CRP-C0077-01
Certification Report
Buheita Fujiwara, Chairman
Information-ｔechnology Promotion Agency, Japan
Target of Evaluation
Application date/ID September 22, 2006 (ITC-6101)
Certification No. C0077
Sponsor RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
Name of TOE (for Japan)
imagio Security Card Type C Software
(for overseas)
DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type D Software
Version of TOE V0.03
PP Conformance None
Conformed Claim EAL3
TOE Developer RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
Evaluation Facility Electronic Commerce Security Technology
Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as
follows.
January 24, 2007
Haruki Tabuchi, Technical Manager
Information Security Certification Office
IT Security Center
Information-ｔechnology Promotion Agency, Japan
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following
criteria prescribed in the “IT Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme”.
- Common Criteria for Information-ｔechnology Security Evaluation Version 2.3
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 2.3
Evaluation Result: Pass
“imagio Security Card Type C Software, DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type D
Software V0.03” has been evaluated in accordance with the provision of the “IT
Security Certification Procedure” by Information-ｔechnology Promotion Agency,
Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.
CRP-C0077-01
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report
published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security
Evaluation and Certification Scheme.
CRP-C0077-01
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ............................................................................... 1
1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 1
1.2 Evaluated Product ............................................................................ 1
1.2.1 Name of Product ......................................................................... 1
1.2.2 Product Overview ........................................................................ 1
1.2.3 Scope of TOE and Overview of Operation....................................... 1
1.2.4 TOE Functionality ....................................................................... 4
1.3 Conduct of Evaluation....................................................................... 4
1.4 Certificate of Evaluation .................................................................... 5
1.5 Overview of Report ............................................................................ 5
1.5.1 PP Conformance.......................................................................... 5
1.5.2 EAL ........................................................................................... 5
1.5.3 SOF ........................................................................................... 5
1.5.4 Security Functions ...................................................................... 5
1.5.5 Threat ........................................................................................ 6
1.5.6 Organisational Security Policy ..................................................... 6
1.5.7 Configuration Requirements ........................................................ 6
1.5.8 Assumptions for Operational Environment .................................... 8
1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product ................................................... 8
2. Conduct and Results of Evaluation by Evaluation Facility....................... 10
2.1 Evaluation Methods ........................................................................ 10
2.2 Overview of Evaluation Conducted ................................................... 10
2.3 Product Testing .............................................................................. 10
2.3.1 Developer Testing...................................................................... 10
2.3.2 Evaluator Testing...................................................................... 11
2.4 Evaluation Result ........................................................................... 12
3. Conduct of Certification ....................................................................... 13
4. Conclusion.......................................................................................... 14
4.1 Certification Result ......................................................................... 14
4.2 Recommendations ........................................................................... 14
5. Glossary ............................................................................................. 15
6. Bibliography ....................................................................................... 16
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1. Executive Summary
1.1 Introduction
This Certification Report describes the content of certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of “imagio Security Card Type C Software, DataOverwriteSecurity
Unit Type D Software V0.03” (hereinafter referred to as “the TOE”) conducted by
Electronic Commerce Security Technology Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center
(hereinafter referred to as “Evaluation Facility”), and it reports to the sponsor, RICOH
COMPANY, LTD.
The reader of the Certification Report is advised to read the corresponding ST and
manuals (please refer to “1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product” for further details)
attached to the TOE together with this report. The assumed environment,
corresponding security objectives, security functional and assurance requirements
needed for its implementation and their summary specifications are specifically
described in ST. The operational conditions and functional specifications are also
described in the document attached to the TOE.
Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance
requirements conformed to the TOE, and does not certify individual IT product itself.
Note: In this Certification Report, IT Security Evaluation Criteria and IT
Security Evaluation Method prescribed by IT Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme are named CC and CEM, respectively.
1.2 Evaluated Product
1.2.1 Name of Product
The target product by this Certificate is as follows:
Name of Product: (for Japan) imagio Security Card Type C
(for overseas) DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type D
Version: V0.03
Developer: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
1.2.2 Product Overview
This TOE is the data overwrite module software (hereinafter: DOMS) mounted in
Multi-functional printers (hereinafter: MFP) produced by Ricoh Co., Ltd., and is
provided as a recorded state in SD memory card.
This TOE is an option kit, which is available for safer use of MFP, and its function is to
overwrite designated areas of the HDD for erasing by the MFP.
1.2.3 Scope of TOE and Overview of Operation
1.2.3.1 TOE scope
This TOE is the software that is recorded state in SD memory card, and the SD
memory card is attached to the controller board. Figure1-1 shows the TOE and the
structure of the MFP, which is operational environment of the TOE.
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Controler board
HDD
RAM
Processor
SDmemory
card
Operation
panel
Scanner unit
Facsimile unit
Printengine
DOMS
TOE
NV-RAM
Host
interface
ROM
Figure1-1: Structure of TOE and MFP hardware
The explanations of each element in Figure1-1 are as follows.
z The print engine prints out data from printer and copier functions and received
data by the facsimile unit while controlling paper feed and paper eject.
z The scanner unit takes image data from paper documents into MFP. It is used for
taking image data from the copier, scanner and facsimile transmission functions
into controller board.
z The facsimile unit carries out transmission and reception of facsimile messages.
z The operation panel displays the information to MFP users and administrator and
also received instructions input by MFP users and administrator. MFP users and
administrator operate the operation panel to use the functions of the MFP.
z The HDD is used for storing image data. During printing, copying, scanning or
facsimile transmission/reception, the MFP temporarily stores image data for
working. Also general users use the HDD to keep their data until making use of
the data.
z The controller board controls whole of the MFP. In the MFP, the controller board
is equipped with the processor and RAM to execute software, ROM on which the
software such as operating system (OS) and the various application modules are
stored, NV-RAM on which setting information for MFP is recorded, and the host
interface to connect to the user PC and servers. TOE is recorded in SD memory
card, and the SD memory card is attached the controller board.
1.2.3.2 Operation overview of the TOE
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Ending
Notification
of each
overwriting
operation
HDD of MFP
UNIX area/RAW area
OS of MFP
TOE
MFP Control software
Writing the request
of overwriting
operation of RAW
area
Execution of the indicated overwriting operation
Shared memory
Request of
Start/Suspend of
overwriting
operation of the
whole HDD
Confirmation of
the permitting of
overwriting
operation of RAW
area
Request of
overwriting
operation
of UNIX
area
Watching the
request of
overwriting
operation of
RAW area
Figure1-2: Operational overview of the TOE
Figure1-2 shows operating overview of the TOE.
Control software of the MFP and the OS of the MFP are software existed on ROM on
Controller board of Figure1-1. The HDD of the MFP is HDD of Figure1-1, and it is
divided into UNIX area and RAW area. The shared memory is an area defined in RAM
on Controller board of Figure1-1.
By instructions from control software of the MFP, the TOE overwrites the specified
area on HDD of the MFP with a specified method.
There are following three operations that the TOE overwrites the area.
z Operation overview of overwrites RAW area
The instruction to overwrite information on RAW area to the TOE is executed via
shared memory on which the control software of the MFP specify an area to
overwrite, and responds to a confirmation of permission from TOE that overwrite
for erasing RAW area. At this time one overwriting method for erasing is
specified, too.
The TOE monitors the overwrite information of RAW area that recorded in the
shared memory. When the TOE finds the record for overwriting, the TOE
requests permission to overwrite for erasing the HDD RAW area to the control
software of the MFP. The TOE overwrites for erasing the RAW area indicated by
the record via the OS, after the control software of the MFP permits the requests.
At the end of overwriting, the TOE notifies the control software of the MFP of
completion.
z Operation overview of overwrites UNIX area
The instruction to overwrite information on UNIX area to the TOE is executed by
the control software of the MFP that specifies a discarded file on UNIX area and
one method of overwrite for erasing and gives instructions to overwrite. When
the TOE receives a notice of the discarded file in the UNIX area from the MFP, the
TOE overwrites for erasing the file via the OS.
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At the end of overwriting, the TOE notifies the control software of the MFP of
completion.
z Operation overview of overwrite all area of the HDD
When TOE receives the order of overwrite of the whole HDD, the TOE overwrites
for erasing all areas of the HDD via the OS.
One method of overwrite for erasing is specified with the order of overwrite for
erasing of the whole HDD.
At the end of overwriting, the TOE notifies the control software of the MFP of
completion.
The TOE can receive the cancellation for overwriting from the MFP during
operation of overwriting all area of the HDD, and the operation is aborted if the
cancelling order comes from the MFP.
1.2.4 TOE Functionality
The TOE provides the functions of overwrite for each area on HDD. Those areas are as
follows.
z The specified area on RAW area
z The specified files on UNIX area
z All area of the HDD
The method of overwrites for erasing can be specified as one of following three
methods.
z NSA method
NSA method overwrites data in following procedure.
- Overwrite twice with random numbers,
- Overwrite once with Null (0).
z DoD method
DoD method overwrites data in following procedure.
- Overwrite once with fixed numbers,
- Overwrite once with complement of above fixed numbers,
- Overwrite once with random numbers,
- Carry out final verification.
z Random Numbers method
Random Numbers method overwrites specified number of times (from one to nine
times) with random numbers.
1.3 Conduct of Evaluation
Based on the IT Security Evaluation/Certification Program operated by the
Certification Body, TOE functionality and its assurance requirements are being
evaluated by evaluation facility in accordance with those publicized documents such as
“IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme”[2], “IT Security Certification
Procedure”[3] and “Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure”[4].
Scope of the evaluation is as follow.
- Security design of the TOE shall be adequate;
- Security functions of the TOE shall be satisfied with security functional
requirements described in the security design;
- This TOE shall be developed in accordance with the basic security design;
- Above mentioned three items shall be evaluated in accordance with the CC Part 3
and CEM.
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More specific, the evaluation facility examined “Security Target for imagio Security
Card Type C, DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type D” as the basis design of security
functions for the TOE (hereinafter referred to as “the ST”)[1], the evaluation
deliverables in relation to development of the TOE and the development,
manufacturing and shipping sites of the TOE. The evaluation facility evaluated if the
TOE is satisfied both Annex C of CC Part 1 (either of [5], [8] or [11]) and Functional
Requirements of CC Part 2 (either of [6], [9] or [12]) and also evaluated if the
development, manufacturing and shipping environments for the TOE is also satisfied
with Assurance Requirements of CC Part 3 (either of [7], [10] or [13]) as its rationale.
Such evaluation procedure and its result are presented in “imagio Security Card Type
C, DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type D Evaluation Technical Report” (hereinafter
referred to as “the Evaluation Technical Report”) [17]. Further, evaluation
methodology should comply with the CEM (either of [14], [15] or [16]).
1.4 Certification
The Certification Body verifies the Evaluation Technical Report and Observation
Report prepared by the evaluation facility and evaluation evidence materials, and
confirmed that the TOE evaluation is conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Certification review is also prepared for those concerns found in the
certification process. Evaluation is completed with the Evaluation Technical Report
dated December, 2006 submitted by the evaluation facility and those problems pointed
out by the Certification Body are fully resolved and confirmed that the TOE evaluation
is appropriately conducted in accordance with CC and CEM. The Certification Body
prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report submitted
by the evaluation facility and concluded fully certification activities.
1.5 Overview of Report
1.5.1 PP Conformance
There is no PP to be conformed.
1.5.2 EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level of TOE defined by this ST is EAL3 conformance.
1.5.3 SOF
The minimum strength level claimed for the TOE is SOF-Basic in this ST.
It is assumed that the MFP, which is operation environment of the TOE, is used in
general offices. Therefore it is appropriate that minimum strength of function for the
TOE is SOF-Basic.
1.5.4 Security Functions
Security functions of the TOE are as follow.
The TOE provides the functions of overwrite for each area on HDD. Those areas are as
follows.
z The specified area on RAW area
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z The specified files on UNIX area
z All area of the HDD
The method of overwrites for erasing can be specified as one of following three
methods.
z NSA method
NSA method overwrites data in following procedure.
- Overwrite twice with random numbers,
- Overwrite once with Null (0).
z DoD method
DoD method overwrites data in following procedure.
- Overwrite once with fixed numbers,
- Overwrite once with complement of above fixed numbers,
- Overwrite once with random numbers,
- Carry out final verification.
z Random Numbers method
Random Numbers method overwrites specified number of times (from one to nine
times) with random numbers.
1.5.5 Threat
There are no threats countered by the TOE.
1.5.6 Organisational Security Policy
Organisational security policy required in use of the TOE is presented in Table 1-1.
Table 1-1 Organisational Security Policy
Identifier Organisational Security Policy
OSP.RESIDUAL The TOE shall prevent from retrieving
information on the HDD area specified by the
MFP.
1.5.7 Configuration Requirements
Target MFP of the TOE are listed inTable1-2.
Table1-2: Target MFP of the TOE
Product names in Japan Product names in other country
Model
1
Ricoh imagio Neo W7050
Ricoh imagio Neo W7050 model 75TR
Ricoh imagio Neo W7050 model 75R
Ricoh Aficio 480W
Lanier LW411
Savin 4800WD
Nashuatec A080
RexRotary A080
Gestetner A080
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Product names in Japan Product names in other country
Model
2
Ricoh imagio Neo C355it
Ricoh imagio Neo C455it
Ricoh imagio Neo C285
Ricoh imagio Neo C285 model 75
Ricoh imagio Neo C246
Ricoh imagio Neo C246 model 75
Ricoh imagio Neo C355
Ricoh imagio Neo C355 model 75
Ricoh imagio Neo C455
Ricoh imagio Neo C455 model 75
Ricoh Aficio 3228C/3235C/3245C
Lanier LD328c/LD335c/LD345c
Savin C2824/C3528/C4535
Nashuatec DSc428/DSc435/DSc445
RexRotary DSc428/DSc435/DSc445
Gestetner DSc428/DSc435/DSc445
infotec ISC 2428/2835/3545
Model
3
Ricoh imagio Neo C200
Ricoh imagio Neo C200 model 6
Ricoh imagio Neo C200 model 765
Ricoh Aficio 3224C/3232C
Lanier LD124c/LD132c
Savin C2410/C3210e
Nashuatec DSc424/DSc432
RexRotary DSc424/DSc432
Gestetner DSc424/DSc432
infotec ISC 1024c/1032c
Model
4
Ricoh imagio Neo 250
Ricoh imagio Neo 250 model 6
Ricoh imagio Neo 250 model 75
Ricoh imagio Neo 250 model 765
Ricoh imagio Neo 300
Ricoh imagio Neo 300 model 6
Ricoh imagio Neo 300 model 75
Ricoh imagio Neo 300 model 765
Ricoh Aficio 3025/3030
Lanier LD225/LD230
Savin 8025/8030
Nashuatec DSm725/DSm730
RexRotary DSm725/DSm730
Gestetner DSm725/DSm730
infotec IS 2225/2230
Model
5
Ricoh imagio Neo 353
Ricoh imagio Neo 353 model D
Ricoh imagio Neo 353 model 6
Ricoh imagio Neo 353 model 75D
Ricoh imagio Neo 353 model 765D
Ricoh imagio Neo 453
Ricoh imagio Neo 453 model 765
Ricoh Aficio 3035/3045/3035G/3045G
Lanier LD235/LD245
Savin 8035/8045
Nashuatec DSm735/DSm745
RexRotary DSm735/DSm745
Gestetner DSm735/DSm745
infotec IS 2235/2245
Model
6
Ricoh imagio MP C2500
Ricoh imagio MP C2500 SP
Ricoh imagio MP C3000
Ricoh imagio MP C3000 SP
Ricoh Aficio MP C2500/C3000
Lanier LD325c/LD330c
Savin C2525/C3030
Nashuatec MP C2500/C3000
RexRotary MP C2500/C3000
Gestetner DSc525/DSc530
infotec ISC 2525/3030
Model
7
Ricoh imagio MP C3500
Ricoh imagio MP C4500
Ricoh Aficio MP C3500/C4500
Lanier LD435c/LD445c
Lanier MP C3500/C4500
Savin C3535/C4540
Nashuatec MP C3500/C4500
RexRotary MP C3500/C4500
Gestetner MP C3500/C4500
Gestetner DSc535/DSc545
infotec ISC 3535/4045
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Product names in Japan Product names in other country
Model
8 Not available Ricoh Aficio MP 3500/4500
Ricoh Aficio MP 3500G/4500G
Ricoh Aficio MP 3590/4590
Lanier LD335/LD345
Lanier MP 3500/4500
Savin 8035e/8045e
Nashuatec MP 3500/4500
RexRotary MP 3500/4500
Gestetner MP 3500/4500
Gestetner MP 3590/4590
Gestetner DSm735e/DSm745e
Gestetner DSm735eg/DSm745eg
infotec IS 2435/2445
Model
9
Not available Ricoh Aficio MP 2510/3010
Ricoh Aficio MP 2590/3090
Lanier LD325/LD330
Lanier MP 2510/3010
Savin 8025e/8030e
Nashuatec MP 2510/3010
RexRotary MP 2510/3010
Gestetner MP 2510/3010
Gestetner MP 2590/3090
Gestetner DSm725e/DSm730e
infotec IS 2425/2430
1.5.8 Assumptions for Operational Environment
Assumptions required in environment using this TOE presents in the Table 1-3.
The effective performance of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these
preconditions are satisfied.
Table 1-3 Assumptions in Use of the TOE
Identifier Assumptions
A.BREAK It is assumed that the execution of the TOE is not
aborted.
The execution of the TOE is not aborted by
turning off the power of the MFP before the TOE
finishes overwriting.
A.CANCEL It is assumed that the execution of Erase All
Memory is not cancelled.
The execution of Erase All Memory is not
cancelled without user’s intent before the function
is finished.
1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product
Documents attached to the TOE are listed below.
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Documents for Japan;
z imagio Security Card Type C/imagio Security Card Type D Operating Instructions
Version B735-8501A
z To customers purchased imagio Security Card Type C/imagio Security Card Type D
Version B735-8510
Documents for overseas;
z DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type C/Unit Type D Operating Instructions
Version B735-8600
z To users of machines with Hold Print and Stored Print functions
Version B735-8801
z Depending on your machine
Version B735-8519
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2. Conduct and Results of Evaluation by Evaluation Facility
2.1 Evaluation Methods
Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in CEM in
accordance with the assurance requirements in CC Part 3. Details for evaluation
activities are report in the Evaluation Technical Report. It described the description of
overview of the TOE, and the contents and verdict evaluated by each work unit
prescribed in CEM.
2.2 Overview of Evaluation Conducted
The history of evaluation conducted was present in the Evaluation Technical Report as
follows.
Evaluation has started on September, 2006 and concluded by completion the
Evaluation Technical Report dated December, 2006. The evaluation facility received a
full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by developer, and
examined the evidences in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Additionally,
the evaluation facility directly visited the development and manufacturing sites on
October, 2006 and examined procedural status conducted in relation to each work unit
for configuration management, delivery and operation and lifecycle by investigating
records and staff hearing. Further, the evaluation facility executed sampling check of
conducted testing by developer and evaluator testing by using developer testing
environment at developer site on November, 2006.
No concerns were found in evaluation activities for each work unit. Therefore no
Observation Report was reported to developer.
As for concerns indicated during evaluation process by the Certification Body, the
certification review was sent to the evaluation facility. These were reflected to
evaluation after investigation conducted by the evaluation facility.
2.3 Product Testing
Overview of developer testing evaluated by evaluator and evaluator testing conducted
by evaluator are as follows.
2.3.1 Developer Testing
1) Developer Test Environment
Developer’s testing was performed using TOE-installed MFP circumstances as
follows.
Ricoh imagio Neo C355it (System version 1.30)
Ricoh imagio Neo 353 (System version 1.31)
And the following devices were used for testing operation and observation of
results:
Testing PC
Terminal software connected to MFP through RS232C/Ethernet
communication was used.
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IDE Bus Analyser
IDE-Pocket Ultra DMA/100 supported (TOYO Corporation)
Others
Boot server to start up the MFP in boot-mode.
Mail server for sending messages to check out the mail-sending function.
2) Outlining of Developer Testing
Outlining of the testing performed by the developer is as follow.
a. Test configuration
Some models of MFPs, which is distinguished in ST, were used as the testing
environment. As the result of the investigation of the difference among the
MFPs distinguished in ST, the evaluator assured that some models of MFPs
used as the testing environment cover the difference among the MFPs
distinguished in ST well. Therefore, the evaluator assured that developer's
testing environment was equal to the TOE configurations distinguished in ST.
b. Testing Approach
Following methods were employed for stimulation testing of TSFI and
observations.
- Checking out the panel operation and its indication.
- Checking out the logging body, which was displayed on PC monitor. The PC
was connected to the testing MFP.
- Monitoring data at the interface of HDD, using IDE bus analyser.
c. Scope of Testing Performed
Testing is performed 57 items by the developer.
The coverage analysis is conducted and examined to testing satisfactorily all of
the security functions described in the functional specification and the external
interface. Then, the depth analysis is conducted and examined to testing
satisfactorily all the subsystems described in the high-level design and the
subsystem interfaces.
d. Result
The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected test results and the
actual test results provided by the developer. The Evaluator confirmed the
developer testing approach performed and legitimacy of items performed, and
confirmed consistencies between the testing approach described in the test plan
and the actual test results.
2.3.2 Evaluator Testing
1) Evaluator Test Environment
Test configuration performed by the evaluator shall be the same configuration with
developer testing.
2) Outlining of Evaluator Testing
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Outlining of testing performed by the evaluator is as follow.
a. Test configuration
Evaluator’s testing was performed in the same TOE testing environment as the
TOE configuration distinguished in ST.
b. Testing Approach
Following methods were employed for stimulation testing of TSFI and
observations.
- Checking out the panel operation and its indication.
- Checking out the logging body, which was displayed on PC monitor. The PC
was connected to the testing MFP.
- Monitoring data at the interface of HDD, using IDE bus analyser.
c. Scope of Testing Performed
Total of 22 items of testing; namely 7 items from testing devised by the
evaluator and 15 items from testing from sampling of developer testing was
conducted. As for selection of the test subset, the following factors are
considered.
1. The items shall cover the developer’s testing from the viewpoint of the TSF
direction timing.
2. All security functions described in the functional specification and external
interface shall be tested fully.
d. Result
All evaluator testing conducted is completes correctly and could confirm the
behaviour of the TOE. The evaluator also confirmed that all the test results are
consistent with the behaviour.
2.4 Evaluation Result
The evaluator had the conclusion that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in
CEM by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.
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3. Conduct of Certification
The following certification was conducted based on each materials submitted by
evaluation facility during evaluation process.
1. Evidential materials submitted were sampled, its contents were examined, and
related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical
Report.
2. Rationale of evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
3. The Evaluator’s evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical
Report shall conform to the CEM.
Concerns found in certification process were prepared as certification review, which
were sent to evaluation facility.
The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in certification review
were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report.
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4. Conclusion
4.1 Certification Result
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report, the Observation
Report and the related evaluation evidential materials submitted and confirmed that
all evaluator action elements required in CC Part 3 are conducted appropriately to the
TOE. The Certification Body verified the TOE is satisfied the EAL3 assurance
requirements prescribed in CC Part 3.
4.2 Recommendations
None
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5. Glossary
The abbreviations used in this report are listed below.
CC: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
CEM: Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
EAL: Evaluation Assurance Level
PP: Protection Profile
SOF: Strength of Function
ST: Security Target
TOE: Target of Evaluation
TSF: TOE Security Functions
OS Operating System
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
HDD Hard Disk Drive
The glossaries used in this report are listed below.
MFP Multi-Functional Printer
It is the printer that has multiple functions such as copier,
printer in a single machine.
NV-RAM Non-volatile random access memory
Semiconductor memory that can maintain memory content
without supply of power
UNIX area HDD area managed by OS file system
The data that exists on the area can be accessed by normal file
operation.
RAW area HDD area not managed by OS file system
The data that exists on the area is managed by CSM in its way
without OS file operation.
SD memory card
Secure Digital memory card
It is a stamp-size memory device with the copyright protection
function.
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6. Bibliography
[1] Security Target for imagio Security Card Type C, DataOverwriteSecurity Unit
Type D Version 1.05 (November 22, 2006) RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
[2] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme, September 2006,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan EC-01
[3] IT Security Certification Procedure, September 2006, Information-technology
Promotion Agency, Japan EC-03
[4] Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure, September 2006,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan EC-05
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-001
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional requirements Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-002
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance requirements Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-003
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-001
(Translation Version 1.0 December 2005)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional requirements Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-002
(Translation Version 1.0 December 2005)
[10] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance requirements Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-003
(Translation Version 1.0 December 2005)
[11] ISO/IEC 15408-1:2005 - Information Technology - Security techniques -
Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 1: Introduction and general model
[12] ISO/IEC 15408-2:2005 - Information technology - Security techniques -
Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 2: Security functional requirements
[13] ISO/IEC 15408-3:2005 - Information technology - Security techniques -
Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 3: Security assurance requirements
[14] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation Methodology Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-004
[15] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation Methodology Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-004
(Translation Version 1.0 December 2005)
[16] ISO/IEC 18045:2005 Information technology - Security techniques - Methodology
for IT security evaluation
[17] imagio Security Card Type C, DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type D Evaluation
Technical Report Version 3.0, December 28, 2006, Electronic Commerce Security
Technology Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center