BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
for
Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card applet configuration providing Secure
Signature Creation Device with Key generation
(SSCD)
from
Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G+D BDR
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.212
BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 (*)
Digital signature: Secure Signature Creation Devices (SSCD)
Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key
generation (SSCD)
from Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G+D BDR
PP Conformance: EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure
signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key
generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-
02 (**)
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria
for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details
on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
(**) The IT Product identified in this certificate is a compliant signature creation device according to
Article 30(3) and a compliant seal creation device according to Article 39(2) of eIDAS Regulation
(Regulation No 910/2014 of THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July
2014) if the operational conditions as outlined in this certification report are followed.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of
the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 18 December 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of te Certification Result....................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................13
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................14
6. Documentation............................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................19
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................19
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)...............................................................19
13. Definitions..................................................................................................................21
14. Bibliography...............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................27
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card
applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation
(SSCD) was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 17 December 2018. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G+D
BDR.
The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of te Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18
December 2018 is valid until 17 December 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure
Signature Creation Device (SSCD) with Key generation. The TOE is named Veridos Suite
v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure
Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD). It consists of an applet
configuration ePasslet3.0/SSCD provided by the Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision
ePasslet Suite for secure signature creation devices with PIN and PACE (Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment) authentication (PACE only for contactless
variant), the corresponding guidance documents, the underlying operating system with the
crypto library and the hardware platform.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation
device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02
[8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF_Access Access Control
TSF_Admin Administration
TSF_Secret Secret key management
TSF_Crypto Cryptographic operations
TSF_SecureMessaging Secure Messaging
TSF_Auth Authentication protocols
TSF_Integrity Integrity protection
TSF_OS Javacard OS Security Functionalities
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
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The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW+
SW
Veridos eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite on platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3
3.0 The delivery is performed with
sealed boxes by courier.
The delivery process is
included in the evaluation of
the underlying smartcard OS.
2 DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite
– Java Card applet configuration providing a
Secure Signature Creation Device application
with on-chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and
supporting PKI utilization - Operational
Guidance (AGD_OPE) [10]
3.0.19 The delivery process is
included in the evaluation of
the underlying smartcard OS.
Signed and encrypted Email
delivery using PGP RSA 2048
bit is used.
3 DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite
– Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID
Documents applications - Guidance Manual [11]
3.0.11
4 DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite
– Java Card applet configuration providing a
Secure Signature Creation Device application
with on-chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and
supporting PKI utilization - Preparation
Guidance (AGD_PRE) [12]
3.0.25
5 DOC Preparative Procedures Sm@rtCafé® Expert
7.0 C3 [13]
3.6
6 DOC Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé®
Expert 7.0 C3 [14]
5.2
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The composite TOE consists of the underlying hardware platform, the SmartCafe Expert
7.0 C3 operating system including the crypto library and the Veridos eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite in applet configuration ePasslet3.0/SSCD. First, the generated
applet suite and the guidance are delivered by encrypted e-mail from the development to
the production site. Either the SmartCafe operating system with the applet is integrated
into the ordered IC by the IC manufacturer, or the smartcard embedded software
developer, here Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (G+D), loads the SW part with
the flash loader. Afterwards the composite TOE is delivered in the sense of Common
Criteria. Thereby the delivery process is the same for the composite product as the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
delivery process covered by the certified SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 platform. The ST [22]
and the guidance [14] of the platform outline the delivery procedure. The product is
delivered within sealed boxes by courier and is additionally secured by the hardware and
operating system security mechanisms. The TOE guidance is delivered in electronic form
(encrypted and signed) according to defined mailing procedures by G+D. The delivery in
sense of CC is fully covered by the underlying platform certification of the SmartCafe
Expert 7.0 C3.
The TOE can be identified in accordance with the described processes in [6] and [12].
After the delivery the TOE can be identified by the command response sequence as
outlined in [6] and [12], verifying the configuration and the life cycle of the underlying
platform OS, as well as the CPLC-Data.
After instantiation of the applet it can be selected and the version of the applet can be
verified, as well as the internal version numbers, see [12].There are two software versions
with different internal version numbers that fall under this certification. Details regarding
the identification of the two versions are described in [12].
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management, and
● Protection of the TSF.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
6.2 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.SVD_Auth,
● OE.CGA_QCert,
● OE.SSCD_Prov_Service,
● OE.HID_VAD,
● OE.DTBS_Intend,
● OE.DTBS_Protect,
● OE.Signatory,
● OE.APPLET,
● OE.VERIFICATION, and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
● OE.CODE-EVIDENCE.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.3 and in the guidance
documents.
5. Architectural Information
The composite TOE is a Java Card applet based on a certified Java Card platform that
comprises eight subsystems, listed with a short description in the following itemization:
● Platform: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the composite
TOE, which interacts with the application in regards of control, including the creation and
selection of applet instance and the internal life cycle control.
● Operating System: Represents the operating system of the underlying SCE platform of
the composite TOE, which is used by the applications to realize the functionality. It also
comprises the underlying cryptographic library.
● Configuration Manager: Provides services for applet creation and configuration. This
subsystem is called by the platform subsystem each time an application is instantiated.
● Event Manager: Handles events from internal subsystems and from the underlying
platform and calls other subsystems interfaces to process these events.
● Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the platform by passing through
APDU commands from the terminal to the applet. The subsystem decides if specific
APDUs have to be handled by the application and ensures their execution by the
responsible applet. It also provides access controlled execution of commands covering
all applet commands.
● Secure Messaging Manager: Handles the secure channel between the application and
the terminal in accordance with the specified cryptographic mechanisms and key sizes.
The responsibility for secure messaging includes the verification of MAC, unwrapping
messages and security mechanisms for secure messaging.
● File System Manager: Provides an interface for file and object access and management
by a representation of the existing elements.
● State Manager: Handles the internal state of the application and provides update
functionality and access to the current DF, EF, KO, security environment, and the
authentication status of the terminal and the challenge.
For details concerning the CC evaluation of the Java Card platform see the evaluation
documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01 [15, 16, 19, 20].
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7. IT Product Testing
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The developer’s testing effort is summarised as follows:
TOE configurations tested:
The tests were performed with the composite smart card product ePasslet3.0/SSCD on
G&D OS SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3, in the one configuration in scope of the certification.
Developer’s testing approach:
The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach:
● Tests to cover all actions defined in the functional specification,
● Good case and bad case tests for each command defined in the functional specification
and executable on the TOE,
● Access rules tests as part of the requirements on TSF data,
● Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design.
Verdict for the activity:
All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version. The
developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE operates as expected.
Evaluator Tests
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The evaluator’s testing effort is described as follows, outlining the testing approach,
configuration, depth and results.
Test Approach and Set-up:
The TOE consists of the ePasslet3.0/SSCD application installed on SmartCafe Expert 7.0
C3 OS. The APDU tests were performed using standard PCSC readers, a standard PC,
test software provided by the developer as well as evaluator’s test software. Further, for
some tests, i.e. fuzzing, B0 card readers (supporting also raw communication) were used.
The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to:
● Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms),
● Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface
execution),
● Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging),
● Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance
documentation [11] and [12].
The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the
following approach:
● Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation of developer
testing strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases,
● Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer’s tests the tests are also
selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and
related functionality,
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● Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the
interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFI have been suitably tested. The
evaluator had no doubt that an interface is not properly implemented,
● The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of testing,
● Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps
were performed and described for nearly each test case,
● The selection process is based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body.
Therefore all TOE security functionality is included within the subset. All cryptographic
functionality is provided by the platform and was sufficiently tested during platform
evaluation,
● Specific tests were conducted that were aligned during online and offline meetings with
the certification body.
Configuration:
The TOE was tested in the one configuration in scope of the certification. The keys and
personalization data used in the test configuration were provided by the developer.
Test Results:
The test reports for the APDU tests are automatically generated by the test tool used. The
test results are logged.
The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the test
configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the
expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test
the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional
specification.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜViT in the
evaluator’s test environment with the evaluator’s test equipment. The samples were
provided by the sponsor and by the developer. The test samples were configured and
parametrized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. The one
configuration of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation was
tested. The overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and
the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of High
was actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment created within vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created
attack scenarios for the penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion that the
vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing so, the evaluator also considered all
aspects of the security architecture of the TOE being not covered by the functional
developer tests.
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The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the
development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported
testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly
be covered by test cases.
The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities
identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test
set was devised.
TOE test configurations:
The tests were performed with the one configuration of the TOE it is delivered in to the
personalization agent and as stated in the security target.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential of High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target provided
that all measures required by the developer are applied.
Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis
The test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
There is only one configuration of the TOE. For all tests the TOE is configured and
parametrized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD
TOE configuration is generated out of the applet suite and loaded in the underlying
certified OS platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD applet needs to be
created according to the guidelines given in [11] and [12].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
(ii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
(iv) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6,
(v) Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA,
DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations,
(vi) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(i.e. on hardware [15, 16, 17, 18, 19. 20, 21]) have been applied in the TOE
evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 26, 33, 34, 36, 46).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature
creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013,
BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The cryptographic algorithms outlined in Table 4, Annex C (except PACEv2) are
implemented in the Java Card Platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 that is part of the TOE
and on which the Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation
Device (SSCD) with Key generation is set up. Except for the PACEv2-implementation the
security evaluation of the implementation of all other cryptographic algorithms depicted in
Table 4 was performed in the framework of the certification of the Java Card Platform
SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 (refer to the Certification Report [15][16] and related Security
Target [25]). The TOE and its specific applet rely on the correct (i.e. standard-conform) and
secure implementation of these cryptographic algorithms.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
The evaluation was performed as a composite evaluation according to AIS 36 and
therefore relies on the platform certifications of the used platform (certification ID BSI-DSZ-
CC-1028-2017-MA01) [15, 16, 19, 20].
The composite TOE takes care of the recommendations and requirements imposed by the
guidance documentation and ETR for composition of the underlying platform to be
resistant against attackers with attack potential high.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
The IT Product identified in this certificate fulfils
● PP EN 419211-2:2013 (Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2:
Device with key generation (BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02))
This Protection Profile is taken from the list of standards identified in COMMISSION
IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2016/650 of 25 April 2016, Annex, for the security
assessment of qualified signature and seal creation devices pursuant to Articles 30(3) and
39(2) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market.
Therefore, the IT-product certified is technically suitable to be a compliant signature
creation device according to Article 30(3) and a compliant seal creation device according
to Article 39(2) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 July 2014 and to fulfil the requirements laid down in Article 29(1), Article
39(1) and Annex II provided that the following operational conditions are followed:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
● The obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE have to be followed as outlined in
chapter 10 of this report.
● The trust service provider has to follow the operational requirements from the regulation
as relevant for a compliant signature creation device and a compliant seal creation
device as well as to follow all related obligations from its supervisory body.
● For the creation of qualified electronic signatures or qualified electronic seals the product
has to use the cryptographic algorithms in accordance with the SOG-IS Crypto
Evaluation Scheme - Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms [26] which are depicted in
Table 3. Please note that digital signature creation with RSA is only certified with the key
sizes 2048, 2304, 2560, 2816, 3072, 3328, 3584, 3840, and 4096 bit and SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with the exception of the following specific
combinations: 3072 bit and SHA-384, 3328 bit and SHA-512, 3584 bit and SHA-512
(see ST [6,7], Table 4 in Annex C, and corresponding guidance documentation [10, 11,
12]).
● The trust service provider shall consider the results of the certification and the
operational conditions listed above within the system risk management process for the
product usage. Specifically, the evolution of limitations of cryptographic algorithms and
parameters7
as well as the evolution of attack methods related to the product or to the
type of product has to be considered e.g. by a regular re-assessment of the TOE
assurance.
No. Cryptographic Mechanism Key Size in Bits Acceptability Deadline
according to [26] as of
today
1 RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 [27, 28, 29] Modulus length = 2048, 2304,
2560, 2816, 3072, 3328, 3584,
3840, 4096
31. December 2022
2 RSA PSS (PKCS#1 v2.1) [27, 28,
29]
Modulus length = 2048, 2304,
2560, 2816
31. December 2024
3 RSA PSS (PKCS#1 v2.1) [27, 28,
29]
Modulus length = 3072, 3328,
3584, 3840, 4096
None
4 ECDSA [30, 31] ECC Key sizes corresponding to
the used elliptic curve
brainpoolP{256, 384, 512}r1 [32]
secp{256, 384, 521}r1 [30,
Appendix D.1.2]
None
5 SHA-2, hash length (bits) = 224 [33,
34]
- 31. December 2022
6 SHA-2, hash length (bits) = 256,
384, 512 [33, 34]
- None
Table 3: Cryptographic algorithms of the TOE in accordance with [26]
7
Future updates of the catalogue [26] may shorten or extending the acceptance time frame. This may need
actions for the usage of the product to be taken.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
Out of this, the compliance of the QSCD / QSealCD is confirmed under the conditions
mentioned above within the following categories:
● Components and procedures for the generation of signature resp. seal creation data
● Components and procedures for the storage of signature resp. seal creation data
● Components and procedures for the processing of signature resp. seal creation data
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CGA Certificate generation application
CPLC Card production life cycle
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DTBS/R Data to be signed or a unique representation thereof
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
eIDAS electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
QES Qualified electronic signature
RAD Reference authentication data
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCA Signature creation application
SCD Signature creation data
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Secure Messaging
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
ST Security Target
SVD Signature verification data
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VAD Verification authentication data
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018, Version 1.9, 2018-12-07, Veridos Suite
v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure
Signature Creation Device with Key Generation (SSCD), cv cryptovision GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032, Version 3, 2018-12-12, ETR
Summary – Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation
(SSCD) 3.0, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security
(confidential document)
[8] EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2:
Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, 2018-12-07, File 1032_SSCD_conflist-SCE.xls, cv
cryptovision GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Guidance Document for the TOE: Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite -
Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device
application with on-chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI
utilization - Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE), Version 3.0.19, 2018-12-07, cv
cryptovision GmbH
[11] Guidance Document for the TOE: Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite -
Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents applications - Guidance
Manual, Version 3.0.11, 2018-12-06, cv cryptovision GmbH
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
[12] Guidance Document for the TOE: Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite -
Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device
application with on-chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI
utilization - Preparation Guidance (AGD_PRE), Version 3.0.25, 2018-12-07, cv
cryptovision GmbH
[13] Preparative procedures Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3, Version 3.6, 10.08.17,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[14] Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3, Version 5.2, 07.08.17,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[15] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017 for Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3 from
Veridos GmbH – Identity Solutions by G&D BDR, 2017-09-08, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[16] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3 from Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH, 2018-
10-04, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[17] Certification Report – BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 for Infineon Security Controller
M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008, EC v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01
and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from Infineon Technologies AG, 2015-11-11, BSI.
[18] Assurance Continuity Reassessment Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015-RA-01,
Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008, EC
v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware) from Infineon Technologies AG, 2017-05-31, BSI.
[19] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation according to AIS 36 for
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3, Version 3, 2017-08-16, BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH.
[20] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation Addendum for Sm@rtCafé®
Expert 7.0 C3, Version 1, 2018-07-18, BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH.
[21] ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), M5073 G11, BSI-DSZ-CC-
0951, Version 4, 2017-05-18, TÜViT.
[22] Security Target Lite Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3, Version 2.9, Date 16.08.17, BSI-
DSZ-CC-1028-2017, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[23] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for
electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
[24] COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2016/650 of 25 April 2016, laying
down standards for the security assessment of qualified signature and seal creation
devices pursuant to Articles 30(3) and 39(2) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the
European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust
services for electronic transactions in the internal market
[25] Security Target Lite Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3, Version 2.9, Date 16.08.17, BSI-
DSZ-CC-1028-2017, Giesecke + Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[26] SOG-IS Crypto Evaluation Scheme Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms, Version 1.1,
June 2018
24 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
[27] J. Jonsson and B. Kaliski. Public-Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1. 2003.
[28] RSA Laboratories. PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard. 2012.
[29] ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 – Information technology – Security techniques –
Digital signature schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorization
based mechanisms. 2010.
[30] National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS PUB 186-4: Digital Signature
Standard (DSS). 2013.
[31] ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006 – Information technology – Security techniques –
Digital signatures with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms.
2006.
[32] M. Lochter and J. Merkle. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard
Curves and Curve Generation. 2010.
[33] National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash
Standard (SHS). 2012.
[34] ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 – Information technology – Security techniques –
Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions. 2004.
[35] ICAO: ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1: Machine Readable Passports, Volume 2:
Specifications for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification
Capability, Sixth Edition – 2006
[36] ICAO: Technical Report: Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version - 1.01, 11. November 2010.
[37] BSI: TR-03110-1 - Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents. Part 1 - eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, v2.10 (20. March
2012)
[38] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS); AIS 20, Version 3,
15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[39] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, November 26, 2001
[40] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, National Institute of Standards
and Technology, May 2005
[41] ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009 Information technology -- Personal identification -- ISO-
compliant driving licence -- Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity
validation (2009)
[42] PKCS #1: “RSA Encryption Standard – An RSA Laboratories Technical Note”,
Version 2.1
[43] Technical Guideline TR-03111, “Elliptic Curve Cryptography”, Version 2.0, BSI,
2012-06-28.
[44] Digital Signature Standard (DSS) - FIPS PUB 186-3, FEDERAL INFORMATION
PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, June, 2009
25 / 31
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
[45] National Institute of Standards and Technology. SP800-38A: Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation. 2001.
[46] Standards for efficient cryptography, SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain
Parameters, Certicom Research, September 20, 2000, Version 1.0
26 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) (Ta
rget of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 December 2018, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2 and ALC_COMP.1) are fulfilled for the
development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) cv cryptovision GmbH, Munscheidstr. 14, 45886 Gelsenkirchen, Germany
(software development site)
b) Regarding the development and production sites of the platform, please refer
to the certification reports BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017 / BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-
MA-01 [15, 16] and BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 / BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015-RA-01
[17, 18]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Authenticity RSA-signature
generation
(RSASSA-PSS and
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5) without
internal hash
calculation, or with
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384 or SHA-
512
PKCS#1 v2.1
[42]
[33]
Modulus length=
2048 bit (without
CRT) or 2048,
2304, 2560, 2816,
3072, 3328, 3584,
3840, 4096 bit (with
CRT) with the
exception of the
following specific
combinations: 3072
bit and SHA-384,
3328 bit and SHA-
512, 3584 bit and
SHA-512
Yes -
2 Authenticity ECDSA without
internal hash
calculation, or with
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384 or SHA-
512
[43]
[33]
ECC Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{160,
192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512}r1 [32],
brainpoolP{160,
192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512}t1 [32],
secp{160, 192, 224,
256, 384, 521}r1
[46]
|k|= 160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384, 512,
521 bit
Yes if |k|
=224 bit
or larger
-
3 Authenticated
Key
Agreement
PACE version 2 with
AES
[37] (PACEv2) ECC Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{160,
192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512}r1 [32],
brainpoolP{160,
192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512}t1 [32],
secp{160, 192, 224,
256, 384, 521}r1
[46]
Yes if |k|
=224 bit
or larger
Only in
contactless
variant
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
AES with |k|=128,
192, 256
Length of the
Nonce: 16 byte
4 Authentication Symmetric
Authentication using
AES
Standard
equivalent to [41]
|k|=128, 192, 256
bit; Length of the
Nonce: 8 byte
No For
personaliza
tion
5 Confidentiality AES in CBC mode [39] (AES), [45]
(CBC), IV
according to [35]
|k|=128, 192, 256 Yes Secure
Messaging
6 Integrity AES in CMAC mode [39] (AES), [40]
(CMAC)
IV according to
[35]
|k|=128, 192, 256 Yes Secure
Messaging
7 Trusted
Channel
Secure messaging
in ENC_MAC mode
establish during
PACE
[37] [36] Cf.
Confidentiality/Integ
rity
Yes Secure
Messaging
8 Secure Messaging
for personalization
[35] but with AES
Standard
equivalent to [41]
|k|=128, 192, 256 No For
personaliza
tion
9 Cryptographic
primitive
Deterministic RNG
DRG.4
[38] - Yes -
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
Note: End of report
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