BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
for
Renesas Cryptographic Library v5126
on Renesas RS47X security integrated circuit
Version 01
from
Renesas Electronics Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.52
BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
Renesas Cryptographic Library
v5126 on Renesas RS47X security integrated circuit Version 01
from Renesas Electronics Corporation
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 22 September 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................12
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................13
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................14
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................14
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................16
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................16
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................17
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................17
11 Security Target............................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................18
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................18
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................20
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Renesas Cryptographic Library v5126 on Renesas RS47X security integrated
circuit Version 01 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Renesas Cryptographic Library v5126 on Renesas RS47X
security integrated circuit Version 01 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 22 September 2011. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Renesas Electronics
Corporation.
The product was developed by: Renesas Electronics Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011 Certification Report
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Renesas Cryptographic Library v5126 on Renesas RS47X security integrated
circuit Version 01 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Renesas Electronics Corporation
5-20-1 Jousuihon-cho, Kodaira-shi
Tokyo 187-8588
Japan
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Renesas Cryptographic Library v5126 running on
the RS47X. The Renesas Cryptographic Library (RCL) provides cryptographic services
using the RS47X hardware. The TOE is intended for use in a range of high security
applications, including high speed secure authentication, data encryption or electronic
signature. The RCL is intended to be used as crypto library by the Security IC Embedded
Software.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.RCL-LeakProtect In addition to the measures provided by the hardware, the RCL
provides additional measures to protect against leakage of
information from the IC.
SF.RNG The RCL provides a pseudo random number generator and
includes functions to generate seeds usind the HW RNG and also
to run the on-line test of the HW RNG.
SF.DES The RCL provides single block (ECB), CBC and OFB mode DES
using the hardware platform DES coprocessor.
SF.AES The RCL provides single block (ECB), CBC and OFB mode AES
using the hardware platform AES coprocessor.
SF.MMCopro The hardware platform of the composite TOE provides a co-
processor that carries out modular multiplication. The RCL provides
an implementation of the RSA and RSA CRT using the MMC and
provides secure key generation for the RSA and RSA CRT.
SF.Hash The RCL provides implementations of the hash functions SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Renesas Cryptographic
Library v5126 running on the RS47X integrated circuit Version 01. For details refer to
chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Renesas Cryptographic Library
v5126 on Renesas RS47X security integrated circuit Version 01
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Renesas RS47X integrated
circuit
version 01 Wafer or packaged module
2 SW IC Dedicated Test Software
Test ROM Software
20981 Included in RS47X test ROM
3 SW RNG on-line test software 1.4 Hardcopy: provided as a part
of [14]
4 SW AES/DES library for RS-4
consists of
RS4_LL.lib,
RS4_LL.txt,
and RS4_LL.h
4658
4658
4658
Electronic Data
5 DOC Hardware Manual [15] 1.10 Electronic Data/Hardcopy
6 DOC User Guidance [14] 1.3 Electronic Data/Hardcopy
7 DOC Option List [16] 1.3 Electronic Data/Hardcopy
8 SW Renesas Cryptographic
Library running on the
RS47X
5126 Electronic Data
9 DOC Renesas Cryptographic
Library User's Manual [13]
1.20 Electronic Data/Hardcopy
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware platform is labelled according to the availability of the optional contactless
protocols Type-B and Type-F and considering the selection of the built-in capacitance
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011 Certification Report
between both antenna contact pads (LA-LB) which are optional modules selected in [16]
by the user.
The security functionality of the TOE is not influenced by the delivery forms.
The commercial type name is the name of the TOE along with the selected contactless
protocols option, the package code, and with the customer specific ROM code (the
Security IC Embedded Software) of the TOE. The commercial type name is built as shown
in Table 3:
Product
Name
Type-A or Type-F ROM code Package code Built-in
capacitance
RS47X A for Type-A
C for Type-F
A number between 0 – 99
(unique for each ROM)
package code (two or
three ASCII characters)
1 or space
Table 3: Meaning of the commercial type names of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified with the information stored at the first 20 bytes
of the EEPROM address range. Option List for Smart Card Microcomputer (for RS47X)
describes the information for identification of the TOE. In addition the hardware version
can be identified by the nameplate on the surface of the die.
The RCL has the version number 5126. The section 2.4.5 of [13] lists the check sums of
the TOE’s components that have to be verified when they are integrated into the hardware
platform.
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement cryptographic algorithms
and will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform with Cryptographic Library, the security policy
of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE),
against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against
abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Usage of Hardware Platform
● Treatment of User Data
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
● Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
● Injected Data Support
● Usage of Kex-dependent Functions
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The Renesas Renesas RS47X integrated circuit version 01 is an integrated circuit
providing a hardware platform for a Security IC Embedded Software. A top level block
diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the “RS47X
Version 01 Security Target”, [6] and [8]. The complete hardware description and the
complete instruction set of the Renesas Renesas RS47X integrated circuit version 01 can
be found in the “RS47X User’s Manual”, [14] and publicly available “H8S/2600 Series,
H8S/2000 Series Software Manual, Revision 4.00”, [17].
The implementation of the TOE Security Functionality basically consists of the components
32-bit CPU, DES/3DES co-processor, AES co-processor, Random Number Generator,
system control logic, and security circuitry implemented in the analogue circuitry as well as
in the random logic circuitries, that include security sensors. The contactless interface
detects the related contactless communication protocols automatically. The security
measures for physical protection are realized within the layout of the whole circuitry.
Beside the security functionalities, the TOE is equipped with the CRC coprocessor, the
contactless interface circuitry, the UART, the interval timers, the pseudo-random number
generator, the modular multiplication coprocessor, and the watchdog timer. Although those
modules are required for the functionality of the TOE, the security of the TOE does not
depend on those modules.
The smart card embedded support software “DES/AES Library of RS-4” is delivered as
object code to the customer, who has to use the library when triple-DES or AES are
required.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following categories:
● tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE,
● characterisation and verification tests to release the hardware platform for production
including tests with different operating conditions as well as special verification tests for
security features of the hardware,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011 Certification Report
● functional tests at the end of the production process using IC Dedicated Test Software.
These tests are executed for every chip to check its correct functionality as a last step of
phase 3,
● design tool checks (layout versus schematic), and
● verification tests carried out to verify the functionality and quality of the related property
Additional tests are carried out when the module production (COT) is completed, however
the tests are limited to confirm the functionality after the COT production. The developer
tests cover all TSFIs as identified in the functional specification as well as in the test
documentation.
The evaluators repeated the tests of the developer by sampling. A test protocol of the tests
provided by the developer was verified. In addition the evaluators performed independent
tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer. The tests
of the evaluators comprise special tests and examination of the hardware platform using
open samples.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the TOE
Security Functionality as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functionality.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all TOE Security Functionality into
consideration. Extensive penetration testing was performed to test the security
mechanisms used to provide the Security Services and Security Features. The tests for
the hardware platform comprise the use of bespoke equipment and expert knowledge. The
penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the hardware platform and
attacks which do not modify the hardware platform physically. The support of attacks by
reverse engineering was also considered. The test of the hardware platform comprises
attacks that must be averted by the combination of the hardware platform and the Security
IC Embedded Software as well as attacks against the hardware platform directly. In
addition side channel analysis was performed for the DES/3DES and AES co-processor
including the supporting software DES/AES Library for RS-4 and the RCL.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Renesas’ Cryptographic Library v5126 running on Renesas’ certified product
hardware platform (RS47X) without any Security IC Embedded Software. The hardware
platform Renesas RS47X integrated circuit version 01 was certified under the certification-
ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0705-2011 (see [19]). The TOE is intended to be used by the secure
application software (Security IC Embedded Software), which is not in scope of the
evaluation, however responsible for the proper use of the TOE. The hardware platform
requires the implementation of the RNG on-line test software, which is implemented as a
security functionality of the TOE. The hardware platform includes the "DES/AES Library for
RS-4", that is also implemented in the TOE. The RCL on RS47X serves supports the
development of Security IC Embedded Software.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, The Application of CC to
Integrated Circuits
● Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, Application of Attack Potential
to Smartcards
● Supporting Document - Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0735-2011, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on vulnerability analysis, testing
and penetration testing.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile,
Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011 Certification Report
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
– the TOE Security functionality SF.DES, SF.AES, SF.Hash and SF.MMCopro
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for this
functionalites it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionalities 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) and RSA 1024 provided by
the TOE achieves a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptograhic algortithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to
be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
If the user decides to use other software countermeasures instead of the DES/AES Library
for RS-4 or the RCL, the composite evaluator is required to evaluate the resistance of the
algorithms against SCA and DFA. The other smart card embedded support software “RNG
online-test Software” is printed out in [14]. The user is required to implement the software.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining. A mode of DES & AES encryption
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
COT Chip on Tape
CPU Central processing unit
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Codebook. A mode of DES & AES encryption.
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HW Hardware
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMC Modular Multiplication Coprocessor
PP Protection Profile
RCL Renesas Cryptographic Library
ROM Read-Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
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ST Security Target
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011, Version 5524, 21.07.2011, RCL on RS47X
Version 01 Security Target, Renesas Europe Ltd. (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
[8] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011, Version 1.1, 21.7.2011, RCL on RS47X
Version 01 Security Target Public Version, Renesas Europe Ltd. (sanitised public
document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774, Version 1,0, 19.09.2011,
T-Systems GEI GmbH, (confidential document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product Renesas RS47X
integrated circuit version 01, Version 1.0, 22.7.2011, T-Systems GEI GmbH
(confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 7, 30.6.2011, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 8, 08.6.2011, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[11] RCL on RS-4 Generic Configuration List, Version 5523, Date: 21.07.2011,
Document Number D008710_ALC, Renesas Electronics Europe Ltd. (confidential
document)
[12] RCL on RS47X-CC-VER, Version 5530, Document Number D008710_VER,
Renesas Electronics Europe Ltd., 21.07.2011 (confidential document)
[13] Renesas Cryptographic Library (RCL), User's Manual: Software, Renesas Secure
Microcomputer RS-4 Series, Version 5126 (RCL2.1), Rev.1.20, CM_Doc_ID: 5317,
Renesas Electronics Corporation, 22.03.2011
[14] RS-4 dual-way Series User Guidance Manual, Revision 1.4, Renesas Electronics
Corporation, July 2011
[15] RS47X User’s Manual: Hardware, Renesas Secure Microcomputer RS-4 Series,
Rev. 1.10, Renesas Electronics Corporation, September 14, 2010
[16] Option List for Smart Card Microcomputer (for RS47X), Revision 1.1, Rev. 14985,
Renesas Electronics Corporation, 24 June 2011
[17] H8S/2600 Series, H8S/2000 Series Software Manual, Revision 4.00, Renesas
Technology Corp., 24 February 2006
[18] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0735-2011 for Renesas RS47X integrated circuit
version 01 from Renesas Electronics Corp., 21 July 2011, Federal Office for
Information Security
[19] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0705-2011 for Renesas Cryptographic Library
v5126 running on the RS46X from Renesas Electronics Corp., 20 July 2011,
Federal Office for Information Security
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (Release 3 = chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0774-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Renesas Cryptographic Library, v5126 on Renesas RS47X security
integrated circuit Version 01 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 22 September 2011, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Renesas Electronics Corporation, 5-20-1, Jousuihon-cho, Kodaira-shi, Tokyo
187-8588, Japan (development and customer support)
b) Renesas Electronics Europe Ltd., Dukes Meadow, Millboard Road, Bourne
End, Buckinghamshire, SL8 5FH, U.K. (development, testing and customer
support)
c) Renesas Electronics Corporation Naka Factory, 751 Horiguchi, Hitachinaka-
shi, Ibaraki 312-0034, Japan (semiconductor factory)
d) Dai Nippon Printing Co., Ltd., 2-2-1 Fukuoka, Fujimino-shi, Saitama 356-8507,
Japan (mask shop)
e) Renesas Electronics Corporation – Kofu site, 4617 Nishiyahata, Kai-shi,
Yamanashi 400-0117, Japan (test center)
f) Toyo Electronics Co., Ltd., 2781-1, Shimosone-cho, Kofu-shi, Yamanashi, 400-
1508, Japan (test center)
g) Renesas Musashi Engineering Service Co., Ltd., 5-22-1 Jousuihon-cho,
Kodaira-shi, Tokyo 187-8522, Japan (ROM handling)
h) MTEX Matsumura Corp., 2-2-2 Kitamachi, Obanazawa-shi, Yamagata 999-
4231, Japan (module assembly)
i) The Apollo Electronics Co., Ltd., 610 Shimoimasuwa, Minami-alps-shi,
Yamanashi, 400-0212, Japan (back grinding)
j) Enzan Factory Co., Ltd., 276 Enzanshimoozo, Koshu-shi, Yamanashi, 404-
0043, Japan (wafer dicing)
k) Renesas Electronics Europe GmbH, Karl-Hammerschmidt-Str. 42, 85609
Aschheim-Dornach, Germany (development and testing)
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For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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