Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
for
SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8
with certification-sles-eal2 package
from
SuSE Linux AG
sponsored by
IBM Corporation
Linux Technology Center
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
SOGIS-MRA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8
with certification-sles-eal2 package
from
SuSE Linux AG
sponsored by
IBM Corporation
Linux Technology Center
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and
approved/licensed evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 (Life cycle support - Basic flaw
remediation)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 28. July 2003
The President of the Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and
no warranty of the IT product by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the Certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
· BSIG2
· BSI Certification Ordinance3
· BSI Schedule of Costs4
· Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
· DIN EN 45011 standard
· BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
· Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
· Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
· BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
2
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
A-2
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the CC
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
A-3
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8 with certification-sles-eal2
package has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8 with
certification-sles-eal2 package was conducted by atsec information security
GmbH which is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI (ITSEF)6
.
The sponsor is:
IBM Corporation
Linux Technology Center
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758
USA
The developer/distributor is:
SuSE Linux AG
Deutschherrnstr. 15-19
90429 Nürnberg
Germany
The certification is concluded with
· the comparability check and
· the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 28th July 2003.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
· all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
· the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
A-4
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
A-5
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-36.
The product SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8 with certification-sles-eal2
package has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline 0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the sponsor7
of the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the
above-mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation - Linux Technology Center, 11400 Burnet Road, Austin, TX 78727, USA
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
A-6
- This page is intentionally left blank -
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
· the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
· the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
· complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
B-2
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 11
3 Security Policy 12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 13
5 Architectural Information 15
6 Documentation 20
7 IT Product Testing 21
8 Evaluated Configuration 24
9 Results of the Evaluation 26
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 28
11 Annexes 29
12 Security Target 32
13 Definitions 33
14 Bibliography 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
B-3
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8 (also
named SLES in short) with the certification-sles-eal2 package.
It is a general purpose, multi-user, multitasking Linux based operating system. It
provides a platform for a variety of applications in the governmental and
commercial environment. SLES is available on a broad range of computer
systems, ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise
servers. The SLES evaluation covers a potentially distributed, but closed
network of IBM xSeries servers running the evaluated version of SLES.
SLES is based on United Linux, which is a common effort of several
organisations to develop a common Linux platform designed as an enterprise
platform for server applications.
The TOE includes Software components only and provides the following
security functions:
- Identification and Authentication
- Discretionary Access Control
- Object reuse functionality
- Security Management
- TSF Protection
The product SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8 is delivered by SuSE Linux AG
on a CD-ROM or DVD. The following packages (rpm) as part of the product
make up the evaluated TOE:
- aaa_base, aaa_skel, acl, ash, at, attr
- bash, bc, bzip2
- certification-sles-eal2, cpio, cracklib, cron, curl, cyrus-sasl
- db, devs, dialog, diffutils,
- e2fsprogs, ed
- file, filesystem, fileutils, fillup, findutils, freetype2
- gawk, gdbm, glibc, gpg, gpm ,grep, groff, grub, gzip
- hdparm, heimdal-lib, howtoenh, hwinfo
- iproute2, iputils, isapnp
- k_deflt, k_smp, kbd, ksymoops
- l2h-pngicons, less, libgcc, libstdc++, libxcrypt, libxml2, liby2util, logrotate,
lprng, lukemftp
- m4, mailx, man, man-pages, mktemp, modutils
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
B-4
- ncurses, netcat, netcfg
- openldap-client, openssh, openssl
- pam, pam-modules, parted, pciutils, pcre, perl, permissions, popts,
postfix, ps
- readline, rpm
- sed, shadow, sh-utils, sitar, sles-admin-x86+x86-en, sles-inst-x86+x86-
64_en, sles-release, star, suse-build-key, sysconfig, syslogd, sysvinit
- tar, telnet, terminfo, texinfo, textutils, timezone
- UnitedLinux-buildkey, unitedlinux-release, utempter, util-linux
- vim, vsftpd
- w3m, wget
- xinetd
- yast2, yast2-bootloader, yast2-core, yast2-country, yast2-installation,
yast2-mouse, yast2-ncurses, yast2-network, yast2-online-update, yast2-
packager, yast2-packetmanager, yast2-pam, yast2-runlevel, yast2-
security, yast2-storage, yast2-sysconfig, yast2-theme-SuSELinux, yast2-
theme-UnitedLinux, yast2-trans-en_US, yast2-transfer, yast2-update,
yast2-users, yast2-xml
- zlib
In addition to the packages listed above the following package has to be
installed (it can be downloaded from the SuSE ftp-server):
- certification-sles-eal2
During the installation process the user has to verify the integrity and
authenticity of the downloaded package as described in the Security Guide [9].
The base software installed from the CD/DVD allow the user to perform this
verification by checking the digital signature of the package.
A more detailed listing which contains the exact versions of the packages can
be found in chapter 11 of this report. For a detailed listing of guidance
documents to be followed by a user of the TOE refer to chapter 6 of this report.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant (hence all taken from the CC, part 2) as
shown in the following list.
- FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_RIP.2
- FIA_ATD.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2,
FIA_USB.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
B-5
- FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_REV.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
- FPT_RVM.1, FPT_SEP.1
Note that some of the SFR have been iterated in the Security Target. For details
on the iteration and the required security functionality please refer to [7],
chapter 5.1.
The TOE SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8 was evaluated by:
atsec information security GmbH
Steinstraße 68-70
81667 München
Germany.
The evaluation was completed on 10th July 2003. The atsec information
security GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI (ITSEF)8
.
The sponsor is:
IBM Corporation
Linux Technology Center
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758
USA
The developer/distributor is:
SuSE Linux AG
Deutschherrnstr. 15-19
90429 Nürnberg
Germany
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL2+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 2 augmented).
The assurance level is augmented by: ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation.
For the evaluation of the CC component ALC_FLR.1 the mutually recognised
CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1, February
2002 ([5]) had been used.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
B-6
1.2 Functionality
The TOE SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8 provides the following Security
Functions:
Name Function
Identification and Authentication (IA)
IA.1 User Identification and Authentication Data Management
IA.2 Common Authentication Mechanism
IA.3 Interactive Login and Related Mechanisms
IA.4 User Identity Changing
IA.5 Login Processing
Discretionary Access Control (DA)
DA.1 Permission Bits
DA.2 Access Control Lists supported by SLES
DA.3 Discretionary Access Control: IPC Objects
Object Reuse (OR)
OR.1 Object Reuse: File System Objects
OR.2 Object Reuse: IPC Objects
OR.3 Object Reuse: Memory Objects
Security Management (SM)
SM.1 Roles
SM.2 Access Control Configuration and Management
SM.3 Management of User, Group and Authentication Data
TSF Protection (TP)
TP.1 TSF Invocation Guarantees
TP.2 Kernel
TP.3 Kernel Modules
TP.4 Trusted Processes
TP.5 TSF Databases
TP.6 Internal TOE Protection Mechanisms
Note: Only the titles of the SF and a short summary are provided here because
they are very granular and almost self-explanatory. Please refer for a precise
definition of the SF to the Security Target of the TOE ([7], chapter 6.2)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
B-7
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of function is rated ‘SOF-basic’ only for the authentication
function (IA) using passwords (refer to [7], chapter 6.5).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
A summary of the threats defined in [7], chapter 3.2.1 is provided here. For the
precise description of the threats please refer to [7]:
T.UAUSER
An attacker (not necessarily an unauthorised user) may try to impersonate
an authorised user of the TOE without knowing the authentication
information.
T.UAACCESS
An authorised user of the TOE tries to access information resources
without having appropriate permissions.
The TOE has to comply to the following Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs). Note that only a summary of the policies is provided here. For the
detailed and precise definition refer to [7], chapter 3.3:
P.AUTHORISED_USERS
Only users who have been authorised to access information within the
system may access the system.
P.NEED_TO_KNOW
The organisation using the TOE must define a discretionary access control
policy on a need-to-know basis. The rules of this access control policy
should base on the attributes (i) owner of object, (ii) identity of subject
attempting access to an object and (iii) access rights (of a subject for the
accessed object).
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.4 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [7] and are summarised here
(please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed
description):
- The CC evaluated package set (refer to chapter 11.1) must be selected
at install time;
- The following file systems are supported: the Ext3 journaling filesystem,
the ISO 9660 file system for CD-ROM drives and the process file system,
procfs.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
B-8
- SLES supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, only IPv4 is included;
- Both installation from CD and installation from a defined disk partition are
supported;
- The default configuration for identification and authentication are the
defined password based PAM modules. Support for other authentication
options e.g. smartcard authentication, is not included in the evaluation
configuration;
- If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the
workstation and afforded the same physical protection as the
workstation;
- The TOE comprises a single server machine (and optional peripherals)
running the system software listed in the package list of chapter 11.1 (a
server running the above listed software is referred to as a “TOE server”
below). Details on the allowed peripherals can be found in [7], chapter
2.4.2.
- Several TOE servers may be interlinked by a LAN, which may be joined
by bridges/routers or by TOE workstations which act as routers /
gateways.
- Each TOE server within this network implement its own security policy.
No synchronisation function for those policies exists.
- If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured
and managed by the same authority using an appropriate security policy
not conflicting with the security policy of the TOE.
Note:
A graphical user interface for system administration or any other operation is
not included in the evaluated configuration.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services. For example a
HTTP server using a port above 1024 (e. g. on port 8080) may be used as a
normal application running without root privileges on top of the TOE.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
B-9
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the allowed hardware and peripherals are
made in the Security Target (refer to [7], chapter 2.4.2):
Hardware Platform:
- IBM xSeries Systems using Intel Pentium 4 or XEON processors
Peripherals:
- All terminals and printers supported by the TOE
(except hot pluggable devices connected via USB or IEEE 1394
(Firewire) interfaces)
- All storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard
disks, CDROM drives, streamer drives, floppy disk drives)
(except hot pluggable devices connected via USB or IEEE 1394
(Firewire) interfaces)
- All Ethernet and Token-Ring network adapters supported by the TOE
- Pheripheral devices connected via PCMCIA are not supported.
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target.
The following constraints are based on the assumptions defined in [7], chapter
3.4. (Please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed
definition):
Identifier Summary
A.LOCATE Location of TOE processing resources in facilities
with controlled access.
A.PROTECT Protection against physical modification (of TOE
and Hardware used by the TOE).
A.MANAGE Management of the TOE is done by competent
individuals.
A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN Administrative personnel are not careless, willfully
negligent, or hostile.
A.COOP Users are co-operative.
A.UTRAIN Users are trained well enough to use the Security
functionality of the TOE appropriately.
A.UTRUST Users are trusted to accomplish some task or
group of tasks within a secure IT environment by
exercising complete control over their data.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
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Identifier Summary
A.NET_COMP Network components (like routers, bridges) used
are assumed to pass data without modification.
A.CONNECT All connections (to peripherals and network
connections) reside within the controlled access
facilities.
The following constraints are based on Security Objectives which have to be
met by the TOE environment. Theses objectives are defined in [7], chapter 4.2.
(Please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed definition):
Identifier Summary
OE.CREDEN User Authentication Data has to be treated
securely.
OE.INSTALL The installation, distribution and configuration of
hardware, software and firmware components
has to be done in a secure manner.
OE.INFO_PROTECT Information on security critical files (e.g.
configuration files, authentication databases) shall
be protected.
OE.MAINTENANCE Diagnostic facilities shall be used periodically.
OE.RECOVER Recovery Procedures after system failure must
be available.
OE.SOFTWARE_IN Only administrators shall be able to introduce new
trusted software into the system.
OE.SERIAL_LOGIN Clear screens before logging off (using serial
login devices).
OE.HW_SEP The underlying hardware has to provide
separation mechanisms.
1.7 Disclaimers
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. The rating of the strength of functions does not include
the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section
4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by
the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of
the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to
this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
B-11
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called:
SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8
The following table summarises the TOE components and defines the
evaluated configuration of the TOE:
Software - CD set / DVD containing the software packages described in
chapter 11.1 of this report.
- certification-sles-eal2 package that can be downloaded from
the SuSE ftp-server.
During the installation process the integrity and authenticity of
this package has to be checked.
The following guidance documents are supplied together with the TOE. The
Guidance have to be followed to ensure an evaluation conformant operation of
the TOE:
- SLES Security Guide, [9]
- SuSE Linux EnterpriseServer8 for X86 and AMD Hammer-based
System. Administration, [10]
- SuSE Linux EnterpriseServer8 for X86 and AMD Hammer-based
System. Installation, [11]
A full description of the installation and configuration process to get the
evaluated configuration of the TOE can be found in [9]. The latest information
on the secure configuration can be found in [12]. The user will need [10] just to
obtain information on the use of the YaST user interface. All steps required to
install and configure the TOE for the evaluated configuration are contained in
[9].
Note that no hardware is delivered as part of the TOE.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is a Linux based multi-user multi-tasking operating system. The TOE
may provide services to several users at the same time. After successful login,
the users have access to a general computing environment, allowing the start-
up of user applications, issuing user commands at shell level, creating and
accessing files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate the users
and protect their data. Privileged commands are restricted to administrative
users.
The TOE uses the standard Unix model of normal (unprivileged) users and
administrative users that have the capability to get full root privileges.
The TOE is intended to operate in a networked environment with other
instantiations of the TOE as well as other well-behaved client systems operating
within the same management domain (refer to [7], chapter 6.1.5 for more
details). All those systems need to be configured in accordance with a defined
common security policy.
The TOE permits one or more processors and attached peripheral and storage
devices to be used by multiple users to perform a variety of functions requiring
controlled shared access to the data stored on the system. Such installations
are typical for workgroup or enterprise computing systems accessed by users
local to, or with otherwise protected access to, the computer system.
It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the data protected by
the TOE can be delegated to the TOE users.
All data is under the control of the TOE. The data is stored in named objects,
and the TOE can associate with each controlled object a description of the
access rights to that object.
All individual users are assigned a unique user identifier within the single host
system that forms the TOE. This user identifier is used as the basis for access
control decisions. The TOE authenticates the claimed identity of the user before
allowing the user to perform any further actions.
The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place
in accordance with the access restrictions placed on that object by its owner or
administrative users. Ownership of named objects may be transferred under the
control of the access control policy.
Access rights (e.g. read, write, execute) can be assigned to data objects with
respect to subjects (users). Once a subject is granted access to an object, the
content of that object may be freely used to influence other objects accessible
to this subject.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the personnel assumptions the following usage conditions exist. Refer
to [7], chapter 3.4.2 for more details:
- The TOE is managed by competent individuals (A.MANAGE).
- Administrative personnel are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile
(A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN).
- Users of the TOE are co-operative (A.COOP).
- Users are trained well enough to use the Security functionality of the
TOE appropriately (A.UTRAIN).
- Users are trusted to accomplish some task or group of tasks within a
secure IT environment by exercising complete control over their data
(A.UTRUST).
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.4.1
and 3.4.2):
- The TOE is located in an access controlled facility (A.LOCATE).
- The TOE (Hardware used by the TOE) is protected against physical
modification (A.PROTECT).
- Network components (like routers, bridges) used are assumed to pass
data without modification (A.NET_COMP).
- All connections (to peripherals and network connections) reside within
the controlled access facilities (A.CONNECT).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below have to be averted in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are not addressed by the TOE itself. They have to be addressed
by the operating environment of the TOE (for detailed information about the
threats and how the environment may cover them refer to the Security
Target [7]).
TE.HWMF
Loss of stored data due to hardware malfunction.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
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TE.COR_FILE
Accidental corruption or manipulation of files relevant for the security
without detection.
TE.HW_SEP
The underlying hardware functions of the hardware used by the TOE does
not provide sufficient capabilities to support the self-protection of the TSF.
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5 Architectural Information
General Overview
SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 is a general purpose, multi-user, multitasking
Linux based operating system. It provides a platform for a variety of applications
in the governmental and commercial environment. SLES is available on a broad
range of computer systems, ranging from departmental servers to multi-
processor enterprise servers.
SLES is based on United Linux, which is a common effort of several
organisations to develop a common Linux platform designed as an enterprise
platform for server applications.
The SLES evaluation covers a potentially distributed, but closed network of IBM
xSeries servers running the evaluated version of SLES. The hardware platforms
selected for the evaluation consist of machines which are available when the
evaluation has completed and to remain available for a substantial period of
time afterwards.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) consist of functions of SLES that run in
kernel mode plus some trusted processes. These are the functions that enforce
the security policy as defined in this Security Target. Tools and commands
executed in user mode that are used by an administrative user need also to be
trusted to manage the system in a secure way. But they are not considered to
be part of this TSF.
Also the hardware and the BootProm firmware is considered not to be part of
the TOE but part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes installation from CDROM and from a local hard disk partition.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, such as ftp and ssh. xinetd
is used to protect network applications which might otherwise have security
exposures.
System administration tools include the standard commands. A graphical user
interface for system administration or any other operation is not included in the
evaluated configuration.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services. For example a
HTTP server using a port above 1024 (e. g. on port 8080) may be used as a
normal application running without root privileges on top of the TOE.
Major structural units of the TOE
The TOE is structured in much the same way as many other operating systems,
especially Unix-type operating systems. It consists of a kernel, which runs in the
privileged state of the processor and provides services to applications (which
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those can use by calling kernel services via the system call interface). Direct
access to the hardware is restricted to the kernel, so whenever an application
wants to access hardware like disk drives, network interfaces or other
peripheral devices, it has to call kernel services. The kernel then checks if the
application has the required access rights and privileges and either performs
the service or rejects the request.
The kernel is also responsible to separate the different user processes. This is
done by the management of the virtual and real memory of the TOE which
ensures that processes executing with different attributes can not directly
access memory areas of other processes but have to do so using the inter-
process communication mechanism provided by the kernel as part of its system
call interface.
The TSF of the TOE also include a set of trusted processes, which when
initiated by a user with a system call operate with extended privileges. The
programs that represent those trusted processes on the file system are
protected by the file system discretionary access control security function
enforced by the kernel.
In addition the execution of the TOE is controlled by a set of configuration files,
which are also called the TSF database. Also those configuration files are
protected by the file system discretionary access control security function
enforced by the kernel.
Normal users – after they have been successfully authenticated by a defined
trusted process – can start untrusted applications where the kernel enforces the
security policy of the TOE when those applications request services from the
kernel via the system call interface.
This structure is shown in the following figure:
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The kernel itself is structured into a number of subsystems which are explained
in detail in the high level design of the TOE. Those are:
File and I/O Subsystem
Implements all file system object related functions. Functions include
those that allow a process to create, maintain, interact and delete file-
system objects, such as regular files, directories, symbolic links, hard links,
device special files, named pipes, and sockets.
Process Subsystem
Implements functions related to process and thread management.
Functions include those that allow the creation, scheduling, execution, and
deletion of process and thread subjects.
Memory Subsystem
Implements functions related to the management of a system’s memory
resources. Functions include those that create and manage virtual
memory, including management of page tables and paging algorithms.
Networking Subsystem
Implements UNIX and internet domain sockets as well as algorithms for
scheduling network packets.
IPC Subsystem
Implements functions related to inter-process communication
mechanisms. Functions include those that facilitate controlled sharing of
information between processes, allowing them to share data and
synchronise their execution in order to interact with a common resource.
Kernel Modules Subsystem
Implements an infrastructure to support loadable modules. Functions
include those that load and unload kernel modules.
Device Driver Subsystem
Implements support for various hardware devices through common,
device independent interface.
Security Functions
The security functions of the TOE defined in the Security Target are (refer to
Security Target [7], chapter 6.2):
- Identification and Authentication
- Discretionary Access Control
- Object reuse functionality
- Security Management
- TSF Protection
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A short summary for each function is provided here. A more detailed description
can be found in [7], chapter 6.2.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides identification and authentication using pluggable
authentication modules (PAM) based upon user passwords. The quality of
the passwords used can be enforced through configuration options
controlled by SLES.
Other authentication methods (e. g. Kerberos authentication, token based
authentication) that are supported by SLES as pluggable authentication
modules are not part of the evaluated configuration.
Functions to ensure a basic password strength and limit the use of the su
command and restrict root login to specific terminals are also included.
Discretionary Access Control
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) restricts access to file system objects
based on Access Control Lists (ACLs) that include the standard UNIX
permissions for user, group and others. Access control mechanisms also
protect IPC objects from unauthorised access.
The TOE includes the ext3 file system, which supports POSIX ACLs. This
allows you to define access rights to files within this type of file system
down to the granularity of a single user.
Object Reuse
File system objects as well as memory and IPC objects will be cleared
before they can be reused by a process belonging to a different user.
Security Management
The management of the security critical parameters of SLES is performed
by administrative users. A set of commands that require root privileges are
used for system management. Security parameters are stored in specific
files that are protected by the access control mechanisms of the TOE
against unauthorised access by users that are not administrative users.
TSF Protection
While in operation, the kernel software and data are protected by the
hardware memory protection mechanisms. The memory and process
management components of the kernel ensure a user process cannot
access kernel storage or storage belonging to other processes.
Non-kernel TSF software and data are protected by DAC and process
isolation mechanisms.
In the evaluated configuration, the reserved user ID root owns the
directories and files that define the TSF configuration. In general, files and
directories containing internal TSF data (e.g., configuration files, batch job
queues) are also protected from reading by DAC permissions.
The TOE and the hardware and firmware components are required to be
physically protected from unauthorised access. The system kernel
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mediates all access to the hardware mechanisms themselves, other than
program visible CPU instruction functions.
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
[9] SLES Security Guide, Version 1.49, 2003/05/15
[10] SuSE Linux EnterpriseServer8 for X86 and AMD Hammer-based
System. Administration. Version 2002. File /usr/share/doc/packages/sles-
admin-x86+x86-64_en/ sles-admin-x86+x86-64_en.pdf from SLES8
package “sles-admin-x86+x86-64_en”; also chapter 4 of the handbook
supplied with SLES8
[11] SuSE Linux EnterpriseServer8 for X86 and AMD Hammer-based
System. Installation. Version 2002. File /usr/share/doc/packages/sles-
inst-x86+x86-64_en/ sles-inst-x86+x86-64_en.pdf from SLES8 package
“sles-inst-x86+x86-64_en”; also chapter 3 of the handbook supplied with
SLES8
[12] /usr/share/doc/packages/certification-sles-eal2/README-eal2.txt, 2003-
05-28
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7 IT Product Testing
Test Schedule
Final developer testing on the configuration defined in the Security Target [7]
was performed in the time from May 16 to May 19, 2003 on two different
systems (IBM xSeries 335 as a single processor machine and IBM xSeries 440
as a multiprocessor machine) at the lab of the Linux Technology Center in
Austin, Texas.
Evaluator testing on the configuration defined in the Security Target was
performed at the developer’s facility in Nürnberg in the time from May 6 to May
7 on an IBM xSeries 335 and at the sponsor’s facility in Austin, Texas on May
16 using an IBM xSeries 440.
The test systems have been installed and configured following exactly the
information provided in the Security Guide [9] The constraints defined for the
hardware configuration in the Security Target have been kept.
Test configuration
Tests have been performed on IBM xSeries 335 and 440 systems with the
following configuration:
- xSeries 335: Memory 4GB, CPU 1way UP, 2 32GB SCSI drives, Onboard
Broadcom 1GB Ethernet adapter
- xSeries 440: Memory 8GB, CPU 4way in hyperthreading mode, 2 18GB
SCSI drives, Onboard Broadcom 1GB Ethernet adapter
Depth/Coverage of Testing
The developer has done substantial functional testing of all externally visible
interfaces (TSFI). The evaluators repeated the developer tests (because of the
highly automated testing approach of the developer) and conducted additional
independent tests and penetrations tests.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The sponsor/developer has performed the tests on the two hardware platforms
defined above. The software was installed and configured as defined in the
Security Guide [9]. Additional software was installed on the system to perform
the tests. It was argued by the developers Test Plan that this additional software
was within the boundary defined by the Security Target and did not constitute a
violation of the evaluated configuration.
Testing approach:
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The sponsor/developer used several test suites and manual tests to test the
TOE. One of the test suites used was the LTP test suite. It is an adapted
version of tests from the Linux Test Project of which the sponsor is a member.
The tests have a common framework in which individual test cases adhere to a
common structure for setup execution and cleanup of tests. Each test case may
contain several tests of the same function, stressing different parts (for
example, base functionality, behaviour with illegal parameters and reaction to
missing privileges). Each test within a test case reports PASS respectively OK
or FAIL and the test case summary in batch mode reports PASS if all the tests
within the test case passed, otherwise FAIL.
Tests can be executed either manually by running the test case file in the
testcases/bin directory or run in batch mode by running the runalltests.sh script
which is controlled by various parameters. One of them (-l) specifies the log
summary file for the test cases. When the test cases are run individually no log
summary is generated. The user running the test cases has to inspect stdout
and stderr of the process.
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The evaluator used the same IBM xSeries 440 machine as the developer and a
different IBM xSeries 335 for testing. The machines were conformant to the
Security Target requirements and setup according to in the Security Guide [9].
Testing approach:
Since the developer test are highly automated the evaluation facility decided not
to choose a subset of the developer tests but to perform all developer tests
again. All manual testing done by the developer were repeated by the
evaluation facility as well. Additional tests were defined and executed by the
evaluation facility in the following areas:
- Identification & Authentication
- Access Control
- TSF Protection
- Object Reuse
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator penetration testing:
The evaluators have devised a set of penetration tests based on
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- common sources for vulnerabilities of the Linux Operating System,
- findings of their evaluation work examination.
In addition a widely available network scanning tool was used to check the TOE
for potential vulnerabilities via network attacks taking into account that the TOE
is intended to be integrated into a closed, physically protected network
environment with a non-hostile user community.
The penetration testing addressed the following security functions:
- Identification and Authentication
- Discretionary Access Control
- TSF Protection
with some emphasis on the TSF Protection.
The penetration testing showed the existence of vulnerabilities but none of the
vulnerabilities were exploitable in the intended environment of the TOE and/or
the attack potential assumed for EAL2+ (AVA_VLA.1).
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8 Evaluated Configuration
According to the Security Target the evaluated configuration of the TOE (as
specified in chapter 2 of this report) is defined as follows (refer also to the
Security Target [7]):
The product SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8 is delivered by SuSE Linux AG
on a CD-ROM or DVD. The packages (rpm) as specified in chapter 11.1 make
up the evaluated TOE. In addition to the packages delivered on CD-ROM/DVD
one package (certification-sles-eal2, refer to chapter 11.1 for more details) has
to be downloaded from the SuSE ftp-server. The integrity and authenticity of
this package has to be verified during the installation process.
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.4 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [7] and are summarised here
(please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed
description):
- The CC evaluated package set (refer to chapter 11.1) must be selected
at install time;
- The following file systems are supported: the Ext3 journaling filesystem,
the ISO 9660 file system for CD-ROM drives and the process file system,
procfs.
- SLES supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, only IPv4 is included;
- Both installation from CD and installation from a defined disk partition are
supported;
- The default configuration for identification and authentication are the
defined password based PAM modules. Support for other authentication
options e.g. smartcard authentication, is not included in the evaluation
configuration;
- If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the
workstation and afforded the same physical protection as the
workstation;
- The TOE comprises a single server machine (and optional peripherals)
running the system software listed in the package list of chapter 11.1 (a
server running the above listed software is referred to as a “TOE server”
below). Details on the allowed peripherals can be found in [7], chapter
2.4.2.
- Several TOE servers may be interlinked by a LAN, which may be joined
by bridges/routers or by TOE workstations which act as routers /
gateways.
- Each TOE server within this network implements its own security policy.
No synchronisation function for those policies exists.
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- If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured
and managed by the same authority using an appropriate security policy
not conflicting with the security policy of the TOE.
Note: A graphical user interface for system administration or any other
operation is not included in the evaluated configuration. The TOE environment
also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are used as unprivileged
tools to access public system services. For example a HTTP server using a port
above 1024 (e. g. on port 8080) may be used as a normal application running
without root privileges on top of the TOE.
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents (refer to chapter 6)
especially the document [9] has to be followed.
The following constraints concerning the allowed hardware and peripherals are
made in the Security Target:
Hardware Platform:
- IBM xSeries Systems using Intel Pentium 4 or XEON processors
Peripherals:
- All terminals and printers supported by the TOE
(except hot pluggable devices connected via USB or IEEE 1394
(Firewire) interfaces)
- All storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard
disks, CDROM drives, streamer drives, floppy disk drives)
(except hot pluggable devices connected via USB or IEEE 1394
(Firewire) interfaces)
- All Ethernet and Token-Ring network adapters supported by the TOE
- Peripheral devices connected via PCMCIA are not supported.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Common Evaluation Methodology [2],
the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the
Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE (this includes especially the
methodology for flaw remediation, [5]).
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and the Security Target evaluation) are summarised
in the following table:
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Configuration items ACM_CAP.2 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Descriptive high-level design ADV_HLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
The evaluation has shown that the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function
for the authentication function using passwords.
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product SuSE Linux
Enterprise Server V8 with certification-sles-eal2 package in the configuration as
defined in the Security Target and summarised in this report (refer to the
Security Target [7] and the chapters 2, 4 and 8 of this report). The validity can
be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification of the modified product, and if the evaluation of the
modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6) contains necessary
information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage
of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into
account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these
documents.
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11 Annexes
11.1 TOE software packages
The following packages include the software that is installed with the evaluated
configuration (packages that are updated when installing the certification-sles-
eal2 package and running the /usr/lib/eal2/bin/sles-eal2 script are marked with
“yes” in the EAL2-package column):
Package Name Version EAL2-package
UnitedLinux-build-key 1.0
aaa_base 2003.3.27 yes
aaa_skel 2002.10.14
acl 2.0.19
ash 0.2
at 3.1.8
attr 2.0.11
bash 2.05b
bc 1.06 yes
bzip2 1.0.2
certification-sles-eal2 1.0 yes
cpio 2.5
cracklib 2.7
cron 3.0.1
curl 7.9.8
cyrus-sasl 1.5.27
db 4.0.14
devs 2002.10.4
dialog 0.52
diffutils 2.8.1
e2fsprogs 1.28
ed 0.2
file 3.37 yes
filesystem 2002.9.2
fileutils 4.1.11
fillup 1.10
findutils 4.1.7
freetype2 2.0.9 yes
gawk 3.1.1
gdbm 1.8.0
glibc 2.2.5 yes
gpg 1.0.7
gpm 1.20.1
grep 2.5.1
groff 1.17.2
grub 0.92 yes
gzip 1.3
hdparm 5.2
heimdal-lib 0.4e
howtoenh 2003.9.6
hwinfo 5.43 yes
iproute2 2.4.7 yes
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Package Name Version EAL2-package
iputils ss020124
isapnp 1.26
k_deflt 2.4.19 yes
k_smp 2.4.19 yes
kbd 1.06 yes
ksymoops 2.4.5
l2h-pngicons 99.2beta8
less 376
libgcc 3.2.2 yes
libstdc++ 3.2.2 yes
libxcrypt 1.1
libxml2 2.4.23
liby2util 2.6.21
logrotate 3.5.9
lprng 3.6.12
lukemftp 1.5
m4 1.40
mailx 8.1.1
man 2.3.19deb4.0
man-pages 1.53
mktemp 1.5
modutils 2.4.19
ncurses 5.2
net-tools 1.60 yes
netcat 1.10
netcfg 2002.9.4
openldap2-client 2.1.4 yes
openssh 3.4p1
openssl 0.96g yes
pam 0.76
pam-modules 2002.8.28 yes
parted 1.6.3
pciutils 2.1.10
pcre 3.9
perl 5.8.0 yes
permissions 2002.9.10
popt 1.6
postfix 1.1.11
ps 2002.9.10
readline 4.3 yes
rpm 3.0.6
sed 3.02.80
sh-utils 2.0
shadow 4.0.2 yes
sitar 0.7.2
sles-admin-x86+x86-64_en 8.1.0.2
sles-inst-x86+x86-64_en 8.1.0.2
sles-release 8
star 1.4.2 yes
suse-build-key 1.0
sysconfig 0.23.22 yes
syslogd 1.4.1
sysvinit 2.82
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Package Name Version EAL2-package
tar 1.13.25
telnet 1.0
terminfo 5.2
texinfo 4.2
textutils 2.1
timezone 2.2.5 yes
unitedlinux-release 1.0
utempter 0.5.2
util-linux 2.11u
vim 6.1
vsftpd 1.1.0
w3m 0.3.1 yes
wget 1.8.2
xinetd 2.3.6
yast2 2.6.40
yast2-bootloader 2.6.65 yes
yast2-core 2.6.56 yes
yast2-country 2.6.35 yes
yast2-installation 2.6.94 yes
yast2-mouse 2.6.18
yast2-ncurses 2.6.24 yes
yast2-network 2.6.33
yast2-online-update 2.6.15 yes
yast2-packagemanager 2.6.49 yes
yast2-packager 2.6.78
yast2-pam 2.6.5
yast2-runlevel 2.6.16
yast2-security 2.6.10
yast2-storage 2.6.56 yes
yast2-sysconfig 2.6.14
yast2-theme-SuSELinux 2.6.8
yast2-theme-UnitedLinux 2.6.8
yast2-trans-en_US 2.6.7
yast2-transfer 2.6.1
yast2-update 2.6.23 yes
yast2-users 2.6.33 yes
yast2-xml 2.6.8
zlib 1.1.4 1.1.4
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACL Access Control List
AMD Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
DA/DAC Discretionary Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IA Identification and Authentication
IPC Interprocess Communication
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation
IEEE Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers
IT Information Technology
LTP Linux Test Project
OSP Organisational Security Policy
OR Object Reuse
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
PP Protection Profile
RPM Red Hat Package Manager
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
SM Security Management
SLES SuSE Linux Enterprise Server
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP TSF Protection
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TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TST TST mode of the DEP/PCI
USB Universal Serial Bus
YaST Yet Another Setup Tool
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
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organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE:
[5] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33,
Version 2 – “Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw
Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[7] SuSE Linux Enterprise Server V8, Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0216,
Version 1.6, IBM Corporation & SuSE Linux AG, 2003-06-20
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216, Version 1.0, atsec
Information Security GmbH, 2003-07-10 (confidential document)
User Guidance Documentation:
[9] SLES Security Guide, Version 1.49, 2003/05/15
[10] SuSE Linux EnterpriseServer8 for X86 and AMD Hammer-based
System. Administration. Version 2002. File /usr/share/doc/packages/sles-
admin-x86+x86-64_en/ sles-admin-x86+x86-64_en.pdf from SLES8
package “sles-admin-x86+x86-64_en”; also chapter 4 of the handbook
supplied with SLES8
[11] SuSE Linux EnterpriseServer8 for X86 and AMD Hammer-based
System. Installation. Version 2002. File /usr/share/doc/packages/sles-
inst-x86+x86-64_en/ sles-inst-x86+x86-64_en.pdf from SLES8 package
“sles-inst-x86+x86-64_en”; also chapter 3 of the handbook supplied with
SLES8
[12] /usr/share/doc/packages/certification-sles-eal2/README-eal2.txt, 2003-
05-28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
BSI-DSZ-CC-0216-2003 Certification Report
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“