BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
for
SMARTY IQ-LTE, Version 1.1
from
Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V2.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 (*)
Smart Meter Gateway
SMARTY IQ-LTE, Version 1.1
Hardware Version: DNT8209/3.3
Software Version: 2.0.3036
Operating System Version: DNT8209-21
from Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart
Metering System, Version 1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-
CC-PP-0073-2014
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 30 March 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................21
12. Definitions.................................................................................................................21
13. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................26
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................27
5 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
6 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
7 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SMARTY IQ-LTE, Version 1.1 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V2-2020. Specific results from
the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V2-2020 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product SMARTY IQ-LTE, Version 1.1 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 11 March 2021. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:
Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH.
The product was developed by: Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 30 March
2021 is valid until 29 March 2029. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to monitor the resistance of the certified product against new attack methods and to
provide a qualified positive confirmation by applying for a re-certification or re-
assessment process on a regular basis every two years starting from the issuance
of the certificate,
5. to make sure that over the complete lifetime of the certificate a security module with
a valid CC certificate is used.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SMARTY IQ-LTE, Version 1.1 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH
Papenreye 65
22453 Hamburg
Deutschland
9 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the SMARTY IQ-LTE, Version 1.1, is an electronic unit
comprising hardware, software and firmware. It serves as a Gateway in a complex Smart
Metering Infrastructure, which is used for collection, storage and provision of meter data
from one or more meters of one or multiple commodities to potentially multiple external
entities. A complete system for smart metering comprises different functional units,
whereby only the Smart Meter Gateway functionality is in the focus of the evaluated TOE.
The hardware device also contains a certified security module (product name “TCOS
Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE”, BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-
V2-2016), which is not part of the TOE, but used by the TOE for specific cryptographic
services.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version 1.3, 31 March
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.CR, Cryptographic Support The TOE implements the cryptographic functionality as required by [17],
[TR-3109]. As defined by [8] this functionality covers the symmetric parts
of the required cryptographic primitives. The TOE utilizes the services of
the security module for all asymmetric cryptographic primitives. The TOE
encrypts all TSF and user data if they are not in use. The TOE will use the
Security Module to generate all necessary random numbers.
SF.IA, Identification and
Authentication
The TOE authenticates every user and external entity before allowing any
other action on behalf of that user. User identities have the following
security attributes:
identity, status of identity, connecting network, role membership, blocking
flag, login and logout time.
The Gateway Administrator can configure consumers with a
username/password combination based identification/authentication or
with a certificate based identification/authentication. The Gateway
Administrator can configure Service Technicians only with a certificate
based identification/ authentication. The identification/authentication of the
Gateway Administrator is implemented as certification-based, bidirectional
mechanism according [17], [TR-03109].
SF.PR, Privacy The TOE provides mechanisms for communication concealing. The
Communication to external Entities is performed over packet oriented
networks. To conceal the communication the packet size is mutable, also
the transmitted content is padded to random size.
SF.AU, Security Audit The TOE implements three different audit logs:
11 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
a) System Log,
b) Consumer Log, and
c) Calibration Log.
All audit messages/entries contain information about the accountable user
or event and they further contain the following information: domain (log
name), date, time, event type, level, subject identity, operation result,
causing component, description. Furthermore, the consumer log contains
all entries that are required for a billing verification, the system log
includes all system relevant events and the calibration log persists of all
information that is relevant for calibration purposes.
SF.SM, Security Management The TOE only provides authorized users with security management
functions. Hereby, all authorized users have the capability to trigger self-
tests. Additionally, the consumer may also display the current version
number of the TOE and the current time. Concerning management
functionalities, the Service Technician may only change the parameters
for the network access for WAN during the installation process and the
Gateway Administrator may configure all aspects of the SMGW, which is
exclusively possible via IF_GW_WAN. For documentation, see the
corresponding HGP protocol [13].
SF.SP, Self-Protection The TOE implements functionality for self-protection, for instance
preserving a secure state in case of failures (for example integrity errors).
If the system time is not valid, all recorded measurement data will marked
for the EMT.
SF.UD, User Data Protection The TOE provides functionality to logically remove unused information by
zeroization. All objects within the used databases are integrity protected.
Furthermore, access control and firewall policies protect the
corresponding data.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.3 to 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
12 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SMARTY IQ-LTE, Version 1.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW SMARTY IQ-LTE Version 1.1 Hardware
Version:
DNT8209/3.3
Standard Delivery via transport
service and installation by a
service technician or personal
hand over.
2 SW Operating System DNT8209-21 Pre-Installed on the HW
3 SW SMGW Application 2.0.3036 Pre-Installed on the HW
4 DOC Anleitung zur IT-Sicherheit / Guidance
Document – Anleitung zum Betrieb, [10]
1.25 Download from https secured
website
hash256
cf119cd4a4b128e2b41648ae73e
2fa4eaa1a6bcb8e8911f6ce1387
d2645ada95
5 DOC Anleitung zur IT-Sicherheit / Guidance
Document – Vorbereitende Maßnahmen,
[11]
1.23 Download from https secured
website
hash256
bb29af033104746a7fd5baeb433
d6f8010bdb12e13cbb2f1af060a
4ba0a7a05a
6 DOC Sichere Lieferkette, [12] 1.3 Download from https secured
website
hash256
3ad99a0fa18b7918821ac70255
a031d4b0d88c64ea57cd224027
48be8b21b375
7 DOC Anlage zum AGD: - Http Gateway Protocol
2.4, [13]
2.4.026 Download from https secured
website
hash256
7448a50402a3c47331429e9323
53575b72fedb2743e928dd2fc8e
ed1ef8c3049
8 DOC Anlage zum AGD: Übersicht der Audit
Records, [14]
1.37 Download from https secured
website
hash256
c99697f8e87cc93d3c74607de72
b110c8691872b066cd8e5c5c9e
c5d052bb439
9 DOC Anlage zum AGD: Übersicht der
versendeten Events, [15]
1.37 Download from https secured
website
hash256
dc4db45ea26695784682b47edd
a59edcab5bf506df1718ef63ac5
3b34f748339
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
13 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
The TOE itself consists of the hardware, firmware and software parts of the Smart Meter
Gateway accompanied by the different guidance documents. For the physical parts
(Hardware parts) two different delivery ways exist. In the first scenario SMGW are
delivered within a special and secure transport box (pylocx Box) by a standard
transportation service. The secure transport box can only be opened by authorized
individuals by using a special key pad and a valid and individual one time PIN. Due to the
mandatory instructions of the developer it is not allowed to remove SMGWs from the
secure transport box outside a secure storage room (e.g. at the premise of the energy
company) or at the place of installation at the consumers premise where it is installed by a
service technician. In the second scenario SMGW can be delivered without such secure
boxes but the general requirements for the transport are increase. For example the freight
hold needs to be sealed and the transport needs to be supervised by two drivers.
Furthermore, the transport time is limited to 36 hours and overnight breaks are not
allowed. If the SMGWs shall be stored without secure transport box, the store has to be
certified against Common Criteria. All places where SMGW will be stored during the
delivery need to provide a basic protection against possible attackers (e.g. concrete walls,
doors need to be locked, and a physical inventory needs to be performed). Thereby it is
ensured that no manipulation of the SMGW can take place on the complete track of
delivery (starting with the manufacturer, through the different stages of storages to the final
place of installation).
The firmware and software are pre-installed on the hardware and therefore part of the
physical delivery. All users can uniquely identify their version by connecting to the TOE and
using the commands described in the relevant guidance document.
The guidance documents can be downloaded by a https secured website (standard
delivery). After they are downloaded they can be uniquely identified by checking the hash
sum which is also included in the Security Target and the Certification Report (which both
will be published on the website of the BSI).
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Security audit, communication, cryptographic support, user data protection, identification
and authentication, security management, privacy, protection of the TSF and trusted
path/channels.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.
14 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.ExternalPrivacy: Authorised and authenticated external entities receiving any kind of
private or billing-relevant data shall be trustworthy and shall not perform unauthorised
analyses of these data with respect to the corresponding consumer(s).
● OE.TrustedAdmins: The Gateway Administrator and the Service Technician shall be
trustworthy and well-trained.
● OE.PhysicalProtection: The TOE shall be installed in a non-public environment within
the premises of the consumer that provides a basic level of physical protection. This pro-
tection shall cover the TOE, the Meters that the TOE communicates with and the
communication channel between the TOE and its Security Module. Only authorised
individuals may physically access the TOE.
● OE.Profile: The Processing Profiles that are used when handling data shall be obtained
from a trustworthy and reliable source only.
● OE.SM: The environment shall provide the services of a certified Security Module for
verification of digital signatures, generation of digital signatures, key agreement, key
transport, key storage and Random Number Generation. The Security Module used
shall be certified according to Common Criteria Protection Profile for a Security Module
for Smart Metering Systems (BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015), Version 1.03, 11.12.2014,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik [16] and shall be used in
accordance with its relevant guidance documentation.
● OE.Update: The firmware updates for the Gateway that can be provided by an
authorised external entity shall undergo a certification process according to this Security
Target before they are issued to show that the update is implemented correctly. The
external entity that is authorised to provide the update shall be trustworthy and ensure
that no malware is introduced via a firmware update.
● OE.Network: It shall be ensured that
• a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual
situation is available,
• one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the system time are available in the
WAN,
• the Gateway is the only communication gateway for Meters in the LMN,
• if devices in the HAN have a separate connection to parties in the WAN (beside the
Gateway) this connection is appropriately protected.
● OE.Keygen: It shall be ensured that the ECC key pair for a Meter (TLS) is generated
securely. It shall also be ensured that the keys are brought into the Gateway in a secure
way by the Gateway Administrator.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
15 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
5. Architectural Information
The following subsystems and modules of the TOE are identified as follows (including a
short description of the corresponding objective extracted from):
● cryptmgr: Contains all functionalities to realize security functionalities with the
Hardware Security Module.
● dataproc: Persists all configuration profiles and other settings in an encrypted
database.
● hanmgr: Contains all functionalities to set up encrypted connections in the LAN.
● hardware: Includes the SMGW hardware: circuit boards, active and passive
components including enclosures.
● lmn485: Contains all functionalities to use the LMN network.
● lmnmgr: Contains all functionalities to capture and process metrics.
● lmnwmbus: Contains all functionalities to use the wireless LMN network.
● logctrl: Accepts the audit records generated in the other subsystem and stores them
accordingly in System, Calibration log and Consumer log required by TR.
● middleware: Contains general functionalities that are provided to other subsystems.
● miscmgr: Miscmgr is a summary of necessary functionalities, which are not related to
the meter data acquisition.
● netmgr: Contains all functionalities to manage the physical network interfaces in the
LAN and WAN.
● OS: Provides the basis for running applications. It manages the system resources of
main memory, non-volatile memory and connected interface blocks.
● wanmgr: Contains all functionalities to set up and manage encrypted connections to
the Gateway Administrator and the External Market Participant.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
16 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Test configuration
The TOE in the evaluated configuration has been tested (see also chapter 8).
Only where necessary in order to enable detailed testing, slightly modified TOE
configurations (e.g. a TOE with SSH capabilities) were used, demonstrably without
influencing the tested security functionality.
7.2. Developer tests
The developer’s testing approach was to test the TSFI systematically next to a deeper
consideration of TOE subsystems, internal interactions and concrete SFR tests.
The coverage and depth in testing all SFs, TSFIs as well as the TOE behaviour and
existing interactions on level of subsystems were also summarized by the developer and
evaluated by the evaluation body without relevant deviations in the developer test
documentation.
The main testing tool is a proprietary test tool (WANSIM) developed and provided by the
developer. With it, all tests can be executed.
The developer’s testing effort has been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the security
functionality / TSFI perform as specified and has therefore passed the evaluator’s
examination.
7.3. Independent and penetration tests
Within this re-certification process the independent testing focused on source code
analysis to confirm, that the source code changes are correct and that the security
functionality as well as all test verdicts from the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-
2019 stay valid.
Hence, the overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was
actually successful.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
SMARTY IQ-LTE, Version 1.1
Hardware Version: DNT8209/3.3
Software Version: 2.0.3036
Operating System Version: DNT8209-21
The certified version of the TOE is built into the case of the Smart Meter Gateway and can
be identified by the laser engraving showing the hardware information as described in the
following example “DNT8209/3.3”.
17 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 [4] (AIS 34)
and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 46, 48).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V2-2020, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on security relevant bug
fixes.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System,
Version 1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation [17]
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application [17]
Validity
Period
Basic support
of integrity,
authenticity
SHA-256, SHA-384 [FIPS180-4] Hash
length =
256, 384
TR-03109 2026+
Encryption /
decryption,
integrity of
TSFI
AES-GCM [FIPS-197]
[SP800-38D]
256 TR-03116 2026+
Key
generation for
CMS
ECKA-EG [RFC5652]
[RFC5639]
[RFC6161]
128, 192
and 256
TR-03111 2026+
18 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation [17]
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application [17]
Validity
Period
containers [X9.62]
[FIPS 186-4]
Encryption /
decryption
/integrity of
CMS
container
AES-CBC-CMAC [RFC5652]
[RFC6033]
[FIPS-197]
[RFC4493]
[SP800-38A]
128, 192
and 256
TR-03109 2026+
Encryption /
decryption /
integrity of
CMS
container
AES-GCM [RFC5652]
[RFC5084]
[FIPS-197]
[SP800-38D]
128, 192
and 256
TR-03109 2026+
Key
generation for
meter data
AES-CMAC [RFC4493]
[FIPS-197]
128, 256 TR-03109 2026+
Encryption/
decryption,
integrity of
meter data
AES-CBC [RFC4493]
[FIPS-197]
[SP800-38A]
128 TR-03109 2026+
TLS key
establishment
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
[RFC5246]
[RFC8422]
[RFC5639]
[FIPS-180-4]
[FIPS-186-4]
[RFC 2104]
256, 384 TR-03109 2026+
TLS peer
authentication
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
[RFC5246]
[RFC6090]
[RFC5639]
[FIPS-186-4]
[FIPS-197]
256, 384 TR-03109 2026+
TLS record
layer
encryption
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
[RFC5246]
[FIPS-197]
[SP800-38A]
AES-
CBC:
128, 256
TR-03109 2026+
19 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation [17]
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application [17]
Validity
Period
TLS record
layer
encryption
and integrity
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
[RFC5246]
[FIPS-197]
[RFC5288]
[SP800-38D]
AES-
GCM:
128, 256
TR-03109 2026+
TLS record
integrity
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
[RFC5246]
[FIPS180-4]
[RFC2104]
[RFC5289]
HMAC-
SHA:
256, 384
TR-03109 2026+
Integrity of
configuration
data
CMAC [SP-800-38B]
[RFC4493]
128 TR-02102-2 2026+
Integrity of
firmware
updates
ECDSA [X9.62]
[RFC6090]
[RFC5639]
256 TR-02102-2 2026+
Integrity of
TSFI
ECDSA [X9.62]
[RFC6090]
[RFC5639]
256 TR-02102-2 2026+
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
20 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FLR Flaw remediation
HAN Home Area Network
HGP HTTP Gateway Protocol
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HW Hardware
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LAN Local Area Network
LMN Local Metrological Network
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMGW Smart Meter Gateway
ST Security Target
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
21 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
TSFI TSF Interfaces
WAN Wide Area Network
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
22 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021, Version 1.30, 2021-02-03, SMARTY
IQ-SMGW LTE Security Target, Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3, Version 2, 2021-03-04, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version 1.3, 31
March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014
[9] Configuration list for the TOE (confidential documents)
filelist_os3036, 2021-03-16
filelist_3036, 2020-12-09
8209SE011_SMGw_CPU_USB.xls, Version 3.3, 2018-09-11
8209SE030_SMGw_Basis_LTE.xls, Version 1.3, 2018-09-26
SMGW_2_Source_Bauteile.xlsx
Documentation according to:
Lebenszyklusunterstützung, chap. 8.4.2 Dokumentation, Version 1.20, 2019-09-18,
Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH
[10] Anleitung zur IT-Sicherheit / Guidance Document – Anleitung zum Betrieb, Version
1.25, 2019-07-18, Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH
[11] Anleitung zur IT-Sicherheit / Guidance Document – Vorbereitende Maßnahmen,
Version 1.23, 2019-09-16, Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH
[12] Sichere Lieferkette, Version 1.3, 2019-09-13, Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH
[13] Anlage zum AGD: - Http Gateway Protocol 2.4, Version 2.4.026, 2019-01-22,
Sagemcom Dr. Neuhaus GmbH
[14] Anlage zum AGD: Übersicht der Audit Records, Version 1.37, Sagemcom Dr.
Neuhaus GmbH
[15] Anlage zum AGD: Übersicht der versendeten Events, Version 1.37, Sagemcom Dr.
Neuhaus GmbH
[16] Common Criteria Protection Profile for a Security Module for Smart Metering
Systems (BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015), Version 1.03, 11.12.2014, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[17] Standard of Implementation / Standard of Application
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 48, Version 1.0, Anforderungen an die Prüfung von Sicherheitsetiketten
23 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
[TR-02102-2], Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen Teil
2 – Verwendung von Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 2015-01, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[TR-03109], Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109, Version 1.0, 18.03.2013,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[TR-03111], BSI - Technical Guideline, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0,
2012-06-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[TR-03116], Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116Kryptographische Vorgaben für
Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 3: Intelligente Messsysteme, Stand 2019, 2019-
01-11
[RFC8422], ETF: Y. Nir, J. Josefsson, M. Pegourie-Gonnard: RFC 8422, Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Versions 1.2 and Earlier, August 2018
[RFC6161], Elliptic Curve Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Encrypted Key Package Content Type, April 2011
[RFC6090], Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithm, February 2011
[RFC6033], Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Encrypted Key
Package Content Type, December 2010
[RFC5652], RFC 5652 - Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), IETF Trust and the
persons identified as the document authors, September 2009
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5652)
[RFC5639], RFC 5639 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard
Curves and Curve Generation, IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors, March 2010 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt)
[RFC5289], RFC 8289 - TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and
AES Galois Counter Mode (CGM), M. Rescorla, August 2008
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5289)
[RFC5288], AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS, August 2008
[RFC5246], RFC 5246 - The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2,
Dierks & Rescorla - Standard Track, August 2008 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt)
[RFC5084], RFC5289 - Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), R. Housley, November 2007
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5084)
[RFC4493], RFC4493 - The AES-CMAC Algorithm, JH. Song, R. Poovendran, J.
Lee, T. Iwata, June 2006 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493)
[RFC2104], Minimal Encapsulation within IP, October 1996
[FIPS180-4], FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015, Information Technology
Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology
[FIPS-186-4], Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186
4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of Commerce /
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
24 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
[FIPS-197], Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), NIST, November 2001
[X9.62], American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005, Public
Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November 16, 2005, American National Standards
Institute
[SP800-38A], NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)
[SP800-38B], NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, The CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2005-05, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
[SP800-38D], NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, November, 2007,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
25 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
26 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
27 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0822-V3-2021
Note: End of report
28 / 28