SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM ON THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target i February 13, 2006
Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
Public Version
Of the
Security Target for
PR/SM for the IBM System z9™
109 (z9-109)
Version 5.1.7
February 13, 2006
This Security Target was developed for the evaluation of the Processor Resource/System Manager™
(PR/SM™
) for the IBM System z9™
109 (z9-109) platform according to the Common Criteria level
EAL5. The intention of this Security Target is also to show the compliance of PR/SM with the
requirements identified in the Common Criteria for those functions identified in this document.
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM ON THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target ii February 13, 2006
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION 5
1.1 Security Target Identification 5
1.2 Security Target Overview 5
1.3 Assurance Level 6
1.4 CC Conformance Claim 6
2 TOE DESCRIPTION 7
2.1 Definition of TOE 7
2.2 PR/SM Overview 8
2.3 Design Considerations 19
2.3.1 Introduction 19
2.3.2 Possible Interactions 19
2.3.3 Binding of Configuration in SE and LPAR 20
2.3.4 Binding of LPAR Instances 20
3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 22
3.1 TOE Environment and Usage Description 22
3.2 Assumptions 22
3.3 Threats 24
3.3.1 Threats countered by the TOE 24
3.4 Organizational Security Policies 25
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 26
4.1 TOE Security Objectives 26
4.2 Environment Security Objectives 27
5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 29
5.1 TOE IT Security Requirements 29
5.1.1 TOE IT Security Functional Requirements 29
5.1.2 TOE IT Security Assurance Requirements 38
5.2 Security Requirements for the IT Environment 38
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PR/SM Security Target iii February 13, 2006
6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION 40
6.1 LPAR Kernel 40
6.2 Information Flow to/from HMC 40
6.3 TOE Security Functions 40
6.3.1 TOE Security Functions Description 41
6.3.2 Mapping of Security Functions and SFRs. 45
6.4 Assurance Requirements 48
7 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE CLAIM 51
8 RATIONALE 52
8.1 TOE Description Rationale 52
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale 52
8.2.1 Security Objectives Coverage 52
8.2.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency 53
8.3 Security Requirements Rationale 55
8.3.1 Security Requirements Coverage 56
8.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency 56
8.3.3 Security Requirements Coverage (IT environment) 57
8.4 TOE Summary Specification Rationale 58
8.5 Internal Consistency and Mutual Support 63
8.5.1 Rationale that Dependencies are Satisfied 63
8.6 Rationale for Strength of Function 65
APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY 68
APPENDIX B – PR/SM GLOSSARY 71
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM ON THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target iv February 13, 2006
List of Tables
Table 2-1 – Default System Administrator User IDs and Console Actions...............................11
Table 2-2 – Default System Administrator User IDs and Tasks................................................14
Table 5-1 – Security Functional Components............................................................................31
Table 6-1 - SFR and Security Function Correspondence...........................................................46
Table 6-2 – Security Function and SFR Correspondence..........................................................47
Table 8-1 – Threats Related to Objectives.................................................................................52
Table 8-2 – Organizational Security Policies mapped to Environment Objectives ...................52
Table 8-3 – Environment Objectives Mapped to Assumptions .................................................54
Table 8-4 – Objectives Related to Requirements.......................................................................56
Table 8-5 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements Dependencies..............................64
Table 8-6 – Summary of environmental Security Functional Requirements Dependencies......64
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 5 February 13, 2006
1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target Identification
This is version 5.1.7 of the ST Document for PR/SM Microcode on IBM System z9 (z9-109). The document date
is February 13, 2006.
1.2 Security Target Overview
This Security Target was developed for the evaluation of PR/SM for the z9-109 platform according to the
Common Criteria level EAL5. The intention of this Security Target is also to show the compliance of PR/SM
with the requirements identified in the Common Criteria for those functions identified in this document.
Chapter 1 contains general introductory information, ST identification, target assurance level and reference
information.
Chapter 2 is a detailed description of the TOE, including the version subject for this evaluation and an overview
of the LPAR architecture and design.
Chapter 3 discusses the TOE Security environment, including assumptions (A.xx), threats (T.xx), and
organizational security policies (P.xx).
Chapter 4 contains a definition of the Security Objectives (O.xx) and Environment Security Objectives (OE.xx)
Chapter 5 contains details of the Security Function Policies (SFP) and Security Functional Requirements (SFR).
Chapter 6 is the TOE Summary Specification describing how LPAR is initialized as well as where LPAR resides
in storage. Additionally, a general overview of the flow of information between LPAR and the HMC is provided.
TOE Security Functions (SF) are described and TOE assurance requirements are discussed.
Chapter 7 is the Protection Profile Conformance Claim.
Chapter 8 is the Rationale section, containing rationale for the Security Objectives, Security Requirements, TOE
Summary Specification, Internal Consistency and Mutual Support, and Strength of Function.
Appendix A is a glossary of Common Criteria terminology.
Appendix B is a glossary of terminology specific to PR/SM and LPAR.
Description of the TOE
The TOE is the PR/SM Microcode kernel running on the z9-109. The z9-109 general-purpose data processing
systems can only be initialized in LPAR mode. PR/SM provides the capability that enables the z9-109 to be
initialized in LPAR mode.
PR/SM is a hardware facility that enables the resources of a single physical machine to be divided between
distinct, predefined logical machines, called “logical partitions”. Each logical partition is a domain of execution
and is considered to be an object capable of running a conventional System Control Program (SCP) such as
z/OS™
, z/VM™
, VIF, VM/ESA®
, VSE/ESA™
, TPF or LINUX.
PR/SM licensed internal code (LIC) provides the Security Administrator the ability to define a completely secure
system configuration. When the system is defined in such a manner, total separation of the logical partitions is
achieved thereby preventing a partition from gaining any knowledge of another partition’s operation.
Only functions related to logical partition isolation, physical resource allocation, access control and audit are the
subject of this Security Target. Additional functions of PR/SM related to normal operations and maintenance of
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 6 February 13, 2006
the system are not considered as security enforcing functions because the TOE will be configured to provide a
configuration consistent with secure isolation such that these operations cannot be in conflict with the security
policy of PR/SM.
The other functions are therefore not evaluated for correctness and no vulnerability analysis for those functions is
performed.
1.3 Assurance Level
The assurance level for this Security Target is EAL5. The business requirements for customers of the z9-109
identify EAL5 as the necessary assurance level for evaluation. This is due to the strong need to have logical
partitions provide the same isolation as air-gapped systems. A high assurance level is needed to satisfy this need.
1.4 CC Conformance Claim
This ST is CC Part 2 conformant and Part 3 conformant, with a claimed Evaluation Assurance Level of EAL5.
The evaluation is based on the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CCIMB-99-
031, Version 2.1, August 1999, Parts 1 to 3.
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 7 February 13, 2006
2 TOE Description
2.1 Definition of TOE
The target of the evaluation is the PR/SM Microcode kernel running on the IBM z9-109 hardware
platform which includes the following models.
z9-109 MODEL NUMBER Feature Code Number of Cps
S08 4501 1
S08 4502 2
S08 4503 3
S08 4504 4
S08 4505 5
S08 4506 6
S08 4507 7
S08 4508 8
S18 4509 9
S18 4510 10
S18 4511 11
S18 4512 12
S18 4513 13
S18 4514 14
S18 4515 15
S18 4516 16
S28 4517 17
S28 4518 18
S28 4519 19
S28 4520 20
S28 4521 21
S28 4522 22
S28 4523 23
S28 4524 24
S38 4525 25
S38 4526 26
S38 4527 27
S38 4528 28
S38 4529 29
S38 4530 30
S38 4531 31
S38 4532 32
Table 2-1 – z9-109 Models and Number of CPs
The above mentioned hardware is not part of the TOE.
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 8 February 13, 2006
The TOE subject of this Security Target is Microcode Driver Level D63 Date: 15 Sept 2005 at MCL bundle 12
with patches TMCF RJ996777D2, and TMCF RJ996777D3. This is also called the Licensed Internal Code. For
the remainder of this document, the Licensed Internal Code (LIC) described above will be referred to as LPAR.
2.2 PR/SM Overview
IBM introduced the System z9-109 enterprise servers designed for the high-performance e-business data and
transaction serving requirements. The z9-109 provides tools for managing e-business, new application
flexibility, and new innovative technology that are designed to meet those demands. The brand of servers offers
numerous upgrade options from S/390
®
9672 Generations 5 and 6 server models. S/390 operations are fully
compatible with the new architecture - z/Architecture
™
, based upon 64-bit real addressing. S/390 applications
are fully compatible with z/Architecture, insuring viability for S/390 information assets, and S/390 technology.
z9-109 General Purpose Models
System z9-109 general purpose models provide high performance and flexibility due to an improved design and
use of technology advances. The design of these models supports:
• Z/Architecture
• ESA/390 architecture (ESA/390 or ESA/390 TPF)
• Parallel Sysplex
®
• Intelligent Resource Director (IRD)
• WorkLoad Manager
• Dynamic CHPID Management
• I/O Priority Queuing.
• Hardware Management Console control
• Logically partitioned (LPAR) operating mode
• Internal Coupling Facility CPs (ICFs)
• LINUX
• IBM Enterprise Systems Connection Architecture (ESCON
®
Architecture) and technology for the
ESCON channels.
• FICON
™
Architecture and FICON channels
• Parallel channels
• Coupling links
• InterSystem Coupling-3 (ISC-3) links
• Integrated Cluster Bus (ICB-3 and ICB-2) links
• Internal Coupling-3 (IC-3) links
• Increased number of subchannels
• IEEE Floating Point operations
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 9 February 13, 2006
• Multiple Image Facility (MIF)
• Cryptographic coprocessor features
• Open Systems Adapter 2 (OSA-2) features
• Open Systems Adapter Express features
• Internal Queued Direct Communication
• Data compression
• Dynamic I/O configuration
• CHPID assignment
• Internal Battery Feature
• Power Sequence Control
• Sysplex Timer
®
attachment
• Subspace Group facility
• Dedicated Move Page Engine
• Fast Sync/Data Mover
• Immediate and Relative Instruction facility
• Perform Locked Operation facility
• Logical string assist
• Modified Operating Environments
• Capacity upgrade on demand (CUoD)
• High levels of reliability, availability, and serviceability
• Online information
• Information in IBM Resource Link
™
PR/SM is a hardware facility that enables the resources of a single physical machine to be divided between
distinct, predefined logical machines called "logical partitions". Each logical partition is a domain of execution,
and is considered to be a subject capable of running a conventional system control program (SCP) such as z/OS,
z/VM, VM/ESA, TPF or Linux. These operating systems run in a PR/SM partition.
Access Modes and States
activated - in this state, a logical partition can access system resources via SIE mode.
allocated - a partition may only use a resource that is allocated to it.
attached - IO devices are attached to control units, and control units are attached to channel paths. This
connectivity is described in the IOCDS part of the configuration. I/O devices are considered to be attached
to the channel paths to which their control units are attached.
authorized - a logical partition may be authorized to perform certain tasks with security implications. The
possible authorizations are:
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 10 February 13, 2006
y I/O configuration control authority - the partition can update any IOCDS which is not write
protected
y Global performance data control authority - the partition can view CPU and Input/Output Processor
busy data for all logical partitions
y Cross-partition control authority - the partition can issue system control instructions that affect other
partitions, i.e. to reset or deactivate another partition.
candidate access - a channel path or I/0 device may only be allocated to a logical partition which has
candidate access to it. The Security Administrator defines which partitions have access to which paths as
part of the IOCDS. The IOCP User’s Guide describes how the IOCDS is set up using the IOCP utility. In
the IOCDS, the access list for each device defines which partitions have candidate access to the device. The
initial access list and candidate access list for each channel path together define which partitions have
candidate access to the channel path.
check-stopped - this state indicates that a physical or logical processor has been subject to an unrecoverable
failure.
deactivate- in this state, a logical partition is prevented from running, i.e. it is denied access to all objects.
dedicated - a dedicated channel path is ever allocated to only a single partition. A dedicated physical
processor is used exclusively by a single partition while the logical processor executing on the dedicated
processor is online and not check-stopped. (Note that the exclusivity is only between partitions: a dedicated
processor is still shared with the PR/SM controlling code).
isolated - when a partition is isolated, its non-shared channel paths remain allocated to the partition even
when the channel path is off-line.
online/off-line - a logical processor or channel path may be configured online or off-line. A resource cannot
be used while it is off-line.
reconfigurable - a reconfigurable resource may be moved between partitions, but is allocated to at most one
partition at any one time.
shared - the resource may be allocated to more than one partition at once.
write protected - the IOCDS part of a configuration cannot be modified by any partition if it is write
protected.
The TOE is implemented in LIC (licensed internal code), which is microcode licensed by IBM. The use of LIC
prevents untrusted code from masquerading as part of the TOE and abusing TOE privileges. The TOE is
composed of:
a) Logical partition (LPAR) LIC, which is the LIC that is responsible for maintaining the isolation of
partitions;
b) Hardware Management Console/Support Element LIC, which provides the system administration,
functions to maintain the current configuration.
The Hardware Management Console (HMC) / Support Element (SE) workplace is the window from where you
start tasks for monitoring and operating the CPC (central processor complex). Your user profile determines
which tasks and controls you can use on the workplace. Not all tasks are available for each user.
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 11 February 13, 2006
The following predefined default user IDs are established as part of a base Hardware Management Console.
Operator - A person with Operator authority typically performs basic system startup and shutdown operations
using predefine procedures.
Advanced Operator - A person with Advanced Operator authority possesses Operator authority plus the ability to
perform some additional recovery and maintenance tasks.
System Programmer - A person with System Programmer authority has the ability to customize the system in
order to determine its operation.
Access Administrator - A person with Access Administrator authority has the ability to create, modify, or delete
user profiles on the Hardware Management Console or for service mode on the support element. A user profile
consists of a user identification, a password, managed resource roles and task roles
Service Representative - A person with Service Representative authority has access to tasks related to the repair
and maintenance of the system.
The following general definitions apply to the above default user IDs:
Security Administrator – any user(s) of the HMC who is defined with the authority of a System Programmer or
Service Representative.
System Administrator - the System Administrator is defined to be any user(s) with access to the Hardware
Management Console (HMC).
The following table lists the console actions and the corresponding default user IDs that can perform these
console actions.
Table 2-1 – Default System Administrator User IDs and Console Actions
Default User ID
Console Actions
OPERATOR ADVANCED SYSPROG ACSADMIN SERVICE
View Console Events X X X X X
View Console Service History X X X X X
Save/Restore Customizable Console Data X
Customize Console Data/Time X X X X X
Change Console Internal Code X X X
Single Step Console Internal Code X X X
Backup Critical Console Data X X
Perform a Console Repair Action X
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 12 February 13, 2006
Default User ID
Console Actions
OPERATOR ADVANCED SYSPROG ACSADMIN SERVICE
View Console Information X X X X X
User Profiles X
Customize User Controls X
Password Profiles X
User Settings X X X X X
Customize Scheduled Operations X X
Transmit Console Service Data X X X X X
Authorize Internal Code Changes X X
Domain Security X X
Installation Complete Report X
Report a Problem X X X X
View Console Tasks Performed X
Network Diagnostic Information X X X X X
Rebuild Vital Product Data X
Archive Security Logs X X
View Security Logs X X
Save Upgrade Data X
Reassign Hardware Management Console X
Enable Electronic Service Agent X
Format Media X X X X X
Offload Virtual RETAIN Data to DVD-
RAM
X X X X X
Copy Console Logs to Diskettes X
Transmit Vital Product Data X X
Manage Remote Support Requests X X X X X
Manage Remote Connections X X X X X
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
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Default User ID
Console Actions
OPERATOR ADVANCED SYSPROG ACSADMIN SERVICE
Certificate Management X X X
Change Password X X X X X
Configure 3270 Emulators X
Copy Support Element Data X
Enable FTP Access to Mass Storage Media X
Format Security Logs to DVD-RAM X X
Hardware Management Console Settings X X X X
Configure Data Replication X
Customize Remote Service X X X X X
Customize API Settings X
Customize Auto Answer Settings X X X X
Customize Automatic Logon X
Customize Console Services X X X
Customize Customer Information X X
Customize Modem Settings X X
Customize Network Settings X X
Customize Outbound Connectivity X X
Customize Product Engineering Access X
Object Locking Settings X X X X
Users and Tasks X X X X X
Logoff or Disconnect X X X X X
Monitor System Events X
Shutdown or Restart X X X X X
View Licenses X X X X X
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 14 February 13, 2006
The following table lists the tasks that can be performed on the objects and the corresponding default
user IDs.
Table 2-2 – Default System Administrator User IDs and Tasks
Default User IDs
Tasks
OPERATOR ADVANCED SYSPROG ACSADMIN SERVICE
Daily
Activate X X X X
Reset Normal X X X X
Deactivate X X X X
Grouping X X
Activity X X X X X
Recovery
Single Object Operations X X X X X
Start All X X X
Stop All X X X
Reset Normal X X X X
PSW Restart X X X
Reset Clear X X X X
Load X X X X
Integrated 3270 Console X X X X
Integrated ASCII Console X X X X
Service
Service Status X X X X X
Perform Problem Analysis X X X
View Service History X X X X
Backup Critical Data X X
Restore Critical Data X
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 15 February 13, 2006
Default User IDs
Tasks
OPERATOR ADVANCED SYSPROG ACSADMIN SERVICE
Report a Problem X X X X
Transmit Service Data X X X X X
Archive Security Logs X X
Format Security Logs to DVD-RAM X X
Change Management
Engineering Changes (ECs) X X
Single Step Internal Code Changes X X X
Retrieve Internal Code X X X
Change Internal Code X X X
Product Engineering Directed Changes X
System Information X X X X X
Alternate Support Element X X
Special Code Load X
Alternate Support Element Engineering
Change (ECs)
X X
Concurrent Upgrade Engineering Changes
(ECs)
X X
Remote Customization
Remote Service X X
Customer Information X X
Support Element Operations Guide X X X X X
Operational Customization
Customize/Delete Activation Profiles X
Customize Activity Profiles X X X X X
View Activation Profiles X X X
Automatic Activation X
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 16 February 13, 2006
Default User IDs
Tasks
OPERATOR ADVANCED SYSPROG ACSADMIN SERVICE
Customize Scheduled Operations X X
Customize Support Element Date/Time X X X X X
Change LPAR Controls X X
Configure Channel Path On/Off X X
Reassign Channel Path X X X
OSA Advanced Facilities X X
Enable I/O Priority Queuing X X
Change LPAR I/O Priority Queuing X X
Object Definition
Change Object Definition X X
Add Object Definition X X
Remove Object Definition X
Reboot Support Element X X
Configuration
Transmit Vital Product Data X X
View Frame Layout X
Edit Frame Layout X
System (Sysplex) Time X X
The address space of the TSF is isolated from the address space of the partitions by hardware protection
mechanisms (the SIE instruction provided by the underlying processor as described below), and by the provision
of separate hardware for the Support Element and I/O (SAP) processors. The TSF LIC and data is therefore
protected from modification or tampering.
The Security Administrator uses an I/O configuration utility (IOCP) to define an Input/Output
configuration data set (IOCDS) of the I/O resources and their allocation to specific logical partitions.
The IOCDS may be verified by the Security Administrator prior to activating the partitions. PR/SM
allows I/O resources to be dedicated to a single partition, relocatable amongst a defined set of
partitions, or shared by a defined set of partitions. When a System Administrator wishes to activate a
partition, the activation request is initiated from the HMC. LPAR will receive an external interrupt
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 17 February 13, 2006
and issue an instruction to obtain the description of the partition the System Administrator wishes to
activate. LPAR will attempt to construct the partition and will inform the HMC of the success or
failure of the command.
Several different configurations may be stored, but only one is in effect at any time. The configuration becomes
effective as part of the activation sequence.
Standard hardware resources such as a central processor, including computation and control registers, timers,
clocks and optional co-processors, storage; and I/O resources are objects allocated to logical partitions. These
objects are subject to a non-discretionary access control policy under which each logical partition is only
permitted access to resources allocated to it. Logical partitions are logical objects that are built from existing
physical objects. These logical objects fall into one of three classes:
a) Logical processor facilities, which are supported by similar physical objects. Each such logical object
is represented by an internal control block that contains current state information each time context is
switched to a different logical partition.
b) Logical storage, both central and expanded, is represented by the same amount of contiguous physical
storage. PR/SM does not perform paging or move logical partitions once they have been placed in real
storage. Physical storage can be de-allocated from one logical partition and reallocated to another. This
feature can be disabled, and is subject to full object reuse control.
c) Logical I/O resources (channels) are implemented by physical resources of the same type. Such
resources can be configured so that they are not shared by partitions. A channel can be de-allocated from
one logical partition and reallocated to another, under the control of the Security Administrator.
The zArchitecture and ESA/390 architecture support two instruction states: problem and supervisor. Problem
state instructions can be executed in either problem or supervisor state. Semi-privileged instructions can be
executed in supervisor state, or in problem state subject to one or more additional authorizations. Privileged
instructions can be executed only in supervisor state. PR/SM exports a virtual machine including all architected
instructions, and initiates the execution in supervisor state, so that all three classes of instruction can be executed
within the logical partition. Thus each logical partition has both execution states available. PR/SM does not
interfere with the logical partition's use of those states.
A system control program (SCP) running in a logical partition can support System z9-109 and ESA/390
architectural mode. This is set when a partition is defined, and cannot be altered while the partition is activated.
PR/SM supports and uses the "start interpretive execution" (SIE) instruction to create an interpretative execution
environment in which the logical partitions execute. PR/SM begins execution in non-SIE mode. When a logical
partition is to be activated PR/SM establishes the parameters for each logical processor allocated to the partition
in a control block called a "state description". PR/SM executes a SIE instruction, which dispatches the logical
processor in SIE mode. The PR/SM hardware executes instructions in the logical processor in SIE mode until an
exception condition occurs, which causes control to return to PR/SM in non-SIE mode. The exception
conditions are events that cannot be handled in interpretative mode. PR/SM receives control in non-SIE mode.
PR/SM maintains a state description for each logical processor of each logical partition so that each time a
logical processor is dispatched, it is in the same context as when it last had control. Since this state description is
updated by the hardware, it is impossible for one logical partition to acquire control with the wrong context (i.e.
the context of another logical partition). The non-SIE/SIE distinction is a powerful privilege differentiation
between PR/SM and the logical partitions.
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
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In LPAR mode, the System z9-109 provides support for several features that are very helpful in many customer
environments. However, these features are not recommended in a secure environment. As a result, the TOE
provides security related controls to disable such features assuring separation of the logical partition(s). The
security related controls are outlined below:
y Logical Partition Isolation
This control reserves reconfigurable unshared channel paths for the exclusive use of a logical partition.
Channel paths assigned to an isolated logical partition are not available to other logical partitions and
remain reserved for that LP when they are configured offline.
y I/O Configuration Control Authority
This control can limit the ability of the logical partition to read or write any IOCDS in the configuration
locally or remotely. Logical partitions with control authority for the I/O configuration data can read and
write any non-write protected IOCDS in the configuration, and can change the I/O configuration
dynamically.
y Global Performance Data Control Authority
This control limits the ability of a logical partition to view central processor activity data for other
logical partitions. Logical partitions with control authority for global performance data can view CP
utilization data and Input/Output (IOP) busy data for all of the logical partitions in the configuration. A
logical partition without control authority for the performance data can view only the CP utilization data
for itself.
y Cross-Partition Authority
This control can limit the capability of the logical partition to issue certain control program instructions
that affect other logical partitions. Logical partitions with cross-partition authority can issue instructions
to perform a system reset of another logical partition, deactivate any other logical partition, and provide
support for the automatic reconfiguration facility.
In addition to the security controls mentioned above, the TOE also insures that central and expanded storage for
each logical partition is isolated and cannot be shared with other logical partitions. The TOE rigidly enforces this
“no sharing” rule during logical partition definition, logical partition activation, logical partition reconfiguration
and during logical partition execution.
The TOE also “removes” central processors (CPs) from logical partitions by virtualizing physical CPs.
Virtualized physical CPs are referred to as logical processors. Within the TOE, each logical CP is represented as
a data structure that is associated with its specific logical partitions preventing the transfer of data between
partitions.
Thus, when PR/SM is initialized for secure operation, one partition cannot gain access to the data within another
partition nor modify any aspect of another partition.
With z/Architecture or ESA/390 architecture (which includes the functions of ESA/370 Architecture), these
models have problem-program compatibility with S/360, S/370, and 4300 processors. They can access virtual
storage in multiple address spaces and data spaces. This extends addressability for system, sub-system, and
application functions that use z/Architecture or ESA/390 architectures.
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
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2.3 Design Considerations
2.3.1 Introduction
This section identifies which architectural components within the PR/SM product are responsible for
implementing each security function, and describes why the functions performed by these components cannot be
disabled, interfered with or bypassed by interactions with other components.
The architectural components of PR/SM, the external entities and the possible interactions between them are
identified in Section 2.3.1, based on the architectural design. The low-level design and code are correct
refinements of this architectural design, and therefore no new interactions between components are introduced at
lower levels in the design (because there are no untrusted sub-components within the PR/SM architectural
components). These design representations therefore only need to be considered where the architectural design
contains insufficient detail to determine whether a binding error exists or not.
Particular design binding issues are discussed as follows:
a) the duplication of the configuration in different components in Section 2.3.3;
b) the multiple instantiation of the LPAR component in Section 2.3.4;
2.3.2 Possible Interactions
• Architectural Components
The architectural components in PR/SM are:
a) Support Element Code (SE) on the SE hardware, including DASD (holding IOCDSs) and an
associated Hardware Management Console (HMC);
b) LPAR LIC, running as part of each logical processor (when in LPAR mode) on the central processor
hardware;
• External Entities
The external entities in PR/SM are:
a) the SCP code running on each logical processor, which executes instructions and causes interrupts;
b) resources (processor elements, storage, channel units, devices);
c) the System Administrator at the HMC console.
d) Central Processor LIC (CP, i390 millicode), including execution elements and the caches for
instructions and data being processed;
e) Channel Subsystem (CSS), including channel and I/O processor (IOP) LIC, expanded storage;
f) System Control Element (SCE), including main storage and caches for access to this storage.
The latter three components are referred to collectively in this document as the resource access components, as
they are the means by which the system accesses the physical processor, storage and channel resources.
• Interactions
The System Administrator interacts with PR/SM through the HMC/SE component only.
The resources interact with the PR/SM through the resource access components only.
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Although some of the SCP code effectively runs directly on the physical processor, all security-relevant
interactions are intercepted by the logical processor management function of the LPAR component.
Communications from a partition are relayed to the SE via LPAR.
LPAR mediates all communications with the SE. The security-relevant interactions between the SE and LPAR
components are those relating to changes in the configuration of the product (e.g. activation of partitions,
allocation of storage).
The security-relevant interactions between the LPAR and the resource access components are:
a) the establishment of resource ownership by LPAR to be enforced by the resource access components
(e.g. storage protection, channel ownership);
b) resource events (e.g. I/O interrupts) to be directed to the appropriate partition by LPAR.
2.3.3 Binding of Configuration in SE and LPAR
The binding of many of the security functions depends on the binding between the current configuration held in
the Support Element (SE), and the current configuration being enforced by LPAR. This is discussed in this
section.
Modifications to the configuration are serialized through the SE, regardless of whether they are made by the
Security Administrator (where changes are input from the console) or authorized partitions (Service calls are
passed on to the SE by LPAR). The serialization is via the request/response nature of the interface between the
SE and LPAR, via the use of the System Logical Processor to serialize LPAR actions, and via the use of locks to
serialize access to the configuration (e.g. serialization of access to IOCDS).
On receipt of a request to change the configuration, the SE validates the request and then sends a request to
LPAR to implement the change. LPAR attempts to do so, and returns a response on completion. The SE will
only change the stored configuration if LPAR succeeds in implementing the change.
The only security-relevant attributes of the configuration (i.e. attributes that are referenced in security functions)
that may change independently of the SE are:
a) whether or not processors are check-stopped;
b) the online/offline status of processors;
c) the online/offline status of channels and devices.
Changes to these statuses are communicated to the SE by LPAR.
The configuration is stored in the SE and in the system area of main storage, which is allocated on system
initialization. Storage protection mechanisms ensure that partitions cannot modify this configuration directly.
Because of this, only modifications permitted by the security functions can be made to the configuration i.e. the
configuration cannot be interfered with. No functions are provided in the interface to the SE or LPAR to disable
the enforcement of this configuration. The enforcement of the configuration by LPAR cannot be bypassed,
because there is no means for the partitions to bypass the entry of LPAR mode and the interception of security-
relevant instructions and interrupts.
From the above, all security functions that are concerned with the enforcement of the configuration cannot be
disabled, bypassed or interfered with.
2.3.4 Binding of LPAR Instances
Of significance to the binding analysis is the fact that the LPAR LIC is distributed between processors, and is
also reentrant. There is therefore the potential for interference between different instances of the LPAR LIC.
This is overcome by the use of semaphores, locks, and a single system logical processor, which serializes LPAR
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
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actions where global processing is required (as in Section Binding of Configuration in SE and LPAR). The
correct implementation of these serialization mechanisms is a correctness and not an effectiveness issue, except
for possible covert timing channels caused by the serialization, which are identified in the 'construction
vulnerability analysis.
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3 TOE Security Environment
3.1 TOE Environment and Usage Description
PR/SM is intended for use in environments where separation of workloads is a requirement, but where the use of
a single hardware platform is desirable for reasons of economy, flexibility, security or management.
The acquisition and management of computer systems is subject to economies of scale in many areas. Leasing
or purchase costs may be lower for a single large machine than for a number of smaller machines of equivalent
total processing capacity. There may also be savings in operational costs resulting from lower machine room
capacity and fewer operations staff.
PR/SM provides flexibility by allowing the single machine to be set up to provide a wide range of virtual
machine configurations. As one workload grows, more resources can be allocated to it, providing significant
advantages where the required configuration is subject to frequent change.
PR/SM provides the facility to partition a single platform to run any combination of z/OS*, z/VM*, VIF*,
VM/ESA*, VSE/ESA*, TPF or LINUX allowing requirements for different operating system environments to
be met.
Where confidentiality is a concern, PR/SM provides separation of workloads, and prevents the flow of
information between partitions. This trusted separation may be used where the separation is based on need to
know, or where data at differing national security classifications must be isolated.
3.2 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed below are assumed to exist in a secure LPAR environment and are outside the
security functionality of the TOE.
A.Data_Secure – Physical and/or controlled access of TOE audit log is required
The TOE records security-relevant actions performed by the System Administrator in an audit
log. The TOE will prune the audit log to two-thirds (2/3) of its capacity when the audit log has
been filled. It is the customer’s responsibility to back-up the audit log prior to the log reaching
capacity. Physical access of archived audit log data is also the responsibility of the customer.
A.Phys_Secure – Physical protection of processor, I/O and HMC is required
The environment of the hardware is physically secured against unauthorized access. Access to I/O
devices is restricted to authorized personnel. In particular the hardware management console and the
Local Area Network (LAN) connecting it to the SEs must be physically protected from access other
than by authorized system administrators.
A.No_Remote - The remote support facility must be disabled.
The phone line and modem connection to the remote support center must be disabled to prohibit
unauthorized connections for remote service.
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A.Sep_Mode - Strict Separation Mode
A strict separation virtual machine monitor (SVMM) restricts the allocation of resources so that there is
absolutely no sharing of objects amongst their clients. Although PR/SM may be configured as a SVMM,
it may also be configured to run in a mode where sharing of some resources is permitted. To be used as a
strict separation virtual machine monitor, PR/SM must be configured in the following manner:
1. Devices must be configured so that no device is accessible by more than one partition (although they
may be accessible by more than one channel path);
2. Each I/O (physical) control unit must be allocated to a single partition in the current configuration;
3. The Security Administrator must not reconfigure a channel path unless all attached devices and
control units are attached to that path only;
4. The Security Administrator must ensure that all devices and control units on a reconfigurable path
are reset before the path is allocated to another partition;
5. No channel paths must be shared between partitions;
6. The amount of reserved storage for a partition must be zero;
7. The System Administrator must ensure that the number of processors and coprocessors dedicated to
activated partitions is less than the total number available.
8. Dynamic I/O configuration changes must be disabled (i.e. changes require a power-on reset);
9. I/O Priority Queuing must be disabled.
10. Workload Manager must be disabled so that CPU and I/O resources are not managed across
partitions.
11. No partition must be configured to enable hipersockets (Internal Queued Direct I/O).
12. Partitions must be prevented from receiving performance data from resources that are not allocated
to them (no partition should have global performance data control authority);
13. At most one partition can have I/O configuration control authority (i.e. no more than one partition
must be able to update any IOCDS) and this partition must be administered by a trustworthy
administrator (i.e. the administrator of this partition is considered a System Administrator of the
TOE);
14. The Security Administrator must ensure that write access is disabled for each IOCDS, unless that
IOCDS is to be updated (the current IOCDS must not be updated);
15. The Security Administrator must verify any changed IOCDS after a power-on reset with that
IOCDS, before any partitions have been activated (the Security Administrator may determine
whether the IOCDS has been changed by inspecting the date of the IOCDS);
16. No partition should have cross-partition control authority (i.e. no partition should be able to reset or
deactivate another partition).
17. No partition must have coupling facility channels that would allow communication to a Coupling
Facility partition.1
18. Replication of HMC Customizable Data must be disabled.
1
The coupling facility provides shared storage and shared storage management functions for the sysplex (for example, high
speed caching, list processing, and locking functions). Applications running on z/OS and OS/390 images in the sysplex
define the shared structures used in the coupling facility. These images efficiently share data so that a transaction processing
workload can be processed in parallel across the sysplex.
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A.Admin_Secure – Administrative Personnel Security
Logical partitions within the System z9-109 can be operated from the Hardware Management Console (HMC)
and the Support Element (SE). The administrator/operators of the system must be cleared for the highest security
classification of work being performed on the system.
3.3 Threats
3.3.1 Threats countered by the TOE
PR/SM may be used in a variety of threat environments, and for each intended use of the product an analysis
should be performed which compares the specific threats within that environment against the claimed
functionality.
The possible threats can be classified into the following two cases:
y Users may gain unauthorized access to data. Users may gain access to data belonging to another partition, for
which they do not have clearance, specific authorization, or a need-to-know. This may be achieved either
directly (for example, by reading storage allocated to another partition, or by failure to clear a resource before
reallocation), or indirectly (for example, through a covert channel). Unauthorized access to audit data may lead
to a false record of System Administrator actions.
y Users may gain unauthorized access to system resources (i.e. channel path, control unit, I/O device, physical
or logical processor): such actions being contrary to the security or resource policy of an Organization.
T.Access_Data – Illegal access to data
access by a partition to data that is not owned by that partition (i.e. data in the storage and I/O resources
allocated to another partition and not including system data);
T.Access_CPU – Illegal access or control of processors and storage
access by a partition to allocate or deallocate storage, logical processors or coprocessors outside the
limits of the configuration;
T.Access_IOCA – Illegal access of the I/O Configuration
access by a partition without I/O configuration control authority to any IOCDS;
T.Access_Perf – Illegal access to performance data
access by a partition without global performance data control authority to CPU and Input/Output
processor data for all partitions;
T.Lpar_XCTL – Illegal control of another logical partition
access by a partition without cross-partition control authority to current configuration data (to reset or
deactivate a partition only).
T.Obj_Reuse – Illegal transfer of data during context switch
data transferred with resources (object reuse) when those objects are reallocated from one
partition to another;
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T.Audit_Data – Illegal modification of the content of the security log.
By design, the contents of the security log cannot be modified while it is contained in the TOE. An
attacker might want to attempt to modify the audit log to remove any evidence that he setup the system
in a manner inconsistent with the directions in the Trusted Facility Manual (ref. Appendix C of the
PR/SM Planning Guide). Anyone attempting to modify the log would need intimate designer level
knowledge of the system, and have access to development tools.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE complies with the following organizational security policies:
P.SEP – Separation of hardware into partitions
The hardware of a Central Electronics Complex must be partitionable into several independent
partitions.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 TOE Security Objectives
This section defines the security objectives of the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to
counter identified threats and/or comply with any organizational security policies identified. Each objective is
stated in bold type font. An application note, in normal font, which supplies additional information and
interpretation, follows it.
O.Identity - Identity
The TOE must ensure that each logical partition has a unique identity.
A zone number uniquely identifies each logical partition.
O.Auth_Admin - Authorized Administration
The TOE provides facilities to enable an authorized administrator to effectively manage the TOE
and its security functions.
The security functions provided by the TOE are designed to enable secure administration of:
• IOCDSs
• Logical Processors and Storage.
• I/O Channel Paths, Control Units and Devices.
• Cross Partition Functions
• Performance Data Access
O.Auth_Ops - Authorized Operations
The TOE provides facilities to enable authorized users to effectively operate the TOE in a secure
manner.
The security functions provided by the TOE are designed to enable secure operation in the
following areas:
• Partition Activation
• Processor and Storage Allocation
• Processor Execution
• Message Transfers
O.Audit - Audit and Accountability
The TOE will provide the means of recording any security relevant events, so as to assist an
administrator in the detection of potential attacks or misconfiguration of the TOE security
features that would leave the TOE susceptible to attack, and also to hold users accountable for any
actions that they perform that are relevant to security.
The TOE will record the security-relevant actions of the System Administrator in an audit log.
Deletions, modifications and reading of the audit log are controlled in a secure manner.
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O.REUSE - Object Reuse
The TOE will provide the means of allowing a subject to use a resource or service without the user
identity or contents of the resource being disclosed to other entities.
The TOE will ensure no information is disclosed via storage, channels, physical processors or
coprocessors.
O.RESOURCE - Reliability of Service
The TOE will provide the means of controlling the use of resources by its users and subjects so as
to prevent unauthorized denial of service.
The TOE will provide functions that enable control of the physical processor running time and cross
partition functions.
4.2 Environment Security Objectives
The following are the security objectives that are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on the
TOE. That is, they do not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software. These
security objectives are assumed to be in place in the TOE environment. They are included as necessary to
support the TOE security objectives in addressing the security problem defined in the TOE security environment.
OE.Data_Store – Off-TOE Data Storage
Audit Log data stored off of the TOE must be controlled for confidentiality and integrity
according to the owner’s needs.
The audit log information from the TOE may be stored separately from the TOE for archival purposes.
The personnel and systems, if any, in charge of this information are responsible for the maintenance of
its required security.
OE.Perss – Personnel
Personnel working as System Administrators or other privileged positions must be carefully
selected and trained.
Since the System Administrator has full access to system data, careful selection and training of
administrators and others in privileged positions works to detect, prevent, or counter other attacks, and
deters compromise of system data.
OE.Sec_Setup – Secure Setup
The TOE must be protected during the setup phase.
The TOE shall be protected during the setup phase to ensure that the operations that have to be
performed in this phase to set up the TOE for normal operation within the intended environment and for
the intended operation is done in accordance with the guidelines within this Security Target. Verification
shall include inspection of the IOCDS definition, verification of the partition security controls, and
verification of the profiles.
OE.Phys_Prot – Restricted physical and remote access
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Physical access and remote access to the HMC and System z9-109 must be restricted only to
authorized and approved users.
The HMC and System z9-109 must be installed in restricted areas for the purposes of limiting
accessibility by company personnel and avoiding physical destruction or alteration of the hardware. In
particular the hardware management console and the Local Area Network (LAN) connecting it to the
SEs must be physically protected from access other than by authorized system administrators.
Additionally, this restricted access applies to the remote support facility as this is outside the scope of the
evaluations.
OE.SIE – Memory access control
The underlying hardware must provide separation mechanism that can be used by the TOE to
protect the TSF and TSF data from unauthorized access and modification.
The underlying processors must support the enforcement of memory access control defined by a caller of
a specific processor instruction.
OE.CHANNEL – Channel access control
The underlying physical I/O LIC must provide separation mechanism that can be used by the
TOE to restrict access of one partition to authorized logical I/O resources.
The physical I/O resources LIC must support the enforcement to restrict access requests from one
partition to the partition’s associated logical I/O resources.
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5 IT Security Requirements
5.1 TOE IT Security Requirements
This section contains the functional requirements that are satisfied by PR/SM on the IBM System z9-109.
5.1.1 TOE IT Security Functional Requirements
Table 5.1 lists the IT security functional components. Following the table, each requirement is listed with
assignments, and refinements (if any) indicated in bold type, and selections indicated in italic font.
5.1.1.1 TOE Security Function Policies
The TOE implements several policies that are mentioned in the security functional requirements. Those policies
are:
Access Control Security Function Policy (SFP)
The TOE implements an access control policy between subjects (users) and objects. The subjects or users are the
logical partitions (LPARs) defined in the IOCDS and the System Administrator. The objects are the physical
resources of the processor (CPs, storage, CHPIDS, audit data, performance data, IOCDSs, profiles, …). Access
to objects by subjects will be mediated by this policy to help insure that subjects are only able to gain access to
authorized objects.
Information Flow Control Security Function Policy (SFP)
The TOE implements an information flow control policy between subjects (users) and objects, and between
objects and objects. The subjects or users are the logical partitions (LPARs) defined in the IOCDS and the
System Administrator. The objects are the physical resources of the processor (CPs, storage, CHPIDS, audit
data, performance data, IOCDSs, profiles, …) and the logical processors instantiated on a physical processor on
behalf of a logical partition. Flow of information between objects and subjects, and between objects and objects
will be mediated by this policy to insure that information flow is only possible when subjects and objects are
associated with the same logical partition.
Memory Access Control Policy (SFP for the TOE environment)
The TOE underlying processor implements a memory access control policy enforced for instructions provided by
the processor (subjects), limiting access to memory locations of the hardware (objects). Using a particular
processor instruction, i.e. the SIE instruction, the processor can be loaded with memory ranges applicable for
subsequent instructions. In case privileged (supervisor mode) instructions are invoked, the processor remains
bound by the storage limitations imposed by the SIE instruction. The processor implements a second SIE
instruction that can be stacked on the first SIE, but this has no effect on the TOE, because the second SIE can
only be set within the scope of memory restrictions defined by the first SIE instruction, managed by the TOE.
Channel Access Control Policy (SFP for the TOE environment)
The TOE underlying hardware implements a channel access control policy enforced on channel subsystem
instructions (subjects), limiting access to I/O resources (objects).
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5.1.1.2 TOE Setup and Initialization
The TOE has to be setup and initialized such that a specific environment is defined.
5.1.1.3 Security Functional Components from the Common Criteria
The following table shows the security functional components selected from Part 2 of the Common Criteria.
Component Component Name
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Low
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control
FDP_IFF.1 Information Flow Control
FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine test
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_SEP.3 Complete reference monitor
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
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Component Component Name
FPT_TRC.1 Internal TSF consistency
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
Table 5-1 – Security Functional Components
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the basic level of audit; and
c) Auditable events include:
1. creating or modifying the IOCDS part of a configuration;
2. modifying the reconfigurable part of a configuration;
3. selecting a configuration;
4. performing a power-on reset;
5. activating or deactivating logical partitions.
6. logging on or off the console.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in
the ST:
• profile contents
• power-on reset options
Application note: The audit subsystem is always active and can be neither shut down nor be activated. Therefore,
FAU_GEN.1.1 a) does not apply.
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 The TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused
the event.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Security Administrator with the capability to read all audit
information from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been
granted explicit read-access.
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FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to perform searches, sorting
of audit data based on date or event criteria.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the audit records.
Application Note: AIS32/Interpretation 141 was considered for this SFR.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records and take no other actions if the audit
trail is full.
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP on the subjects [defined logical partitions and
the System Administrator] and objects [physical CPs, physical storage, CHIPDs / Control Units / Devices,
global performance data] and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject in the TSC and any object within the
TSC are covered by an access control SFP.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control (activation)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP to objects based on: Cross Partition Authority.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: a logical partition with cross-partition authority or a System
Administrator can deactivate or reset a logical partition.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control (allocation)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP to objects based on: resource limits (number of
logical processors, physical processor time slices, amount of storage).
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed:
A logical partition can allocate the resources
1. logical processor
2. storage
only within the resource limits as defined in the image profile.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules: [none].
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FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control (Channel path)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP to objects based on:
1. Candidate Access
2. Logical Partition Isolation Authority
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: a channel path may only be allocated to a logical partition with candidate
access to it.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules:
1. If a channel path is dedicated to a logical partition, it cannot be de-allocated from that partition.
2. If a channel path is reconfigurable and allocated to an logical partition with Logical Partition
Isolation Authority, it cannot be de-allocated from that partition.
3. A logical partition with Logical Partition Isolation Authority can deconfigure a CHPID and make
it available for use by another logical partition.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control (Control Unit/ Devices)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP to objects based on: Candidate Access.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed:
1. A logical partition has access to a control unit if the control unit is on a channel path allocated to
the logical partition.
2. A logical partition has access to a device if the device is attached to a control unit on a channel
path allocated to the logical partition, and the logical partition has candidate access to the device.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules: [none].
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the information flow control SFP on:
1. Subjects:
a. Activated logical partitions
2. Objects:
a. resources
b. storage
c. processors
d. co-processors
e. CHPIDs
f. I/O Control Units and Devices
which prevents the transfer of information between subjects and objects if they are not associated
with the same logical partition. The following operations are mediated:
• Read central storage
• Write central storage
• Read expanded storage
• Write expanded storage
• Read I/O
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• Write I/O
• Read central processor
• Write central processor
• Read co-processor
• Write co-processor
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the information flow control SFP based on the following types of subjects:
1. Activated Logical Partitions
and information security attributes:
1. partition identifier
2. Cross Partition Authority
3. Global Performance Data Authority
Application Note: This SFR was editorially refined without changing the requirement.
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information
via a controlled operation if the following rules hold:
1. Describable effect: When an operation is executed on behalf of a logical partition, the effects that
partition perceives must be capable of complete description only in terms of objects known to that
partition.
2. Isolation of effect: When an operation is executed on behalf of a partition, other partitions should
perceive no effects at all.
3. I/O isolation: I/O devices associated with a partition affect the state perceived by only that
partition.
4. I/O-State effect: I/O devices must not be able to cause dissimilar behavior to be exhibited by states
that a partition perceives as identical.
5. State-I/O effect: A partition's I/O devices must not be able to perceive differences between states
that the partition perceives as identical.
6. Isolation determinacy: The selection of the next operation to be executed on behalf of a partition
must depend only on the state of that partition.
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall provide the following list of additional SFP capabilities: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules:
1. the logical partition has cross-partition authority and the access is to reset or deactivate a
logical partition;
2. Transfer of a message between a logical partition and a resource can occur if the partition has
cross-partition authority and one of the following is true:
i) the message is a request to reset a partition,
ii) the message is a response to a request to reset a partition,
iii) the message is a request to deactivate a partition,
iv) the message is a response to a request to deactivate a partition.
3. A logical partition with Global Performance Data control authority can view the performance
data of all other logical partitions.
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FDP_IFF.1.6 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection
FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon
the allocation of the resource to all objects.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
1. Partition Identifier
2. Resource limits
3. Partition scheduling parameters
Application Note: Within the scope of the TOE, an individual user is a logical partition unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions
on behalf of that user.
Application Note: This identification requirement applies to logical partitions as well as administrative users
working on the HMC/SE.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (authorities)
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP, to restrict the ability to assign the security
attributes
1. I/O Configuration Control Authority,
2. Cross Partition Authority,
3. Logical Partition Isolation Authority,
4. Global Performance Data Control Authority
to the Security Administrator.
Application Note: According to A.Sep_Mode, 8., no logical partition should have Global Performance Data
Control Authority.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (resource limits)
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP, to restrict the ability to modify the security
attribute
1. Resource limits (number of logical processors, amount of storage)
2. Partition Scheduling Parameters
to the Security Administrator.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (candidate access)
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP, to restrict the ability to assign the security
attribute
1. candidate access
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to the Security Administrator.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP, to provide restrictive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the Security Administrator to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data (configuration)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the
• IOCDS part of the configuration
• reconfigurable part of the configuration
• image profile
• reset profile
to the Security Administrator or logical partition with I/O Configuration Control Authority.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: object
security attributes management.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Operator
• Advanced Operator
• System Programmer
• Service Representative
• Access Administrator.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note: Any of the above roles are associated with the generic role System Administrator. The roles
of System Programmer and Service Representative are associated with the generic role Security Administrator.
FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability
FPR_UNO.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any users/subjects are unable to observe any operation on any
object/resource by any other user/subject.
Application Note: Users/subjects are defined as the logical partitions and the software running in these partitions
which is a consistent view with FIA_ATD.1.
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing
FPT_AMT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at
the request of an authorized user, and as part of recovery actions to demonstrate the correct operation of the
security assumptions provided by the abstract machine that underlies the TSF.
Application Note: The possible value for selection “other conditions” has been refined to reflect the functionality
of the TOE.
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FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure and modification when it is transmitted between
separate parts of the TOE.
Application Note: Internal TSF data, specifically the audit log, is protected when synchronized between dual
SEs.
FPT_SEP.3 Complete reference monitor
FPT_SEP.3.1 The un-isolated portion of the TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that
protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.3.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
FPT_SEP.3.3 The TSF shall maintain the part of the TSF that enforces the access control and/or information
flow control SFPs in a security domain for its own execution that protects them from interference and tampering
by the remainder of the TSF and by subjects untrusted with respect to the TSP.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
Application Note: The TOE uses a hardware timer to maintain its own time stamp. This hardware timer is
protected from tampering by untrusted subjects. The start value for this timer may be set by the system
administrator, but the system administrator may also start a program that uses an external trusted time source to
set this initial value.
FPT_TRC.1 Internal TSF consistency
FPT_TRC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSF data is consistent when replicated between parts of the TOE.
FPT_TRC.1.2 When parts of the TOE containing replicated TSF data are disconnected, the TSF shall ensure the
consistency of the replicated TSF data upon reconnection before processing any requests for recording of
auditable events.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation,
at the request of the authorized user, at the conditions: performing a reset or recovery, to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF
executable code.
FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas
FRU_RSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce maximum quotas of the following resources:
1. physical processor time slices
that subjects can use over a specified period of time.
Application Note: The term “subject” is equivalent to “logical processors” in this context, since no other subjects
may use processor time slices.
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
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FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on
1. the unavailability of necessary physical resources (CPs, storage, channels)
2. exceeding the scheduling parameters for the logical partitions
5.1.2 TOE IT Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE will be conformant to the assurance requirements required for level EAL5.
5.2 Security Requirements for the IT Environment
The assumptions stated for the environment need to be satisfied by the IT environment. It is expected that any
system integrating the TOE will provide documentation and procedures as well as technical measures (e. g.
within the host system) to demonstrate that the assumptions are fulfilled and the policies are implemented. A
separate system audit or system accreditation process has to check this.
The only IT environment where requirements are stated is the underlying processor that has to provide the
mechanism to protect the TSF and TSF data from unauthorized access and tampering. This is expressed with
the following security functional requirement for the processor used to execute TOE software:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control (1)
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the memory access control policy on instructions as subjects and
memory locations as objects.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control (1)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the memory access control policy to objects based on the memory
configuration defined.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: access to memory locations is based on the memory configuration defined
by the invocation of the SIE instruction. When in SIE mode access to memory is restricted by the
environment defined when the SIE instruction was invoked.
Application Note: The SIE instruction causes the processor to adhere to memory definitions supplied with the
invocation of SIE. The processor only allows access to the defined memory. The “SIE mode” sets special
purpose registers in the processor, which are not visible to any application running on the processor.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following rule: [none].
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization (1)
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the memory access control policy to provide permissive default values
for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the no role to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
Application Note: The „default” values in this case are seen as the values the processor has after start-up.
They have to be „permissive”, since the initialization routine needs to set up the memory and must have the
ability to perform privileged instructions.
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FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control (2)
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the channel access control policy on I/O resource instructions as
subjects and logical I/O resources as objects.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control (2)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the channel access control policy to objects based on the logical I/O
resoure association with a partition ID.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: access to logical I/O devices is based on the partition ID of the requesting
logical partition.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following rule: [none].
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization (2)
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the channel access control policy to provide permissive default values
for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the no role to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
Application Note: The „default” values in this case are seen as the values the channel processor has after
start-up. They have to be „permissive”, since the initialization routine needs to set up the memory and must
have the ability to perform privileged instructions.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
As defined in chapter 2 the TOE consist of the PR/SM Microcode kernel running on the System z9-109
Hardware. This LIC implements the security functions specified in chapter 5. This chapter provides a more
detailed description of the TOE interfaces and internals and how the TOE implements the security functional
requirements.
The first section describes how LPAR is initialized as well as where LPAR resides in storage. This information is
provided to provide a better understanding of the secure nature of LPAR code.
The second section provides a general overview of the flow of information between LPAR and the HMC. The
last section describes the security functions of the TOE and relates them to the security functional requirements
listed in chapter 5.1.
6.1 LPAR Kernel
The LPAR core image is loaded into the Hardware System Area (HSA) by the Support Element. The Support
Element then sets the prefix register of one processor to the beginning of the image and restarts this processor
thereby turning control to LPAR initialization LIC. After LPAR initialization completes, a Security
Administrator may allocate system resources via partition definition panels.
The amount of storage used by LPAR in HSA depends on the number of physical processors installed, the
number of partitions defined, and the number of I/O devices defined in the IOCDS. All storage between X’0’ and
2 MB is reserved for LPAR’s core image. Since this area of HSA is reserved exclusively for LPAR’s core image,
“real” HSA is allocated starting at 2 MB in 1 MB increments. LPAR will allocate the rest of its storage in “real”
HSA. All other storage LPAR uses must fit below 2 GB in HSA.
HSA is an area of central storage that is inaccessible to programs resident in logical partitions and is therefore
secure.
6.2 Information Flow to/from HMC
Information flow between LPAR and the HMC is accomplished through a proprietary mechanism.
When a System Administrator wishes to activate a partition, the activation request is initiated from the HMC.
LPAR will receive an external interrupt and issue an instruction to obtain a description of the partition the
System Administrator wishes to activate. LPAR will attempt to construct the partition and will inform the HMC
of the success or failure of the command.
6.3 TOE Security Functions
The following section describes the security functions of the TOE and how they relate to the security functional
requirements listed in chapter 5.1. This provides a better understanding of the TOE security functions and the
mapping to the Common Criteria.
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6.3.1 TOE Security Functions Description
The following section provides a list of Security Functions of the TOE and describes how they map to the
Security Functional Requirements of Chapter 5.
6.3.1.1 Logical Partition Identity
The TOE implemented an Image profile to define the initial operational characteristics of a logical partition. In a
given configuration each logical partition is uniquely named and has a corresponding Image profile. One of the
parameters in the Image profile is the logical partition identifier (i.e. zone number). If a logical partition is in the
current configuration, then the zone number uniquely identifies that partition.
This security function contributes to satisfy the security functional requirement FIA_UID.2.
6.3.1.2 Authorized Administration
The authority level specified when defining a new user determines the tasks made available to that user. This
capability allows an authorized administrator to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions in the
following way:
a) The TOE will help to prevent access to the IOCDS part of a configuration by a user, unless
I/O Configuration Control is enabled AND IOCDS Write Protection is disabled AND the
user must be a Security Administrator (in the case of Standalone IOCP).
[Satisfies SFRs: FDP_ACC.2, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1]
b) The TOE will help to prevent access to the reconfigurable part of a configuration by a user unless
i. the user is the Security Administrator, or
ii the user is a logical partition and:
a) The logical partition has cross-partition control authority and the access is to deactivate or
reset a logical partition; or
b) The access is to deallocate storage or logical processor resources allocated to the partition
itself; or
c) The access is to allocate storage or logical processor resources to the partition itself.
[Satisfies SFRs: FDP_ACF.1 (Activation, Allocation), FDP_ACC.2, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1]
c) The TOE can be configured so that no logical partition has I/O configuration control authority. When it
is necessary to change an IOCDS, PR/SM can be configured so that only one logical partition has I/O
configuration control authority.
[Satisfies SFRs: FMT_MSA.1 (Authorities)]
d) The TOE can be configured so that no logical partition has cross-partition control authority.
[Satisfies SFRs: FMT_MSA.1 (Authorities)]
e) The TOE will permit the set of logical partitions with candidate access to a channel path to be restricted.
A channel path can only be allocated to a logical partition if that partition has candidate access to the
path. [Satisfies SFRs: FTA_TSE.1, FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path), FMT_MSA.1(candidate
access)]
f) The TOE will permit the set of logical partitions with candidate access to an I/O device on a shared
channel path to be restricted. An I/O device will not be allocated to a partition without candidate access
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to it, even if the shared channel path to which the device is attached is allocated to the partition.
[Satisfies SFRs: FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Control Unit/Devices)]
g) The TOE can be configured to help prevent the shared use of any channel path, control unit or I/O device
between logical partitions. [Satisfies SFRs: FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path, Control
Unit/Devices)]
h) The TOE will permit a channel path to be allocated exclusively to one logical partition either by
identifying the channel path as dedicated, or by designating the owning partition as isolated (isolation
only applies to the partition’s reconfigurable channel paths). The TOE will prevent the de-allocation of
such a channel path from the partition, even when the channel path is off-line. [Satisfies SFRs:
FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path), FDP_IFC.1]
i) The TOE will help to ensure that a reconfigurable or dedicated channel path is never shared. [Satisfies
SFRs: FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path), FDP_IFC.1]
j) The TOE will help to ensure that control units and I/O devices cannot be allocated independently of the
channel path to which they are attached. A control unit is allocated to a partition if a channel path to
which it is attached is allocated to the partition. An I/O device is allocated to a partition if a control unit
to which it is attached is allocated to the partition, and the partition has candidate access to the device.
[Satisfies SFRs: FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path, Control Unit/Devices)]
k) The TOE can be configured so that a logical partition has dedicated use of the physical processors
allocated to it. The TOE will ensure that a dedicated physical processor is allocated to only one logical
partition, and will prevent the de-allocation of the physical processor while the logical processor using it
is online and not check-stopped. [Satisfies SFRs: FDP_ACC.2, FPR_UNO.1, FDP_IFC.1]
l) The TOE can be configured so that no logical partitions have global performance data control authority.
In this case, a logical partition will only be able to gather performance data about the resources allocated
to it. [Satisfies SFRs: FMT_MSA.1 (Authorities), FPR_UNO.1, FDP_ACC.2]
6.3.1.3 Authorized Operations
The authority level specified when defining a new user determines the tasks made available to that user. This
capability allows an authorized administrator to effectively operate the TOE and its security functions in the
following way:
a) The TOE will help ensure that only logical partitions in the current configuration are activated. Only
activated partitions and the System Administrator will be permitted access to objects. [Satisfies SFRs:
FDP_ACC.2, FIA_UID.2, FMT_MSA.1 (resource limits), FMT_SMR.1]
b) The TOE will help ensure that logical processor is allocated exclusively to a single partition, and that the
number of logical processors allocated to a partition does not exceed the limit specified in the current
configuration. Once deallocated, a logical processor cannot be reallocated to another partition. [Satisfies
SFRs: FDP_ACF.1 (allocation), FIA_ATD.1, FTA_TSE.1, FMT_MSA.1 (resource limits)]
c) The TOE will help ensure that a storage resource is never shared, and that the amount of storage
allocated to a logical partition does not exceed the limit specified in the current configuration. [Satisfies
SFRs: FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (allocation), FDP_IFC.1, FIA_ATD.1, FPR_UNO.1, FTA_TSE.1,
FMT_MSA.1 (resource limits)]
d) The TOE will help ensure that at most one logical processor can execute on a physical processor at any
given time. Processors from different partitions may be dispatched on the same processor at different
times. [Satisfies SFR: FPR_UNO.1]
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e) The TOE will help prevent the transfer of a message between a logical partition and resources that are
not allocated to it, except where the logical partition is explicitly authorized to do so. For example,
PR/SM will intercept I/O interrupts that are not for the currently executing logical processor and will
present them to the appropriate logical processor. [Satisfies SFRs: FDP_IFC.1, FPR_UNO.1,
FDP_IFF.1]
6.3.1.4 Audit and Accountability
The TOE implemented a Security Log that is designed to always be enabled and contains a record of security
relevant events. The View Security Log task allows an administrator to view the log recorded while the Archive
Security Log task allows an administrator to create an archival copy of the security log. [satisfies SFRs :
FAU_SAR.1]. The View Security Log task also allows an administrator to search or sort the security relevant
events based on date or event criteria. [satisfies SFRs : FAU_SAR.3]. The log data assists an administrator in
detection of potential attack or misconfiguration of the TOE security features.
a) The TOE will record in an audit log the security-relevant actions of the System Administrator. [satisfies
SFRs: FAU_GEN.1] These actions are:
i. Creating or modifying the IOCDS part of a configuration;
ii. Modifying the reconfigurable part of a configuration;
iii. Selecting a configuration to become the next current configuration;
iv. Installing a selected configuration by a power-on reset, or activation;
v. Activating or deactivating logical partitions.
vi. Logging on or off the console.
b) Each audit log entry will be able to be associated with the identity of the System Administrator that
caused the event. [satisfies SFRs: FAU_GEN.2].
c) Each audit log entry contains a reliable timestamp. [satisfies SFRs: FPT_STM.1].
d) The TOE will prevent the deletion or modification of these audit records by any user, except when the
allocated audit space has been filled. In this case, the system will prune the log to two-thirds (2/3) of its
capacity. [satisfies SFRs: FAU_STG.1 and FAU_STG.4]. Note: When archiving audit logs to CD, the
audit log will be pruned to 20% of its capacity if the audit log exceeds 20% of the audit storage capacity.
e) The TOE will prevent the reading of the audit log by logical partitions.
[satisfies SFRs : FAU_SAR.2]
6.3.1.5 Object Reuse
The TOE ensures that the contents of physical processors, storage or I/O utilized by different logical partitions
will be cleared of any residual information before being utilized by the receiving logical partition.
a) The TOE will ensure the clearing of information from a storage resource before that resource is allocated
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to a logical partition. [Satisfies SFR: FDP_RIP.2]
b) The TOE will ensure that the information in a physical processor or coprocessor that is available to the
currently executing logical processor is unaffected by any previously executing logical processor from
another logical partition. For example, on a context switch, the control registers, general registers and
program status word in the physical processor will be restored to their previously saved values. [Satisfies
SFR: FPR_UNO.1, FDP_IFF.1]
c) The TOE will send a reset signal to a non-shared channel path and its attached I/O devices before that
channel is allocated to a logical partition. [Satisfies SFR: FDP_RIP.2]
6.3.1.6 Reliability of Service
The TOE implemented a Reset profile to define the initial operational characteristics of the physical processors.
[Satisfies SFR: FMT_MSA.3] Two of the parameters in the Reset profile are the processor running time and wait
completion. These parameters provide the ability to share physical processor resources on either an event-driven
basis or a time-driven basis. Disabling event driven dispatching causes shared physical processor resources to be
distributed on the basis of time intervals according to the weights specified to effectively prevent unauthorized
denial of service.
a) The TOE will enable the utilization of a physical processor resource by a logical partition to be
restricted. [Satisfies SFR: FRU_RSA.1]
b) The logical partition can be prevented from releasing allocated processor time, or from receiving more
than a configurable proportion of processor time. [Satisfies SFR: FTA_TSE.1]
6.3.1.7 Self Test
The TOE implemented a set of self-test functions that are executed when the TOE is started or reset [Satisfies
SFR: FPT_TST.1], and periodically during normal execution [Satisfies SFR: FPT_SEP.3]. These functions help
ensure that critical hardware functions work properly [Satisfies SFR: FPT_AMT.1, FPT_STM.1] and that the
TOE has not been tampered with when it was powered off. [Satisfies SFR: FPT_TST.1]
6.3.1.8 Alternate Support Element
The TOE implemented functions that permit a quick switch to another Support Element when the primary
Support Element has a hardware problem. Mirroring functions are performed on a regular basis to communicate
any hard disk changes from the primary SE to the alternate SE [Satisfies SFR: FPT_TRC.1]. The Support
Elements communicate using TCP/IP over a private Ethernet network that connects cage controllers and support
elements. [Satisfies SFR: FPT_ITT.1]
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6.3.2 Mapping of Security Functions and SFRs.
The following table shows the correspondence of the SFRs to the security functions of the TOE.
Component Security Functions
FAU_GEN.1 Audit and Accountability (a)
FAU_GEN.2 Audit and Accountability (b)
FAU_SAR.1 Audit and Accountability
FAU_SAR.2 Audit and Accountability (e)
FAU_SAR.3 Audit and Accountability
FAU_STG.1 Audit and Accountability (d)
FAU_STG.4 Audit and Accountability (d)
FDP_ACC.2 Authorized Operations (a),(c);
Authorized Administration (a,b,e,f,g,h,i,j,k,l)
FDP_ACF.1
(Activation)
Authorized Administration(b)
FDP_ACF.1
(Allocation)
Authorized Administration (b);
Authorized Operations (b),(c)
FDP_ACF.1
(Channel Path)
Authorized Administration (e),(g),(h),(i),(j)
FDP_ACF.1
(CU/Devices)
Authorized Administration (f),(g),(j)
FDP_IFC.1 Authorized Administration (h),(i),(k);
Authorized Operations (c),(e)
FDP_IFF.1 Authorized Operations (e);
Object Reuse (b)
FDP_RIP.2 Object Reuse (a),(c)
FIA_ATD.1 Authorized Operations (b,c)
FIA_UID.2 Logical Partition Identity, Authorized Operations (a)
FMT_MSA.1
(Authorities)
Authorized Administration (c),(d),(l)
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Component Security Functions
FMT_MSA.1
(Rsrc. Limits)
Authorized Operations (a),(b),(c)
FMT_MSA.1
(Cand. Access)
Authorized Administration (e)
FMT_MSA.3 Reliability of Service
FMT_MTD.1 Authorized Administration (a)
FMT_SMF.1 Authorized Administration(a),(b)
FMT_SMR.1 Authorized Administration(a),(b);
Authorized Operations (a)
FPR_UNO.1 Authorized Administration (k),(l);
Authorized Operations (c),(d),(e);
Object Reuse (b)
FPT_AMT.1 Self Test
FPT_ITT.1 Alternate Support Element
FPT_SEP.3 Self Test
FPT_STM.1 Audit and Accountability (c);
Self Test
FPT_TRC.1 Alternate Support Element
FPT_TST.1 Self Test
FRU_RSA.1 Reliability of Service (a)
FTA_TSE.1 Authorized Administration (e),
Authorized Operations (b),(c);
Reliability of Service (b)
Table 6-1 - SFR and Security Function Correspondence
Security Functions SFR
Audit and Accountability FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3
Audit and Accountability (a) FAU_GEN.1
Audit and Accountability (b) FAU_GEN.2
Audit and Accountability (c) FPT_STM.1
Audit and Accountability (d) FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4
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Audit and Accountability (e) FAU_SAR.2
Authorized Administration (a) FDP_ACC.2, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
Authorized Administration (b) FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Activation, Allocation),
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
Authorized Administration (c) FMT_MSA.1 (Authorities)
Authorized Administration (d) FMT_MSA.1 (Authorities)
Authorized Administration (e) FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path),
FMT_MSA.1(Candidate Access), FTA_TSE.1
Authorized Administration (f) FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Control Unit/Devices)
Authorized Administration (g) FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path, Control
Unit/Devices)
Authorized Administration (h) FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path), FDP_IFC.1
Authorized Administration (i) FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path), FDP_IFC.1
Authorized Administration (j) FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path, Control
Unit/Devices)
Authorized Administration (k) FDP_ACC.2, FPR_UNO.1, FDP_IFC.1
Authorized Administration (l) FMT_MSA.1 (Authorities), FPR_UNO.1, FDP_ACC.2
Authorized Operations (a) FDP_ACC.2, FIA_UID.2, FMT_MSA.1 (Resource
Limits), FMT_SMR.1
Authorized Operations (b) FDP_ACF.1 (Allocation), FIA_ATD.1, FTA_TSE.1,
FMT_MSA.1 (Resource Limits)
Authorized Operations (c) FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1 (Allocation), FDP_IFC.1,
FIA_ATD.1, FPR_UNO.1, FTA_TSE.1, FMT_MSA.1
(Resource Limits)
Authorized Operations (d) FPR_UNO.1
Authorized Operations (e) FDP_IFC.1, FPR_UNO.1, FDP_IFF.1
Object Reuse (a) FDP_RIP.2
Object Reuse (b) FPR_UNO.1, FDP_IFF.1
Object Reuse (c) FDP_RIP.2
Logical Partition Identity FIA_UID.2
Reliability of Service FMT_MSA.3
Reliability of Service (a) FRU_RSA.1
Reliability of Service (b) FTA_TSE.1
Self Test FPT_AMT.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_SEP.3, FPT_STM.1
Alternate Support Element FPT_ITT.1, FPT_TRC.1.
Table 6-2 – Security Function and SFR Correspondence
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6.4 Assurance Requirements
ACM_AUT.1 – Partial CM Automation
Development of the System z9-109 is complex and performed by multiple developers. In this environment
changes are controlled with the support of automated tools that handle numerous changes and only allow them to
be performed by authorized developers.
LPAR and HMC/SE development are performed according to the an ISO certified process.
ACM_CAP.4 – Generation Support and Acceptance Procedures
The required documentation is essentially the same as specified for ACM_AUT.1. In addition each time the
TOE is built any modified or newly created configuration items are subject to tests to ensure the integrity of the
build. The HMC/SE tests are described in the HMC Testplans – Standard Regression.
ACM_SCP.3 – Development tools CM coverage
Standard development processes by whichare used to track design documentation, test documentation and
development tools are tracked. Design is discussed in Section 3, test in section 4 and tool development in section
8 of this document.. Change control as well as authorization control is also discussed in the associated sections.
ADO_DEL.2 – Detection of Modification
The required documentation for initial TOE delivery is provided in the Installation Manual – Physical Planning
and the Install Guide documents. Updates to the TOE once installed are provided through the release of new
Engineering Change (EC) levels or via the Microcode Fix (MCF) process.
ADV_FSP.3 – Semiformal Functional Specification
The specifications for the security functions of the TOE are documented in the PR/SM Planning Guide; Chapter
3 - Security Related Controls section. A detailed outline for complete exploitation of the TOE's security
functions is found in the PR/SM: Planning for Security document.
ADO_IGS.1 – Installation, generation and start-up procedures
The required guidance for the installation, generation and start-up procedures is provided in the Trusted Facility
Manual (ref. Appendix C of the PR/SM Planning Guide) which provides the necessary information regarding
establishing the correct physical environment, how to prepare the system for secure operation, procedures on
how to correctly initialize the TOE, and operational considerations to help to insure continued operation in
conjunction with the security polity.
ADV_HLD.3 – Semiformal high-level design
The high-level designs for PR/SM and the HMC/SE on the System z9-109 are documented in proprietary
internal documents. These documents contain a description of the major structural elements of LPAR and the
function they provide. The documents further refine the structural elements into subsystems. The
interrelationships of the subsystems are represented by flow diagrams.
ADV_IMP.2 - Implementation of the TSF
Implementation at the source code level is provided to the evaluators on a need to know basis under a
nondisclosure agreement. A companion document, the Correspondence document provides the path from the
SFRs to the actual implementation for all components of the TOE.
ADV_INT.1 – Modularity
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PR/SM’s modular design is discussed in the document Philosophy of Protection for System z9 PR/SM.PR/SM’s
modular design and component interaction are discussed in proprietary internal documents. An architectural
description of each component is also provided.
ADV_LLD.1 – Descriptive Low-level design
Internal proprietary documents provide a semiformal representation of the low-level design for PR/SM and the
HMC/SE.
ADV_RCR.2 – Semiformal correspondence demonstration
An internal proprietary document associates each component of the Security Target with the corresponding
functional specification, high-level design, and low-level design documentation.
Modules noted in the section “LLD” are either in bold text or plain text. Bold text modules enforce the security
aspects of the component. Plain text modules are required to support, but not enforce the component.
ADV_SPM.3 - Formal TOE Security Policy Model
A formal mathematical model for the security policy has been created which shows the required correspondence.
A companion document has been provided to show the correspondence between the model and the functional
implementation of the TOE.
AGD_ADM.1 – Administrator guidance
The Trusted Facility Manual (ref. Appendix C of the PR/SM Planning Guide) provides guidance required
helping to insure a secure environment. All security parameters are described along with warnings about security
settings that should be controlled in a secure processing environment.
AGD_USR.1 – User Guidance
The required guidance documentation is provided in the Trusted Facility Manual (ref. Appendix C of the PR/SM
Planning Guide) which provides the necessary information regarding establishing the correct physical
environment, how to prepare the system for secure operation, procedures on how to correctly initialize the TOE,
and operational considerations to insure continued operation in conjunction with the security polity.
ALC_DVS.1 – Identification of Security Measures
The security measures that are necessary to help protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and
implementation are described in the Site Security Manual.
ALC_LCD.2 – Standardized Life Cycle Model
An internal proprietary document describes the process used to develop the TOE. This process represents the
Incremental Model life cycle which in which the product is designed, implemented, integrated and tested as a
series of incremental builds.
ALC_TAT.2 – Compliance with implementation standards
Well-defined development tools are in place for the implementation of the TOE. Detailed information about the
development tools used is contained in the following documents:
• HMC-SE Development Tools
• PR/SM LPAR Process Instructions
• PR/SM LPAR Development and Test Tools
• PR/SM LPAR Build and Other Instructions
• PR/SM Tools Documentation
ATE_COV.2 - Analysis of Coverage
The test suite used to verify the correct implementation of the TOE has been constructed to provide a one-to-one
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correspondence between individual tests and the specific security relevant functions of the TOE. In some cases,
a test will cover more than one security function. This is due to the nature of some of these functions. (For
example, many functions will also leave an audit trail and the test therefore includes the audit capability as well)
Additionally, the execution and verification of the test suite will include validation of the correctness of the
external interfaces of the TOE as they are necessary for the invocation, execution and completion of the
individual tests.
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: low-level design
Developers perform low-level testing whenever a new requirement is added into LPAR code.
ATE_FUN.1 – Functional testing
An internal proprietary document contains test plans, procedural descriptions and the goal of the test. Test results
from the execution of the tests demonstrate that each tested security functions behaved as specified.
ATE_IND.2 – Independent Testing Sample
By independent testing and repeating a subset of developer tests, the evaluator will gain confidence in the
developer’s testing effort and in the test results.
AVA_CCA.1 - Covert Channel Analysis
A thorough and systematic analysis of the implementation of the TOE was conducted to identify potential
vulnerabilities in each subsystem of the TOE. Each vulnerability was subsequently examined by the appropriate
designers to determine:
• Existence of the theoretical vulnerability
• Method and feasibility of exploitation
• Estimate of the bandwidth.
AVA_MSU.2 – Validation of Analysis
The required guidance documentation is provided in the Trusted Facility Manual (ref. Appendix C of the PR/SM
Planning Guide) which provides the necessary information regarding establishing the correct physical
environment, how to prepare the system for secure operation, procedures on how to correctly initialize the TOE,
and operational considerations to insure continued operation in conjunction with the security polity.
AVA_SOF.1 - Strength of TOE Security Function Evaluation
While the assurance requirements for EAL5 call for this item, this only applies for functions that return
measurable values and therefore is not applicable for LPAR. BSI has agreed with this interpretation.
AVA_VLA.3 - Moderately Resistant
The attack potential was calculated and shown to be within the guidelines specified in the CEM.
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7 Protection Profile Conformance Claim
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.
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8 Rationale
The functional components were selected from CC components defined in part 2 of the Common Criteria.
Functional component FMT_SMF.1 (Specification of Management Functions) has been added in
accordance with AIS 32, Final Interpretation 065. The use of component refinement was accomplished in
accordance with CC guidelines.
8.1 TOE Description Rationale
The target of evaluation, PR/SM on z9 Servers has been defined. In addition the setup phase has been
described showing how the TOE is to be set up for the intended operational environment. The security
objectives, threats, and security functional requirements have been described and mapped to the security
functions implemented within the TOE.
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section demonstrates that the stated security objectives counter all identified threats.
8.2.1 Security Objectives Coverage
The following tables provide a mapping between the threats and the security objectives, and assumptions,
illustrating that each security objective covers at least one threat, policy or assumption and that each
threat, policy, or assumption is covered by at least one security objective.
THREATS OBJECTIVES
T.Access_Data O.Identity, O.Auth_Ops
T.Access_CPU O.Identity, O.Auth_Ops
T.Access_IOCA O.Identity, O.Auth_Admin
T.Access_Perf O.Identity, O.Auth_Admin
T.Lpar_XCTL O.Identity, O.Auth_Admin, O.Resource
T.Obj_Reuse O.Reuse
T.Audit_Data O.Audit
Table 8-1 – Threats Related to Objectives
POLICIES OBJECTIVES
P.SEP OE.SIE
OE.CHANNEL
Table 8-2 – Organizational Security Policies mapped to Environment Objectives
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8.2.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency
Separation of the physical resources of the processor into separate independent and isolated logical domains is
the purpose of the TOE. The TOE is intended to prove a very high level of isolation of these logical partitions. In
addition to the objectives for the TOE also objectives for the TOE environment have been defined. Those
objectives for the TOE environment are addressed by assumptions on the TOE environment. A Security Policy
has been defined that assist in establishing the correct environment that will be used by the TOE to enforce the
security policy. The table above provides the mapping between the objectives, threats, and policies. The tables
show that each objective addresses at least one threat and that each threat is covered by at least one objective, or
policy. It is the intention to provide a comprehensive list of threats that may compromise the isolation of
partitions. Below follows a justification for each identified threat that the security objectives are suitable to
counter it.
T.Access_Data – Illegal Access to Data
O.Identity helps to remove the threat of illegal access to data by a partition by assigning a zone number to each
logical partition which provides it with a unique identity. O.Identity is additionally supported by O.Auth_Ops
which then uses the unique zone number to establish ownership of processor and storage resources during
partition activation and then prevents any illegal access to data or storage or message transfers during normal
processor execution.
T.Access_CPU – Illegal Access or Control of Processors and Storage
O.Identity helps to remove the threat of illegal access or control of processors and storage a partition by
assigning a zone number to each logical partition which provides it with a unique identity. O.Identity is
additionally supported by O.Auth_Ops which then uses the unique zone number to ensure that the limits
established at partition activation for storage, logical processors and coprocessors are not exceeded during
normal processor execution.
T.Access_IOCA – Illegal Access of the IO Configuration
O.Identity helps to remove the threat of illegal access to the I/O configuration by a partition by assigning a zone
number to each logical partition which provides it with a unique identity. O.Identity is additionally supported by
O.Auth_Admin which then uses the unique zone number to restrict access to the IOCDS to only those logical
partitions which have I/O configuration control authority.
T.Access_Perf – Illegal Access to Performance Data
O.Identity helps to remove the threat of illegal access to performance data by a partition by assigning a zone
number to each logical partition which provides it with a unique identity. O.Identity is additionally supported by
O.Auth_Admin which then uses the unique zone number to restrict access to the CPU and I/O processor
performance data to only those logical partitions which have global performance data control authority.
T.Lpar_XCTL – Illegal control of another logical partition
O.Identity helps to remove the threat of illegal access to partition controls by a partition by assigning a
zone number to each logical partition that provides it with a unique identity. O.Identity is additionally supported
by O.Auth_Admin. Only when the Cross Partition functions are enabled due to O.Auth_Admin can one
authorized partition take over control of an authorized target partition.
T.Obj_Reuse – Illegal transfer of data during context switch.
O.Reuse: The TOE provides the means to allow the subject to use a resource or service without the user‘s
identity or contents of the resource being disclosed to other entities. When objects are reallocated from one
subject to another, the objects are either reset (cleared) or are dedicated to one subject and therefore cannot be
reallocated.
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T.Audit_Data – Illegal modification of the content of the security log.
O.Audit helps to eliminate this threat by insuring that all security relevant events occurring on the system are
recorded in a non-volatile audit log. All events are guaranteed to be recorded and no modifications can be made
to the audit log except those consistent with the policy enforced by the TOE.
Environment
Objectives
mapped to
Assumptions
OE.Data
Store
OE.Perss OE.Sec_Setup OE.Phys_Prot OE.SIE
OE.
CHANNEL
A.Phys_Secure
*
A.No_Remote
*
A.Sep_Mode
*
A.Admin_Secure
*
A.Data_Secure
*
Table 8-3 – Environment Objectives Mapped to Assumptions
A.Data_Secure – Physical and/or controlled access of TOE audit log is required
The TOE records security-relevant actions performed by the System Administrator in an audit log. The TOE will
prune the audit log to two-thirds (2/3) of its capacity when the audit log has been filled. It is the customer’s
responsibility to back-up the audit log prior to the log reaching capacity. Physical access of archived audit log
data is also the responsibility of the customer.
OE.Data_store defines that the security and integrity of the audit log is predicated on the assumption that the
System Administrator will prune the Audit Log prior to reaching its capacity and physically protect archived
data off-TOE. Because there is no functionality within the TOE to prevent the Audit Log from over-writing itself,
such an environment is key to the security of the Audit Log.
A. Phys_Secure – Physical protection of processor, I/O and HMC is required.
The TOE does not provide any mechanism for physical protection of the actual processor, IO control units and
devices, and Hardware Management Console. Therefore to help to insure that only trusted personnel have access
to the processor hardware, IO and consoles, these assets are to be protected in restricted access areas. In
particular the hardware management console and the Local Area Network (LAN) connecting it to the SEs must
be physically protected from access other than by authorized system administrators.
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As specified in OE.Phys_Prot, the method for providing physical security of the hardware is assumed to be
restricted access. Restricted access will insure that assets used by the TOE, which are outside the domain of the
TOE, remain secure.
A.No_Remote – The remote support facility must be disabled
The scope of the evaluation of the TOE was limited to exclude interaction between the remote support facility
and the TOE. Therefore, to be compliant with the evaluation, the remote support facility must be disabled by
removing the phone connection from the HMC modem.
In addition to restricting physical access to the HMC, OE.Phys_Prot requires that access via the remote support
facility must also be prevented since this facility is not necessarily secure and outside of the TOE.
A. Sep_Mode – Strict Separation Mode
For conformance with the scope of the evaluation, the z9-109 must be setup and initialized in Strict Separation
Mode as defined in the Trusted Facility Manual (ref Appendix C of the PR/SM Planning Guide), and in Section
3.2 of this document.
Protection of the TOE for establishment of the required strict separation mode, as specified by OE.Sec_Setup
helps to guarantee that all of the defined requirements to establish secure separation will be completed to
provide the operational environment consistent with the scope of the evaluation.
A.Admin_Secure – Administrative Personnel Security
As any administrative personnel, who have access to the z9-109 will also have access to any and all information
on that processor, these personnel must be cleared to the level required by the level of information and need-to-
know that applies to the system.
OE.Perss requires that System and Security Administrators are authorized with the required need to know for all
levels of the TOE. This is required to satisfy the assumption of secure administration.
P.SEP – Separation of hardware into partitions
The hardware of a Central Electronics Complex must be partitionable into several independent partitions.
The policy requires the hardware to provide independent partitions, which are separated from each other by the
environment with the objective OE.SIE that provides a special execution environment for a software component
enforcing that objective. In addition, OE.CHANNEL provides the capability of associating I/O resources to
logical partitions to restrict access to arbitrary I/O resources.
8.3 Security Requirements Rationale
This section provides the rationale for necessity and sufficiency of security requirements, demonstrating that
each of the security objectives is addressed by at least one security requirement, and that every security
requirement is directed toward solving at least one objective.
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8.3.1 Security Requirements Coverage
The following tables provide a mapping of the relationships of security requirements to objectives, illustrating
that each security requirement covers at least one objective and that each objective is covered by at least one
security requirement.
OBJECTIVES REQUIREMENTS
O.Identity FDP_ACF.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UID.2
O.Auth_Admin FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
O.Auth_Ops FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1, FPT_AMT.1. FPT_SEP.3, FPT_TST.1,
O.Audit FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2,
FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FMT_MTD.1, FPT_ITT.1,
FPT_STM.1, FPT_TRC.1,
O.Reuse FDP_RIP.2, FPR_UNO.1
O.Resource FDP_ACC.2, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FRU_RSA.1, FTA_TSE.1
Table 8-4 – Objectives Related to Requirements
8.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency
The table above shows that each objective is addressed by at least one security functional requirement.
O.Identity – Identity
The objective demands that each logical partition have a unique identity. The objective is covered by
FIA_ATD.1 that defines the security attributes belonging to an individual logical partition. FIA_UID.2
requires that each logical partition is identified before any TSF-mediated action is performed on behalf of that
logical partition. Finally FDP_ACF.1 enforces access control SFP to objects based on the list of security
attributes.
O.Auth_Admin – Authorized Administration
O.Auth_admin requires security functions provided by the TOE to help enable secure administration of the
following: IOCDS, logical processors and storage, I/O channel paths and control units, cross partition
functions and performance data access. The TOE provides restrictive default values for security attributes
governing these security functions as specified in FMT_MSA.3. The TSF ensures that only the Security
Administrator can alter these security attributes as per FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1. FDP_ACF.1 specifies
the TSF shall enforce the access control SFP to objects based on security attributes including partition
scheduling parameters (logical processors and storage), and global performance data (performance data
access). I/O channel paths and control units are covered by the security functions enforced in FMT_MSA.1
(I/O Configuration Control Authority and Logical Partition Isolation). The TSF restricts the ability to change
the IOCDS to the Security Administrator as covered in FMT_MTD.1.
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O.Auth_Ops – Authorized Operations
O.Auth_Ops requires that the TOE provide an authorized administrator an effective means to manage the
TOE and its security functions. FDP_ACC.2 provides authorized allocation of subjects to objects.
FDP_ACF.1 provides for the establishment of security attributes and rules governing operations and access
by subjects to objects based on these attributes. FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3 help insure that once the
authorization (or lack of authorization) is set, these attributes cannot be changed. FMT_MTD.1 allows only
the Security Administrator the ability modify these settings. FPT_AMT.1, FPT_SEP.3 and FPT_TST.1
provide for periodic validation of the correct operation of the TOE to help insure that there can be no
compromise in the execution of authorized operations. FDP_IFF.1 and FDP_IFC.1 specify that the TSF shall
enforce the information flow control SFP on logical partitions based on security attributes including: global
performance data access, I/O configuration control, cross partition reset/deactivate capability, and logical
partition isolation.
O.Audit – Audit and Accountability
The objective demands that the TOE provide the means of recording any security relevant events, so as to
assist an administrator in the detection of potential attacks or misconfiguration of the TOE security features
that would leave the TOE susceptible to attack, and also to hold users accountable for any actions that they
perform that are relevant to security. The objective is covered by FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2 and
FPT_STM.1 that define which events are recorded in the audit log and associates an identity and timestamp
with each event. FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2 and FAU_SAR.3 cover the ability of an authorized Security
Administrator to read, search and sort the audit log data. FAU_STG.1, FMT_MTD.1 and FAU_STG.4 cover
the prevention of any unauthorized deletions or modification to the audit records as well as specify the
actions that occur when the audit log is full. Finally FPT_ITT.1 and FPT_TRC.1 cover the integrity and
consistency of the audit log when transmitted between dual Support Elements.
O.Reuse - Reuse
O.Obj_Reuse requires that data is not transferred with resources when those resources are reallocated from
one partition to another. FDP_RIP2. And FPR_UNO.1 sufficiently satisfies this requirement. FDP_RIP.2
ensures than any previous content of a resource is made unavailable when that resource is de-allocated from
any and all objects. FPR_UNO.1 ensures that users/subjects are unable to observe any operation on any
object/resource by any other object/subject.
O.Resource – Reliability of Service
The objectives states that the TOE will prevent unauthorized access to physical processor running time and
cross partition functions. FDP_ACC.2 helps ensure that the access control SFP is enforced to control all
operations between subjects and objects. Therefore no subject (partition) can gain unauthorized access to the
running time and partition control functions. FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3 help ensure that once the
authorization (or lack of authorization) is set, these attributes cannot be changed. FRU_RSA.1 enforces the
running time slices that have been previously defined. Finally, FTA_TSE.1 guarantees adherence to physical
resource definitions and scheduling parameters.
8.3.3 Security Requirements Coverage (IT environment)
OE.SIE - Memory access control
The security functional requirements FDP_ACC.1 (1), FDP_ACF.1 (1) and FMT_MSA.3 (1) for the IT
environment define an access control policy on memory regions such that memory regions can be defined
limiting subsequent instructions performed by the processor to this memory. The models of the z9-109
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processor used in the hardware underlying the TOE provide this support as documented in the processor
manuals using the SIE instruction. This all contributes to satisfy the objective OE.SIE for the IT environment.
OE.CHANNEL - Channel access control
The security functional requirements FDP_ACC.1 (2), FDP_ACF.1 (2) and FMT_MSA.3 (2) for the IT
environment define an access control policy on channel instructions to access logical I/O resources to limit
requesting partitions to the logical I/O resources they are allowed to access. The mapping between partition
IDs and logical I/O resources devices is set up by the TOE. This all contributes to satisfy the objective
OE.CHANNEL for the IT environment.
8.4 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
The purpose of this section is to describe how the requirements of each of the Security Functional Requirements
are satisfied by the IT Security functions.
FAU_GEN.1
The IT security function Audit and Accountability (a) fulfills the requirement because:
a) a security log has been implemented which records all configuration related actions
b) each security log entry contains the date and time of the event, the subject which preformed the action, and
the outcome of the action
c) any activation profile updates or power-on reset actions will contain detailed definitions of the parameters
FAU_GEN.2
The IT security function Audit and Accountability (b) fulfills the requirement because:
a) security log entries record the identity of each user when they log on or off the HMC/SE
b) security log entries for requests which originate remotely contain the identity of the requesting user.
FAU_SAR.1
The IT security function Audit and Accountability (View Security Log Task) fulfills the requirement because:
a) a View Security Log task is available which allows the Security Administrator to read the security log entries
in a clear and concise format
FAU_SAR.2
The IT security function Audit and Accountability (e) fulfills the requirement because:
a) the View Security Log task is only available to those users which are created with Security Administrator
authority (i.e. authority of a System Programmer or Service Representative).
FAU_SAR.3
The IT security function Audit and Accountability (View Security Log Task) fulfills the requirement because:
a) the View Security Log task is provides the capability to search or sort the audit records based on date or event
FAU_STG.1
The IT security function Audit and Accountability (d) fulfills the requirement because:
a) no user or programmatic interfaces exist which allow for the deletion of entries from the Security Log
b) no user or programmatic interfaces exist which allow for the modification of entries in the Security Log
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FAU_STG.4
The IT security function Audit and Accountability (d) fulfills the requirement because:
a) the Security Log is managed in such a way that when the allocated audit space has been filled the system will
prune the log to two-thirds (2/3) of its capacity by removing the oldest log entries.
FDP_ACC.2
The IT security functions Authorized Administration (a,b,e,f,g,h,i,j,k,l), and Authorized Operations (a),(c)
together fulfill the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user
b) tasks which allow modification of profile and IOCDS definitions are restricted to Security Administrators.
Profile definitions specify the resources (physical CPs, physical storage) available to a logical partitions as
well as its authority to access Global Performance Data. IOCDS definitions specify the CHPIDS, Control
Units and Devices that a logical partition can access.
FDP_ACF.1 (Activation)
The IT security functions Authorized Administration (b) fulfills the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user
b) only users authorized as Security Administrators are allowed to modify the system configuration in the area
concerning cross-partition control authority. This authority provides the capability for a logical partition to
reset or deactivate another logical partition.
FDP_ACF.1 (Allocation)
The IT security functions Authorized Administration (b), and Authorized Operations (b,c) together fulfill the
requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user
b) only users authorized as Security Administrators are allowed to modify the system configuration in the area
concerning allocation of storage and logical processors.
c) the TOE helps ensure that the number of logical processors, amount of storage allocated to a partition
cannot exceed the limit specified in the current configuration.
d) the TOE helps ensure that the physical processor time slice allocated to logical processors cannot exceed the
limit specified in the current configuration.
FDP_ACF.1 (Channel Path)
The IT security functions Authorized Administration (e,g,h,i,j) together fulfill the requirement because the TOE
implemented functions which enforce that:
a) a channel path can only be allocated to a logical partition if that partition has candidate access to the path
b) a logical partition can be prevented from using a shared channel path.
c) a channel path can be allocated exclusively to one logical partition either by identifying the channel path as
dedicated, or by designating the owning partition as isolated.
d) a reconfigurable or dedicated channel path is never shared.
e) control units and I/O devices cannot be allocated independently of the channel path to which they are
attached.
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FDP_ACF.1 (Control Unit/Devices)
The IT security functions Authorized Administration (f,g,j), together fulfill the requirement because the TOE
implemented functions which:
a) allow access to an I/O device on a shared channel path to be restricted among the set of logical partitions
with candidate access.
b) allow the TOE to be configured to prevent the shared use of any channel path, control unit or I/O device
between logical partitions
c) helps ensure that control units and I/O devices cannot be allocated independently of the channel path to
which they are attached
FDP_IFC.1
The IT security functions Authorized Administration (h,i,k) and Authorized Operations (c,e) together fulfill the
requirement because:
a) the TOE can be configured so that no information can flow among subjects and objects if they are not
allocated to the same logical partition.
FDP_IFF.1
The IT security functions Authorized Operations (e) and Object Reuse (b) together fulfill the requirement
because:
a) the TOE helps prevent the transfer of a message between a logical partition and resources that are not
allocated to it, except where the logical partition is explicitly authorized to do so.
b) the TOE helps to ensure that the information in a physical processor or coprocessor that is available to the
currently executing logical processor is unaffected by any previously executing logical processor from
another logical partition
FDP_RIP.2
The IT security function Object Reuse (a,c) fulfills the requirement because:
a) the TOE helps ensure that the contents of physical processors, storage or I/O utilized by different logical
partitions will be cleared of any residual information before being utilized by the receiving logical partition.
FIA_ATD.1
The IT security functions Authorized Operations (b,c) together fulfill the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user.
b) the TOE implemented Reset and Image profiles which allow the specification of partition identifiers,
resource limits and partition scheduling parameters
FIA_UID.2
The IT security functions Logical Partition Identity and Authorized Operation (a) together fulfill the requirement
because:
a) LPAR identify assigns a unique ID to Logical Partitions
b) Authorized Operations helps ensure that each user has to identify before any other interaction with the TOE
FMT_MSA.1 (Authorities)
The IT security functions Authorized Administration (c,d,l) together fulfill the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user.
b) only Security Administrators are allow to change, query or delete : I/O Configuration Control Authority,
Cross Partition Authority, Logical Partition Isolation Authority, or Global Performance Data Control
Authority.
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FMT_MSA.1 (Resource Limits)
The IT security functions Authorized Operations (a,b,c) together fulfill the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user.
b) only Security Administrators are allow to change, query or delete: resource limits (number of logical
processors, amount of storage) or partition scheduling parameters.
FMT_MSA.1 (Candidate Access)
The IT security function Authorized Administration (e)fulfill the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user.
b) only Security Administrators are allow to change, query or delete candidate access.
FMT_MSA.3
The IT security function Reliability of Service (Reset Profile) fulfills the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user
b) the TOE has implemented a Default Reset and Image profile which contains restrictive initial values which
are used as the basis for the creation of additional profiles
c) the TOE allows Security Administrators to override the restrictive initial values when creating new profiles
FMT_MTD.1
The IT security function Authorized Administration (a) fulfills the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user
b) the authority to modify the IOCDS, reconfigurable part of the configuration, image profile or reset profile is
limited to Security Administrators or logical partitions with I/O Configuration Control authority
FMT_SMF.1
The IT security function Authorized Administration (a,b) fulfills the requirement because:
a) The TOE allows the management of security attributes of objects for the access control SFP.
FMT_SMR.1
The IT security functions Authorized Administration (a,b) and Authorized Operations (a) together fulfill the
requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a User Profile task used to define user identities, passwords and their corresponding
authority level which determines the tasks made available to that user
b) all users which either operate or administer the TOE must first be assigned an identity, password and an
authority level of either: Operator, Advanced Operator, System Programmer, Service Representative or
Access Administrator
FPR_UNO.1
The IT security functions Authorized Administration (k,l), Authorized Operations(c,d,e), and Object Reuse (b)
together fulfill the requirement because:
a) the TOE can be configured so that no logical partitions have global performance data control authority. In
this case, a logical partition will only be able to gather performance data about the resources allocated to it
b) the TOE will help ensure that a storage resource is never shared
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PR/SM Security Target 62 February 13, 2006
c) the TOE helps to ensure that the contents of physical processors, storage or I/O utilized by different logical
partitions will be cleared of any residual information before being utilized by the receiving logical partition
FPT_AMT.1
The IT security function Self Test fulfills the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a set of self test functions which are executed whenever the TOE is started or reset as
well as periodically during normal execution
b) the self tests demonstrate the correct operation of the hardware platform on which the TOE is executing
FPT_ITT.1
The IT security function Alternate Support Element fulfills the requirement because:
a) the TOE helps to protect the Security Log data from disclosure and modification during replication between
Support Elements by transmitting the data over a private network
FPT_SEP.3
The IT security function Self Test fulfills the requirement because:
a) it validates that the mechanisms use to protect the TOE are not compromised by insuring that the underlying
hardware is fully operational, and by verifying the storage isolation parameters established during TOE setup
and initialization have not been modified.
FPT_STM.1
The IT security function Audit and Accountability (c) and Self Test fulfills the requirement because:
a) all Security Log entries are recorded with a timestamp
b) HMC/SE timestamps are retrieved from the HMC/SE hardware clock which is periodically synchronized
with the other hardware clocks in the system
FPT_TRC.1
The IT security function Alternate Support Element fulfills the requirement because:
a) any hard disk changes that are mirrored from the primary SE to the alternate SE are checked for consistency
through the use of a checksum on the transmitted data
b) all consistency checking of mirrored data is performed before any Security Log updates are allowed
FPT_TST.1
The IT security function Self Test fulfills the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a set of self test functions which are executed whenever the TOE is started or reset as
well as periodically during normal execution
b) the self tests demonstrate the correct operation of the hardware platform on which the TOE is executing
FRU_RSA.1
The IT security function Reliability of Service (a) fulfills the requirement because:
a) the TOE implemented a Reset profile which allows the utilization of a physical processor resource by a
logical partition to be restricted.
FTA_TSE.1
The IT security function Authorized Operations (b,c), Authorized Administration(e), and Reliability of Service
(b) together fulfill the requirement because:
a) the TOE helps ensure that the amount of storage allocated to a logical partition does not exceed the limit
specified in the current configuration
b) the TOE helps ensure that the number of logical processors allocated to a logical partition does not exceed
the limit specified in the current configuration
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PR/SM Security Target 63 February 13, 2006
c) a channel path can only be allocated to a logical partition if that partition has candidate access to the path
d) the TOE implemented Reset profile parameters which prevents a logical partition from releasing allocated
processor time, or from receiving more than a configurable proportion of processor time
8.5 Internal Consistency and Mutual Support
This section demonstrates that the stated security requirements together form a mutually supportive and
internally consistent whole. Internal consistency is demonstrated in an analysis of dependencies. Mutual
support is shown through consideration of the interactions between and among the SFRs.
8.5.1 Rationale that Dependencies are Satisfied
The selected security requirements include related dependencies, both direct and indirect. The indirect
dependencies are those required by the direct dependencies. All of these dependencies must be met or their
exclusion justified.
8.5.1.1 Security Functional Requirements Dependencies
The following table provides a summary of the security functional requirements dependency analysis. No
dependencies are excluded. For dependencies on a selective list of components are stated in the CC, the
component that has been included in this Security Target is displayed in bold.
A dependency is also resolved, if a hierarchical higher component from the CC has been included in the
Security Target. Therefore it might be that not exactly the component as stated in the CC is selected within
this Security Target, but a hierarchical higher one.
Component Dependencies Resolved
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Yes
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1, FIA_UID.1 Yes
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 Yes
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 Yes
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 Yes
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 Yes
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 Yes
FDP_ACC.2 FDP_ACF.1 Yes
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3 Yes
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 Yes
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3 Yes
FDP_RIP.2 None Yes
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Component Dependencies Resolved
FIA_ATD.1 None Yes
FIA_UID.2 None Yes
FMT_MSA.1* FDP_ACC.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FDP_IFC.1
Yes
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_SMF.1 None Yes
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Yes
FPR_UNO.1 None Yes
FPT_AMT.1 None Yes
FPT_ITT.1 None Yes
FPT_SEP.3 None Yes
FPT_STM.1 None Yes
FPT_TRC.1 FPT_ITT.1 Yes
FPT_TST.1 FPT_AMT.1 Yes
FRU_RSA.1 None Yes
FTA_TSE.1 None Yes
Table 8-5 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements Dependencies
* Dependency of FMT_MSA.1 to FDP_ACC.1 is resolved by the use of the hierarchical SFR FDP_ACC.2.
Component Dependencies Resolved
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Yes
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3 Yes
FMT_MSA.3* FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1 No
Table 8-6 – Summary of environmental Security Functional Requirements Dependencies
*The security functional requirements FMT_MSA.3 (1) and FMT_MSA.3 (2) for the IT environment do not
satisfy the dependency to FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_SMR.1. The following rationale applies: Both dependencies
are not resolved, because the access control policy of the underlying processor and the access control policy of
the channel instructions are static and can not be managed by any role. Therefore, neither a management of the
access control policies is required (which FMT_MSA.1 would define) nor a role model for management is
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PR/SM Security Target 65 February 13, 2006
required (which FMT_SMR.1 would define). The dependencies defined in part 2 of the CC for this security
functional requirement therefore do not apply here.
Security Assurance Dependencies Analysis
The assurance level selected within this TOE is EAL5 with no modifications. The dependencies are defined by
the criteria and since they are unmodified in this TOE, all dependencies of the assurance components within this
Security Target are resolved.
8.6 Rationale for Strength of Function
The security enforcing function argument only applies to cases where measurable values are obtainable. In the
case of z9-109 LPAR, this is not possible therefore the Strength of Function claim is not applicable for this
Security Target because no mechanism in the TOE is based upon permutational or probabilistic functions.
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Appendix - Notices
© Copyright International Business Machines Corporation 2005
IBM Corporation
New Orchard Rd,
Armonk, NY 10504
Produced in the United States of America,
All Rights Reserved
More details on IBM UNIX hardware, software and solutions may be found at ibm.com/servers/unix/.
IBM
IBM logo
IBM eServer
IBM System z9
e-business
ESCON
FICON
Lotus
MVS/ESA
OS/390
Parallel Sysplex
PR/SM
Processor Resource/Systems Manager
Resource Link
RMF
S/370
S/390
Sysplex Timer
VM/ESA
VSE/ESA
z/Architecture
z/OS
z/VM
zSeries
are trademarks or registered trademarks of the International Business Corporation in the United States, other
countries, or both.
Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds.
UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group in the United States and other countries.
IBM, the IBM logo, the e-business logo, AIX, DB2, DB2 Universal Database, pSeries, RS/6000, SP and
WebSphere are registered trademarks or trademarks of the International Business Machines Corporation in the
United States and/or other countries.
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
PR/SM Security Target 67 February 13, 2006
Other company, product and service names may be trademarks or service marks of others.
IBM may not offer the products, programs, services or features discussed herein in other countries, and the
information may be subject to change without notice.
General availability may vary by geography.
IBM hardware products are manufactured from new parts, or new and used parts. Regardless, our warranty
terms apply.
All statements regarding IBM's future direction and intent are subject to change or withdrawal without notice, and
represent goals and objectives only. Any reliance on these statements is at the relying party’s sole risk and will
not create any liability or obligation for IBM.
IBM may have patents or pending patent aplications covering subject matter described in this document. The
furnishing of this document does not give you any license to these patents. You can send license inquiries, in
writing to:
IBM Director of Licensing
IBM Corporation
North Castle Drive
Armonk, NY 10504-1785
U.S.A.
SECURITY TARGET FOR PR/SM FOR THE IBM SYSTEM Z9
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Appendix A - Glossary
A.1 Common Criteria Terminology
This section contains only those terms that are used in a specialized way in the CC. The majority of terms
in the CC are used either according to their accepted dictionary definitions or commonly accepted
definitions found in ISO security glossaries or other well-known collections of security terms.
Assets Information or resources to be protected by the countermeasures of a TOE.
Assignment The specification of an identified parameter in a component.
Assurance Ground for confidence that an entity meets its security objectives.
Attack potential The perceived potential for success of an attack, should an attack be launched, expressed
in terms of an attacker’s expertise, resources and motivation.
Augmentation The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from ISO 15408 Part 3 to an EAL or
assurance package.
Authentication Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
data
Authorized user A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Component The smallest selectable set of elements that may be included in a PP, an ST, or a package.
Dependency A relationship between requirements such that the requirement that is depended upon
must normally be satisfied for the other requirements to be able to meet their objectives.
Evaluation Assurance A package consisting of assurance components from ISO 15408 Part 3
Level (EAL) that represents a point on the CC predefined assurance scale.
Extension The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in Part 2 and/or
assurance requirements not contained in ISO 15408 Part 3 of the CC.
Human user Any person who interacts with the TOE.
Identity A representation (e.g. a string) uniquely identifying an authorized user, which can either
be the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym.
Internal A communication channel between separated parts of TOE.
communication channel
Internal TOE transfer Communicating data between separated parts of the TOE.
Object An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects
perform operations.
Organizational One or more security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed
security policies by an organization upon its operations.
Package A reusable set of either functional or assurance components (e.g. an EAL), combined
together to satisfy a set of identified security objectives.
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Protection Profile An implementation-independent set of security requirements
(PP) for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Refinement The addition of details to a component.
Role A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and the
TOE.
Secret Information that must be known only to authorized users and/or the TSF in order to
enforce a specific SFP.
Security attribute Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used for the enforcement
of the TSP.
Security Function A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
(SF) closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Function The security policy enforced by an SF.
Policy (SFP)
Security objective A statement of intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy identified organization
security policies and assumptions.
Security Target A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
(ST) as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Selection The specification of one or more items from a list in a component.
Strength of A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
Function (SOF) efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behavior by directly attacking its
underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides
adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low
attack potential.
SOF-medium A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides
adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by
attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides
adequate protection against deliberately planned or organized breach of TOE security by
attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of An IT product or system, including its associated administrator and user
Evaluation (TOE) guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE resource Anything useable or consumable in the TOE.
TOE Security A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE
Functions (TSF) that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
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TOE Security A set of rules that regulates how assets are managed, protected and
Policy (TSP) distributed within a TOE.
TOE security A structured representation of the security policy to be enforced by
policy model the TOE.
Transfers outside Communicating data to entities not under control of the TSF.
TSF control
Trusted channel A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product can communicate with the
necessary confidence to support the TSP.
Trusted path A means by which a TSF and device physically separated from the TOE can communicate
with the necessary confidence to support the TSP.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.
TSF Scope of The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are
Control (TSC) subject to the rules of the TSP.
User Any entity (human user, resident added application, or external IT entity) outside the TOE
that interacts with the TOE.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF.
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Appendix B – PR/SM Glossary
B.1 Subjects
System Administrator – the System Administrator is defined to be any user(s) with access to the Hardware
Management Console.
Logical Partition – the possible logical partitions are defined in the current configuration object. Only
activated logical partitions may use the system.
B.2 Definitions
audit log - security-relevant actions are recorded in an audit log. The audit log file is 10 megabytes in size
and can hold records of varying sizes (100 bytes - 1 kilobytes). In a typical installation this would represent
many weeks worth of activity. This is also referred to as the security log.
audit record - an entry in the audit log.
channel path - a channel resource which can be allocated to a logical partition. The static attributes of a
channel include its type, which partitions have candidate access to it, and whether it is shared, reconfigurable
or dedicated. The dynamic attributes of a channel include its current allocation to a partition, and whether it
is online.
configuration - a set of objects (logical partitions and resources) and the relationships between them. This
consists of two exclusive parts: the static configuration held in the IOCDS, and the reconfigurable data.
The IOCDS part of a configuration identifies the logical partitions, channel paths, control units, and IO
devices in the system; their connectivity and characteristics; the candidate access restrictions and initial
allocations for channel paths and IO devices; and whether channel paths are shared, reconfigurable or
dedicated.
The reconfigurable part of a configuration identifies the number of logical processors, co-processors and
storage resources that may be allocated to a logical partition; the actual allocation of resources;
scheduling parameters; status information such as whether logical processors and channel paths are
online or off-line; and whether logical partitions are authorized, isolated, activated or deactivated.
Note that a single object in a configuration may contain both static data from the IOCDS and
reconfigurable data.
control unit - a physical unit which may be attached to one or more channel paths (in one or more partitions)
and manages a number of I/O devices. A control unit is allocated to a partition if a channel path to which it
is attached is allocated to the partition.
coprocessor – an optional cryptographic facility which can be allocated to 1 or more logical partitions.
current configuration - the configuration that is currently being enforced by PR/SM.
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Global Performance Partition - the logical partition that is given the authority to view the activity data for
other logical partitions.
IOCDS – IO Configuration Data Set. This is a system file that defines the available logical partitions, and
the allocation of the available the I/O devices to the defined logical partitions.
I/O device - a physical device that may be attached to one or more control units (on one or more channel
paths). An I/O device is allocated to a partition if a control unit to which it is attached is allocated to the
partition, and the partition has candidate access to the IO device.
logical partition - a virtual machine which runs on the host system. It has a unique identifier (the zone
number) and name. A logical partition can be both an object and a user of the system .A logical partition has
attributes determining whether the logical partition is authorized for various actions. Other attributes define
the amount of logical processor and storage resources to be allocated to the partition, and the scheduling
parameters for the partition's processors. The possible logical partitions are defined in the current
configuration object. Only activated logical partitions may use the system.
logical processor - a logical interface to a physical processor, which allows the physical resource to be
shared. Each activated partition has at least one logical processor (and optionally other coprocessor
resources). Logical processors are never shared. Allocation of logical processors occurs only at logical
configuration activation. The number of logical processors can be altered. When the number of logical
processors is decreased, an increment of dispatchability/parallelism is deleted from the partition in a manner
that corresponds to varying a physical processor off-line in basic mode.
message - a flow of information, including requests, responses and indications. If a partition has Cross-
Partition Control Authority, it can send out a message to reset/deactivate another partition. If a
partition as Global Performance Data enabled, it can request performance data (CP utilization data
and IOP busy data) for all logical partitions in the configuration.
Partition scheduling parameters - Partition Scheduling Parameters - theses parameters consist of two
values: Processor Running Time and Wait Completion. The processor running time is the length of
continuous time allowed for the dispatch of a logical CP. The wait completion setting determines if shared
CP resources are divided on either an event-driven basis or a time-driven basis.
physical processor - a processor resource which may be dedicated to a single partition or shared between
partitions.
profiles – image profiles and reset profiles are utilized. Reset profiles are used to: Select LPAR mode of
operation; Select an LPAR mode IOCDS; Optionally specify an LP activation sequence; Enable I/O Priority
Queuing. Image Profiles are used to Define LP characteristics and optionally specify automatic load
settings.
resource - an object that can be allocated to a logical partition, i.e. channel path, control unit, I/O device,
storage, physical processor, logical processor.
security log - see audit log.
storage - each activated partition has an initial allocation of central storage. It may also have an initial
allocation of expanded storage. Both types of storage are individually contiguous. In some circumstances,
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further areas of storage, known as reserved central storage and reserved expanded storage, may also be
identified. This storage is reserved for future allocation to, and use by, the partition.
Security Administrator – any user(s) of the HMC who are defined with the authority of a System
Programmer or Service Representative.
System Administrator - the System Administrator is defined to be any user(s) with access to the Hardware
Management Console (HMC).
users - The only direct users are the System Administrator and logical partitions.
END OF THE DOCUMENT