Security Target Juniper Networks
Routers, T
Version 1.7
Security Target
Juniper Networks M-Series Multiservice Edge Routers,
Universal Edge Routers, T
Switches Running Junos
ST Version1.7
May 12, 2014
Juniper Networks M-Series Multiservice Edge Routers, MX-Series 3D Universal Edge
Routers, T-Series Core Routers and EX-Series Ethernet Switches
© 2014Juniper Networks
Series Multiservice Edge Routers, MX
Edge Routers, T-Series Core Routers and EX-Series Ethernet
Junos 12.1R3.6
Series 3D Universal Edge
Series Ethernet Switches Junos 12.1R3.6
Page 1 of 49
MX-Series 3D
Series Ethernet
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Prepared By:
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1194 North Mathilda Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
www.juniper.net
Abstract
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), the M-
Series Multiservice Edge Routers, MX-Series 3D Universal Edge Routers, T-Series Core Routers and EX-
Series Ethernet Switches running Junos 12.1R3.6. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions
about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of
security objectives, a set of security requirements and the IT security functions provided by the TOE
which meet the set of requirements.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction...........................................................................................................................................5
1.1 ST Reference...............................................................................................................................................5
1.2 TOE Reference............................................................................................................................................5
1.3 About This Document.................................................................................................................................5
1.3.1 Document Conventions .........................................................................................................................6
1.3.2 Document Terminology .........................................................................................................................6
1.4 TOE Overview.............................................................................................................................................6
1.5 TOE Boundaries..........................................................................................................................................7
1.5.1 Physical Boundary..................................................................................................................................8
1.5.2 Logical Boundary....................................................................................................................................8
1.5.3 Summary of Out-of-Scope Items ...........................................................................................................9
2 Conformance Claims.............................................................................................................................10
2.1 CC Conformance Claim.............................................................................................................................10
2.2 PP Claim ...................................................................................................................................................10
3 Security Problem Definition..................................................................................................................11
3.1 Threats .....................................................................................................................................................11
3.2 Organizational Security Policies ...............................................................................................................11
3.3 Assumptions.............................................................................................................................................12
4 Security Objectives...............................................................................................................................13
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................................................................................13
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..............................................................................14
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale...................................................................................................................14
5 Security Requirements .........................................................................................................................15
5.1 Security Functional Requirements............................................................................................................15
5.1.1 Security Audit (FAU).............................................................................................................................17
5.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)................................................................................................................17
5.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP).................................................................................................................19
5.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA) ...............................................................................................19
5.1.5 Security Management (FMT) ...............................................................................................................20
5.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ..................................................................................................................21
5.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)..................................................................................................................................21
5.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) ...............................................................................................................22
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements ............................................................................................................23
5.3 Security Requirements Rationale .............................................................................................................24
5.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale.......................................................................................24
5.3.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.......................................................................................26
6 TOE Summary Specification ..................................................................................................................27
6.1 Security Audit ...........................................................................................................................................27
6.2 Cryptographic Support .............................................................................................................................29
6.3 User Data Protection................................................................................................................................31
6.4 Identification and Authentication ............................................................................................................31
6.5 Security Management..............................................................................................................................32
6.6 Protection of the TSF................................................................................................................................33
6.7 TOE Access................................................................................................................................................35
6.8 Trusted Path/Channels.............................................................................................................................35
6.9 RFC Conformance Statements..................................................................................................................35
6.10 800-56 Conformance Statements.............................................................................................................38
6.10.1 Finite Field-Based Key Establishment Schemes...............................................................................38
6.10.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography-Based Schemes (ECC Scheme)............................................................40
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7 Audit Events ........................................................................................................................................41
8 Appendices..........................................................................................................................................42
8.1 References................................................................................................................................................42
8.2 Glossary....................................................................................................................................................42
8.3 Acronyms..................................................................................................................................................47
List of Tables
Table 1 - ST Organization and Section Descriptions ....................................................................................................5
Table 2 - List of Network Device Hardware .................................................................................................................8
Table 3 - TOE Logical Boundary ...................................................................................................................................9
Table 4 - Threats Addressed by the TOE....................................................................................................................11
Table 5 - Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................................................12
Table 6 - Assumptions................................................................................................................................................12
Table 7 – TOE Security Objectives .............................................................................................................................13
Table 8 – Operational Environment Security Objectives...........................................................................................14
Table 9 – TOE Security Functional Requirements......................................................................................................16
Table 10 – Security Assurance Requirements ...........................................................................................................23
Table 11 – Satisfaction of dependencies ...................................................................................................................26
Table 12 - CAVS Certificate Results............................................................................................................................29
Table 13 – Key zeroization handling..........................................................................................................................30
Table 14 – RFC Conformance Statements .................................................................................................................37
Table 15 – 800-56A Conformance Statements..........................................................................................................40
Table 16 - Security Audit Requirements....................................................................................................................41
Table 17 - Acronyms used in the Security Target ......................................................................................................49
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1 Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), Security Target organization,
document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the evaluated products.
1.1 ST Reference
ST Title Security Target: Juniper Networks M-Series Multiservice Edge Routers,
MX-Series 3D Universal Edge Routers, T-Series Core Routers and EX-Series
Ethernet Switches running Junos 12.1R3.6
ST Revision 1.7
ST Draft Date May 12, 2014
Author Juniper Networks, Inc.
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Reference Juniper Networks M-Series Multiservice Edge Routers, MX-Series 3D
Universal Edge Routers, T-Series Core Routers and EX-Series Ethernet
Switches running Junos 12.1R3.6
1.3 About This Document
This Security Target follows the following format:
SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION
1 Introduction Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the hardware and
software that make up the TOE as well as the physical and logical
boundaries of the TOE
2 Conformance Claims Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria versions,
Protection Profiles, or Packages where applicable
3 Security Problem Definition Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational security
policies that affect the TOE
4 Security Objectives Defines the security objectives for the TOE/operational
environment and provides a rationale to demonstrate that the
security objectives satisfy the threats
5 Security Requirements Contains the functional and assurance requirements for this TOE
6 TOE Summary Specification Identifies the IT security functions provided by the TOE and also
identifies the assurance measures targeted to meet the
assurance requirements
7 Rationale Demonstrates traceability and internal consistency
8 Audit Events TOE audit events are listed here
9 Appendices Supporting material
Table 1 - ST Organization and Section Descriptions
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1.3.1 Document Conventions
The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections,
assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font
conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC that are not already completed in
[NDPP]1
:
• Assignment: Indicated with italicized text;
• Refinement made by PP author: Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs, if necessary;
• Selection: Indicated with underlined text;
• Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with italicized and underlined text.
Iterations are indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3).
Iterations identified in [NDPP] are identified in the same manner in this ST.
1.3.2 Document Terminology
See Section 8.2for the Glossary.
1.4 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) includes the following secure network devices running Junos 12.1R3.6:
• M-Series Multiservice Edge Routers:M7i M10i M120 M320
• MX-Series 3D Universal Edge Routers: MX5 MX10 MX40 MX80MX240 MX480 MX960
• T-Series Core Routers:T320 T640 T1600
• EX-Series Ethernet Switches:EX3300 EX4200 EX4500 EX6200 EX8200
1
i.e. if a selection, assignment or refinement has been made in [NDPP] it will not also be marked using the font conventions
(although any square brackets used in [NDPP] will be retained) in this security target, thereby highlighting the additional
operations completed in the Security Target.
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1.5 TOE Boundaries
The TOE consists of the following components:
1. Network devices (as detailed in Table 2 below).
2. Junos 12.1R3.6: an operating system for security appliances.
The TOE is managed and configured via Command Line Interface.
Each appliance is a secure network device that protects itself largely by offering only a minimal logical
interface to the network and attached nodes. All router platforms are powered by the same JUNOS
software, which is a special purpose OS that provides no general purpose programming capability.
JUNOS provides both management and control functions as well as all IP routing.
Each Juniper Networks M-series, T-series and MX-series routing platform is a complete routing system
that supports a variety of high-speed interfaces (only Ethernet is within scope of the evaluation) for
medium/large networks and network applications. Juniper Networks routers share common JUNOS
software, features, and technology for compatibility across platforms.
The hardware has two components: the router itself and the PICs/DPC that have been installed in the
router. The various PICs/DPC that have been installed in the router allow it to communicate with the
different types of networks that may be required within the environment where the router will be
used.
The router architecture of each platform cleanly separates routing and control functions from packet
forwarding operations, thereby eliminating bottlenecks and permitting the router to maintain a high
level of performance.
Each router consists of two major architectural components:
• The Routing Engine (RE), which provides Layer 3 routing services and network management
and control;
• The Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE), which provides all operations necessary for transit packet
forwarding.
The Routing Engine and Packet Forwarding Engine perform their primary tasks independently, while
constantly communicating through a high-speed internal link. This arrangement provides streamlined
forwarding and routing control and the capability to run Internet-scale networks at high speeds.
The EX-series platforms provide high-performance, carrier-class networking solutions, supporting a
variety of high-speed Ethernet interfaces for medium/large networks. The EX-series platforms share
common JUNOS software with the routers, such that control plane features are implemented
consistently with those of the routers.
The EX-series platforms are designed as hardware devices, featuring complete Layer 2 and Layer 3
switching capabilities. The EX-series platforms are powered by the same JUNOS modular architecture
as the routers. The hardware abstraction layer allows control-plane features to be written once and
implemented seamlessly on the underlying hardware. This modular approach also enhances fault-
tolerance, as each JUNOS software protocol daemon runs in its own protected memory space and can
be gracefully restarted independently without impacting the rest of the system.
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1.5.1 Physical Boundary
M-Series M7i M10i M120 M320
MX-Series MX5 MX10 MX40 MX80MX240 MX480 MX960
T-Series T320 T640 T1600
EX-Series EX3300 EX4200 EX4500 EX6200 EX8200
Table 2 - List of Network Device Hardware
The TOE is comprised of appliance chassis (appliances listed in Table 2 above) and the Junos
12.1R3.6software and firmware running on the appliance (including the software implementing the
Routing Engine and the software and ASICs implementing the Packet Forwarding Engine2
). Hence the
TOE is contained within the physical boundary of the specified appliance chassis.
1.5.2 Logical Boundary
This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical boundary of the
TOE includes the security functionality described in the following sections.
TSF DESCRIPTION
Audit (FAU) Junos auditable events are stored in the syslog files, and can be sent to an
external log server (via Netconf over SSH). Auditable events include start-up
and shutdown of the audit functions, authentication events, service
requests, as well as the events listed in the table in Section 7. Audit records
include the date and time, event category, event type, username, and the
outcome of the event (success or failure). Local syslog storage limits are
configurable and are monitored. In the event of storage limits being reached
the oldest logs will be overwritten.
Cryptographic Support
(FCS)
The TOE includes a baseline cryptographic module that provides
confidentiality and integrity services for authentication and for protecting
communications with adjacent systems.
User Data
Protection/Information
Flow Control
The TOE is designed to forward network packets (i.e., information flows)
from source network entities to destination network entities based on
available routing information. This information is either provided directly by
TOE users or indirectly from other network entities (outside the TOE)
configured by the TOE users. The TOE has the capability to regulate the
information flow across its interfaces; traffic filters can be set in accordance
with the presumed identity of the source, the identity of the destination, the
transport layer protocol, the source service identifier, and the destination
service identifier (TCP or UDP port number).
Identification and
Authentication (FIA)
The TOE requires users to provide unique identification and authentication
data before any administrative access to the system is granted. .The devices
also require that applications exchanging information with them successfully
2
The lower layers of the PFE (the DPC, PIC and Line Card network interface components) which simply deal with physical
interfaces mechanics are out of scope.
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TSF DESCRIPTION
authenticate prior to any exchange. This covers all services used to exchange
information, including Secure Shell (SSH). Telnet, File Transfer Protocol (FTP),
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) are out of scope.
Security Management
(FMT)
The TOE provides an Authorized Administrator role that is responsible for:
• the configuration and maintenance of cryptographic elements
related to the establishment of secure connections to and from the
evaluated product
• the regular review of all audit data;
• all administrative tasks (e.g., creating the security policy).
The devices are managed through a Command Line Interface (CLI). The CLI is
accessible through remote administrative session.
Protection of the TSF (FPT) The TOE provides protection mechanisms for its security functions. One of
the protection mechanisms is to protect TFS data (e.g. cryptographic keys,
administrator passwords). Another protection mechanism is to ensure the
integrity of any software/firmware updates are can be verified prior to
installation. The TOE provides for both cryptographic and non-cryptographic
self-tests, and is capable of automated recovery from failure states. Also,
reliable timestamp is made available for use by the TOE.
TOE Access (FTA) The TOE can be configured to terminate interactive user sessions and to
present an access banner with warning messages prior to authentication.
Trusted Path/Channels
(FTP)
The TOE creates trusted channels between itself and remote trusted
authorized IT product (e.g. syslog server) entities that protect the
confidentiality and integrity of communications. The TOE creates trusted
paths between itself and remote administrators and users that protect the
confidentiality and integrity of communications.
Table 3 - TOE Logical Boundary
1.5.3 Summary of Out-of-Scope Items
The only security functionality addressed by the evaluation is the functionality specified by the
functional requirements in Section 5.1, and does not include additional product capabilities such as use
of IPsec and information flow control based on traffic filters. The following items are out of the scope
of the evaluation:
• External syslog server3
• Use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.1)
• Use of FTP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.1)
• Use of SNMP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.1)
• Use of SSL, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it violates the
Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.1)
• Media use (other than during installation of the TOE)
• Use of root account, other than during initial installation and configuration.
3
Although an external syslog server is expected to be present in the operational environment, the syslog server itself is not
subject to evaluation.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
The TOE is Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 3 (July 2009) Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant.
2.2 PP Claim
The TOE conforms to the following Protection Profile:
• Security Requirements for Network Devices, Version 1.1, 08June 2012 [NDPP]
The Security Problem definition in this Security Target is consistent with the security problem definition
detailed in [NDPP] Section 2. The threats in this ST are the same as the resulting threats detailed in
Table 4 of [NDPP] Annex A. The organizational security policies in this ST are the same as those
specified in Table 5 of [NDPP] Annex A and the assumptions in this ST are the same as those in Table 3
of [NDPP] Annex A.
The statement of security objectives in this ST is consistent with the statement of security objectives
detailed in [NDPP] Section 3. The Security Objectives for the TOE specified in this ST are the same as
those in Table 6 of [NDPP] Annex A and the Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
specified in this ST are the same as those in Table 7 of [NDPP] Annex A.
The statement of requirements in this ST is consistent with the statement of requirements detailed in
[NDPP] Section 4. The Security Functional Requirements specified in this ST are the same as those in
[NDPP] Section 4.2, with all extended requirements taken from [NDPP] Section 4.2. The Security
Assurance Requirements specified in this ST include all those in [NDPP] Section 4.3, with all refinements
taken from [NDPP] Section 4.3. In addition to those Security Assurance Requirements specified in
[NDPP] this ST includes the ASE requirements necessary to evaluate this Security Target as part of a
TOE evaluation.
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3 Security Problem Definition
The security problem to be addressed by the TOE is described by threats and policies that are common
to network devices, as opposed to those that might be targeted at the specific functionality of a specific
type of network device, as specified in [NDPP].
This chapter identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy.
Note that the assumptions, threats, and policies are the same as those found in [NDPP] such that this
TOE serves to address the Security Problem.
3.1 Threats
The following threats are addressed by the TOE, as detailed in table 4 of [NDPP] Annex A.
THREAT DESCRIPTION
T.ADMIN_ERROR An authorized administrator may incorrectly install or
configure the TOE incorrectly, resulting in ineffective
security mechanisms.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a
compromise of the TSF.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take
actions that adversely affect the security of the TOE.
These actions may remain undetected and thus their
effects cannot be effectively mitigated.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data
and TOE executable code. A malicious user, process, or
external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized
entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or
TOE resources. A malicious user, process, or external IT
entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain
identification and authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with
an update to the product that may compromise the
security features of the TOE.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination
not intended by the original sender.
Table 4 - Threats Addressed by the TOE
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an organization
to address its security needs. The TOE is required to meet the following organizational security policies,
as specified in table 5 of [NDPP] Annex A.
POLICY NAME POLICY DESCRIPTION
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing
restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other
appropriate information to which users consent
by accessing the TOE.
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Table 5 - Organizational Security Policies
3.3 Assumptions
This section contains assumptions regarding the security environment and the intended usage of the
TOE, as specified in table 3 of [NDPP] Annex A.
ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than
those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of
the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all admin guidance in a
trusted manner.
Table 6 - Assumptions
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The IT Security Objectives for the TOE are detailed below, as specified in table 6 of [NDPP] Annex A.
OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS The TOE will provide protected communication channels for
administrators, other parts of a distributed TOE, and authorized IT
entities.
O.VERIFIABLE_UPDATES The TOE will provide the capability to help ensure that any
updates to the TOE can be verified by the administrator to be
unaltered and (optionally) from a trusted source.
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING The TOE will provide the capability to generate audit data and
send those data to an external IT entity.
O.DISPLAY_BANNER The TOE will display an advisory warning regarding use of the TOE.
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The TOE will provide mechanisms to ensure that only
administrators are able to log in and configure the TOE, and
provide protections for logged-in administrators.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEARING The TOE will ensure that any data contained in a protected
resource is not available when the resource is reallocated.
O.SESSION_LOCK The TOE shall provide mechanisms that mitigate the risk of
unattended sessions being hijacked.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset of its
security functionality to ensure it is operating properly.
Table 7 – TOE Security Objectives
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The security objectives for the operational environment are detailed below, as specified in table 7 of
[NDPP] Annex A.
OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user
applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all admin guidance in a
trusted manner.
Table 8– Operational Environment Security Objectives
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
As these objectives for the TOE and operational environment are the same as those specified in
[NDPP], the rationales provided in the prose of [NDPP] Section 3 and in the tables in [NDPP] Annex A
are wholly applicable to this security target as the statements of threats, assumptions, OSPs and
security objectives provided in this security target are the same as those defined in the [NDPP].
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5 Security Requirements
This section provides security functional and assurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE.
These requirements consist of components from the CC Part 2 and Part 3, National Information
Assurance Partnership (NIAP) interpreted requirements, and explicit requirements defined in [NDPP].
All extended components are taken from [NDPP] and as such are understood to be defined by [NDPP];
hence no statement of extended components is required in this security target.
5.1 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the security functional requirements (SFRs) for the TOE, organized by CC class as
specified in [NDPP].
Table 8 identifies all the SFR’s implemented by the TOE.
CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
AUDIT
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SERVICES
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4)
Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Explicit SSH Requirements
USER DATA
PROTECTION
FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
IDENTIFICATION & FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
AUTHENTICATION FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
SECURITY
MANAGEMENT
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data)
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
PROTECTION
OF THE TOE
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric
keys)
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CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FTA_EXT_SSL.1 TSF-initiated session locking
TOE FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
ACCESS FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
TRUSTED
PATH/CHANNEL
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1
Trusted path
Table 9– TOE Security Functional Requirements
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5.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
5.1.1.1 Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit;
c) All administrative actions; and
d) [Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 16, Section 7].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event time, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [information specified in
column three of Table 16, Section 7].
5.1.1.2 User identity association – human users (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able
to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the
event.
5.1.1.3 Protected audit trail storage (FAU_STG_EXT.1)
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to [transmit the generated audit data to an external IT
entity] using a trusted channel implementing the [SSH] protocol.
5.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.1.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) (FCS_CKM.1.1)
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key
establishment in accordance with;
[NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for finite field-
based key establishment schemes,]
and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a
symmetric key strength of 112 bits.
5.1.2.2 Cryptographic Key Zeroization (for asymmetric keys) (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 The TSF shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
CSPs when no longer required.
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5.1.2.3 Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption) (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1.1(1) The TSF shall perform [ encryption and decryption ] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES operating in [CBC mode] ] and
cryptographic key sizes 128-bits, 256-bits, and [192 bits] that meets the
following:
• FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”
• [NIST SP 800-38A]
5.1.2.4 Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature) (FCS_COP.1(2))
FCS_COP.1.1(2) The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance with [RSA
Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with a key size (modulus) of 2048 bits or
greater], that meets the following:
• [FIPS PUB 186-2, "Digital Signature Standard "]
5.1.2.5 Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing) (FCS_COP.1(3))
FCS_COP.1.1(3) The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256] and message digest sizes
[160, 256] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-3, “Secure Hash
Standard.”
5.1.2.6 Cryptographic Operation (for key-hash message authentication) (FCS_COP.1(4))
FCS_COP.1.1(4) The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA1, SHA-256], key size [160, 256
bits], and message digest sizes [160, 256] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub
198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS Pub 180-3,
“Secure Hash Standard.”
5.1.2.7 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance
with [NIST Special Publication 800-90 using [HMAC_DRBG (any)]] seeded by an
entropy source that accumulated entropy from [a TSF-hardware-based noise
source].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy
at least equal to the greatest bit length of the keys and authorization factors
that it will generate.
5.1.2.8 Explicit: SSH (FCS_SSH_EXT.1)
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252,
4253, and 4254.
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FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the
following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based,
password-based.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than
[32768] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, [no other algorithms].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses SSH_RSA and
[no other public key algorithms] as its public key algorithm(s).
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport
connection is [hmac-sha1].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 is the only allowed key
exchange method used for the SSH protocol.
5.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.1.3.1 Full residual information protection (FDP_RIP.2)
FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the [deallocation of the resource from] all objects.
5.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.1.4.1 Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT.1)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower
case letters, numbers, and the following special characters [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”,
“^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”];
2. Minimum password length shall be settable by the Authorized4
Administrator, and
support passwords of 15 characters or greater;
5.1.4.2 User Identification and Authentication (FIA_UIA_EXT.1)
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity
to initiate the identification and authentication process:
• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
• [[ping, arp services]].
4
This is identified as a refinement as the PP uses the term “Security Administrator” in this instance, but defines the role
“Authorized Administrator” in FMT_SMR.1 (see section 5.1.5.3). Therefore, the ST has adopted and applied the term
“Authorized Administrator” for consistency reasons.
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FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified
and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on
behalf of that administrative user.
5.1.4.3 Extended: Password-based Authentication mechanism (FIA_UAU_EXT.2)
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism,
[public key-based authentication] to perform administrative user
authentication.
5.1.4.4 Protected Authentication Feedback (FIA_UAU.7)
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while
the authentication is in progress at the local console.
5.1.5 Security Management (FMT)
5.1.5.1 Management of TSF data (For General TSF data) (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to the Authorized4
Administrators.
5.1.5.2 Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature]
capability prior to installing those updates;
• [No other capabilities].
5.1.5.3 Restrictions on security roles (FMT_SMR.2)
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Authorized Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
• Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
• Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE
remotely;
are satisfied.
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5.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.6.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys) (FPT_SKP_EXT.1)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and
private keys.
5.1.6.2 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords (FPT_APW_EXT.1)
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
5.1.6.3 Reliable time stamps (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
5.1.6.4 Extended: Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized4
administrators the ability to query the
current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized4
administrators the ability to initiate
updates to TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the
TOE using a [digital signature mechanism] prior to installing those updates.
5.1.6.5 Extended: TSF Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
5.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)
5.1.7.1 TSF-initiated session locking (local sessions) (FTA_SSL_EXT.1)
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after an
Authorized4
Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
5.1.7.2 TSF-initiated termination (remote sessions) (FTA_SSL.3)
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a [after
anAuthorized4
Administrator-specified time period of inactivity].
5.1.7.3 User-initiated termination (FTA_SSL_EXT.4)
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s
own interactive session.
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5.1.7.4 Default TOE access banners (FTA_TAB.1)
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display an
Authorized4
Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning
message regarding use of the TOE.
5.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.1.8.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (prevention of disclosure) (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall use [SSH] to provide a trusted communication channel between
itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit
server, [[no other capabilities]] that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of
modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [export of
audit logs to syslog servers].
5.1.8.2 Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1 )
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall use [SSH] to provide a trusted communication path between itself
and remote administrators that is logically distinct from other communication
paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of
the communicated data from disclosure and detection of modification of the
communicated data.
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via the
trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator
authentication and all remote administration actions.
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5.2 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE, which are summarized in Table 10 below.
The security assurance requirements included in this Security Target include all those specified in
[NDPP] for which conformance is claimed. In addition, Table 10 details the ASE Security Assurance
Requirements to be applied for the evaluation of this ST, in the context of a TOE evaluation.
ASSURANCE CLASS COMPONENTS DESCRIPTION
ASE: Security Target
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance Documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative User Guidance
ALC: Lifecycle Support
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing - Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Analysis
Table 10 – Security Assurance Requirements
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5.3 Security Requirements Rationale
5.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The rationale of how the security functional requirements meet all objectives for the TOE is provided in
the prose of [NDPP] Section 3. As all objectives and all SFRs in this Security Target are the same as
those specified in [NDPP] the rationale provided in [NDPP] Section 3 is wholly applicable to this security
target.
All dependencies of security functional requirements are satisfied as demonstrated in below.
SFR Dependency Satisfaction of dependency
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data
generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1 dependency satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1which
authenticates administrator identity prior to interaction
with TSF.
FAU_STG_EXT.1
Assumed to be:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data
generation
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel
FAU_GEN.1, FTP_ITC.1
FCS_CKM.1
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_COP.1 (1-4)
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
Assumed to be:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FDP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1(1)
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by FCS_CKM_EXT.4
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SFR Dependency Satisfaction of dependency
FCS_COP.1(2)
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_COP.1(3)
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_COP.1(4)
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Assumed to be: None n/a
FCS_SSH_EXT.1
Assumed to be:
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1(1-4)
FDP_RIP.2 None n/a
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
Assumed to be:
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based
authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Assumed to be: None n/a
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
Assumed to be:
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password
management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
FIA_UAU.7
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 which authenticates administrator
identity prior to interaction with TSF.
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 None n/a
FMT_SMR.2
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 which authenticates administrator
identity prior to interaction with TSF.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Assumed to be: None n/a
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SFR Dependency Satisfaction of dependency
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 Assumed to be: None n/a
FPT_STM.1 None n/a
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Assumed to be: None n/a
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Assumed to be: None n/a
FTA_EXT_SSL.1 Assumed to be:
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User
identification and
authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
FTA_SSL.3 None n/a
FTA_SSL.4 None n/a
FTA_TAB.1 None n/a
FTP_ITC.1 None n/a
FTP_TRP.1 None n/a
Table 11– Satisfaction of dependencies
5.3.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The rationale provided in [NDPP] Section 4.3 for the selection of security assurance requirements is
wholly applicable to this security target, as the security assurance requirements specified in this
security target are the same as those specified in [NDPP].
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This section provides summary information on how the security requirements are met. The objective is
to give a high-level view of the security requirements are satisfied by the TOE; therefore, the
descriptions are not overly detailed.
6.1 Security Audit
JUNOS creates and stores audit records for the following events (the detail of content recorded for
each audit event is detailed in Table 16):
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit function;
b) Configuration is committed;
c) Configuration is changed;
d) All use of the identification and authentication mechanisms;
e) Service requests;
f) Failure to establish an SSH session establishment/termination of an SSH session;
g) Changes to the time;
h) Initiation of update;
i) Indication that TSF self-test was completed;
j) Termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism;
k) Termination of an interactive session;
l) Initiation/termination/failure of the trusted channel functions.
Auditing is done using syslog. Syslog can be configured to store the audit logs locally, and optionally to
send them to one or more syslog log servers (via Netconf over SSH5
). Local audit log are stored in
/var/log/. Only an authorized administrator can read log files, or delete log and archive files. The syslog
files are automatically deleted locally according to configurable limits on storage volume.
The TOE defines an active log file and a number of “archive” files (10 by default, but configurable from
1 to 1000). When the active log file reaches its maximum size, the logging utility closes the file,
compresses it, and names the compressed archive file ‘logfile.0.gz’. The logging utility then opens and
writes to a new active log file. When the new active log file reaches the configured maximum size,
‘logfile.0.gz’ is renamed ‘logfile.1.gz’, and the active log file is closed, compressed, and renamed
‘logfile.0.gz’ (see Junos OS System Basics Configuration Guide [SB] Chapter 9, Subsection ‘Specifying Log
File Size, Number, and Archiving Properties’). When the maximum number of archive files is reached
and when the size of the active file reaches the configured maximum size, the contents of the oldest
archived file are deleted so the current active file can be archived. For further details see Junos OS
System Basics Configuration Guide [SB] Chapter 13, Subsection “archive (All System Log Files)”.
The maximum value that can be specified for the size of a log file is 1GB. However, the default
maximum size depends on the platform type:
• 1 megabyte (MB) for M Series, MX Series, and T Series routers
• 128KB for the EX Series switches
These defaults maximum sizes can be modified by the user, as detailed in Junos OS System Basics
Configuration Guide [SB] Chapter 9, Subsection ‘Specifying Log File Size, Number, and Archiving
Properties’.
5
In accordance with RFC 4741.
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For more information about configuring event logging, see the Junos OS System Basics Configuration
Guide [SB] and the Junos OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX Series, M Series,
MX Series, and T series Devices 12.1R3.6 [ECG].
The Audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FAU_GEN.1
• FAU_GEN.2
• FAU_STG_EXT.1
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6.2 Cryptographic Support
All FIPS-approved cryptographic functions implemented by the secure network appliance are
implemented in the Junos-FIPS cryptomodule. The TOE evaluation provides a CAVS validation
certificate for all FIPS-approved cryptographic functions implemented by the TOE. CAVS certificate
details are provided in Table 12 - CAVS Certificate Results, below
Implementation Algorithm Cert Number Cert Number
M,T,Mx EX
RNG N/A 1118 1120
MD SHA 1921 1925
HMAC 1361 1366
Kernel AES 2232 2236
SHA 1920 1924
HMAC 1360 1365
OpenSSL AES 2233 2237
RSA 1144 1146
ECDSA 346 348
SHA 1922 1926
HMAC 1362 1367
Table 12 - CAVS Certificate Results
The TOE meets the cryptographic requirements either by allowing the administrator to enable the FIPS
operating mode or by running a FIPS image (per platform guidance). The evaluated configuration of
the TOE requires the use of this FIPS operating mode. The Cryptographic security function is described
in the context of how it satisfies the cryptographic security requirements.
The FIPS-approved cryptomodule implements RSA Digital Signature Standard using a base point of
2048-bits or greater (as specified by the cryptographic administrator) for digital signature generation
and verification.
The TOE implements a timeout period for authentication for the SSHv2 protocol and provides a limit of
three failed authentication attempts. The TOE uses public key-based authentication methods and
password-based authentication for SSHv2.
Packets greater than 32768 bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped and the connection is
terminated by the TOE.
The TOE supports AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 encryption algorithms for SSH transport and uses
"SSH-RSA" as its public key algorithm.
The data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport connection is”hmac-sha1", as required by
[RFC4253].
Key exchange is done using "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" [RFC4253].
The TOE supports cryptographic hashing via the SHA-1 and SHA-256 algorithms, provided it has a
message digest size of either 160 or 256 bits.
The TOE handles zeroization for all CSP, plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys according to
Table 13– Key zeroization handling below. Zeroization is performed when then memory is called back
for subsequent use, and is zeroized before it is re-used.
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The TOE performs random number generation in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90 using
HMAC_DRBG, SHA-256
CSP Description
How
Stored
Where
Stored
Zeroization Method
SSH Private
Host Key
The first time SSH is
configured, the key is
generated. Used to identify
the host.
Plaintext Disk Overwritten three times, first with the
byte pattern 0xff, then 0x00, and then
0xff again, before they are deleted
SSH Session
Key
Session keys used with SSH,
AES 128, 256, HMAC-SHA-1
key (160), DH Private Key
1024
Plaintext Memory Scrubbed in memory using OpenSSL
scrubbing method, overwriting the buffer
with random data
User
Password
Plaintext value as entered by
user
Hashed Memory Overwritten with zero’s
RNG State Internal state and seed key
of RNG
Plaintext Memory Handled by kernel, overwritten with zero’s
Table 13– Key zeroization handling
The Cryptographic support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
• FCS_CKM.1
• FCS_CKM_EXT.4
• FCS_COP.1(1)
• FCS_COP.1(2)
• FCS_COP.1(3)
• FCS_COP.1(4)
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1
• FCS_SSH_EXT.1
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6.3 User Data Protection
The only resource made available to information flowing through a TOE is the temporary storage of
packet information when access is requested and when information is being routed. User data is not
persistent when resources are released by one user/process and allocated to another user/process.
Temporary storage (memory) used to build network packets is erased when the resource is called into
use by the next user/process. Junos knows, and keeps track of, the length of the packet. This means
that when memory allocated from a previous user/process arrives to build the next network packet,
Junos OS is aware of when the end of the packet is reached and pads a short packet with zeros
accordingly. Therefore, no residual information from packets in a previous information stream can
traverse through the TOE.
The User Data Protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FDP_RIP.2
6.4 Identification and Authentication
The TSF enforces binding between human users and subjects. The Authorized Administrator is
responsible for provisioning user accounts, and only the Authorized Administrator can do so. User
accounts in the TOE have the following attributes: user identity (user name), authentication data
(password) and role (privilege). The Authorized Administrator is associated with a defined login class,
which is assigned “permissions all”. Locally stored authentication data for fixed password
authentication is a case-sensitive, alphanumeric value. The password has a minimum length of 156
characters with at least two changes of character set (upper, lower, numeric, punctuation), and can be
up to 20 ASCII characters in length (control characters are not recommended).Authentication data for
public key-based authentication methods are stored in a directory owned by the user (and typically
with the same name as the user). This directory contains the files '.ssh/authorized_keys' and
'.ssh/authorized_keys2' which are used for SSH public key authentication.
The internal architecture supporting Authentication includes an active process, associated linked
libraries and supporting configuration data. The Authentication process and library are
• login()
• PAM Library module
Following TOE initialization, a ‘login’ process is listening for a connection at the local console. This
‘login’ process can be accessed through either direct connection to the local console or following
successful establishment of a remote management connection over SSH (as detailed in Section 6.8),
when a login prompt is displayed.
This login process identifies and authenticates the user using PAM operations. The login process does
two things; it first establishes that the requesting user is whom they claim to be and second provides
them with an interactive Junos Command interactive command line interface (CLI).
The SSH daemon supports public key authentication by looking up a public key in an authorized keys
file located in the directory '.ssh' in the user's home directory (i.e. '~/.ssh/') and this authentication
6
By default the minimum password length is 10, but this should be set to minimum length of 15 in the evaluated configuration
using the command:set system login password minimum-length 15
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method will be attempted before any other if the client has a key available. The SSH daemon will
ignore the authorized keys file if it or the directory '.ssh' or the user's home directory are not owned by
the user or are writeable by anyone else.
For password authentication, login() interacts with a user to request a username and password to
establish and verify the user’s identity. The username entered by the administrator at the username
prompt is reflected to the screen, but no feedback to screen is provided while the entry made by the
administrator at the password prompt until the Enter key is pressed. Login uses PAM Library calls for
the actual verification of this data. PAM is used in the TOE support authentication management,
account management, session management and password management. Login primarily uses the
session management and password management functionality offered by PAM.
Following authentication, login launches the CLI using an exec()7
system call. Such an invocation, results
in the main() function for the CLI to be invoked.
The TOE requires users to provide unique identification and authentication data (passwords/public key)
before any access to the system is granted. A password is configured for each user allowed to log into
the secure router. The TOE successfully authenticates if the authentication data provided matches that
stored in conjunction with the provided identity.
The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
• FIA_PMG_EXT.1
• FIA_UIA_EXT.1
• FIA_UAU_EXT.2
• FIA_UAU.7
6.5 Security Management
There is only one user role defined for the TOE: Authorized Administrator. The Authorized
Administrator is responsible for provisioning user accounts. User accounts in the TOE have the
following attributes: user identity (user name), authentication data (password/public key) and role
(privilege). Locally stored authentication data for fixed password authentication is a case-sensitive,
alphanumeric value. Public keys are stored in '.ssh' files in the user's home directory (i.e. '~/.ssh/').
The TOE provides user access either through the system console or remotely over the Trusted Path
using the SSHv2 protocol. Users are required to provide unique identification and authentication data
(passwords/public key) before any access to the system is granted. A password is configured for each
user allowed to log into the secure router. Password information is stored as hashed data (using hmac-
sha1) in the authentication database and public keys are stored in plaintext in '.ssh' files in the user's
home directory (i.e. '~/.ssh/'). Only the authentication subsystem has the capability to decrypt the
password. The TOE successfully authenticates if the authentication data provided matches that stored
in conjunction with the provided identity.
The Authorized Administrator has the capability to:
• Modify cryptographic security data (import of certificates for the establishment of SSH
sessions) and date/time
7
Any of the exec family of system calls may be used.
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• Restrict the service available to unidentified or unauthenticated IT entities
• Restrict TOE (release) updates8
Detailed topics on the secure management of Juniper's routers & switches are discussed in the Junos
OS System Basics Configuration Guide [SB] and the Junos OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration
Guide for EX Series, M Series, MX Series, and T series Devices OS 12.1R3.6 [ECG].
The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
• FMT_MTD.1
• FMT_SMF.1
• FMT_SMR.2
6.6 Protection of the TSF
The clock function of the TOE provides a source of date and time information for the appliance, used in
audit timestamps. The clock function is reliant on the system clock provided by the underlying
hardware. In addition, for each user session the TOE maintains a count of clock cycles (provided by the
system clock) since last activity. The count is reset each time there is activity related to the user
session. When the counter reaches the number of clock cycles equating to the configured period of
inactivity the user session is locked out.
Authorized administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software. Junos
does not provide partial updates for the TOE, customers requiring updates must migrate to a
subsequent release.
The kernel maintains a set of fingerprints (SHA1 digests) for executable files and other files which
should be immutable. No executable can be run or shared object loaded unless the fingerprint is
correct. The fingerprints are loaded as the filesystems are mounted, from digitally signed manifests.
The manifest file is signed using the Juniper engineering private key, and is verified by the TOE using
the Juniper engineering public key (stored on the TOE filesystem in clear, protected by filesystem
access rights).
The fingerprint loader will only process a manifest for which it can verify the signature. Thus without a
valid digital signature an executable cannot be run. When the command is issued to install an update
(e.g. request system software addjinstall), the manifest file for the update is verified and stored, and each
executable/immutable file is verified before it is executed. If any of the fingerprints in an update are
not correctly verified, the TOE rolls back to the last known verified image.
The TOE will run the following set of self tests during power on to check the correct operation of the
TOE:
• Power on test – determines the boot-device responds, and performs a memory size check to
confirm the amount of available memory.
• File integrity test –verifies integrity of all mounted signed packages, to assert that system files
have not been tampered with.
• Crypto integrity test – checks integrity of major CSPs, such as SSH hostkeys and iked
credentials, such as CAs, CERTS, and various keys.
8
Patch updates are not included in the scope of the evaluation, only complete release updates are supported.
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• Authentication error – verifies that veriexec is enabled and operates as expected using
/opt/sbin/kats/cannot-exec.real.
The power on self-tests may produce some or all of the output shown in Figure 1 - FIPs Self-Test
Example, below.
Figure 1 - FIPs Self-Test Example
Junos OS is designed to fail securely. In the event of a transiently corrupt state or failure condition, the
system will report an error; the event will be logged and the system restarted, having ceased to process
network traffic. When the system restarts, the system boot process does not succeed without passing
all self-tests for cryptographic algorithms, RNG tests, and software integrity tests. This automatic
recovery and self-test behavior, is discussed in Chapter 7 of the Junos OS Evaluated Configuration Guide
for EX Series, M Series, MX Series, and T series Devices OS 12.1R3.6 [ECG].
The TOE does not provide a CLI interface to permit the viewing of keys. Cryptographic keys are
protected through the enforcement of kernel-level file access rights, limiting access to the contents of
cryptographic key containers to processes with cryptographic rights.
The Protection of the TSF function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FPT_SKP_EXT.1
• FPT_APW_EXT.1
• FPT_STM.1
• FPT_TUD_(EXT).1
• FPT_TST_EXT.1
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6.7 TOE Access
Junos enables Authorized Administrators to configure an access banner provided with the authentication prompt.
The banner can provide warnings against unauthorized access to the secure router as well as any other
information that the Authorized Administrator wishes to communicate.
User sessions can be locked or terminated by users. The Authorized Administrator can set the TOE so
that a user session is terminated after a period of inactivity.
The TSF overwrites the display device and makes the current contents unreadable after the local
interactive session is terminated due to inactivity, thus disabling any further interaction with the TOE.
This mechanism is the inactivity timer for administrative sessions. The Authorized Administrator can
configure this inactivity timer on administrative sessions after which the session will be logged out.
The local administrative user can logout of existing session by typing logout to exit the CLI admin
session and the TSF makes the current contents unreadable after the admin initiates the locking and no
user activity can take place until the user re-identifies and authenticates.
The TOE Access function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
• FTA_SSL.3
• FTA_SSL.4
• FTA_TAB.1
6.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports and enforces Trusted Channels that protect the communications between the TOE
and a remote audit server from unauthorized disclosure or modification. It also supports Trusted Paths
between itself and remote administrators so that the contents of administrative sessions are protected
against unauthorized disclosure or modification.
The TOE achieves Trusted Paths by use of the SSHv2 protocol which ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of user sessions. The encrypted communication path between the TSF and a remote
administrator is provided by the use of an SSH session. Remote administrators of the TSF initiate
communication with the TSF through the SSH tunnel created by the SSH session. Assured identification
is guaranteed by using public key certificate based authentication for SSH. The SSHv2 protocol ensures
that the data transmitted over a SSH session cannot be disclosed or altered by using the encryption and
integrity mechanisms of the protocol with the FIPS cryptographic module.
The Trusted Path/Channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
• FTP_ITC.1
• FPT_TRP.1
6.9 RFC Conformance Statements
This section identifies, for the critical RFCs applied in the implementation of SSH, the options supported
by the TOE.
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RFC RFC synopsis TOE Handling of Security-Related Protocol Options
RFC
4251
The Secure Shell
(SSH) Protocol
Architecture
Host Keys: The TOE has one RSA, one DSA, and one ECDSA Host Key for SSH v2,
which are generated on initial setup of the TOE. Any of them can be deconfigured
via the CLI and the relevant key will be deleted and thus unavailable during
connection establishment. These keys are randomly generated to be unique to
each TOE instance. The TOE presents the client with its public key and the client
matches this key against its known_hosts list of keys. When a client connects to
the TOE, the client will be able to determine if the same host key was used in
previous connections, or if the key is different (per the SSHv2 protocol).
Policy Issues: The TOE implements all mandatory algorithms and methods. The
TOE can be configured to accept public-key based authentication and/or
password-based authentication. The TOE does not require multiple authentication
mechanisms for users. The TOE allows port forwarding and sessions to clients. The
TOE has no X11 libraries or applications and X11 forwarding is prohibited.
Confidentiality: The TOE does not accept the “none” cipher. For ciphers whose
blocksize>= 16, the TOE rekeys every 2^32 blocks have been sent/received. For
other ciphers, the TOE rekeys connections, after 2^27 blocks have been
sent/received. (Rekeying can also be triggered by sending 2^31 + 1 packets, rather
than blocks.) The client may explicitly request a rekeying event as a valid
SSHv2message at any time and the TOE will honor this request.
Denial of Service: When the SSH connection is brought down, the TOE does not
attempt to re-establish it. The TOE can be configured with ACLs to control the
clients that are able to connect to it via SSH.
Ordering of Key Exchange Methods: The TOE orders key exchange algorithms as
follows: ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-
hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, diffie-
hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group1-sha1.
Debug Messages: The TOE sshd server does not support debug messages via the
CLI.
End Point Security: The TOE permits port forwarding.
Proxy Forwarding: The TOE permits proxy forwarding.
X11 Forwarding: The TOE does not support X11 forwarding.
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RFC RFC synopsis TOE Handling of Security-Related Protocol Options
RFC
4252
The Secure Shell
(SSH)
Authentication
Protocol
Authentication Protocol: The TOE does not accept the “none” authentication
method. The TOE disconnects a client after 30 seconds if authentication has not
been completed. The TOE also allows authentication retries of three times before
sending a disconnect to the client.
Authentication Requests: The TOE does not accept authentication if the
requested service does not exist. The TOE does not allow authentication requests
for a non-existent username to succeed – it sends back a disconnect as it would
for failed authentications and hence does not allow enumeration of valid
usernames. The TOE denies “none” authentication method and replies with a list
of permitted authentication methods.
Public Key Authentication Method: The TOE supports public key authentication.
Authentication succeeds if the correct private key is used. The TOE does not
require multiple authentications (public key and password) for users.
Password Authentication Method: The TOE supports password authentication.
Expired passwords are not supported and cannot be used for authentication.
Host-Based Authentication: The TOE does not support the configuration of host-
based authentication methods.
RFC
4253
The Secure Shell
(SSH) Transport
Layer Protocol
Encryption: The TOE offers the following for encryption of SSH sessions: aes128-
ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc, and 3des-cbc
9
. The
TOE permits negotiation of encryption algorithms in each direction. The TOE does
not allow the “none” algorithm for encryption.
Data Integrity: The TOE permits negotiation of MAC algorithms in each direction.
Key Re-Exchange: The TOE performs a re-exchange when SSH_MSG_KEXINIT is
received.
RFC
4254
Secure Shell (SSH)
Connection Protocol
Multiple channels: The TOE assigns each channel a number (as detailed in RFC
4251, see above).
Data transfers: The TOE supports a maximum window size of 32768 bytes for data
transfer.
Interactive sessions: The TOE only supports interactive sessions that do NOT
involve X11 forwarding.
Forwarded X11 connections: This is not supported in the TOE.
Environment variable passing: The TOE only sets variables once the server
process has dropped privileges.
Starting shells/commands: The TOE supports starting one of shell, application
program or command (only one request per channel). These will be run in the
context of a channel, and will not halt the execution of the protocol stack.
Window dimension change notices: The TOE will accept notifications of changes
to the terminal size (dimensions) from the client.
Port forwarding: This is fully supported by the TOE.
Table 14 – RFC Conformance Statements
9
Others are supported by default, but these are the encryption algorithms the Secure Configuration Guide specifies are to be
configured in the evaluated configuration.
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The RFC conformance statements support the satisfaction of FCS_SSH_EXT.1.
6.10 800-56 Conformance Statements
The following sections detail all sections of the 800-56A standard the TOE complies with for generation
of asymmetric cryptographic keys (as claimed in FCS_CKM.1). The relevant sections of 800-56A are
section 5.5 “Domain Parameters” and section 5.6 “Private and Public Keys”.
All “SHALL” statements within the listed sections are implemented in the TOE and all “SHALL NOT”
statements are adhered to within the TOE and the described functionality/behavior is not present. The
implemented option associated with each “SHOULD” and “SHOULD NOT” statement in a referenced
section is detailed.
There are no TOE specific extensions relating to cryptographic key generation that are not included in
this standard.
6.10.1 Finite Field-Based Key Establishment Schemes
The requirements for Finite Field-Based Key Establishment Schemes are specified in 800-56A:
800-56A section 800-56A sub section Compliance
5.5 Domain Parameters General Comply with all “shall”
statements.
5.5.1 Domain Parameter
Generation
5.5.1.1 FFC Domain Parameter
Generation
Comply with all “shall”
statements.
The FFC parameter is set and
so ECC is not used
5.5.1.2 ECC Domain Parameter
Generation
n/a – Elliptic Curve
Cryptography is not used.
5.6 Private and Public Keys General No statements
5.6.1 Private/Public Key Pair
Generation
5.6.1.1 FFC Key Pair Generation Comply with all “shall”
statements. Only static public
keys used.
5.6.1.2 ECC Key Pair Generation n/a – Elliptic Curve
Cryptography is not used.
5.6.2 Assurances of the
Arithmetic Validity of a Public
Key
General Comply with all “shall”
statements.
The TOE will determine and
explicitly reflect whether or
not key establishment is
allowed based upon the
method(s) of assurance that
was used.
5.6.2.1 Owner Assurances of
Static Public Key Validity
Owner Full Validation - The
owner performs a successful
full public key validation, via
pair-wise consistency check
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800-56A section 800-56A sub section Compliance
5.6.2.2 Recipient Assurances of
Static Public Key Validity
TTP Generation – The recipient
receives assurance that a
trusted third party (trusted by
the recipient) has generated
the public/private key pair in
accordance with Section 5.6.1
and has provided the key pair
to the owner.
5.6.2.3 Recipient Assurances of
Ephemeral Public Key Validity
Recipient Full Validation - The
recipient performs a successful
full public key Validation.
5.6.2.4 FFC Full Public Key
Validation Routine
Comply with “shall” statement.
5.6.2.5 ECC Full Public Key
Validation Routine
n/a – Elliptic Curve not used.
5.6.2.6 ECC Partial Public Key
Validation Routine
n/a – Elliptic Curve not used.
5.6.3 Assurances of the
Possession of a Static Private
Key
General Comply with “shall” statement.
5.6.3.1 Owner Assurances of
Possession of a Static Private
Key
Owner Receives Assurance via
Key Generation - The act of
generating a key pair.
5.6.3.2 Recipient Assurance of
Owner’s Possession of a Static
Private Key
General Comply with all “shall”
statements.
5.6.3.2.1 Recipient Obtains
Assurance through a Trusted
Third Party
The TOE will be made aware of
the method(s) used by the
third party.
5.6.3.2.2 Recipient Obtains
Assurance Directly from the
Claimed Owner
The underlying key agreement
used by the TOE is “dhOneFlow or
(Cofactor) One-Pass Diffie-
Hellman”.
Comply with all “shall”
statements.
5.6.4 Key Pair Management 5.6.4.1 Common Requirements
on Static and Ephemeral Key
Pairs
Comply with all “shall”
statements and the “shall not”
statement.
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800-56A section 800-56A sub section Compliance
5.6.4.2 Specific Requirements
on Static Key Pairs
Comply with all “shall”
statements and the “shall not”
statement.
In item #3 – The TOE will
determine whether or not key
establishment is allowed based
upon the method(s) of
assurance that was used.
5.6.4.3 Specific Requirements
on Ephemeral Key Pairs
Comply with all “shall”
statements.
In item #2 – The TOE will
generate an ephemeral key
pair just before the ephemeral
public key is transmitted.
In item #3 – The TOE will
determine whether or not to
key establishment is allowed
based upon the method(s) of
assurance that was used.
Table 15 – 800-56A Conformance Statements
6.10.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography-Based Schemes (ECC Scheme)
Elliptic curve is not implemented in the TOE.
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7 Audit Events
The table below maps security requirements to auditable events and audit record contents, in support
of FAU_GEN.1.1.
REQUIREMENT AUDITABLE EVENTS AUDIT RECORD CONTENTS
FAU_GEN.1 None
FAU_GEN.2 None
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None
FCS_CKM.1 None
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 None
FCS_COP.1(1) None
FCS_COP.1(2) None
FCS_COP.1(3) None
FCS_COP.1(4) None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1
Failure to establish an SSH session
Establishment/Termination of an SSH
session
Reason for failure
Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP
address) for both successes and failures.
FDP_RIP.2 None.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of the authentication mechanism. Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7 None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Provided user identity, origin of the
attempt (e.g., IP address).
FMT_MTD.1 None.
FMT_SMF.1 None.
FMT_SMR.2 None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None.
FPT_STM.1 Changes to the time.
The old and new values for the time.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update. No additional information.
FPT_TST_EXT.1
None.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
Any attempts at unlocking of an interactive
session.
No additional information.
FTA_SSL.3
The termination of a remote session by the
session locking mechanism.
No additional information.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive session. No additional information.
FTA_TAB.1 None.
FTP_ITC.1
Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Failure of the trusted channel functions.
Identification of the initiator and target of
failed trusted channels establishment
attempt.
FTP_TRP.1
Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Failures of the trusted path functions.
Identification of the claimed user identity.
Table 16 - Security Audit Requirements
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8 Appendices
This section contains the appendices that accompany the Security Target and provide clarity and/or
explanation for the reader.
8.1 References
[AES] The AES Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec <draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-cbc.03.txt>,
Internet draft, November 2001.
[CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-001.
[CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-002.
[CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-003.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-004.
[FIPS140] Federal Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS-PUB) 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001. (Change notice (12-03-2002))
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS-PUB) 197, Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), November 2001.
[NDPP] Security Requirements for Network Devices, Version 1.1, 08 June 2012
[RFC2451] Internet Engineering Task Force, ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms, RFC 2451, November
1998.
[RFC2409] Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet Key Exchange (IKE), RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC2406] Internet Engineering Task Force, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 2406,
November 1998.
[RFC2404] Internet Engineering Task Force, Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH, RFC 2404,
November 1998.
[SB] Junos OS System Basics Configuration Guide, Release 12.1, Published 2012-05-08
[ECG] Junos OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX Series, M Series, MX
Series, and T series Devices Junos OS 12.1R3.6.
8.2 Glossary
Access – Interaction between an entity and an object that results in the flow or modification of data.
Access Control – Security service that controls the use of resources and the disclosure and modification
of data.
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Accountability – Property that allows activities in an IT system to be traced to the entity responsible for
the activity.
Active – (scanning capability) – to gain understanding of the IT environment through means that
illuminate the environment being scanned.
Administrator – A user who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or the
entire TOE and whose actions may affect the TSP. Administrators may possess special privileges that
provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP.
Assurance – A measure of confidence that the security features of an IT system are sufficient to enforce
it’s’ security policy.
Asymmetric Cryptographic System – A system involving two related transformations; one determined
by a public key (the public transformation), and another determined by a private key (the private
transformation) with the property that it is computationally infeasible to determine the private
transformation (or the private key) from knowledge of the public transformation (and the public key).
Asymmetric Key – The corresponding public/private key pair needed to determine the behavior of the
public/private transformations that comprise an asymmetric cryptographic system
Attack – An intentional act attempting to violate the security policy of an IT system.
Authentication – Security measure that verifies a claimed identity.
Authentication data – Information used to verify a claimed identity.
Authorization – Permission, granted by an entity authorized to do so, to perform functions and access
data.
Authorized user – An authenticated user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Availability – Timely, reliable access to IT resources.
Component – A single scanning capability, sensing capability or analyzing capability, operating within
the TOE configuration
Compromise – Violation of a security policy.
Confidentiality – A security policy pertaining to disclosure of data.
Critical Security Parameters (CSP) – Security-related information (e.g., cryptographic keys,
authentication data such as passwords and pins, and cryptographic seeds) appearing in plaintext or
otherwise unprotected form and whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a
cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module.
Cryptographic boundary – An explicitly defined contiguous perimeter that establishes the physical
bounds (for hardware) or logical bounds (for software) of a cryptographic module.
Cryptographic key (key) – A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that
determines:
• the transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data,
• the transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data,
• a digital signature computed from data,
• the verification of a digital signature computed from data, or
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• a digital authentication code computed from data.
Cryptographic Module – The set of hardware, software, firmware, or some combination thereof that
implements cryptographic logic or processes, including cryptographic algorithms, and is contained
within the cryptographic boundary of the module.
Cryptographic Module Security Policy – A precise specification of the security rules under which a
cryptographic module must operate, including the rules derived from the requirements of this PP and
additional rules imposed by the vendor.
Defense-in-Depth (DID) – A security design strategy whereby layers of protection are utilized to
establish an adequate security posture for an IT system.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) – A means of restricting access to objects based on the identity of
subjects and/or groups to which they belong. Those controls are discretionary in the sense that a
subject with certain access permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to
any other subject.
Embedded Cryptographic Module – On that is built as an integral part of a larger and more general
surrounding system (i.e., one that is not easily removable from the surrounding system).
Enclave – A collection of entities under the control of a single authority and having a homogeneous
security policy. They may be logical, or may be based on physical location and proximity.
Entity – A subject, object, user or another IT device, which interacts with TOE objects, data, or
resources.
External IT entity – Any trusted Information Technology (IT) product or system, outside of the TOE,
which may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Identity – A representation (e.g., a string) uniquely identifying an authorized user, which can either be
the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym.
Integrity – A security policy pertaining to the corruption of data and TSF mechanisms.
Integrity level – The combination of a hierarchical level and an optional set of non-hierarchical
categories that represent the integrity of data.
Intrusion – Any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability of
a resource.
Intrusion Detection – Pertaining to techniques which attempt to detect intrusion into an IT System by
observation of actions, security logs, or audit data. Detection of break-ins or attempts either manually
or via software expert systems that operate on logs or other information available on the network.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) – A combination of one or more sensing capabilities, and one or more
analyzing capabilities and an optional but recommended scanning capability that monitor an IT System
for activity that may inappropriately affect the IT System's assets and react appropriately.
Intrusion Detection System Analyzing Capability – The components of an IDS that accepts data from
sensing capabilities and scanning capabilities and other IT System resources, and then applies analytical
processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions (past, present, or future).
Intrusion Detection System Data (IDS data) – Data collected and produced by the IDS functions. This
could include digital signatures, policies, permissions, and IDS audit data.
Intrusion Detection System Sensing Capability – The component of an IDS that collects real-time events
that may be indicative of vulnerabilities in or misuse of IT resources.
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Jade – A daemon used for the authentication of JUNOScript connections.
JUNOScope – A management framework that consists of tools for managing IP services for the M-Series
Multiservice Edge Routers, MX-Series 3D Universal Edge Routers, T-Series Core Routers and EX-Series
Ethernet Switches. Use of JUNOScope is not supported in the evaluated configuration.
JUNOScript – An XML-based API for managing devices, developed by Juniper Networks. Use of
JUNOScript is not supported in the evaluated configuration.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) – A means of restricting access to objects based on subject and object
sensitivity labels.
Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC) – A means of restricting access to objects based on subject and
object integrity labels.
Multilevel – The ability to simultaneously handle (e.g., share, process) multiple levels of data, while
allowing users at different sensitivity levels to access the system concurrently. The system permits each
user to access only the data to which they are authorized access.
Named Object – An object that exhibits all of the following characteristics:
The object may be used to transfer information between subjects of differing user identities within the
TSF.
Subjects in the TOE must be able to require a specific instance of the object.
The name used to refer to a specific instance of the object must exist in a context that potentially
allows subjects with different user identities to require the same instance of the object.
Non-Repudiation – A security policy pertaining to providing one or more of the following:
• To the sender of data, proof of delivery to the intended recipient,
• To the recipient of data, proof of the identity of the user who sent the data.
Object – An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects
perform operations.
Operating Environment – The total environment in which a TOE operates. It includes the physical
facility and any physical, procedural, administrative and personnel controls.
Operating System (OS) – An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed. Subjects can
come in two forms: trusted and untrusted. Trusted subjects are exempt from part or all of the TOE
security policies. Untrusted subjects are bound by all TOE security policies.
Operational key – Key intended for protection of operational information or for the production or
secure electrical transmissions of key streams
Passive – (sensing capability) – To gain understanding of the IT environment through means that do not
effect or impact the environment being sensed.
Peer TOEs – Mutually authenticated TOEs that interact to enforce a common security policy.
Public Object – An object for which the TSF unconditionally permits all entities “read” access. Only the
TSF or authorized administrators may create, delete, or modify the public objects.
Release Train -- The technique of planning software releases on regular or cyclic time period, for
example, the last day of every quarter, or every 9 weeks, etc. The "train" metaphor of a release train is
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likely based on the concept of railroad train schedules (planned arrival and departure times) and that
trains carry multiple types of rolling stock (different types of features are included in a release).
Robustness – A characterization of the strength of a security function, mechanism, service or solution,
and the assurance (or confidence) that it is implemented and functioning correctly. DoD has three
levels of robustness:
• Basic: Security services and mechanisms that equate to good commercial practices.
• Medium: Security services and mechanisms that provide for layering of additional safeguards
above good commercial practices.
• High: Security services and mechanisms that provide the most stringent protection and
rigorous security countermeasures.
Secure State – Condition in which all TOE security policies are enforced.
Security attributes – TSF data associated with subjects, objects, and users that are used for the
enforcement of the TSP.
Security level – The combination of a hierarchical classification and a set of non-hierarchical categories
that represent the sensitivity of the information.
Sensitivity label – A security attribute that represents the security level of an object and that describes
the sensitivity (e.g., Classification) of the data in the object. Sensitivity labels are used by the TOE as the
basis for mandatory access control decision.
Split key – A variable that consists of two or more components that must be combined to form the
operation key variable. The combining process excludes concatenation or interleaving of component
variables.
Subject – An entity within the TSC that causes operation to be performed.
Symmetric key – A single, secret key used for both encryption and decryption in symmetric
cryptographic algorithms.
Threat – Capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries, or any circumstance or event, with
the potential to violate the TOE security policy.
Threat Agent – Any human user or Information Technology (IT) product or system, which may attempt
to violate the TSP and perform an unauthorized operation with the TOE.
User – Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
Vulnerability – A weakness that can be exploited to violate the TOE security policy.
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8.3 Acronyms
TERM DEFINITION
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Program Interface
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Method
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
CC Common Criteria version 3.1
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation Validation
Scheme
CCIMB Common Criteria Interpretations
Management Board
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-
Message Authentication Code
CLNP Connectionless Network Protocol
CLNS Connectionless Network Service
CM Configuration Management
CSP Cryptographic security parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie Hellman
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DoD Department of Defense
DPC Dense Port Concentrator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FIPS-PUB 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standard
Publication
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GIG Global Information Grid
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Keyed-Hash Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
I&A Identification and Authentication
IATF Information Assurance Technical
Framework
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ID Identification
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IKE Internet Key Exchange
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TERM DEFINITION
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IPsec ESP Internet Protocol Security Encapsulating
Security Payload
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6
IPX Internetwork Packet Exchange
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol
IS-IS Intermediate System-to-Intermediate
System
ISO International Organization for
Standardization
IT Information Technology
Junos Juniper Operating System
LDP Label Distribution Protocol
MAC Mandatory Access Control
MRE Medium Robustness Environment
NAT Network Address Translation
NBIAT&S Network Boundary Information Assurance
Technologies and Solutions Support
NDPP Network Devices Protection Profile
NIAP National Information Assurance Program
NIST National Institute of Standards Technology
NSA National Security Agency
OSI Open Systems Interconnect
OSP Organizational Security Policy
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
PAM Pluggable Authentication Module
PFE Packet Forwarding Engine
PIC/PIM Physical Interface Card/Module
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RE Routing Engine
RFC Request for Comment
RIP Routing Information Protocol
RNG Random Number Generator
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adelman
SA Security Association
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TERM DEFINITION
SCEP Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SOF Strength of Function
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
TCP/IP Transmissions Control Protocol/ Internet
Protocol
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TOE Scope of Control
TSE TOE Security Environment
TSF TOE Security Function
TSFI TSF interfaces
TSP TOE Security Policy
TTAP/CCEVS Trust Technology Assessment Program/
Common Criteria Evaluation Standard
Scheme
UDP User Datagram Protocol
URL Uniform Research Locator
VPN Virtual Private Network
Table 17 - Acronyms used in the Security Target