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.3,
2014-05-21
electronic form
9 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family,
Post Delivery Configuration, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.2,
2013-02-04
electronic form
10 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family,
Chip Health Mode, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.0,
2012-05-11
electronic form
11 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family,
Firmware Interface Specification, Firmware, NXP
Semiconductors
Rev. 4.1,
2014-06-25
electronic form
12 DOC MIFARE Plus, Functionality of implementations on
smart card controllers, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.2,
2013-02-27
electronic form
13 DOC NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey,
MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual, User Guidance Manual
Rev. 1.5,
2013-06-21
electronic form
14 DOC NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey,
MIFARE DESFire EV1 Guidance, Delivery and
Operation, User Guidance Manual, NXP
Semiconductors
Rev. 1.3,
2013-06-10
electronic form
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
15 DOC MIFARE DESFire EV1, Functionality of
implementations on smart card controllers, NXP
Semiconductors
Rev. 2.0,
2013-02-06
electronic form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The commercial type name is the identification used to order the TOE
P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG in the respective major configuration and with the
evaluated package type. In consequence this means that a full commercial product name
that fits in the variable forms described in the Security Target [6,8] determines that the
hardware platform is an evaluated product. In addition the hardware version can be
identified by the crypted nameplate "9049A", respectively “9049B” for yVG on the surface
of the hardware platform as described in chapters 4.2 and 3.9.3 of the Wafer and delivery
specification. The nameplate is the same for all configurations. In addition each major
configuration has a different device coding and type coding described in the Data Sheet.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and is
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE provides
countermeasures against: leakage of information, physical probing, malfunctions, physical
manipulations, access to code, access to data memory, abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall maintain
• the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories,
• the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory
access and
• the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality
provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
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Name Assumption Title
OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
OE.Check-Init Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded Software
OE.Check-OriginalityKey Check of the Originality Key of the MIFARE Software
OE.Secure-Values Generation of secure values
OE.Terminal-Support Terminal support to ensure integrity, confidentiality and use of random numbers
Table 3: Objectives for the TOE-Environment
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the following 15 subsystems (7 hardware / 8 software):
Subsystem Description
Hardware
IC.LOGIC_BLK
The IC.LOGIC_BLK comprises the instance id_smx2_kernel except the contacts
and the memory blocks. Furthermore, it is stated in the developer documentation
that the hardware instantiation id_smx2_kernel instantiates and connects all
digital IPs.
IC.RAM
This subsystem is in charge for the TOE’s RAM memory operations. In
comparison to the previous subsystem, the subsystem IC.RAM is not that
complex, nevertheless several modules are associated to it.
IC.EEPROM This subsystem is in charge for the TOE’s EEPROM memory and its operations.
IC.ROM This subsystem is in charge for the TOE’s ROM memory and its operations.
IC.ANALOG
This subsystem consists of two major parts:
• a power conversion unit including a contactless part with voltage supply
for contactless operation, clock recovery and demodulation of the
contactless signal,
• various sensors, a part of the random number generator, the internal
oscillator and further circuitry to monitor the operating conditions and
provide reference signals.
IC.PADS
This subsystem contains the physical interfaces of the TOE which can be divided
into ISO contacts and non-ISO contacts.
IC.COVER
This subsystem comprises only passive metal structures. It is not included in the
design hierarchy because it is not part of the functional design of the device.
Software
SW.Iso The subsystem SW.Iso is part of SW.Framework and implements the IC
Dedicated Support software interface to use the ISO 14443-3 and 14443-4
communication layers. The evaluator remarks that this subsystem serves merely
to group a semantically similar group of modules and is to be interpreted as part
of the subsystem IC.ROM. This is reasonable, as all firmware resides in the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
Subsystem Description
TOE’s ROM.
SW.Framework
The subsystem SW.Framework is part of the IC Dedicated Support Software. It
operates in the firmware mode of M.CPU and is located in IC.ROM protected by
M.MMU, i.e. access from Security IC Embedded Software to the external
interface of the SW.Framework can only be done via an FVEC call. The evaluator
remarks that this subsystem serves merely to group a semantically similar group
of modules and is to be interpreted as part of the subsystem IC.ROM. This is
reasonable, as all firmware resides in the TOE’s ROM.
SW.CommonHal
The SW.CommonHal is part of the IC Dedicated Support Software and
implements the interface to use the hardware blocks M.CRC, M.CIU,
M.EEIF_CTRL, M.SBC-IF, M.RNG-DIG, M.TIMER, M.COPY-MACHINE and
M.CPU. The evaluator remarks that this subsystem serves merely to group a
semantically similar group of modules and is to be interpreted as part of the
subsystem IC.ROM. This is reasonable, as all firmware resides in the TOE’s
ROM.
SW.MfpCore
This subsystem implements the core MIFARE Plus functionality and provides the
interface to the different MIFARE Plus security levels.
SW.MfpOs
This subsystem provides a well-structured implementation of the MIFARE Plus
basic operations needed by SW.MfpCore.
SW.MfpHal
This subsystem implements a hardware abstraction layer for MIFARE Plus related
HW and provides the low-level functions to SW.MfpCore and SW.MfpOs.
SW.MdfCore
This subsystem provides the core functionality for MIFARE DESFire EV1
emulation mode.
SW.MdfHal
This subsystem is part of MIFARE DESFire EV1 and supports the implementation
of the DESFire relevant Hardware Abstraction Layer.
Table 4: TOE subsystems
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The developer’s testing effort can be summarised in the following aspects.
TOE test configuration and Developer’s testing approach:
• The tests are performed with the TOE in different test environments and
configurations depending on the test classes and groups.
• All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in
order to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
• Test categories/classes were
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◦ Production testing on wafers using test functions implemented in the IC
Dedicated Software.
◦ Simulation tests (design verification) which are performed to verify functionality,
which is not visible at the accessible interfaces of the TOE including automated
regression testing and manual simulation tests.
◦ Characterization tests to verify the electrical properties of the device, which are
specified with regard to limiting values, thresholds and timings of several
electrical parameters like voltages, currents, frequencies, capacitors,
resistances and latches.
◦ Verification tests which are performed on single samples of the device to verify
specific security functionality, which is not testable for each device during
production test or within the scope of characterization testing. Such tests include
standard tests of the Random Number Generator, AES coprocessor and
Triple-DES coprocessor.
◦ Test of configurations
◦ Functional verification and validation (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE
DESFire EV1) including firmware tests, MIFARE Plus Acceptance/Regression
Tests, MIFARE Plus Backwards Compatibility Tests, Anti-Tearing Test,
◦ System Stability Verification (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1)
including Robot Arm test and Multiple PICC Test,
◦ Performance Verification (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1) of
each individual command and of standard transactions,
◦ External test (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1), consisting of a
“Test plan for MIFARE® Compatibility for Certification of Terminals and
Qualification of Contactless Readers”.
Amount of developer testing performed:
• The tests are performed on security mechanisms and on subsystem and module
level.
• As demonstrated by ATE_COV.2 the developer has tested all security mechanisms
and TSFIs.
• As demonstrated by ATE_DPT.3 the developer has tested all the TSF subsystems
and modules against the TOE design and against the security architecture
description.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG can be delivered in different major configurations. All
of the following major configurations are covered by this evaluation:
P60D080yVC(Z/A)/yVG, P60D052yVC(Z/A)/yVG and P60D040yVC(Z/A)/yVG, see the
Secutity Target [6,8] for details..
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9 Results of the Evaluation
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
• The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
• Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
• Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on life cycle and laser
fault injection penetration testing.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
Purpose Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Authentication (MFP) AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 128 yes
Authentication (DF) AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 128 yes
Three-key TDES
in CBC mode
[FIPS-46-3] (DES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 168 yes
Key Agreement
(MFP)
FTP_TRP.1[MFP] -- -- no
Key Agreement (DF) FTP_TRP.1[DF] -- -- no
Confidentiality (MFP) AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 128 yes
Confidentiality (DF) AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 128 yes
Integrity (MFP) AES in CMAC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP800-38B] (CMAC)
|K| = 128 yes
Integrity (DF) AES in CMAC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP800-38B] (CMAC)
|K| = 128 yes
Trusted Channel
(MFP)
Mifare Plus
MF1PLUSx0
-- -- no
Trusted Channel
(DF)
Desfire EV1 -- -- no
Cryptographic
Primitives
Two-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 112 no
Three-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 168 yes
AES [FIPS-197] (AES) |K| = 128, 192,
256
yes
Table 5: Cryptographic TOE Security Functionalities
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10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software using the TOE.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product
layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also
consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation
[10].
In addition, the following aspect needs to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
The implementation of the encryption/decryption operation of the MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 may expose some bits of the XOR difference between pairs of plaintext using
the principles of a watermark attack.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
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CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-based MAC
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Desfire
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FOS Firmware Operating System
FVEC Firmware Vector
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MFP Mifare Plus
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TDES Triple-DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014, Version 2.0, 21 August 2014, NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG Security Target,
NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[8] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014, Version 2.0, 21 August 2014, NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG Security Target Lite,
NXP Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 17 October 2014, EVALUATION
TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, Version 3, 17 October 2014,
ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Configuration lists for the TOE:
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1)
and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 1, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG,
Configuration List, Version 01.50, 23 July 2014, NXP Semiconductors,
Business Unit Identification (confidential document) and
• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG,
Customer specific Appendix of the Configuration List, Version 01.40, 01 July
2014, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential
document) and
• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG,
Appendix of the Configuration List for composite evaluation, Version 01.40,
05 August 2014, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification
(confidential document) and
• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040MVC(Z/A)/MVG,
Firmware Configuration List, Version 1.0, 01 July 2014, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document) and
• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040JVC(Z/A)/JVG,
Firmware Configuration List, Version 1.1, 01 July 2014, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document)
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE:
• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x040/052/080 VC/VG, Information on
Guidance and Operation, Guidance and Operation Manual, Version 1.1, 26
June 2014, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential
document) and
• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey, MIFARE DESFire EV1
Guidance, Delivery and Operation, User Guidance Manual, Version 1.3, 10
June 2013, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential
document) and
• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey, MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, User Guidance Manual, Version
1.5, 21 June 2013, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification
(confidential document)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG
including IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0
and MIFARE DESFire EV1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 24 October 2014, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
Site and address Function
NXP Semiconductors Hamburg Business Unit
Identification (BU ID) Stresemannallee 101 22569
Hamburg Germany
Development, Delivery and customer support
NXP Semiconductors Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Development
NXP Semiconductors India Private Limited,
Bangalore, India
Development
TSMC, Fab 2 and 5 No. 121 Park Ave. III Hsinchu
Science Park Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.
Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 7 No. 6, Creation Rd. II Hsinchu Science
Park Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.
Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 6 and Fab 14 No. 1, Nan-Ke North Rd.
Tainan Science Park Tainan, Taiwan 741, R.O.C.
Mask and wafer production
Chipbond Technology Corporation No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd.
V Science Based Industrial Park Hsin-Chu City
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Bumping
NXP Semiconductors GmbH Hamburg Test Center
Europe - Hamburg (TCE- H) Stresemannallee 101
22569 Hamburg Germany
Test Center and configuration of the Fabkey
Assembly Plant Bangkok 303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana
Rd. Laksi, Bangkok 10210 Thailand
Test Center, Delivery and Module assembly
Assembly Plant Kaohsiung NXP Semiconductors
Taiwan Ltd #10, Jing 5th Road, N.E.P.Z, Kaohsiung
Module assembly and test center
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014
Site and address Function
81170 Taiwan, R.O.C
SMARTRAC Technology Ltd. Bangkok Street: 142
Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate Tambon Ban Laean,
Amphor Bang- Pa-In 13160 Ayutthaya Thailand
Inlay assembly
SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY GERMANY GmbH
Gewerbeparkstr. 10 51580 Reichshof-Wehnrath
Germany
Inlay assembly
HID Global Teoranta Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh Balle
na hAbhann Co. Galway Ireland
Inlay assembly
NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH Styria Business
Unit Identification (BU ID) Mikron-Weg 1 8108
Gratkorn Austria
Document control
NedCard B.V. Bijsterhuizen 25-29 6604 LM Wijchen
The Netherlands
Module assembly
The site of this SST is NXP Nijmegen, located at the
campus: NXP Semiconductors Netherlands B.V.
Gerstweg 2 6534AE Nijmegen The Netherlands
Development and Manufacturing
NXP High Tech Campus Building 60, High Tech
Campus Secure Room 131 5656AE, Eindhoven The
Netherlands
Regional Quality Center - Europe, Tape Out Office,
and Materials Management Department
Atos Bydgoszcz Building BETA Secure Room B20S1
Biznes Park ul. Kraszewskiego 1 85-240 Bydgoszcz
Poland
IT Engineering and Generic Support
Ardentec Corporation (T Site) Ardentec Corporation
No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd. Hsin-Chu Industrial Park,
Hu-Kou, Hsin-Chu Hsien Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
Wafer Testing
NedCard (Shanghai) Microelectronics Co Ltd.
Standardized Plant Building #8 No. 789 Puxing Road
Caohejing Hi-Tech Park, EPZ 201114 Shanghai,
People’s Republic of China
Module Assembly
Table 6: Production Sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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