BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018
for
PR/SM for IBM z14 and IBM LinuxONE Systems
Driver Level D32L with Bundle Level S29
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.21
BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018 (*)
Server Applications: Virtualization
PR/SM for IBM z14 and IBM LinuxONE Systems
Driver Level D32L with Bundle Level S29
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_FLR.3, ALC_TAT.3,
ATE_FUN.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 3 September 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................21
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................21
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................24
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................24
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................25
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................25
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................26
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................27
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................29
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................30
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
SOGIS MRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families
are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product PR/SM for IBM z14 and IBM LinuxONE Systems, Driver Level D32L with
Bundle Level S29 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1005-2016 Specific results from the evaluation process
BSI-DSZ-CC-1005-2016 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product PR/SM for IBM z14 and IBM LinuxONE Systems, Driver
Level D32L with Bundle Level S29 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH.
The evaluation was completed on 7 August 2018. atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation.
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018 Certification Report
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 3 September
2018 is valid until 2 September 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product PR/SM for IBM z14 and IBM LinuxONE Systems, Driver Level D32L with
Bundle Level S29 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road P329
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is PR/SM for IBM z14 and IBM LinuxONE Systems, Driver
Level D32L with bundle level S29.
PR/SM is a hardware facility running on IBM z14 or LinuxONE Emperor II systems that
enables the resources of a single physical machine to be divided between distinct,
predefined logical machines called "logical partitions". Each logical partition is a domain of
execution, and is considered to be a subject capable of running a conventional system
control program (SCP) such as z/OS™, z/VM™, z/VSE, z/TPF™, or Linux for System z.
These operating systems run unmodified in a PR/SM partition.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_FLR.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_FUN.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus,
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Identification and
Authentication
The TOE supports identification and authentication of users by means of:
• Unique identification via zone numbers assigned to each logical
partition
• Unique user IDs assigned to each user of the HMC/SE
Access Control and
Information Flow Control
The TOE supports access control between users and resources by means
of:
• The TOE implements LPAR Security Controls which define a
partition's access to IOCDSs, performance data, cryptographic
hardware, the channel reconfiguration process, and the authority to
reset or shutdown other partitions.
• The TOE implements LPAR Security Controls which specify the
partition's permissions to send BCPii commands to the SE part of
the TOE and to specify which partition's configuration on the SE part
of the TOE can receive and process BCPii commands. It should be
noted that in the evaluated configuration no partition has either the
send or receive BCPii permission.
• The TOE allows access to specific control units and devices on non-
dedicated channels to be restricted.
• The TOE ensures that dedicated channels, storage and physical
CPs are never shared.
• The TOE will prevent the transfer of any message between a logical
partition and any resource not explicitly allocated to it.
• The TOE implements management access controls to define
configurable role-based authorized administrator access to the
TOE's management functions.
Auditing The TOE supports auditing of relevant events by means of a security log
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
with the following characteristics:
• All security relevant events are recorded in the security log. This
auditing mechanism cannot be bypassed.
• The security log is protected from unauthorized deletions or
modifications.
• Applications in logical partitions cannot read the security log.
• The security log can be offloaded for archival purposes.
Authorized Administration
and Operation
The HMC/SE workplace is the window from where users start tasks for
monitoring and operating the CPC (central processor complex). A user
profile determines which tasks and controls users can use on the workplace.
Not all tasks are available for each user.
In addition to a set of five predefined user roles supplied with the console,
the ability to define customized user roles is also provided. A user role is a
collection of authorizations.
A user role can be created to define the set of tasks allowed for a given
class of users (task roles) or it can be created to define the set of managed
objects that are manageable for a user (managed resource roles). A
customized user role is based on one of the predefined user roles from
which objects or tasks are removed.
Once user roles are defined or customized they can be used to create new
users with their own permissions. A user can be created with one or more
user roles.
Object Reuse The TOE supports object reuse by means of:
• Clearing of all storage prior to allocation or re-allocation.
• Resetting all information in physical processors before dispatching
the processor to a new logical partition.
• Resetting non-shared channel paths and attached I/O devices prior
to allocation to a logical partition.
Reliability of Service The TOE supports the control of the processor running time and wait
completion processor parameters. These parameters provide the ability to
share physical processor resources on either an event-driven basis or a
time-driven basis. Disabling event-driven dispatching causes shared
physical processor resources to be distributed on the basis of time intervals
according to the weights specified to effectively prevent unauthorized denial
of service.
TSF Protection The TOE supports TSF protection by means of:
• Self test whenever the TOE is loaded and started and periodically
during the TOE's operation.
• The PR/SM kernel is loaded into a protected area of central storage
where it is inaccessible by any users, operating systems or
applications.
• An alternate (backup) SE operates to provide real time mirroring of
relevant system data: IOCDSs, audit log, image profiles.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.5.2.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1048-2018 Certification Report
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
PR/SM for IBM z14 and IBM LinuxONE Systems,
Driver Level D32L with Bundle Level S29
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1 SW LPAR Licensed Internal Code (LIC) D32L7
Bundle S29
n/a8
2 SW HMC/SE Licensed Internal Code (LIC)
3 DOC Processor Resource/Systems Manager Planning Guide [9] SB10-7169-00c DVD
4 DOC Hardware Management Console Operations Guide [8] 2.14.0 Pre-installed as
integral part of
the HMC help
system
5 DOC Support Element Operations Guide [10] 2.14.0 Pre-installed as
integral part of
the SE help
system
6 DOC Input/Output Configuration Program User's Guide for ICP
IOCP [11]
SB10-7172-00a DVD
7 DOC Stand-Alone Input/Output Configuration Program User's
Guide [12]
SB10-7173-00 DVD
8 DOC 3906 Service Guide [13] GC28-6966-00 DVD
9 DOC 3906 Installation Manual for Physical Planning
All Models [14]
GC28-6965-00
Level 00b
DVD
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery procedure for the TOE is under full control of IBM Corporation. Once the
ordered hardware the TOE is intended to run on, i.e. an IBM z14 or LinuxONE server, has
been installed with Driver D32L at bundle level S29 and is ready to be shipped, it is loaded
7
Note that the Driver Level "D32L" corresponds to the Version Number "2.14.0" that can be verified by the
customer as stated in the respective section of this report.
8
Note that the customer is not provided with media that contains the installable LIC. All LIC is installed during
manufacturing as part of the TOE delivery procedure. After physical hardware installation, specific checkout
tests are performed at the customer's site by IBM personnel before the system is handed over.
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into a climate-controlled truck, which is then locked. The customer is informed that the
hardware is on its way.
Upon arrival at the customer's site, the truck is unlocked by IBM personnel and the
hardware is unloaded. After physical installation of the hardware components, i.e. cabling
and air conditioning, the TOE is tested by IBM service personnel.
Only after the TOE has been successfully installed, the delivery and installation procedure
as documented in respective installation manuals is considered to be complete by IBM and
the TOE (and the underlying hardware) is handed over to the customer who is not involved
in the whole process of preparing the machine (apart from providing the operational
environment for physical installation) up to that moment.
As a final step, the IBM service personnel is expected to advise the customer to change
the passwords for the predefined system users on the HMC/SE workplaces from their
default values to customized, more secure passwords.
In order to identify the correct version of the TOE, the user may bring up the System
Information Panel on the Support Element or an attached Hardware Management
Console, which will show the version number and bundle level and should read "2.14.0"
with bundle level "S29" 9
.
Due to delivery and installation procedure under full IBM Corporation control and observed
by the customer once the TOE arrived, customers are able to verify during physical
installation that their order has been fulfilled correctly by IBM Corporation.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• Identification and Authentication
• Access Control and Information Flow Control
• Auditing
• Authorized Administration and Operation
• Object Reuse
• Reliability of Service
• TSF Protection
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• Security log data stored off of the TOE must be controlled for confidentiality and
integrity according to the owner’s needs.
9
The driver level "D32L" cannot be displayed to a customer as the customer does not have the PEMODE
privileges required to bring up the respective machine information. However, version 2.14.0 is equivalent to
D32L and the bundle level S29 applies to both.
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• Personnel working as administrators or other privileged positions must be carefully
selected and trained.
• The TOE must be protected during the setup phase.
• Physical access and remote access to the HMC and z System must be restricted
only to authorized and approved users. In particular the HMC and the LAN
connecting it to the SEs must be physically protected from access other than by
authorized system administrators.
• The underlying hardware must provide separation mechanism that can be used by
the TOE to protect the TSF and TSF data from unauthorized access and
modification.
• The underlying physical I/O LIC must provide separation mechanisms that can be
used by the TOE to restrict access of one partition to authorized logical I/O
resources.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is the PR/SM Licensed Internal Code (LIC) kernel running on the z System. The
kernel provides the capability to initialize the system in LPAR mode, which in the evaluated
configuration is the only valid mode of operation. The TOE is implemented in LIC. The use
of LIC prevents untrusted code from masquerading as part of the TOE and abusing TOE
privileges. The TOE is composed of:
1. The LPAR LIC running on the Central Processing Complex (CPC) as a hypervisor
responsible for maintaining the isolation of logical partitions maintained and
controlled by the TOE.
2. HMC LIC running on the Hardware Management Console (HMC) providing remote
system administration functions to maintain the current configuration. The HMC is
connected over internal network with one or more Support Elements.
3. SE LIC running on the Support Element (SE) physically located in the CPC cabinet
and connected to the CPC. The SE also provides system administration functions to
maintain the current configuration and can be used independently from an HMC
connected to it.
PR/SM LIC provides the security administrator with the ability to define a completely
secure system configuration. When the system is defined in such a manner, total
separation of the logical partitions is achieved, thereby preventing a partition from gaining
any knowledge of another partition's operation.
Only functions related to logical partition isolation, physical resource allocation, access
control and audit are the subject of the Security Target. Additional functions of PR/SM
related to normal operations and maintenance of the system are not considered as
security enforcing functions, because the TOE will be configured to provide a configuration
consistent with secure isolation such that these operations cannot be in conflict with the
security policy of PR/SM.
The other functions are therefore not evaluated for correctness and no vulnerability
analysis for those functions is performed.
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The address space of the TSF is isolated from the address space of the partitions by
hardware protection mechanisms (the "start interpretive execution" (SIE) instruction
provided by the underlying processor as described below), and by the provision of
separate hardware for the SE and I/O (SAP) processors. The TSF LIC and data is
therefore protected from modification or tampering.
The security administrator uses an I/O configuration utility (IOCP) to define an IOCDS of
the I/O resources and their allocation to specific logical partitions. The IOCDS should be
verified by the security administrator prior to activating the partitions. PR/SM allows I/O
resources to be dedicated to a single partition, relocatable among a defined set of
partitions, or shared by a defined set of partitions. When an administrator wishes to
activate a partition, the activation request is initiated from the HMC. LPAR will receive an
external interrupt and issue an instruction to obtain the description of the partition the
administrator wishes to activate. LPAR will attempt to construct the partition and will inform
the HMC of the success or failure of the command.
Several IOCDSs, defining different configurations, may be stored but only one is in effect
at any time given. The configuration becomes effective as part of the activation sequence.
Standard hardware resources such as a central processor, including computation and
control registers, timers, clocks and storage; and I/O resources are objects allocated to
logical partitions. These objects are subject to a non-discretionary access control policy
under which each logical partition is only permitted access to resources allocated to it.
Logical partitions are logical objects that are built from existing physical objects. These
logical objects fall into one of three classes:
a) Logical processor facilities, which are supported by similar physical objects. Each
such logical object is represented by an internal control block that contains current
state information each time context is switched to a different logical partition.
b) Logical storage, both central and expanded, is represented by the same amount of
contiguous physical storage. PR/SM does not perform paging or move logical
partitions once they have been placed in real storage. Physical storage can be de-
allocated from one logical partition and reallocated to another. This feature can be
disabled, and is subject to full object reuse control.
c) Logical I/O resources (channels) are implemented by physical resources of the
same type. Such resources can be configured so that they are not shared by
partitions. A channel can be de-allocated from one logical partition and reallocated
to another, under the control of the security administrator.
The z/Architecture® and ESA/390® architecture supports two instruction states: problem
and supervisor. Problem state instructions can be executed in either problem or supervisor
state. Semi-privileged instructions can be executed in supervisor state, or in problem state
subject to one or more additional authorizations. Privileged instructions can be executed
only in supervisor state. PR/SM exports a virtual machine including all architected
instructions, and initiates the execution in supervisor state, so that all three classes of
instructions can be executed within the logical partition. Thus, each logical partition has
both execution states available. PR/SM does not interfere with the logical partition's use of
those states. A system control program (SCP) running in a logical partition can support z
and ESA/390 architectural mode. The SCP can define whether it is running in
z/Architecture mode or ESA/390 mode by a use of a SIGP instruction. Typically, if the SCP
understands z/Architecture mode, it gets into z/Architecture mode immediately and
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remains in that mode. But z/OS will switch back to ESA/390 if it needs to load the
standalone dump program.
PR/SM supports and uses the "start interpretive execution" (SIE) instruction to create an
interpretative execution environment in which the logical partitions execute. PR/SM begins
execution in non-SIE mode. When a logical partition is to be activated, PR/SM establishes
the parameters for each logical processor allocated to the partition in a control block called
a "state description". PR/SM executes a SIE instruction, which dispatches the logical
processor in SIE mode. The PR/SM hardware executes instructions in the logical
processor in SIE mode until an exception condition occurs, which causes control to return
to PR/SM in non-SIE mode. The exception conditions are events that cannot be handled in
interpretative mode. PR/SM receives control in non-SIE mode. PR/SM maintains a state
description for each logical processor of each logical partition so that each time a logical
processor is dispatched, it is in the same context as when it last had control. Since this
state description is updated by the hardware, it is impossible for one logical partition to
acquire control with the wrong context (i.e. the context of another logical partition). The
non-SIE/SIE distinction is a powerful privilege differentiation between PR/SM and the
logical partitions.
The z14 or LinuxONE system provides support for several features that are very helpful in
many customer environments. However, these features are not recommended in a secure
environment. As a result, the TOE provides security related controls to disable such
features assuring separation of the logical partition(s). The security related controls are
outlined below:
Logical Partition Isolation
This control reserves reconfigurable unshared channel paths for the exclusive use
of a logical partition. Channel paths assigned to an isolated logical partition are not
available to other logical partitions and remain reserved for that LP when they are
configured offline.
I/O Configuration Control Authority
This control can limit the ability of the logical partition to read or write any IOCDS in
the configuration locally or remotely. Logical partitions with control authority for the
I/O configuration data can read and write any non-write-protected IOCDS in the
configuration, and can change the I/O configuration dynamically.
BCPii Permissions
This control can limit the ability of the logical partition to send BCPii commands to
other partition's configuration on the SE part of the TOE and whether a logical
partition's configuration can receive and process BCPii commands from other
partitions. This control can also limit from which specific logical partitions a partition
can receive BCPii commands on the SE part of the TOE. It should be noted that in
the evaluated configuration no partition has either the send or receive BCPii
permission.
Global Performance Data Control Authority
This control limits the ability of a logical partition to view central processor activity
data for other logical partitions. Logical partitions with control authority for global
performance data can view CP utilization data and Input/Output (IOP) busy data for
all of the logical partitions in the configuration. A logical partition without control
authority for the performance data can view only the CP utilization data for itself.
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Cross-Partition Authority
This control can limit the capability of the logical partition to issue certain control
program instructions that affect other logical partitions. Logical partitions with
cross-partition authority can issue instructions to perform a system reset of another
logical partition, deactivate any other logical partition, and provide support for the
automatic reconfiguration facility.
In addition to the security controls mentioned above, the TOE also ensures that central
and expanded storage for each logical partition is isolated and cannot be shared with other
logical partitions. The TOE rigidly enforces this “no sharing” rule during logical partition
definition, logical partition activation, logical partition reconfiguration and during logical
partition execution.
The TOE also “removes” central processors (CPs) from logical partitions by virtualizing
physical CPs. Virtualized physical CPs are referred to as logical processors. Within the
TOE, each logical CP is represented as a data structure that is associated with its specific
logical partitions preventing the transfer of data between partitions.
Thus, when PR/SM is initialized for secure operation, one partition cannot gain access to
the data within another partition nor modify any aspect of another partition. With
z/Architecture or ESA/390 architecture (which includes the functions of ESA/370
Architecture), these models have problem-program compatibility with S/360TM
, S/370TM
,
and 4300 processors. They can access virtual storage in multiple address spaces and
data spaces. This extends addressability for system, sub-system, and application functions
that use z/Architecture or ESA/390 architecture.
The Security Features are outlined in the following table.
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Identification and
Authentication
The TOE supports identification and authentication of users by means of
• Unique identification via zone numbers assigned to each logical
partition
• Unique user IDs assigned to each user of the HMC/SE
For the logical partitions, there is no specific password. The logical partition
is authenticated by its existence in the I/O Configuration Dataset (IOCDS)
definition when activation occurs. The zone number is used to mediate
access between the logical partition and the physical resources of the
processor assigned to that logical partition.
For the HMC/SE user, the required passwords are assigned by the security
administrator. The use of the user ID and password allows the user of the
HMC/SE to invoke the various functions that are defined as being allowed
for that user ID.
Access Control and
Information Flow Control
The TOE supports access control between users and resources by means
of:
• The TOE implements LPAR Security Controls which define a
partition's access to IOCDSs, performance data, cryptographic
hardware, the channel reconfiguration process, and the authority to
reset or shutdown other partitions.
• The TOE implements LPAR Security Controls which specify the
partition's permissions to send BCPii commands to the SE part of
the TOE and to specify which partition's configuration on the SE
part of the TOE can receive and process BCPii commands. It
should be noted that in the evaluated configuration no partition has
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
either the send or receive BCPii permission.
• The TOE allows access to specific control units and devices on
non-dedicated channels to be restricted.
• The TOE ensures that dedicated channels, storage and physical
CPs are never shared.
• The TOE will prevent the transfer of any message between a logical
partition and any resource not explicitly allocated to it.
• The TOE implements management access controls to define
configurable role-based authorized administrator access to the
management functions of the TOE.
Auditing The TOE supports auditing of relevant events by means of a security log
with the following characteristics:
• All security relevant events are recorded in the security log. This
auditing mechanism cannot be bypassed.
• The security log is protected from unauthorized deletions or
modifications.
• Applications in logical partitions cannot read the security log.
• The security log can be offloaded for archival purposes.
Authorized Administration
and Operation
PR/SM is a hardware facility that enables the resources of a single physical
machine to be divided between distinct, predefined logical machines, called
“logical partitions”. The HMC/SE workplace is the window from where users
start tasks for monitoring and operating the CPC (central processor
complex). A user profile determines which tasks and controls users can use
on the workplace. Not all tasks are available for each user.
The following predefined default user IDs are established as part of base
HMC/SE.
Operator - A person with operator authority typically performs basic system
start up and shutdown operations using predefine procedures.
Advanced Operator - A person with advanced operator authority
possesses operator authority plus the ability to perform some additional
recovery and maintenance tasks.
Programmer - A person with programmer authority has the ability to
customize the system in order to determine its operation.
Access Administrator - A person with access administrator authority has
the ability to create, modify, or delete user profiles on the HMC or for service
mode on the support element. A user profile consists of user identification, a
password, managed resource roles and task roles.
Service Representative - A person with service representative authority
has access to tasks related to the repair and maintenance of the system.
In addition to the predefined user roles supplied with the console the ability
to define customized user roles is also provided. A user role is a collection of
authorizations. A user role can be created to define the set of tasks allowed
for a given class of users (task roles) or it can be created to define the set of
managed objects that are manageable for a user (managed resource roles).
A customized user role is based on one of the predefined user roles from
which objects or tasks are removed.
Once user roles are defined or customized they can be used to create new
users with their own permissions. A user can be created with one or more
user roles.
The following general definitions can be established:
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Administrator
The Administrator is defined to be any user(s) with access to the
HMC/SE workplace.
Security Administrator
Any administrator authorized to perform all of the following tasks:
• Archive Security Logs
• Change LPAR Controls
• Change LPAR Group Controls
• Change LPAR I/O Priority Queuing
• Change LPAR Security
• Customize/Delete Activation Profiles
• Input/Output (I/O) Configuration
• Logical Processor Add
• Manage Users Wizard
• Reassign Channel Path
• User Management
• View Security Logs
A detailed list of the console actions authorized for each predefined role is
contained in the Hardware Management Console Operations Guide [8].
Object Reuse The TOE supports object reuse by means of:
• Clearing of all storage prior to allocation or re-allocation.
• Resetting all information in physical processors before dispatching
the processor to a new logical partition.
• Resetting non-shared channel paths and attached I/O devices prior
to allocation to a logical partition.
Reliability of Service The TOE supports the control of the processor running time and wait
completion processor parameters. These parameters provide the ability to
share physical processor resources on either an event-driven basis or a
time-driven basis. Disabling event-driven dispatching causes shared
physical processor resources to be distributed on the basis of time intervals
according to the weights specified to effectively prevent unauthorized denial
of service.
TSF Protection The TOE supports TSF protection by means of:
• Self test whenever the TOE is loaded and started and periodically
during operation.
• The PR/SM kernel is loaded into a protected area of central storage
where it is inaccessible by any users, operating systems or
applications.
• An alternate (backup) SE operates to provide real time mirroring of
relevant system data: IOCDSs, audit log, image profiles.
Table 3: Summary of security features
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Test Configuration
With respect to the underlying hardware used, the test configuration is identical to the
evaluated configuration of the TOE. However, some of the configuration requirements
mandated by the Processor Resource/Systems Manager Planning Guide [9] do not fully
apply to the test configuration as they refer to secure operation of the TOE at the
customer's site. Moreover, in some cases overriding safeguards mandated for the TOE,
like, for instance, security authorities settings for partitions, was required to actually
perform tests related to that safeguard, i.e. to verify that with an authority enabled, a
logical partition in fact may perform actions but cannot do so with that authority removed.
The evaluator assessed the configuration deviations identified during his analysis of
developer test cases and test approach and concluded that the configuration tested by the
developer was consistent with the evaluated configuration of the TOE. When performing
his independent tests, the evaluator deliberately invalidated the configuration requirements
in order to observe the behaviour of the TOE, which he also considered a valid and
acceptable approach. At any time during his testing, the evaluator considered the TOE to
be in its evaluated configuration.
7.2. Developer Testing
For security-specific testing the evaluator identified the following developer testing effort:
• The security test suite is running for any major driver change.
• A random subset of the security test suite must be included in the driver regression
testing.
This ensures that changes to the driver do not affect the security functions of the TOE.
There is significantly more effort spent by the developer in addition to the security-specific
testing:
• New features that are implemented in the TOE have to follow the strict development
procedures. This includes, that in parallel to the design, test cases need to be
written. This is done by creating test variation lists, i.e. checking which variations of
inputs, configurations etc. need to be tested, and writing test cases. The whole
process is shadowed by review cycles ensuring a broad agreement, and coverage
of all necessary test scenarios. If the design documentation points out that other
parts of the system may be affected by the new feature, test cases are written to
verify that there is no negative impact. Tests must complete successfully before the
new feature is approved.
• If errors are reported, the TOE gets fixed by the developer. After fixing the bug and
informal testing by the developer, the newly built driver is tested to verify that the
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bug is fixed. Normal regression tests ensure that the TOE as a whole is still
functional.
• New drivers are tested using an internal proprietary test program, which is also
included in the test suite. The internal proprietary test program is used for rigorous
and continuous testing of the TOE. It provides a pseudo-random stream of
instructions from a customizable set of instructions that are issued to a logical
partition, thus simulating a running application. The tool would reveal unexpected
system behavior during the intense test runs on the TOE, e.g. if some processor
instructions are not properly simulated by the TOE. Running the internal proprietary
test program successfully for a long period without crash and without detecting
unexpected behaviour, gives a rather good confidence that the TOE is working
correctly.
There are no specific configuration requirements for the TOE to be tested in its evaluated
configuration apart from running the tests on one of the hardware platforms listed in the ST
using the appropriate version of the TOE and configuring the separation conditions as
required by assumption A.Sep_Strength and Appendix B of [9].
Additional requirements and assumptions from the ST may be neglected for testing since
they have been considered to have no impact on the testing itself nor do they impact the
security functionality of the TOE.
The evaluator concluded that the configuration chosen for developer testing was in
accordance with the evaluated configuration as defined by the ST.
The tests performed by the developer were at the level of the modules of the TOE design.
The actual test results obtained by the developer during the developer testing performed in
September 2017 matched the expected test results laid down in the test documentation.
Also, the internal proprietary test program did not return any deviation from the
z/Architecture definition.
After completion of developer testing in September 2017 as reported in the latest version
of the respective report on ATE, the TOE was subject to changes. All changes that
eventually led to the current version of the TOE, i.e. D32L with bundle level S29, have
been tested by the developer. The developer provided respective evidence demonstrating
successful test execution. As for an evaluator assessment of a subset of those changes
refer to section Evaluator Testing Effort below.
7.3. Evaluator Testing Effort
The following testing was performed by the evaluator:
a) TOE test configurations:
The tests were performed on the following systems:
● IBM System z14 server model M02 at microcode driver level D32L. This
configuration was consistent with the platform configuration given in the ST
at the time the testing was performed. A fix applied as MCL P42601.154 after
completion of the evaluator testing has been verified by a respective source
code review.
The correct driver level was confirmed by the evaluator using the System
Information Panel on the Support Element logged on in SERVICE mode. The
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System Information Panel stated driver level D32L, which matches the TOE version
stated in the ST.
The general machine configuration was modified on a test-specific basis (e.g. by
defining specific IOCDS) to adapt the machine configuration to the test purpose. No
external connectivity was enabled throughout the tests. As a result of this setup, the
TOE at any time was in its evaluated configuration when performing the evaluator
tests.
b) Subset of independently repeated developer tests
The evaluator performed a subset of the developer test suite, deliberately skipping
the internal proprietary test program, which has already been confirmed to be
effective by multiple evaluations. The sampled subset chosen was considered
appropriate in size and coverage.
The following security functions as stated in the ST were subject to testing:
1. Identification and Authentication
2. Access Control and Information Flow Control
3. Auditing
4. Authorized Administration
5. Authorized Operations
6. Object Reuse
7. Reliability of Service
8. Self Test
As a result of testing the above-mentioned security functions, the following
interfaces (TSFI) have been included in the evaluator testing:
1. GUI as part of testing of all security functions
2. z/Architecture as part of tests related to security function Authorized
Operations
3. Proprietary internal interfaces as part of tests related to all tested security
functions except Self Test
4. CHSC as part of tests related to security functions Authorized Operations
and Object Reuse
5. IOCP as part of tests related to security function Access Control and
Information Flow Control
6. SIE as part of all tests that involve running LPARs10
The subset chosen by the evaluator covers all interfaces to the TOE security
functions.
In addition to repetition of developer tests, the evaluator applied variations to the
test steps and input data and observed the deviating results of the TOE.
c) Verdict for the activity:
10
Note that SIE is a TSFI not accessible from the outside but invoked whenever a logical partition is
operative.
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The overall judgement on the results of testing during the evaluation is that all
security tests passed, i.e. the actual results achieved by the evaluator either exactly
matched the expected results, or, in case of test variations, matched the
expectation of the evaluator.
By using developer tests as a base for independent testing, the evaluator achieved the
same test depth as the developer when performing the developer tests. Therefore, the
tests performed by the evaluator were at the level of the modules of the TOE design.
There were no failed tests that were caused by TOE behaviour different from the expected
behavior or violating requirements stated in ST.
7.4. Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator did neither devise nor conduct additional penetration testing apart from his
source code analysis performed with respect to an identified potential vulnerability. That
analysis at level of the LPAR LIC source code was based on an assumed misuse of a
proprietary internal interface in order to gain unauthorized access to storage areas actually
allocated to partitions other than the partition using that proprietary internal interface.
Examination of the implementation revealed that no such penetration is feasible.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The Target of Evaluation is IBM PR/SM for IBM z14 and LinuxONE Emperor II Systems at
driver level D32L with bundle level S29. The TOE is firmware only and is accompanied by
guidance documentation. The items listed in table 2 of this report represent the TOE.
The TOE can be run on a number of hardware models all belonging to the IBM z14 or
LinuxONE Emperor II server families. A detailed list of supported machine models is given
in section 1.5.3 of the ST [6], which is the base for evaluation.
The evaluated configuration of the TOE is defined by the mandatory configuration
requirements to be met as stated in section "Trusted Configuration" in Appendix B of [9].
The ST [6] directly redirects readers to this document, which is part of the deliverables as
listed in table 2.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_FUN.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for
this TOE evaluation.
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As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1005-2016, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the new supported hardware
and feature refinements.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target [6]
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
augmented by ALC_FLR.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_FUN.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition, all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The customer or user of the product must consider all assumptions of the ST [6] when
using the TOE. Particular attention should be paid to A.Phys_Secure: The Hardware
Management Console (HMC) and the Local Area Network (LAN) connecting it to the SEs
must be physically protected from access other than by authorized, trusted system
administrators.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CHSC Channel Subsystem Call
CPC Central Processor Complex
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HMC Hardware Management Console
IOCDS Input/Output Configuration Dataset
IOCP Input/Output Configuration Program
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LIC Licensed Internal Code
LPAR Logical Partition
PP Protection Profile
PR/SM Processor Resource/Systems Manager™
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SE Support Element
SIE Start Interpretive Execution
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
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Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
I/O Configuration Data Set - This is a system file that defines the available logical
partitions, and the allocation of the available the I/O devices to the defined logical
partitions.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Logical Partition - A virtual machine which runs on the host system. It has a unique
identifier (the zone number) and name. A logical partition can be both an object and a user
of the system. A logical partition has attributes determining whether the logical partition is
authorized for various actions. Other attributes define the amount of logical processor and
storage resources to be allocated to the partition, and the scheduling parameters for the
partition's processors. The possible logical partitions are defined in the current
configuration object. Only activated logical partitions may use the system.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE11
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] PR/SM for IBM z14 and IBM LinuxONE Systems Security Target, Version 16.12,
Date 2018-06-20, IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2018-08-01, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] z14 Hardware Management Console Operations Guide Version 2.14.0, Version
2.14.0, September 2017, IBM Corporation
[9] z Systems Processor Resource/Systems Manager Planning Guide, Version SB10-
7169-00c, Date April 2018, IBM Corporation
[10] z14 System Support Element Operations Guide Version 2.14.0, Version 2.14.0,
Date September 2017, IBM Corporation
[11] z Systems Input/Output Configuration Program User's Guide for ICP -IOCP, Version
SB10-7172-00, Date September 2017, IBM Corporation
[12] z Systems Stand-Alone Input/Output Configuration Program User's Guide, Version
SB10-7173-00, Date September 2017, IBM Corporation
[13] 3906 Service Guide, Version GC28-6966-00, Date September 2017, IBM
Corporation
[14] 3906 Installation Manual for Physical Planning All Models, Version GC28-6965-00,
Level 00b, Date July 2017, IBM Corporation
11
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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