BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
for
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server Version 15 SP4
from
SUSE LLC
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 (*)
Operating System
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP4
from SUSE LLC
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating
Systems Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019, CCEVS-VR-PP-
0047, NIAP,
Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version
1.0, 13 May 2021, CCEVS-VR-PP-0075, NIAP
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1,
ALC_TSU_EXT.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
valid until: 14 December 2028
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 15 December 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks...................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure..............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements.............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification...............................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result................................................................................8
6. Publication..................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.....................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary..................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy..........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information...........................................................................................14
6. Documentation..........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.....................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation..........................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE....................................................18
11. Security Target........................................................................................................19
12. Definitions...............................................................................................................19
13. Bibliography............................................................................................................20
C. Excerpts from the Criteria............................................................................................22
D. Annexes.......................................................................................................................23
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the extended component
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 that is not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
SOGIS MRA.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP4 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP4 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 12
December 2023. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: SUSE LLC.
The product was developed by: SUSE LLC.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 15
December 2023 is valid until 14 December 2028. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP4 has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
SUSE LLC
1221 S Valley Grove Way
#500, Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
United States
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, a highly-configurable
Linux-based operating system which has been developed to provide a good level of
security as required in commercial environments.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019,
CCEVS-VR-PP-0047, NIAP [8] supplemented by the Functional Package for Secure Shell
(SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021, CCEVS-VR-PP-0075, NIAP [9].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.3. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 3 and there
is one additional Extended Component defined in the Protection Profile. Thus the TOE is
CC Part 3 extended. The TOE meets the assurance requirements defined in the Protection
Profile.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Audit The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shut-down functions,
and all auditable events as specified by the requirements.
Each audit record contains the date and time of the event, type of event,
subject identity (if applicable), and outcome (success or failure) of the
event.
Cryptographic support The TOE includes the OpenSSL version 1.1.1 cryptographic libraries for
performing userspace cryptographic operations. In addition, the Linux
kernel crypto API performs the cryptographic operations performed by the
kernel. In addition, the TOE uses software noise sources for entropy
generation. The TOE implements TLSv1.2 for secure communications with
remote servers.
The TOE implements SSHv2 for allowing secure remote administration.
User data protection The TOE implements access controls which can be configured to prevent
unprivileged users from accessing files and directories owned by other
users.
The configuration of the access control mechanism is left to the owner of
the file system object.
Identification and
Authentication
All users including administrators must be authenticated to the TOE prior
to carrying out any actions, including management operations. The TOE
supports password-based authentication, authentication based on SSH-
keys as well as X.509 certificate-based authentication. The TOE will lock
out user accounts after a defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts to that user account has been met.
Security Management The TOE can perform management functions. The administrator has full
access to carry-out all management functions offered by the TOE. The
user is allowed a limited set of administrative operations for his own user
account.
Protection of the TSF The TOE implements the following protection of TSF data functions:
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
● Access controls
● Address space layout randomization (ASLR) with 11 bits (stack) and 28
bits (text segment start address) of entropy
● Stack buffer overflow protection
● Verification of integrity of the boot-chain
● Trusted software updates using digital signatures
TOE Access The TOE displays an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized
use of the OS prior to establishment of a user session.
Trusted Path / Channel The TOE supports TLS v1.2 for trusted channel communications. The TOE
uses TLS to securely communicate with the SUSE Customer Center.
Applications may invoke the TOE-provided TLS to securely communicate
with remote servers.
The TOE offers an SSH server which uses the SSHv2 protocol allowing
remote administration.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.2.
The TOE Security Problem Definition has been taken from the Protection Profile [8] and is
defined in terms of Assumptions and Threats. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.1 and 3.2.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP4
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1 SW
(ISO
image)
SLE-15-SP4-Full-x86_64-QU3-Media1.iso
(SHA-256:
447baa21dd85e5433a1a2b2f46fe91491e8
792f559397aca86fdf7a114c23c06)
SLES 15 SP4 D/L
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
2 SW
(ISO
image)
SLE-15-SP4-Full-aarch64-QU3-Media1.iso
(SHA-256:
664f17cf0d853ffdaca8781670249cd39213
e9cfcc64e1de4318b6a5e9bb0eff)
SLES 15 SP4 D/L
3 SW
(ISO
image)
SLE-15-SP4-Full-s390x-QU3-Media1.iso
(SHA-256:
60a4e8306cbdbe693353fb85836c04e0267
ca64cd1adbb40f405f2708027cfe4)
SLES 15 SP4 D/L
4 SW
(ISO
image)
SLE-15-SP4-Full-ppc64le-QU3-Media1.iso
(SHA-256:
afd6a7843da52ffa8c44e0f0c1567a141a33
1fbe4ee3f2bd16eaac43cbaa65bb)
SLES 15 SP4 D/L
5 DOC Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration
Guide for SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server
15 SP4
(SHA-256:
c1e0abfee4412e312ea440041bd737a72b
2a4e4846503551e32446f14962ac58)
SLES 15 SP4,
version 4.0
D/L
6 SW
(rpm
package)
openssh 8.4p1-150300.3.22.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
7 SW
(rpm
package)
openssh-client 8.4p1-150300.3.22.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
8 SW
(rpm
package)
openssh-common 8.4p1-150300.3.22.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
9 SW
(rpm
package)
openssh-fips 8.4p1-150300.3.22.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
10 SW
(rpm
package)
openssh-server 8.4p1-150300.3.22.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
11 SW
(rpm
package)
kernel-default (for intel) 5.14.21-150400.24.81.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
12 SW
(rpm
package)
ucode-intel 20230808-150200.27.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
13 SW
(rpm
package)
audit-audispd-plugin 3.0.6-150400.4.6.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
14 SW
(rpm
package)
yast2-online-update 4.4.5-150400.3.6.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
15 SW
(rpm
package)
yast2-online-update-configuration 4.4.1-150400.3.10.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
16 SW
(rpm
package)
firewalld 20230808-150200.27.1 D/L and
verification
by the TOE
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the TOE is electronic download only in the form of ISO images and
additional rpm packages. The packages that make up the TOE are digitally signed using
GPG. The key of the developer is contained on the installation ISO, as described in the
Evaluated Configuration Guide [10].
The developer provides and operates the download site and provides checksums for the
downloaded images that enable the user to verify the integrity of the download.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Auditing, Cryptographic support,
User data protection, Identification and Authentication, Security Management, Protection of
the TSF, TOE Access, Trusted Path/Channel.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware (OE.PLATFORM).
● The user of the OS is not wilfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are
provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of
access should have a separate account dedicated for that use (OE.PROPER_USER).
● The administrator of the OS is not careless, wilfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy
(OE.PROPER_ADMIN).
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES) is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking Linux
based operating system. It provides a platform for a variety of applications.
The SLES evaluation covers a potentially distributed network of systems running the
evaluated versions and configurations of SLES as well as other peer systems operating
within the same management domain. The hardware platforms selected for the evaluation
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consist of machines which are available when the evaluation has completed and to remain
available for a substantial period of time afterwards.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) consist of functions of SLES that run in kernel mode
plus a set of trusted processes. These are the functions that enforce the security policy as
defined in this Security Target. Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used
by an administrative user need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way.
But as with other operating system evaluations they are not considered to be part of this
TSF.
The hardware, the BIOS/UEFI firmware and potentially other firmware layers between the
hardware and the TOE are considered to be part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, including applications allowing access
of the TOE via cryptographically protected communication channels, such as SSH.
System administration tools include the standard command line tools. A graphical user
interface for system administration or any other operation is not included in the evaluated
configuration.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are used as
unprivileged tools to access public system services. For example a network server using a
port above 1024 may be used as a normal application running without root privileges on
top of the TOE. The additional documentation specific for the evaluated configuration
provides guidance how to set up such applications on the TOE in a secure way.
5.1. TOE Structure and Security Functions
The TOE is structured in much the same way as many other operating systems, especially
Unix-type operating systems. It consists of a kernel, which runs in the privileged state of
the processor and provides services to applications (which can be used by calling kernel
services via the system call interface). Direct access to the hardware is restricted to the
kernel, so whenever an application wants to access hardware like disk drives, network
interfaces or other peripheral devices, it has to call kernel services. The kernel then checks
if the application has the required access rights and privileges and either performs the
service or rejects the request.
The kernel is also responsible for separating the different user processes. This is done by
the management of the virtual and real memory of the TOE which ensures that processes
executing with different attributes cannot directly access memory areas of other processes
but have to do so using the inter-process communication mechanism provided by the
kernel as part of its system call interface.
The TSF of the TOE also includes a set of trusted processes, which when called by a user,
operate with extended privileges. The programs that represent those trusted processes on
the file system are protected by the file system discretionary access control security
function enforced by the kernel.
In addition, the execution of the TOE is controlled by a set of configuration files, which are
also called the TSF database. Those configuration files are also protected by the file
system discretionary access control security function enforced by the kernel.
The TOE includes a secure system initialization function which brings the TOE into a
secure state after it is powered on or after a reset. This function ensures that user
interaction with the TOE can only occur after the TOE is securely initialized and in a secure
state.
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The evaluator performed all the tests defined in the General Purpose Operating System
Protection Profile (PP) [8] and the SSH Functional Package (FP) [9] which are
approximately 100 tests. For the test requirements on crypto primitives and RNG, the
ACVP tests were performed on all applicable cryptographic algorithms.
The evaluator followed the test requirements from the PP and FP and constructed the
tests and an evaluator test plan (ETP). He used the evaluator test plan as an entry point,
which explains the test configuration and links the test requirements (including the
complete text specification from the PP and FP) to the actual test procedure.
The evaluator tests are partly manual tests and partly automated.
The evaluator verified the correct setup of the test systems according to the
documentation in the Evaluated Configuration Guide (EVG) [10] and the ETP. The
evaluator tested on the hardware setups named in Chapter 8 below. All tests were
performed on all hardware platforms.
7.1. Evaluator Testing
Two types of tests were performed: independent testing as defined by the Protection
Profile [8] and the Functional Package [9] as well as CAVS algorithm testing.
Independent testing mainly comprised of tests that test the external interfaces, but there
were also tests that target TOE security behaviour that is normally hidden from the outside:
● stack protection: a tool has been used that analyses the binary file meta data to
determine whether stack protection is enforced
● binary modifications: for integrity/boot tests the kernel or program packages were
modified
● adapted TLS and SSH servers/clients: modified versions of TLS/SSH peers were used
to force protocol misbehaviour as mandated by the PP/FP
Multiple algorithm testing is required to be performed by the PP/FP. The ACVP parser tool
was used to trigger the cryptographic interfaces with the given test vectors for validation.
No deviation from the expected results have been encountered.
7.2. Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator used the MITRE CVE portal, SUSE support center and internet researches
to identify publicly documented vulnerabilities. This lead to some tests in the areas of CPU
checks and external network interfaces.
Linux standard tools (dbus-send and basic shell commands) have been used as part of the
testing.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
In summary, the following aspects were subject to testing:
● Check for DOWNFALL processor vulnerability mitigation
● Potentially inappropriately controlled DBus services
● Undocumented security-relevant programs
● Potentially inappropriate access control to configuration files
● Unexpected network interfaces
● General privilege escalation scan
No deviation from the expected results have been found.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE as also listed in the
Evaluated Configuration Guide [10], section 1.3.1 and the Security Target [6], section
1.5.1:
● x86_64 Intel Cascade Lake processors on Delta D20x-M1-PC-32-8-96GB-1TB-2x1G
● x86_64 AMD EPYC 1st Generation processors on Gigabyte R181-Z90
● ARMv8.2-A processors on Gigabyte R181-T90
● IBM Power 10 processors on IBM Power10 9080-HEX
● IBM z15 processors on IBM Z System z15
The installation of the TOE must be carried out as described in Evaluated Configuration
Guide [10], which describes the actual installation steps as well as additional configuration
steps that need to be carried out when the TOE is installed.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretation AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components claimed in the Security Target [6], chapter 6 and defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems
Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019, CCEVS-VR-PP-0047, NIAP [8]
Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May
2021, CCEVS-VR-PP-0075, NIAP [9]
17 / 31
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
Technical Decisions listed in Chapter 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 in the
Security Target [6]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2,
ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1, ALC_TSU_EXT.1,
ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in
general context) only.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
18 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
ACVP Automated Cryptographic Validation Protocol
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BIOS Basic Input/Output System
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAVS Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPU Central Processing Unit
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETP Evaluator Test Plan
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVG Evaluated Configuration Guide
FP Functional Package
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
ISO International Organization for Standardization
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RPM Red Hat Package Management
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SLES SUSE Linux Enterprise Server
SSH Secure Shell Protocol
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UEFI Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
ISO Image - File system image typically containing ISO 9660 or URF file systems
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements.
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
20 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023, Version 1.4, 2023-12-05, SUSE Linux
Enterprise Server 15 SP4, SUSE LLC
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 8, 2023-12-05, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems Version 4.2.1, 22 April
2019, CCEVS-VR-PP-0047, NIAP
[9] Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021, CCEVS-VR-
PP-0075, NIAP
[10] Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server
15 SP4 (NIAP), Version 4.0, 2023-11-10, atsec information security GmbH and
SUSE LLC
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, 2023-11-03, Master Configuration List, SUSE LLC
(confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
22 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
23 / 31
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
0 Authentication The client authenticates either with UserID & password (#3) or by cryptographic
means as shown in #1 and#2 and verified by the server respectively.
1 RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1.5 using SHA-2
(rsa-sha2-256 or
rsa-sha2-512)
[RFC8017],PKCS#1
v2.2sec.8.-2(RSA)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[RFC4253] (SSH-
TRANS) for host
authentication
[RFC4252], sec.
7(SSHAUTH) for
user authentication
Modulus
length:
2048, 3072
and 4096
Yes Pubkeys are
exchanged
trustworthily out
of band, e.g.
checkingfingerpri
nts.
Authenticity is not
part of the TOE.
2 ECDSA signature
generation and
verification using
SHA-{256, 384, 512}
on nistp-{256, 384,
521}
(ecdsa-sha2-
nistp256, ecdsa-
sha2-nistp384,
ecdsa-sha2-
nistp521)
[ANSIX9.62]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
NIST curves
[FIPS186-4]
identifiers
analogous to
[RFC5903], sec 5
[RFC5656]
secp{256,3-
84,521}r1 [SEC2]
[RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS)
for host
authentication
[RFC4252], sec. 7
(SSH-AUTH)
for user
authentication
plength=
256, 384,
521
depends
on
selected
curve
Yes
3 User name and
password-based
authentication
[RFC4252], sec. 5
(SSH-AUTH) for
user authentication
Guess
success
prob.
ε ≤ 2 -20
Yes PAM is used
centrally. Thus if
the authentication
is aborted the
counter for failed
logins is
increased and
remains as is for
the next login.
24 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
4 Key
agreement
(key
exchange)
DH with diffie-
hellman-group-
exchange-sha256
and 512 (for RSA)
[RFC4253](SSH-
TRANS) supported
by [RFC4419] and
[RFC8268](DH-
Group Exchange)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA)
plength=
2K, 3K,
4K, etc.
Yes As of /etc/ssh/m-
oduli
5 ECDH with ecdh-
sha2-nistp256,
ecdh-sha2-nistp384,
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
(ecdh-sha2-
nistp256,ecdh-sha2-
nistp384, ecdh-
sha2-nistp521)
[RFC4253] (SSH-
TRANS)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA)
supported by
[RFC5656] (ECC in
SSH)
secp{256,384,521}r
1 [SEC2]
NIST curves
[FIPS186-4]
identifiers
analogous to
[RFC5903], sec 5
plength=
256, 384,
521
depends
on
selected
curve
Yes
6 Confidentiality AES in CBC mode
and GCM mode
(aes128-cbc,
aes256-cbc)
(aes128-gcm,
aes256-gcm);
[FIPS197] (AES),
[SP800-38A] (CBC),
[RFC 4253] (SSH-
TRANS using AES
with CBC mode),
[RFC8268] (SSH-2
using AES with
GCM mode)
|k|=128,
256
Yes
7 Integrity and
Authenticity
HMAC-SHA-2
(hmac-sha2-256,
hmac-sha2-512)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4251] /
[RFC4253] (SSH
HMAC support)
|k|= 256,
512
Yes BPP: Message
authentication
8 Authenticated
encryption
(encrypt-then
authenticate)
HMAC-SHA-2
(hmac-sha2-256-
etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-512-
etm@openssh.com)
+ CBC-AES
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4251] /
[RFC4253] (SSH
HMAC support),
[RFC6668] (SHA-2
in SSH)
|k|=160,
256, 512
Yes etm = encrypt-
then-MAC
(OpenSSH 6.2)
9 AES in GCM
mode(aes128-
[RFC5647] |k|=128,
256
Yes
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
gcm@openssh.com,
aes256-
gcm@openssh.com)
10 Key
generation for
host and user
keys
RSA key generation
with key size: 2048,
3072, 4096 bits
[FIPS 186-4], B.3.3
and
C.3 for Miller Rabin
primality tests.
[RFC8332]
n/a n/a Using
FCS_RBG_EXT.
1
11 ECDSA key
generation based on
NIST curves:
P-256, P-384, and
P-521
[FIPS 186-4],B.4 n/a n/a
12 Key
generation for
diffie-hellman
key agreement
Modular
exponentiation DH
key exchange with
key size:
2048, 4096, 8192
bits
[RFC4253] chapter
8
[RFC8268] sec.
5.6.1.1.4
n/a n/a Using
FCS_RBG_EXT.
1
13 ECDSA key
generation based on
the NIST curves:
P-256, P-384, and
P-521
[SP800-56A-Rev3],
sec. 5.6.1.2.2
[RFC4253]
[RFC4306]
n/a n/a
14 Trusted
channel
FTP_ITC_EXT.1
ST [6], sec. 7.2.8.1
for SSH v2
Cf. all lines for SSH
above
See above n/a
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality for SSH
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Key derivation
with
authentication
(access
control,
protection /
recovery
mode)
Password based
key derivation using
PBKDF2 with PRF
HMAC using SHA-
256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
[SP800-132]
[RFC2898]
(PBKDF2)
[FIPS198-1](HMAC)
[FIPS180-4](SHA)
Guessing prob.
2-20
Salt 32 byte
(LUKS_SALTSIZ
E)
iteration count
1000 ms
Yes
2 Confidentiality AES in XTS mode [FIPS197] |k|= 2*128, Yes
26 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
(bulk data &
key access /
key wrapping)
IV-handling
mechanism:
XTS-plain64
XTS-benbi
[SP800-38E] (XTS) 2*192, 2*256
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality for LUKS/dm-crypt
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
1 Confidentiality Cipher: AES
Modes: CBC, GCM
CBC: [RFC5246],
[SP800-38A]
GCM: [RFC5288],
[SP800-38D]
128, 256 Yes
2 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
[RFC4868]
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[FIPS198-1] (HMAC)
Key length
equal to
digest
Yes
AES GMAC used
by GCM
[SP800-38D]
(GCM / GMAC)
3 Key
Agreement
DH with PQG:
FFDHE2048 /
3072 / 4096 / 6144 /
8192 ECDH with
curves NIST P-256,
NIST P- 384, NIST
P-521
[RFC7919],
[SP800-56A-rev3]
Keys size
as defined
by PQG
parameters
/ curves
n/a
4 IV / Key
derivation
PRF SHA-2 with
hash type chosen
by TLS cipher suite
[RFC5996]
[FIPS180-4]
[FIPS198-1]
Depending
on chosen
cipher,
compliant
to
[RFC5246]
Yes
5 Peer
authentication
RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1.5 using SHA-2
[RFC 5246]
[FIPS 186-4]
[FIPS 180-4]
[RFC8017],
(PKCS#1v2.2) Sec.
8 (RSA)
Modulus >=
2048 bits
Keys size
as defined
by curves
Yes
RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-PSS
using SHA-2
ECDSA with [RFC5246] Sec1-v2
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
signature
generation and
verification using
SHA-2 with NIST P-
256, P-384, P-521
(ECDSA) ([SEC2])
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
6 Key
generation for
authentication
ECDSA using NIST
P-256, P-384, P-
521
[FIPS186-4], B.4 Modulus >=
2048 bits
Keys size
as defined
by curves
Yes
RSA with 3072,
4096 bits
4 rounds of Miller-
Rabin
[FIPS186-4], B.3.3
and C.3 for Miller
primality tests
7 Key
generation for
DH / ECDH
DSA using PQG
parameter set
defined for DH
operation
[SP800-56A-rev3]
section 5.6.1.1.4
[RFC5246]
Keys size
as defined
by PQG
parameters
n/a
ECDSA with P-256,
P-384, P-521
[SP800-56A-rev-3]
section 5.6.1.2.2
[RFC5246]
Keys size
as defined
by curves
8 Trusted
channel
FTP_ITC_EXT.1
ST [6], Sec. 7.2.8.1
for TLS v1.2
Cf. all lines for TLS
above
- n/a
9 Random
number
generator
CTR DRBG with
AES- 256, with DF,
without PR
[SP800-90A-Rev1] - n/a
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality for TLS
References for table 3 to 5:
ANSIX9.62 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: the Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
Date 2005-11-16
Location https://standards.globalspec.com/std/1955141/ANSI%20X9.62
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
Date 2015-08-04
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/180-4/upd1/final
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Date 2013-07-19
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-4/final
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Date 2023-05-09
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/197/final
FIPS198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
Date 2008-07-16
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/198-1/final
RFC2104 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
28 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
Author(s) H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti
Date 1997-02-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
RFC2898 PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0
Author(s) B. Kaliski
Date 2000-09-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt
RFC3447 Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
Author(s) J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski
Date 2003-02-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC4251 The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4251.txt
RFC4252 The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4252.txt
RFC4253 The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4253.txt
RFC4306 Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol
Author(s) C. Kaufman
Date 2005-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4306.txt
RFC4419 Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
Protocol
Author(s) M. Friedl, N. Provos, W. Simpson
Date 2006-03-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4419.txt
RFC4868 Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec
Author(s) S. Kelly, S. Frankel
Date 2007-05-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4868.txt
RFC5246 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
Author(s) T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt
RFC5288 AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS
Author(s) J. Salowey, A. Choudhury, D. McGrew
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt
RFC5647 AES Galois Counter Mode for the Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) K. Igoe, J. Solinas
Date 2009-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5647.txt
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023
RFC5656 Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
Author(s) D. Stebila, J. Green
Date 2009-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5656.txt
RFC5903 Elliptic Curve Groups modulo a Prime (ECP Groups) for IKE and IKEv2
Author(s) D. Fu, J. Solinas
Date 2010-06-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5903.txt
RFC5996 Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
Author(s) C. Kaufman, P. Hoffman, Y. Nir, P. Eronen
Date 2010-09-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5996.txt
RFC6668 SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
Protocol
Author(s) D. Bider, M. Baushke
Date 2012-07-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6668.txt
RFC7919 Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)
Author(s) D. Gillmor
Date 2016-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7919.txt
RFC8268 More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange (KEX)
Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)
Author(s) M. Baushke
Date 2017-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8268.txt
RFC8332 Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
Author(s) D. Bider
Date 2018-03-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8332.txt
SEC2 Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters
Date 2000
Location http://www.secg.org
SP800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques
Date 2001-12-01
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/a/final
SP800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
Date 2007-11-28
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/d/final
SP800-38E Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices
Date 2010-01-18
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/e/final
SP800-56A-Rev3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
Date 2018-04-16
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/56/a/r3/final
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1213-2023 Certification Report
SP800-90A-Rev1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
Bit Generators
Date 2015-06-24
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/90/a/r1/final
SP800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation: Part 1: Storage
Applications
Date 2010-12-22
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/132/final
Note: End of report
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