SERTIT, P.O. Box 814, N-1306 Sandv ika, NORWAY Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no Sertif iseringsmy ndigheten f or IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security SERTIT-077 CR Certification Report Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 Thinklogical TLX640 Matrix Switch CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009E VERSION 1.1 01.07.2015 Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 Page 2 of 17 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 ARRANGEM E NT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN THE FIELD OF INFORM ATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a m em ber of the above Arrangem ent and as s uch this confirm s that the Com m on Cri teria certificate has been is s ued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangem ent and is the Party’s claim that the certificate has been is s ued in accordance with the term s of this Arrangem ent The judgem ents contained in the certificate and Certification Report are thos e of SERTIT which is s ued it and the evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried out the evaluation. There is no im plication of acceptance by other Mem bers of the Agreem ent Group of liability in res pect of thos e judgem ents or for los s s u s tained as a res ult of reliance placed upon thos e judgem ents by a third party. The Com m on Criteria Recognition Arrangem ent logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognized under the term s of the CCRA July 2 nd 2014. The recognition under CCRA is lim ited to cPP related as s urance packages or EAL 2 and ALC_FLR CC part 3 com ponents . MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEM ENT OF INFORM ATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY EVALUATION CERTIFICATES (SOGIS MRA) SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a m em ber of the above Agreem ent and as s uch this confirm s that the Com m on Criteria certificate has been is s ued by or under the authority of a Party to this Agreem ent and is the Party’s claim that the certificate has been is s ued in accordance with the term s of this Agreem ent The judgem ents contained in the certificate and Certification Report are thos e of SERTIT which is s ued it and the evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried out the evaluation. There is no im plication of acceptance by other Mem bers of the Agreem ent Group of liability in res pect of thos e judgem ents or for los s s us tained as a res ult of reliance placed upon thos e judgem ents by a third party. Mutual recognition under SOGIS MRA applies to com ponents up to EAL 4. Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 Page 3 of 17 Contents Certification Statement 4 1 Abbreviations 5 2 References 6 3 Executive Summary 7 3.1 Introduction 7 3.2 Evaluated Product 7 3.3 TOE scope 7 3.4 Protection Profile Conformance 7 3.5 Assurance Level 7 3.6 Security Policy 7 3.7 Security Claims 8 3.8 Threats Countered 8 3.9 Threats and Attacks not Countered 8 3.10 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies 8 3.11 Security Objectives for the TOE 8 3.12 Security Objects for the environment 9 3.13 Security Functional Components 9 3.14 Security Function Policy 9 3.15 Evaluation Conduct 10 3.16 General Points 10 4 Evaluation Findings 11 4.1 Introduction 12 4.2 Delivery 12 4.3 Installation and Guidance Docume ntation 12 4.4 Misuse 12 4.5 Vulnerability Analysis 13 4.6 Developer’s Tests 13 4.7 Evaluators’ Tests 13 5 Evaluation Outcome 14 5.1 Certification Result 14 5.2 Recommendations 14 Annex A: Evaluated Configuration 15 TOE Identification 15 TOE Documentation 15 TOE Configuration 15 Environmental Configuration 17 Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 Page 5 of 17 1 Abbreviations CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation(ISO/IEC 15408) CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the Field of Information Technology Security CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EOR Evaluation Observation Report ETR Evaluation Technical Report EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security EWP Evaluation Work Plan ISO/IEC 15408 Information technology –- Security techniques –- Evaluation criteria for IT security SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security SOGIS MRA SOGIS Mutual Recognition Agreement SPM Security Policy Model ST Security Target TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security Functions TSP TOE Security Policy Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 Page 6 of 17 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 2 References [1] Thinklogical TLX640 Matrix Switch Security Target Document Version 1.4, January 2016. [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012. [3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional components, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012. [4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance components, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012. [5] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 9.0, 02 April 2013. [6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012. [7] NO-5152147_ Evaluation Technical Report_v1.1 20 September 2016. [8] TLX640 router KVM Matrix Switch Product Manual Rev. A [9] TLX640 10G Matrix Switch QUICK-START GUIDE As used with Thinklogical’s Q-Series & TLX Video Extension Systems [10] TLX 640 Matrix Router Design Specification 1.2 [11] Changing a Routers' IP Address Rev. A [12] Thinklogical System Management Portfolio Configurator Hot Key Manager -On-Screen Display System Management Interface Drag & Drop Product Manual Rev. A [13] VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.1 [14] Using the VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.0 [15] ALC.DEL_1_0.doc v1.0 Thinklogicals delivery procedure 06/01/10 Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 Page 7 of 17 3 Executive Summary 3.1 Introduction This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch (for version see chapter 3.2), and is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security of the product for their particular requirements. Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the Security Target[1] which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance evaluation components. 3.2 Evaluated Product The version of the product evaluated Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch in the following configurations: ƒ TLX640 Matrix Switch Chassis (TLX-MSC-000640 Rev B) - TLX640 Matrix Switch Data Input and Output Card, 20 Ports, SFP+, Multi-Mode (TLX-MSD-M00020 Rev C), Single Mode (TLX-MSD-S00020 Rev C) - Velocity Matrix Switch 640 Data Input and Output Card, 20 Ports, SFP+, Multi-Mode (VXM-DIOR20 Rev A), Single-Mode (VXM-DIOS20 Rev A) This product is also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The developer was Thinklogical Details of the evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s supporting guidance documentation, are given in Annex A. 3.3 TOE scope The TOE scope is described in the Security Target [1] chapter 2. 3.4 Protection Profile Conformance The Security Target[1] did not claim conformance to any protection profile. 3.5 Assurance Level The Security Target[1] specified the assurance components for the evaluation. Predefined evaluation assurance level EAL 4 was used. Common Criteria Part 3[4] describes the scale of assurance given by predefined assurance levels EAL1 to EAL7. An overview of CC is given in CC Part 1 [2]. 3.6 Security Policy The TOE security policies are detailed in the Security Target[1]. Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 Page 8 of 17 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 There are no Organizational Security Policies or rules with which the TOE must comply. 3.7 Security Claims The Security Target[1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the threats which these objectives counter and security functional components and security functions to elaborate the objectives. All of the SFR’s are taken from CC Part 2[3]; use of this standard facilitates comparison with other evaluated products. 3.8 Threats Countered ƒ T.INSTALL The TOE may be delivered and installed in a manner which violates the security policy. ƒ T.ATTACK An attack on the TOE may violate the security policy. ƒ T.RESIDUAL Residual data may be transferred between different port groups in violation of data separation security policy. ƒ T.STATE State information may be transferred to a port group other than the intended one. 3.9 Threats and Attacks not Countered No threats or attacks that are not countered are described. 3.10 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies ƒ A.PHYSICAL The switch, the transmitters, the receivers, the optical connections from the Switch to the transmitters and receivers and the wired network connections from the Switch to the administrators are physically secure. ƒ A.EMISSIO N The TOE meets the appropriate national requirements (in the country where used) for conducted/radiated electromagnetic emissions. [In the United States, Part 15 of the FCC Rules for Class B digital devices. ƒ A.MANAGE The TOE is installed and managed in accordance with the manufacturer’s directions. ƒ A.NOEVIL The TOE users and administrators are non-hostile and follow all usage guidance. ƒ A.SCENARIO Vulnerabi liti es associated with attached devices are a concern of the application scenario and not of the TOE. 3.11 Security Objectives for the TOE ƒ O.CONF The TOE shall not violate the confidentiality of information which it processes. Information generated within any peripheral Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 Page 9 of 17 set/computer connection shall not be accessible by any other peripheral set/computer connection. ƒ O.CONNECT No information shall be shared between switched computers and peripheral sets via the TOE in violation of Data Separation SFP. 3.12 Security Objects for the environment ƒ OE.EMISSIO N The TOE shall meet the appropriate national requirements (in the country where used) for conducted/radiated electromagnetic emissions. [In the United States, Part 15 of the FCC Rules for Class B digital devices. ƒ OE.MANAGE The TOE shall be installed and managed in accordance with the manufacturer’s directions. ƒ OE.NOEVIL The authorized user shall be non-hostile and follow all usage guidance. ƒ OE.PHYSICAL The Switch, the transmitters, the receivers, the optical connections from the Switch to the transmitters and receivers and the wired network connections from the TOE to the administrators shall be physically secure. ƒ OE.SCENARIO Vulnerabilities associated with attached devices or their connections to the TOE, shall be a concern of the application scenario and not of the TOE. 3.13 Security Functional Components ƒ FDP_ETC.1 Export of User Data Without Security Attributes ƒ FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control ƒ FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes ƒ FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data Without Security Attributes 3.14 Security Function Policy The TOE enforces secure separation of information flows corresponding to different switched connections. The corresponding Data Separation Security Policy is the main security feature of the TOE. Data Separation Security Function Policy states that data shall flow between Transmitter Port group A and Receiver Port group B if and only if a deliberate logical connection has been established to connect A to B. There shall be no data flow between any pair of Transmitter Port Groups or Receiver Port Groups. There shall be no data flow between Transmitter Port Groups or Receiver Port Groups and any other physical port on the Switch. Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 Page 10 of 17 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 3.15 Evaluation Conduct The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT Document SD001E[5]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this Certification Report, SERTIT is a member of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the Field of Information Technology Security (CCRA), and the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement. The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness of the TOE in meeting its Security Target[1], which prospective consumers are advised to read. To ensure that the Security Target [1] gave an appropriate baseline for a CC evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against this baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in accordance with CC Part 3[4] and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)[6]. SERTIT monitored the evaluation which was carried out by the Norconsult AS Commercial Evaluation Facility (EVIT). The evaluation was completed when the EVIT submitted the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)[7] to SERTIT in 20 September 2016. SERTIT then produced this Certification Report. 3.16 General Points The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in the Security Target[1] with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by the Security Target[1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in Annex A. Prospective consumers are advised to check that this matches their identified requirements and give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of this report. Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only reflect the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the responsibility of users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any security vulnerabilities have been discovered since the date shown in this report. This Certification Report is not an endorsement of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report, and no warranty of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report is either expressed or implied. Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 Page 11 of 17 4 Evaluation Findings The evaluators examined the following assurance classes and components taken from CC Part 3[4]. These classes comprise the EAL 4 assurance package. Assurance class Assurance components Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 Page 12 of 17 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 All assurance classes were found to be satisfactory and were awarded an overall “pass” verdict. 4.1 Introduction The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security Target[1]. The results of this work were reported in the ETR [7] under the CC Part 3[4] headings. The following sections note considerations that are of particular relevance to either consumers or those involved with subsequent assurance maintenance and re-evaluation of the TOE. 4.2 Delivery On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the evaluated version has been supplied, and to check that the security of the TOE has not been compromised in delivery. The procedure for physical distribution of the TOE is described in Thinklogicals delivery procedure[15]. This procedure describes how the TOE is shipped from Thinklogicals warehouse via Federal Express, UPS or DHL to the customer. The procedure explains that all tracking and shipment information are logged, and upon delivery of the TOE a signature is required Each shipment is noted with dimension and weight, and hard copies of each shipment are held in Thinklogicals Sales Order folder. 4.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation A description of the secure installation of the TOE and the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives in the ST[1] can be found in the guidance documents. The guidance documentation also describes the security functionality and interfaces provided by the TOE. It provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use of the TOE, it addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates prevention and detection of insecure TOE states . A list of all guidance documents evaluated can be found in Annex A. 4.4 Misuse There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that could possibly compromise confidential information. The user should always follow the guidance for the TOE in order to ensure that the TOE operates in a secure manner. Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 Page 13 of 17 The guidance documents adequately describe the mode of operation of the TOE, all assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements for external security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consumer to effectively use the TOE's security functions. 4.5 Vulnerability Analysis The evaluators’ vulnerability analysis was based on both public domain sources and the visibility of the TOE given by the evaluation process and evaluation process of previous versions of the TOE. The evaluators have devised a set of tests to tes t potential vulnerabilities to the TOE. The tests were performed at the developer’s site in Milford, Connecticut in October 2015. The result of the vulnerability analysis is that the TOE in its evaluated configuration and in its intended environment has no exploitable vulnerabilities. 4.6 Developer’s Tests The evaluators’ assessment of the developer´s tests shows that the developer´s tests cover all the TSFIs and all SFRs. The evaluators have confirmed the developer have correctly performed and documented the tests according to the test documentation. 4.7 Evaluators’ Tests The evaluators have independently tested a sample of the developer´s tests and verified that the TOE behaves as specified. Confidence in the developer's test results is gained by performing a sample of the developer's tests. The evaluators tests were conducted at the developer’s site in Milford, Connecticut in October 2015. Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 Page 14 of 17 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 5 Evaluation Outcome 5.1 Certification Result After due consideration of the ETR[7], produced by the evaluators, and the conduct of the evaluation, as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has determined that Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch (version see chapter 4.2) meets the Common Criteria Part 3 conformant components of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 for the specified Common Criteria Part 2 conformant functionality, in the specified environment, when running on platforms specified in Annex A. 5.2 Recommendations Prospective consumers of Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch (version see chapter 4.2) should understand the specific sc ope of the certification by reading this report in conjunction with the Security Target [1]. The TOE should be used in accordance with a number of environmental considerations as specified in the Security Target. Only the evaluated TOE configuration should be installed. This is specified in Annex A with further relevant information given above in Section 3.3 “TOE Scope” and Section 4 “Evaluation Findings”. The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance documentation included in the evaluated configuration. The above “Evaluation Findings” include a number of recommendations relating to the secure receipt, installation, configuration and operation of the TOE. Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 Page 15 of 17 Annex A: Evaluated Configuration TOE Identification The TOE consists of: ƒ TLX640 Matrix Switch Chassis (TLX-MSC-000640 Rev B) - TLX640 Matrix Switch Data Input and Output Card, 20 Ports, SFP+, Multi-Mode (TLX-MSD-M00020 Rev C), Single Mode (TLX-MSD-S00020 Rev C) - Velocity Matrix Switch 640 Data Input and Output Card, 20 Ports, SFP+, Multi-Mode (VXM-DIOR20 Rev A), Single-Mode (VXM-DIOS20 Rev A) TOE Documentation The supporting guidance documents evaluated were: [a] TLX640 router KVM Matrix Switch Product Manual Rev. A [b] TLX640 10G Matrix Switch QUICK-START GUIDE As used with Thinklogical’s Q-Series & TLX Video Extension Systems [c] TLX 640 Matrix Router Design Specification 1.2 [d] Changing a Routers' IP Address Rev. A [e] Thinklogical System Management Portfolio Configurator Hot Key Manager -On-Screen Display System Management Interface Drag & Drop Product Manual Rev. A [f] VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.1 [g] Using the VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.0 Further discussion of the supporting guidance material is given in Section 4.3 “Installation and Guidance Documentation”. TOE Configuration The following configuration was used for testing: Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 Page 16 of 17 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 The figure shows the TLX48 Router KVM Matrix Switch in an evaluated configuration. An equivalent layout is the evaluated configuration for the TLX640 Router KVM Matrix Switch. Tools used during the evaluation: ƒ Microsoft Office 2013 ƒ Microsoft Hyperterminal ƒ Oracle VM VirtualBox ƒ Kali Linux ƒ Noyes optical power meter, Model OPM 4-1D, Serialnumber 1W11NL001 ƒ Putty Terminal Emulator ƒ WinSCP ƒ Oscilloscope Tektronic DSA72504D, asset number 1147321 ƒ Microsoft Telnet ƒ TLX640 Connect Test 1 A.xls ƒ TLX640 Connect Test 2 PR2.xls ƒ TLX640 Connect Test 3 PR2.xls ƒ TLX640 Connect Test 4 PR1.xls Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch EAL 4 SERTIT-077 CR Issue 1.0 22 September 2016 Page 17 of 17 Environmental Configuration The TOE is a fiber optic switch that uses multi-mode or single-mode fiber optics to transmit and receive a digital video pulse stream without alteration or interpretation of the original signal. The TOE provides remote connectio ns from a set of shared computers to a set of shared peripherals. The switching capability of the TOE is used to connect ports on a peripheral set to multiple computers. The TOE provides a capability to dynamically change the switching configuration. For use in an evaluated configuration, the TOE must be located in a physically secure environment to which only authorized administrators has access. Similarly, the server used to manage the TOE must be physically protected and have suitable identification/auth entication mechanism to ensure that only trusted administrators have access .