TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Headoffice:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
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P.O. Box 37
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The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the Dutch
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number 27288788
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2020-2
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Certification Report
SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document ICAO
Application - BAC, version 3
Sponsor and developer: HID Global
viale Remo De Feo, 1
80022 Arzano (NA),
ITALY
Evaluation facility: UL
Unit 2 Horizon, Wade Road, Kingsland Business Park
Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG24 8AH
United Kingdom
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0061438-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0061438
Author(s): Denise Cater
Date: 10 September 2020
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the SOMA-
c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document ICAO Application - BAC, version 3. The developer of
the SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document ICAO Application - BAC, version 3 is HID
Global located in Arzano, Italy and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A
Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a composite product made up of the Machine Readable Electronic Document application
“ICAO Application - BAC” and the native Smart Card operating system “SOMA-c016”, in composition
with the already certified “NXP N7121” Integrated Circuit and Crypto Library.
The TOE provides Basic Access Control (BAC) security mechanisms, featured by the ICAO
application according to ICAO Doc 9303 7th ed. Part 11.
The TOE is delivered in phase 2 to the Card manufacturer as a microcontroller module which is ready
to be embedded into a Smart Card or document booklet with the antenna and substrate, which are
outside the physical boundaries of the TOE.
The TOE has been evaluated by UL located in Hampshire, UK. The evaluation was completed on 25
August 2020 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security
[NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic
Document ICAO Application - BAC, version 3, the security requirements, and the level of confidence
(evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.
Consumers of the SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document ICAO Application - BAC,
version 3 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to
give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic
Document ICAO Application - BAC, version 3 from HID Global located in Arzano, Italy.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
NXP N7121 IC
(Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-1040-2019)
Hardware release B
• IC Dedicated Test Software Release 9.2.3
• IC Dedicated Support Software including: Release 9.2.3
o Flashloader OS Release 1.2.5
o Communication Library Release 6.0.0
o CRC Library Release 1.1.8
o Memory Library Release 1.2.3
o Flash Loader Library Release 3.6.0
o System Mode OS Release 13.2.3
o Crypto Library Release 0.7.6
Software SOMA-c016_3 Version 3
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the SOMA-c016
Machine Readable Electronic Document ICAO Application - BAC, version 3. Details can be found in
section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.5.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a contact or contactless based integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD) and provides Basic Access Control according to ICAO Doc 9303 Part 11. The
TOE is delivered to the Card manufacturer in Phase 2 as a microcontroller module which is ready to
be embedded into a Smart Card or document booklet with the antenna and substrate, which are
outside the physical boundaries of the TOE.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 3.2 of the
[ST].
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2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalized must perform proper and safe personalization
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data sent to and read from the TOE.
In BAC configuration the TOE does not address Active Authentication. The SOMA-c016 product
consists of three separate applications. This certification addresses the TOE that contains the ICAO
Application - BAC. The additional applications noted below were evaluated concurrently with this TOE,
but are addressed by separate certificates and are out of scope of this report.
• ICAO Application - EAC-PACE-AA
• eIDAS QSCD Application.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is comprised of the following subsystems:
• Commands manager: responsible for managing application commands, managing rollback
and reset, and managing access conditions.
• Security manager: responsible for authentication, secure messaging, security data
management, and low-level crypto features.
• Data objects and NVM management: responsible for managing the storage of persistent data.
• Communications manager: manages the contact (T=1 ISO/IEC 7816-3) and contactless
(ISO/IEC 14443) communication interface protocols, and handles errors during start-up.
• Initialization and command management: responsible for TSF secure initialization, life cycle
and secure messaging status management, managing the main loop, command dispatch, and
utility functions.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
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SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Operational User
Guidance ICAO application, TCAE180018
1.4, 2020-08-14
SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Initialization
Guidance, TCAE180013
1.6, 2020-08-14
SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Personalization
Guidance ICAO application, TCAE180016
1.6, 2020-08-14
SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Pre-personalization
Guidance ICAO application, TCAE180014
1.6, 2020-08-14
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification and subsystems. The
developer used a black-box testing approach. The testing coverage and depth is achieved by the
black-box testing on the external interfaces. Black-box testing on the external interfaces is done using
a subset of the ICAO and BSI test plans for e-passports. These are public test plans intended for
testing the correct implementation of the e-passport functionality.
Since the public ICAO and BSI test plans are very comprehensive and all the TSFI’s listed in the
specifications are tested by them, they are the most suitable way to test the mechanisms and
protocols provided by the ICAO and BSI specifications. The developer performed additional tests on
the external interfaces to demonstrate those not covered by the generic BSI and ICAO test plans.
The sample of tests selected for repetition by the evaluators covered all the TSFI commands, with at
least one test case per TSFI.
The evaluator augmented the testing of the interfaces used in the TOE in phases 2 and 3 (pre-
personalisation and personalisation phases), which are TOE specific, by using different test
parameters with the same tools as the developer.
The evaluator augmented the testing of TOE internal modules by using different inputs on a small set
of interfaces with the same tools as the developer.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The evaluator performed a vulnerability analysis using a vulnerability-centric approach. All generic
attacks to smart cards and similar devices considered in [JIL_AM] have been taken into account.
The evaluator performed a public vulnerability search, including a literature review of conference
proceedings, University research, relevant journals and published papers. The evaluator also
considered Internet surveys and online vulnerability databases.
The evaluator then performed an independent vulnerability analysis as follows:
• The security architecture of the TOE was analysed and understood based on the security
architecture document.
• The SFRs defined in [ST] were analysed and for each, a deep understanding of the SFR was
gained based on all the evidence provided for ADV.
• The security guidance documentation and the ETR for composition of the underlying platform
were analysed and a list of requirements that the embedded software must be compliant with
were extracted.
• The code review confirmed that the elements listed in the previous bullets were implemented
as described and looked for vulnerabilities in each item.
The evaluators performed two perturbation tests, with light, EMFI and FBBI for fifteen weeks and one
side channel attack test for six weeks.
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2.6.3 Test Configuration
All developer and evaluator testing was performed on operational samples containing the final version
of the TOE, as identified in Identification of Target of Evaluation section above. The only exception to
this was the use of open samples during the identification phase of the side-channel testing.
The following test equipment and tools were used by the evaluator:
• UL Zeus test suite v4.2.0.18.
• UL DEEPLY_v0.7.9_Release_bis.
• UL Crypto Tool v1.0, including:
o Artemis v4.2
o Atropos v5.0
• MATLAB R2017a.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
There is no re-use of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SOMA-c016 Machine Readable
Electronic Document ICAO Application - BAC, version 3.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE Report
and other evaluator documents, and a Site Technical Audit Report for one site [STAR]
2
.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SOMA-c016 Machine
Readable Electronic Document ICAO Application - BAC, version 3, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC
Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2. This
implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to the resistance
against certain attacks.
2
The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and certification
body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
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3 Security Target
The SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Security Target ICAO Application BAC,
TCAE180001, version 1.6, 2020-08-14 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
BAC Basic Access Control
EAC Extended Access Control
eIDAS electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services
eMRTD electronic MRTD
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
QSCD Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Device
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document ICAO Application - BAC
Evaluation Technical Report, UL12665569/ETR_BAC, Version 4.0, 2020-08-17.
[EU-REG] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for
electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.
[HW-CERT] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1040-2019 for NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
[HW-ETRfC] ETR for Composition NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated
Software and Crypto Library (N7121) – EAL6+ according to AIS36, BSI-CC-1040,
version 8.0, 31 May 2019.
[HW-ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library Security Target Lite, version 1.1, 31 May 2019.
[JIL_AM] Joint Interpretation Library – Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
Version 2.3, April 2019.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[PP] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055, version 1.10, 25th
March 2009.
[ST] SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Security Target ICAO
Application BAC, TCAE180001, version 1.6, 2020-08-14.
[ST_LITE] SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Security Target ICAO
Application BAC Public Version, TCLE180022, version 1.4, 2020-08-14.
[STAR] Site Technical Audit Report HID Global S.p.A, Arzano, Italy, version 3.0, 2020-08-
14.
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April
2006.
(This is the end of this report).