BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012
For
IBM DB2 Version 9.1
for z/OS Version 1 Release 10
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.61
BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012
Database Management System
IBM DB2 Version 9.1
for z/OS Version 1 Release 10
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: U.S. Government Protection Profile for Database
Management Systems in Basic Robustness
Environments, Version 1.2, 25 July 2007,
Information Assurance Directorate, National
Security Agency,
Controlled Access Protection Profile, Version 1.d,
NSA 1999-10-08
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 July 2012
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................17
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................18
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................21
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................21
7.1 Developer Testing..................................................................................................21
7.2 Evaluator Testing Effort..........................................................................................22
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing................................................................................22
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................23
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................24
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................24
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................25
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................25
11 Security Target............................................................................................................25
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................26
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................26
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................26
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................28
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................31
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................41
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS Version 1 Release 10 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS Version 1 Release 10 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24 April
2012. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation.
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012 Certification Report
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product IBM DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS Version 1 Release 10 has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
IBM Corporation
555 Bailey Avenue
San Jose, CA 95141
USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a combined TOE, consisting of:
● The “IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 10 (z/OS V1R10)” operating system, including the
Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) which is used as the evaluated platform
● The “IBM DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS” (DB2 9), which is built upon this platform
The DB2 v9.1 for z/OS Security Target [6] builds on the z/OS Security Target [8], which
refers to the evaluated “IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 10” operating system.
DB2 9 is a relational database management system that operates as a subsystem of z/OS.
DB2 is implemented by a set of address spaces plus a set of utilities.
The evaluation consist of z/OS and DB2, the TOE is a combination of both. Thus "TOE"
always means DB2 and z/OS in this report. For z/OS, usually the term “z/OS platform” is
used and for the application, “DB2.”
DB2 for z/OS is IBM’s flagship database management system, designed to efficiently and
cost-effectively deliver information to enterprise-class e-business applications and
leverage the capacity and processing power of IBM zSeries and z/OS.
Version 9.1 of DB2 introduces enhancements to performance, reliability/availability and
security, breaking barriers in key areas of database deployment.
Users can use SQL statements to define databases and manage their content. Several
“attach facilities” exist that can be used to submit SQL statements as well as database
commands from user programs to DB2. DB2 will evaluate the user’s right to perform the
requested actions before satisfying the request.
DB2 9 for z/OS provides security options for e-business with multilevel security and row-
level security as well as high security, more granularity and more information for additional
flexibility in applications and SQL, and encryption capabilities.
In addition, DB2 9 for z/OS improves access control by using database roles in a trusted
context, which provides the flexibility for managing context-specific privileges and
simplifies the processing of authorization. Improved filtering makes auditing more usable
and the Secure Sockets Layer(SSL) data encryption on networks is more secure.
The TOE fulfills the requirements of the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Database
Management Systems in Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.2. [7] and the
Controlled Access Protection Profile [7]. In the evaluated configuration. DB2 uses the
access control and security management services provided by the Resource Access
Control Facility (RACF) of z/OS for discretionary access controls and to implement
multilevel security controls down to the granularity of individual rows in a database.
Additionally, the TOE provides access control functions for z/OS and DB2 using RACF as
the central access control module. Access rights for both z/OS and DB2 objects are
therefore managed using the same interface provided by RACF. Access controls defined
by the SQL GRANT and REVOKE commands are not relevant and therefore ignored in the
evaluated version of the TOE with access control to the DB2 objects provided by RACF.
The TOE also implements mandatory access control for both z/OS and DB2 objects. In
DB2, mandatory access control is implemented by a dedicated column in each table that
contains the sensitivity label of the row. This column is maintained by the TOE and can not
be altered by a user unless he has the specific privilege to overwrite labels.
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To operate a mainframe system which deploys the products constituting this TOE in either
a CAPP or Labeled Security Mode of operation, the products must be installed in their
evaluated version and configured in a secure manner as described in the directions
delivered with the media and the accordant guides listed in the [8] and especially for DB2
9, “DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS Requirements for the Common Criteria" [11].
The DB2 for z/OS security target [6] documents the security characteristics of the TOE
described above in the Labeled Security and CAPP modes of operation.
The TOE is composed of one instance of z/OS V1R10 running on an abstract machine as
the sole operating system exercising full control over it, and DB2 9 running on top of z/OS
V1R10.
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected in a basic sysplex or in a parallel sysplex,
sharing their RACF database and acting like a single system. This functionality is provided
by z/OS V1R10, and DB2 relies on the mechanisms provided by the underlying operating
system.
The required runtime environment for the z/OS V1R10 platform is described in section
“TOE description” of the z/OS Security Target [8]. This description is also valid for this
combined TOE and is not restricted or expanded by DB2 9.
User identification and authentication and parts of access control to DB2 objects are
provided by the Resource Access Control Facility (RACF), a z/OS Security Server
component that is used by different services as the central instance for identification and
authentication and for access control decisions. z/OS V1R10 and DB2 9 come with
management functions that allow configuring the TSF and tailoring them to the customer’s
needs.
Some elements that have been included in the TOE do not provide security functions.
These elements run in authorized mode, so they could compromise the TOE if they do not
behave properly. Because these elements are essential for the operation of many
customer environments, the inclusion of these elements subjects them to scrutiny during
the evaluation and ensures that they may be used by customers without affecting the
TOE’s security status.
In its evaluated configuration, the TOE allows two modes of operation: Labeled Security
mode and CAPP-mode. In both modes, the same software elements are used. The two
modes have different RACF settings with respect to the use of security labels, but all other
configuration parameters are identical in the two modes.
Throughout the DB2 Security Target [6], any claims that are only valid for the Labeled
Security mode are marked accordingly.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile U.S. Government Protection Profile for Database Management Systems
in Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.2, 25 July 2007, Information Assurance
Directorate, National Security Agency, Controlled Access Protection Profile, Version 1.d,
NSA 1999-10-08 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
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The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Identification and authentication DB2 relies on the identification and authentication performed by
z/OS. When checking for the user's right to use authorities
managed by DB2, the database management system uses the
ID of the user verified by z/OS.
Additionally, DB2 can establish a trusted connection with a user
or system when a trusted context matches the characteristics of
the connection, based on the user ID and connection trust
attributes (e.g. IP address, domain name or SERVAUTH
security zone name for a remote client, the job or task name for
a local client). A trusted context allows the association of the
trusted connection with a database role, a different user or a
security label (in Labeled Security mode) for access control.
Object access control In the evaluated configuration, DB2 uses RACF to check for and
manage access control to DB2 objects. DB2 internal access
controls based on the GRANT and REVOKE SQL statements
will not be effective in the evaluated configuration.
In the case of a trusted connection, access control also includes
object ownership rules based on database roles. A database
role can be assigned to the DB2 process by a trusted context.
In Labeled Security mode, mandatory access control is in effect:
DB2 then uses the labels defined in the RACF profiles related to
DB2 objects as well as the DB2-managed labels of rows in
tables. In any case, the label-based access checks for
mandatory access control are performed using RACF. In the
case of a trusted connection, the default security label defined
for the related trusted context, if any, is assigned to the DB2
process.
Audit The audit requirements are implemented using a mix of SMF
records generated by RACF and the DB2 internal trace.
TSF management In the evaluated configuration DB2 uses the functions provided
by RACF to manage user profiles as well as the profiles related
to DB2 objects. Access to authorities of DB2 objects is
controlled by those profiles. Labels for rows in tables are
assigned when they are created using the current label of the
user that creates the row. The current label of the user is
maintained by RACF.
TOE self protection DB2 uses the protection mechanisms of z/OS with RACF to
protect its address space, functions and objects from
unauthorized access and manipulation.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7, and its references.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
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Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
For the configurations of the TOE covered by this certification please refer to chapter 8 of
this report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS Version 1 Release 10
The following tables outline the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW One of the following licensing options:
● DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS (standard version) –
product number 5635-DB2
● DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS (Value Unit Edition
"VUE") -product number 5697-P12
9.1 Physical shipment (tapes)
2 SW DB2 Utilities Suite for z/OS - product number 5655-
N97
9.1 Physical shipment (tapes)
3 SW ● UK57609 (APAR PM10538)
● UK56520 (APAR PK90346)
● UK64090 (APAR PM28621)
● UK64250 (APAR PM28854)
● UK50217 (APAR PK75583)
● UK65907 (APAR PM33064)
N/A Electronic download (via
ShopzSeries)
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
4 DOC ● ServerPac: Installing Your Order
● Requirements for the Common Criteria (SC19-
2788-00)
● Memo to Customers of DB2 9 for z/OS Common
Criteria Evaluated Base
● DB2 9 for z/OS (5635-DB2) standard licensing
option:
– DB2 for z/OS Codes (GC18-9843-05)
– DB2 for z/OS Installation Guide (GC18-9846-07)
– DB2 9 VUE Softcopy Publications CD (LK3T-
7195-03)
– DB2 for z/OS Licensed Program
Specifications(GC18-9848-01)
– DB2 for z/OS Messages (GC18-9849-05)
– DB2 for z/OS Program Directory (GI10-8737-02)
● DB2 9 for z/OS (5697-P12) Value Unit Edition
(VUE) licensing option:
– DB2 for z/OS Installation Guide (GC18-9846-07)
– Softcopy Publications CD (LK3T-7195-03)
– DB2 9 for z/OS License Information (GC19-
2414-02)
– DB2 9 for z/OS Value Unit Edition Program
Directory (GI10-8779-02)
● DB2 Utilities Suite for z/OS V9.1.0. (5655-N97):
● Licensed Information for DB2 Utilities Suite
(GC19-1100-00)
● DB2 Utilities Suite for z/OS, V9R1 Program
Directory(GI10-8647-00)
9.1 Physical shipment
(hardcopies and CD-ROM)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE, DB 2 portion
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
z/OS Version 1 Release 10 (V1R10) Common Criteria Evaluated Base Package:
z/OS Version 1 Release 10 (z/OS V1R10, program number 5694-A01)
1 SW z/OS V1R10 Common Criteria Evaluated Base
(IBM program number 5694-A01)
V1R10 Tape
2 DOC z/OS V1R10 Program Directory GI10-0670-10 Hardcopy
3 DOC z/OS CD Collection Kit SK3T-4269-21 CD-ROM
4 DOC z/OS Hot Topics Newsletter GA22-7501-15 Hardcopy
5 DOC ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order) n/a Hardcopy
6 DOC Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.10 Common Criteria Evaluated
Base
n/a Hardcopy
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No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
7 DOC z/OS V1R10.0 Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common
Criteria
GA22-7509-09 Hardcopy
IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 4 Release 2 for z/OS (PSF V4.2.0, program number 5655-M32)
8 SW IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 4 Release 2 for z/OS
(PSF V4.2.0, program number 5655-M32)
V4R2 Tape
9 DOC PSF 4.2 CDROM Kit BOOK SK3T-9927-02 CD-ROM
10 DOC PSF 4.2 CDROM Kit PDF SK3T-9928-02 CD-ROM
11 DOC PSF Tiers-AFP/IPDS Printers Z125-4564-18 Hardcopy
OGL/370 V1.1.0 (Program number 5688-191)
12 SW Overlay Generation Language Version 1
(OGL V1R1, program number 5688-191)
V1R1 Tape
13 DOC Overlay Generation Language/370: User's Guide and Reference S544370203 Hardcopy
14 DOC OGL/370 V1R1.0: Getting Started G544369100 Hardcopy
15 DOC OGL/370 V1R1.0: LPS G544369700 Hardcopy
16 DOC OGL: Command Summary and Quick Reference S544370301 Hardcopy
17 DOC Program Directory OGL/370 GI10021201 Hardcopy
IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.1.3 (5655-M23)
18 SW IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.1.3
(Program number 5655-M23, optional)
V1.1.3 Tape
19 DOC Program Directory IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.1.3 GI10-0769-03 Hardcopy
20 DOC IBM Ported Tools for z/OS License Information GA22-7986-05 Hardcopy
21 DOC Supplementary Toolkit License Information GA22-7986-06 Hardcopy
Additional Media
22 SW PTFs: UA44228, UA44851, UA44991, UA45841, UK38941,
UK39926, UK41041
obtained electronically from ShopzSeries
(https://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries)
n/a Electronic
Table 3: Deliverables of the TOE, z/OS portion
The DB2 portion of the TOE is delivered as a ServerPac (a preconfigured set of software
modules) on a cartridge that is physically shipped to the customer and installed by the
customer via CustomPac install dialogs, as well as applicable PTFs that are available for
electronic download.
These additional PTFs must be electronically downloaded using ShopzSeries IBM
website.
The delivery of the TOE is a chain of processes to produce and ship the TOE components
called ServerPacs, a preconfigured set of software modules that can be installed by the
customer. The process starts when the TOE has been built by the developers and
delivered to the production facility in Boulder, CO, where they are collected, packaged, and
finally delivered to the customer.
The evaluated version of z/OS can be orderd via an IBM sales representative or via the
ShopzSeries web application (http://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries). When filing an
order via (secured) internet services, IBM requires customers to have an account with a
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login name and password. Registration for such an account in turn requires a valid
customer ID from IBM.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Identification and authentication
● Object access control
● Audit
● TSF management
● TOE self protection
For more information on these issues, see Security Target [6], chapter 1.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed,
managed, and operated in a manner that maintains IT security objectives.
● Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to
security policy are protected from physical attack, which might compromise IT security
objectives.
● Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all access credentials, such as
passwords or other authentication information, are protected by the users in a manner
that maintains IT security objectives.
● The underlying abstract machine must provide a separation mechanism that can be
used by the TOE to protect the TSF and TSF data from unauthorized access and
modification.
● When installed/available in the hardware the TOE is operating on, the cryptographic
features provided by the processor or specific hardware coprocessors shall correctly
perform the cryptographic operations the TOE requests them to perform.
● Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that users of the TOE are cleared for
access to information depending on the classification of the information. They must also
ensure that information is correctly classified to be protected by the security functions of
the TOE.
● Sites using the TOE shall ensure that authorized administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained and follow all administrator guidance.
● There will be no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user
applications) available on DMBS servers, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the DBMS.
● The underlying OS has been validated.
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● Physical security will be provided within the domain for the value of the IT assets
protected by the TOE and the value of the stored, processed, and transmitted
information.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IBM DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS on the IBM z/OS
Version 1 Release 10 operating system, including the Resource Access Control Facility
(RACF) as described in the DB2 v9.1 for z/OS Security Target ([6]).
The security description and configuration of the z/OS V1R10 operating system is provided
in the z/OS Security Target [8] section 1.3 “TOE description”, and is considered in this
evaluation. Only the DB2-specific functionality is described below.
DB2 portion of the TOE is a relational database management system that operates as a
subsystem of z/OS. DB2 is implemented by a set of address spaces plus a set of utilities.
Users can access DB2 locally using "attachment facilities" or remotely via the Distributed
Data Facility which uses the DRDA protocols defined in the Open Group Technical
Standards DRDA-V1,DRDA-V2, and DRDA-V3.
Attachment facilities execute in the caller's address space and communicate with the DB2
address spaces to serve requests from the user. Attachment facilities included in the
evaluated configuration include the TSO attachment facility via the DSN TSO command or
the DB2I ISPF panels (which in turn use the DSN command to communicate with DB2).
Another attachment facility is the Call Attachment Facility (CAF), which allows programs
executing under TSO or in the z/OS batch environment to communicate with DB2.
The Resource Recovery Services Attachment Facility (RRSAF) is a newer implementation
of CAF with additional capabilities. RRS is a feature of z/OS that coordinates commit
processing of recoverable resources in a z/OS system. DB2 supports use of these
services for DB2 applications that use the RRS attachment facility provided with DB2. Use
the RRS attachment to access resources such as SQL tables, DL/I databases, MQSeries
messages, and recoverable VSAM files within a single transaction scope.
A requester using DRDA connects to an application server or database server. DRDA uses
Distributed Data Management (DDM) and Formatted Data Object Content Architecture
(FD:OCA) as part of the underlying architecture of DRDA. DDM is the communication
language used for message interchange systems. FD:OCA is used to exchange user data
among like or unlike systems. This allows external users to connect to DB2 and operate on
DB2 databases.
The DB2 Utilities are a set of online and standalone programs providing database
diagnostic and maintenance functions for administrators. The utilities do not use the
standard attachment facilities and operate with the database files directly at the table
space level.
The following figure shows the basic structure of DB2 and the attachment facilities
supported in the evaluated configuration.
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Figure 1:: Basic structure of DB2 for z/OS showing TOE structure with TOE boundary
The blue boxes in this figure represent the trusted parts of DB2, the yellow boxes
represent those parts of the attachment facilities of DB2 executing in the user's address
space or connections using the network interface. The brown box represents the z/OS
system that has already been evaluated as the platform of this combined TOE. The green
box represents (untrusted) user programs using services of z/OS and DB2.
The yellow arrows in the figure represent external interfaces of the trusted parts of DB2.
The brown arrow represents the external interfaces of the trusted parts of z/OS (which
have been assessed in the z/OS evaluation). The blue arrows represent the interface
between the trusted part of DB2 and the trusted part of z/OS.
It should be noted that this figure shows the main parts of the TOE and its interfaces, not a
flow of information. It should also be noted that the interfaces are not disjointed. The
trusted parts of DB2, for example, will also use interfaces to the trusted parts of z/OS that
are also used by other programs operating on top of z/OS.
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Subsystem Description
Relational Data Subsystem
Relational Data Security Module The module uses RACF to implement the security functions
which is described at the start of the chapter. Subsequent sub-
chapters describe how specific functions are implemented and
how they interface with other modules or subsystems.
System Services Subsystem
TSO Attachment Verifies TSO attachment credentials by using RACF.
Call Attachment Facility Verifies attachment credentials by using RACF.
RRSAF Uses RACF to check whether the primary authorization ID of
the allied address space is authorized to connect.
z/OS System Services Identification and sign-on support for attachment facilities using
RACF.
Authorization Security Interface Authorization interface for other subsystems using RACF for
access checks.
General Command Preprocessor Status: Command parsing fronted to DB that performs the required
authorization checks.
Audit Trace Security Interface Audit log interface used by DB2 to generate the SMF log
entries.
Instrumentation Facility Interface Allows application to obtain trace information aboutDB2. It uses
RDS which in turn uses RACF to verify the authorization for the
instrumentation.
System Parameter Manager DB2 system parameter interface available only for SYSADM or
SYSOPR.
Service Controller Interface between RDS and system services subcomponents.
Data Manager The data manager handles the synchronized access to the DB
using RDS if needed to enforce MLS.
Data Space Manager Performs data set management for DB2 z/OS Access Method
Services to modify VSAm data sets.
Buffer Manager Performs storage buffer management and cleans out newly
requested buffers, thereby enforcing object reuse requirements.
Stored Procedures Manager Manages stored procedures and uses RDS for authentication.
Utilities Subsystem
Utilities Subsystem Security Functions Utilities work directly on VSAM data sets and are therefore
directly authorized via RACF. When using multilevel security the
table loading function validates seclabels.
Row Level Security Provides a service to perform mandatory access control on the
row level.
Distributed Data Services Subsystem
DRDA Security Functions Provides the DRDA interface and uses RACF to provide the
related security functions.
Distributed Transaction Manager(DTM) Uses DSN3AUTH to authenticate and ensure the user’s
authority to access DB2 as required by DRDA.
Table 4: TOE design
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6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 and table 3 is being provided with the
product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure
usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
Testing Effort
The developer used a fully-automated test suite comprised of 66 test cases that split up
into test case files where each test case file may test several functions and interface
parameters. This test framework was used to test every ST claim, all interface functions,
and subsystems, in both DAC and MAC context. Separate mapping files (for
interfaces/subsystems and claims) were maintained. In addition, the developer used a
summary sheet where the date of the successful execution of each test case was
recorded. The test environment was comprised of several virtualized systems of DB2 on
z/OS to test remote functionality. Most of the tests naturally focused on testing access
privileges, which comprises the biggest portion of the TSF. In general, the testing effort
allowed for very focused and fine-grained testing.
The test case description is embedded within the test files and refers explicitly to the test
claims. The test environment was enhanced by scripts that check that the different test
servers are still active during testing. Additional test scripts reverse the order of test cases
to demonstrate that no interdependencies exist.
Approach
The developer's approach was to demonstrate that because all TCs ran successfully
(which was supported by the automated result check) that all ST claims, interfaces, and
subsystems are verified by the tests.
Configuration
The provided test system is a virtualized environment on z/VM. Several VMs allow for
distributed testing. The test tool TCPUN is installed on these machines to drive the test
suites. The test systems are statically configured with necessary RACF options from z/OS
and the DB2 Common Criteria specific settings. This includes defining users in RACF. As
part of the test scripts, options are set dynamically to allow for DAC and MAC contexts,
and user privileges and authorities a reset dynamically as needed by each test case. The
test environment was made available remotely. Test files were stored on the z/VM system
and could be executed by the evaluator, either individually or as a group.
Depth
The tested behavior was covered down to the level of subsystems, and the evaluator could
verify that most relevant execution paths were taken into account. Most test cases directly
referred to the sections in the guidance and some cited paragraphs to smooth test
development and verification in respect to specific TOE behavior. Each tested behavior
was tested with different privileges if applicable, e.g., administrative users, users with
explicit privileges for the task, or users without privileges (to test the negative case).
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Results
The results of the developer showed a 100% successful test run.
7.2 Evaluator Testing Effort
Effort
The evaluator executed 2 of the 6 developer test suites where one of the test suites
comprised the majority of all developer tests. The evaluator further devised 6 tests that are
partially based on existing developer tests. A code review was performed to analyze the
authentication mechanism available via a remote connection (DRDA).
Approach
The evaluator used the test tool TCPUN to execute the test cases and to determine
whether any of the tests failed. The test tool produced a results file for each unsuccessful
test case, and summary files on the results for several tests. The evaluator also used
options of the tool to generate output files for test cases -- even the ones that were
successful. This was used to verify the comparison logic of the tool that takes place when
comparing the actual results with the provided verification file. All independent tests were
executed on the test environment provided by the developer. Additional tests were devised
to cover all attachment facilities and all privileges defined for the CAPP access control
security function, and to determine that TOE setup options are enforced.
Configuration
The evaluator executed the developer test suites in both the Label Security and CAPP
mode. The evaluator tests were performed in CAPP mode (no additional Label Security
related tests were necessary).
Depth
Execution of the developer tests covered most interfaces and subsystems. The additional
evaluator tests closed a gap for the attachment facilities testing (relevant for I&A
functionality), and for testing all privileges (increasing the rigor of the already thorough
testing of access control functions).
Results
All tests were run successfully. The code view revealed no weakness in the authentication
logic.
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
Penetration testing effort
The evaluator considered common sources for vulnerabilities of DB2 in general and
narrowed the findings down to what is applicable to the z/OS version of the product. He
also examined the vulnerabilities and defects tracked by the developer and whether they
have been fixed. In each case, no exploitable vulnerabilities have been identified in these
areas that would need additional penetration testing. The evaluator still devised tests
related to the following:
● running vulnerability scanners on the TOE
● input validation on the remote TSFI
● session handling on the remote TSFI
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● check of AC(1) modules
The vulnerability scanners were publicly available, while the input validation was
performed by using custom C test code. The test code is based on the opendrda project,
but was heavily revised during the testing activity, based on the new DRDA standard and
information from the developer who observed the TOE behaviour via debug traces where
the DRDA connection failed to be established.
Testing approach
The tests focused on using remote access to the TOE (using the DRDA interface), which
enabled the evaluator to connect vulnerability scanners to the TOE to automatically search
for vulnerabilities. The evaluator further focused the DRDA specification to perform more
in-depth tests on specific DRDA aspects. This focused approach was favoured against an
approach where a variety of functionality is not so deeply tested, because the developer
already runs a very thorough suite of test cases on all aspects of the TSF, and because
any remote vulnerabilities are usually much more critical to the TOE. The goal was to
reveal any TOE behaviour that violates the security policy in terms of Identification and
Authentication and to determine whether the TOE operation remains stable which would
otherwise indicate incorrect verification of the input that might require additional
investigation.
Test configuration
The test configuration comprised of the TOE residing in the developer test lab which was
also used for independent testing. The test configuration was in accordance to the
evaluated configuration. From the set of the different TOE setups provided by the
developer, the test was run on a setup that supported the distributed data facility which
provided the working remote DRDA interface. The evaluator used tools to connect to the
TOE remotely via the DRDA interface. The vulnerability scanners were installed on a
windows client while the fuzzy code was developed and executed on a Linux client (both
residing or tunnelled into the test network).
Depth
The main goal was to perform in-depth tests on the DRDA data flow (exchanging individual
protocol parameter values with invalid input, incorrect length parameters, and changing the
order of protocol messages).
Results
The vulnerability scanners were not able to connect to the TOE. The fuzzy test did not
reveal any violation of the TSF, and the TOE had stable operation across the testing
phase, and returned proper error codes which indicated that all tested input variations
were correctly handled.
The z/OS-specific penetration test derived during the evaluation of z/OS V1R6 was the
building of a fuzzing-framework for SVC and PC calls.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated configuration is documented in DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS Requirements for
the Common Criteria [11]. It is based on one of the two shipping options: DB2 Version 9.1
for z/OS (standard version) - product number 5635-DB2 or DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS
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(Value Unit Edition "VUE") - product number 5697-P12, the underlying IBM z/OS Version 1
Release 10 and further components as listed in table 2 and 3.
The difference between the two shipping options of the DB2 portion relates to the product
licensing, not to product functionality. The chosen licensing option will be visible as a string
identifier in the record facility of z/OS, and in the ISPF panel during installation. Both TOE
versions are completely representative because there is no functional difference between
them which means the VUE-option does not contain additional functions, nor does it
replace or remove functions of the standard edition. Therefore, although the actual testing
only happened for an VUE-installation, its results apply to the non-VUE shipping version
as well.
The software is to be used on the following hardware platforms:
The TOE is running within a logical partition provided by a certified version of PR/SM, on
the z/Architecture as implemented by the following hardware platforms:
● IBM zSeries model z890, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card or PCIXCC and PCICA
crypto cards
● IBM zSeries model z990, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card or PCIXCC and PCICA
crypto cards
● IBM System z9 109, z9 BC, or z9 EC, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card.
● IBM System z10 Business Class, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card.
● IBM System z10 Enterprise Class, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card.
In addition, the TOE may run on a virtual machine provided by a certified version of z/VM.
This Evaluated Configuration Guide specifies a number of constraints, such as
configuration values for various configuration files, specific steps to be taken during
installation and information to administrators on how to manage the TOE.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
● All components claimed in the Security Target [6], chapter 2 and defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
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● PP Conformance: U.S. Government Protection Profile for Database Management
Systems in Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.2, 25 July
2007, Information Assurance Directorate, National Security
Agency,
Controlled Access Protection Profile, Version 1.d, NSA 1999-10-
08 [7]
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:
● The TOE Security Functions “RACF Passtickets”, “Authentication via Client Digital
Certificates”, “Authentication via Kerberos” and “Communication Security” and
● for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 and 3 contain necessary information about the usage
of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] and [8] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012, Version 1.29, 2012-01-20, DB2 v9.1 for
z/OS Security Target, IBM Corporation
[7] U.S. Government Protection Profile for Database Management Systems in Basic
Robustness Environments, Version 1.2, 25 July 2007, Information Assurance
Directorate, National Security Agency,
Controlled Access Protection Profile, Version 1.d, NSA 1999-10-08
[8] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0534, Version 5.11, 2009-03-16, Security Target for
IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 10, IBM Corporation
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 5, 2012-.05-10, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, DB2 v9.1 for z/OS, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential
document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE (confidential document):
CMVC User Guidance: [CLGUIDANCE], 2011-04-13, File name: v9_plugins.pdf
CMVC Defect: [SECINT], 2009-11-17, File name: DB2 Security Integrity
Vulnerabilities 2009.11.17.pdf
CMVC Source Code: [hdb9910], 2009-11-23, File name: hdb9910.pdf
CMVC DB2 Utilities Suite: [jdb991k], 2009-11-23, File name: alc/jdb991k.pdf
CMVC DB2 VUE (licensing option): [jdb991z], 2009-11-23, File name: jdb991z.pdf
CMVC object code (SMP/E tape loaded into SPA as TOE base): [OBJCODECI],
2009-07-31, File name: db2910_beta.files.txt
8
Specifically
• AIS14, Version 7, 3. August 2010, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS19, Version 8, 19. Oktober 2010, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung
des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische ZufallszahlengeneratorenAIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im
deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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Teamroom CC evidence: [TROOMCI], 2012-01-30, File name:
TeamRoomPlus_Configuration_List.pdf
COMLIB final Test Cases and Test Results: [TESTCASECI], 2011-06-17, File name:
110322.5b7.CCEAL4.BU1.zip
CMVC Test Plan: [TESTPLANCI], 2009-04-14, File name: v9 testplan.xls
(Preliminary) Test Results: [TESTRESCI], 2009-04-29, File name: ConfigList-V9-
test-results.pdf
SPA source files (deltas, open APARs): [MINIFCI], 2009-07-31, File name:
hdb106.pdf
SPA source files (committed PTFs fixed/tested/approved): [MINIJCI], 2009-07-31,
File name: hdb110.pdf
SPA source files (original sources of original release, read only, never modified base
code, metadata, control files, etc.): [MINILCI], 2009-07-31, File name: hdb112.pdf
RETAIN APAR list: [RETAINAPAR], 2011-04-18, File name: APARs_20110418.xls
RETAIN PTF list: [RETAINPTF], 2011-04-18, File name: PTFs_20110418.xls
CONFLIST z/OS R10 Element Configuration Lists, 2009-04-08, File name:
cm.lists/cm.lists.r10.zip
[11] DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS Requirements for the Common Criteria, Version SC19-
2788-00, May 2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0622-2012 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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