CombICAO Applet v2.1 in
EAC with PACE
configuration on Cosmo
V9.1
Public Security Target
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© IDEMIA. All rights reserved.
Specifications and information are subject to change without notice.
The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement.
All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners.
- Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled -
About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly
digital world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay,
connect, travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By
standing for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and protect
this asset, whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as well as
guarantee secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international clients from
Financial, Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT
(Oberthur Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company
counts 14,000 employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180
countries.
| For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
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DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
Business Unit – Department CI – R&D
Document type FQR
Document Title CombICAO Applet v2.1 in EAC with PACE configuration on
Cosmo V9.1 – Public Security Target
FQR No 550 0086
FQR Issue 3
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DOCUMENT REVISION
Date Revision Modification
2020/03/17 1 Creation of the document
2020/04/13 2 Updated Platform version
2020/06/17 3 Updated reference of guidance documents
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 GENERAL............................................................................................................. 10
1.1 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................10
1.2 PRODUCT OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................10
2 ST INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 12
2.1 ST REFERENCE AND TOE REFERENCE....................................................................................12
2.1.1 ST reference.........................................................................................................12
2.1.2 TOE reference.......................................................................................................12
2.2 TOE OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................................13
2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE ........................................................13
2.2.2 TOE type ..............................................................................................................16
2.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware .....................................................16
2.3 TOE DESCRIPTION ..........................................................................................................17
2.3.1 Physical scope of the TOE......................................................................................17
2.3.2 TOE delivery .........................................................................................................17
2.3.3 Logical scope of the TOE .......................................................................................19
2.3.4 Authentication Protocols ........................................................................................20
2.3.5 Other features ......................................................................................................21
2.3.6 TOE life cycle........................................................................................................23
2.3.7 Development Environment.....................................................................................24
2.3.8 Production Environment ........................................................................................25
2.3.9 Preparation Environment .......................................................................................26
2.3.10 Operational Environment .......................................................................................26
3 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..................................................................................... 27
3.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE ......................................................................................27
3.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE ...................................................................................27
3.2.1 Overview..............................................................................................................27
3.2.2 Assumptions .........................................................................................................28
3.2.3 Threats ................................................................................................................28
3.2.4 Organisational Security Policies ..............................................................................28
3.2.5 Security Objectives................................................................................................29
3.3 CC CONFORMANCE AND USAGE IN REAL LIFE ...........................................................................30
4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................... 31
4.1 ASSETS.........................................................................................................................31
4.1.1 Biometric Data ......................................................................................................31
4.1.2 Authenticity of the MRTDs chip ..............................................................................32
4.1.3 User data stored on the TOE..................................................................................32
4.1.4 User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected ........................32
4.1.5 MRTD tracing data ................................................................................................32
4.1.6 Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects ...................33
4.1.7 Genuineness of the TOE ........................................................................................33
4.1.8 TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys...................................................................33
4.1.9 MRTD communication establishment authorisation data ..........................................33
4.2 SUBJECTS......................................................................................................................34
4.3 THREATS.......................................................................................................................37
4.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..................................................................................42
4.5 ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................44
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5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................... 46
5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...................................................................................46
5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................50
5.2.1 Issuing State or Organisation.................................................................................50
5.2.2 Receiving State or Organisation .............................................................................51
5.2.3 Travel document Issuer as the general responsible .................................................52
5.2.4 Travel document Issuer and CVCA: travel document's PKI (issuing) branch ..............52
5.2.5 Terminal operator: Terminal's receiving branch.......................................................53
5.2.6 Travel document holder Obligations .......................................................................53
5.2.7 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................53
5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE.......................................................................................54
5.3.1 Threats ................................................................................................................54
5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies..............................................................................57
5.3.3 Assumptions .........................................................................................................60
5.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives ..................................................................................60
6 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 66
6.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES ........................................................................................................66
6.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation...........................................................66
6.1.2 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity.....................................67
6.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities......................................................68
6.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage.......................................................69
6.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers...................................70
7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................ 71
7.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................71
7.1.1 Class FCS Cryptographic Support ...........................................................................71
7.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication .............................................................77
7.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection..............................................................................80
7.1.4 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels ...........................................................................84
7.1.5 Class FAU Security Audit........................................................................................84
7.1.6 Class FMT Security Management............................................................................85
7.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ........................................................90
7.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................92
7.2.1 ADV Development.................................................................................................92
7.2.2 AGD Guidance documents .....................................................................................97
7.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support ...........................................................................................98
7.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation ............................................................................102
7.2.5 ATE Tests...........................................................................................................108
7.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment ..............................................................................111
7.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ................................................................................112
7.3.1 Objectives ..........................................................................................................112
7.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs...................................................118
7.3.3 Dependencies .....................................................................................................124
7.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements ...............................................129
7.3.5 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis .........................................129
7.3.6 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures .........................................................130
8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION....................................................................... 131
8.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.........................................................................................131
8.2 SFRS AND TSS.............................................................................................................137
8.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale ....................................................................................137
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8.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS ......................................................................143
9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS............................................................................. 149
9.1 GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................................149
9.2 ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................162
10 REFERENCES..................................................................................................... 164
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TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Physical Form of the Module ............................................................................................17
Figure 2 TOE Boundaries ..............................................................................................................19
Figure 3 Life cycle Overview..........................................................................................................24
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TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1 ST reference ....................................................................................................................12
Table 2 TOE reference..................................................................................................................12
Table 3 PACE configuration ...........................................................................................................21
Table 4 Roles identification on the life cycle ...................................................................................23
Table 5 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded at IC manufacturer (Option 1)
............................................................................................................................................25
Table 6 Cap file of CombICAO Applet v2.1 is loaded (using GP) (Option 2) ......................................26
Table 7 Image containing both platform and applet is loaded through the loader of the IC (Option 3)
............................................................................................................................................26
Table 8 Common Criteria conformance claim..................................................................................27
Table 9 Protection Profile conformance ..........................................................................................27
Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage ....................................................................61
Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage ....................................................................62
Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage........................................................................63
Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage ........................................................................64
Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage.............64
Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage.............65
Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage ......................................................................120
Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives .......................................................................................123
Table 18 SFRs Dependencies .....................................................................................................127
Table 19 SARs Dependencies .....................................................................................................129
Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage.............................................................................................147
Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage.............................................................................................148
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1 GENERAL
1.1 Introduction
This security target describes the security needs induced by the CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in
EAC with PACE configuration on IDEMIA underlying Java Card ID-ONE Cosmo V9.1 Platform,
see 2.1.2 .
The objectives of this Security Target are:
 To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart
card life cycle,
 To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and
the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the
platform active phases,
 To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and
its documentation) during the product active phases,
 To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the
TOE assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment,
 To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security
functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements,
 To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the
TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security
environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements.
1.2 Product overview
The product is designed to support the following usages:
1. eMRTD as per [ICAO_9303] and European provisions [TR_03110]; scope of the
current ST
2. ISO compliant driving license as per [ISO/IEC_18013] and [ISO/IEC_19446]; (out of the scope of the
current ST)
3. digital identity and electronic services; (out of the scope of the current ST)
It is achieved thanks to a flexible design allowing to “build” during personalization of the applet the
required application(s) by configuring accordingly:
 the file system;
 authentication protocols;
 the user authentication credentials;
 Access conditions on files.
The product can be personalized to support an eMRTD application compliant with [ICAO_9303]
and European provisions [TR_03110].
The TOE can be configured in five configurations.
However, The current ST addresses CombICAO Applet v2.1 in configuration 3) below.
1) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in BAC configuration with CA,
2) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in EAC configuration,
3) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in EAC with PACE configuration,
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4) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in EAC with PACE configuration for French ID
5) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in SSCD configuration
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2 ST INTRODUCTION
2.1 ST reference and TOE reference
2.1.1 ST reference
Title CombICAO Applet v2.1 in EAC with PACE configuration on Cosmo V9.1
– Public Security Target
ST Identification FQR 550 0086
ST Version 3
CC Version 3.1 revision 5
Authors IDEMIA
ITSEF CEA-LETI
Certification Body ANSSI
EAL EAL5 augmented with:
 ALC_DVS.2
 AVA_VAN.5
PP [PP_EACwPACE]
Table 1 ST reference
2.1.2 TOE reference
Product Name CombICAO Applet v2.1
TOE Name CombICAO Applet v2.1 in EAC with PACE configuration on ID-ONE
Cosmo V9.1
Developer Name IDEMIA
TOE Identification SAAAAR code: 203523
Platform Name ID-One Cosmo V9.1 Platform
Platform Identification 092914
Platform Certificate [PTF_CERT]
Guidance Documents [Applet_Perso_Guide], [Applet_User_Guide]
[PTF_AGD_OPE], [PTF_AGD_PRE], [PTF_AGD1], [PTF_AGD2],
[PTF_AGD3], [PTF_AGD4], [PTF_AGD5] and [PTF_AGD_SEC_AC]
Table 2 TOE reference
In order to assure the authenticity of the card, the TOE Identification shall be verified by analyzing the
response of the command GET DATA, see section 4 of [Applet_Perso_Guide].
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2.2 TOE overview
2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler
presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this
Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a
separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the
Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for
contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a
valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page
and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a
genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO_9303]. These security measures include
the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s
chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
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[ICAO_9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed
completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
This Security Target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-
only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access
Control Mechanism. Also it addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [TR_03110] as
an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO_9303].
If BAC is supported by the TOE, the travel document has to be evaluated and certified separately. This
is due to the fact that [PP_BAC] does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic
Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3).
During the prepersonalization and personalisation, the Personalisation Agent, once authenticated,
gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and (4)
writing of personalization data. The Personalisation Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF)
required for this configuration.
Mutatis mutandis, the TOE may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC 18013
or ISO/IEC TR 19446 supporting BAP-1 (the same protocol as BAC but used in the context of driving
license), AA and CA, as both applications (MRTD and IDL) share the same protocols and data
structure organization. Therefore, in the rest of the document, the word “MRTD” MAY be understood
either as a MRTD in the sense of ICAO, or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC
TR 19446 depending on the targeted usage envisioned by the issuer.
The table below indicates how terms and concept present in the current document shall be read when
considering the TOE to be an ISO driving license:
MRTD ISO driving licence
MRTD IDL
ICAO ISO/IEC
ICAO 9303 ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
BAC BAP-1
DG3 DG7
DG4 DG8
DG15 DG13
MRZ or CAN MRZ or SAI (Scanning area identifier)
Traveler Holder
NB: the ISO driving license is out of the scope of the current ST and not evaluated.
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a mandatory
security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly conform to the ‘Common Criteria
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with
PACE ([PP_PACE]). Note that [PP_PACE] considers high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC], the following steps shall be performed:
(i) the travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password,
derived from the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce
together with the domain parameters to the terminal.
(ii) The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically)
reading the MRZ resp. CAN data.
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(iii) The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann
key agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a
shared secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the
shared secret.
(iv) Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and
verifies the received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip provide private
communication (secure messaging) [TR_03110], [ICAO_TR_SAC].
The Security Target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in
[TR_03110]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol
Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1). The Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the travel document’s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes
secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the
inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1 can only be performed if Chip Authentication
v.1 has been successfully executed. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the
authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving State or Organisation
through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive
biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. The issuing
State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification the authentication public
keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.
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2.2.2 TOE type
The TOE is a composite product made up of an Embedded Software developed using Java Card
technology, composed on a Java Card open platform. Both developed by IDEMIA.
The underlying Java Card open platform has already been certified, please see [PTF_CERT].
The TOE embedded is the dual (contactless and/or contact) integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
and providing :
 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
 Extended Access Control (EAC)
 Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM)
 Terminal Authentication (TA)
Please refer to 2.3.2 TOE delivery section for more details on TOE deliveries
2.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its
claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system
and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the
printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable
for the secure operation of the TOE.
Note: In particular, the TOE may be used in contact mode, without any inlay or antenna.
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2.3 TOE description
2.3.1 Physical scope of the TOE
The TOE is physically made up of several components hardware and software.
Once constructed, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for
communication.
The physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of
evaluation as it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE.
The TOE may be used on several physical medium within an inlay, or eCover; in a plastic
card are not part of the TOE.
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure below. The cryptographic boundary of
the module is the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads, shown as circles
in the following figure
Figure 1 Physical Form of the Module
2.3.2 TOE delivery
The TOE is composed of:
 Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the IC) :
 IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software
 ID-ONE Cosmo V9.1 Platform: see [ST_PTF] and [PTF_CERT]
 CombICAO v2.1 application
 Associated guidance documentation (delivered in electronic version)
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This lite version of the Security Target also serves as a guidance document along with above-
mentioned documents.
TOE
Component
Identification Form Factor of Delivery
Delivery method
CombICAO
Applet v2.1 for
MRTD
203523
ID1 or ID3 Passport
booklets
ID1 cards or ID3 holder
pages
Antenna1
inlays
Chip in modules on a reel
CPS tool is used in the
case of an Image
delivery. Otherwise,
trusted courier is used.
Personalizing
Agent
[Applet_Perso_Guide]
Electronic doc
PGP-encrypted parts on
USB or CD media, off-
line registered
distribution by trusted
courier
End User of
the TOE
[Applet_Uder_Guide]
Underlying
platform
guidance
[PTF_AGD_OPE]
[PTF_AGD1]
[PTF_AGD2]
[PTF_AGD3]
[PTF_AGD4]
[PTF_AGD5]
[PTF_AGD_SEC_AC]
[PTF_AGD_PRE]
Form factor and Delivery Preparation:
1. As per the Software Development Process of IDEMIA, upon completion of development
activities, particular applet will be uploaded into CPS in CAP file format. Before uploading, the
applet will be verified through Oracle verifier and IDEMIA verifier.
2. During Release for Sample as project milestone, status of the applet in CPS will be changed
into “Pilot version” to be used further for manufacturing samples.
3. During Software Delivery Review as the final R&D project milestone, status of the
applet in CPS will be changed into “Industrial release” to be used further for mass
production.
1
The inlay production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE
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Figure 2 TOE Boundaries
2.3.3 Logical scope of the TOE
The TOE is a smartcard, composed of :
 IC,
 Java Card Open Platform (OS) and
 CombICAO v2.1 application (data storage file structure)
The TOE scope encompasses the following features:
 Chip Authentication
 Terminal Authentication
 Password Authentication Connection Establishment (PACE v2) including the Chip
Authentication Mapping
 Active Authentication
 Prepersonalization phase
 Personalisation phase
The prepersonalization and personalisation are performed by the Manufacturer and the
Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE. All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected, as it
requires the authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent prior to any operation.
By being authenticated, the Personalisation Agent gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and
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writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and (4) writing of personalization data. The
Personalisation Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF) required for this configuration.
2.3.4 Authentication Protocols
2.3.4.1 Terminal Authentication (TA)
This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive data. As
the terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST be protected
appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an ephemeral public key chosen
by the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with Chip Authentication. The MRTD chip
MUST bind the terminal’s access rights to Secure Messaging established by the authenticated
ephemeral public key of the terminal.
Terminal Authentication v1 is part of the EACv1 procedure defined in [TR_03110].
2.3.4.2 Chip Authentication (CA)
The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that
provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static
key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active
Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two
advantages over the original protocol:
Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are non-
transferable.
Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys.
The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored
data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
The protocol in Version 2 provides explicit authentication of the MRTD chip by verifying the
authentication token and implicit authentication of the stored data by performing Secure Messaging
using the new session keys.
Chip Authentication v1 is part of the EACv1 procedure defined in [TR_03110].
2.3.4.3 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE v2)
PACE is an access control mechanism that is supplemental to BAC. It is a cryptographically stronger
access control mechanism than BAC since it uses asymmetric cryptography compared to BAC’s
symmetric cryptography.
PACE is realized through five commands:
1. MSE SET – AT command
2. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Encrypted Nonce
3. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Map Nonce
4. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Perform Key Agreement
5. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Mutual Authentication
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
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This table lists the supported configurations for PACE protocol:
Configuration Mapping
Key
Algo
Key
Length
(in
bytes)
Secure
Messaging
Auth.
Token
Hash
Algo
PACE–ECDH–GM–
3DES
Generic
3DES
2Key
16
CBC / Retail
MAC
Retail
MAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–GM–
AES–128
Generic AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–GM–
AES–192
Generic AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–GM–
AES–256
Generic AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–IM–
3DES
Integrated
3DES
2Key
16
CBC / Retail
MAC
Retail
MAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–IM–
AES–128
Integrated AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–IM–
AES–192
Integrated AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–IM–
AES–256
Integrated AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–CAM–
AES–128
Chip
Authenticatio
n
AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–CAM–
AES–192
Chip
Authenticatio
n
AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–CAM–
AES–256
Chip
Authenticatio
n
AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
Table 3 PACE configuration
2.3.4.4 Active Authentication (AA)
Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a
challenge-response protocol between the IS and the chip.
Active Authentication is realized with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The key and algorithms supported are the following:
RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1024 bits, 1536 bits or 2048 bits and hashing algorithm of
SHA1 or SHA2.
ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 and the key sizes 192 to 512.
2.3.5 Other features
2.3.5.1 Automatic BAC phasing out
The TOE also supports a mechanism allowing the automatic deactivation of the BAC protocol after the
current date (of the TOE) has reached a reference date - chosen by the issuer and configured by the
personalization Agent. The current date is the internal date updated through the EAC protocol.
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Thanks to this feature, it is possible to issue MRTD supporting both PACE and BAC as needed for
interoperability reasons, and perform smooth phasing out of the BAC protocol in the medium term (due
to its cryptographic weaknesses) during the life time of the issued MRTD, without having to wait for the
complete renewal of issued MRTD (> 10 years).
The automatic BAC phasing out is part of the TOE.
2.3.5.2 Enhanced protection over Sensitive biometric data reading
The access to sensitive biometric data: the fingerprint and iris stored in DG3 and DG4 are protected in
accordance with the requirements of the protection profile and specification. Beyond that, the TOE
also provides a feature able to ensure a high level of confidentiality when reading these data. The
TOE supports a mechanism enforcing to use a minimum cryptographic strength for the confidentiality,
integrity and authenticity protection of these sensitive biometric data when being read. This may be
useful for issuing authority that do not consider DES algorithm strong enough to ensure a sufficient
level of confidentiality. This mechanism allows the TOE to enforce the terminal using a stronger
algorithm such as AES 128, or 192 bits, or 256 bits when reading the sensitive biometric data, and
deny access to them if this condition is not met (algorithm not strong enough).
The enhanced protection over sensitive biometric data reading is part of the TOE.
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2.3.6 TOE life cycle
2.3.6.1 Life cycle overview
The following table presents the TOE roles and the corresponding subject:
Roles Subject
IC developer IC Manufacturer
TOE developer IDEMIA
Manufacturer
IC manufacturer IC Manufacturer
MRTD packaging responsible IDEMIA or another agent
IDEMIA
Embedded software loading
responsible
IDEMIA
Pre-personalization Agent
(Manufacturer Role)
IDEMIA or another agent
Personalization Agent IDEMIA or another agent
Table 4 Roles identification on the life cycle
Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded.
The following tables present the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the
standard smart card life cycle [PP_IC], and describe for each of them, (1) the TOE delivery point and
(2) the assurance coverage:
The TOE life cycle in the following figure distinguishes stages for development, production,
preparation and operational use in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [PP_IC].
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Figure 3 Life cycle Overview
2.3.7 Development Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development (Java Card Open Platform
components and CombICAO Applet v2.1)
 Phase 2: IC Development
The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of the specification, development and validation of
the software (Java Card Open Platform and CombICAO Applet v2.1).
The IC Developer designs the IC, develops the IC dedicated software and provides information,
software or tools to the IC embedded software developer.
Roles, actors, sites and coverage for this environment of the product life-cycle are listed in the table
below:
Role Actor Site Covered by
CombICAO Applet v2.1 Developer IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D sites ALC
Redaction and Review of
Documents
IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D sites ALC
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Role Actor Site Covered by
Platform Developer IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D sites
Refer to [PTF_CERT]
ALC
IC Developer IC
Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Refer to [PTF_CERT]
ALC
2.3.8 Production Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 3: IC manufacturing
 Phase 4: Smart card loading
The IC manufacturer is responsible for producing the IC (manufacturing, testing, and initialisation).
Depending on the intention:
 (Option 1) the developer sends the image (containing both the Java Card platform
and the CombICAO Applet v2.1) to be flashed in the IC to the IC manufacturer in the
phase 3.
Or
 (Option 2) the platform developer sends the image (containing only the Java Card
platform) to be flashed in the IC to the IC manufacturer in the phase 3. Once the Java
Card platform has been loaded, the package of CombICAO v2.1 is securely delivered
from the applet developer to the smart card loader. The cap file of the applet is then
loaded (using GP) in the Java Card platform by the smart card loader in phase 4 at
IDEMIA audited site.
Or
 (Option 3) the developer sends the image (containing both the Java Card platform
and the CombICAO Applet v2.1) to be loaded in Flash (using the loader of the IC) to
the smart card loader in phase 4.
Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded. The following tables
present roles, actors, sites and coverage for this for this environment of the product life-cycle and
describe for each of them the TOE delivery point.
Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer Image containing
both platform and
applet
manufactur
er
IC manufacturer
production plants
[PTF_CERT]
ALC
Smart card loader - - - -
TOE Delivery Point
Table 5 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded at IC
manufacturer (Option 1)
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Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer Image containing
only Java Card
Platform
manufactur
er
IC manufacturer
production plants
Refer to [PTF_CERT]
ALC
Smart card loader Cap file of the applet IDEMIA IDEMIA plants ALC
TOE Delivery Point
Table 6 Cap file of CombICAO Applet v2.1 is loaded (using GP) (Option 2)
Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer - - - -
TOE Delivery Point
Smart card loader Image containing
both the platform
and applet
IDEMIA or
another
agent
Any AGD
Table 7 Image containing both platform and applet is loaded through the loader of the IC
(Option 3)
2.3.9 Preparation Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 5: Prepersonalisation of the applet
 Phase 6: Personalisation
The preparation environment may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be
performed anywhere. All along these two phases, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the
authentication of the prepersonalisation agent or personalisation agent prior to any operation.
The CombICAO Applet v2.1 is prepersonalised and personalised according to [Applet_Perso_Guide].
At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed. These two phases are covered by
[Applet_Perso_Guide] tasks of the TOE and [PTF_AGD_OPE] tasks of [PTF_CERT].
2.3.10 Operational Environment
The TOE is under the control of the User (Signatory and/or Administrator).
During this phase, the TOE may be used as described in [Applet_User_Guide] of the TOE.
This phase is covered by [Applet_User_Guide] tasks of the TOE and [PTF_AGD_OPE] tasks of
[PTF_CERT].
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3 Conformance claims
3.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target claims conformance to [CC_2], [CC_3] and [CC_EM].
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance Claim
Part 2 Conformance with extensions:
 FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”,
 FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”,
 FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”,
 FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”,
 FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”,
 FPT_EMS.1 “TOE
Emanation”,
Part 3 Conformance with package EAL5 augmented with:
 ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of
security measures” defined in [CC_3],
 AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” defined in
[CC_3]
Table 8 Common Criteria conformance claim
3.2 Protection Profile conformance
3.2.1 Overview
This ST claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profile (PP):
Title
Common Criteria Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)
CC Version 3.1 (Revision 3)
Assurance
Level
The minimum assurance level for this PP is EAL4 augmented
Version
Number
Version 1.3.2, 05th December 2012
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012
Table 9 Protection Profile conformance
This ST also addresses the Manufacturing and Personalization phases at TOE level (cf. § 2.3.6). This
ST also addresses Active Authentication as an additional authentication protocol.
Since the Chip Authentication protocol is an alternative to the Active Authentication defined in
[ICO_9303], the additional assumptions and security objectives for the operational environment
counter the same threats as the ones for chip authentication. They however do not mitigate the threat,
and instead provide an additional functionality to the ones defined in the PP.
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The additions do not contradict any of the threats, assumptions, organisational policies, objectives or
SFRs stated in the [PP_EACwPACE] that covers the advanced security methods PACE and EAC in
operational use phase.
The following parts list assumptions, threats, OSP, OT and OE for this TOE (i.e. from
[PP_EACwPACE] and additional).
3.2.2 Assumptions
The following Assumptions are assumed for this TOE:
 A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” defined in
[PP_EACwPACE],
 A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],
 A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],
 A.Insp_Sys_AA “Inspection Systems with Active Authentication” defined in this ST.
3.2.3 Threats
The following threats are averted by this TOE:
 T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” defined in
[PP_EACwPACE],
 T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],
 T.Skimming “Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication”
referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the
PACE terminal” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Tracing “Tracing travel document” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in
[PP_PACE],
 T.Forgery “Forgery of Data” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in
[PP_PACE],
 T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and
defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from travel document” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and
defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation” defined in this
ST,
 T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data “Forgery of supplemental data stored in the TOE”
defined in this ST,
 T. BAC_breaking “BAC protocol is broken” defined in this ST.
3.2.4 Organisational Security Policies
This TOE complies with the following OSP:
 P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” defined in
[PP_EACwPACE],
 P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or
Organisation only” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],
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 P.Pre-Operational “Pre-operational handling of the travel document” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 P.Card_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 P.Trustworthy_PKI “Trustworthiness of PKI” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and
defined in [PP_PACE],
 P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 P.Activ_Auth “Active Authentication” defined in this ST.
3.2.5 Security Objectives
The Security Objectives for this TOE are the following:
 OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” defined in
[PP_EACwPACE],
 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of the travel document’s chip authenticity” defined in
[PP_EACwPACE],
 OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in
[PP_PACE],
 OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and
defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of Data” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE]
and defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Tracing “Tracing travel document” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in
[PP_PACE],
 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and
defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE].
 OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE preparation” defined in this ST,
 OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational Use Phase” defined in this ST,
 OT.BAC_Expiration “Automatic deactivation of BAC protocol” defined in this ST,
 OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM
level” defined in this ST,
 OT.AA_Proof “Proof of MRTD using Active Authentication” defined in this ST,
 OT.Data_Int_AA “Data Integrity using Active Authentication” defined in this ST.
The Security Objectives for the environment of this TOE are the following:
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 OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Authentication Key” defined in
[PP_EACwPACE],
 OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference
Data” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],
 OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel
document” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],
 OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of data from the logical travel
document” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],
 OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” defined in
[PP_EACwPACE],
 OE.Legislative_Compliance “Issuing of the travel document” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” referenced
in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 OE.Terminal “Terminal operating” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in
[PP_PACE]
 OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder Obligations” referenced in
[PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],
 OE.Exam_MRTD_AA “Examination of the MRTD using Active Authentication” defined in this
ST,
 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA “Protection of MRTD after Active Authentication” defined in this
ST,
 OE.Activ_Auth_Verif “Verification using Active Authentication” defined in this ST,
 OE.Activ_Auth_Sign “Infrastructure for Active Authentication Key Generation” defined in this
ST.
3.3 CC conformance and usage in real life
In the real life, for interoperability purposes, the MRTD will most likely support BAC, PACE and EAC.
 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing BAC then EAC, the
security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of (1) the TOE
described by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_BAC] and (2) the TOE described by
the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EAC], assuming PACE is not supported (as not
used for the inspection procedure)
 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing PACE then EAC, the
security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described
by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EACwPACE], assuming BAC is not supported
(as not used for the inspection procedure).
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4 Security Problem Definition
4.1 Assets
Overview
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to §1.3.6 TOE life cycle:
Asset Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
Biometric Data No Yes Yes
Personal Data No Yes Yes
EF.COM No Yes Yes
CA_SK No Yes Yes
Session_K Yes Yes Yes
PACE_Kmac No No Yes
PACE_Kenc No No Yes
ephem-Skpicc-PACE No No Yes
PACE_PWD No Yes Yes
Perso_K No Yes No
LCS Yes Yes Yes
Updatable data No Yes Yes
Table: Assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s chip,
user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data
from the claimed [PP_PACE], chap 3.1.
4.1.1 Biometric Data
Biometric Data
The Biometric Data are the Logical MRTD sensitive User Data: sensitive biometric
reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
Application Note:
(5 in [PP_EACwPACE]): Due to interoperability reasons the [ICAO_9303] requires that
Basic Inspection Systems may have access to logical travel document data DG1, DG2,
DG5 to DG16. The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using BAC [ICAO_9303].
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Note that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack potential (cf.
[PP_BAC]). If supported, it is therefore recommended to use PACE instead of BAC. If
nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip Authentication v.1
before getting access to data (except DG14), as this mechanism is resistant to high
potential attacks.
4.1.2 Authenticity of the MRTDs chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organisation for the
MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
4.1.3 User data stored on the TOE
All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the ePassport application of
the MRTD as defined in [ICAO_TR_SAC] and being allowed to be read out solely by an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of
[ICAO_TR_SAC]).
This asset covers ‘User Data on the MRTD’s chip’, ‘Logical MRTD Data’ and ‘Sensitive User
Data’ in [PP_BAC].
It includes:
Personal Data
The Personal Data are the logical MRTD standard User Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16).
EF.COM
The EF.COM is an elementary file containing the list of the existing elementary files (EF)
with the user data.
4.1.4 User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected
All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the ePassport
application of the MRTD as defined in [ICAO_TR_SAC] between the TOE and an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of
[ICAO_TR_SAC]).
User data can be received and sent (exchange receive, send).
4.1.5 MRTD tracing data
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the MRTD gathered
unnoticeable by the MRTD holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password. TOE
tracing data can be provided / gathered.
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4.1.6 Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to authorised
subjects only.
4.1.7 Genuineness of the TOE
Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a
proper way.
This asset also covers ‘Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip in [PP_BAC].
4.1.8 TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to
enforce its security functionality.
It includes:
Chip Authentication Private Key (CA_SK)
The Chip Authentication Private Key is used by the application to process Chip
Authentication.
Secure Messaging session keys (Session_K)
Session keys are used to secure communication in confidentiality and authenticity.
PACE session keys (PACE-Kmac, PACE-Kenc)
PACE session keys are secure messaging keys for message authentication and for
message encryption agreed between the TOE and a terminal as result of the PACE
Protocol.
Ephemeral private key PACE (ephem-Skpicc-PACE)
The ephemeral PACE Authentication Key Pair is used for Key Agreement Protocol.
4.1.9 MRTD communication establishment authorisation data
Restricted-revealable authorisation information for a human user being used for verification
of the authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are stored in
the TOE and are not to be send to it.
It includes:
PACE password (PACE_PWD)
Password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
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Personalization Agent keys (Perso_K)
This key set used for mutual authentication between the Personalization agent and the
chip, and secure communication establishment.
TOE Life Cycle State (LCS)
This is the Life Cycle State of the TOE.
Updatable Data
Data other than Personal Data, Biometric Data, EF.COM, EF.SOD, CA_PK, CA_SK, Pre-
Perso_K, Perso_K, Session_K, LCS and Configuration Data which can be modified in
Operational Use phase.
4.2 Subjects
Overview
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to §1.2.1
Subject Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
MRTD Holder No No No No Yes
Traveler No No No No Yes
Basic Inspection System with PACE No No No No Yes
Document Signer No No No Yes No
Country Signing Certification Authority No No No Yes No
Personalization Agent No No No Yes No
IC manufacturer (Manufacturer role) Yes No No No No
MRTD packaging responsible (Manufacturer role) No Yes No No No
Embedded software loading responsible (Manufacturer
role)
No Yes No No No
Pre-personalization Agent (Manufacturer role) No No Yes No No
Country Verifying Certification Authority No No No No Yes
Document Verifier No No No No Yes
Terminal No No Yes Yes Yes
Inspection System No No No No Yes
Attacker Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table – Subjects of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
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MRTD Holder
MRTD holder is the travel document holder defined in [PP_PACE]:
A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalised the travel document. This
entity is commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [PP_BAC]. Please note that a travel
document holder can also be an attacker.
Traveller
A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity of the
travel document holder. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveller’ in [PP_BAC].
Please note that a travel document presenter can also be an attacker.
Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the travel
document presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real
biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data
(DG2) of the travel document holder).
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to
the travel document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive
Authentication.
See also par. 1.2.5 in [PP_PACE].
Document Signer (DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security
Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is
authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer Certificate, see
[ICAO_9303]. This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to
confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA
represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel document and creates the
Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA
Certificate having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see [ICAO_9303],
5.5.1.
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel
document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities: (i)
establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the
travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
(iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for
the travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303], (iv) writing the document details
data, (v) writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in
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[ICAO_9303] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be
distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel
document Issuer. This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in [PP_BAC].
IC Manufacturer
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[PP_PACE]. It is the manufacturer of the IC.
If scheme 1 is applied (cf. § 1.3.6), this subject is responsible for the embedded software
downloading in the IC. This subject does not use Flash loader, even if it is embedded in
the IC
MRTD packaging responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[PP_PACE]. This subject is responsible for the combination of the IC with hardware for the
contactless and/or contact interface.
Embedded software loading responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[PP_PACE]. This subject is responsible for the embedded software loading when scheme 2
is applied (cf. § 1.3.6). This subject does not exist if scheme 1 is applied (cf. § 1.3.6).
This subject used the Flash loader embedded in the IC.
Pre-personalization Agent
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[PP_PACE]. This subject is responsible for the preparation of the card, i.e. creation of the
MF and MRTD ADF. He also sets Personalization Agent keys and Configuration data.
Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the
issuing State or Organisation with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric
reference data stored in the travel document. The CVCA represents the country specific
root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates
within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of
Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier (DV)
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect
to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended
Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended
Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the travel document in the limits provided by
the issuing States or Organisations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
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Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Note: as the TOE may also be used in contact mode, the terminal may also communicate
using the contact interface.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an travel document presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as travel document holder.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure
(figure1) and therefore (i) contains a terminal for the communication with the travel
document’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC; (iii) gets the
authorization to read the logical travel document either under PACE or BAC by optical
reading the travel document providing this information, (iv) implements the Terminal
Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocols both Version 1 according to [TR_03110]
and (v) is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier
of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of
the EIS are defined by means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be
used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the
BIS, PACE must be used.
Attacker
Additionally to the definition from [PP_PACE], chap 3.1 the definition of an attacker is
refined as followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical travel document
without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3,
EF.DG4), (iii) to forge a genuine travel document, or (iv) to trace a travel document.
Application Note:
(7 in [PP_EACwPACE]): An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT
environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document.
Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the
attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
4.3 Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through
the communication interface of the travel document’s chip. The attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [PP_BAC]) in respect of the
attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the
travel document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive
biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the
opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack methods.
Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the travel document’s
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chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually
readable on the physical part of the travel document as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in
possession of a legitimate travel document.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric
reference.
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: AAn attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine travel document’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit travel
document. This violates the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for
authentication of a traveler by possession of a travel document. The attacker may
generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine travel
document’s chip and copy them to another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel
document’s chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
travel documents
Asset: authenticity of user data stored on the TOE
T.Skimming
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the
user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority
connected via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE..
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct
value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document data
Application Note:
Application Note (10 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in
the context of the security policy defined in [PP_PACE].
Application Note (11 in [PP_PACE]): MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the
travel document. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but
are restricted-revealable, cf. OE.Travel_Document_Holder.
T.Eavesdropping
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel
document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data
transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct
value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document data.
Application Note:
Application Note (12 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in
the context of the security policy defined in [PP_PACE]
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T.Tracing
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement
of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or listening
to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct
value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: privacy of the travel document holder.
Application Note:
Application Note (13 in [PP_PACE]): This Threat completely covers and extends “T.Chip-
ID” from [PP_BAC].
Application Note (14 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BAC (whatever the type of the
inspection system is: BIS-BAC) cannot avert this threat in the context of the security
policy defined in [PP_PACE], see also the par. 1.2.5 in [PP_PACE].
Application Note (15 in [PP_PACE]): Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not
support any unique-secret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip
Authentication), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel document) cannot be
averted by the current TOE.
Application Note: As our TOE supports Chip Authentication in addition to Standard
Inspection Procedure, the previous application note extracted from PP does not apply.
T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on
the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected in
order to outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by means of changed travel
document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The attacker
does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives these modified data as
authentic one.
Threat agent: having high attack potential.
Asset: integrity of the travel document.
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE
operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the
TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate
(bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE. This threat
addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and personalisation in the
operational phase after delivery to the travel document holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
travel documents integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of
the travel document.
Application Note:
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Application Note (16 in [PP_PACE]): Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for
instance, on the capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test
Software being not specified here.
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel
document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected. The
information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Threat agent: having high attack potential.
Asset: confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document.
Application Note:
Application Note (17 in [PP_PACE]): Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in
power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time
requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is
more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived
either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct
measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can
then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the
attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential
Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order
(i) to disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter (I) its security
functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the User Data or the TSF-data
stored on the travel document.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
travel documents
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of
the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document.
Application Note:
Application Note (18 in [PP_PACE]): Physical tampering may be focused directly on the
disclosure or manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the
inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or
indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of
security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical
tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document’s internals. Techniques
commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be
used. Before that, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be
identified. Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the
TSF data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a
security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
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T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware and
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or
modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by
operating the travel document outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors
in the travel document’s Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To
exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation
having information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
travel documents, having information about the functional operation
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of
the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
Application Note:
Application note (19 in [PP_PACE]): A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a
direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a
manipulation (refer to the threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about
TOE’s internals
T.Configuration
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the TOE at Manufacturing and Personalization
phases (steps 5 and 6) to try to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of
the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more MRTD in
Pre-personalization or Personalization phases.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the data stored in files other than EF.DG1
to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF document security object. This may lead the extended
inspection system (EIS) using these data to be deceived
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of data stored in files other than EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF
document security object
T. BAC_breaking
Adverse action: An attacker manages to break the BAC protocol using cryptanalysis
means and powerful computation capacity leading to threaten (1) the non traceability and
(2) confidentiality of data. The attacker is able to intercept and record a log of BAC
transaction during inspection at a border control. Then using computation capacity, he is
able to perform reverse engineering over the logs, to break the protocol within a few
minutes or less and get (1) the MRZ value, and (2) the log of plain text exchanged
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between the MRTD and the inspection system. This leads the attacker to (1) get the
holder information and use it, and (2) trace the holder in real time.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being able to intercept transaction with
MRTDs.
Asset: confidentiality of data read from the MRTD, traceability of the MRTD
4.4 Organisational Security Policies
P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are
sensitive private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive biometric
reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this
access at the time the travel document is presented to the inspection system (Extended
Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the Document Verifiers
of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits
defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The travel document’s chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during
transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication Version 1.
P.Personalisation
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of
the logical travel document with respect to the travel document holder. The
personalisation of the travel document for the holder is performed by an agent authorized
by the issuing State or Organisation only.
P.Pre-Operational
1) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of
those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently stored in
the TOE.
3) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which
enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle
phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase, cf. sec. 1.2.3 in [PP_PACE].
4) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the
travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to ensure
that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s policy.
P.Card_PKI
1) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive
authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document.
For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel
document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA).
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2) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall
keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having
to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly secure means, see
[ICAO_9303], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for the
Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the travel document
Issuer, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
3) A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over the
Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the
Document Security Objects of travel documents.
Application Note:
The description below states the responsibilities of involved parties and represents the
logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical distribution ways shall be
implemented by the involved parties in such a way that all certificates belonging to the
PKI are securely distributed / made available to their final destination, e.g. by using
directory services.
P.Trustworthy_PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations
(DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to
be stored on the travel document.
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which contains at least
the Personalisation Agent Key.
P.Terminal
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as
follows:
1) The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by terminal
operators and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303].
2) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO_TR_SAC], of the
Passive Authentication [ICAO_9303] and use them in this order28. The PACE terminal
shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols
(for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public
Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication
(determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document,
[ICAO_9303]).
5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of
respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI
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certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to
[PP_PACE].
P.Activ_Auth
The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [ICAO_9303]
4.5 Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [ICAO_TR_SAC]
and/or BAC [PP_BAC]. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and
BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the logical
travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v.1 to verify
the logical travel document and establishes secure messaging. EIS supports the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 in order to ensure access control and is authorized by the
issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read
the sensitive biometric reference data.
Justification: The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security objectives of the
[PP_PACE] as it repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds only assumptions for
the Inspection Systems for handling the EAC functionality of the TOE.
A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or
Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document
Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the public keys of
their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip.
Justification: This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The issuing and use
of card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is neither relevant for the
PACE part of the TOE nor will the security objectives of the [PP_PACE] be restricted by
this assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE the assumption is necessary
because it covers the pre-requisite for performing the Terminal Authentication Protocol
Version 1.
A.Passive_Auth
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel
document. The issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which
securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the
Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country
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Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The
Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the
Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the
Document Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer
Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving
States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the
Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according
to [ICAO_9303].
A.Insp_Sys_AA
The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection
System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature
returned by the TOE during Active Authentication.
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5 Security Objectives
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3
and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems.
The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System
Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the
authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the
Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical travel document data during their transmission to
the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference
data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the travel document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organisation by
means of the Chip Authentication Version 1 as defined in [TR_03110]. The authenticity
proof provided by travel document’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high
attack potential.
Application Note:
The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s chip to have (i) a unique identity
as given by the travel document’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by
knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF
data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the
authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip
Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel
document’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [ICAO_9303] and (ii) the hash value of DG14 in the
Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
OT.Data_Integrity
Integrity of Data
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by
protecting these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and
unauthorised modifying).The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-
data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and
represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
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OT.Data_Authenticity
Authenticity of Data The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-
data stored on it by enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side.The TOE
must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange
between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification
at the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE
itself (at receiving by the TOE).
OT.Data_Confidentiality
Confidentiality of Data
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read
access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure
confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE
and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the
PACE Authentication.
OT.Tracing
Tracing travel document
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying
the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of
shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
Application Note:
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-secret-based
authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip Authentication), a security objective
like OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (proof of travel document authenticity) cannot be achieved by
the current TOE.
As our TOE supports Chip Authentication in addition to Standard Inspection Procedure,
the previous application note extracted from PP does not apply.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE
operational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data
stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE, (iii) to
manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF-
data stored and/or processed by the travel document
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o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application Note:
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due
to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF-data and the travel document’s Embedded Software by means of
o measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the
chip’s surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction
between electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC
failure analysis),
o manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF-data) with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE. The environmental
conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any
contacts), clock frequency or temperature. The following TOE security objectives address
the aspects of identified threats to be countered involving TOE’s environment.
OT.Identification
IIdentification of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its
non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document.
The storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the Personalisation Agent
Key(s).
OT.AC_Pers
Personalization of the Electronic Document
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The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the
Document Security Object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be written
by authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after
personalisation of the document.
Application Note:
The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalisation for
travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed using write
access after personalisation.
OT.Configuration
Protection of the TOE preparation
During Pre-personalization and Personalization phases, the TOE must control the access
to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the means to secure
exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of useless
keys.
OT.Update_File
Modification of file in Operational Use Phase
During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow the modification of Updatable Data if
the write access to these objects is fulfilled by the Terminal.
OT.BAC_Expiration
Automatic deactivation of BAC protocol
OT.AC_SM_Level
Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
The TOE must support the terminals to verify the identity and authenticity of the
electronic document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by
means of the PACE-Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM) as defined in [ICAO_9303].
The authenticity proof provided by electronic document’s chip shall be protected against
attacks with high attack potential.
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO_9303]. The authenticity proof through AA
provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
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OT.Data_Int_AA
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active
Authentication.
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
5.2.1 Issuing State or Organisation
The issuing State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
Travel document Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the travel document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and
store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in
EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations to verify
the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine travel document by
certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security
Object.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to counter the Threat T.Counterfeit as it
specifies the pre-requisite for the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 which is one of
the additional features of the TOE described only in this Protection Profile and not in
[PP_PACE].
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of travel document
holders to authorized receiving States or Organisations. The Country Verifying
Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation generates card verifiable
Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the
Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 as it concerns the need of an PKI for this protocol and the responsibilities of
its root instance. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is one of the additional
features of the TOE described only in this Protection Profile and not in [PP_PACE].
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5.2.2 Receiving State or Organisation
The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Examination of the physical part of the travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the travel
document presented by the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical
security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel
document. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organisation, and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [ICAO_TR_SAC] and/or the
Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to
these points the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the
presented travel document’s chip.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Threat T.Counterfeit and the
Assumption A.Insp_Sys by demanding the Inspection System to perform the Chip
Authentication protocol v.1. OE.Exam_Travel_Document also repeats partly the
requirements from OE.Terminal in [PP_PACE] and therefore also counters T.Forgery and
A.Passive_Auth from [PP_PACE]. This is done because a new type of Inspection System is
introduced in [PP_EACwPACE] as the Extended Inspection System is needed to handle the
additional features of a travel document with Extended Access Control.
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
Protection of data from the logical travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical travel document. The inspection system will
prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by
requiring the Inspection System to perform secure messaging based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive
biometric reference data of the logical travel document. The Extended Inspection System
authenticates themselves to the travel document’s chip for access to the sensitive
biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection
System Certificate.
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Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the
Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 as it concerns the responsibilities of the Document Verifier instance and the
Inspection Systems.
5.2.3 Travel document Issuer as the general responsible
The travel document Issuer as the general responsible for the global security policy related
will implement the following security objectives for the TOE environment:
OE.Legislative_Compliance
Issuing of the travel document
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
5.2.4 Travel document Issuer and CVCA: travel document's PKI (issuing)
branch
The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement the following security
objectives for the TOE environment:
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
Authentication of travel document by Signature
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as
follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document
Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational
environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby
authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being maintained. A Document Signer
acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must (i) generate a cryptographically secure
Document Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key,
(iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iv) sign
Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational
environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all
hash values for each data group in use according to [ICAO_9303]. The Personalisation
Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of
genuine user data according to [ICAO_9303]. The CSCA must issue its certificates
exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct
Document Security Objects to be stored on travel document.
OE.Personalisation
Personalisation of travel document
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his
behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the
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biographical data for the travel document, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the
travel document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical
personalisation) and store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the
travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303], (iv) write the document details data,
(v) write the initial TSF data, (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in
[ICAO_9303] (in the role of a DS).
5.2.5 Terminal operator: Terminal's receiving branch
OE.Terminal
Terminal operating
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
1) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal
operators and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303]. 2) The related
terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO_TR_SAC], of the
Passive Authentication [ICAO_TR_SAC] (by verification of the signature of the Document
Security Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and
(almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral
keys for Diffie-Hellmann). 3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key (in form of C_CSCA and C_DS) in order to enable and to perform
Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data
groups stored in the travel document, [ICAO_9303]) 5) The related terminals and their
environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them
(e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is
necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the [PP_PACE].
Application Note:
OE.Terminal completely covers and extends “OE.Exam_MRTD”, “OE.Passive_Auth_Verif“
and “OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD” from [PP_BAC].
5.2.6 Travel document holder Obligations
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Travel document holder Obligations
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the
PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to
respective regulations and are trustworthy.
5.2.7 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active
Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
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OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document, the inspection system prevents
eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Active Authentication Protocol.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use
the verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the
authenticity of the MRTD.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the MRTD’s Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication
Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support
inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
5.3.1 Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric
reference data”is fulfilled and the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive
biometric reference data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf
“Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that read access to
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to
authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these
data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier
certificates issued by the issuing State or Organisation as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data”.
The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection
Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive
biometric reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of
Extended Inspection Systems”.
This threat is also covered by OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric
reference data according to SM level” that enhences this protection by allowing the
issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure messaging with a minimum
security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The strength of the
secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (DES, AES-
128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure
messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the
sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read.
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T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data”addresses
the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip.
This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of the travel document’s chip authenticity”using an
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organisation. The Public
Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of
Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel
document Authentication Key”. According to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of
the physical part of the travel document” the General Inspection system has to perform
the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the authenticity of the travel
document’s chip. OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM ensures that the chip in addition to CA
also supports the PACE-Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM) protocol, which
supports the same security functionality as CA does. PACE-CAM enables much faster
authentication of the of the chip than running PACE with general mapping followed by CA.
This threat is also covered by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document
Authentication Key”using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or
Organization.
This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip
as required by OT.AA_Proof and OT.Data_Int_AA using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif and OE.Activ_Auth_Sign covers also this threat enabling the
possibility of performing an Active Authentication which reinforce the security associated
to the communication.
T.Skimming The threat T.Skimming “Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal
Communication” addresses accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or transferred
between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE’s contactless/contact interface. This
threat is countered by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data”,
OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data” and OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality
of Data” through the PACE authentication. The objective OE.Travel_Document_Holder
“Travel document holder Obligations” ensures that a PACE session can only be established
either by the travel document holder itself or by an authorised person or device, and,
hence, cannot be captured by an attacker.
T.Eavesdropping The threat T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping on the communication
between the TOE and the PACE terminal” addresses listening to the communication
between the TOE and a rightful terminal in order to gain the User Data transferred there.
This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality
of Data” through a trusted channel based on the PACE authentication.
T.Tracing The threat T.Tracing “Tracing travel document” addresses gathering TOE tracing
data identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE, whereby the attacker does not a priori know the
correct values of the PACE password. This threat is directly countered by security
objectives OT.Tracing “Tracing travel document” (no gathering TOE tracing data) and
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OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder Obligations” (the attacker does not
a priori know the correct values of the shared passwords).
T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of Data” addresses the fraudulent, complete or
partial alteration of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged
between the TOE and the terminal. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalisation of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write access for the travel
document to the trustworthy Personalisation Agent (cf. OE.Personalisation). The TOE will
protect the integrity and authenticity of the stored and exchanged User Data or/and TSF-
data as aimed by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data” and
OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data”, respectively. The objectives OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection
against Abuse of Functionality” contribute to protecting integrity of the User Data or/and
TSF-data stored on the TOE. A terminal operator operating his terminals according to
OE.Terminal “Terminal operating” and performing the Passive Authentication using the
Document Security Object as aimed by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel
document by Signature” will be able to effectively verify integrity and authenticity of the
data received from the TOE.
Additionally to the security objectives from [PP_PACE] (see above) which counter this
threat, the examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” and
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA shall ensure its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document.
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T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of
misusing TOE’s functionality to manipulate or to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data
as well as to disable or to bypass the soft-coded security functionality. The security
objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” ensures that
the usage of functions having not to be used in the operational phase is effectively
prevented.
T.Information_Leakage The threat T.Information_Leakage is typical for integrated circuits
like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE
against this threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards
under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this
threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper
T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards
under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this
threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Malfunction
T.Configuration The threat T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during
preparation” addresses attacks in Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The
attacker trying to access to unauthorized TOE functions, trying to access or to modify
sensitive information exchanged between the TOE and the Personalization system.
Protection of the TOE during these two phases is directly addressed by OT.Configuration
“Protection of the TOE preparation”.
T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data The threat T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data “Forgery of
supplemental data stored in the TOE” addresses the fraudulent alteration of Updatable
Data. The TOE protects the update of these data thanks to OT.Update_File “Modification
of file in Operational Use Phase” that ensures inspection system are authenticated and
data to be updated are sent through a secure channel ensuring integrity, authenticity and
confidentiality.
T. BAC_breaking The threat T. BAC_breaking “BAC protocol is broken” addresses the
attack aiming at breaking the BAC protocol. The protection of the TOE against this threat
is addressed by security objective OT.BAC_Expiration “Automatic deactivation of BAC
protocol” which is directly related to it. It prevents an attacker to perform offline
dictionary attacks on transaction log, in order to preserve confidentiality of data and avoid
citizen traceability.
5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies
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P.Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference
data”is fulfilled and the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric
reference data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4
(containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized
inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures
the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued
by the issuing State or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization
for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving
State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection
System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
This threat is also covered by OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric
reference data according to SM level” that enhences this protection by allowing the
issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure messaging with a minimum
security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The strength of the
secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (DES, AES-
128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure
messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the
sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read
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P.Personalisation The OSP P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the travel document by
issuing State or Organisation only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical travel
document by the Personalisation Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document”, and (ii) the access
control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers
“Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” Note the manufacturer equips the
TOE with the Personalisation Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification of
the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical
MRTD” limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the
Personalisation Agent.
P.Pre-Operational The OSP P.Pre-Operational “Pre-operational handling of the travel
document” is enforced by the following security objectives: OT.Identification
“Identification of the TOE” is affine to the OSP’s property ‘traceability before the
operational phase’; OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” and
OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document” together enforce the OSP’s
properties ‘correctness of the User- and the TSF-data stored’ and ‘authorisation of
Personalisation Agents’; OE.Legislative_Compliance “Issuing of the travel document” is
affine to the OSP’s property ‘compliance with laws and regulations’.
P.Card_PKI The OSP P.Card_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)” is
enforced by establishing the issuing PKI branch as aimed by the objectives
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” (for the
Document Security Object).
P.Trustworthy_PKI The OSP P.Trustworthy_PKI “Trustworthiness of PKI” is enforced by
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” (for CSCA,
issuing PKI branch).
P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip” requires a
unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the
Pre-personalisation Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE”.
P.Terminal The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is obviously
enforced by the objective OE.Terminal “Terminal operating”, whereby the one-to-one
mapping between the related properties is applicable.
The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is countered by the
security objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the
travel document” additionally to the security objectives from [PP_PACE] (see above).
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document”
enforces the terminals to perform the terminal part of the PACE protocol.
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P.Activ_Auth The OSP P.Activ_Auth requires the implementation of the Active
Authentication protocol as enforced by OT.AA_Proof.
5.3.3 Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the
physical part of the travel document”which requires the inspection system to examine
physically the travel document, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic
Access Control, and the Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel
document’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of data from the logical travel document”
require the Inspection System to protect the logical travel document data during the
transmission and the internal handling.
A.Auth_PKI The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use
of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to
sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving
States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure
A.Passive_Auth The assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
“Authentication of travel document by Signature” from [PP_PACE] covering the necessary
procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The
implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document”.
A.Insp_Sys_AA The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys_AA "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD_AA "Examination of the MRTD
passport book". The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the
Basic Inspection System to implement the Active Authentication Protocol and to protect
the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
5.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives Rationale
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T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OT.AC_SM_Level
Section 5.3.1
T.Counterfeit OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document,
OE.Exam_Travel_Document,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM,
OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA,
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Section 5.3.1
T.Skimming OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Section 5.3.1
T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Confidentiality Section 5.3.1
T.Tracing OT.Tracing, OE.Travel_Document_Holder Section 5.3.1
T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OE.Personalisation,
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign, OE.Terminal,
OE.Exam_Travel_Document,
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Section 5.3.1
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Section 5.3.1
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Section 5.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Section 5.3.1
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Section 5.3.1
T.Configuration OT.Configuration Section 5.3.1
T.
Forgery_Supplemental_Data
OT.Update_File Section 5.3.1
T. BAC_breaking OT.BAC_Expiration Section 5.3.1
Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Threats
OT.Sens_Data_Conf T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Data_Integrity T.Skimming, T.Forgery
OT.Data_Authenticity T.Skimming, T.Forgery
OT.Data_Confidentiality T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OT.Tracing T.Tracing
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OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Forgery, T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction
OT.Identification
OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery
OT.Configuration T.Configuration
OT.Update_File T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data
OT.BAC_Expiration T. BAC_breaking
OT.AC_SM_Level T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM T.Counterfeit
OT.AA_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Data_Int_AA T.Counterfeit
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document T.Counterfeit
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document T.Counterfeit, T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign T.Forgery
OE.Personalisation T.Forgery
OE.Terminal T.Forgery
OE.Travel_Document_Holder T.Skimming, T.Tracing
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif T.Counterfeit
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign T.Counterfeit
Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
Organisational Security
Policies
Security Objectives Rationale
P.Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OT.AC_SM_Level
Section 5.3.2
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P.Personalisation OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification, OE.Personalisation Section 5.3.2
P.Pre-Operational OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalisation,
OE.Legislative_Compliance
Section 5.3.2
P.Card_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Section 5.3.2
P.Trustworthy_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Section 5.3.2
P.Manufact OT.Identification Section 5.3.2
P.Terminal OE.Terminal, OE.Exam_Travel_Document Section 5.3.2
P.Activ_Auth OT.AA_Proof Section 5.3.2
Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Organisational Security Policies
OT.Sens_Data_Conf P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Identification P.Personalisation, P.Pre-Operational,
P.Manufact
OT.AC_Pers P.Personalisation, P.Pre-Operational
OT.Configuration
OT.Update_File
OT.BAC_Expiration
OT.AC_SM_Level P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
OT.AA_Proof P.Activ_Auth
OT.Data_Int_AA
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data P.Sensitive_Data
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OE.Exam_Travel_Document P.Terminal
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems P.Sensitive_Data
OE.Legislative_Compliance P.Pre-Operational
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign P.Card_PKI, P.Trustworthy_PKI
OE.Personalisation P.Personalisation, P.Pre-Operational
OE.Terminal P.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Rationale
A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_Travel_Document,
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
Section 5.3.3
A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Section 5.3.3
A.Passive_Auth OE.Passive_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_Travel_Document Section 5.3.3
A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA Section 5.3.3
Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Assumptions
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data A.Auth_PKI
OE.Exam_Travel_Document A.Insp_Sys,
A.Passive_Auth
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document A.Insp_Sys
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems A.Auth_PKI
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign A.Passive_Auth
OE.Personalisation
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OE.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage
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6 Extended Requirements
6.1 Extended Families
6.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
6.1.1.1 Description
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of
TOE?s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis
(DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation etc. This family describes the functional requirements
for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The family FPT_EMS belongs to the Class FPT
because it is the class for TSF protection. Other families within the Class FPT do not cover
the TOE emanation.
6.1.1.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FPT_EMS.1
Description
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
 FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
 FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
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Definition
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.2 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity
6.1.2.1 Description
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API)
of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication
verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the
verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note 10: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of
the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the
style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter 'Explicitly stated IT security
requirements (APE_SRE)') from a TOE point of view.
6.1.2.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FIA_API.1
Description
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
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Definition
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism ] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role ].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities
6.1.3.1 Description
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing
abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability.
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6.1.3.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FMT_LIM.2
Description
Definition
FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
Extended Component FMT_LIM.1
Description
Definition
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
6.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
6.1.4.1 Description
To describe the security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FAU_SAS of the class
FAU (Security audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for
the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does
not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not
give specific details of the content of the audit records. The family ‘Audit data storage
(FAU_SAS)’ is specified as follows:
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6.1.4.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FAU_SAS.1
Description
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Definition
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
6.1.5.1 Description
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to
be used for cryptographic purposes.
6.1.5.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FCS_RND.1
Description
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.
Definition
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric ].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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7 Security Requirements
7.1 Security Functional Requirements
This section describes the requirements imposed on the TOE in order to achieve the security
objectives laid down in the previous chapter.
7.1.1 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH compliant to [TR_03111] and
specified cryptographic key sizes 192 to 512 bit that meet the following:
[ICAO_TR_SAC].
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified cryptographic key
sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below:
Key Generation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
based on ECDH compliant to
[ISO_11770]
192 to 512 bit [TR_03111]
based on DH 1024, 1536 and
2048
[TR_03110] and
PKCS#3
.
FCS_CKM.1/CAM Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CAM The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm based on ECDH compliant to
[ISO_11770] and specified cryptographic key sizes 192 to 521 bit that meet the
following: [TR_03110].
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FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DATA_GEN The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified
cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below
Algorithm Key Size Standard
Chip Authentication Data Generation using
DH keys compliant to PKCS#3
1024 to 2048 bits in
steps of 512 bits
PKCS#3
Chip authentication data generation using
ECDH keys compliant to [ISO_15946]
192 to 512 bits [TR_03111]
.
FCS_CKM.1/GP Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/GP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified
cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below:
Key Generation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [GPC_SPE_034]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 [GPC_SPE_014]
.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC The TSF shall perform refer to table below in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm refer to table below and cryptographic key
sizes refer to table below that meet the following: refer to table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms
secure messaging-encryption AES in CBC 128, 192 and [ICAO_TR_SAC]
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and decryption mode 256 bits
secure messaging-encryption
and decryption
TDES in CBC
mode
112 bits [ICAO_TR_SAC]
.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC The TSF shall perform refer table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm refer table below and cryptographic key sizes refer
table below that meet the following: refer table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms
secure messaging - message
authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 192 and
256 bits
[ICAO_TR_SAC]
secure messaging - message
authentication code
Retail MAC 112 bits [ICAO_TR_SAC]
.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC The TSF shall perform refer to table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm refer to table below and cryptographic key sizes
refer to table below that meet the following: refer to table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms
secure messaging-encryption and
decryption
AES in CBC
mode
128, 192 and
256 bits
[TR-
03110]
secure messaging-encryption and
decryption
TDES in CBC
mode
112 bits [TR-
03110]
.
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FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic
Operation
Algorithm Key Sizes
digital signature
verification
ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256
as defined in [FIPS_186_3]
192 to 512
digital signature
verification
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-1, SHA-256 and
SHA-512
1024, 1536,
2048
digital signature
verification
RSA PKCS#1-PSS with SHA-1, SHA-256 and
SHA-512
1024, 1536,
2048
.
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform refer table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm refer table below and cryptographic key sizes refer
table below that meet the following: refer table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms
secure messaging - message
authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 192 and
256 bits
[TR-
03110]
secure messaging - message
authentication code
Retail MAC 112 bits [TR-
03110]
.
FCS_COP.1/CAM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CAM The TSF shall perform the PACE-CAM protocol in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm PACE-CAM and cryptographic key sizes 192 to 521
bits that meet the following: [ICAO_9303].
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FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_ENC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
secure messaging (GP) –
encryption and decryption
Triple-DES in
CBC mode
112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
secure messaging (GP) –
encryption and decryption
AES in CBC
mode
128, 192
and 256 bits
[NIST_800_38A]
.
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_MAC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
secure messaging – message
authentication code
Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
secure messaging – message
authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 198 and
256 bits
[NIST_800_38B]
.
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_AUTH The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
symmetric authentication –
message authentication code
Full 3DES
MAC
112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
symmetric authentication –
message authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 198
and 256 bits
[NIST_800_38B]
.
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Application Note:
The Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES is the authentication process
performed in phases 5 and 6
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_KEY_DEC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic
Operation
Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
key decryption Triple-DES in ECB
mode
112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
key decryption AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256
bits
[FIPS_197]
.
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform [Cryptographic Operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [Cryptographic Algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the following: [Standard]
Cryptographic
Operation
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Sizes(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA with SHA1,
256, 384, 512
192 to 512 over
prime field curves
[ISO_9796-2],
[PKCS#3],
[FIPS_180_2] and
[X.92]
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature (CRT)
with SHA1, 256,
384, 512
1024, 1536 and
2048
[ISO_9796-2]
.
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FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.994.
7.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
o To establish a communication channel,
o Carrying out the PACE protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC],
o To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
o To carry out the Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM) according to
[ICAO_9303]
o To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[TR_03110]
o To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol according to
[TR_03110]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
o to establish the communication channel,
o carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC]
o to read the Initialization Data if it is not disable by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
o to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
o to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[TR_03110]
o To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol according to
[TR_03110]
o To carry out the authentication of the Manufacturer and Personalization
Agent
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on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC],
o Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES
o Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR_03110].
Application Note:
The authentication mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES is the authentication process
performed in phases 5 and 6
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide
o PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC] and PACE-CAM Protocol
according to [ICAO_9303],
o Passive Authentication according to [ICAO_9303],
o Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [ICAO_TR_SAC]
o Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
o Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR_03110]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of
secure messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by means of
the PACE protocol.
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation Agent by
the Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key(s).
o After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 the TOE accepts
only received commands with correct message authentication code
sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal
by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1.
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o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the terminal uses the public key
presented during the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1 or the
terminal uses the public key presented during PACE-CAM and the
secure messaging established during PACE.
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation Agent by
the Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key(s).
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE protocol shall be
verified as being sent by the PACE terminal.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent by the Inspection System.
FIA_UAU.6/MP Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/MP The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the
authenticated terminal.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts
occur related to authentication attempts using the PACE password as shared
password.
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the
terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the PACE
authentication attempts.
Application Note:
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The PACE password being referred here are MRZ or CAN.
FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent.
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met, the TSF shall slow down exponentially the next authentication.
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1
according to [TR_03110] to prove the identity of the TOE.
FIA_API.1/CAM Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CAM The TSF shall provide a PACE-CAM according to [ICAO_9303] to
prove the identity of the TOE.
7.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining access to user data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel
document.
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on
the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Terminal,
b. BIS-PACE,
c. Extended Inspection System
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2. Objects:
a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16,EF.SOD and EF.COM of the
logical travel document,
b. data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document,
c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document,
d. all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document
3. Security attributes:
a. PACE Authentication
b. Terminal Authentication v.1
c. Authorisation of the Terminal.
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: a BIS-PACE is allowed to
read data objects from FDP_ACF.1/TRM according to [ICAO_TR_SAC] after a
successful PACE authentication as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE.
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
o Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE
is not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any User Data stored
on the travel document.
o Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write,
to modify, to use any data stored on the travel document.
o Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System with the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted
by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed
to read the data objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
o Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System with the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the
relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read
the data objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
o Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
o Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read data
in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
o Moreover, the Extended Inspection System shall communicate with at
least the minimum secure messaging level identified at the creation of
the DG3 and DG4, to be able to read these DGs.
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FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control SFP on
terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the file(s)
other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control SFP to
objects based on the following:
o Subjects:
 Personalization Agent,
 Extended Inspection System
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data in the file(s)EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD
o Security attributes
 authentication status of terminals,.
FDP_ACF.1.2/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the Personalization Agent is allowed to write, read and modify the data
in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System following
FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE is allowed to modify the data in the file(s)
other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: Any Terminal is not allowed to modify the data in
the file(s) EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
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FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects:
o Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication
session),
o the ephemeral private key ephem-SK picc -PACE (by having generated a
DH shared secret K)
o none.
FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to receive and
transmit user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and
replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used
as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of
the validity of the indicated information.
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FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP
when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
7.1.4 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce communication via the
trusted channel for any data exchange between the TOE and the Terminal.
FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for loading
sensitive data (Pre-Perso_K, Perso_K, PACE_PWD, CA_SK) shall be encrypted.
7.1.5 Class FAU Security Audit
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FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the
Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in the audit records.
7.1.6 Class FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/BAC_EXP The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions
o deactivation of BAC protocol
to Country Verifying Certification Authority and Domestic Document Verifier
once the current date in the TOE has reached or passed the value set by
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP.
Application Note:
The BAC is automatically deactivated by the TOE once the authenticated subject (CVCA or
Domestic Document Verifier) has updated the current date of the TOE with a date that
reaches or passes the reference date configured by FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP
FMT_MOF.1/GP Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/GP The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions
o transmission of user data in a manner protected from unauthorized
disclosure,
o reception of user data in a manner protected from unauthorized
disclosure,
o transmission of user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors,
o reception of user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors,
to the manufacturer and personalization agent.
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions
TSF Active Authentication to Personalization Agent.
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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o Initialization,
o Pre-personalisation,
o Personalisation,
o Configuration,
o Chip Authentication Protocol,
o Protection of incoming user data,
o Protection of outgoing user data,
o Basic Access Control expiration.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles
o Manufacturer,
o Personalization Agent,
o Terminal,
o PACE authenticated BIS-PACE
o Country Verifying Certificate Authority,
o Document Verifier,
o Domestic Extended Inspection System
o Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note:
This SFR also applies to the refinement of the role Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialisation
Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Manufacturer.
Application Note:
Please refer to F.ACW for details of the data written by the manufacturer.
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FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the Initialisation
Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Personalisation Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the document Security
Object (SO D) to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
o Initial Current Date
o none
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
o Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date to
o Country Verifying Certification Authority
o Document Verifier
o Domestic Extended Inspection System.
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FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load or create the Chip
Authentication private key to the personalization agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
o PACE passwords,
o Manufacturer Keys
o Pre-personalization Agent Keys,
o Personalisation Agent Keys,
o Chip Authentication Private Key
to none.
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_PWD The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the PACE Password
to Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the LCS from
phase 6 to phase 7 to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_EXP The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the BAC expiry date to
Personalization Agent.
Application Note:
By default, BAC expiration feature is not activated
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FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the identifiers of files
that can be modified in phase 7(different from EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16) to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the minimum Secure
Messaging level required to access DG3 and DG4 to Personalization Agent.
Application Note:
Possible secure messaging levels are: DES, AES 128, AES 192 or AES 256
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to
none.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to
Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the
certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
v.1 and the Access Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
 the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the
Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
 the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and
the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is
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not before the Current Date of the TOE and the expiration date of the Document
Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
 the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority known to the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended
Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
o User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
o TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
o software to be reconstructed,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks,
o sensitive User Data(EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
o User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
o TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
o software to be reconstructed,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks,
o sensitive User Data(EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
7.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
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FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
o Chip Authentication Session Keys,
o PACE session keys (PACE-K mac, PACE-K enc),
o The ephemeral private key ephem SK picc -PACE,
o The ephemeral private key SK Map,PICC -PACE-CAM,
o Personalization Agent Key(s),
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Active Authentication Private Key (AAK).
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure users are unable to use the following interface smart
card circuit contacts to gain access to
o Chip Authentication Session Keys,
o PACE session keys (PACE-K mac, PACE-K enc),
o The ephemeral private key ephem SK picc -PACE,
o Personalization Agent Key(s),
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Active Authentication Private Key (AAK).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
o Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE malfunction,
o Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1,
o none.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
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FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
7.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The Evaluation Assurance Level is EAL5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
7.2.1 ADV Development
7.2.1.1 ADV_ARC Security Architecture
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ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security
features of the TSF cannot be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to
protect itself from tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
ADV_ARC.1.1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail
commensurate with the description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the
TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains
maintained by the TSF consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF
initialisation process is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
protects itself from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
prevents bypass of the SFR-enforcing functionality.
ADV_ARC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.1.2 ADV_FSP Functional specification
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ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information
ADV_FSP.5.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.5.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to
the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.5.1C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
ADV_FSP.5.2C The functional specification shall describe the TSFI using a semi-formal
style.
ADV_FSP.5.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use
for all TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.4C The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters
associated with each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.5C The functional specification shall describe all actions associated with each
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.6C The functional specification shall describe all direct error messages that may
result from an invocation of each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.7C The functional specification shall describe all error messages that do not
result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.8C The functional specification shall provide a rationale for each error message
contained in the TSF implementation yet does not result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.9C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
ADV_FSP.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.5.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate
and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
7.2.1.3 ADV_IMP Implementation representation
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ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for
the entire TSF.
ADV_IMP.1.2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description
and the sample of the implementation representation.
ADV_IMP.1.1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail
such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.1.2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the
development personnel.
ADV_IMP.1.3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the
implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.
ADV_IMP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that, for the selected sample of the
implementation representation, the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.1.4 ADV_TDS TOE design
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ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.4.1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.4.2D The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional
specification to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
ADV_TDS.4.1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.4.2C The design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules, designating each
module as SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, or SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_TDS.4.3C The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.4C The design shall provide a semiformal description of each subsystem of the
TSF, supported by informal, explanatory text where appropriate.
ADV_TDS.4.5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all
subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the
modules of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.7C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its purpose and relationship with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.8C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its SFR-related interfaces, return values from those interfaces, interaction with
other modules and called SFR-related interfaces to other SFR-enforcing or SFR-supporting
modules.
ADV_TDS.4.9C The design shall describe each SFR-non-interfering module in terms of its
purpose and interaction with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behaviour
described in the TOE design that they invoke.
ADV_TDS.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_TDS.4.2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete
instantiation of all security functional requirements.
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7.2.1.5 ADV_INT TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.2.1D The developer shall design and implement the entire TSF such that it has
well-structured internals.
ADV_INT.2.2D The developer shall provide an internals description and justification.
ADV_INT.2.1C The justification shall describe the characteristics used to judge the
meaning of ``well-structured''.
ADV_INT.2.2C The TSF internals description shall demonstrate that the entire TSF is well-
structured.
ADV_INT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_INT.2.2E The evaluator shall perform an internals analysis on the TSF.
7.2.2 AGD Guidance documents
7.2.2.1 AGD_OPE Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to
use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control
of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to
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be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control
of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation
of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences
and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.2.2 AGD_PRE Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in
accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the
TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
7.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support
7.2.3.1 ALC_CMC CM capabilities
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ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMC.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.4.3D The developer shall use a CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.4.2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify
the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only
authorised changes are made to the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated
means.
ALC_CMC.4.6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development
of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or
newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being
maintained under the CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in
accordance with the CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.2 ALC_CMS CM scope
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ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.5.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs; the parts that comprise the TOE; the
implementation representation; security flaw reports and resolution status; and
development tools and related information.
ALC_CMS.5.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.5.3C For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall
indicate the developer of the item.
ALC_CMS.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.3 ALC_DEL Delivery
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the
TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ALC_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary
to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.4 ALC_DVS Development security
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ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2.1D The developer shall produce and provide development security
documentation.
ALC_DVS.2.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical,
procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development
environment.
ALC_DVS.2.2C The development security documentation shall justify that the security
measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.
7.2.3.5 ALC_LCD Life-cycle definition
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to
develop and maintain the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.6 ALC_TAT Tools and techniques
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ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2.1D The developer shall provide the documentation identifying each
development tool being used for the TOE.
ALC_TAT.2.2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementation-
dependent options of each development tool.
ALC_TAT.2.3D The developer shall describe and provide the implementation standards that
are being applied by the developer.
ALC_TAT.2.1C Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.
ALC_TAT.2.2C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the
implementation.
ALC_TAT.2.3C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
ALC_TAT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TAT.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards have been
applied.
7.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation
7.2.4.1 ASE_CCL Conformance claims
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ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies
the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended
components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement
packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a
package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem
definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs
for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.2 ASE_ECD Extended components definition
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ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component
for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components,
families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective
elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be
demonstrated.
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using existing components.
7.2.4.3 ASE_INT ST introduction
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ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE
overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of
the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and
the TOE description are consistent with each other.
7.2.4.4 ASE_OBJ Security objectives
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ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
ASE_OBJ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale.
ASE_OBJ.2.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives
for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.
ASE_OBJ.2.2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
TOE back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that
security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
operational environment back to threats countered by that security objective, OSPs
enforced by that security objective, and assumptions upheld by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives counter all threats.
ASE_OBJ.2.5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives enforce all OSPs.
ASE_OBJ.2.6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives for the operational environment uphold all assumptions.
ASE_OBJ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.5 ASE_REQ Security requirements
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ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_REQ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
ASE_REQ.2.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
ASE_REQ.2.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and
other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.2.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.2.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or
the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.2.6C The security requirements rationale shall trace each SFR back to the
security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet
all security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were
chosen.
ASE_REQ.2.9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
ASE_REQ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.6 ASE_SPD Security problem definition
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ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_APD.1.1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition.
ASE_SPD.1.1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats.
ASE_SPD.1.2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an
adverse action.
ASE_SPD.1.3C The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.
ASE_SPD.1.4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the
operational environment of the TOE.
ASE_SPD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.7 ASE_TSS TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each
SFR.
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent
with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
7.2.5 ATE Tests
7.2.5.1 ATE_COV Coverage
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ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.
ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the
functional specification have been tested.
ATE_COV.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.5.2 ATE_DPT Depth
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.3.1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
ATE_DPT.3.1C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and modules in the
TOE design.
ATE_DPT.3.2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF
subsystems in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF modules
in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.5.3 ATE_FUN Functional tests
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ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and
actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering
dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.5.4 ATE_IND Independent testing
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ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that
were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.
ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to
verify the developer test results.
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
7.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment
7.2.6.1 AVA_VAN Vulnerability analysis
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AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.5.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.5.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.5.3E The evaluator shall perform an independent, methodical vulnerability
analysis of the TOE using the guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE
design, security architecture description and implementation representation to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.5.4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker possessing High attack potential.
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale
7.3.1 Objectives
7.3.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.Sens_Data_Conf The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
sensitive biometric reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in
FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be
read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a
valid certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER. The SFRs FIA_UID.1/PACE and
FIA_UAU.1/PACE require the identification and authentication of the inspection systems.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 before any
authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected
communication following the CA v.1 the reuse of authentication data is prevented by
FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires the
confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means
of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1
(for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the
generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys),
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN for generation of Chip Authentication Data in personalization
phase, and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR
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FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key
cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. FIA_UAU.6/MP requires that the
sensitive data is sent via Secure Messaging during personalization phase. To allow a
verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and certificate
as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE. FMT_MOF.1/GP
ensures all data is transmitted and received via secure messaging to ensure confidentiality
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel
document’s chip authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 provided
by FIA_API.1/CA proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private
key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip
Authentication Data is generated by using FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN. The Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 [TR_03110] requires additional TSF according to
FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).The SFRs FMT_SMF.1
and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
OT.Data_Integrity The security objective OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of personal data”
requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical travel document stored on the
travel document’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical
manipulation is addressed by FPT_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored user data is
addressed by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalisation Agent is
allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document
(FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM).
FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the
TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the
Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The
Personalisation Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to
FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these data. FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the
protocols used. The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the
TSF management functions.
Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE secured data exchange, a
prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication
(FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the
special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted
channel is established using PACE, Chip Authentication v.1, and Terminal Authentication
v.1. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC).
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical
travel document data after Chip Authentication v.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and
FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip
Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA and FCS_CKM.1/CAM(for the generation of shared
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secret andfor the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR
FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.
The SFRs FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE ensure that no terminal is
allowed to modify the user data.
FIA_UAU.6/MP and FMT_MOF.1/GP makes sure that the data is transmitted via secure
messaging to maintain integrity.
OT.Data_Authenticity The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity aims ensuring
authenticity of the User- and TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its
verification at the terminal-side and by an active verification by the TOE itself.This
objective is mainly achieved by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A
prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and
Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA or FCS_CKM.1/CAM and possessing the
special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC.
FIA_UAU.6/MP ensures the data that is reaching the TOE is coming from the
personalization agent by maintaining secure messaging for all commands. FDP_RIP.1
requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the
protocols used. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE
passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD
containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive
Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to
be considered as trustworthy.The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for
cryptographic operations needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the
functions and roles related.
OT.Data_Confidentiality The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality aims that the TOE
always ensures confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE
Authentication resp. Chip Authentication, of these data exchanged.This objective for the
data stored is mainly achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the
protocols used. This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
resp. FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a
successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA or FCS_CKM.1/CAM
and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FIA_UAU.6/MP for Manufacture and Personalization Agent
authentication. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for Kenc).
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip
Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over
the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be
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written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy.The
SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the general support for cryptographic operations needed.The
SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
OT.Tracing The security objective OT.Tracing aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE
tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through
establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless interface of the TOE
without a priori knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ).This
objective is achieved as follows:(i) while establishing PACE communication with CAN or
MRZ (non-blocking authorisation data) – by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;(ii) for listening to PACE
communication (is of importance for the current PP, since SOD is card-individual) –
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against
Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE
Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage” requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
travel document’s chip against disclosure
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against
Physical Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against
Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to
demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of
TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case
of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE”
addresses the storage of Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile
memory, whereby they also include the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the
TOE’s chip. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialisation and Pre-
personalisation Data (including the Personalisation Agent key). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the Personalisation Agent to disable access to Initialisation
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and Pre-personalisation Data in the life cycle phase ‘operational use’. The SFRs
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical
travel document” addresses the access control of the writing the logical travel document.
The justification for the SFRs FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
arises from the justification for OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre-
personalisation Data. The write access to the logical travel document data are defined by
the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in the
same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent is allowed to write
the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document only once.
FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in generally,
personalisation data). The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including Personalisation
Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalisation). The SFRs FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict the access to
the Personalisation Agent Keys and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalisation Terminal
want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE will use
TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA
(for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication v.1),
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN for generation of CA Data in phase 6, and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1)
and FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalisation Terminal wants to
authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Authentication Mechanism with
Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the
generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify the authentication
attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The Personalisation Agent can load the PACE password according to
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD.
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS ensures only personalization agent can transfer the TOE from life
cycle phase 6 to phase 7.
FIA_UAU.6/MP ensures all commands in personalization phase are sent via secure
messaging. FIA_AFL.1/MP helps block the Authentication in Phase 6 if too many failed
authentication attempts occur to prevent attacks.
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE restrict write access to files to
personalization agent.
OT.Configuration The security objective OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE
preparation” addresses management of the Data Configuration, Pre-personalization Agent
keys, Personalization Agent keys and the Life Cycle State of the TOE.
The authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer is performed by TSF according to SFR
FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Manufacturer can be authenticated by using
the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the Pre-
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personalization key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication. In case of failed
authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the
necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The SFR FTP_ITC.1/MP
allows the Manufacturer to communicate with the OS.
Once step 4 is done, the MRTD packaging responsible is allowed to set the Pre-
personalization Agent keys according to the SFR FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC. The read
access to the Pre-personalization keys is prevented by SFRs FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
In step 5, the authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Manufacturer shall be
authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH).
In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1/MP the protection
of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys.
The Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent can select the protection mode of user
data following FMT_MOF.1.1/GP.
The SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of
Personalization Agent keys.
OT.Update_File The security objective OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational
Use Phase” addresses the modification of Updatable Data as defined in
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE. The SFR FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE clarifies what can be done by
which subject: after a correct authentication the Personalization Agent is allowed to write,
read and modify these Updatable Data during Pre-Personalisation and Personalisation
phases. Any Terminal is not allowed to modify them during Operational phase. Only a
successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to modify Updatable
Data, only if with the name corresponding to the one (or beginning of the one) set
following FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE by the Personalization Agent during Pre-Personalisation
and Personalisation phases.
OT.BAC_Expiration The security objective OT.BAC_Expiration “Automatic deactivation of
BAC protocol” is ensured by the SFR FMT_SMF.1 and detailed in FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP
regarding mechanism activation and FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP regarding mechanism
configuration.
OT.AC_SM_Level The security objective OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive
biometric reference data according to SM level” is covered by FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM aims to ensure the
authenticity of the electronic document's chip by the PACE-CAM protocol. This is
supported by FCS_CKM.1/CAM for cryptographic key-generation, and FIA_API.1/CAM and
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FCS_COP.1/CAM for the implementation itself, as well as FIA_UID.1/PACE and
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, the latter supporting the PACE protocol.
OT.AA_Proof The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication
Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on
FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential
private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.
OT.Data_Int_AA The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active
Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA and
FDP_ITC.1/AA proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE.
7.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
OT.Sens_Data_Conf FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FMT_MOF.1/GP,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.3,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN
Section 7.3.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FIA_API.1/CA,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN
Section 7.3.1
OT.Data_Integrity FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
Section 7.3.1
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FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FDP_RIP.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FPT_PHP.3,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FCS_RND.1,
FMT_MOF.1/GP, FCS_CKM.1/CAM
OT.Data_Authenticity FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/PA,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/CAM
Section 7.3.1
OT.Data_Confidentiality FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/PA,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FDP_RIP.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/CAM
Section 7.3.1
OT.Tracing FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/PACE Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_TST.1,
FPT_EMS.1
Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper FPT_PHP.3 Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1 Section 7.3.1
OT.Identification FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FAU_SAS.1,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Section 7.3.1
OT.AC_Pers FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FAU_SAS.1,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FMT_SMF.1,
Section 7.3.1
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FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FIA_AFL.1/MP, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE,
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD, FPT_EMS.1,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
OT.Configuration FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
FTP_ITC.1/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_RND.1,
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
Section 7.3.1
OT.Update_File FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE,
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE
Section 7.3.1
OT.BAC_Expiration FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP
Section 7.3.1
OT.AC_SM_Level FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL Section 7.3.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM FCS_COP.1/CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_API.1/CAM, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/CAM
Section 7.3.1
OT.AA_Proof FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1,
FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA,
FMT_MOF.1/AA,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Section 7.3.1
OT.Data_Int_AA FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA,
FMT_MOF.1/AA
Section 7.3.1
Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
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FCS_CKM.1/CA OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers
FCS_CKM.1/CAM OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.AC_Pers
FCS_CKM.1/GP OT.Configuration
FCS_CKM.4 OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC OT.Data_Confidentiality
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.AC_Pers
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.AC_Pers
FCS_COP.1/CAM OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FCS_RND.1 OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration, OT.AA_Proof
FIA_UID.1/PACE OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
FIA_UAU.1/PACE OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers
FIA_UAU.4/PACE OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers
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FIA_UAU.5/PACE OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
FIA_UAU.6/PACE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FIA_UAU.6/EAC OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers
FIA_UAU.6/MP OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FIA_AFL.1/PACE OT.Tracing
FIA_AFL.1/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FIA_API.1/CA OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FIA_API.1/CAM OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
FDP_ACC.1/TRM OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers
FDP_ACF.1/TRM OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Update_File
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Update_File
FDP_RIP.1 OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1/TRM OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1/TRM OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Confidentiality
FDP_DAU.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FTP_ITC.1/PACE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Tracing
FTP_ITC.1/MP OT.Configuration
FAU_SAS.1 OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP OT.BAC_Expiration
FMT_MOF.1/GP OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity
FMT_MOF.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FMT_SMF.1 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
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OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.BAC_Expiration
FMT_SMR.1/PACE OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/PA OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/DATE OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Integrity
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP OT.BAC_Expiration
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE OT.Update_File
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL OT.AC_SM_Level
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MTD.3 OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_LIM.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.2 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FPT_EMS.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Configuration
FPT_FLS.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction,
OT.Configuration
FPT_PHP.3 OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OT.Configuration
FPT_TST.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives
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7.3.3 Dependencies
7.3.3.1 SFRs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_CKM.1/CA (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_CKM.1/CAM (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CAM
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_CKM.1/GP (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC
FCS_CKM.4 (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN,
FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
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FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_COP.1/CAM (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CAM, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/AA
FCS_RND.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UID.1/PACE No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/PACE No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/PACE No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/EAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/MP No Dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/PACE (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_AFL.1/MP (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_API.1/CA No Dependencies
FIA_API.1/CAM No Dependencies
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FDP_ACC.1/TRM (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_RIP.1 No Dependencies
FDP_UCT.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FDP_UIT.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FDP_DAU.1/AA No Dependencies
FDP_ITC.1/AA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FTP_ITC.1/PACE No Dependencies
FTP_ITC.1/MP No Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No Dependencies
FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MOF.1/GP (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MOF.1/AA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
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FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/DATE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.3 (FMT_MTD.1) FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_LIM.1 (FMT_LIM.2) FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 (FMT_LIM.1) FMT_LIM.1
FPT_EMS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No Dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No Dependencies
Table 18 SFRs Dependencies
Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/TRM is discarded. The access control
TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes that have been defined during
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personalization, and that are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management
of these security attributes (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE is discarded. The access
control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE uses security attributes which are defined
during the personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is
necessary here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ITC.1/AA is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
7.3.3.2 SARs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5
ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_TAT.2
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No Dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and
(ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No Dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No Dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No Dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No Dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No Dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
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ASE_SPD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Table 19 SARs Dependencies
7.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high
level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous
development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security
engineering techniques.
7.3.5 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an
attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill
the security objectives OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
 ADV_ARC.1 “Security architecture description”
 ADV_FSP.4 “Security-enforcing functional specification”
 ADV_TDS.3 “Basic modular design”
 ADV_IMP.1 “Implementation representation of the TSF”
 AGD_OPE.1 “Operational user guidance”
 AGD_PRE.1 “Preparative procedures”
 ATE_DPT.1 “Testing: basic design”
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All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package
7.3.6 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security
requirements.
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8 TOE Summary Specification
8.1 TOE Summary Specification
The TOE provides the following Security Functions (TSF):
TSF Acronym Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
Access Control in Reading F.ACR Yes Yes Yes
Access Control in Writing F.ACW Yes Yes Yes
Clear Residual Information F.CLR_INFO Yes Yes Yes
Cryptographic Support F.CRYPTO Yes Yes Yes
Extended Access Control F.EAC No No Yes
PACE F.PACE No No Yes
MRTD Personalisation F.PERS No Yes No
Physical Protection F.PHY Yes Yes Yes
MRTD Pre-Personalisation F.PREP Yes No No
Safe State Management F.SS Yes Yes Yes
Secure Messaging F.SM Yes Yes Yes
Self Test F.STST No No Yes
F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data
retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data,
and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that
at any time, the following keys are never readable:
o Manufacturer Keys,
o Pre-personalization Agent keys,
o Personalization Agent keys,
o CA private key,
o PACE passwords,
o Active Authentication Keys.
It controls access to the Initialization and Pre-Personalization data by allowing read access
without authentication prior to delivery. After delivery, only the personalization agent after
authentication has read access to it.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
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o The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, (EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) only after PACE or EAC authentication and through
a valid secure channel.
In the Production and preparation stage:
The Manufacturer can read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 “Production”. The pre-
personalization agent and the Personalization Agent can read only the random identifier in
Stage 3 “Preparation” stored in the TOE. Other data-elements can only be read after they
are authenticated by the TOE (using their authentication keys).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime.
F.ACW - Access Control in Writing
This function controls access to write functions (in NVM) and enforces the security policy
for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the
access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible
to update any files (system or data files), except for the current date, the CVCA public key
and the CVCA certificate which can be updated if the access conditions is verified by the
subjects defined in FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
In the Production and preparation stage:
The Manufacturer can write all the Initialization and data for the Pre-personalization. The
Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel all the data, PACE
passwords, Chip Authentication Private Key, Active Authentication Keys and Country
Verifying Certification Authority Public Key after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its
authentication keys).
The Pre-Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel data to be used
by the personalization agent (after it is authenticated by the TOE using its authentication
keys). The Pre-personalization agent is only active after delivery. The key that is written in
the TOE for authentication purposes during manufacturing in meant for the pre-
personalizaiton agent. the Pre-personalization agent (which is seen as a sub-role of thep
Personalization agent) will refresh this key.
F.AA - Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in
[ICAO_9303] (if it is activated by the personalizer).
F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
This security function ensures clearing of sensitive information
o Authentication state is securely cleared in case an error is detected or a new
authentication is attempted
o Authentication data related to GP authentication, PACE authentication and EAC is
securely cleared to prevent reuse
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o Session keys is securely erased in case an error is detected or the secure
communication session is closed
o ephem-SK picc -PACE is securely erased
o PIN and PUK
F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
This Security Function provides the following cryptographic features:
o Key Generation based on ECDH with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
o Key generation based on DH with key sizes 1024, 1536 and 2048.
o Key generation for Triple-DES in CBC mode for 112 bits.
o Key generation for AES in CBC mode with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits.
o Secure messaging (encryption and decryption) using:
 Triple DES in CBC mode (key size 112 bits).
 AES in CBC mode (key sizes 128,192,256 bits).
o Secure messaging (message authentication code) using:
 Retail MAC with key size 112 bits.
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128,192 and 256 bits.
o GP Secure Messaging (encryption and decryption) using:
 Triple-DES in CBC mode with key size 112 bits as defined in [FIPS_46_3].
 AES with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in [NIST_800_38A].
o Digital signature creation using:
 ECDSA with SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512 with key sizes 192 to 512 bits over
prime field curves
 RSA signature (CRT) with SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512 with key sizes 1024,
1536, 2048.
o Digital signature verification using:
 ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 with key sizes 192 to 512 bits.
 RSA PKCS#1v1.5 with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 with key sizes 1024,
1536, 2048
 RSA PKCS#1-PSS with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 with key sizes 1024,
1536, 2048
o GP Secure Messaging (message authentication code) using:
 Retail MAC with key size 112 bits as defined in [ISO_9797_1].
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in
[NIST_800_38B].
o Random number generation that meets the requirement the average Shannon
entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.994.
o Symmetric Authentication - encryption and decryption using:
 Full 3DES MAC with key size 112 bits as defined in [ISO_9797_1].
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in
[NIST_800_38B].
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o Key decryption using:
 Triple-DES in ECB mode with key size 112 bits as defined in [FIPS_46_3].
 AES in CBC mode with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in
[FIPS_197].
o Chip Authentication Data Generation using DH, with key sizes 1024 to 2048 bits in
steps of 512 bits.
o Chip Authentication Data Generation using ECDH, with key sizes 192 to 512 bits.
o PACE-CAM as defined in [ICAO_9303] with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
F.EAC - Extended Access Control
This TSF provides the Extended Access Control, authentication and session keys
generation to be used by F.SM, as described in [TR_03110]. It also provides the following
management functions:
o Maintain the roles: Document Verifier, CVCA, Domestic EIS, Foreign EIS
o Limit the ability to update the CVCA Public key and CVCA Certificate to the Country
Verifying Certification Authority
o Limit the ability to update the date to CVCA, Document Verifier and Domestic
Extended Inspection System.
F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
This TSF provides the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment Authentication
(all mappings) and session keys generation to be used by F.SM, as described in
[ICAO_9303].
In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses the
administrator defined number defined in FIA_AFL.1/PACE the TSF will slow down further
authentication attempts.
F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization
Agent, provides and requires authentication for data exchange. This authentication is
based on a Triple DES and AES authentication mechanism. This security function is also
responsible for management operations during personalization phase. This function allows
to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Personalization Agent keys,
o Configuration of the TOE
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
o Load user data,
o Configure SM level for biometrical data access,
o Load Chip Authentication keys in encrypted form,
o Chip Authentication Key Generation,
o Write Active Authentication Keys,
o Enable and disable TSF Active Authentication,
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o Load of key data PACE in encrypted form,
o Configure BAC deactivation mechanism,
o Set TOE life cycle to Operational Use phase,
o set the files that are allowed to be modified in phase 7,
o Write the Document Security Object (SO d),
o Write the initial CVCA Public Key, CVCA Certificate and Current Date.
In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses 1 the TSF will
slow down further authentication attempts.
F.PHY - Physical Protection
This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and
confidentiality of the TOE is ensured, including keys, user data, configuration data and
TOE life cycle. It detects physical tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the
emanations sent out by the TOE.
This Security Function also limits any physical emanations from the TOE so as to prevent
any information leakge via these emanations that might reveal or provide access to
sensitive data.
Furthermore, it prevents deploying test features after TOE delivery.
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer,
provides and requires an authentication mechanism for data exchange. This
authentication is based on Triple DES and AES symmetric authentication mechanism. This
function allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Pre-personalization Agent keys,
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
o Initialization of the TOE,
o Load Personalization Agent keys in encrypted form,
o Store the Initialization and Pre-Personalization data in audit records.
In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses 1 the TSF will
slow down further authentication attempts.
F.SM - Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the
communication between the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after
a successful Authentication Procedure (i.e. PACE or CA), a secure channel is established.
This security functionality also provides a Secure Messaging (SCP02 and SCP03) for the
transmission of user data in Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The protocols
can be configured to protect the exchanges integrity and/or confidentiality. If an error
occurs in the secure messaging layer or if the session is closed, the session keys are
destroyed. This ensures protection against replay attacks as session keys are never
reused.
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F.SS - Safe State Management
This security functionality ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when:
o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in NVM).
o an error due to self test as defined in FPT_TST.1.
o any physical tampering is detected.
This security functionality ensures that if such a case occurs, the TOE either is switched in
the state "kill card" or becomes mute.
F.STST - Self Test
This security function implements self test features through platform functionalities at
reset as defined in FPT_TST.1 to ensure the integrity of the TSF and TSF data.
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8.2 SFRs and TSS
8.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale
Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that generates keys
after a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that generates keys after
a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CAM is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that generates keys after a
successful authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that generates keys
after a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/GP is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization that generates keys after a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.4 is met by F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information and F.SM - Secure
Messaging that destroys the session keys upon closure of a secure messaging session.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to provide digital signature verification.
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement
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FCS_COP.1/CAM is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to provide PACE-CAM functionality
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization that use F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Supportto perform Symmetric
Authentication.
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization and F.PERS -
MRTD Personalization that use F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support to perform key
decryption.
FCS_COP.1/AA is covered by F.AA - Active Authentication in association with F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_RND.1 is met by F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1/PACE is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages access to data
based on the current authentication state.
It is also met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE and F.EAC - Extended Access Control
that provide PACE and Chip Authentication.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages access to
data based on the current authentication state.
It is also met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE and F.EAC - Extended Access Control
that provide PACE and Extended Access Control.
It is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization for
manufacturer and peronalization agent authentication
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FIA_UAU.4/PACE is met by F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information that ensures all
authentication data is securely erased to prevent reuse.
FIA_UAU.5/PACE is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that provides PACE
Authentication.
It is also met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control that provides Chip Authentication and
Terminal Authentication as part of Extended Access Control.
It is also met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
that provides symmetric authentication.
It is also met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that provides a secure messaging channel.
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FIA_UAU.6/PACE is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent
through secure messaging after PACE authentication
FIA_UAU.6/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent
through secure messaging after chip and terminal authentication
FIA_UAU.6/MP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent
through secure messaging after symmetric authentication
FIA_AFL.1/PACE is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACEthat handles the
consecutive failed authentication attempts related to PACE
FIA_AFL.1/MP is met byF.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization that ensures that after 3 unsuccessful symmetric authentication attempts
the TOE increases the time taken to respond to a terminal challenge
FIA_API.1/CA is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control that provides Chip
Authentication.
FIA_API.1/CAM is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that provides PACE-CAM
functionality to prove authenticity of the chip.
Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/TRM is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control
in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanism provided by F.PACE - Authentication
using PACE
FDP_ACF.1/TRM is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control
in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanism provided by F.PACE - Authentication
using PACE
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access
Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended
Access Control and F.PACE - Authentication using PACE using PACE and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access
Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.PACE -
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Authentication and F.EAC - Extended Access Control using PACE and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FDP_RIP.1 is met by F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information that ensures keys are
erased securely.
FDP_UCT.1/TRM is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all user data is
transmitted and received via a secure communication channel.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all user data is
transmitted and received via a secure communication channel.
FDP_DAU.1/AA is met by F.AA - Active Authentication.
FDP_ITC.1/AA is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that verifies the write access
based on authentication provided by F.AA - Active Authentication.
Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that establishes a secure channel for
communication as defined in F.EAC - Extended Access Control and F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE.
FTP_ITC.1/MP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that establishes a secure channel for
communication for loading of keys as defined in F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization.
Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
Class FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control that implements date
change to automatically deactivate BAC protocol
FMT_MOF.1/GP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that provides secure messaging after
authentication through F.PERS - MRTD Personalization andF.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_MOF.1/AA is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_SMF.1 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization that provide the required management functions and
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F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures protection of incoming and outgoing user data via
secure communication.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.EAC - Extended Access
Control, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization. These
roles are maintained by means of the authentication states during the authentication
mechanisms provided by the 3 security functions.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access
conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures access
conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/PA is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls write
access based on authentication provided by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls write
access based on authentication provided by F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FMT_MTD.1/DATE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls write access
based on authentication provided by F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access
conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures the
secret keys are never readable
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that allows the
personalization agent after successful authentication to switch the lifecycle state from
phase 6 to phase 7
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that controls access
conditions in F.ACW - Access Control in Writing to allow only the name set by the
personalization agent to be able to edit files in operational phase.
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FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that allows the
personalization agent to provide configure the secure messaging level required to access
DG.3 and DG.4
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures the
secret keys are never readable
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls
write access for Active Authentication based on authentication provided by F.PERS -
MRTD Personalization.
FMT_MTD.3 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control that implements terminal
authentication.
FMT_LIM.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that
ensure that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in
case any illegal attempts to do so are detected.
FMT_LIM.2 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that
ensure that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in
case any illegal attempts to do so are detected.
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that prevents emanations beyond
permissible limits to prevent any accidental revelation of data.
FPT_FLS.1 is met by F.SS - Safe State Management that ensures a safe state is maintained.
FPT_PHP.3 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that protects the TOE against any phycial
probing or tampering by using F.SS - Safe State Management in case any physical
manipulation is detected.
FPT_TST.1 is met by F.STST - Self Test that performs self tests to ensure integrity of the
TSF
8.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS
Security Functional
Requirements
TOE Summary Specification
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.CRYPTO -
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Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CAM F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1/GP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.4 F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual
Information
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/CAM F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_COP.1/AA F.AA - Active Authentication, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_RND.1 F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FIA_UID.1/PACE F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE - Authentication
using PACE, F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.1/PACE F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE,
F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
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FIA_UAU.4/PACE F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
FIA_UAU.5/PACE F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE - Authentication
using PACE, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP -
MRTD Pre-personalization, F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/PACE F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/EAC F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/MP F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/PACE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FIA_AFL.1/MP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
FIA_API.1/CA F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FIA_API.1/CAM F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FDP_ACC.1/TRM F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access Control
in Writing, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FDP_ACF.1/TRM F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access Control
in Writing, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access Control
in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.EAC -
Extended Access Control, F.PACE - Authentication using
PACE
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access Control
in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.EAC -
Extended Access Control, F.PACE - Authentication using
PACE
FDP_RIP.1 F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
FDP_UCT.1/TRM F.SM - Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/TRM F.SM - Secure Messaging
FDP_DAU.1/AA F.AA - Active Authentication
FDP_ITC.1/AA F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.AA - Active
Authentication
FTP_ITC.1/PACE F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PACE - Authentication using
PACE, F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FTP_ITC.1/MP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization, F.SM - Secure Messaging
FAU_SAS.1 F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FMT_MOF.1/GP F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization,
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F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MOF.1/AA F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_SMF.1 F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.SM -
Secure Messaging
FMT_SMR.1/PACE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization, F.EAC
- Extended Access Control
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/PA F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.ACW - Access Control
in Writing
FMT_MTD.1/DATE F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.ACW - Access Control
in Writing
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.ACW - Access Control in
Writing
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.3 F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FMT_LIM.1 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State Management
FMT_LIM.2 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State Management
FPT_EMS.1 F.PHY - Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1 F.SS - Safe State Management
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FPT_PHP.3 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State Management
FPT_TST.1 F.STST - Self Test
Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage
TOE Summary
Specification
Security Functional Requirements
F.ACR - Access
Control in Reading
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
F.AA - Active
Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
F.CLR_INFO - Clear
Residual
Information
FCS_CKM.4, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FDP_RIP.1
F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/CAM,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CAM, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1
F.EAC - Extended
Access Control
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_API.1/CA,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.3
F.PACE -
Authentication
using PACE
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.1/CAM, FCS_COP.1/CAM,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FIA_API.1/CAM, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_AFL.1/MP, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE,
FTP_ITC.1/MP, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_MOF.1/AA, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/PA,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD,
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FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE,
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
F.PHY - Physical
Protection
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_PHP.3
F.PREP - MRTD
Pre-personalization
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FTP_ITC.1/MP,
FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
F.SM - Secure
Messaging
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FTP_ITC.1/MP, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_SMF.1
F.SS - Safe State
Management
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
F.STST - Self Test FPT_TST.1
Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage
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9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
9.1 Glossary
Term Definition
Accurate Terminal
Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is
trusted by the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal Certificates
with the correct certificate effective date, see [TR_03110].
Advanced Inspection
Procedure (with PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document and a
terminal as required by [ICAO_TR_SAC], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip
Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD and (iv) Terminal
Authentication v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-PACE.
Agreement This term is used in the current PP in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] option by which means the
travel document’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the
identity and authenticity of the travel document’s chip as part of a genuine
travel document issued by a known State of Organisation.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document's chip to
store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the travel
document’s chip were created by the issuing State or Organisation
Basic Access Control
(BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] by which means the travel
document’s chip proves and the inspection system protects their
communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic
Access Keys (see there).
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Term Definition
Basic Inspection
System with PACE
protocol (BIS-PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and operated by
a governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or Foreign
Document Verifier) and verifying the travel document presenter as the
travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric
data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data
(DG2) of the travel document holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PACE Terminal additionally
supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol and is authorised
by the travel document Issuer through the Document Verifier of receiving
state to read a subset of data stored on the travel document.
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the travel
document’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the
printed MRZ data for reading the logical travel document.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalised details of the travel document holder of the document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the
biographical data page of a travel document. [ICAO_9303]
Biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder in
the travel document’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric
reference data.
Card Access Number
(CAN)
Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of the
data-page.
Certificate chain A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System
Certificate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between,
and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates are on the
highest level. A certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher level.
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document
made by whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key
(KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in the
inspection system.
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Term Definition
Country Signing
Certification Authority
(CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with
respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel
document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for
the travel documents and creates the Document Signer Certificates within
this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having
to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO_9303],
5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for
Document Signers (cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the domestic CVCA may be
integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority.
However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different
roles, see [TR_03110].
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
(CVCA)
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document Issuer
with respect to protection of user data stored in the travel document (at a
trial of a terminal to get an access to these data). The CVCA represents
the country specific root of the PKI for the terminals using it and creates
the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. Updates of the public
key of the CVCA are distributed in form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see
[TR_03110].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-
based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a CVCS
as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organizational entity within
this PP.
The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing certificates for
Document Signers (cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the domestic CVCA may be
integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority.
However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different
roles, see [TR_03110].
Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate
card verifiable certificates.
CV Certificate Card Verifiable Certificate according to [TR_03110].
CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key
is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
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Term Definition
Document Basic
Access Key Derivation
Algorithm
The [ICAO_9303] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys
from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document Details Data Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document
representing the document details like document type, issuing state,
document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The
document details data are less-sensitive data.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the
travel document’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate
(CDS). [ICAO_9303]
Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive
authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the
Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [TR_03110] and [ICAO_9303].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Document Verifier
(DV)
An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service
Provider (here: of a governmental organisation / inspection authority) and
managing terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by a
State’s border police), by – inter alia – issuing Terminal Certificates. A
Document Verifier is therefore a Certification Authority, authorised by at
least the national CVCA to issue certificates for national terminals, see
[TR_03110].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-
based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a DV as
a subject; hence, it merely represents an organisational entity within this
PP.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting under
the policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel document Issuer;
a foreign DV is acting under a policy of the respective foreign CVCA (in
this case there shall be an appropriate agreement between the travel
document Issuer und a foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the travel
document Issuer’s privacy policy).55 56
Eavesdropper A threat agent with high attack potential reading the communication
between the travel document’s chip and the inspection system to gain the
data on the travel document’s chip.
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Term Definition
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [ICAO_9303]
Travel document
(electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic or
paper, optical readable cover and providing the following application:
ePassport.
ePassport application A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl.
biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this
application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a
machine readable travel document (MRTD). See [TR_03110].
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [ICAO_9303] by which means the travel
document’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems
authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the
access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data during
their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging.
Extended Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to
Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organisation
to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals
part of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to
the biographical data or the portrait. [ICAO_9303]
Global Interoperability 1.1.1 The capability of inspection systems (either manual or
automated) in different States throughout the world to
exchange data, to process data received from systems in other
States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of
the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-
readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs.
[ICAO_9303]
IC Dedicated Software
Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the IC
hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery
procedures between different players. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life phases.
IC Dedicated Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
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Term Definition
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to
test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
IC Embedded Software Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer.
The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life phase and
embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of the TOE.
IC Identification Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control the
IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the
delivery process to the travel document manufacturer.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false
name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance
to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using
that person’s document. [ICAO_9303]
Improperly document
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no
travel document or visa, if required. [ICAO_9303]
Initialisation
Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (cf. sec. 1.2,
TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 3).
Initialization Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These
data are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as travel
document’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection
The act of a State examining an travel document presented to it by a
traveller (the travel document holder) and verifying its authenticity.
[ICAO_9303]
Inspection System (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State
(i) examining an travel document presented by the traveller and verifying
its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as travel document holder.
Integrated Circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the travel
document’s chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing
State or Organisation
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Term Definition
Issuing Organisation
Organisation authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO_9303]
Issuing State
The Country issuing the travel document. [ICAO_9303]
Logical Data Structure
(LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity expansion
technology used is the travel document’s chip.
Logical travel
document
Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact
based/contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact based/contactless
readable data including (but not limited to)
1.personal data of the travel document holder
2.the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
3.the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
4.the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
5.the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
6.EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine Readable
Travel Document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organisation which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read. [ICAO_9303]
Machine Readable
Zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document or
MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel
document, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading
using OCR methods. [ICAO_9303]
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from
the machine readable zone and may be used for PACE.
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Term Definition
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form
that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO_9303]
Manufacturer
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the
travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document.
The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing
life phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC
Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
Metadata of a CV
Certificate
Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described in
[TR_03110].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
ePassport application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on
the IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes
•the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO_9303],
•the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself
(i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF.SOD)
and
•the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
the authentication data itself.
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Term Definition
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder in
the travel document’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii)
encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European
commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris images as
optional biometric reference data.
Passive authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash
values contained in the Document Security Object.
PACE Password
A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
Personalization
The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document. This
may also include the optional biometric data collected during the
“Enrolment” (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
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Term Definition
Personalization Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to
personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by some
or all of the following activities:
(i)establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic
data in the travel document,
(ii)enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
(iii)writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic
personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [TR_03110],
(iv)writing the document details data,
(v)writing the initial TSF data,
(vi)signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the
role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed
among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel
document Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this
role.
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Term Definition
Personalisation Data
A set of data incl.
(i)individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the travel
document holder,
(ii)dedicated document details data and
(iii)dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-cycle phase
card issuing.
Personalization Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalisation Agent.
Personalization Agent
Key
Cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the Personalisation Agent to
prove his identity and to get access to the logical travel document and (ii)
by the travel document’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a
terminal as Personalisation Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FIA_UAU.6/EAC.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to)
1.biographical data,
2.data of the machine-readable zone,
3.photographic image and
4.other data.
Pre-Personalisation
Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the travel document Application (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE
life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
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Term Definition
Pre-personalization
Data Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
travel document Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalised travel document’s and/or to secure shipment within or
between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the
Personalisation Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized travel
document’s chip travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
Receiving State
The Country to which the traveller is applying for entry. [ICAO_9303]
reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
RF-terminal
A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according
to ISO/IEC 14443.
secondary image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
Secure messaging in
encrypted/combined
mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Service Provider
An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection service
which can be used by the travel document holder. Service Provider uses
terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV.
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical travel document or
parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without
knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and a
terminal as required by [ICAO_TR_SAC], namely (i) PACE or BAC and (ii)
Passive Authentication with SOD. SIP can generally be used by BIS-
PACE and BIS-BAC.
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Term Definition
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either
through the contact based or contactless interface. A technical system
verifying correspondence between the password stored in the travel
document and the related value presented to the terminal by the travel
document presenter.
In this PP the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to any terminal being
authenticated by the TOE.
Terminal may implement the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and thus
authenticate itself to the travel document using a shared password (CAN
or MRZ).
Terminal Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the
Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and
Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the
Current Date.
Terminal Authorisation
Level
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the
Terminal Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current
Date.
TOE tracing data
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the
travel document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document
holder) recognising the travel document.
Travel document
Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read; see [ICAO_9303]
(there “Machine readable travel document”).
Travel Document
Holder
The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing State or
Organisation personalised the travel document.
Travel document’s
Chip
A contact based/contactless integrated circuit chip complying with
ISO/IEC 14443 and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
as specified by ICAO, [ICAO_9303], sec III.
Travel document’s
Chip Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a travel document’s chip and not being developed
by the IC Designer. The travel document’s chip Embedded Software is
designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the travel document’s chip in
Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
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Term Definition
Traveler
Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system and
claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the
TOE (CC part 1 [CC_1]).
Unpersonalised travel
document
The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding only
Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to the
Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data
All data (being not authentication data)
(i) stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel
document as defined in [TR_03110] and
(ii) being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting
as Basic Inspection System with PACE .
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the
TSF ([CC_1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated
upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF
places no special meaning ([CC_2]).
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being
claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s template.
[ICAO_9303]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
9.2 Acronyms
Acronym Term
BIS Basic Inspection System
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
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CA Chip Authentication
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
EAC Extended Access Control
CPS Common Personalization System
EF Elementary File
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
MF Master File
MRZ Machine readable zone
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organisational security policy
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PP Protection Profile
PT Personalisation Terminal
RF Radio Frequency
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure
TA Terminal Authentication
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)
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10 References
Common Criteria
[CC_1] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and general model", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5.
[CC_2] "Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional component", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5.
[CC_3] "Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance components", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5.
[CC_EM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
Protection Profiles
[PP_0002] PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July
2001; registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th,
2002
[PP_IC] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, June 2007; registered and
certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under the
reference BSI-PP-0035-2007
[PP_BAC] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access
control – BSI-PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
[PP_EAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
”ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0056, Version 1.10, 25th
March 2009
[PP_PACE] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011,
V1.0 2nd
November 2011
[PP_EACwPACE] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Extended Application Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-
PP-0056-V2-2012, Version 1.3.2, 5th
December 2012
Platform
[PTF_CERT] ANSSI-CC-2020/07
[ST_PTF] FQR 110 9395 Ed3 Public Security Target Cosmo v9.1
CombICAO Applet v2.1 in
EAC with PACE configuration on
Cosmo V9.1 Public Security Target
165 | 166
[PTF_AGD1] ID-One COSMO V9.1 Application Loading Protection Guidance, FQR 110
9238 Ed 1
[PTF_AGD2] ID-One COSMO V9.1 Security Recommendations, FQR 110 9237 Ed 2
[PTF_AGD3] ID-One Cosmo V9.1 platform - Javadoc, FQR 110 9242 Ed 1
[PTF_AGD4] FQR 110 8805 JCVM Patch Ed 2
[PTF_AGD5] FQR 110 9402 Ed 1 – 27/11/2019 - IDEMIA Platform Flash Generation
[PTF_AGD_OPE] ID-One COSMO V9.1, Reference Guide FQR 110 9200 Ed 4
[PTF_AGD_PRE] ID-One COSMO V9.1 Pre-Perso Guide, FQR 110 9208 Ed 6
[PTF_AGD_SEC_AC] FQR 110 8921 Ed 1 – 24/09/2018 - Secure acceptance and delivery of
sensitive elements
[Applet_Perso_Guide] FQR 220 1455 Ed 6 – CombICAO Applet v2.1 – Perso Guide, IDEMIA
[Applet_User_Guide] FQR 220 1456 Ed 6 – CombICAO Applet v2.1 – User Guide, IDEMIA
ICAO
[ICAO_9303] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015 –
Security Mechanisms for MRTDs
[ICAOT] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL)
DIVISION, twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
[ICAO_TR_SAC
]
International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT, Supplemental Access Control for Machine
Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.00, November 2010
ISO
[ISO_9797_1] ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology – Security techniques – Message
Authentication codes (MACs) – part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, Second
edition 2011-03-01
[ISO_9796-2] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital
signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-
function
[ISO_15946] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Cryptographic techniques based
on elliptic curves
CombICAO Applet v2.1 in
EAC with PACE configuration on
Cosmo V9.1 Public Security Target
166 | 166
Other
[TR_03110] Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, TR-03110,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[TR_03111] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Technical Guideline
TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, Version 1.11, 17.04.2009
[ICAO_9303]
[FIPS_180_2] FIPS 180-2, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB)
180-2, Secure Hash Standard, August 2002
[FIPS_46_3] FIPS 46-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 46-
3, Data Encryption Standard (DES), 1999 October 25
[FIPS_186_3] FIPS 186-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB)
186-3, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June 2009
[FIPS_197] FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB 197),
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[NIST_800_38A
]
NIST Special Publication 800-38A: 2001, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques, December 2001
[NIST_800_38B
]
NIST Special Publication 800-38B: 2005, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
[GPC_SPE_034] GlobalPlatform – Card Specification – Version 2.2.1 – Public Release, January
2011
[GPC_SPE_014] GlobalPlatform Card Technology - Secure Channel Protocol '03', Card
Specification v2.2 – Amendment D Version 1.1.1 - Public Release July 2014
[RGS2_B1] Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 – Annexe B1 – Mécanismes
cryptographiques – Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et lme
dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques, Version 2.03 du 21 février
2014.
[PKCS#3] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
[X9.62] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For
The Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 september 1998