Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006
for
IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.3
Technology Level 5300-05-02
with optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS),
Version 1.3
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006
IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.3
Technology Level 5300-05-02
with optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS),
Version 1.3
from
IBM Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Controlled Access Protection Profile, Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3 - Systematic flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 22 December 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic algorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 Technology Level 5300-05-02 with
optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS), Version 1.3 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0302-2005.
For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process based on BSI-
DSZ-CC-0302-2005 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 Technology Level
5300-05-02 with optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS), Version 1.3 was conducted
by atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor is:
IBM Corporation
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 22 December 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-36.
The product IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 Technology Level 5300-05-02 with
optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS), Version 1.3 has been included in the BSI list
of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 14
3 Security Policy 15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 16
5 Architectural Information 19
6 Documentation 23
7 IT Product Testing 25
8 Evaluated Configuration 27
9 Results of the Evaluation 29
10 Comments/Recommendations 31
11 Annexes 31
12 Security Target 31
13 Definitions 32
14 Bibliography 35
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 Technology
Level 5300-05-02 with optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS), Version 1.3 (also
refered as AIX 5300-05-02 hereafter). It is a UNIX-based Operating System
which has been developed to meet the requirements of the Controlled Access
Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999 [8]. By being compliant to
the CAPP the TOE fulfils the requirements of the C2 class of the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC). This includes the fulfilment of the requirements for Identification and
Authentication, Audit, Object Reuse and Access Control including the use of
Access Control Lists.
The TOE can be used on one or more servers running the evaluated version of
AIX which are connected to form a distributed system. The communication
aspects used for this connection are also part of the evaluation. The
communication links themselves are protected against interception and
manipulation by measures which are outside the scope of the evaluation.
This certification is a re-certification of BSI-DSZ-CC-0302-2005. The TOE is
allowed to be used in an LPAR environment (refer to [6], chapter 2.4.2.1 for
more details on LPAR). The TOE includes the Virtual Input/Output Server
(VIOS) which allows for the virtualization of SCSI drives and network adapters
and makes use of the LPAR environment.
The TOE and a various set of user guidance for the TOE is delivered on CD-
ROM (for details refer to chapters 2 and 6 of this report). The Licensed Product
Packages (LPPs) which are allowed to be used for the evaluated configuration
of the TOE are specified in [6], chapter 2.3.
The TOE is running in an LPAR on a IBM System p5 POWER5 server.
The hardware and LPAR are not part of the TOE but support the TSF by
providing separation mechanisms. The BootPROM firmware is not part of the
TOE either.
The IT product IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 Technology Level 5300-05-02 with
optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS), Version 1.3 was evaluated by atsec
information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 15 December
2006. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor is
IBM Corporation
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4 (Evaluation Assurance Level augmented augmented by ALC_FLR.3 -
Systematic flaw remediation).
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective Audit
FAU_STG.1 Guarantees of Audit Data Availability
FAU_STG.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1(SYM) Cryptographic Key Generation (SSL:
Symmetric Algorithms)
FCS_CKM.2(SYM) Cryptographic Key Distribution (SSL:
Symmetric Keys)
FCS_CKM.2(KRB) Cryptographic Key Distribution (Kerberos)
FCS_COP.1(SYM) Cryptographic Operation (SSL: Symmetric
Operations)
FCS_COP.1(RSA) Cryptographic Operation (SSL: RSA)
FCS_COP.1(NFS) Cryptographic Operation (NFSv4)
FCS_COP.1(KRB) Cryptographic Operation (Kerberos)
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1(CAPP) Discretionary Access Control Policy
FDP_ACC.1(VIOS) VIOS Access Control Policy
FDP_ACF.1(CAPP) Discretionary Access Control Functions
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP_ACF.1(VIOS) VIOS Access Control Functions
FDP_RIP.2 Object Residual Information Protection
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_SOS.1 Strength of Authentication Data
FIA_UAU.2 Authentication
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UID.2 Identification
FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1(CAPP) Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.1(VIOS) Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3 (CAPP) Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MSA.3(VIOS) Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of the Audit Trail
FMT_MTD.1 Management of Audited Events
FMT_MTD.1 Management of User Attributes
FMT_MTD.1 Management of Authentication Data
FMT_MTD.1 Management of VIOS Mappings
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of User Attributes
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of Object Attributes
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1(CAPP) Security Management Roles
FMT_SMR.1(VIOS) Security Roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract Machine Testing
FPT_RVM.1 Reference Mediation
FPT_SEP.1 Domain Separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
Table 1: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
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The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP User data protection
Note 1 (as defined in [8]) Subject Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP.3-AIX Hard disk drive residual information
protection
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_RVM.2-AIX Stack Execution Reference Mediation
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1(KRB) Cryptographic Key Generation (Kerberos)
FCS_CKM.1(RSA) Cryptographic Key Generation (SSL: RSA)
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1. Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control .
FDP_ACC.1 (LPAR) Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 (LPAR) Security attribute based access control
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Table 3: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006 Certification Report
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
IA Identification and Authentication
AIX provides identification and authentication (I&A) based
upon user passwords. The quality of the passwords used can
be enforced through configuration options controlled by AIX.
Configurations for I&A allowed in the evaluated configuration
are:
• The default configuration for authentication, which uses
passwords to authenticate users.
• The LDAP authentication method configured for UNIX-
type authentication, which uses passwords to authenticate
users. (In the UNIX-type configuration, LDAP only stores
the data used for I&A. It does not perform I&A for AIX. AIX
must communicate with the LDAP server across an SSL
connection.)
AU Auditing
AIX can collect extensive auditing information about security
related actions taken or attempted by users, ensuring that
users are accountable for their actions. For the minimal set of
events to be audited in the evaluated configration refer to the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
The audit trail writtencan be analyzed to identify attempts to
compromise security and determine the extent of the
compromise.
DA Discretionary Access Control
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) restricts access to
objects, such as files and is based on Access Control Lists
(ACLs) and the standard UNIX permissions for user, group
and others. Access control mechanisms also protect IPC
objects from unauthorized access. In addition, AIX supports
ACLs on sockets for TCP connections.
Additionally, VIOS provides DAC between VIOS SCSI device
drivers acting on behalf of LPAR partitions as subjects and
logical/physical volumes as objects. It also provides DAC
between VIOS Ethernet device drivers acting on behalf of
groups of LPAR partitions sharing a virtual network and VIOS
Ethernet adapter device drivers where one is the subject and
the other is the object (the Ethernet packets cannot contain
VLAN tags).
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TOE Security Function Addressed issue
OR Object Reuse
All resources are protected from Object Reuse (scavenging)
by one of three techniques: explicit initialization, explicit
clearing, or storage management. Four general techniques
are used to meet this requirement:
• Explicit Initialization: The resource’s contents are explicitly
and completely initialized to a known state before the
resource is made accessible to a subject after creation.
• Explicit Clearing: The resource's contents are explicitly
cleared to a known state when the resource is returned for
re-use.
• Storage Management: The storage making up the
resource is managed to ensure that uninitialized storage is
never accessible.
• Erase Disk: AIX offers as part of its diagnostic subsystem
an Erase Disc service aid that can be invoked by the
administrator to overwrite all data currently stored in user-
accessible blocks of a disk with pre-defined bit patterns.
SM Security Management
The management of the security critical parameters of AIX is
performed by the system administrator. A set of commands
that require system administrator privileges are used for
system management. Security parameters are stored in
specific files that are protected by the access control
mechanisms of the TOE against unauthorized access by
users that are not the system administrator.
VIOS defines a separate set of roles for system management
than AIX. Each VIOS role has a set of commands available to
it. Security parameters are stored in specific files that are
protected by the access control mechanisms of the TOE
against unauthorized access by users.
TP TSF Protection
The TOE protects itself from tampering by untrusted subjects
in a variety of ways. The kernel operates in its own protected
address space, which can not be modified or read by
untrusted processes. The kernel also prohibits any direct
access of untrusted processes to hardware. All non-kernel
processes have to use the system call interface to get access
to objects in the file system, inter-process communication
objects or network objects. The kernel controls access to
those objects based on the access control policy for those
objects and the access rights defined for the individual users.
There is also a number of system calls where the use is
restricted to the system administrator. Other system calls have
specific parameters that are restricted to system
administrators.
In addition the TOE uses trusted processes which run with
system administrator privileges to implement some of the TOE
security functions. Those trusted processes are separated by
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
the kernel from untrusted processes. Also the configuration
files used by the TSF are protected by the discretionary
access control functions of the TOE from unauthorised access
by untrusted users.
The system administrator has the ability to start a program
that checks the hardware for correct operation.
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘medium’ (SOF-medium) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.5.2, 5.8 and 8.3.8.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
Since the Security Target claims conformance to CAPP, the OSPs defined
there (refer to [8], chapter 3.2) are applicable for the TOE as well. Because all
security objectives of CAPP are derived from OSPs, no specific threats have
been defined in the Protection Profile.
In addition to CAPP the following OSP have been defined in [6], chapter 3.3:
• P.STATIC: Dynamic partitioning must not be used for the allocation and de-
allocation of resources to the TOE’s partition during operation of the TOE.
Only “static” partitioning may be performed while the TOE is in a non-
operating phase.
• P.ERASE: Administrators shall be able to support information
compartmentalization by preventing recovery of logically deleted information
from physically and logically intact SCSI hard disk drives before they are re-
used within the same system. Such hard disk drives will remain within the
physical and logical protection domain of the TOE and will reside within the
TSC.
• P.DIST_USERS: When the TOE is used in a distributed environment, the
administrators shall ensure that the user databases on each TOE are
consistent with each other.
• P.COMPROT: When the TOE is used in a distributed environment, the
administrator may create a trusted communications path between NFSv4
clients and servers and, for LDAP-based authentication, between the TOE
and LDAP server.
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Also in addition to the PP, the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.1 adds the
following threats:
• T.UAUSER: An attacker (possibly, but not necessarily, an unauthorized user
of the TOE) may impersonate an authorized user of the TOE. This includes
the threat of an authorized user A that tries to impersonate as another
authorized user without knowing the authentication information.
• T.UAACCESS: An authorized user of the TOE may access information
resources without having permission from the person who owns, or is
responsible for, the information resource for the type of access.
• T.UAACTION: An undetected violation of the security policy may be caused
as a result of an attacker (possibly, but not necessarily, an unauthorized
user of the TOE) attempting to perform actions that the individual is not
authorized to do.
• T.VIOS: A VIOS SCSI device driver acting on behalf of an LPAR partition
may try to access logical volumes or physical volumes that are not assigned
to the device driver. A VIOS Ethernet device driver acting on behalf of a
group of LPAR partitions may try to access a VIOS Ethernet adapter device
driver intended for a different VIOS Ethernet device driver (or vise versa).
Note that also threats to be averted by the TOEs environment have been
defined (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.2 and to chapter 4 of this
report).
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.4 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [6] and are summarised here (for
the complete information please refer to the Security Target):
• The CC Evaluated file set must be selected at install time.
• If a windowing environment is to be used, the CDE file set must be selected
at install time.
• The role based system administration features of AIX 5300-05-02 are not
included.
• AIX AIX 5300-05-02 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6. IPv4 is included in
the evaluated configuration. IPv6 is also included in the evaluated
configuration, but only the functional capabilities of IPv6 that are also
supported by IPv4 are included.
• Only 64 bit architectures are included.
• Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
• Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006 Certification Report
• Only the default mechanism for identification and authentication and the
LDAP authentication method configured for “UNIX-type” authentication with
an SSL connection are included. Support for other authentication options
e.g. smartcard authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration.
• If the system console is used, it must be connect directly to the workstation
and afforded the same physical protection as the workstation.
• Dynamic Partitioning (Dynamic LPAR, DLPAR) is not supported in the
evaluated configuration, i.e. the dynamic (de-) allocation of resources to a
partition during operations is not allowed and must be prevented by
organizational means in the IT environment.
• The TOE comprises one or more of the server machines (and optional
peripherals) running the system software listed in chapter 2 of this report (a
server running this software is referred to as a “TOE server” in the following).
• If the product is configured with more than one TOE server, they are linked
by LANs, which may be joined by bridges/routers or by TOE workstations
which act as routers/gateways or they connect using the Virtual Input/Output
Server (VIOS).
• If other systems are connected to the network, they need to be configured
and managed by the same authority using an appropriate security policy not
conflicting with the security policy of the TOE.
• The following file system types are supported:
• the AIX journaled file system, jfs2,
• the standard remote file system access protocol, nfs (V3, V4);
• the High Sierra file system for CD-ROM drives, cdrfs,
• the DVD-ROM file system, udfs,
• the process file system, procfs (/proc)
(provides access to the process image of each process on the machine
as if the process were a “file”. Process access decisions are enforced by
DAC attributes inferred from the underlying process’ DAC attributes).
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the technical environment the TOE is intended
to be used in are made:
Hardware platforms:
• The TOE is running in an LPAR on a System p5 POWER5 server
Periphals:
• all terminals and printers supported by the TOE
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• all storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard
disks, CD- and DVD-ROM drives, streamer drives, floppy disk drives) -
note that the Erase Disk functionality supports SCSI hard disk drives only
• all printer devices supported by the TOE
Network:
• Network connectors supported by the TOE (e.g. Ethernet, Token Ring,
etc.) supporting TCP/IP services over the TCP/IP protocol stack.
• NFSv4 supports the use of NAS v1.4 (Kerberos Version 5) for aiding in
establishing a trusted channel between NFSv4 clients and servers. NAS
v1.4 is part of the TOE environment. NAS v1.4 must be configured to use
LDAP for its database.
Since the Security Target claims conformance to CAPP, the assumptions
defined there on physical, personnel and connectivity aspects are also valid for
the TOE (refer to [8], chapter 3.3). Additionally the Security Target defines the
assumptions:
• A.UTRAIN: Users are trained well enough to use the security functionality
provided by the system appropriately.
• A.UTRUST: Users are trusted to accomplish some task or group of tasks
within a secure IT environment by exercising complete control over their
data.
• A.NET_COMP: All network components (like bridges and routers) are
assumed to correctly pass data without modification.
• A.KERB_KEY: The Kerberos KDC generates encryption keys used for
encrypting the data communications between an NFSv4 client and server.
• A.RSA_KEY: The environment generates RSA encryption keys used by the
SSL communication.
• A.KERB_PROTECT: The Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) used by
the TOE provides protection mechanisms against unauthorized access to
TSF data stored in the Kerberos database.
This includes the requirement for user-subject binding when communicating
to Kerberos and the use of the Kerberos protocol to protect the
communication link between Kerberos and a Kerberos client.
• A.LDAP_PROTECT: The LDAP server used by the TOE provides protection
mechanisms against unauthorized access to TSF data stored in the LDAP
server. This includes the requirement for authentication when accessing
user entries and the configuration to use SSL v3 as the preferred protocol to
protect the communication links.
For a detailed description refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.4.2 and
3.4.3.
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1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called:
IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.3
Technology Level 5300-05-02
with optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS),
Version 1.3
The TOE documentation is supplied on CD-ROM (see chapter 6 of this report).
The documents [24] (Release Notes) and [25] (Security Guide) are used as a
starting point for an evaluation conformant usage of the TOE.
The Licensed Product Packages (LPPs) / File Sets which are allowed to be
installed in the evaluated configuration of the TOE are defined in the Security
Target [6], chapter 2.3.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW AIX 5L for POWER V5.3
with Recommended
Technology Package 5300-
05-02,
Program Number 5765-G03
Virtual I/O Server (VIOS)
contained in IBM Advanced
Power Virtualization Version
1.3,
Program Number 5765-G30
AIX 5L TL 5300-
05-02
VIOS version 1.3
Shrink wrapped CDs, Fixes are
delivered electronically
Shrink wrapped CDs, Fixes are
delivered electronically
2 DOC Documents as listed in
chapter 6 of this report
see chapter 6 Part of the CDs
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is a UNIX based multi-user multi-tasking operating system, thus
providing service to several users at the same time. After successful login, the
users have access to a general computing environment, allowing the start-up of
user applications, issuing user commands at shell level, creating and accessing
files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate the users and
protect their data. Privileged commands are restricted to the system
administrator role (root).
The TOE provides facilities for on-line interaction with users. Networking is
covered only to the extent to which the TOE can be considered to be part of a
centrally-managed system that meets a common set of security requirements
(refer to the Security Target [6] for the constraints).
It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the data protected by
the TOE can be delegated to the TOE users. All data is under the control of the
TOE. The data is stored in named objects, and the TOE can associate with
each controlled object a description of the access rights to that object. All
individual users are assigned a unique user identifier. This user identifier
supports individual accountability. The TOE authenticates the claimed identity of
the user before allowing the user to perform any further actions.
The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place
in accordance with the access restrictions placed on that object by its owner or
other suitably authorised user. Access rights (e.g. read, write, execute) can be
assigned to data objects with respect to subjects (users). Once a subject is
granted access to an object, the content of that object may be freely used to
influence other objects accessible to this subject.
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [6] and with even more detail in the developer
document of the security policy model.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the Organisational Security Policies to which the TOE complies the
following usage assumptions arise:
• Only those users who have been authorised to access the information within
the system may access the system (P.AUTHORIZED_USERS).
• Implicit and explicit access rights to an object are granted by the object
owner (P.NEED_TO_KNOW).
• The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions within the
system (P.ACCOUNTABLE).
• The TOE is only to be allowed with static LPAR. Dynamic LPAR must not be
used (P.STATIC).
• An administrator has to initiate the hard disk erase function of the TOE in
order to prevent the recovery of the original information stored on the disk
(P.ERASE).
• When used in a distributed environment, the administrators shall ensure that
the user databases on each TOE Server are consistent with each other
(P.DIST_USERS)
• When used in a distributed environment, the a trused communication path
between NFSv4 clients and server and for LDAP-based authentication
between the TOE and LDAP server is in the reponsibility of the
administrators (P.COMPROT)
Based on the personnel assumptions the following usage conditions consist:
• The TOE and the security of information have to be managed by one or
more competent individuals (A.MANAGE).
• The system administrative personnel are not careless, malicious and abide
the instruction provided by the TOE documentation (A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN).
• TOE users are expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign
environment (A.COOP).
• TOE users are trained well enough to be able to use the security
functionality appropriately (A.UTRAIN).
• TOE users are trusted to some task or group of tasks within a secure IT
environment by exercising complete control over their data (A.UTRUST).
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target
[6], especially chapter 3.3 and 3.4.
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4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.4.1
and 3.4.3):
• It is assumed that the processing resources of the TOE are located within
controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorised physical access
(A.LOCATE).
• It is assumed that TOE hardware and software (critical to security policy
enforcement) is protected from unauthorised physical modification
(A.PROTECT).
• All network components (like bridges and routers) are assumed to correctly
pass data without modification (A.NET_COMP).
• Any other system with which the TOE communicates is assumed to be
under the same management control and operates under the same security
policy constraints. There are no security requirements which address the
need to trust external systems or the communication links to such systems
(A.PEER).
• It is assumed that all connections to peripheral devices and all network
connections reside within the controlled access facilities. Internal
communication paths to access points such as terminals or other systems
are assumed to be adequately protected (A.CONNECT).
• It is assumed that the Kerberos KDC generates encryption keys used for
encrypting the data communications between an NFSv4 client and server
(A.KERB_KEY).
• It is assumed that the environment generates RSA encryption keys used by
the SSL communication (A.RSA_KEY).
• It is assumed that the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) used by the
TOE provides protection mechanisms against unauthorized access to TSF
data stored in the Kerberos database. This includes the requirement for
user-subject binding when communicating to Kerberos and the use of the
Kerberos protocol to protect the communication link between Kerberos and
a Kerberos client (A.KERB_PROTECT).
• It is assumed that the LDAP server used by the TOE provides protection
mechanisms against unauthorized access to TSF data stored in the LDAP
server. This includes the requirement for authentication when accessing
user entries and the configuration to use SSL v3 as the preferred protocol to
protect the communication links (A.LDAP_PROTECT).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
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4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below have to be averted in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are not addressed by the TOE itself. They have to be addressed
by the operating environment of the TOE (for detailed information about the
threats and how the environment can cover them refer to the Security Target
[6]).
• A unprivileged user or the privileged system administrator is losing stored
data due to hardware malfunction (TE.HWMF).
• Security enforcing or relevant files of the TOE are manipulated or
accidentally corrupted without the system administrator being able to detect
this (TE.COR_FILE).
• The hardware the TOE is running on, does not provide sufficient capabilities
to support the self-protection of the TSF from unauthorised programs
(TE.HW_SEP).
• When running in a logical partition, software running in a different partition
than the TOE is able to access resources that are assigned to the TOE
(TE.LPAR).
• An attacker (possibly, but not necessarily, an unauthorized user of the TOE)
may attempt to guess the password of a Kerberos account through repeated
bind attempts to Kerberos (TE.KERB_BIND).
For a detailed description of the threats covered by the TOE environment
please refer to [6], chapter 3.2.2.
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5 Architectural Information
General overview of AIX
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the operating system AIX 5300-05-02.
AIX is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system. It is
compliant with all major international standards for UNIX systems, such as the
POSIX standards, X/Open XPG 4, Spec 1170, and FIPS Pub 180. It provides a
platform for a variety of applications in the governmental and commercial
environment. AIX is available on a broad range of computer systems from IBM,
ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise servers.
The evaluated configuration of AIX 5300-05-02 consists of a distributed, closed
network of highend, mid-range and low-end IBM Series p5 servers running the
evaluated version of AIX 5300-05-02. All servers complying with the definition of
System p5 POWER5 and POWER5+ with hardware components as defined in
the Security Target [6] are covered by the evaluation.
The network links and cabling are assumed to be physically protected against
eavesdropping and tampering. All hosts within the network must run the
evaluated version of the TOE software and must be configured in accordance
with the requirements as described in the AIX Security Guide for the operation
of the TOE as CAPP/EAL4+ system [25].
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) provided by AIX consists of those parts that
run in kernel mode plus some defined trusted processes. These together are
the functions that enforce the security policy as defined in the Security Target.
Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used by the system
administrator need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way.
But as with other operating system evaluations they are not considered to be
part of this TSF.
The hardware and the BootProm firmware are considered not to be part of the
TOE but part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes installation from CDROM and from the network.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, such as ftp, rlogin, rsh and
NFS. Configuration of those network applications has to be performed in
accordance with the guidance provided in [24] and [25] for a CAPP/EAL4+
conformant configuration.
The TOE includes the X-Window graphical interface and X-Window
applications. System administration tools include the smitty non-graphical
system management tool.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services, for example the
Mozilla browser or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access the supplied online
documentation (which is provided in HTML and PDF formats). No HTTP server
is included in the evaluated configuration.
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General overview of VIOS
In addition to the AIX OS, VIOS is part of the TOE as well to provide access to
shared SCSI and Ethernet resources.
Conceptually, VIOS resides as a layer between the AIX OS and the physical
hardware. Access to the shared resources is restricted based on the VIOS
configuration performed by the administrator.
VIOS provides discretionary access control between VIOS SCSI device drivers
behavior on behalf of LPAR partitions and logical or physical volumes. In
addition, VIOS provides discretionary access control between shared Ethernet
device drivers accessing a Hypervisormaintained virtual LAN and the VIOS
Ethernet adapter device driver. A VLAN setup with VLAN tags is not supported.
VIOS defines a separate set of roles compared to AIX for system management.
Each VIOS role has a set of commands available to it. Security parameters are
stored in specific files that are protected by the access control mechanisms.
Nevertheless, access to the VIOS management interface must be restricted to
authorized administrators.
Major structural units of the TOE
The TOE contains the following structural units:
• The kernel, which executes in system mode
• A set of trusted processes that execute in user mode but with root privileges.
They also provide some of the security functions of the TOE.
• A set of configuration files that define the system configuration. Those files
are named the “TSF database” and need to be protected by the access
control mechanisms of the TOE such that they can only be modified by the
system administrator.
• VIOS providing access to shared SCSI and Ethernet resources.
Security Functions
The security functions that have been evaluated include:
• Identification and Authentication: The TOE requires users to authenticate
themselves before they can work with the TOE. The mechanism used for
authentication is a userid/password combination. The system administrator
has a variety of configuration parameter he can use to enforce users to
select passwords that are hard to guess. In addition the system
administrator can define the maximum and minimum life-time of passwords.
The user data is either stored locally in files or remotely within an LDAP
server.
Users need to authenticate themselves when they log in but also when they
change their identity using the su command or when using network
applications like rlogin, telnet, ftp. To avoid that normal users can login as
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root when they for some reason get hold of the password for root, direct
login as root is prohibited. A system administrator has to log in under his id
using his password and then get root using the su command. Since the use
of the su command to get root can be restricted to defined users that act as
system administrators, any user without this permission can not log in as
root even when he knows the root password.
• Auditing: The TOE includes the possibility to audit a large number of
events. The system administrator can configure which events are audited
and is also able to define such events on a per file system object basis,
define audit classes and assign them individually to users. This allows for a
great flexibility in the configuration of the events that are audited. The
evaluated configuration supports bin mode auditing only.
• Discretionary Access Control: The TOE supports discretionary access
control for three different types of objects:
1. The discretionary access control for file system objects: The
discretionary access control for file system objects in the TOE support
the standard Unix permission bits extended by access control lists that
allow the system administrator and the owner of the file system object to
allow or restrict the access to the file system object down to the
granularity of a single user.
2. The discretionary access control for IPC objects: The TOE supports
discretionary access control based on Unix permission bits for
semaphore, shared memory segments and message queues.
3. The discretionary access control for TCP ports: The TOE includes a
unique access control feature for TCP ports allowing the system
administrator to restrict the use of TCP ports (binding to this port) to
defined users. This feature also allows to define TCP ports with numbers
higher than 1024 to be privileged ports (i. e. only a process with root
authority can bind to this port). This feature allows to eliminate some
known vulnerabilities for network programs using port numbers higher
than 1024.
In addition to the AIX DAC mechanisms, VIOS control access to the shared
SCSI and Ethernet resources. This access mediation is subject to the
discretion of the administrator.
• Object Reuse: The TOE ensures that objects are cleared before they are
reassigned to and reused by other subjects. This applies to memory and file
system objects as well as to a number of other objects that could transmit
information a user might not want to be transmitted to other users.
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• System management: The AIX part of the TOE supports only two roles:
System administrator and normal users. Additional privileges that exist
within the TOE are not used in the evaluated configuration. System
management within the TOE is restricted to the system administrator. He
may either use the commands provided for system management or the
“smitty” tool, which provides a non-graphical interface. The tool will generate
scripts using the system management commands.
VIOS provides support for different roles for administrative purposes. As
only trusted administrators are allowed to access the management interface
of VIOS, these roles are provided for convenience for a group of
administrators.
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
• Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1, commtrf1.pdf, Third
Edtition September 2005, [9]
• Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2, commtrf2.pdf, Third
Edtition September 2005, [10]
• Commands Reference, Volume 1, aixcmds1.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [11]
• Commands Reference, Volume 2, aixcmds2.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [12]
• Commands Reference, Volume 3, aixcmds3.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [13]
• Commands Reference, Volume 4, aixcmds4.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [14]
• Commands Reference, Volume 5, aixcmds5.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [15]
• Commands Reference, Volume 6, aixcmds6.pdf Third Edition September
2005, [16]
• Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX, diagunsd.pdf, Sixth
Edition October 2002, [17]
• Diagnostic Information for Multiple Bus Systems, 380509.pdf, Version 5.3,
December 2004, [18]
• Files Reference, aixfiles.pdf, Third Edtition September 2005, [19]
• General Programming Concepts: Writing and Debugging Programs,
genprogc.pdf, Third Edition September 2005, [20]
• Operating System and Device Management, baseadmndita.pdf, First Edition
July 2006, [21]
• System Management Guide: Operating System and Devices, baseadmn.pdf,
Thrid Edition September 2005, [22]
• System Management Concepts: Operating System and Devices,
admnconc.pdf, Third Edition September 2005, [23]
• README addendunm to the AIX guidance, User_Guidance_Docs.txt, [24]
• AIX 5L Version 5.3: Security, security.pdf, Fourth Edition July 2006, [25]
• System Management Guide: Communications and Networks,
commadmn.pdf, Third Edition September 2005, [26]
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• Networks and Communication Management, commadmndita.pdf, First
Edition July 2006, [27]
• AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 1, basetrf1.pdf, Second Edition December 2004, [28]
• AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 2, basetrf2.pdf, Second Edition December 2004, [29]
• Using the Virtual I/O Server, iphb1.pdf, Sixth Edition February 2006, [30]
The administrator/user is recommended to use the documents:
• README addendunm to the AIX guidance, User_Guidance_Docs.txt, [24]
• AIX 5L Version 5.3: Security, security.pdf, Fourth Edition July 2006, [25]
as a starting point for an evaluation conformant usage of the TOE. Please note
that the information contained in the Security Target [6] also have to be taken
into account.
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7 IT Product Testing
Test hardware configuration
The following System p5 systems were used by the developer for the testing:
• p550: VIOS served SCSI and Ethernet resources to AIX partitions; LDAP
was configured to provide the user databases
• p570: AIX standalone within an LPAR
• p575: AIX standalone within an LPAR
• p595: AIX standalone within an LPAR
Evaluator testing on the TOE version with the TOE configuration as described in
the Security Target was also performed on one of the systems mentioned
above.
Test coverage/depth
All tests were performed on external interfaces of the TSF. Internal interfaces
were partially tested directly and partially indirectly. For the sufficiency of the
indirect tests an argumentation was provided.
The correspondence between the tests and the functional specification was
found to be accurate and complete.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
All the tests have been performed on the systems defined above.
Testing approach:
IBM has a large number of different test suites and test cases for each
component. The test suite related to the core AIX functionality is supplemented
by test suites related to the NFS and VIOS. Most of the test are automatic test
but some manual testing remains.
The developer performed the testing of the final product on all the platforms
listed above. Correspondence of the test configuration to the configuration
required by the ST and guidance documentation was ensured. Any deviations
because of the test setup have been justifed. The tests cases showed the
expected behaviour.
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Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The evaluator performed his test on a p5 p550 systems located in Austin.
Testing approach:
The evaluator testing effort consists of two parts. The first one is the rerun of the
developer test cases and the second is the execution of the tests created by the
evaluator.
Since the core functinality of the TOE hasn’t changed much compared to the
previous evaluation the evaluator chose to concentrate his tests on the new
features like VIOS.
The evaluator has verified that all test cases produced the results that where
expected. Therefore the evaluator has determined that the tests show that the
TOE works as described in the Security Target and the developer’s design
documentation.
Evaluator penetration testing:
The evaluator has devised a set of penetration tests based on the developer’s
vulnerability analysis and based on the evaluator’s knowledge of the TOE
gained by the other evaluation activities. All penetration tests have been
designed to assume the the attack potential as defined in AVA_VLA.2.
The evaluator conducted those tests and did not find any test that resulted in a
sucessful penetration of the TOE with the attack potential assumed for
AVA_VLA.2.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
According to the Security Target the evaluated configuration of the TOE is
defined as follows (refer also to the Security Target [6]):
General Aspects:
• The CC Evaluated file set must be selected at install time
• If a windowing environment is to be used, the CDE file set must be selected
at install time.
• The role based system administration features of AIX 5300-05-02 are not
included.
• AIX 5300-05-02 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6. IPv4 is included in the
evaluated configuration. IPv6 is also included in the evaluated configuration,
but only the functional capabilities of IPv6 that are also supported by IPv4
are included.
• Only 64 bit architectures are included.
• Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
• Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
• Only the default mechanism for identification and authentication and the
LDAP authentication method configured for “UNIX-type” authentication with
an SSL connection are included. Support for other authentication options
e.g. smartcard authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration.
• If the system console is used, it must be connect directly to the workstation
and afforded the same physical protection as the workstation.
• Dynamic Partitioning (Dynamic LPAR, DLPAR) is not supported in the
evaluated configuration, i.e. the dynamic (de-) allocation of resources to a
partition during operations is not allowed and must be prevented by
organizational means in the IT environment.
Networking Aspects:
• The TOE comprises one or more of the server machines (and optional
peripherals) running the system software listed in chapter 2 of this report.
• If the product is configured with more than one TOE server, they are linked
by LANs, which may be joined by bridges/routers or by TOE workstations
which act as routers/gateways or they connect using the Virtual Input/Output
Server (VIOS).
• If other systems are connected to the network, they need to be configured
and managed by the same authority using an appropriate security policy not
conflicting with the security policy of the TOE.
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Technical Aspects:
• The TOE is running in an LPAR on a System p5 POWER5 server
• The following file system types are supported:
• the AIX journaled file system, jfs2,
• the standard remote file system access protocol, nfs (V3, V4),
• the High Sierra file system for CD-ROM drives, cdrfs,
• the DVD-ROM file system, udfs,
• the process file system, procfs (/proc)
(provides access to the process image of each process on the machine
as if the process were a “file”. Process access decisions are enforced by
DAC attributes inferred from the underlying process’ DAC attributes).
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents especially the
documents [24] and [25] have to be followed (please refer to chapter 6 of this
report for more information on the guidance documentation).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Systematic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.3 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0302-2005. New functionality
like VIOS, LDAP-supported I&A and NFSv4 have been subject of the re-
evaluation. For details on the functionality newly integrated in the TOE please
refer to [6].
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the CAPP [8]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3 - Systematic flaw remediation.
• the TOE Security Function “Identification and Authentication based on
passwords” fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: SOF-medium. This
strength applies for the identification and authentication of AIX as well as for
the identification and authentication for VIOS.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic
algorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3,
Clause 2). This holds for all security function related to the Security Functional
Requirements from the FCS class.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as outlined in
chapter 2 of this report.
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The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation as listed in chapter 6 of this report
(especially documents [24] and [25]) contains necessary information about the
secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage of the TOE the
fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [6]
and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into account. Therefore a
user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these documents.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AU Security Function Auditing
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) /
Federal Office for Information Security
CAPP Controlled Access Protection Profile
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CDE Common Desktop Environment
DA Security Function Discretionary Access Control
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FTP File Transfer Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
LPAR Logical partitioning
LPP Licensed Product Package
IP Internet Protocol
IA Security Function Identification and Authentication
IT Information Technology
JFS Journalled File System
NFS Network File System
NIM Network Install Manager
OR Security Function Object Reuse
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
PROM Programmable read only memory
RPC Remote Procedure Call
RSH Remote Shell
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
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SM Security Function Security Management
SMIT System Management Interface Tool
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TCSEC Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP TSF Protection
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
VMM Virtual Memory Manager
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
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SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006, “AIX 5L Version 5.3
Technology level 53000502 with optional Virtual I/O Server Security
Target”, Version 1.3, 2006-11-27, IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006, Release 2, 2006-
12-14, atsec infofmation security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Controlled Access Protection Profile, Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999, National
Security Agency
User Guidance Documentation:
[9] Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1, commtrf1.pdf, Third
Edtition September 2005
[10] Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2, commtrf2.pdf, Third
Edtition September 2005
[11] Commands Reference, Volume 1, aixcmds1.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[12] Commands Reference, Volume 2, aixcmds2.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[13] Commands Reference, Volume 3, aixcmds3.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[14] Commands Reference, Volume 4, aixcmds4.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[15] Commands Reference, Volume 5, aixcmds5.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[16] Commands Reference, Volume 6, aixcmds6.pdf Third Edition September
2005
[17] Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX, diagunsd.pdf, Sixth
Edition October 2002
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[18] Diagnostic Information for Multiple Bus Systems, 380509.pdf, Version
5.3, December 2004
[19] Files Reference, aixfiles.pdf, Third Edtition September 2005
[20] General Programming Concepts: Writing and Debugging Programs,
genprogc.pdf, Third Edition September 2005
[21] Operating System and Device Management, baseadmndita.pdf, First
Edition July 2006
[22] System Management Guide: Operating System and Devices,
baseadmn.pdf, Thrid Edition September 2005
[23] System Management Concepts: Operating System and Devices,
admnconc.pdf, Third Edition September 2005
[24] README addendunm to the AIX guidance, User_Guidance_Docs.txt
[25] AIX 5L Version 5.3: Security, security.pdf, Fourth Edition July 2006
[26] System Management Guide: Communications and Networks,
commadmn.pdf, Third Edition September 2005
[27] Networks and Communication Management, commadmndita.pdf, First
Edition July 2006
[28] AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 1, basetrf1.pdf, Second Edition December 2004
[29] AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 2, basetrf2.pdf, Second Edition December 2004
[30] Using the Virtual I/O Server, iphb1.pdf, Sixth Edition February 2006
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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