BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
for
MN67S150 Smart Card IC Version RV08 including
IC Dedicated Software
from
Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions Co., Ltd.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
MN67S150 Smart Card IC Version RV08 including IC Dedicated
Software
from Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions Co., Ltd.
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Valid until: 27.01.2020
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 28 January 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
Contents
A Certification.........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure..................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements.................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification...................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result....................................................................................9
5 Publication.....................................................................................................................10
B Certification Results..........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE................................................................................................13
3 Security Policy...............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope........................................................................15
5 Architectural Information................................................................................................15
6 Documentation..............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing..........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation...............................................................................................16
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE........................................................18
11 Security Target.............................................................................................................19
12 Definitions....................................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography.................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria.................................................................................................23
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................23
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................24
D Annexes............................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL 4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the
assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and
for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up
to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ALC_CMS.5 ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition
the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015 Certification Report
The product MN67S150 Smart Card IC Version RV08 including IC Dedicated Software,
Version 1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product MN67S150 Smart Card IC Version RV08 including IC
Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 15 January 2015. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Panasonic Semiconductor
Solutions Co., Ltd..
The product was developed by: Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions Co., Ltd..
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited as outlined on the certificate. The
owner of the certificate can apply for re-certification at any time to refresh the validity
period and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. Nevertheless, the
rules on re-useability for composition applies as defined in the supporting documents (AIS
36 [4]).
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
5 Publication
The product MN67S150 Smart Card IC Version RV08 including IC Dedicated Software,
Version 1.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions Co., Ltd.
1 Kotari-yakemachi, Nagaokakyo City
Kyoto 617-8520
Japan
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is MN67S150 Smart Card IC Version RV08 including IC
Dedicated Software. The TOE is the smart card integrated circuit (IC) called MN67S150,
developed by Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions Co., Ltd. The TOE is composed of
hardware including a processing unit, Cryptographic Hardware (TDES and AES), security
components, RF interface, and volatile and non-volatile memories. It also includes IC
Dedicated Software and documentation. The IC Dedicated Software is used for test
purposes during production but also provide additional services to facilitate usage of
hardware. perform testing. All other software is called Security IC Embedded Software,
which is not part of the TOE.
The TOE is intended to be used for the applications requiring high security such as
transportation and fare collection applications (the Commuter ticket), access control
applications (ID cards), and government applications (the Basic Resident Register, health
cards and driver license).
The security features implemented by the MN67S150 are true random number generator,
voltage sensors, glitch sensor, low frequency sensor, light sensor, clock filters (high
frequency & glitch), reset filter, temperature sensors (high & low)), sensing shield,
cryptograpy (TDES and AES) and countermeasures against DFA, DPA and SPA. For more
detail please refer to [6], chapter 1.3.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.RNG Random Number Generator
SF.FAS Filters and Sensors
SF.PHY Tamper Resistance
SF.DPR Data Protection
SF.MCT Mode Control
SF.CRPT Cryptography
SF.ACU Access Control Unit
SF.ID ID Injection
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015 Certification Report
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MN67S150 Smart Card IC Version RV08 including IC Dedicated Software, Version 1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
1 HW MN67S150 Smart Card IC Version RV08
including IC Dedicated Software
RV08 Sawn wafers (dice)
2 SW MN67S150 Smart Card IC - IC Dedicated
Software
consisting of:
1. IC Dedicated Support Software
2. I/O Preprocessor API
3. Memory API
4. Cryptographic API
5. Timer API
6. Utility API
7. Issuance API
8. Secure Startup
9. IC Dedicated Test Software
10. Contact Test Software
FV0C Encrypted in
electronic form
Object file (.rf),
executable format
file (.ex) or HEX
format file (.hex)
3 DOC MN67S150 Smart Card IC Administrator
Guidance for Smartcard Embedded
Software Developer
1.3 Encrypted in
electronic form
4 DOC MN101C/MN101E Series Installation Manual 11640-080E Encrypted in
electronic form
5 DOC MN101C/MN101E/MN103L Series In-Circuit
Emulator Installation Manual
19940-015E Encrypted in
electronic form
6 DOC PCI/PC Card Installation Manual 19942-101E Encrypted in
electronic form
7 DOC MN101C00 Series LSI User’s Manual 21499-030E Encrypted in
electronic form
8 DOC Debug Factory Builder Version 4 Tutorial 1999002-010 Encrypted in
electronic form
9 DOC MN101C/MN101E Series Cross Assembler
User’s Manual
11410-230E Encrypted in
electronic form
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
10 DOC MN101C Series Instruction Manual 11450-041E Encrypted in
electronic form
11 DOC MN101C/MN101E Series C Compiler User’s
Manual Library Reference
11422-060E Encrypted in
electronic form
12 DOC MN101C/MN101E Series C Compiler User’s
Manual Language Description
11421-090E Encrypted in
electronic form
13 DOC MN101C/MN101E/MN101L Series C
Compiler User’s Manual Usage Guide
11420-210E Encrypted in
electronic form
14 DOC MN67S150 Software Library Specification 1.20 Encrypted in
electronic form
15 DOC MN67S150 Smart Card IC Administrator
Guidance for Card Manufacturer
1.2 Encrypted in
electronic form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
A processing step during LSI testing incorporates the chip-individual features into the
TOE. Each individual TOE is uniquely identified by its ID number. The ID comprises the
lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the chip on the wafer.
The hardware of the TOE is identified by MN67S150 Smart Card IC including IC Dedicated
Software. In addition the dedicated software stored in the ROM of the IC is identified by
FV0C (see also table 2).
Another characteristic of the TOE is the chip version information. This information is stored
in the ROM and can be read out by the user of the card via the command
mc_GetDevVersion. For the format of the chip version information see [11], chapter
3.8.2.2. During the production tests furthermore a unique chip ID is written into each copy
of the TOE (this chip ID is then stored in NVM and cannot be modified after production
tests are finished). The TOE is produced only in Tonami/Japan and the unique Chip ID is
represented by '001' (see [11], chapter 3.8.2.1).
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE.
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG).
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES and Triple-DES cryptographic functions performed by the
TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and
against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Protection during packaging, finishing and personalization, usage of
hardware platform and treatment of user data. Details can be found in the Security Target
[6] and [8], chapter 3.4.1.
5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Smart card integrated circuit which is composed of
hardware such as a processing unit, Cryptographic Hardware (TDES, AES), security
components, RF Interface and volatile and non-volatile memories ([6] and [8], figure 1).
The TOE also includes IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software ([6]
and [8], figure 2). Such software (also known as IC firmware) is used for test purposes
during production but also provides additional services to facilitate usage of hardware. In
addition to the IC Dedicated Software the Smart Card Integrated Circuit also includes
hardware to perform testing. All other software is called Security IC Embedded Software,
which is not part of the TOE.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. Technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against
the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the
circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities);
2. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. Regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. Regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for
the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a
software simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. Characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
a) used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests);
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
b) special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with
samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which
include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify
statements concerning the layout;
6. Functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with an evaluation operating system. For the
developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were used and the test
equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data
and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that
the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for
the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Smartcard IC MN67S150
Smart Card IC including IC Dedicated Software (table 2).
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE..
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015 Certification Report
● Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certificationprocedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic
Functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as
secure without considering the application context. Therefore for this functionalities it shall
be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system.
Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI
TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Cryptographic
Primitive
DES [FIPS46-3] (DES)
[SP 800-38A] (CBC, ECB)
|k| = 56 No
TDES [NIST SP800-67] |k| = 112 No
AES [FIPS-197] |k| = 128 Yes
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Physical RNG PTG.2 [AIS31] N/A N/A
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
[FIPS46-3] DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 46-3, Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, withdrawn 2005 May 19, U.S. Department
of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[FIPS-197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001,
Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Revised January 2012, Revision 1, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9.2 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
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The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [12] and further documents referred to in [12] have to be
considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [12] have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Code Book
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIB Focused Ion Beam
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RF Radio Frequency
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RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target MN67S150 Smart Card IC, BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015, Version 1.7,
2014-12-04, Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions Co., Ltd. (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[8] Security Target (ST-Lite) MN67S150 Smart Card IC, BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015,
Version 1.7, 2014-12-04, Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions Co., Ltd. (sanitised
public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report Summary (ETR Summary) for MN67S150 Smart Card
IC Version RV08 including IC Dedicated Software, Version 5, 2015-01-16, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1)
and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for MN67S150 Smart Card IC
Version RV08 including IC Dedicated Software, Version 5, 2015-01-16, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] MN67S150 Smartcard IC Administrator Guidance for Security IC Embedded
Software Developer, Version 1.4, 2014-12-04, Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions
Co., Ltd.
[12] MN67S150 Smartcard IC Administrator Guidance for Card Manufacturer, Version
1.2, 2014-07-23, Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions Co., Ltd.
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 33
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0803-2015
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MN67S150 Smart Card IC Version RV08 including IC Dedicated Software,
Version 1.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 28 January 2015, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site Function Address
Moriguchi
(Panasonic
Semiconductor Solutions)
Development regarding:
1. Security IC Embedded
Software
2. Logical design data
3. Physical design data
4. IC dedicated software
5. Configuration data (ROM
data, TSF data)
6. Pre-personalization data
7. Specific development aids
8. Test and characterisation
related data
9. Material for software
development support
10. Wafer/development samples
for testing
11. Related documentation
Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions
Co., Ltd.
Semiconductor Business Unit
3-1-1 Yagumo-naka-machi,
Moriguchi City, Osaka 570-8501,
Japan
Asaka
(Toppan Printing)
Production regarding data conversion
for photomask creation
Toppan Printing Co., Ltd.
Material Solutions Division
7-21-33 Nobitome, Niiza-city,
Saitama 352-8562,
Japan
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Site Function Address
Shiga
(Toppan Printing)
Production regarding photomask
creation
Toppan Printing Co., Ltd.
Material Solutions Division
1101-20, Myohoji-cho, Higashi
Omi-city,
Shiga 527-8566,
Japan
Tonami
(TowerJazz Panasonic
Semiconductor)
Wafer production TowerJazz Panasonic Semiconductor
Co., Ltd.
271 Higashi-kaihotsu, Tonami City,
Toyama 939-1312,
Japan
Uozu
(TowerJazz Panasonic
Semiconductor)
Production regarding assembly, wafer
testing and delivery
TowerJazz Panasonic Semiconductor
Co., Ltd.
800 Higashiyama, Uozu City,
Toyama 937-8585,
Japan
Iruma
(Matsuda Sangyo)
Defective products processing Matsuda Sangyo Co., Ltd.
Product Division Iruma Factory
87 Higashisayama, Negishi, Iruma,
Saitama 358-0034,
Japan
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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