KECS-CR-20-56
MagicDBPlus v2.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1042-2020
2020. 9. 8.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2020.09.08. -
Certification report for MagicDBPlus v2.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for MagicDBPlus v2.0 for
Dreamsecurity Co., LTD.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KoSyAs)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................8
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
6. Documentation................................................................................................... 11
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................12
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................12
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................13
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................13
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................13
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................14
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................14
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................14
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................15
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................15
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................16
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................16
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................17
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................18
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the evaluation facility on the results
of the MagicDBPlus v2.0 developed by Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd. with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)[1]. It
describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (“TOE” hereinafter) is database encryption software to prevent
unauthorized exposure of the information from DBMS. Also, the TOE shall provide a
variety of security features: security audit, cryptographic operation using cryptographic
module, the user identification and authentication including mutual authentication
between TOE components, security management, the TOE access session
management, and the TSF protection function, etc..
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
and completed on July 29, 2020.
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Database
Encryption V1.1[3]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based
only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs.
Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security
Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components in CC Part
2 and a newly defined component in the Extended Component Definition chapter of the
PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
As shown in [Figure 1], the operational environment is comprised of MagicDBPlus v2.0
Server(“Management Server”), MagicDBPlus v2.0 Admin(“Administrative Tool”),
MagicDBPlus v2.0 Agent(“Agent”).
Installed as a plug-in to the DBMS which has to be protected, the Agent receives TSF
data from the Management Server and performs encryption/decryption of user data upon
the request from the Application Server. In addition, the authorized administrator
manages the scope and policies of encryption befitting security policy required in the
organization via the Management Server, using the Administrative Tool. Upon the request
of Application Service Users, the Application Server makes a request to the Database
Server while the Agent encrypts/decrypts user data, if necessary, and deliver them to
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Application Service Users.
Moreover, if a critical events(e.g., reaching to audit data threshold, etc.) arises in the
Management Server, a mail is sent to a user designated by the authorized administrator
via a mail server.
[Figure 1] Plug-in type operational environment of the TOE
(Agent, Management Server separate type)
Communications among TOE components, which rely on a self-implemented protocol,
carry out cryptographic communication, using an approved algorithm of the validated
cryptographic module (MagicCrypto V2.2.0).
The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE are
shown in [Table 1].
Component Requirement
MagicDBPlus v2.0
Server
(Management
Server)
HW
CPU Intel(R) Core (TM) i3 CPU @ 2.27 GHz or higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
100 GB or higher
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NIC 100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Port 1 unit or higher
SW OS CentOS 7.8 (Linux Kernel 3.10.0) 64 bit
MagicDBPlus v2.0
Admin
(Administrative
Tool)
HW
CPU Intel(R) Core (TM) i5 CPU @ 2.50GHz or higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
500 MB or higher
NIC 100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Port 1 unit or higher
SW OS Windows 10 Pro 64 bit
MagicDBPlus v2.0
Agent
(Agent)
HW
CPU Intel(R) Core (TM) i5 CPU @ 2.30GHz or higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
500 MB or higher
NIC 100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Port 1 unit or higher
SW
OS CentOS 7.8 (Linux Kernel 3.10.0) 64 bit
DBMS to be
protected
Oracle 12.2.0.1.0 64 bit
[Table 1] TOE Hardware and Software specifications
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of Republic
of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the certificate, is either
expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE is software consisting of the following software components and related
guidance documents.
TOE MagicDBPlus v2.0
Version v2.0.3.0
TOE
Components
MagicDBPlus
v2.0 Server
(Management
Server)
MagicDBPlus v2.0 Server v2.0.3.0
(MagicDBPlus_v2.0_Server_v2.0.3.0.sh)
MagidDBPlus
v2.0 Admin
(Administrative
Tool)
MagicDBPlus v2.0 Admin v2.0.3.0
(MagicDBPlus_v2.0_Admin_v2.0.3.0.exe)
MagicDBPlus
v2.0 Agent
(Agent)
MagicDBPlus v2.0 Agent v2.0.3.0
(MagicDBPlus_v2.0_Agent_v2.0.3.0.sh)
Guidance
Document
MagicDBPlus v2.0 Installation Guide v1.2
(MagicDBPlus_v2.0_PRE_v1.2.pdf)
MagicDBPlus v2.0 Operational Guidance v1.2
(MagicDBPlus_v2.0_OPE_v1.2.pdf)
[Table 2] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation,
facility, certification body, etc.
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 24, 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(September 12, 2017)
TOE MagicDBPlus v2.0
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Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Protection Profile Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1
Developer Dreamsecurity Co., LTD.
Sponsor Dreamsecurity Co., LTD.
Evaluation
Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
July 29, 2020
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [4] for the TOE claims strict to the Korean National PP for Database Encryption
V1.1 [3], and complies security policies defined in the PP by security requirements. Thus,
the TOE provides security features defined in the PP as follows:
 Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events such
as the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation, self-test
failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
 Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic key management such
as key generation, distribution, and destruction, and cryptographic operations
such as encryption and decryption using the cryptographic modules
(MagicCrypto V2.2.0) validated under the KCMVP.
 User data protection: The TOE provides encryption and decryption for the user
data in a column of a database.
 Identification and authentication: The TOE identifies and authenticates the
administrators using their ID/password and mutually authenticates TOE
components.
 Security management: The TOE allows only an authorized administrator to
access the management interface provided by the TOE.
 Protection of the TSF: The TOE implements secure communications between
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the TOE components to protect the transmitted data. The TOE encrypts the
stored TSF data to protect them from unauthorized exposure and modification.
The TOE performs self-tests on the TOE components, which includes the self-
test on the validated cryptographic module.
 TOE access: The TOE manages authorized administrators’ sessions based on
access IP addresses and administrator rights, and terminates the sessions after
predefined time interval of inactivity.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions secti
on in the low assurance ST. Some security aspects of the operational environment are
added to those of the PP [3] in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used
(For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives of the operational envir-
onment, refer to the ST [4], chapter 3.).
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
 Agent (MagicDBPlus v2.0 Agent)
 Management Server (MagicDBPlus v2.0 Server)
 Administrative Tool (MagicDBPlus v2.0 Admin)
In [Figure 2], the three components perform the same functionalities of audit data
generation, cryptographic key management, cryptographic operations, protection of TSF
data, and mutual authentication between the components. For the detailed description
on the architectural information, refer to the ST [4].
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[Figure 2] Logical scope of the TOE
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identification Date
MagicDBPlus v2.0 Installation Guide v1.2
(MagicDBPlus_v2.0_PRE_v1.2.pdf)
July 10, 2020
MagicDBPlus v2.0 Operational Guidance v1.2
(MagicDBPlus_v2.0_OPE_v1.2.pdf)
July 10, 2020
[Table 4] Documentations
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7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by each
TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test case
includes the following information:
 Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected
and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the assurance
component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative
procedures, and conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the
evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer’s tests.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities.
The evaluator’s testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results are
summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: MagicDBPlus v2.0 (v2.0.3.0)
 MagicDBPlus v2.0 Server v2.0.3.0
 MagicDBPlus v2.0 Admin v2.0.3.0
 MagicDBPlus v2.0 Agent v2.0.3.0
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The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6
were evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and
it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMC.1.
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The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use
of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specification specifies a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
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The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment
accessible only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote
management from outside.
 The administrator shall maintain a safe state such as application of the latest
security patches, eliminating unnecessary service, change of the default
ID/password, etc., of the operating system and DBMS in the TOE operation.
 The administrator should periodically check a spare space of audit data storage
in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup to prevent
audit data loss.
 The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and
authentication function in the operational environment of the business system
shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied in
accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
11. Security Target
MagicDBPlus v2.0 Security Target v1.3 [4] is included in this report for reference.
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Critical Security Parameter
(CSP)
Information related to security that can erode the
security of the encryption module if exposed or changed
(e.g., verification data such as secret key/private key,
password, or Personal Identification Number).
Management Console Application program such as GUI (Graphical User
Interface) or CLI (Command Line Interface) provided to
an administrator for management and configuration of a
system / It is also used as a synonym with the
Administrative Tool in this document.
Secret Key Cryptographic key that is used along with a secret key
cryptographic algorithm and can be uniquely combined
with an entity or more / It shall not be made public.
Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
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13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1, KECS-PP-
0820a-2017, December 11, 2019
[4] MagicDBPlus v2.0 Security Target v1.3, July 10, 2020
[5] MagicDBPlus v2.0 Evaluation Technical Report(ETR) Lite V1.00, July 29, 2020