National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM and Presence
Service (IM&P) 11.5SU3SU3 running on Cisco Unified
Computing System™ (Cisco UCS) C220 M4S, UCS C240
M4S
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10760-2017
Dated: 11/21/2017
Version: 0.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Dr. Patrick W. Mallett, MITRE, Lead Validator
Paul Bicknell, MITRE, Senior Validator
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Pascal Patin
Zalman Kuperman
Acumen Security, LLC
3
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 7
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 8
4.1.1 Security Audit ..............................................................................................................................................8
4.1.2 Cryptographic Support.................................................................................................................................8
4.1.3 Identification and authentication..................................................................................................................9
4.1.4 Security Management...................................................................................................................................9
4.1.5 Protection of the TSF .................................................................................................................................10
4.1.6 TOE Access................................................................................................................................................10
4.1.7 Trusted path/Channels................................................................................................................................10
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 11
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................11
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 12
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 13
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................13
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................13
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 14
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................14
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................14
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 15
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................15
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................15
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................15
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................16
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................16
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................16
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 18
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 19
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 20
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 21
4
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 22
5
1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Cisco IM&P Series Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the
TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or
implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as
evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in November 2017. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) v 1.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the NDcPP. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
6
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work-units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM and Presence Service (IM&P)
11.5SU3SU3 running on Cisco Unified Computing System™ (Cisco UCS) C220 M4S,
UCS C240 M4S
Protection Profile Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP, v1.0)
Security Target Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM and Presence Service (IM&P)
11.5SU3SU3 running on Cisco Unified Computing System™ (Cisco UCS) C220 M4S,
UCS C240 M4S Common Criteria Security Target
Evaluation Technical
Report
Cisco IM&P Security Target Evaluation Technical Report, 10/16/17
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Montgomery Village, MD
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, Paul Bicknell
7
3 Architectural Information
The TOE is Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM and Presence Service running IM&P
11.5 (herein after referred to as IM&P). The TOE provides native standards-based, dual-protocol,
enterprise instant messaging (IM) and network-based presence as part of Cisco Unified
Communications capabilities.
IM&P is a hardware and software-based, native standards-based enterprise IM and network-
based presence that is a part of Cisco Unified Communications family of products. IM&P is a
secure and scalable service that offers users feature-rich communications capabilities within the
enterprise as well as with external partners.
IM and Presence Service provides the foundation to deliver enterprise IM and network-based
presence-enabled collaboration capabilities that allows users to view the presence status or
availability of the people they want to communicate with, exchange instant messages with these
individuals, and escalate to a voice and video call or a rich collaborative session.
The evaluated configuration of the TOE includes the IM&P 11.5 software installed on either the
Cisco Unified Computing System™ (Cisco UCS) C220 M4S or C240 M4S Rack Server.
8
4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above
consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE
implements all RFCs of the NDcPP v1.0 as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance measures
prescribed therein.
4.1.1 Security Audit
The Cisco IM&P provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The
Cisco IM&P generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event
has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The administrator configures
auditable events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE audit
event logging is centralized and enabled by default. Audit logs can be backed up over a secure
TLS channel to an external audit server.
4.1.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography support for secure communications and protection of information.
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE include: symmetric encryption and decryption
using AES; asymmetric key generation; cryptographic key establishment using RSA-based key
establishment schemes and DH key establishment; digital signature using RSA; cryptographic
hashing using SHA-256; random bit generation using DRBG and keyed-hash message
authentication using HMAC-SHA (SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384). The TOE implements the
secure protocols TLS/HTTPS and TLS for the client and server. The algorithm certificate
references are listed in the table below.
Algorithm Description Supported
Mode
Cert. # Module SFR
RSA Signature generation
and Verification, and
key generation and
transport
FIPS PUB
186-4 Key
Generation
#1743 FOM FCS_CKM.1(1)
FCS_COP.1(2)
9
Algorithm Description Supported
Mode
Cert. # Module SFR
AES Used for symmetric
encryption/decryption
AES in CBC
and GCM
(128 and 256
bits)
#3404 FOM FCS_COP.1(1)
SHS (SHA-1,
256, 384)
Cryptographic
hashing services
Byte Oriented #2817 FOM FCS_COP.1(3)
HMAC SHA-1,
SHA-256,
SHA-384
Keyed hashing
services and software
integrity test
Byte Oriented #2172 FOM FCS_COP.1(4)
DRBG Deterministic random
bit generation
services in
accordance with
ISO/IEC 18031:2011
CTR_DRBG
(AES 256)
#817 FOM FCS_RBG_EXT.1
CAVP Certificate References
The algorithm certificates applicable to the TOE are based on the underlying OS of the IM&P,
which is RHEL 6/Linux kernel 2.6 with the Intel Xeon processor.
The TOE provides cryptography in support of remote administrative management via HTTPS. The
TOE can also use the X.509v3 certificate for securing TLS sessions.
4.1.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs GUI
administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to be successfully identified
and authenticated prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE
can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters. The TOE provides
administrator authentication against a local user database using the GUI interface accessed via
secure HTTPS connection.
4.1.4 Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration
and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through
a secure HTTPS session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to
securely manage:
 the configuration of the TOE;
10
 the configuration of access banners;
 the configuration of session inactivity;
 the verification and installation of TOE updates;
 the auditing behavior; and
 the cryptographic functionality
The TOE supports the security administrator role. Only the privileged administrator can perform
the above security relevant management functions.
Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login, and can also
define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of
inactivity.
4.1.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. The TOE
protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification,
authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE
prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, Cisco IM&P is not a general-
purpose operating system and access to Cisco IM&P memory space is restricted to only Cisco
IM&P functions.
The TOE initially synchronizes time with the Cisco Unified Communications Manager that
maintains and synchronizes with an NTP server and then internally maintains the date and time.
This date and time is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE.
The TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the system itself and that of the
cryptographic module.
Finally, the TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed
on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
4.1.6 TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-
period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to
establish a new session.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the GUI management
interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.1.7 Trusted path/Channels
The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over HTTPS
and initiates secure HTTPS connections to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers.
11
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.0, 27 February 2015
(NDcPP)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP should be consulted if there is
interest in that material.
5.2 Threats
Likewise, the Security Problem Definition, including the threats, may be found in the NDcPP
The NDcPP should be consulted if there is need to review that material.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the NDcPP.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
12
6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM and Presence Service (IM&P) Common
Criteria Security Target v1.0
 Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM and Presence Service (IM&P) Common
Criteria Configuration Guide v1.0
13
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration of the TOE is clearly identified in the Security Target.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.
Table 1 Excluded Functionality
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of
operation on the TOE
This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed operations.
These services will be disabled by configuration. The exclusion of this functionality does not
affect compliance to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 1.0.
14
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Cisco IM&P, which is not publically
available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the prescribed
assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the
Assurance Activities Report, which is publically available, and is not duplicated here.
15
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined Cisco IM&P to be Part 2
extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP v 1.0.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by Cisco IM&P that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally,
the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP v 1.0.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
16
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed
a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any
issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
17
18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration
of the device(s). Those employing the devices must follow the configuration instructions
provided in the Configuration Guide documentation listed above to ensure the evaluated
configuration is established and maintained.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR’s within the
Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality, including the Excluded Functionality
discussed above, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
The evaluated version of the products utilizes Cisco FIPS Object Module v6.0 crypto software
and the Intel Xeon E5-2600 v4/E5-2600 v3 hardware/processors and no earlier or later versions
were evaluated and therefore cannot be considered as compliant.
The TOE stores a limited amount of audit records in its internal persistent storage. It is
recommended that the administrator configure the TOE to export audit logs to a remote audit
storage server.
19
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
20
12 Security Target
Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM and Presence Service (IM & P)11.5SU3 running on
Cisco Unified Computing System™ (Cisco UCS) C220 M4S and UCS C240 M4S Common
Criteria Security Target v1.0
21
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
22
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.