BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015
for
secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel,
Version 1.0.0
from
secunet Security Networks AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.13
BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015 (*)
Certificate Issuing and Management Component
secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel
Version 1.0.0
from secunet Security Networks AG
PP Conformance: Certificate Issuing and Management Components
Protection Profile Version 1.5, 11 August, 2011
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 6 November 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................15
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................18
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................19
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................20
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................22
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................23
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................23
11. Security Target............................................................................................................24
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................24
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................26
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................28
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e.
for all assurance components selected.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015 Certification Report
The product secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel, Version 1.0.0 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel, Version 1.0.0
was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 9 October 2015. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: secunet Security Networks
AG.
The product was developed by: secunet Security Networks AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 6 November
2015 is valid until 5 November 2020. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel, Version 1.0.0 has been included in
the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
secunet Security Networks AG
Kronprinzenstraße 30
45128 Essen
Deutschland
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel
Version 1.0.0 provided by secunet Security Networks AG.
The TOE is a CA (Certification Authority) Kernel that provides request, issuance,
revocation, and overall management of certificates and certificate status information. The
secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel supports Extended Access Control Certification
Authorities (EAC CAs) according to the BSI Technical Guideline TR-03110 [11] and
International Civil Aviation Organization CAs (ICAO CAs), which are X.509 CAs according
to ITU-T X.509 [12]. For cryptographic operations, the secunet CA Kernel relies on a
FIPS-2 Level 3 validated cryptographic module – a Hardware Security Module (HSM)
which is not part of the TOE.
The CA-Server administrator integrates the secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel into
a TOE functional environment. He is defined as TOE end-user.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Certificate Issuing and Management Components Protection Profile
Version 1.5, 11 August, 2011 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF1.1 Audit Message
Generation
The subsystem Audit logs the security-relevant events that were
performed by the TOE. These events are either triggered internally or by
external components/users via Java methods. That is, the subsystem
CACore logs amongst others every event and the appropriate event state,
in the case that this event triggers a process of the CACore.
If the audit trail is full the TOE will shut down.
SF1.2 Audit Trail Protection After audit message generation, the Audit unit of the TOE generates
uniquely identifiable audit messages, so called audit records.
The Audit is able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the
user that caused the event as the identity is contained in the audit record.
The Audit is able to select the set of events to be audited from the set of all
auditable events based on the following attributes contained in the audit
record: Object identity, user identity and event type.
The TOE triggers that a set of these chronologically ordered audit records
(called audit trail) are periodically signed by means of a digital signature by
the Hardware Security Module. This period is configurable.
In order to protect audit messages against modification or deletion the
Audit uses timestamps and sequence numbers.
The Audit also triggers further cryptographic operations with HSM to
protect the audit messages. The Audit needs three different cryptographic
keys to protect the audit trails. It needs one signature key (ASK), one
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
encryption key (AEK) and also one current symmetric trail record key
(TRK). All these keys are generated within and stored on the HSM.
SF2 Management of the TSF At the first startup of the TOE, the CACore has no configuration. Thus, the
CACore must first be configured via the Java-API.
The CACore performs the same checks for Java configuration method as
described in SF3.2. That is, certificate validation, signature verification,
challenge/identity check and role check. If all checks succeed, the Audit
generates an audit log and the CACore triggers the generation of a new
symmetric key within HSM. Then the CACore triggers HMAC protection of
the configuration within the HSM. Finally the CACore stores the HMAC
protected configuration via Java-API to the Adapter. (All data of Certified
CA Kernel may be stored in or retrieved from a database via an Adapter.)
If a configuration is needed during processing, the CACore loads all
information via Java-API from the Adapter. Then the CACore triggers
HMAC verification within the HSM. If HMAC verification fails the Audit
generates an audit log record and the CACore does not further continue
processing. If HMAC verification succeeds the CACore Job processing is
continued.
SF3.1 Challenge Request and
Response
In order to prevent replay attacks, the CACore triggers a
challenge-response algorithm. In a first step, the external component must
request a challenge via the Adapter from the CACore. The CACore then
triggers generation of a challenge within the HSM.
The CACore then stores the challenge with the user identification given in
the request and sends the challenge back to the external component via
the Adapter. Now the external component may request Job processing via
the Adapter in a second step. A Job must contain amongst others the
requested challenge and must be signed with the user’s private key.
SF3.2 Remote Data Entry
Verification, Authorization and
Challenge Verification
Before the CACore starts a particular process it performs the following
checks to ensure the integrity of the consigned Java method data:
The CACore
● performs user certificate validation and the appropriate certificate chain
validation,
● performs the signature verification with all consigned data,
● checks whether the given challenge and the signature identity matches
a stored challenge/identity and
● checks whether the role of the signature identity has the right to perform
the requested process. The allowed roles are: Administrator, Auditor
and Officer.
If all checks succeed, the Audit generates an audit log record and starts
request processing. If a check fails, the Audit generates an audit log
record and the CACore does not start request processing.
SF4 Certificate and Certificate
Status Management
The TOE triggers the generation of X.509 certificates and CRLs according
to the standards X.509v3 [12] and RFC 5280 [13].
In addition to this, the TOE also generates CVC for EAC e-Passport
infrastructure according to the BSI TR-03110 [11] standard.
The TOE maintains via Adapter all issued certificates and their current
state in a database, in order to serve status information. Status information
of certificates is made available through CRLs and delta CRLs (RFC 5280
[13]).
SF4.1 Certificate Generation In case of a certificate request, the CACore
● validates the certificate request against the loaded CAProfile,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
● triggers signature verification of the certificate request within HSM,
● transforms the CAProfile and merges it with the certificate request into a
certification template,
● triggers the signing of a certificate template to generate a certificate
within HSM and
● returns the new certificate via Java-API to the Adapter.
SF4.2 Certificate Revocation In case of a certificate revocation list request, the CACore
● merges the CRLProfile and the list of revoked certificates into the
certificate revocation list template,
● triggers the singing of the certificate revocation list template within HSM
and
● returns the new certificate revocation list via Java-API to the Adapter.
SF4.3 Certificate Status
Export
Issued CRLs are stored via Java-API in the Adapter.
SF5 Access Control The TOE enforces the CIMC TOE Access Control Policy specified in
Section 9.1 of [6]. The access to resources in the TOE is controlled using
access control lists, based on:
● access rule – accept or decline access to a resource,
● resource – a resource to which access is controlled,
● user – an entity that have access rights to a resource,
● role – a role that a user is allowed to take on.
When a controlled resource is accessed, the CACore verifies that the
caller meets the appropriate access rules for the resource and, if not,
denies access and generates an error. If there are no access rules
associated to the resource, access is denied. The TOE access control
system maps authentication information to a user entity. The entity is then
associated to a role in order to acquire privileges.
SF6 Cryptographic Key
Management
For cryptographic operations the TOE relies on a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 [14]
validated cryptographic module – a Hardware Security Module (HSM). All
cryptographic operations (key generation, hashing, signing, verifying and
key zeroizing) are performed within this validated cryptographic module.
The HSM runs in FIPS mode. Here, FIPS mode means FIPS approved
mode of operation according to [14].
The TOE only manages Component keys. Component keys are used to
sign certificates and certificate status information. Component keys are
also used to sign audit logs and to ensure the integrity of changed Jobs by
CACore. Component private keys are only stored on the HSM.
The integrity and authenticity of public keys stored by the TOE in the
database – outside the HSM – is protected by the usage of a digital
signature, namely of the digital certificate structure in which it has been
included. Every time a public key needs to be used to perform any
cryptographic operation, its protective digital signature will be verified and,
in case of failure, an audit log entry will be generated and the key will be
marked as tampered with, becoming unusable for all types of operations.
The TOE triggers zeroizing plaintext Component private keys within the
HSM, if required.
The TOE may trigger the following cryptographic operations within the
HSM in FIPS mode:
● Generate Key
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
● En/Decrypt Data
● Sign Data
● Verify Signature
● Compute Hash
● Agree/Handle shared secret
● Generate Random Number
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 10.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel, Version 1.0.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW secunet_eID_PKI_Suite_CertifiedCAKernel-
1_0_0.zip (contains #2 to #6)
Version 1.0.0 Via Download or DVD/CD
2 SW CertifiedCAKernel.jar
SHA256 checksum:
82c1a41893944d4e18dca82d3f144de0b830c1
4e83cf64a641c7b52edb7b0192
Version 1.0.0 As part of #1
3 SW bootstrap.bat
SHA256 checksum:
7dbe04657b939d384c96bbc9af8337b8505acd
69c51469dffce10bfa419b7d08
Version 1.0.0 As part of #1
4 DOC Manual Certified CA Kernel.pdf [10]
SHA256 checksum:
5ffd82d9e84212b60179437d347e5953b6f37ec
6bd97642af80db68ddb432c9f
Version 1.03 As part of #1
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
5 DOC Security Target Certified CA Kernel.pdf [6]
SHA256 checksum:
d4e6088b749c2891846e2e25a813e7bdf398d7
e02b64d9977048a68655584b07
Version 1.07 As part of #1
6 DOC ReleaseNotes.pdf [15]
SHA256 checksum:
1fc1813a0c464eda3933877ec47e8c636551de
619a94f25adcd345c475d8ca10
Version 1.0 As part of #1
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The software consists of two files which can be uniquely identified by their hash
checksums given in the table above (#2 and #3). The version number of the TOE is 1.0.0.
The user is provided with guidance for TOE identification in [10] (#4 in the above table).
The TOE is delivered via the secunet download portal or personally delivered to the
application developer on a CD/DVD. The project manager at secunet describes the
integrity and authentication checks to the application developer by phone or personally.
The end-user can verify that the authenticity and integrity of the TOE has not been altered.
First the signed zip file must be verified. Therefore the user uses the public verification
RSA key delivered with the zip file (#1 in the above table), with the SHA256 fingerprint
given to him by the developer. After a successful verification, the hash values of the binary
parts of the TOE can be compared to the ones given in Table 2. This calculation can be
done with any available SHA256 program.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The TOE implements logical
security functionality in order to provide Registration Authority (RA) functionality to verify
the information in public key certificates and determine certificate status and CA
functionality to generate certificates and certificate status information as well as audit data
generation according to example CIMC-3 (single component) of CIMC PP [8]. Specific
details concerning the above mentioned security functionalities can be found in section 6
of the Security Target.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Administrators, Officers and Auditors guidance documentation: Deter Administrator,
Officer or Auditor errors by providing adequate documentation on securely configuring
and operating the CIMC.
● OE.Auditors Review Audit Logs: Identify and monitor security-relevant events by
requiring auditors to review audit logs on a frequency sufficient to address level of risk.
● OE.Authentication Data Management: Ensure that users change their authentication
data at appropriate intervals and to appropriate values (e.g., proper lengths, histories,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015 Certification Report
variations, etc.) through enforced authentication data management (Note: this objective
is not applicable to biometric authentication data).
● OE.Communications Protection: Protect the system against a physical attack on the
communications capability by providing adequate physical security.
● OE.Competent Administrators, Officers and Auditors: Provide capable management of
the TOE by assigning competent Administrators, Officers and Auditors to manage the
TOE and the security of the information it contains. Only non-hostile people are
entrusted with administrative tasks.
● OE.Cooperative Users: Ensure that users are cooperative so that they can accomplish
some task or group of tasks that require a secure IT environment and information
managed by the TOE.
● OE.CPS: All Administrators, Officers and Auditors shall be familiar with the certificate
policy (CP) and the certification practices statement (CPS) under which the TOE is
operated.
● OE.Detect modifications of firmware, software, and backup data: Provide integrity
protection to detect modifications to firmware, software, and backup data.
● OE.Disposal of Authentication Data: Provide proper disposal of authentication data and
associated privileges after access has been removed (e.g., Job termination, change in
responsibility).
● OE.HSM: The HSM in FIPS mode enforces usage of smartcards. Thus all
Administrators, Officers and Auditor must only use smartcards as authentication token
between them and the HSM via CXI library.
● OE.Installation: Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is delivered,
installed, managed, and operated in a manner which maintains IT security.
● OE.Lifecycle security: Provide tools and techniques used during the development phase
to ensure security is designed into the CIMC. Detect and resolve flaws during the
operational phase.
● OE.Malicious Code Not Signed: Protect the TOE from malicious code by ensuring all
code is signed by a trusted entity prior to loading it into the system.
● OE.Notify Authorities of Security Issues: Notify proper authorities of any security issues
that impact their systems to minimize the potential for the loss or compromise of data.
● OE.Object and data recovery free from malicious code: Recover to a viable state after
malicious code is introduced and damage occurs. That state must be free from the
original malicious code.
● OE.Operating System: The operating system used is validated to provide adequate
security, including domain separation and non-bypassability, in accordance with security
requirements recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
● OE.Periodically check integrity: Provide periodic integrity checks on both system and
software.
● OE.Physical Protection: Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the
security-relevant components of the TOE and non-TOE are protected from physical
attack that might compromise IT security.
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● OE.Preservation/trusted recovery of secure state: Preserve the secure state of the
system in the event of a secure component failure and/or recover to a secure state.
● OE.Procedures for preventing malicious code: Incorporate malicious code prevention
procedures and mechanisms.
● OE.Repair identified security flaws: The vendor repairs security flaws that have been
identified by a user.
● OE.Require inspection for downloads: Require inspection of downloads/transfers.
● OE.Security-relevant configuration management: Manage and update system security
policy data and enforcement functions, and other security-relevant configuration data, to
ensure they are consistent with organizational security policies.
● OE.Social Engineering Training: Provide training for general users, Administrators,
Officers and Auditors in techniques to thwart social engineering attacks.
● OE.Sufficient backup storage and effective restoration: Provide sufficient backup storage
and effective restoration to ensure that the system can be recreated.
● OE.Time stamps: Provide time stamps to ensure that the sequencing of events can be
verified. The IT environment provides reliable timestamps (NTP server).The connection
between the management machine and the network components is protected by
cryptographic transforms (e. g. SSH authorization and SSH transport protection).
● OE.Trusted Path: Provide a trusted path between the user and the system. Provide a
trusted path to security-relevant (TSF) data in which both end points have assured
identities.
● OE.Validation of security function: Ensure that security-relevant software, hardware, and
firmware are correctly functioning through features and procedures.
● OE.Cryptographic functions: Provide approved cryptographic algorithms for
authentication and signature generation/verification; approved key generation
techniques and use validated cryptographic modules in the TOE environment. (Validated
is defined as FIPS 140-2 validated.). The cryptographic module is required to run in
FIPS mode.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a CA (Certification Authority) Kernel that provides request, issuance,
revocation, and overall management of certificates and certificate status information. For
cryptographic operations the secunet CA Kernel relies on a FIPS-2 Level 3 validated
Hardware Security Module (HSM).
The security functions of the TOE are:
● SF1 Security Audit
• SF1.1 Audit message generation
• SF1.2 Audit trail protection
• SF2 Management of the TSF
● SF3 Data Authenticity and Authorization
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• SF3.1 Challenge Request and Response
• SF3.2 Remote Data entry Verification, Authorization and Challenge Verification
● SF4 Certificate and Certificate Status management
• SF4.1 Certificate Generation
• SF4.2 Certificate Revocation
• SF4.3 Certificate Status Export
● SF5 Access Control
● SF6 Cryptographic Key Management
In the TOE design, these security functions are enforced by the following subsystems:
● System (supports the TSF SF1, SF2, SF3, SF4, SF5, SF6): The subsystem System
provides methods for the subsystems System, Audit, CACore and supports Bootstrap for
the secure initialization.
● Audit (supports the TSF SF1): The subsystem Audit interacts with the subsystem
System and provides message generation and protection of the Audit trails.
● CACore (supports the TSFs SF2 and SF4): The subsystems CACore interacts with the
subsystem System and provides the main functionalities of the TOE.
● Bootstrapping: The subsystem bootstrapping interacts with subsystem System and
CA-Core, to ensure a secure initialization and boot process on the first initialization of
the TOE
Figure 1 visualizes the TOE Design and its TSFIs in the TOE structure.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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Figure 1: Visualization of TOE Design
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7. IT Product Testing
The TOE test configuration is defined by “secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel” with
the hash values for the two binary parts of the TOE as given in table 2 above. Therefore
the evaluated configuration and the configuration tested during evaluation were confirmed
to be the same.
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions. For all commands and functionality tests,
test cases were specified in order to demonstrate its expected behaviour including error
cases. Hereby a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set
were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
During their testing, the evaluators covered
● Testing of all developer tests
● Additional evaluator tests
● Vulnerability analysis
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against enhanced basic attack
potential during their testing.
The achieved test results corresponded to the expected test results.
7.1. Functional Testing
TOE Test Configuration
The TOE was tested in the secunet testing environment. The TOE was installed on a
standard PC fulfilling the requirements from chapter 1.2.3 of [6]. It was connected to the
Utimaco HSM and a personalised PinPad reader. Besides the requirements described in
chapter 1.2.3 of [6] the test environment also needed to fulfil the security objectives for the
environment. The evaluators compared the requirements for the operational environment
with the actual testing environment of the developer. The TOE environment and the related
test equipment for the tests are consistent with the described ones in [6] and [10].
Testing approach
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem. The test
cases divided into those of the CACore, Audit, System and the Bootstrapping. Thus all
subsystems are covered by several test cases.
For the tests of the TOE, the developer used the JUnit testing framework. In this
framework test cases are implemented in Java. Each test is implemented as a Java
method. The tests can be run and the framework shows whether the test was successful.
To create extensive log files as required for the evaluation the developer changed the
default behaviour of the testing framework, so additional information about the testing was
logged.
Testing Results
The results of the TOE tests prove the correct implementation. All test cases were
executed successfully and ended with the expected result.
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7.2. Independent Evaluator Tests
Overview
The independent testing was performed using the developer’s testing environment. The
configuration of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation was
tested. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results.
Test Configuration
The TOE was tested in the secunet testing environment. The TOE is installed on a
standard PC fulfilling the requirements from chapter 1.2.3 of [6]. It is connected to the
Utimaco HSM and a personalised PinPad reader. Besides the requirements described in
chapter 1.2.3 of [6] the test environment also needs to fulfil the security objectives for the
environment. The evaluators compared the requirements for the operational environment
with the actual testing environment of the developer. The TOE environment and the related
test equipment for the tests are consistent with the described ones in [6] and [10].
The entire developer test configuration and the test protocols were provided to the
evaluator. The evaluator used the same configuration as the developer.
The following configuration is the configuration of the virtual machine and is consistent with
the described one in [6]:
● 16 GB RAM
● Intel Core i7 @ 3.4 GHz
● 500 GB storage
● Network adapter
● power supply
● VGA graphics adapter
Utimaco HSM
● Utimaco Package Version 3.11.0 (contains the CXI library)
Utimaco HSM Emulator
● CryptoServerCXI: Version 1.61
● CryptoServerAPI: Version 1.49
● bl_ver = 3.00.3.0
The configuration was verified by the evaluator during the ATE workshop.
For the tests of the TOE which were carried out at the developer’s site this configuration
was used.
Subset size chosen
The independent test subset consists of eight individual tests. Each TSFI was tested at
least once. The tests cover especially the quality of imported certificates using different
configurations using one or two HSMs. Security critical operations during states and the
bootstrapping mechanism was part of the tests. Tests to ensure the correct usage of
parameters during audit functionality in different states were also part of the subset.
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Developer’s test subset repeated
From the developer tests a subset of six tests was generated. These tests were chosen
because they cover all TSFIs of the TOE. In all test cases the expected result was met.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.3. Vulnerability Analysis
The evaluators applied a methodical analysis to create a list of potential vulnerabilities.
The evaluators have conducted their search and have taken the following information into
account: All evaluation deliverables, in particular the ST and the deliverables for the
classes ADV, AGD, ALC and ATE.
Firstly, the evaluator created a list of potential vulnerabilities based on the results gained
while performing the vulnerability analysis considering the current TOE type,TOE specific
technology, and TOE specific implementation.
Secondly, the evaluator reconstructed the formal assumptions about the TOE operational
environment. In order to do this he referred to [6], section 5.1 and 5.2. The operational
environment does neither restrict nor extend vulnerabilities.
During the vulnerability analysis of the evaluator, all potential attack methods and
vulnerabilities were discussed in a systematic way in accordance to the attack potential,
enhanced basic.
Having performed the analysis above the evaluator found no remaining potential
vulnerabilities in accordance to the attack potential, enhanced basic which may be
exploitable in the intended TOE’s environment.
Due to the fact that there are no potential vulnerabilities identified that are not analysed in
vulnerability analysis of the evaluator there was no further penetration testing done by the
evaluator.
The test results fulfil the requirements of AVA_VAN.3.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers only one configuration of the TOE that is defined in chapter 1.2.3
and chapter 2.1 of the Security Target [6] and in chapter 12 of the guidance documentation
[10].
The Certified CA Kernel supports Windows Server 2012 R2 operating system. The
operating system must be appropriately prepared for the operation of Certified CA Kernel.
It is sufficient if the operating system was installed in the basic configuration. Particularly,
the server does not need any additional services such as print servers or web servers. In
addition to the base installation, the package 'Oracle Java SE 8u45' must be installed.
The evaluated configuration only supports HSMs. The TOE evaluated configuration
comprises the Utimaco HSM package version 3.11.0, which also includes the CXI library.
The CXI library is not part of the TOE.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Certificate Issuing and Management Components Protection Profile
Version 1.5, 11 August, 2011 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BAT Batch File
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Certification Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CIMC Certificate Issuing and Management Component
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAC CA Extended Access Control Certification Authority
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HSM Hardware Security Module
ICAO CA International Civil Aviation Organization CA
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
ITU-T ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector
JAR Java Archive
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0960-2015, Version 1.07, 08.10.2015, secunet eID PKI
Suite Certified CA Kernel Version 1.0.0 Security Target, secunet Security Networks
AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, 09.10.2015, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) – Summary, Lab-Name, (confidential document)
[8] Certificate Issuing and Management Components Protection Profile Version 1.5, 11
August, 2011, Communications Security Establishment Canada, Document number:
383-6-3-CR
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.92, 16.07.2015, Konfigurationsliste
ALC_CMS.4 (confidential document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.03, 21.08.2015, Handbuch
(AGD_PRE.1 und AGD_OPE.1)
[11] TR-03110, BSI, Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents, Part 1-3, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012, https://www.bsi.de
[12] ITU-T X.509, Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The
Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks, http://www.itu.int
[13] RFC 5280, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile, May 2008, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280
[14] FIPS140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, FIPS PUB 140-2,
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES, NIST,
12.03.2002, http://www.nist.gov
[15] Release Notes, secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel Version 1.0.0, Version
1.0, 10.07.2015
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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