BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
for
NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite
- Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based
on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.2
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 (*)
Electronic ID documents: IC with Applications
NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents
based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25
March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 and
CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 18 May 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................13
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................14
6. Documentation............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................19
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................24
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................25
5 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
6 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
7 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110
for Official Use with BAC option has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java
Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on
BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 April 2018. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is
an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH, Munscheidstr. 14, 45886
Gelsenkirchen.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18 May 2018
is valid until 17 May 2023 Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110
for Official Use with BAC option has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Deutschland
9 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-
Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option.
The composite TOE is named NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java
Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on
BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option and short named ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC.
It is intended for use as a Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) chip.
It consists of an applet configuration ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC provided by the NXP eDoc
Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite used for electronic travel documents providing
BAC (Basic Access Control), the according guidance documents [11], [12] and [13], the
underlying operating system and the hardware platform with the crypto library.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic
Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF_Access Access Control
TSF_Admin Administration
TSF_Secret Secret key management
TSF_Crypto Cryptographic operations
TSF_SecureMessaging Secure Messaging
TSF_Auth Authentication protocols
TSF_Integrity Integrity protection
TSF_OS Javacard OS Security Functionalities
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
11 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for
Official Use with BAC option
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Item / Identifier Version Form of Delivery
1 HW+SW NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite on
platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID
P60 CS (OSB)
3.0 Two different ways of
delivery of the TOE are
described. Either, the
customer collects the
product at the NXP site
itself, or the product is
sent by NXP to the
customer. Here, the
product is delivered in
parcels sealed with
special tapes to detect
manipulation of the
tapes.
2 DOC NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card applet
configuration providing an
ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control
(EACv1) or with Basic Access
Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control
(SAC) Operational Guidance
(AGD_OPE)
3.0.7 The TOE documentation
is delivered in electronic
form (encrypted)
according to defined
mailing procedures by
NXP.
3 DOC NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card applet
configuration providing an
ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control
(EACv1) or with Basic Access
Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control
(SAC) Preparation Guidance
(AGD_PRE)
3.0.10
12 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
No. Type Item / Identifier Version Form of Delivery
4 DOC NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card Applet Suite
providing Electronic ID
Documents applications
Guidance Manual
3.0.9
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The composite TOE consists of the underlying hardware platform, the crypto lib, the JCOP
operating system and the NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite in applet
configuration ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC. First, the generated applet suite and the guidance
are delivered by encrypted e-mail from the development to the production site. There the
JCOP operating system and the applet is integrated into the ordered IC variant by masking
during the chip production by the manufacturer, according to the configuration information
contained in the OEF (Order Entry Form). Afterwards the composite TOE is delivered in
the sense of Common Criteria. Thereby the delivery process is the same for the composite
product as the delivery process covered by the certified JCOP platform [14].
The TOE identification comprises several steps. The correctness of the IC and the
existence of an additional banking applet can be checked with the custom mask ID by
using GET DATA (Identify) command (see [20]).
The verification of the correct eDoc Suite version can be done by requesting data from the
Issuer Security Domain by using GET DATA (Verify Package) command (see [20]).
Detailed information on the TOE identification can be found in the guidance documents for
the TOE [11] [12] [13] and the platform [20].
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security Audit,
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management, and
● Protection of the TSF.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
6.2 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.MRTD_Manufact,
13 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
● OE.MRTD_Delivery,
● OE.Personalization,
● OE.Pass_Auth_Sign.
● OE.BAC-Keys,
● OE.Exam-MRTD,
● OE.Passive_Auth_Verif,
● OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
● OE.APPLET,
● OE.VERIFICATION,
● OE.CODE-EVIDENCE,
● OE.APPS-PROVIDE,
● OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY,
● OE.KEY-CHANGE,
● OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS,
● OE.USE_DIAG,
● OE.USE_KEYS, and
● OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.3 and in the guidance
documents.
5. Architectural Information
The composite TOE is a Java Card applet based on a certified Java Card platform
comprises of eight subsystems, listed with a short description in the following itemization:
● Platform: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the composite
TOE, which interacts with the application in regards of control, including the creation and
selection of applet instance and the internal life cycle control.
● Operating System: Represents the operating system of the underlying JCOP platform of
the composite TOE, which is used by the applications to realize the functionality. It also
comprises the underlying cryptographic library.
● Configuration Manager: Provides services for applet creation and configuration. This
subsystem is called by the platform subsystem each time an application is instantiated.
● Event Manager: Handles events from internal subsystems and from the underlying
platform and calls other subsystems interfaces to process these events.
● Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the platform by passing through
APDU commands from the terminal to the applet. The subsystem decides if special
APDUs have to be handled by the application and ensures their execution by the
responsible applet. It also provides access controlled execution of commands covering
all applet commands.
14 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
● Secure Messaging Manager: Handles the secure channel between the application and
the terminal in accordance with the specified cryptographic mechanisms and key sizes.
The responsibility for secure messaging includes the verification of MAC, unwrapping
messages and security mechanisms for secure messaging.
● File System Manager: Provides an interface for file and object access and management
by a representation of the existing elements.
● State Manager: Handles the internal state of the application and provides update
functionality and access to the current DF, EF, KO, security environment, and the
authentication status of the terminal and the challenge.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The developer’s testing effort is summarised as follows:
TOE configurations tested:
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC
on NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS by NXP, in all variants (except the different memory
configurations) in scope of the certification, including those used for the independent tests:
● J3H145CEX30,
● J3H145CAX30, and
● J3H145CGX30.
Developer’s testing approach:
The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach:
● Tests to cover all actions defined in [21],
● Good case and bad case tests for each command defined in the document [21] and
executable on the TOE,
● Access rules test as part of the requirements on TSF data,
● Conformance tests according to BSI TR03105-Part3 with commercial test suites,
● Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design.
Verdict for the activity:
All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected.
Evaluator Tests
15 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The evaluator’s testing effort is described as follows, outlining the testing approach,
configuration, depth and results.
Test Approach and Set-up:
The TOE consists of the ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC application installed on NXP JCOP 3
SECID P60 CS. The APDU tests were performed using standard PCSC readers, a
standard PC, test software provided by the developer as well as evaluator’s test software.
Further, for some tests, i.e. fuzzing, B0 card readers (supporting also raw communication)
were used.
The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to:
● Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms),
● Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface
execution),
● Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging),
● Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance [12].
The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the
following approach:
● Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation of developer
testing strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases.
● Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer’s tests the tests are also
selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and
related functionality.
● Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the
interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFI have been suitably tested. The
evaluator had no doubt that an interface is not properly implemented.
● The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of testing.
● Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps
were performed and described for nearly each test case.
● The selection process is based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body.
Therefore all TOE security functionality is included within the subset. All cryptographic
functionality is provided by the platform and was sufficiently tested during platform
evaluation (except the SHA perturbation resistance).
● Specific tests were conducted that were aligned during online and offline meetings with
the certification body.
Configuration:
The TOE was tested in the HW variants:
● J3H145CAX30,
● J3H145CEX30, and
● J3H145CGX30.
All TOE variants were used for different tests with the ROM values, see [6].
16 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
The keys and personalization data used in the test configurations were provided by the
developer.
Test Results:
The test reports for the APDU tests are automatically generated by the test tool used. The
test results are logged.
The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the test
configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the
expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test
the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional
specification.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜViT in the
evaluator’s test environment with the evaluator’s test equipment. The samples were
provided by the sponsor and by the developer. The test samples were configured and
parameterized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. All
configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested. The overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and
the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential of
enhanced-basic was actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment created within vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created
attack scenarios for penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion, that the
vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing this, the evaluator also considered all
aspects of the security architecture of the TOE, being not covered by the functional
developer tests.
The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the
development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported
testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly
be covered by test cases.
The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities
identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test
set was devised.
TOE test configurations:
The tests were performed with the one configuration of the TOE it is delivered in to the
personalization agent, as stated in the security target.
Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis
The test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential enhanced-basic was
actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
17 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
There is only one configuration of the TOE. For all tests the TOE is configured and
parameterized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents. The
ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC TOE configuration is generated out of the applet suite that is part
of the ROM of platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) by NXP. The
ePasslet3.0/MRTD-BAC applet needs to be created according to the guidelines given in
[12] and [13].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology
of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
● Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
● Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA,
DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations,
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform [20] and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(i.e. [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], 26, 34, 36, 46).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the Basic Access Control (BAC)
functionality, which was evaluated with the attack potential Enhanced-Basic.
Both evaluation projects are based on the same hardware and same code basis. In the
base evaluation the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), Extended
Access Control (EAC), Chip Authentication (CA) and optional Active Authentication (AA)
18 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
were evaluated with the attack potential High. The results of the base evaluation were
taken over completely, as far as applicable.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic
Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-
2009 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
Since this TOE is a composite TOE it relies on its platform certifications. Please refer to
[14][16][18] for details.
The composite TOE takes care of the recommendations and requirements imposed by the
guidance documentation and ETR for composition of the underlying platform.
In the course of the evaluation the underlying platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB)
underwent a re-certification and the re-certified platform was chosen as basis for the
current composite evaluation. All composite work units according to [4, AIS36] were
reworked and the evaluation reports are valid for the re-certified platform.
Further, the developer created an ST-Lite for publication. During the examination the
evaluator compared the Security Target [6] with the Security Target Lite [9]. The
Security Target Lite complies with the requirements of [4, AIS35]. Therefore the evaluator
determines that the Security Target Lite is a correct sanitised version of the Security
Target.
After completion of the evaluation report for aspect ALC the developer documents [9],
[11], [12] were changed. The final version of the configuration list [10] which includes the
current version of these documents was provided. The changes in the configuration list
were examined and the evaluator is of the opinion that the evaluation report for aspect
ALC remains valid also for the updated configuration list.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of
application where its specific appropriateness is stated. The strength of the these
cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see
BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
19 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MRED Machine-Readable Etronic Document
MRTD Machine-ReadableTravel Document
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
20 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
21 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018, Version 1.8, 12 February 2018, NXP eDoc
Suite v3.0 cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use
with BAC option, Security Target, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023, Version 2, 16 March 2018, ETR
Summary – NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI
TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH –
Evaluation Body for IT Security (confidential document)
[8] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control,
Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018, Version 1.8, 22 Februar 2018, NXP
eDoc Suite v3.0 cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for
Official Use with BAC option, Security Target Lite, cv cryptovision GmbH
(confidential document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Revision 13027, 22 Februar 2018, File 2018-02-
22_conflist-JCOP3_rev13027.xlsx, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Guidance Document for the TOE: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing an ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control (SAC) Operational Guidance, Version 3.0.7,
16 February 2018, cv cryptovision GmbH
[12] Guidance Document for the TOE: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing an ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control (SAC) Preparation Guidance, Version 3.0.10,
20 February 2018, cv cryptovision GmbH
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
22 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
[13] Guidance Document for the TOE: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents applications
Guidance Manual, Version 3.0.9, 26 February 2018, cv cryptovision GmbH
[14] Certification Report NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB), Report number NSCIB-
CC-98209-CR2, version 2, 15 January 2018, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
[15] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) –
EAL5+, version 3.0, 04 December 2017, Brightsight B.V. (confidential document)
[16] Certification Report Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB, Certificate number CC-17-
67206, Report number NSCIB-CC-67206-CR2, 17 November 2017, TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V.
[17] ETR for Composite Evaluation Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB EAL6+/5+,
Reference 17-RPT-421, version 3.0, 24 October 2017, Brightsight B.V. (confidential
document)
[18] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016 for NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6022y VB including IC Dedicated Software, 11 October 2016,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[19] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation P6022y VB, version 1, 25
August 2016, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[20] Guidance Document for the platform: JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS User Guidance and
Administration Manual, Rev. 2.5, 16 November 2017, NXP Semiconductors.
[21] NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing an ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with
Basic Access Control (BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC) Functional
Specification ADV_FSP. Version 3.0.5, 29 September 2017, cv cryptovision GmbH
(confidential document)
23 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
24 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
25 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110
for Official Use with BAC option (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 May 2018, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1 and ALC_COMP.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) cv cryptovision GmbH, Munscheidstr. 14, 45886 Gelsenkirchen, Germany
(software development site)
b) Regarding the development and production sites of the platform, please refer
to the certification reports NSCIB-CC-98209-CR2 [14], NSCIB-CC-67206-CR2
[16] and BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016 [18].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
26 / 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018 Certification Report
Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
No. Purpose Cryptograph
ic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementat
ion
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authentic
ation
Symmetric
Authenticatio
n Mechanism
based on
TDES in
CBC mode
[FIPS46-3]
(DES),
[NIST800-
38A] (CBC),
[ICAO9303]
|k|=112 [TR-03110] -
2 Symmetric
Authenticatio
n Mechanism
based on
AES for
Personalizati
on Agent
AES:
[FIPS197]
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO18013-3]
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAO9303]
but with AES
FCS_COP.1/A
UTH,
cryptographic
primitive for
authentication
attempt of a
terminal as
Personalizatio
n Agent by
means of the
symmetric
authentication
mechanism
(cf.
FIA_UAU.4)
3 Basic Access
Control
Authenticatio
n Mechanism
for Basic
Inspection
System
[ICAO9303] |k|=112 [ICAO9303] -
4 Key
Derivation
SHA-1, SHA-
256
[FIPS180-4] - [ICAO9303] -
5 Document
Basic Access
Key
Derivation
Algorithm
normative
appendix 5 of
[ICAO9303]
- [ICAO9303] -
6 Confidenti
ality
TDES in
CBC mode
[FIPS46-3]
(DES),
[NIST800-
38A] (CBC)
|k|=112 [ICAO9303] FCS_COP.1/E
NC,
cryptographic
primitive for
secure
messaging.
The keys are
agreed
between the
TOE and the
terminal as
part of the
27 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023-2018
No. Purpose Cryptograph
ic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementat
ion
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
Basic Access
Control
Authentication
Mechanism
according to
the
FCS_CKM.1
and
FIA_UAU.4.
7 AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS197]
(AES),
[NIST800-
38A] (CBC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAO9303]
but with AES
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO18013-3]
Secure
Messaging for
personalizatio
n.
8 Integrity Retail-MAC [FIPS46-3]
(DES),
[ISO9797]
(MAC
algorithm 3,
block cipher
DES,
Sequence
Message
Counter,
padding
mode 2)
|k|=112 [ICAO9303] -
9 AES in
CMAC mode
[FIPS197]
(AES),
[NIST800-
38B] (CMAC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAO9303]
but with AES
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO18013-3]
-
10 Trusted
Channel
Secure
messaging in
with
message
authenticatio
n code:
Retail MAC
[ISO9797]
(MAC
algorithm 3,
block cipher
DES,
Sequence
Message
Counter,
padding
mode 2)
|k|=112 [ICAO9303] FCS_COP.1.1
/MAC
11 Secure
messaging
with
message
authenticatio
n code: AES
CMAC
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO18013-3]
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAO9303]
but with AES
For
personalisatio
n
12 Cryptogra
phic
primitive
Deterministic
RNG DRG.3
[AIS20] n.a. - FCS_RND.1
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Note: End of report
28 / 28