Security Target– Public Version
Machine Readable Travel Document with
”ICAO Application“,
Extended Access Control with PACE
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLX
M7820 V2
MASKTECH INTERNATIONAL GMBH
Document number: BSI-DSZ-CC-0941, ST, Version 1.1
Created by: MaskTech International GmbH
Date: 2016-04-18
Signature:
Released by Management:
Date:
Signature:
Change history
Version Date Author Changes
1.0 2015-09-30 Gudrun Schürer Initial public version
1.1 2016-04-18 Gudrun Schürer Update of SmarTrac and HID site certificates
1
Contents
1 ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1) 4
1.1 ST Reference and TOE reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 TOE Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 TOE definition and operational usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 TOE major security features for operational use . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 TOE life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.4 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE . . . . . . 9
2 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1) 10
2.1 CC Conformance Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 PP Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 PP Additions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Package Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 Conformance rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1) 12
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4 Organizational Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2) 23
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2 Security Objectives for Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3 Security Objective Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5 Extended Components Definition
(ASE_ECD.1) 34
5.1 Family “Generation of Random Numbers (FCS_RNG)” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RNG.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2) 36
2
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.1 Class FCS Cryptographic Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.1.4 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.1.5 Class FAU Security Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.1.6 Class FMT Security Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency . . . 73
7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1) 75
7.1 TOE Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Cryptographic Library 75
7.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operating
system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.2 Assurance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.2.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.3 Statement of Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.3.1 Relevance of Hardware TSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.3.2 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8 Glossary and Acronyms 93
A Overview Cryptographic Algorithms 106
3
1 ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
1.1 ST Reference and TOE reference
Title Security Target – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Ap-
plication”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)
Version 1.1, 2016-04-18
Editors Gudrun Schürer, Thomas Rölz
Compliant to Common Criteria Protection Profile - ’Machine Readable Travel Doc-
ument with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE
(EAC PP)’
CC Version 3.1 (Revision 4)
Assurance Level The assurance level for this ST is EAL5 augmented
TOE name MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLX M7820 V2, operation
system for secure passports
TOE Hardware Infineon Technologies AG, M7820, dual interface Smartcard IC
TOE version MTCOS Pro 2.2
Keywords ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Document, Extended Access Control,
PACE, Supplemental Access Control (SAC)
1.2 TOE Overview
This security target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless/contact1
chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommen-
dations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced secu-
rity methods Password Authenticated Connection Establishment, Extended Access Control, and
Chip Authentication similar to the Active Authentication in ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303].
MTCOS Pro is a fully interoperable multi-application smart card operating system compli-
ant to ISO/IEC 7816 [ISO_7816]. It provides public and secret key cryptography and supports
also other applications like e-purses, health insurance cards and access control.
1
Both interfaces provide the same functionality and are thus taken as one single product in this ST.
4
The operating system software is implemented on the M7820 secure dual-interface con-
troller of Infineon Technologies AG (BSI-DSZ-CC-0813 [IFX_ST-SLE78]) including the op-
tional Software Libraries RSA, EC and SHA-2. The chip supports the contactless communi-
cation protocols ISO/IEC 14443 types A and B [ISO_14443]. Both types do not differ in any
security-relevant aspects and fulfill the same functionality. Thus, they are taken as one product.
The chip is certified according to CC EAL5 augmented compliant to the Protection Profile
BSI-PP-0035 [CC_PP-0035]). The TOE consists of software and hardware.
1.2.1 TOE definition and operational usage
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an electronic travel document representing a contactless/contact
smart card programmed according to ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control”
[ICAO_SAC] (which means amongst others according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) de-
fined in [ICAO_LDS]) and additionally providing the Extended Access Control according to the
’ICAO 9303’ [ICAO_9303] and BSI TR-03110 [BSI_TR-03110], respectively. The communi-
cation between terminal and chip shall be protected by Password Authenticated Connection Es-
tablishment (PACE) according to Electronic Passport using Standard Inspection Procedure with
PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2 [CC_PP-0068-V2]. Additionally, Active Authentica-
tion according to TrPKI [ICAO_PKI] is provided.
The TOE comprises of at least
• the circuitry of the travel document’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
• the epassport application and
• the associated guidance documentation [MT_SLE78, MT_Part1, MT_Part2, MT_Part3,
MT_Part5, AGD]
1.2.2 TOE major security features for operational use
State or Organization issues travel documents to be used by the holder for international travel.
The traveler presents a travel document to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The
travel document in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical
data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine
reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on
the travel document’s chip according to LDS [ICAO_LDS] for contactless or contact based
machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a valid
travel document personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical
data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the travel document. The issuing
state or organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine travel documents. The
receiving state trusts a genuine travel document of an issuing State or Organization.
For this security target the travel document is viewed as unit of
5
the physical part of the travel document in form of paper and/plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel document
holder
1. the biographical data on the biographical data page of the travel document surface,
2. the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
3. the printed portrait.
the logical travel document as data of the travel document holder stored according to the
Logical Data Structure as defined in [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the con-
tactless/contact integrated circuit. It presents contactless or contact based readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel document holder
1. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
2. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
3. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both2
,
4. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
5. the Document Security Object (SOD).
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the travel document to
maintain the authenticity and integrity of the travel document and their data. The physical part
of the travel document and the travel document’s chip are identified by the Document Number.
The physical part of the travel document is protected by physical security measures (e.g.
watermark, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the travel document’s chip)
and organizational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)
[ICAO_9303]. These security measures can include the binding of the travel document’s chip
to the travel document.
The logical travel document is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature
created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security
features of the travel document’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active Au-
thentication of the travel document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption
of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [ICAO_9303] and
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment [ICAO_SAC]. The Passive Authentication
Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity
by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the
Extended Access Control Mechanism. This security target addresses the Chip Authentication
Version 1 described in [BSI_TR-03110] as an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in
[ICAO_9303].
The confidentiality by Basic Access Control is a mandatory security feature that shall be
implemented by the TOE, too. Nevertheless this is not explicitly covered by [CC_PP-0056-V2]
2
These biometric reference data are optional according to [ICAO_9303]. This ST assumes that the issuing
State or Organisation uses this option and protects these data by means of extended access control.
6
as there are known weaknesses in the quality (i.e. entropy) of the BAC keys generated by the
environment. Therefore, the MRTD has additionally to fulfill the ’Common Criteria Protection
Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control’
BSI-CC-PP-0055 [CC_PP-0055]. Due to the fact that [CC_PP-0055] does only consider ex-
tended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3) the
MRTD has to be evaluated and certified separately. The evaluation and certification process is
carried out contemporaneous to the current process as a re-certification.
If BAC is supported by the TOE, the travel document has to be evaluated and certified
separately. This is due to the fact that [CC_PP-0055] does only consider extended basic attack
potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3).
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a manda-
tory security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly conform to the ’Common
Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Pro-
cedure with PACE (PACE PP)’ [CC_PP-0068-V2]. Note that [CC_PP-0068-V2] considers high
attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [ICAO_SAC], the following steps shall be performed:
1. The travel document’s chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived from
the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with the domain
parameters to the terminal.
2. The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically) reading the
MRZ resp. CAN data.
3. The travel document’s chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellman key agree-
ment together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared secret. Both
parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared secret.
4. Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and verifies the
received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document’s chip provide private
communication (secure messaging) [BSI_TR-03110, ICAO_SAC].
The security target requires the TOE to implement Active Authentication described in
[ICAO_PKI]. This protocol provides evidence of the travel document’s chip authenticity.
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined
in[BSI_TR-03110]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authen-
tication Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1). The
Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the travel document’s chip to the inspection
system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their
transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1
can only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed. The Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity
authorized by the receiving State or Organization through the issuing State, and (ii) an access
control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully
authenticated authorized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the
receiving State by means of certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers
who create Inspection System Certificates.
7
1.2.3 TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases (with respect to [CC_PP-0035],
the TOE life cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps).
Phase 1 Development
Step 1 The TOE is developed in phase 1. Infineon Technologies AG develops the inte-
grated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associ-
ated with these TOE components.
Step 2 MASKTECH INTERNATIONAL uses the guidance documentation for the inte-
grated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated
Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the ePassport
application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software
and the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is se-
curely delivered to Infineon Technologies AG. The IC Embedded Software in the
non-volatile programmable memories, the ePassport application and the guidance
documentation is securely delivered to the travel document manufacturer.
Phase 2 Manufacturing
Step 3 In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel doc-
ument’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip Em-
bedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). Infineon
Technologies AG writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC
as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process
to the travel document manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from Infineon
Technologies AG to the travel document manufacturer.
If necessary Infineon Technologies AG adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software
in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM).
Step 4 (optional) The travel document manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for
the contactless/contact interface in the travel document unless the travel document
consists of the card only.
Note 1: The inlay production including the application of the antenna is NOT
part of the TOE and takes part after the delivery.
Step 5 The travel document manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of
it in the non-volatile programmable memories (EEPROM) if necessary, (ii) creates
the ePassport application (creation of MF and ICAO.DF), and (iii) equips travel
document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
Note 2: The role of the Manufacturer performing initialization and pre-personali-
zation in the Card Issuing phase is taken over by SmarTrac, Thailand (see
[SC_Smartrac]), HID Global, Galway (see [SC_HID]), Trüb AG3
, Switzerland
(see [SC_Trueb]), and Infineon Technologies AG (see [IFX_ST-SLE78]).
The pre-personalized travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely de-
livered from the travel document manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The
3
Since March 2015 the owner of the site is Gemalto AG.
8
travel document manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance doc-
umentation to the Personalization Agent.
Phase 3 Personalization of the travel document
Step 6 The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel
document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrollment of the travel document
holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional bio-
metric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the
physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF
Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not lim-
ited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait
(EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document Security Object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [ICAO_9303]
finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document
holder. The personalized travel document (together with appropriate guidance for
TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational
use.
Phase 4 Operational Use
Step 7 The TOE is used as a travel document’s chip by the traveler and the inspection
systems in the Operational Use phase. The user data can be read according to the
security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the
security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.
1.2.4 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its
claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating
system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet
(holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete travel document, nevertheless
these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
9
2 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
[CC_Part1]
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Func-
tional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
[CC_Part2]
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security As-
surance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
[CC_Part3]
as follows
• Part 2 extended
• Part 3 conformant
The
• Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Method-
ology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 Revision 4, July 2012 [CC_PartEM]
has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP Reference
The conformance of this ST to the Common Criteria Protection Profile - ’Machine Readable
Travel Document with ’ICAO Application’, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)’,
version 1.3.2, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 [CC_PP-0056-V2] is claimed.
10
2.3 PP Additions
Active Authentication based on ICAO PKI v1.1 [ICAO_PKI] has been added. This implies the
following augmentations:
1. Extension of existing Assumptions for the TOE
• A.Insp_Sys: Inclusion of Active Authentication
2. Addition of new TOE Objectives
• OT.Active_Auth_Proof
3. Addition of new IT Environment Objectives
• OE.Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document
4. Addition of new SFRs for the TOE
• FCS COP.1/RSA_AA
• FIA API.1/AA
• FMT MTD.1/AAPK
• FMT MTD.1/KEY_READ_AA: Inclusion of the Active Authentication Private Key
ECC key generation in order to create the Chip Authentication key pair has been added.
This implies the following augmentation:
1. Addition of new SFRs for the TOE
• FCS CKM.1/CA_STATIC
2.4 Package Claim
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
defined in CC part 3 [CC_Part3].
2.5 Conformance rationale
Since this ST is not claiming conformance to any other protection profile, no rationale is neces-
sary here.
11
3 Security Problem Definition
(ASE_SPD.1)
3.1 Introduction
Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the user data on the travel document’s chip, user
data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data defined in
PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] (primary assets):
User data stored on the TOE (object no. 1 in [CC_PP-0068-V2]) All data (being not authen-
tication data) stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel document
as defined in [ICAO_SAC] and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated
terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO_SAC]).
This asset covers ’User Data on the MRTD’s chip’, ’Logical MRTD Data’ and ’Sensitive
User Data’ in [CC_PP-0055].
User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected (object no. 2) All data
(being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the ePassport ap-
plication of the travel document as defined in [ICAO_SAC] between the TOE and an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of
[ICAO_SAC]).
User data can be received and sent (exchange ⇔ receive, send).
Travel document tracing data (object no. 3) Technical information about the current and pre-
vious locations of the travel document gathered unnoticeable by the travel document
holder recognizing the TOE not knowing any PACE password. TOE tracing data can
be provided/gathered.
Logical travel document sensitive User Data Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3,
EF.DG4)
Note 3: Due to interoperability reasons the ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303] requires that
Basic Inspection Systems may have access to logical travel document data DG1, DG2, DG5
to DG16. The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using BAC [ICAO_9303]. Note
that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [CC_PP-0055]). If
supported, it is therefore recommended to used PACE instead of BAC. If nevertheless BAC has
12
to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip Authentication v.1 before getting access to data
(except DG14), as this mechanism is resistant to high potential attacks.
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the travel document’s chip The authenticity of the travel document’s chip
personalized by the issuing State or Organisation for the travel document holder is used by the
traveler to prove his possession of a genuine travel document.
Due to strict conformance to PACE PP, this ST also includes the secondary assets defined in
[CC_PP-0068-V2]:
Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorized subjects (object no. 4)
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to au-
thorized subjects only.
Genuineness of the TOE (object no. 5) Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide
claimed security functionality in a proper way. This asset also covers ’Authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip’ in [CC_PP-0055].
TOE internal secret cryptographic keys (object no. 6) Permanently or temporarily stored se-
cret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.
TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material (object no. 7) Permanently or temporarily
stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non-secret material (Document
Security Object SOD containing digital signature) used by the TOE in order to enforce its
security functionality.
Travel document communication establishment authorization data (object no. 8) Restricted
revealable authorization information for a human user being used for verification of the
authorization attempts as authorized user (PACE password). These data are stored in the
TOE and are not to be send to it.
Subjects and external entities
This security target considers the following external entities and subjects as defined in PACE
PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]:
Travel document holder (subject no. 1 in [CC_PP-0068-V2]) A person for whom the travel
document Issuer has personalized the travel document1
.
This entity is commensurate with ’MRTD Holder’ in [CC_PP-0055]. Please note that a
travel document holder can also be an attacker (s. below).
Travel document presenter (traveler) A person presenting the travel document to a terminal 2
and claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
This external entity is commensurate with ’Traveler’ in [CC_PP-0055]. Please note that
a travel document presenter can also be an attacker (s. below).
1
i.e. this person is uniquely associated with a concrete electronic Passport
2
in the sense of [ICAO_SAC]
13
Terminal (subject no. 2) A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE
through the contactless/contact interface. (see below)
The role ’Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being recognized by the TOE as
not PACE authenticated (’Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter).
This entity is commensurate with ’Terminal’ in [CC_PP-0055].
Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE) (subject no. 3) A technical system being
used by an inspecting authority3
verifying the travel document presenter as the travel
document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel
document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder).
(see below ’Inspection System’)
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself
to the travel document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive
Authentication.
Document Signer (DS) An organization enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorized by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS), see [ICAO_9303].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalization Agent.
Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) An organization enforcing the policy of
the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data
stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI
for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed
by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
Personalization Agent (subject no. 4) An organization acting on behalf of the travel document
Issuer to personalize the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all
of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder for
the biographic data in the travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data
of the travel document holder, (iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel
document (optical personalization) and storing them in the travel document (electronic
personalization) for the travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303], (iv) writing
the document details data, (v) writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document
Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role
’Personalization Agent’ may be distributed among several institutions according to the
operational policy of the travel document Issuer.
This entity is commensurate with ’Personalization Agent’ in [CC_PP-0055].
Manufacturer (subject no. 5) Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated cir-
cuit and the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The
Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Manufacturing life cycle phaseThe
TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document Man-
ufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
This entity is commensurate with ’Manufacturer’ in [CC_PP-0055].
3
concretely, by a control officer
14
Attacker A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying to undermine the
security policy defined by PACE PP, especially to change properties of the assets having
to be maintained. (see below)
The attacker is assumed to possess an at most high attack potential.
Please note that the attacker might ’capture’ any subject role recognized by the TOE.
This external entity is commensurate with ’Attacker’ in [CC_PP-0055].
The following subjects additionally to those defined in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] are
considered:
Country Verifying Certification Authority The Country Verifying Certification Authority
(CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or Organisation with respect
to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the travel document. The
CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates
the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the
CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving
State with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by
the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of
the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the travel document in the limits
provided by the issuing States or Organizations in the form of the Document Verifier
Certificates.
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the
contact interface or through the contactless interface. (see above)
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiv-
ing State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveler and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as travel document holder. (see above ’Basic
Inspection System with PACE’)
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure (see
figure 1 in [CC_PP-0056-V2]) and therefore (i) contains a terminal for the communication
with the travel document’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC;
(iii) gets the authorization to read the logical travel document either under PACE or BAC
by optical reading the travel document providing this information. (iv) implements the
Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocols both Version 1 according to
[BSI_TR-03110] and (v) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Security attributes of the EIS are defined by means of the Inspection System Certificates.
BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported
by the TOE and the BIS, PACE must be used. Optionally all the Inspection Systems can
implement Active Authentication.
Attacker Additionally to the definition above, the definition of an attacker is refined as fol-
lowed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical travel document without au-
thorization, (ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4), (iii) to
forge a genuine travel document, or (iv) to trace a travel document. (see above)
15
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.Insp_Sys (Inspection Systems for global interoperability)
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [ICAO_SAC]
and/or BAC [CC_PP-0055]. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both
PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads
the logical travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v.1
to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure messaging. EIS supports the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in order to ensure access control and is authorized
by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State
to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Optionally all the Inspection Systems can
implement Active Authentication.
Justification:
The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security objectives of the [CC_PP-0068-V2]
as it repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds only assumptions for the Inspection
Systems for handling the the EAC functionality of the TOE.
A.Auth_PKI (PKI for Inspection Systems)
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure
for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organi-
zations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers
are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States
or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of their
Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip.
Justification:
This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The issuing and use of card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is neither relevant for the PACE
part of the TOE nor will the security objectives of the [CC_PP-0068-V2] be restricted
by this assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE the assumption is necessary
because it covers the pre-requisite for performing the Terminal Authentication Protocol
Version 1.
This ST includes the assumption from the PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]:
A.Passive_Auth (PKI for Passive Authentication)
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure
for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical
travel document. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA)
which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA
16
keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the
Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity.
The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the
Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing
the Document Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document
Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiv-
ing States and Organizations. It is assumed that the Personalization Agent ensures that the
Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according
to [ICAO_9303].
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data (Read the sensitive biometric reference data)
Adverse action An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through
the communication interface of the travel document’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (see below)
in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get
data stored on the travel document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under
the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and
other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the
possible attack methods. Note that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored
only on the travel document’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the
MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical part of the travel
document as well.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in pos-
session of a legitimate travel document.
Asset Confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric refer-
ence).
T.Counterfeit (Counterfeit of travel document chip data)
Adverse action An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine travel document’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit
travel document. This violates the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used
for authentication of a traveler by possession of a travel document.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine travel document’s chip and copy them to another appropriate chip to
imitate this genuine travel document’s chip.
Threat agent having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
travel documents
17
Asset authenticity of user data stored on the TOE
This ST includes all threats from the PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]:
T.Skimming (Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication)
Adverse action An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the
user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority
connected via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct
value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset Confidentiality of logical travel document data.
T.Eavesdropping (Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE ter-
minal)
Adverse action An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel docu-
ment and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data trans-
ferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct
value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset Confidentiality of logical travel document data.
T.Tracing (Tracing travel document)
Adverse action An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement
of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or
listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct
value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset Privacy of the travel document holder
Note 4: This Threat completely covers and extends “T.Chip-ID” from [CC_PP-0055].
T.Forgery (Forgery of Data)
Adverse action An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored
on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal con-
nected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated Inspection System by means of
changed travel document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biomet-
ric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives
these modified data as authentic one.
Threat agent Having high attack potential.
Asset Integrity of the travel document.
Note 5: T.Forgery from the PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] is extended by the Extended
Inspection System additionally to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE being outsmarted
by the attacker.
18
T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality)
Adverse action An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored
in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or
(iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality
of the TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization
and personalization in the operational phase after delivery to the travel document
holder.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
travel documents.
Asset Integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality
of the travel document
Note 6: Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities
of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software being not specified here.
T.Information_Leakage (Information Leakage from travel document)
Adverse action An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the
travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected.
The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the
attacker.
Threat agent Having high attack potential.
Asset Confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document.
Note 7: Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This
leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is more closely related
to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements
of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip
still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific opera-
tion being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and
Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce
information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper (Physical Tampering)
Adverse action An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in or-
der (i) to disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded
Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter
(I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the User Data
or the TSF-data stored on the travel document.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
travel documents.
Asset Integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functional-
ity of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel
document.
19
Note 8: Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of
the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or the TSF data
(e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to
following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information
leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with
the travel document’s internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis
and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware security mecha-
nisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design
including treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a pre-requisite. The
modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or
data can be permanent or temporary.
T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress)
Adverse action An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware
and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate
or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) cir-
cumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside the normal op-
erating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded Software or
misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs
information about the functional operation.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
travel documents, having information about the functional operation.
Asset Integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functional-
ity of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel
document.
Note 9: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with
elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the
threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE’s internals.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations (see
CC part 1, sec. 3.2).
P.Sensitive_Data (Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data)
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sen-
sitive private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive biometric refer-
ence data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at
the time the travel document is presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection
Systems). The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the Document Verifiers of the re-
ceiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined
by the Document Verifier Certificate. The travel document’s chip shall protect the confi-
dentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to
the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication Version 1.
20
P.Personalization (Personalization of the travel document by issuing State or Organisation
only)
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical travel document with respect to the travel document holder. The personalization
of the travel document for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing
State or Organisation only.
This ST includes all OSPs from the PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]:
P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip)
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely.
The travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at
least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Pre-Operational (Pre-operational handling of the travel document)
1. The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2. The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other
of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently
stored in the TOE.
3. The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which
enable traceability of the travel documents in their Manufacturing and issuing life
cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase.
4. If the travel document Issuer authorizes a Personalization Agent to personalize the
travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to en-
sure that the Personalization Agent acts in accordance with the travel document
Issuer’s policy.
P.Card_PKI (PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch))
Note 10: The description below states the responsibilities of involved parties and rep-
resents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical distribution ways
shall be implemented by the involved parties in such a way that all certificates belonging
to the PKI are securely distributed / made available to their final destination, e.g. by using
directory services.
1. The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive
authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel docu-
ment. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The
travel document Issuer shall shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA).
2. The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA
shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA) having to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly secure
means, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Cer-
tificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the
travel document Issuer, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
21
3. A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over
the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the Doc-
ument Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer Private
Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents.
P.Trustworthy_PKI (Trustworthiness of PKI)
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organiza-
tions (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security
Objects to be stored on the travel document.
P.Terminal (Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals)
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as
follows:
1. The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by terminal
operators and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303].
2. They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO_SAC], of
the Passive Authentication [ICAO_9303] and use them in this order4
. The PACE
terminal shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by
the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellman).
3. The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4. They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive
Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel
document, [ICAO_9303]).
5. The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity
of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, in-
tegrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the
TOE according to the current ST.
4
This order is commensurate with [ICAO_SAC].
22
4 Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the
TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into secu-
rity objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the
operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf (Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data)
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3
and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems.
The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certifi-
cate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the autho-
rization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country
Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must en-
sure the confidentiality of the logical travel document data during their transmission to
the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference
data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (Proof of the travel document’s chip authenticity)
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
travel document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organisation by means
of the Chip Authentication Version 1 as defined in [BSI_TR-03110]. The authenticity
proof provided by travel document’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high
attack potential.
Note 11: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s chip to have (i) a
unique identity as given by the travel document’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to
prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE
shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference
data to verify the authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the
Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the
travel document’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [ICAO_9303] and (ii) the hash value of DG14 in
the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
23
OT.Active_Auth_Proof (Proof of travel document’s chip authenticity)
The TOE shall support the Basic Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity
of the travel document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by
means of the Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO_PKI]. The authenticity proof
provided by travel document’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack
potential.
This ST includes all Security Objectives for the TOE from the PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]:
OT.Data_Integrity (Integrity of Data)
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-datastored on it by protect-
ing these data against unauthorized modification (physical manipulation and unauthorized
modifying).
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange
between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Data_Authenticity (Authenticity of Data)
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data0
stored on it by
enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side1
.
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their ex-
change between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authen-
ticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a
verification at the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verifica-
tion by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE)2
.
OT.Data_Confidentiality (Confidentiality of Data)
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-databy granting read
access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure
confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE
and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the
PACE Authentication.
OT.Tracing (Tracing travel document)
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying
the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via
the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of
shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality)
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE op-
erational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data
stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE, (iii) to
manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE.
1
verification of SOD
2
secure messaging after the PACE authentication, see also [ICAO_SAC].
24
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak (Protection against Information Leakage)
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and
TSF-data stored and/or processed by the travel document
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time be-
tween events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power con-
sumption, clock, or I/O lines,
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE
Note 12: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal pro-
cessing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering)
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data,
the TSF-Data, and the travel document’s Embedded Software by means of
• measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the
chip’s surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction be-
tween electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC
failure analysis)
• manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality.
OT.Prot_Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions)
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE. The environmental
conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any
contacts), clock frequency or temperature.
The following TOE security objectives address the aspects of identified threats to be countered
involving TOE’s environment.
OT.Identification (Identification of the TOE)
The TOE must provide means to store Initialization3
and Pre-Personalization Data in its
non-volatile memory. The Initialization Data must provide a unique identification of the
IC during the Manufacturing and the Card Issuing life cycle phases of the travel docu-
ment. The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization
Agent Key(s).
3
amongst other, IC Identification data
25
OT.AC_Pers (Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD)
The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the
Document Security Object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be
written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical travel document data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed
after personalization of the document.
4.2 Security Objectives for Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document (Travel document Authentication Key)
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the travel document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and
store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data
in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organizations to
verify the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine travel document by
certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security
Object.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
from [CC_PP-0068-V2] in order to counter the Threat T.Counterfeit as it specifies the
pre-requisite for the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 which is one of the additional
features of the TOE described only in EAC PP and not in [CC_PP-0068-V2].
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data (Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data)
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of travel document hold-
ers to authorized receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification
Authority of the issuing State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier
Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
from [CC_PP-0068-V2] in order to handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Orga-
nizational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it speci-
fies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the need
of an PKI for this protocol and the responsibilities of its root instance. The Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in
EAC PP and not in [CC_PP-0068-V2].
OE.Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document (Travel document Active Authentication Key)
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the travel document’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign
26
and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key
data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support Inspection Systems of receiving States or Organiza-
tions to verify the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine MRTD by
certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security
Object.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document (Examination of the physical part of the travel document)
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the travel doc-
ument presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document. The
Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA
Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organisation,
and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [ICAO_SAC] and/or the Basic Access
Control [ICAO_9303]. Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points
the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented
travel document’s chip.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
from [CC_PP-0068-V2] in order to handle the Threat T.Counterfeit and the Assumption
A.Insp_Sys by demanding the Inspection System to perform the Chip Authentication
protocol v.1. OE.Exam_Travel_ Document also repeats partly the requirements from
OE.Terminal in [CC_PP-0068-V2] and therefore also counters T.Forgery and A.Passive_
Auth from [CC_PP-0068-V2]. This is done because a new type of Inspection System
is introduced in EAC PP as the Extended Inspection System is needed to handle the
additional features of a travel document with Extended Access Control.
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document (Protection of data from the logical travel document)
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical travel document. The inspection system will
prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
from [CC_PP-0068-V2] in order to handle the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by requiring the
Inspection System to perform secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication Proto-
col v.1.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems (Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems)
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspec-
tion Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive bio-
metric reference data of the logical travel document. The Extended Inspection System
27
authenticates themselves to the travel document’s chip for access to the sensitive biomet-
ric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System
Certificate.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
from [CC_PP-0068-V2] in order to handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organi-
zational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies
the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the responsi-
bilities of the Document Verifier instance and the Inspection Systems.
This ST includes all Security Objectives of the TOE environment from the PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]:
Travel document Issuer as the general responsible The travel document Issuer as the gen-
eral responsible for the global security policy related will implement the following secu-
rity objectives for the TOE environment:
OE.Legislative_Compliance (Issuing of the travel document)
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
Travel document Issuer and CSCA: travel document’s PKI (issuing) branch The travel doc-
ument Issuer and the related CSCA will implement the following security objectives for
the TOE environment (see also the Note 10 above):
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (Authentication of travel document by Signature)
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel
document Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii)
ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates
in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA
Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being
maintained.
A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must (i) gener-
ate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the Document Signer Private Key, (iii) hand over the Document Signer Public
Key to the CSCA for certification, (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine
travel documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in
the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for each data group in use
according to [ICAO_9303]. The Personalization Agent has to ensure that the Docu-
ment Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according
to [ICAO_9303]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful or-
ganizations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects
to be stored on travel document.
OE.Personalization (Personalization of travel document)
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
his behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and cre-
ate the biographical data for the travel document, (ii) enroll the biometric reference
28
data of the travel document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical
Passport (optical personalization) and store them in the travel document (electronic
personalization) for the travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303]4
, (iv)
write the document details data, (v) write the initial TSF data, (vi) sign the Docu-
ment Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the role of a DS).
Terminal operator: Terminal’s receiving branch
OE.Terminal (Terminal operating)
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
1. The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal
operators and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303].
2. The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol
[ICAO_SAC], of the Passive Authentication [ICAO_SAC] (by verification of
the signature of the Document Security Object) and use them in this order5
.
The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if
required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellman).
3. The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4. The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and
to perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the
authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [ICAO_9303]).
5. The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and
integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE
passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure
operation of the TOE according to the current ST.
Travel document holder Obligations
OE.Travel_Document_Holder (Travel document holder Obligations)
The travel document Holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of
the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according
to respective regulations and are trustworthy.
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage. Objectives, threats
and assumptions marked in italic letters are adapted from PACE-PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2, those
included for the Active Authentication functionality are underlined.
4
see also [ICAO_9303], sec. 10
5
This order is commensurate with [ICAO_SAC]
29
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OE.Personalization
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
OE.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Legislative_Compliance
T.Read_Sensitive_
Data
x x x
T.Counterfeit x x x x x
T.Skimming x x x x
T.Eavesdropping x
T.Tracing x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Information_
Leakage
x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
T.Forgery x x x x x x x x x
P.Sensitive_Data x x x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Manufact x
P.Pre-
Operational
x x x x
P.Terminal x x
P.Card_PKI x
P.Trustworthy_
PKI
x
A.Insp_Sys x x
A.Auth_PKI x x
A.Passive_Auth x x
Table 4.1: Security Objective Rationale
A detailed justification required for suitability of the security objectives to coup with the
security problem definition is given below.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the travel document by issuing State or Or-
ganisation only” addresses the (i) the enrollment of the logical travel document by the Personal-
ization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personaliza-
tion “Personalization of logical travel document”, and (ii) the access control for the user data
and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Person-
alization of logical travel document”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Per-
sonalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication
of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and the
management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
30
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and
the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered
by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference
data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric
reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required
that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases
on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The
Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by cre-
ating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference
data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is countered by the secu-
rity objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document additionally to the security objectives from PACE
PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]. OE.Exam_Travel_Document enforces the terminals to perform the
terminal part of the PACE protocol.
The threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data” addresses the attack
of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document’s chip. This attack is
thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
“Proof of travel document’s chip authentication” using an authentication key pair to be gen-
erated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be
written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Authentication Key”. According to
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” the
General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to ver-
ify the authenticity of the travel document’s chip. Additionally, this attack is thwarted through
the chip by an identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof
of travel document’s chip authentication” using an authentication key pair to be generated by
the issuing State or Organization. The Public Active Authentication Key has to be written into
EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Active_
Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Active Authentication Key”.
The threat T.Skimming addresses accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or trans-
ferred between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE’s contactless/contact interface. This
threat is countered by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity and
OT.Data_Confidentiality through the PACE authentication. The objective OE.Travel_Document_
Holder ensures that a PACE session can only be established either by the travel document holder
itself or by an authorized person or device, and, hence, cannot be captured by an attacker.
The threat T.Eavesdropping addresses listening to the communication between the TOE
and a rightful terminal in order to gain the User Data transferred there. This threat is countered
by the security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality through a trusted channel based on the PACE
authentication.
The threat T.Tracing addresses gathering TOE tracing data identifying it remotely by es-
tablishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE,
whereby the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the PACE password). This
threat is directly countered by security objectives OT.Tracing (no gathering TOE tracing data)
and OE.Travel_Document_Holder (the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the
shared passwords).
The threat T.Abuse-Func addresses attacks of misusing TOE’s functionality to manipulate
or to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data as well as to disable or to bypass the soft-coded
31
security functionality. The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func ensures that the usage of
functions having not to be used in the operational phase is effectively prevented.
The threats T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper and T.Malfunction are typical for
integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection
of the TOE against these threats is obviously addressed by the directly related security objectives
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and OT.Prot_Malfunction, respectively.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data” addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial alter-
ation of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged between the TOE
and the terminal. The security objective OT.AC_Pers requires the TOE to limit the write access
for the travel document to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The
TOE will protect the integrity and authenticity of the stored and exchanged User Data or/and
TSF-data as aimed by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity and OT.Data_Authenticity, re-
spectively. The objectives OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and OT.Prot_Abuse-Func contribute to pro-
tecting integrity of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE. A terminal operator
operating his terminals according to OE.Terminal and performing the Passive Authentication
using the Document Security Object as aimed by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign will be able to ef-
fectively verify integrity and authenticity of the data received from the TOE. Additionally, the
examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_Travel_ Docu-
ment “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” shall ensure its authenticity by
means of the physical security measures and detect any manipulation of the physical part of the
travel document.
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip” requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personaliza-
tion Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Pre-Operational is enforced by the following security objectives: OT.Identifica-
tion is affine to the OSP’s property ’traceability before the operational phase’; OT.AC_Pers and
OE.Personalization together enforce the OSP’s properties ’correctness of the User- and the TSF-
data stored’ and ’authorization of Personalization Agents’; OE.Legislative_Compliance is affine
to the OSP’s property ’compliance with laws and regulations’.
The OSP P.Terminal is obviously enforced by the objective OE.Terminal, whereby the one-
to-one mapping between the related properties is applicable.
The OSP P.Card_PKI is enforced by establishing the issuing PKI branch as aimed by the
objectives OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (for the Document Security Object).
The OSP P.Trustworthy_PKI is enforced by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (for CSCA, issuing
PKI branch).
The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspec-
tion Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE en-
vironment OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel doc-
ument“ which requires the inspection system to examine physically the travel document, the
Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the Extended Inspection
Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify
the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE
environment OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of data from the logical travel
document” require the Inspection System to protect the logical travel document data during the
transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of
32
travel document by Signature” from PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] covering the necessary pro-
cedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The imple-
mentation of the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_Travel_Document
“Examination of the physical part of the travel document”.
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security ob-
jective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive
biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by
issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or Organizations only. The
Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization
of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspec-
tion System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish
the necessary public key infrastructure.
The Assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly addressed
by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign requiring the travel document issuer to establish a PKI for Passive
Authentication, generating Document Signing private keys only for rightful organizations and
requiring the Document Signer to sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be
stored on travel document.
33
5 Extended Components Definition
(ASE_ECD.1)
This Security Target uses the components defined in chapter 5 of BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2
[CC_PP-0056-V2]. Additionally there is one extended component defined and described for
the TOE:
• The family FCS_RNG at the class FCS Cryptographic Support
5.1 Family “Generation of Random Numbers (FCS_RNG)”
The family “Generation of Random Numbers (FCS_RNG.1)”has to be newly created according
the new version of the “Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS)”[BSI_AIS31].
This security functional component is used instead of the functional component FCS_RND.1
defined in the protection profile [CC_PP-0068-V2] and referenced in [CC_PP-0056-V2]1
.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RNG)” is specified as follows.
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RNG.1
This section describes the functional requirements for the generation of random numbers, which
may be used as secrets for cryptographic purposes or authentication. The IT security functional
requirements for the TOE are defined in an additional family (FCS_RNG) of the Class FCS
(Cryptographic support).
FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers
Family behavior This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random num-
bers that are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers 1
FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers, requires that the random number generator im-
plements defined security capabilities and that the random numbers meet a defined quality
metric.
1
Consequently, FCS_RNG is defined according to the Security Target of the hardware [IFX_ST-SLE78]
34
Management FCS_RNG.1: There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit FCS_RNG.1: There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RNG.1 – Random number generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true,
deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic] random num-
ber generator that implements: [assignment: list of security capa-
bilities].
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [as-
signment: format of the numbers]] that meet: [assignment: a de-
fined quality metric].
Note 13: The functional requirement FCS_RNG.1 is a refinement of FCS_RND.1 defined
in [CC_PP-0068-V2] according to “Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema
(AIS)”[BSI_AIS31].
35
6 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements: refinement, se-
lection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 of the CC [CC_Part1].
Each of these operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts
a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in
bold text and that added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC
requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating
a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP author are denoted as underlined text.
Selections filled in by the ST author are denoted as double-underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP author are
denoted by showing as underlined text. Assignments filled in by the ST author are denoted as
double-underlined text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Extended Inspec-
tion System”, “Country Verifying Certification Authority”, “Document Verifier” and “Termi-
nal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1. Note, that all these subjects are acting
for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either in section 7 or in the
following table. The operations “write”, “modify”, “read” and “disable read access” are used in
accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations “store”, “create”, “transmit”, “re-
ceive”, “establish communication channel”, “authenticate” and “re-authenticate” are originally
taken from [CC_Part2]. The operation “load” is synonymous to “import” used in [CC_Part2].
36
Definition of security attributes:
Security attribute Values Meaning
Terminal authentication status none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without authorization after
start-up)
CVCA roles defined in the certificate used for au-
thentication (cf. [BSI_TR-03110]); Termi-
nal is authenticated as Country Verifying
Certification Authority after successful CA
v.1 and TA v.1
DV (domestic) roles defined in the certificate used for au-
thentication (cf. [BSI_TR-03110]); Termi-
nal is authenticated as domestic Document
Verifier after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV (foreign) roles defined in the certificate used for au-
thentication (cf. [BSI_TR-03110]); Termi-
nal is authenticated as foreign Document
Verifier after successful CA v.1 1 and TA v.1
IS roles defined in the certificate used for au-
thentication (cf. [BSI_TR-03110]); Termi-
nal is authenticated as Extended Inspection
System after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
Terminal Authorization none
DG4 (Iris) Read access to DG4: (cf. [BSI_TR-03110])
DG3 (Fingerprint) Read access to DG3: (cf. [BSI_TR-03110])
DG3 (Fingerprint) /
DG4 (Iris)
Read access to DG3 and DG4: (cf.
[BSI_TR-03110])
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used. Further keys and
certificates are listed in [CC_PP-0068-V2].
Name Data
TOE intrinsic secret crypto-
graphic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material
used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.
Country Verifying Certification
Authority Private Key (SKCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a
private key (SKCVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier Cer-
tificates.
Country Verifying The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certification Authority Public
Key (PKCVCA)
Public Key (PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the Docu-
ment Verifier Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security attribute
Current Date as the most recent valid effective date of the Coun-
try Verifying Certification Authority Certificate or of a domestic
Document Verifier Certificate.
37
Name Data
Country Verifying Certification
Authority Certificate (CCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be
a self-signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [5] and Glossary).
It contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Pub-
lic Key (PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded
access control rights of the Country Verifying Certification Au-
thority, (iii) the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expi-
ration Date as security attributes.
Document Verifier Certificate
(CDV)
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document
Verifier Public Key (PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii)
identification as domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded
access control rights of the Document Verifier, the Certificate Ef-
fective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security at-
tributes.
Inspection System Certificate
(CIS)
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document
Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the Inspec-
tion System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded access control rights
of the Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date
and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication Public Key
Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used
for Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to
RFC 2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO
11770-3 [ISO_11770-3].
Chip Authentication Public Key
(PKICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the
EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical
travel document and used by the inspection system for Chip Au-
thentication Version 1 of the travel document’s chip. It is part of
the user data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
Chip Authentication Private Key
(SKICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE
to authenticate itself as authentic travel document’s chip. It is part
of the TSF data.
Active Authentication Public
Key Pair
The Active Authentication Public Key Pair (SKAA, PKAA) are used
for Active Authentication according to TrPKI [ICAO_PKI].
Active Authentication Public
Key (PKAA)
The Active Authentication Public Key (PKAA) is stored in the
EF.DG15 Active Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical
travel document and used by the inspection system for Active Au-
thentication of the travel document’s chip. It is part of the user data
provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
Active Authentication Private
Key (SKAA)
The Active Authentication Private Key (SKAA) is used by the TOE
to authenticate itself as authentic travel document’s chip. It is part
of the TSF data.
38
Name Data
Country Signing Certification
Authority Key Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or Or-
ganization signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate with
the Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key and the
signature will be verified by receiving State or Organisation (e.g.
an Extended Inspection System) with the Country Signing Certifi-
cation Authority Public Key.
Document Signer Key Pairs Document Signer of the issuing State or Organisation signs the
Document Security Object of the logical travel document with the
Document Signer Private Key and the signature will be verified by
an Extended Inspection System of the receiving State or Organiza-
tion with the Document Signer Public Key.
Chip Authentication Session
Keys
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC computation key
agreed between the TOE and an Inspection System in result of
the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
PACE Session Keys Secure messaging encryption key and MAC computation key
agreed between the TOE and an Inspection System in result of
PACE.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
6.1.1 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key
generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for Chip Authentication
session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation ]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH and spec-
ified cryptographic key sizes 112, 128, 192 and 256 bits that meet
the following: based on the Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol
compliant to [PKCS_3] and [BSI_TR-03110], based on an ECDH
protocol compliant to [BSI_TR-03111]
Note 14: FCS_CKM.1/CA implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions
used for key derivation by demanding compliance to [BSI_TR-03110].
Note 15: The TOE shall destroy any session keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4 from
[CC_PP-0068-V2] after (i) detection of an error in a received command by verification of the
39
MAC and (ii) after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1. (iii) The TOE shall
destroy the PACE Session Keys after generation of a Chip Authentication Session Keys and
changing the secure messaging to the Chip Authentication Session Keys. (iv) The TOE shall
clear the memory area of any session keys before starting the communication with the terminal
in a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1. Concerning the Chip Authentication
keys FCS_CKM.4 is also fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA.
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for PACE ses-
sion keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
Justification: A Diffie-Hellman key agreement is used in order to
have no key distribution, therefore FCS_CKM.2 makes no sense
in this case.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1/
DH_PACE
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to [PKCS_3], ECDH
compliant to [BSI_TR-03111] and specified cryptographic
key sizes 112 bits, 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits that meet the
following: [ICAO_SAC], [ISO_15946-1], and [ISO_15946-3].
Note 16: The TOE generates a shared secret value K with the terminal during the PACE pro-
tocol, see [ICAO_SAC]. The shared secret value K is used for deriving the AES or DES session
keys for message encryption and message authentication (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc) according
to [ICAO_SAC] for the TSF required by FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC.
Note 17: FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing
functions used for key derivation by demanding compliance to [ICAO_SAC].
FCS_CKM.1/CA_STATIC Cryptographic key generation – ECC key pair generation for
Chip Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation ]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/
CA_STATIC
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECC key pair
generation by testing candidates and specified cryptographic key
sizes 224 bits (BP, NIST), 256 bits (BP, NIST), 320 bits (BP),
384 bits (NIST) and 512 bits (BP) that meet the following:
[FIPS_186-3], Annex B.4.2, [BSI_TR-03111], Section 6 (r1), and
[ISO_15946-1]
40
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – Session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with the
cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion of key
value that meets the following: FIPS PUB 140-2 [FIPS_140-2].
Note 18: The TOE shall destroy the PACE session keys after detection of an error in a
received command by verification of the MAC. The TOE shall clear the memory area of any
session keys before starting the communication with the terminal in a new after-reset-session as
required by FDP_RIP.1.
Cryptographic Operation (FCS_COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified be-
low (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms
to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging - encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
AES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit
and 256 bit and 3DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes
112 bit that meet the following: [FIPS_197], [NIST_SP800-67],
and [NIST_SP800-38A], Section 6.2.
Note 19: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitives (e.g. Triple-
DES and/or AES) for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are
agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version
1 according to the FCS_CKM.1/CA.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by travel docu-
ment
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
41
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_VER
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 and cryptographic key sizes
224 (BP, NIST), 256 (BP, NIST), 320 (BP), 384 (NIST) and
512 (BP) bits that meet the following: [FIPS_186-3], chapter 6,
[FIPS_180-2], section 6.2, [ANSI_X9.62], and [ISO_15946-2].
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging - message authentication
code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
CMAC-AES and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit and
256 bit and Retail-MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112
bit that meet the following: [FIPS_197], [NIST_SP800-67],
[NIST_SP800-38B], Section 6, and [ISO_9797], MAC algorithm
3 with block cipher DES, key KMAC and IV=SSC.
Note 20: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure
messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The
key is agreed between the TSF by Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to the
FCS_CKM.1/CA. Furthermore the SFR is used for authentication attempts of a terminal as
Personalization Agent by means of the authentication mechanism.
FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by travel document
– AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
RSA_AA
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA with SHA-1
and cryptographic key sizes 1536 bits that meet the follow-
ing: [ISO_9796-2] Digital Signature Scheme 1, section 8,
[FIPS_180-2], section 6, and [PKCS_1_v21].
42
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption AES/3DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE_ENC
The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - encryption and
decryption in accordance with the cryptographic algorithm AES
in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit and
256 bit and 3DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112
bit that meet the following: [FIPS_197], [NIST_SP800-67], and
[NIST_SP800-38A], Section 6.2 compliant to [ICAO_SAC].
Note 21: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive AES or
3DES for secure messaging with encryption of transmitted data and encrypting the nonce in the
first step of PACE. The related session keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as
part of the PACE protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-KEnc).
This SFR also covers the usage of 3DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key size 112 bit
for Basic Access Control as it is used for Personalization.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE_MAC
The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - message authentication
code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
CMAC-AES and cryptographic key sizes 256 bit and Retail-MAC
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following:
[FIPS_197], [NIST_SP800-67], [NIST_SP800-38B], Section 6
and [ISO_9797], MAC algorithm 3 with block cipher DES, key
KMAC and IV=SSC compliant to [ICAO_SAC].
Note 22: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure
messaging with message authentication code over transmitted data. The related session keys
are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of either the PACE protocol according to
the FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-KMAC).
43
Random Number Generation (FCS_RNG.1)
FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that
implements:
(PTG.2.1) A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy
source immedia- tely when the RNG has started. When a total
failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.
(PTG.2.2) If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while
the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the output of
any internal random number that depends on some raw random
numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the
entropy source.
(PTG.2.3) The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical
defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when
the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The
TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up
online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been
detected.
(PTG.2.4) The online test procedure shall be effective to detect
non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon.
(PTG.2.5) The online test procedure checks the quality of the
raw random number sequence. It is triggered continuously. The
online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects
of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an
acceptable period of time.
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide numbers in the format 8- or 16-bit that meet:
(PTG.2.6) Test procedure A, as defined in [BSI_AIS31] does not
distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of
an ideal RNG.
(PTG.2.7) The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit
exceeds 0.997.
Note 23: The functional requirement FCS_RNG.1 is a refinement of FCS_RND.1 defined
in [CC_PP-0068-V2] according to “Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema
(AIS)”[BSI_AIS31]. It requires the TOE to generate random numbers (random nonce) used for
the authentication protocols (PACE) as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE.
44
6.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Table 6.1 provides an overview of the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE
Authentication Mechanism for Personalization Agents FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 FIA_API.1,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 FIA_UAU.5/PACE
PACE protocol FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Passive Authentication FIA_UAU.5/PACE
Active Authentication (specified in addition to [CC_PP-0056-V2]) FIA_API.1/AA
Table 6.1: Overview on authentication SFR
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 as defined in this protection profile includes
• the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys between
the TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and the Terminal
Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1,
• the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code
with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may be used independent of the Terminal Authenti-
cation Protocol v.1. But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is used the terminal shall
use the same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
45
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_SAC]
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according
to [BSI_TR-03110]
5. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [BSI_TR-03110]
6. none
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Note 24: The SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE covers the definition in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]
and extends it by EAC aspect 4. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to
PACE PP.
Note 25: In the Phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE” the Manufacturer is the only user role
known to the TOE which writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data in the
audit records of the IC. The travel document manufacturer may create the user role Personaliza-
tion Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”. The
users in role Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication
key. After personalization in the Phase 3 the PACE domain parameters, the Chip Authentica-
tion data and Terminal Authentication Reference Data are written into the TOE. The Inspection
System is identified as default user after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will run
the PACE protocol, to gain access to the Chip Authentication Reference Data and to run the
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1. After successful authentication of the chip the termi-
nal may identify itself as (i) Extended Inspection System by selection of the templates for the
Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 or (ii) if necessary and available by authentication
as Personalization Agent (using the Personalization Agent Key).
Note 26: In the life-cycle phase “Manufacturing” the Manufacturer is the only user role
known to the TOE. The Manufacturer writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization
Data in the audit records of the IC. Please note that a Personalization Agent acts on behalf of the
travel document Issuer under his and CSCA and DS policies. Hence, they define authentication
procedure(s) for Personalization Agents. The TOE must functionally support these authentica-
tion procedures being subject to evaluation within the assurance components ALC_DEL.1 and
AGD_PRE.1. The TOE assumes the user role “Personalization Agent”, when a terminal proves
the respective Terminal Authorization Level as defined by the related policy (policies).
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
46
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_SAC]
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
4. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
5. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according
to [BSI_TR-03110]
6. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [BSI_TR-03110]
7. none
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenti-
cated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Note 27: The SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE in EAC PP covers the definition in PACE PP
[CC_PP-0068-V2] and extends it by EAC aspect 5. This extension does not conflict with the
strict conformance to PACE PP.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of
the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_SAC],
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES or AES,
3. Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[BSI_TR-03110].
Note 28: The SFR FIA_UAU.4.1 covers the definition in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] and
extends it by the EAC aspect 3. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance
to PACE PP. The generation of random numbers (random nonce) used for the authentication
47
protocol (PACE) and Terminal Authentication as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE is required by
FCS_RND.1 from [CC_PP-0068-V2].
Note 29: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and randomly
generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful
authentication attempt. However, the authentication of Personalization Agent may rely on other
mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as
a diversifier.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide
1. PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_SAC],
2. Passive Authentication according to [ICAO_9303],
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to
[ICAO_SAC],
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
or AES,
5. Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[BSI_TR-03110].
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the following rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE
accepts only received commands with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with
the key agreed with the terminal by means of the PACE
protocol.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as
Personalization Agent by the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent
Keys.
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 the
TOE accepts only received commands with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging
with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism v.1.
48
4. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of
the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the terminal
uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1 and the secure messaging established by the
Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1.
5. none
Note 30: The SFR FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE covers the definition in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]
and extends it by EAC aspects 4), 5), and 6). The SFR FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE in covers the def-
inition in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] and extends it by EAC aspects 2), 3), 4)and 5). These
extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE
protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent
by the Inspection System.
Note 31: The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment and the Chip Authentica-
tion Protocol specified in [ICAO_9303] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged
after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messag-
ing in MAC_ENC mode each command based on a corresponding MAC algorithm whether it
was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further de-
tails). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code.
Therefore the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those
commands received from the previously authenticated user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
49
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1
according to [BSI_TR-03110] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Note 32: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication Mechanism
v.1 specified in [BSI_TR-03110]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using
the Diffie-Hellman Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in
ENC_MAC mode according to [ICAO_9303]. The terminal verifies by means of secure mes-
saging whether the travel document’s chip was able or not to run his protocol properly using its
Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended [CC_Part2]).
FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity – AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Mechanism
according to [ICAO_PKI] to prove the identity of the TOE.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling – PACE authentication using non-block-
ing authorization data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication: fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1/
PACE
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempt
occurs related to authentication attempts using the PACE password
as shared password for PACE.
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been met, the TSF shall wait for an administrator configurable
time greater 10 seconds between the reception of the authentication
command and its processing.
6.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
50
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining access to the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the
logical travel document.
Note 33: The SFR FIA_ACC.1.1 covers the definition in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] and
extends it by data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel document. This extension does not
conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on
the following:
1. Subjects:
(a) Terminal
(b) BIS-PACE
(c) Extended Inspection System
2. Objects:
(a) data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16,
EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical travel document,
(b) data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document,
(c) data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document,
(d) all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in
the travel document.
3. Security attributes:
(a) PACE Authentication,
(b) Terminal Authentication v.1,
(c) Authorization of the Terminal.
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects from
FDP_ACF.1/TRM according to [ICAO_SAC] after a successful
PACE authentication as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE.
51
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules:
1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated
BSI-PACE is not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use
any User Data stored on the travel document.
2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to
read, to write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel
document.
3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System with the Read access to
DG3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder
authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data objects
2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
4. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG4
(Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization
encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2b) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed
to read data in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
Note 34: The SFR FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM covers the definition in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]
and extends it by additional subjects and objects. The SFRs FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM and FDP_
ACF.1.3/TRM cover the definition in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]. The SFR FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM
covers the definition in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] and extends it by 3) to 6). These extensions
do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
Note 35: The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in the CVC of the inspec-
tion system is defined in [BSI_TR-03110]. The TOE verifies the certificate chain established
by the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the In-
spection System Certificate (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The Terminal Authorization is the intersection
of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the certificates of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain.
Note 36: FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM require the protection of the User Data
transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message au-
thentication codes after successful Chip Authentication Version 1 to the Inspection System. The
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment, and the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
establish different key sets to be used for secure messaging (each set of keys for the encryption
and the message authentication key).
52
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content
of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of
the resource from the following objects:
1. Session keys (immediately after closing related
communication session),
2. the ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC-PACE (by
having generated a DH shared secret K)1
3. none
The TOE shall meet the requirement ”Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)“ as
specified below Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]: fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]: fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unau-
thorized disclosure.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]: fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]: fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able
to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
1
according to [ICAO_SAC]
53
6.1.4 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel after PACE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate com-
munication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted chan-
nel for any data exchange between the TOE and the Terminal.
6.1.5 Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the the Initialization and Pre-personalization Data in the audit
records.
Note 37: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the
life cycle phase ’Manufacturing’. The IC Manufacturer and the travel document Manufacturer
in the Manufacturer role write the Initialization and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF-data
into the TOE. The audit records are usually write-only-once data of the travel document (see
FMT_ MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS). Please note that there could also be such
audit records which cannot be read out, but directly used by the TOE.
6.1.6 Class FMT Security Management
Note 38: The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE provides basic requirements to the management of the
TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)”as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
54
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles:
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Terminal,
4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE,
5. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
6. Document Verifier,
7. Domestic Extended Inspection System,
8. Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles
Note 39: The SFR FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE in EAC PP covers the definition in PACE PP
[CC_PP-0068-V2] and extends it by 5) to 8). This extension does not conflict with the strict
conformance to PACE PP.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization,
4. Configuration.
Note 40: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and
TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life-cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified be-
low (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
55
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities
so that in conjunction with ’Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’
the following policy is enforced:
Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified be-
low (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with ’Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’
the following policy is enforced:
Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
3. software to be reconstructed
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed.
Note 41: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data
(FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as spec-
ified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions
and different TSF data.
56
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate
and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_INI
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate,
3. Initial Current Date,
4. none.
to the Personalization Agent
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification Au-
thority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_UPD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate,
to Country Verifier Certification Authority
Note 42: The Country Verifying Certification Authority updates its asymmetric key pair
and distributes the public key be means of the Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf.
[BSI_TR-03110]). The TOE updates its internal trust-point if a valid Country Verifying CA
Link-Certificates (cf. FMT_MTD.3) is provided by the terminal (cf. [BSI_TR-03110]).
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
DATE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System.
Note 43: The authorized roles are identified in their certificate (cf. [BSI_TR-03110]) and
authorized by validation of the certificate chain (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The authorized role of
the terminal is part of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the card verifiable certificate
provided by the terminal for the identification and the Terminal Authentication v.1 (cf. to
[BSI_TR-03110]).
57
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the Chip
Authentication Private Key to the Personalization Agent
Note 44: The verb “load” means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated
securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE memory. The verb “create” means here that
the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated by the TOE itself (see SFR FCS_CKM.1/CA_STATIC).
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key –
AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
AAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Active Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization Agent
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. PACE passwords,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalization Agent Keys.
to none.
Note 45: The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ in EAC PP covers the definition in PACE
PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] and extends it by additional TSF data. This extension does not conflict
with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ_AA Management of TSF data – Key Read – AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ_AA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Active Authentication
Private Key to none
58
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Secure TSF data (FMT_MTD.3)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2):
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 and the Access Control.
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1. the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of
the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
2. the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Author-
ity and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE and the expiration date of the
Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
3. the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Author-
ity can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certifica-
tion Authority known to the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in
a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Ex-
tended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates
of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
Note 46: The Terminal Authentication Version 1 is used for Extended Inspection System as
required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Terminal Authorization is used as
TSF data for access control required by FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing Initialization and Pre-per-
sonalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
59
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Reading and Using Initialization and
Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the Initialization Data
and the Pre-personalization Data to Personalization Agent
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data – Personalization Agent
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write to the Document Security
Object (SOD) to the Personalization Agent
6.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for the User Data and
TSF-data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent leakage. The
SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” together with
the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and
manipulation of the security features or misuse of the TOE security functionality.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended):
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption
and command execution time in excess of non-useful information
enabling access to
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys,
2. PACE session keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC-PACE,
4. Manufacturer Authentication Key,
5. Administration keys,
60
6. Personalization Agent Keys,
7. Chip Authentication Private Key,
8. Active Authentication Private Keys.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys,
2. PACE session keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC-PACE,
4. Manufacturer Authentication Key,
5. Administration keys,
6. Personalization Agent Keys,
7. Chip Authentication Private Key,
8. Active Authentication Private Keys.
Note 47: The SFR FPT_EMS.1.1 covers the definition in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] and
extends it by EAC aspects 1., 5. and 6. The SFR FPT_EMS.1.2 in EAC PP covers the definition
in PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] and extends it by EAC aspects 4) and 5). Active Authentication
is taken into account in aspect 9 of FPT_EMS.1.1 and FPT_EMS.1.2. These extensions do not
conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit in-
formation leakage including physical manipulation.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1. Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE
malfunction,
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1,
3. none
61
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and
at the condition ’request of random numbers’ to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to ver-
ify the integrity of the TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to ver-
ify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing
to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are
always enforced.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit
information leakage including physical manipulation.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating
environment are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by
taking the following components:
• ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures),
• AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The table 6.2 provides The following table provides an overview for security functional re-
quirements coverage. SFRs and security objectives from PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] are
marked in italic letters, SFRs from PACE PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] which are extended in EAC
PP [CC_PP-0056-V2] are marked in bold letters. SFRs and security objectives included in
addition for CA key generation or Active Authentication are underlined.
62
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FAU_SAS.1 x x
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE x x x
FCS_CKM.1/CA x x x x x x
FCS_CKM.1/CA_STATIC x
FCS_CKM.4 x x x x x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC x
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC x x x x x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC x x
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC x x x x
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER x x
FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA x
FCS_RND.1 x x x x x
FIA_AFL.1/PACE x
FIA_UID.1/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.1/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.4/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.5/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.6/PACE x x x
FIA_UAU.6/EAC x x x x x
FIA_API.1 x
FIA_API.1/AA x
FDP_ACC.1/TRM x x x x
FDP_ACF.1/TRM x x x x
FDP_RIP.1 x x x
FDP_UCT.1/TRM x x x
FDP_UIT.1/TRM x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x x x x
FMT_SMR.1/PACE x x x x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD x
FMT_MTD.1/DATE x
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK x x x
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK x
FMT_MTD.1/PA x x x x
63
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ_AA x
FMT_MTD.3 x
FPT_EMS.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FPT_FLS.1 x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
FTP_ITC.1/PACE x x x x
Table 6.2: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” addresses the storage
of Initialization and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-volatile memory, whereby they also
include the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the TOE’s chip. This will be ensured
by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the
Manufacturer to write Initialization and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personaliza-
tion Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the Personalization Agent to disable
access to Initialization and Pre-personalization Data in the life cycle phase ’operational use’.
The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical travel
document” addresses the access control of the writing the logical travel document. The justi-
fication for the SFRs FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS arises
from the justification for OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre-personalization Data.
The write access to the logical travel document data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in the same way: only the suc-
cessfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document only once. FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related prop-
erty of OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in generally, personalization data). The SFR FMT_
SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists
the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The SFRs FMT_MTD.1./KEY_
READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict the access to the Personalization Agent Keys and the Chip
Authentication Private Key.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalization Terminal
want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (af-
ter Chip Authentication v.1) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF accord-
ing to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the deriva-
tion of the new session keys after Chip Authentication v.1), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
64
(as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1) and FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authenti-
cation). If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to
the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify the
authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The security objective OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE
to protect the integrity of the logical travel document stored on the travel document’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is addressed
by FPT_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored user data is addressed by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1) and terminals are not
allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document
(cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the
User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written
by the Personalization Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The Per-
sonalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1/PACE
and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these data. FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE
and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR
FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management func-
tions.
Unauthorized modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by FTP_ITC.1/
PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE secured data exchange, a prerequisite for es-
tablishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_
UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/
PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted channel is established using
PACE, Chip Authentication v.1, and Terminal Authentication v.1. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing
the values of session keys (here: for KMAC).
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical
travel document data after Chip Authentication v.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UIT.1/
TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_
CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys),
and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure mes-
saging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Au-
thentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR FCS_RND.1
represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.
The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity aims ensuring authenticity of the User- and
TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the terminal-side and
by an active verification by the TOE itself.
This objective is mainly achieved by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A
prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Au-
thentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp.
65
FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE
resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for
KMAC).
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific
properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access to
the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the
TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalization
Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy.
The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.
The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality aims that the TOE always ensures con-
fidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication resp. Chip
Authentication, of these data exchanged.
This objective for the data stored is mainly achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/
TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required spe-
cific properties of the protocols used.
This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/
TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC resp. FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A
prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Au-
thentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp.
FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE
resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for Kenc).
The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip
Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the
User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written
by the Personalization Agent only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy.
The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the general support for cryptographic operations needed.
The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric refer-
ence data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/
TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated
Extended Inspection System being authorized by a valid certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_
VER.
The SFRs FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE require the identification and authen-
tication of the inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the successful Chip
Authentication (CA) v.1 before any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System.
During the protected communication following the CA v.1 the reuse of authentication data is
prevented by FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires
the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of
secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for
the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation
of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
66
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are de-
stroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/
KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read
afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key
and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as
of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authentic-
ity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 provided by FIA_API.1 proving the
identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is per-
formed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The generation of the key pair is defined by FCS_CKM.1/
CA_STATIC. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 [BSI_TR-03110] requires additional TSF
according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
he security objective OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authentic-
ity” is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_ API.1/AA proving
the identity of the TOE. The Active Authentication Protocol defined by FIA_API.1/AA is per-
formed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ_AA. The Active Authentication Protocol [ICAO_PKI] requires
additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA.
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality
of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” re-
quires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the travel document’s
chip against disclosure
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Tracing aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE tracing data
by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or
listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without a priori
knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ).
This objective is achieved as follows:(i) while establishing PACE communication with CAN
or MRZ (non-blocking authorization data) – by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;(ii) for listening to PACE
67
communication (is of importance for the current PP, since SOD is card-individual) – FTP_ITC.1/
PACE.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered
by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and
tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR
FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions
possibly causing a malfunction.
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mu-
tual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied.
All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved
dependencies are appropriately explained.
Table 6.3 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1/
DH_PACE
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key dis-
tribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation],
justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key de-
struction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/CA [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key dis-
tribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation],
Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key de-
struction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/
CA_STATIC
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key dis-
tribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation],
Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key de-
struction
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_CKM.4
from
[CC_PP-0068-V2]
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion]
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and
FCS_CKM.1/CA
68
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/
PACE_ENC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key gen-
eration],
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key de-
struction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/
CA_ENC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key gen-
eration],
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key de-
struction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/
PACE_MAC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key de-
struction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/
CA_MAC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key de-
struction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/
SIG_VER
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key de-
struction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
69
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/
RSA_AA
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
justification 3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_AFL.1/
PACE
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Fulfilled by
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/
PACE
No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1/
PACE
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/
PACE
No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/
PACE
No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1/AA No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1/TRM FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based
access control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initializa-
tion
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies n.a.
FDP_UCT.1/TRM [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel,
or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
Fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel,
or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
Fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
70
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1/
PACE
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/
INI_ENA
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/
INI_DIS
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/
CVCA_INI
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/
CVCA_UPD
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/
DATE
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/
CAPK
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/
AAPK
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/
KEY_READ
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
71
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FMT_MTD.1/
KEY_READ_AA
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.3 FMT_MTD.1 Fulfilled by
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI and
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FTP_ITC.1/PACE No dependencies n.a.
Table 6.3: Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1 A Diffie-Hellman key agreement is used in order to have no key distribution, therefore
FCS_CKM.2 makes no sense in this case.
No. 2 When the Chip Authentication private key is generated, it is permanently stored within
the TOE. There is no need for FCS_CKM.4.
No. 3 The SFR FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA uses the asymmetric Authentication Key permanently
stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the man-
ufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the
addressed TOE life cycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the key is
permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.
No. 4 The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes which
are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE.
No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is
necessary here.
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The selection of assurance components is based on the underlying PP [CC_PP-0068-V2]. This
Security Target uses the same augmentations as the PP, but chooses a higher assurance level.
The level EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigor-
ous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL5 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing prod-
uct line. EAL5 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a very
high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared
to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs. Additionally, the requirement of the PP
[CC_PP-0068-V2] to choose at least EAL4 is fulfilled.
72
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the travel document’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
travel document’s material.
The selection of the component ATE_DPT.2 as augmentation from the PP is made obsolete
by the selection of EAL5 because the component ATE_DPT.3 as part of EAL5 already exceeds
ATE_DPT.2.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill the security
objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
• ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
• ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
• ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
• ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
• AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
• AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package.
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security require-
ments for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security
assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally consistent
whole.
The analysis of the TOE’s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 6.3.2 ’Dependency Rationale for the security functional
requirements’ shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all
defined functional requirements is satisfied. This is also true for the augmentations specified
in 2.3. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed and non-
satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
All subjects and objects addressed by more than one SFR in sec. 6.1 are also treated in a con-
sistent way: the SFRs impacting them do not require any contradictory property and behavior
of these ’shared’ items.
The assurance class EAL5 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally con-
sistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance compo-
nents in section 6.3.3 ’Security Assurance Requirements Rationale’ shows that the assurance
requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies
are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not
73
to arise in sections 6.3.2 ’Rationale for SFR’s Dependencies’ and 6.3.3 ’Security Assurance
Requirements Rationale’. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 6.3.3 ’Security Assurance
Requirements Rationale’, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of
the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other
and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
74
7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
This chapter describes the TOE Security Functions and the Assurance Measures covering the
requirements of the previous chapter.
7.1 TOE Security Functions
This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions composing
the TSF.
7.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Cryptographic
Library
F.IC_CL: Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and Cryptographic Library
This Security Function covers the security functions of the hardware (IC) as well as of the cryp-
tographic library. The Security Target of the hardware [IFX_ST-SLE78] defines the following
Security Services and Security Features:
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support including the components
• 3DES
• AES
• RSA (Encryption, Decryption, Signature Generation and Verification, Asymmetric
Key Generation)
• EC (Signature Generation and Verification, Asymmetric Key Generation, Asym-
metric Key Agreement)
• SHA-2
• TRNG
75
7.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operat-
ing system
F.Access_Control
This TSF regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are only
executed after this TSF allowed access. This function consists of following elements:
1. Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects (any file) and security attributes
2. No access control policy allows reading of any key
3. Any access not explicitly allowed is denied
4. Access Control in the Manufacturing phase (phase 2): Configuration and initialization of
the TOE, configuring of Access Control policy and doing key management only by the
Manufacturer or on behalf of him (see F.Management)
5. Access Control in the Personalization phase (phase 3): Personalization including the
writing of user and dedicated TSF data and reading of initialization data only by the
Personalization Agent identified with its authentication key (see F.Management)
6. Access Control in Operational Use phase (phase 4): Reading of user data (except DG3
and DG4) only by a PACE Terminal (PCT) after a successful PACE authentication and
using Secure Messaging; reading of optional biometrics (EF.DG3, EF.DG4) by authenti-
cated and authorized EIS
F.Identification_Authentication
This function provides identification/authentication of the user roles
• Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent)
• Personalization Agent
• Terminal (for BAC authentication mechanism)
• PACE Terminal (PCT)
• Country Verifier Certification Authority
• Document Verifier
• Extended Inspection System (domestic/foreign)
by the methods:
1. In the Manufacturing phase1
:
• Symmetric BAC authentication method [ICAO_9303, ICAO_PKI] with following
properties
– The authentication is as specified by ICAO
– It uses a challenge from the MRTD
– The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by
F.Crypto
1
’Layout 0’ only, see F.Management
76
– The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by
F.Crypto
– On error (wrong MAC, wrong challenge) the user role is not identified/authen-
ticated
– On success the session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging (op-
tional)
2. In the Personalization phase:
• Symmetric BAC authentication method [ICAO_9303, ICAO_PKI] with following
properties
– The authentication is as specified by ICAO
– It uses a challenge from the MRTD
– The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by
F.Crypto
– The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by
F.Crypto
– On error (wrong MAC, wrong challenge) the user role is not identified/authen-
ticated
– After three consecutive failed authentication attempts the authentication method
is blocked and the key is no longer usable (retry counter with a value of 3)
– On success the session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging
• Secure Messaging with following properties
– The Secure Messaging is as specified by ICAO
– The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by
F.Crypto
– The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by
F.Crypto
– In a Secure Messaging protected command the method for confidentiality and
the method for authenticity must be present
– The initialization vector is a zero-IV for encryption and an encrypted Send Se-
quence Counter (SSC) for MAC
– A session key is used
– On any command that is not protected correctly with the session keys these are
overwritten according to FIPS 140-2 [FIPS_140-2] (or better) and a new BAC
authentication is required
– Keys in transient memory are overwritten after usage
• In the Operational Use phase
– BAC authentication (optional) with the same properties as the BAC authenti-
cation used in the Personalization phase except that on failed authentications
the method is not blocked, but subsequent authentication attempts are delayed
by up to 10 seconds and on successful authentications the usage counter is de-
creased by one (the maximum number of authentications against the key is 10
000); note that BAC authentication in Operational Use phase is beyond the
scope of the certification
77
– PACE authentication method [BSI_TR-03110]
∗ It uses an MRZ or a Card Access Number
∗ The cryptographic method for confidentiality is AES/CBC or 3DES/CBC
provided by F.Crypto
∗ The cryptographic method for authenticity is CMAC or Retail-MAC pro-
vided by F.Crypto
∗ On error the user role is not identified/authenticated; subsequent authenti-
cation attempts are delayed by up to 10 seconds
∗ On success the session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging;
the usage counter is decreased by one (the maximum number of authenti-
cations against the key is 10 000)
– Secure Messaging with following properties
∗ The cryptographic method for confidentiality is AES/CBC or 3DES/CBC
provided by F.Crypto
∗ The cryptographic method for authenticity is CMAC or Retail-MAC pro-
vided by F.Crypto
∗ In a Secure Messaging protected command the method for confidentiality
and the method for authenticity must be present
∗ The initialization vector is a zero-IV for 3DES encryption and an encrypted
Send Sequence Counter (SSC) for AES encryption, CMAC and Retail-
MAC.
∗ A session key is used
∗ On any command that is not protected correctly with the session keys these
are overwritten according to FIPS 140-2 [FIPS_140-2] (or better) and a new
PACE authentication is required
∗ Keys in transient memory are overwritten after usage
• Active Authentication with following properties
– According to TrPKI [ICAO_PKI] using RSA from F.IC_CL.
• Chip Authentication with following properties
– According to TR-03110 [BSI_TR-03110] using ECDH from F.IC_CL
– Session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging replacing existing
session keys.
• Terminal Authentication with following properties
– According to TR03110 [BSI_TR-03110] checking certificates with ECDSA
from F.IC_CL
– It uses a challenge from the MRTD
– Usable only in a Secure Messaging session with Chip Authentication key
– It distinguishes between the roles
∗ Country Verifier Certification Authority
∗ Domestic and foreign Document Verifier
∗ Domestic and foreign Extended Inspection System
– Update of CVCA certificate is allowed for CVCA
– Update of current date is allowed for CVCA, domestic and foreign Document
Verifier and domestic Extended Inspection System
78
– Only with a public key from an IS certificate the challenge-response authenti-
cation itself is performed
– The bitwise AND of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of a certificate chain
is used for Terminal Authorization
– Verifying validity of certificate chain
∗ Certificates must be in the sequence: known CVCA [> CVCA]> DV > IS
∗ Expiration dates must not be before the current date
F.Management
In phase 2 the Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent) performs the initial-
ization and configures the file layout including security attributes. In any case the layout deter-
mines that the parameters given in F.Access_Control for phases 3 and 4 are enforced. The agent
can also do key management including on-wafer change of the Personalization Key and other
administrative tasks.
In phase 3 the Personalization Agent performs the following steps:
• Formatting of all data to be stored in the TOE
• Writing of all the required data to the appropriate files
• Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4 where reading of the initialization
data is prevented
F.Crypto
This function provides a high level interface to
• DES (supplied by F.IC_CL)
• AES (supplied by F.IC_CL)
• CMAC
• 3DES/CBC
• DES/Retail MAC
• ECC (supplied by F.IC_CL)
Note 48: The ECC functionality is used in phase 3 by the Personalization Agent to generate
the Chip Authentication key pair.
F.Verification
TOE internal functions ensures correct operation.
79
7.2 Assurance Measures
The assurance measures fulfilling the requirements of EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 are given in table 7.1.
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures, automation
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Table 7.1: Assurance Measures
7.2.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Table 7.2 shows the coverage of the SFRs by TSFs.
SFR TSFs
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE F.IC_CL
FCS_CKM.1/CA F.IC_CL
FCS_CKM.1/CA_STATIC F.IC_CL
FCS_CKM.4 F.Identification_Authentication
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC F.IC_CL, F.Crypto
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC F.IC_CL
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC F.IC_CL, F.Crypto
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC F.IC_CL
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER F.IC_CL
FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA F.IC_CL
80
SFR TSFs
FCS_RND.1 F.IC_CL
FIA_AFL.1/PACE F.Identification_Authentication
FIA_UID.1/PACE F.Access_Control
FIA_UAU.1/PACE F.Access_Control
FIA_UAU.4/PACE F.Identification_Authentication
FIA_UAU.5/PACE F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication
FIA_UAU.6/PACE F.Identification_Authentication
FIA_UAU.6/EAC F.Identification_Authentication
FIA_API.1 F.Identification_Authentication
FIA_API.1/AA F.Identification_Authentication
FDP_ACC.1/TRM F.Access_Control
FDP_ACF.1/TRM F.Access_Control
FDP_RIP.1 F.Identification_Authentication, F.Management
FDP_UCT.1/TRM F.Access_Control
FDP_UIT.1/TRM F.Access_Control
FAU_SAS.1 F.IC_CL
FMT_SMF.1 F.Management
FMT_SMR.1/PACE F.Identification_Authentication
FMT_LIM.1 F.IC_CL
FMT_LIM.2 F.IC_CL
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA F.IC_CL, F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS F.Access_Control, F.Management
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD F.Identification_Authentication
FMT_MTD.1/DATE F.Identification_Authentication
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.1/PA F.Identification_Authentication
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ_AA F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.3 F.Identification_Authentication
FPT_EMS.1 F.IC_CL
FPT_FLS.1 F.IC_CL
FPT_TST.1 F.IC_CL, F.Verification
FPT_PHP.3 F.IC_CL
FTP_ITC.1/PACE F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication
Table 7.2: Coverage of SFRs for the TOE by TSFs.
81
The SFR FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE requires the ECDH algorithm. This is provided by the
cryptographic library function F.IC_CL, SF_CS(EC).
The SFR FCS_CKM.1/CA requires the ECDH algorithm. This is provided by the crypto-
graphic library function F.IC_CL, SF_CS(EC).
The SFR FCS_CKM.1/CA_STATIC requires ECDSA key generation. This is provided by
the cryptographic library function F.IC_CL, SF_CS(EC).
The SFR FCS_CKM.4 requires the destroying of cryptographic keys. This is done in
F.Identification_Authentication (“Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage”).
The SFR FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC requires AES and 3DES in CBC mode. F.IC_CL,
SF_CS(AES), SF_CS(3DES) and F.Crypto provide this algorithm.
The SFR FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC requires AES and 3DES in CBC mode. F.IC_CL, SF_CS
(AES), SF_CS(3DES) and F.Crypto provide this algorithm.
The SFR FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC requires AES and 3DES in CBC mode. F.IC_CL,
SF_CS(AES), SF_CS(3DES) and F.Crypto provide this algorithm.
The SFR FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC requires AES and 3DES in CBC mode. F.IC_CL, SF_CS
(AES), SF_CS(3DES) and F.Crypto provide this algorithm.
The SFR FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER requires ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 224, 256
and 320 bits to perform digital Signature Verification. F.IC_CL (SF_CS/3EC) provides func-
tions to verify signatures based on ECC.
The SFR FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA requires RSA. F.IC_CL (SF_CS/RSA) provides the func-
tions.
The SFR FCS_RND.1 requires the generation of random numbers which is provided by
F.IC_CL, SF_CS(TRNG). The provided random number generator produces cryptographically
strong random numbers which are used at the appropriate places as written in the addition there.
The SFR FIA_AFL.1/PACE requires the detection of an unsuccessful authentication at-
tempt and the waiting for a specified time between the reception of an authentication command
and its processing. F.Identification_Authentication detects unsuccessful authentication at-
tempts.
The SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE requires timing of identification. It is handled by F.Access_
Control which enforces identification of a role before access is granted. Also all policies pre-
vent reading sensitive or user dependent data without user identification.
The SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE requires timing of authentication. It is handled by F.Access_
Control which enforces authentication of a role before access is granted. Also all policies
prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without user authentication.
The SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE requires prevention of authentication data reuse. This is in
particular fulfilled by using changing initialization vectors in Secure Messaging. Secure Mes-
saging is provided by F.Identification_Authentication.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires Passive Authentication protocol, Secure Messag-
ing in encrypt-then-authenticate mode and PACE protocol based on AES. In addition SFR
FIA_UAU.5 also requires the authentication of any user’s claimed identity. F.Identification
_Authentication and F.Access_Control fulfill these requirements.
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/PACE requires re-authentication for each command after successful
authentication (PACE authentication in usage phase). This is done by F.Identification_Authenti-
cation providing Secure Messaging.
82
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC requires re-authentication for each command after successful
authentication (EAC authentication in usage phase). This is done by F.Identification_Authenti-
cation providing Secure Messaging.
The SFR FIA_API.1 requires the proving of the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentica-
tion is done by F.Identification_Authentication.
The SFR FIA_API.1 requires the proving of the identity of the TOE. The Active Authenti-
cation is done by F.Identification_Authentication.
The SFR FDP_ACC.1/TRM requires the enforcement of the terminal access control policy
on terminals gaining write, read, modification and usage access to user data stored in the ePass.
This is done by F.Access_Control.
The SFR FDP_ACF.1/TRM requires the enforcement of the terminal access control policy
on objects which is done by F.Access_Control.
The SFR FDP_RIP.1 requires residual information protection. This is done by F.Identifica-
tion_Authentication and F.Management.
The SFR FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires data exchange confidentiality. This is done by F.Access_
Control.
The SFR FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires data exchange integrity. This is done by F.Access_
Control.
The SFR FAU_SAS.1 requires the storage of the chip identification data which is addressed
in F.IC_CL, SF_DPM.
The SFR FMT_SMF.1 requires security management functions for initialization, personal-
ization and configuration. This is done by F.Management.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE requires the maintenance of roles. The roles are managed
by F.Identification_Authentication.
The SFR FMT_LIM.1 requires limited capabilities of test functions which is provided by
F.IC_CL, SF_DPM which controls what commands can be executed thereby preventing exter-
nal usable test functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software only is available in the
Test Mode.
The SFR FMT_LIM.2 requires limited availabilities of test functions which is provided
by F.IC_CL, SF_DPM which controls what commands can be executed thereby preventing
external usable test functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software only is available in
the Test Mode.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA requires writing of Initialization data and Pre-personaliza-
tion data to the Manufacturer. Writing of Pre-personalization and Installation data only by the
Manufacturer is enforced by F.Access_Control. In addition F.IC_CL, SF_DPM stores this
data in the User Read Only Area which cannot be changed afterwards.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires only the Personalization Agent to be able to read
out and use the Initialization data. This is provided by F.Management and F.Access_Control.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI requires only pre- and personalization agent to be able
to write initial Country Verifying Certification Authority public public key, initial Country Ver-
ifier Certification Authority certificate and initial date. This is provided by F.Access_Control.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD requires only country verifier certification authority
to be able to update Country Verifier Certification Authority public public key and Country Ver-
ifier Certification Authority certificate. This is provided by F.Identification_Authentication
(properties of terminal authentication).
83
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/DATE requires only country verifier certification authority, docu-
ment verifier and domestic extended Inspection System to be able to modify the current date.
This is provided by F.Identification_Authentication (properties of terminal authentication).
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK requires the Personalization agent to be able to create or
load the Chip Authentication Private Key. This is provided by F.Access_Control allowing the
personalization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/AAPK requires the Personalization agent to be able to load the
Active Authentication Private Key. This is provided by F.Access_Control allowing the person-
alization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/PA requires only the Personalization Agent to write the document
security object. This is provided by F.Identification_Authentication.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ_AA require that
no read access to secret keys is given to anyone. This is provided by F.Access_Control.
The SFR FMT_MTD.3 requires only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted
for data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control. This is done by
F.Identification_Authentication (Terminal Authentication properties).
The SFR FPT_EMS.1 requires limiting of emanations. This is provided by F.IC_CL,
SF_PS.
The SFR FPT_FLS.1 requires failure detection and preservation of a secure state. The
Control of Operating Conditions of F.IC_CL, SF_PS„ SF_PMA, SF_PLA is directly designed
for this SFR. It audits continually and reacts to environmental and other problems by bringing
it into a secure state.
The SFR FPT_TST.1 requires testing for (a) correct operation, (b) integrity of data and
(c) integrity of executable code. F.Verification does this testing. F.IC_CL, SF_CS, SF_PMA
controls all EEPROM and ROM content for integrity.
The SFR FPT_PHP.3 requires resistance to physical manipulation and probing. This is
provided by F.IC_CL, SF_DPM, SF_PS, SF_PMA, SF_PLA, SF_CS which is provided by
the hardware to resist attacks.
The SFR FTP_ITC.1/PACE requires the usage of a trusted channel. This is done by
F.Access_Control and F.Identification_Authentication.
7.3 Statement of Compatibility
This is a statement of compatibility between this Composite Security Target and the Security
Target of M7820[IFX_ST-SLE78].
7.3.1 Relevance of Hardware TSFs
Table 7.3 shows the relevance of the hardware security functions for the composite Security
Target.
84
Hardware TSFs Relevant Not relevant
SF_DPM Device Phase Management x
SF_PS Protection against Snooping x
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks x
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks x
SF_CS (3DES) Cryptographic Support x
SF_CS (AES) Cryptographic Support x
SF_CS (RSA) Cryptographic Support x
SF_CS (EC) Cryptographic Support x
SF_CS (SHA-2) Cryptographic Support x
SF_CS (TRNG) Cryptographic Support x
Table 7.3: Relevance of Hardware and Cryptographic Library TSFs for Composite ST
7.3.2 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment
Beside the assumptions, threats, organizational security policies, security objectives and secu-
rity requirements included in protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2 [CC_PP-0056-V2], this
section also lists those taken from protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2 [CC_PP-0068-V2].
These are given in italics.
Assumptions
The following list shows that the assumptions of the hardware are either not relevant for
this Security Target or are covered by appropriate Security Objectives. The assumptions for the
TOE are not relevant for the hardware ST.
• Assumptions of the TOE
– A.Passive_Auth (PKI for Passive Authentication): No conflict
– A.Insp_Sys (Systems for global interoperability): No conflict
– A.Auth_PKI (PKI for Inspection Systems): No conflict
• Assumptions of the hardware
– A.Process-Sec-IC (Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization): No
conflict
– A.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform): See OE.Plat-Appl; the correct usage of
the hardware platform becomes a Security Objective of the TOE and is proven by
the evaluation
– A.Resp-Appl (Treatment of User Data): Covered by Security Objective OT.Prot_
Inf_Leak
– A.Key-Function (Usage of Key-dependent Functions): No conflict
• Assumptions of the cryptographic lib
– A.RSA-Key-Gen (Operational Environment for RSA Key Generation function): Not
relevant
85
Threats
The Threats of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped (see Table 7.4) or are not relevant.
They show no conflicts between each other.
• Threats of the TOE
– T.Skimming (Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communica-
tion): No conflict
– T.Eavesdropping (Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the
PACE terminal): No conflict
– T.Tracing (Tracing travel document): No conflict
– T.Forgery (Forgery of Data): No conflict
– T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality): Matches T.Abuse-Func of the hardware ST
– T.Information_Leakage (Information Leakage from travel document): Matches T.Leak-
Inherent and T.Leak-Forced of the hardware ST
– T.Phys-Tamper (Physical Tampering): Matches T.Phys-Probing and T.Phys-Manipulation
of the hardware ST
– T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress): Matches T.Malfunction
of the hardware ST
– T.Read_Sensitive_Data (Read the sensitive biometric reference data): No conflict
– T.Counterfeit (Counterfeit of travel document chip data): No conflict
• Threats of the hardware
– T.Leak-Inherent (Inherent Information Leakage): Matches T.Information_Leakage
of the TOE ST
– T.Phys-Probing (Physical Probing): Matches T.Phys-Tamper of the TOE ST
– T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress): Matches T.Malfunction
of the TOE ST
– T.Phys-Manipulation (Physical Manipulation): Matches T.Phys-Tamper of the TOE
ST
– T.Leak-Forced (Forced Information Leakage): Matches T.Information_Leakage of
the TOE ST
– T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality): Matches T.Abuse-Func of the TOE ST
– T.RND (Deficiency of Random Numbers): Basic threat concerning especially the
BAC/PACE functionality of the TOE; no conflict
– T.Mem-Access (Memory Access Violation): Matches T.Malfunction, T.Abuse-Func
and T.Phys-Tamper of the TOE
86
T.Abuse-Func
T.Information_Leakage
T.Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction
T.Leak-Inherent x
T.Phys-Probing x
T.Malfunction x
T.Phys-Manipulation x
T.Leak-Forced x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Mem-Access x x x
Table 7.4: Mapping of hardware to TOE Threats (only threats that can be mapped directly are
shown)
Organizational Security Policies
The Organizational Security Policies of the TOE and the hardware have no conflicts between
each other. They are shown in the following list.
• Organizational Security Policies of the TOE
– P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip): Covers P.Process-TOE
of the hardware ST
– P.Pre-Operational (Pre-operational handling of the travel document): Covers P.Process-
TOE of the hardware ST
– P.Terminal (Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals): Not applicable
– P.Card_PKI (PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)): Not applicable
– P.Trustworthy_PKI (Trustworthiness of PKI): Not applicable
– P.Sensitive_Data (Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data): Not applicable
– P.Personalization (Personalization of the travel document by issuing State or Orga-
nization only): Not applicable
• Organizational Security Policies of the hardware
– P.Process-TOE (Protection during TOE Development and Production): Covered by
P.Manufact and P.Pre-Operational of the TOE ST
– P.Add-Func (Additional Specific Security Functionality): Not applicable
Security Objectives
Some of the security objectives of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped directly (see
Table 7.5). Those taken from the PACE-PP [CC_PP-0068-V2] are given in italic, those taking
87
Active Authentication into account are underlined. None of them show any conflicts between
each other.
• Security Objectives for the TOE
– OT.Data_Integrity (Integrity of Data): No conflicts
– OT.Data_Authenticity (Authenticity of Data): No conflicts
– OT.Data_Confidentiality (Confidentiality of Data): Matches O.Add-Functions of
the hardware ST
– OT.Tracing (Tracing travel document): No conflicts
– OT.Prot_Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality): Matches O.Abuse-
Func of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot_Inf_Leak (Protection against Information Leakage): Matches O.Leak-Inherent
and O.Leak-Forced of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering): Matches O.Phys-
Probing and O.Phys-Manipulation of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot_Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions): Matches O.Malfunction of
the hardware ST
– OT.Identification (Identification of the TOE): Matches O.Identification of the hard-
ware ST
– OT.AC_Pers (Personalization of travel document): No conflicts
– OT.Sens_Data_Conf (Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data): Matches
O.Add-Functions of the hardware ST
– OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (Proof of travel document’s chip authenticity): No conflicts
– OT.Active_Auth_Proof (Proof of travel document’s chip authenticity): Matches O.Add-
Functions of the hardware ST
• Security Objectives for the hardware
– O.Leak-Inherent (Protection against Inherent Information Leakage): Covered by
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak of the TOE ST
– O.Phys-Probing (Protection against Physical Probing): Covered by OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper of the TOE ST
– O.Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions): Covered by OT.Prot_Malfunction
of the TOE ST
– O.Phys-Manipulation (Protection against Physical Manipulation): Covered by OT.Prot_
Phys-Tamper of the TOE ST
– O.Leak-Forced (Protection against Forced Information Leakage): Covered by OT.Prot_
Inf_Leak of the TOE ST
– O.Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality): Covered by OT.Prot_
Abuse-Func of the TOE ST
– O.Identification (TOE Identification): Covered by OT.Identification of the TOE ST
– O.RND (Random Numbers): Basic objective for the security of the TOE; no con-
flicts with any Security Objective of the TOE
– O.Add-Functions (Additional specific security functionality): Covered by OT.Data_
Confidentiality, Active_Auth_Proof and OT.Sens_Data_Conf of the TOE ST
– O.Mem-Access (Area based Memory Access Control): Covered by OT.Prot_Malfunc-
tion, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper of the TOE ST
88
– OE.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform): The correct usage of the hardware
platform becomes a Security Objective of the TOE and is proven by the evaluation
– OE.Resp-Appl (Treatment of User Data): No conflicts
– OE.Process-Sec-IC (Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization):
No conflicts
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Identification
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
O.Leak-Inherent x
O.Phys-Probing x
O.Malfunction x
O.Phys-Manipulation x
O.Leak-Forced x
O.Abuse-Func x
O.Identification x
O.Add-Functions x x x
O.Mem-Access x x x
Table 7.5: Mapping of hardware to TOE Security Objectives including those of the environment
(only those that can be mapped directly are shown)
Security Requirements
The relevant Security Requirements of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped directly
(see Table 7.6). None of them show any conflicts between each other.
• Relevant Security Requirements of the TOE
– FAU_SAS.1 (Audit storage) Matches FAU_SAS.1 of the hardware ST
– FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (Cryptographic key generation - Diffie-Hellman for PACE
session keys): Matches FCS_COP.1/EC and FCS_COP.1/ECDH cryptography op-
eration of the hardware ST
– FCS_CKM.1/CA (Cryptographic key generation - Diffie-Hellman for Chip Authen-
tication session keys): Matches FCS_COP.1/EC and FCS_COP.1/ECDH cryptogra-
phy operation of the hardware ST
– FCS_CKM.1/CA_STATIC (Cryptographic key generation - Diffie-Hellman for Chip
Authentication session keys): Matches FCS_COP.1/EC cryptography operation of
the hardware ST
– FCS_CKM.4 (Cryptographic key destruction): No conflicts
89
– FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC (Cryptographic operation - Encryption / Decryption AES/
3DES): Matches FCS_COP.1/AES and FCS_COP.1/DES of the hardware ST
– FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (Cryptographic operation - Symmetric Encryption / Decryp-
tion): Matches FCS_COP.1/EC and FCS_COP.1/ECDH cryptography operation of
the hardware ST
– FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC (Cryptographic operation - MAC): Matches FCS_COP.1/
AES and FCS_COP.1/DES of the hardware ST
– FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (Cryptographic operation - MAC): Matches FCS_COP.1/AES
and FCS_COP.1/DES/3DES operation of the hardware ST
– FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (Cryptographic operation - Signature verification by the travel
document): Matches FCS_COP.1/ECDSA cryptography operation of the hardware
ST
– FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA (Cryptographic operation - Signature creation by the travel
document): Matches FCS_COP.1/RSA cryptography operation of the hardware ST
– FCS_RND.1 (Quality metric for random numbers): Matches FCS_RNG.1 of the
hardware ST
– Class FIA (Identification and Authentication): No conflicts
– FDP_ACC.1/TRM (Subset access control - Terminal Access): Matches FDP_ACC.1
of the hardware ST
– FDP_ACF.1/TRM (User Data Protection - Security attribute based access control):
Matches FDP_ACF.1 of the hardware ST
– FDP_RIP.1 (Subset residual information protection): No conflicts
– FDP_UCT.1/TRM (Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD): No conflicts
– FDP_UIT.1/TRM (Data exchange integrity): No conflicts
– FMT_SMF.1 (Specification of Management Functions): Matches FMT_SMF.1 of
the hardware ST
– FMT_SMR.1/PACE (Security roles): No conflicts
– FMT_LIM.1 (Limited capabilities): Matches FMT_LIM.1 of the hardware ST
– FMT_LIM.2 (Limited availability): Matches FMT_LIM.2 of the hardware ST
– Other Class FMT (Management of TSF data): No conflicts
– FPT_EMS.1 (TOE Emanation): Matches FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_IFC.1
of the hardware ST
– FPT_FLS.1 (Failure with preservation of secure state): Matches FPT_FLS.1, FRU_
FLT.2 and FPT_PHP.3 of the hardware ST
– FPT_TST.1 (TSF testing): Matches FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_TST.2 of the hardware ST
– FPT_PHP.3 (Resistance to physical attack): Matches FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_PHP.3
of the hardware ST
– FTP_ITC.1/PACE: No conflicts
• Security Requirements of the hardware
– FAU_SAS.1 (Audit storage) Matches FAU_SAS.1 of the TOE ST
– FRU_FLT.2 (Limited fault tolerance): Covered by FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1 and
FPT_ PHP.3 of the TOE ST
– FPT_FLS.1 (Failure with preservation of secure state): Covered by FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_PHP.3 of the TOE ST
– FMT_LIM.1 (Limited capabilities): Covered by FMT_LIM.1 of the TOE ST
90
– FMT_LIM.2 (Limited availability): Covered by FMT_LIM.2 of the TOE ST
– FPT_PHP.3 (Resistance to physical attack): Covered by FPT_PHP.3 of the TOE ST
– FDP_ITT.1 (Basic internal transfer protection): Covered by FPT_EMS.1 of the TOE
ST
– FDP_SDI.1 (Stored data integrity monitoring): No conflicts to the TOE SFRs
– FDP_SDI.2 (Stored data integrity monitoring and action): No conflicts to the TOE
SFRs
– FPT_ITT.1 (Basic internal TSF data transfer protection): Covered by FPT_EMS.1
of the TOE ST
– FPT_TST.2 (Subset TOE testing): Covered by FPT_TST.1 of the TOE ST
– FDP_IFC.1 (Subset information flow control): Covered by FPT_EMS.1 of the TOE
ST
– FCS_RNG.1 (Random number generation): Covered by FCS_RND.1 of the TOE
ST
– FDP_ACC.1 (Subset access control) Covered by FDP_ACC.1/TRM of the TOE ST
– FDP_ACF.1 (Security attribute based access control) Covered by FDP_ACF.1/TRM
of the TOE ST
– FMT_MSA.3 (Static attribute initialization): Used implicitly, no conflicts to the
TOE SFRs
– FMT_MSA.1 (Management of security attributes): Used implicitly, no conflicts to
the TOE SFRs
– FMT_SMF.1 (Specification of Management Functions): Covered by FMT_SMF.1
of the TOE ST
– FCS_COP.1/DES (Cryptographic operation (DES)): Covered by FCS_COP.1/PACE_
ENC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
of the TOE ST
– FCS_COP.1/AES (Cryptographic operation (AES)): Covered by FCS_COP.1/PACE_
ENC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
of the TOE ST
– FCS_COP.1/RSA (Cryptographic operation (RSA)): Covered by FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA
of the TOE ST
– FCS_COP.1/ECDSA (Cryptographic operation (ECDSA)): Covered by FCS_COP.1/
SIG_VER of the TOE ST
– FCS_COP.1/ECDH (Cryptographic operation (ECDH)): Covered by FCS_CKM.1/
DH_PACE and FCS_CKM.1/CA of the TOE ST
– FCS_COP.1/SHA (Cryptographic operation (SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256)): Not
relevant
– FCS_CKM.1/RSA (Cryptographic key generation (RSA key generation)): Not rel-
evant
– FCS_CKM.1/EC (Cryptographic key generation (EC key generation)): Covered by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.1/CA and FCS_CKM.1/CA_STATIC of the
TOE ST
91
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.1/CA_STATIC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA
FCS_RND.1
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FAU_SAS.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
FAU_SAS.1 x
FRU_FLT.2 x x x
FPT_FLS.1 x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FPT_PHP.3 x
FDP_ITT.1 x
FPT_ITT.1 x
FPT_TST.2 x
FDP_IFC.1 x
FCS_RNG.1 x
FDP_ACC.1 x
FDP_ACF.1 x
FMT_SMF.1 x
FCS_COP.1/AES x x x x
FCS_COP.1/DES x x x x
FCS_COP.1/RSA x
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA x
FCS_COP.1/ECDH x x x
FCS_CKM.1/EC x x x x
Table 7.6: Mapping of hardware to TOE Security SFRs (only SFRs that can be mapped directly
are shown)
Assurance Requirements The level of assurance of the
• TOE is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
• Hardware is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 (EAL5 requires
ATE_DPT.3)
This shows that the Assurance Requirements of the TOE is matched or exceeded by the
Assurance Requirements of the hardware. There are no conflicts.
7.3.3 Conclusion
Overall no contradictions between the Security Targets of the TOE and the hardware can be
found.
92
8 Glossary and Acronyms
Accurate Terminal Certificate A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document
Verifier is trusted by the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal Certificates with the
correct certificate effective date, see [BSI_TR-03110].
Advanced Inspection Procedure (with PACE) A specific order of authentication steps be-
tween a travel document and a terminal as required by [ICAO_SAC], namely (i) PACE,
(ii) Chip Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD and (iv) Terminal Au-
thentication v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-PACE and EIS-AIP-BAC.
Agreement This term is used in [CC_PP-0056-V2] in order to reflect an appropriate relation-
ship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] option by which means
the travel document’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and au-
thenticity of the travel document’s chip as part of a genuine travel document issued by a
known State of Organization.
Application note / Note Optional informative part of the ST containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use
of the TOE.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document’s chip to
store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the travel docu-
ment’s chip were created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access Control (BAC) Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] by which means
the travel document’s chip proves and the basic inspection system protects their commu-
nication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection System with PACE protocol (BIS-PACE) A technical system being used by
an inspecting authority and operated by a governmental organization (i.e. an Official Do-
mestic or Foreign Document Verifier) and verifying the travel document presenter as the
travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the
travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document
holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PACE Terminal additionally supporting/
applying the Passive Authentication protocol and is authorized by the travel document
Issuer through the Document Verifier of receiving state to read a subset of data stored on
the travel document.
93
Basic Inspection System (BIS) An inspection system which implements the terminals part of
the Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the travel document’s
chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the printed MRZ data for
reading the logical travel document.
Biographical data (biodata) The personalized details of the travel document holder appear-
ing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a
passport book or on a travel card or visa. [ICAO_9303]
Biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder
in the travel document’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference
data.
Card Access Number (CAN) Password derived from a short number printed on the front side
of the data-page.
Certificate chain A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System Certifi-
cate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between, and Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificates are on the highest level. A certificate of a lower level
is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next
higher level.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
Country Signing CA Certificate (CCSCA) Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Au-
thority Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority and stored
in the inspection system.
Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) An organization enforcing the policy of
the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data
stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI
for the travel documents and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed
by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for Document Signers
(cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a
Country Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be
used for different roles, see [BSI_TR-03110].
Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) An organization enforcing the privacy
policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to protection of user data stored in the
travel document (at a trial of a terminal to get an access to these data). The CVCA
represents the country specific root of the PKI for the terminals using it and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. Updates of the public key of the CVCA
are distributed in form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see [BSI_TR-03110].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based terminal
authentication, the current TOE cannot recognize a CVCS as a subject; hence, it merely
represents an organizational entity within [CC_PP-0056-V2].
94
The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing certificates for Document
Signers (cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated into a single entity,
e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs must
be used for different roles, see [BSI_TR-03110].
Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspec-
tion System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certifi-
cates.
CV Certificate Card Verifiable Certificate according to [BSI_TR-03110].
CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate expiration date
of the certificate for the old key.
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm The [ICAO_9303] describes the Docu-
ment Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document
Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
PACE passwords Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or the SHA-
1-value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth and Date of Expiry as read
from the MRZ, see [ICAO_SAC].
Document Details Data Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document rep-
resenting the document details like document type, issuing state, document number, date
of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The document details data are less-sensitive
data.
Document Security Object (SOD) A RFC 3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the
Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored
in the travel document’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS).
[ICAO_9303]
Document Signer (DS) An organization enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorized by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS)(CDS), see [BSI_TR-03110] and [ICAO_9303].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalization Agent.
Document Verifier (DV) An organization enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Ser-
vice Provider (here: of a governmental organization / inspection authority) and managing
terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by a State’s border police), by -
inter alia - issuing Terminal Certificates. A Document Verifier is therefore a Certifica-
tion Authority, authorized by at least the national CVCA to issue certificates for national
terminals, see [BSI_TR-03110].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based terminal
authentication, the current TOE cannot recognize a DV as a subject; hence, it merely
represents an organizational entity within this ST.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting under the policy of
the domestic CVCA being run by the travel document Issuer; a foreign DV is acting
95
under a policy of the respective foreign CVCA (in this case there shall be an appropriate
agreement between the travel document Issuer and a foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing
the travel document Issuer’s privacy policy).1
,2
Eavesdropper A threat agent with high attack potential reading the communication between
the travel document’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the travel docu-
ment’s chip.
Enrollment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person’s iden-
tity. [ICAO_9303]
Travel document (electronic) The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the
plastic or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following application: ePass-
port.
ePassport application A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data
(incl. biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this appli-
cation is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a machine readable travel
document (MRTD). See [BSI_TR-03110].
Extended Access Control Security mechanism identified in [ICAO_9303] by which means
the travel document’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems autho-
rized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional
biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional
biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure
messaging.
Extended Inspection System (EIS) A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which
is in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organiza-
tion to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the
Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the bio-
graphical data or portrait. [ICAO_9303]
Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated)
in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective
States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications
for placement of both eye readable and machine readable data in all travel documents.
[ICAO_9303]
IC Dedicated Software Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the IC hardware and
be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery procedures between different players.
The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life cycle
phases.
1
The form of such an agreement may be of formal and informal nature; the term ’agreement’ is used in BSI-
CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved.
2
Existing of such an agreement may be technically reflected by means of issuing a CCVCA-F for the Public
Key of the foreign CVCA signed by the domestic CVCA.
96
IC Dedicated Support Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
IC Embedded Software Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC devel-
oper. The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life cycle phase and embedded
into the IC in the manufacturing life cycle phase of the TOE.
IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control
the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process
to the travel document manufacturer.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and
identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or
herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s document. [ICAO_9303]
Improperly documented person A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an ex-
pired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel doc-
ument or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or
visa, if required. [ICAO_9303]
Initialization Process of writing Initialization Data (see below) to the TOE (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE
life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 3).
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are, for
instance, used for traceability and for IC identification as travel document’s material (IC
identification data).
Inspection The act of State examining an travel document presented to it by a traveler (the
travel document holder) and verifying its authenticity. [ICAO_9303].
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveler and verifying its authen-
ticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as travel document holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or mem-
ory functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the travel document’s
chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organisation.
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO_9303]
Issuing State The Country issuing the travel document. [ICAO_9303]
Logical Data Structure (LDS) The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the op-
tional capacity expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity expansion technology
used is the travel document’s chip.
97
Logical travel document Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical
Data Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless/contact integrated
circuit. It presents contactless or contact based readable data including (but not limited
to)
1. personal data of the travel document holder
2. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
3. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
4. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
and
5. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
6. EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine readable travel document (MRTD) Official document issued by a State or Orga-
nization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a sep-
arate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements
capable of being machine read. [ICAO_9303].
Machine readable zone (MRZ) Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel doc-
ument or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1,the back of the travel document, con-
taining mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [ICAO_9303].
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from the machine
readable zone and may be used for PACE.
Machine-verifiable biometrics feature A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g.
an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form
that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO_9303]
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel
document manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is
the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase. The TOE itself
does not distinguish between the IC manufacturer and travel document manufacturer us-
ing this role manufacturer.
Metadata of a CV Certificate Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as de-
scribed in [BSI_TR-03110].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
• Certificate Profile Identifier,
• Certificate Authority Reference,
• Certificate Holder Reference,
• Certificate Holder Authorization Template,
• Certificate Effective Date,
• Certificate Expiration Date.
ePassport application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system
on the IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes
98
• the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO_9303],
• the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content
of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
• the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the authen-
tication data itself.
Optional biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel doc-
ument holder in the travel document’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or
(ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission
decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference
data.
Passive authentication Security mechanism implementing (i) verification of the digital signa-
ture of the Document Security Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS
data fields with the hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) A communication establish-
ment protocol defined in [ICAO_SAC]. The PACE Protocol is a password authenticated
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol providing implicit password-based authentication
of the communication partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal connected): i.e. PACE
provides a verification, whether the communication partners share the same value of a
password π). Based on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure communication,
whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data transferred within this communication
channel are maintained.
PACE password A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
Personalization The process by which the Personalization Data are stored in and unambigu-
ously, inseparably associated with the travel document. This may also include the optional
biometric data collected during the “Enrollment” (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3,
Step 6).
Personalization Agent An organization acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to per-
sonalize the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the follow-
ing activities:
i establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the
travel document,
ii enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
iii writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personaliza-
tion) and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalization) for the
travel document holder as defined in [BSI_TR-03110],
iv writing the document details data,
v writing the initial TSF data,
vi signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ’Personalization Agent’ may be distributed among several insti-
tutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this role.
99
Personalization Data A set of data incl. (i) individual-related data (biographic and biometric
data) of the travel document holder, (ii) dedicated document details data and (iii) dedi-
cated initial TSF data (incl. the Card/Chip Security Object, if installed, and the Document
Security Object). Personalization data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the Personalization Agent in the life cycle phase card issuing.
Pre-personalization Data Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE
by the Manufacturer for traceability of the non-personalized travel document and/or to
secure shipment within or between the life cycle phases Manufacturing and card issuing.
Pre-personalized travel document’s chip Travel document’s chip equipped with a unique iden-
tifier and a unique Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State The Country to which the travel document holder is applying for entry; see
[ICAO_9303].
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verifi-
cation data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according to
ISO/IEC 14443.
Rightful equipment (rightful terminal or rightful Card) A technical device being expected
and possessing a valid, certified key pair for its authentication, whereby the validity of
the related certificate is verifiable up to the respective root CertA. A rightful terminal can
be either BIS-PACE (see Inspection System).
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the docu-
ment by whatever means; see [ICAO_9303]
Secure messaging in combined mode Secure messaging using encryption and message au-
thentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Skimming Imitation of a rightful terminal to read the travel document or parts of it via the
contactless/contact communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed
PACE password.
Standard Inspection Procedure A specific order of authentication steps between an travel
document and a terminal as required by [ICAO_SAC], namely (i) PACE and (ii) Passive
Authentication with SOD. SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.
Supplemental Access Control A Technical Report which specifies PACE v2 as an access con-
trol mechanism that is supplemental to Basic Access Control.
Terminal A Terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through a contact-
less/contact interface.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel
document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document holder) recognizing the
travel document.
100
Travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and
which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data sum-
mary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine
read; see [ICAO_9303] (there “Machine readable travel document”).
Travel document (electronic) The contactless/contact smart card integrated into the plastic or
paper, optical readable cover and providing the following application: ePassport.
Travel document holder A person for whom the ePass Issuer has personalized the travel doc-
ument.
Travel document Issuer (issuing authority) Organization authorized to issue an electronic
Passport to the travel document holder.
Travel document presenter A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claim-
ing the identity of the travel document holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE
(CC part 1 [CC_Part1]).
Unpersonalized travel document Travel document material prepared to produce a personal-
ized travel document containing an initialized and pre-personalized travel document’s
chip.
User data All data (being not authentication data)
i stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel document as defined
in [ICAO_9303] and
ii being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic
Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO_SAC]).
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC part 1
[CC_Part1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated upon by users in
accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no special meaning (CC part 2
[CC_Part2]).
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity
to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data
known for the claimed identity.
101
Acronyms
Acronym Term
BAC Basic Access Control
BIS-BAC Basic Inspection System with BAC (equivalent to Basic Inspection Sys-
tem as used in [CC_PP-0055])
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
CertA Certification Authority
CGA Certificate generation application. In the current context, it is represented
by ATT for the eSign application.
CHAT Certificate Holder Authorization Template
DTBS Data to be signed
DTBS/R Data to be signed or its unique representation
EAC Extended Access Control
EIS-AIP-BAC Extended Inspection System with BAC (equivalent to EIS as used in
[CC_PP-0056-V2])
EIS-AIP-PACE Extended Inspection System with PACE (see [BSI_TR-03110], sec.
3.1.1, 3.2.1)
EIS-GAP Extended Inspection System using GAP (see [BSI_TR-03110], sec.
3.1.1, 3.2.1)
GAP General Authentication Procedure (see [BSI_TR-03110], sec. 3.4)
HID Human Interface Device. It is equivalent to SGT in the context of
ID_Card.
MRZ Machine readable zone
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organizational security policy
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PP Protection Profile
RAD Reference Authentication Data
RF Radio Frequency
SAC Supplemental Access Control
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure, see [BSI_TR-03110], sec. 3.1.1
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functionality
TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)
102
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A Overview Cryptographic Algorithms
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
ST-Reference
1 Authenticity Terminal Authentication,
ECDSA-signature
verification using
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384 or SHA-512
(r1 curve type)
[ISO_15946-2]
(Digital signatures),
[FIPS_186-3]
chapter 6,
[ANSI_X9.62]
224 (BP, NIST),
256 (BP, NIST),
320 (BP),
384 (NIST),
512 (BP)
[ICAO_9303],
[BSI_TR-03110]
Verification of certificates
(Terminal Authentication),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
2 Authentication PACEv2
(Generic Mapping),
Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment
[BSI_TR-03110]
(PACEv2)
|MRZ|=160
|Nonce|=128
[ICAO_SAC],
[BSI_TR-03110]
-
3 Active Authentication,
RSA Signing,
[PKCS_1_v21]
[FIPS_180-2]
chapter 6,
[ISO_9796-2]
Digital Signature
scheme 1, section 8
1536 [ICAO_9303] FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA
4 Implicit Authentication
during Secure Messaging,
Triple-DES in CBC mode
[NIST_SP800-38A]
section 6.2 (CBC),
[NIST_SP800-67]
version 1.1 (3DES)
112 [ICAO_SAC],
[BSI_TR-03110]
Personalization-key,
BIS-PACE-key
PACE, 1st step (opt.)
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
5 Implicit Authentication
during Secure Messaging,
AES in CBC mode
[FIPS_197] (AES)
[NIST_SP800-38A]
section 6.2 (CBC)
128, 192, 256 [ICAO_SAC],
[BSI_TR-03110]
PACE, 1st step (opt.)
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
6 Key Agreement Chip Authentication,
ECC Key Pair Generation
(r1 curve type)
[FIPS_186-3]
Annex B.4.2
(Candidate Testing),
[ISO_15946-1],
[ANSI_X9.63]
224 (BP, NIST),
256 (BP, NIST),
320 (BP),
384 (NIST),
512 (BP)
[ICAO_SAC],
[BSI_TR-03110]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_STATIC
7 Chip Authentication,
Key derivation
ECDH - SHA-1, SHA-256
[PKCS_3]
[ISO_15946-1]
[ANSI_X9.63]
112, 128, 192,
256
[ICAO_SAC],
[BSI_TR-03110]
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA
8 Confidentiality Secure Messaging,
Triple-DES in CBC mode
[NIST_SP800-38A]
section 6.2 (CBC),
[NIST_SP800-67]
version 1.1 (3DES)
112 [ICAO_SAC],
[BSI_TR-03110]
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
9 Secure Messaging,
AES in CBC mode
[FIPS_197] (AES),
[NIST_SP800-38A]
section 6.2 (CBC)
128, 192, 256 [ICAO_SAC],
[BSI_TR-03110]
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
10 Integrity Secure Messaging,
Triple-DES in Retail MAC
mode (MAC algorithm 3,
Sequence Message Counter,
padding mode 2)
[NIST_SP800-38B]
section 6 (CMAC),
[ISO_9797]
algorithm 3
(Retail-MAC),
[NIST_SP800-67]
version 1.1 (3DES)
112 [ICAO_SAC],
[BSI_TR-03110]
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
106
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
ST-Reference
11 Secure Messaging,
CMAC-AES
[FIPS_197] (AES),
[NIST_SP800-38B]
section 6 (CMAC)
128, 192, 256 [ICAO_SAC],
[BSI_TR-03110]
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
12 Trusted
Channel
Secure Messaging in ENC
MAC mode established
during PACE
[BSI_TR-03110]
(PACE) additionally
cf. lines 2, 4, 5, 8-11
- [ICAO_SAC],
[ICAO_9303],
[BSI_TR-03110]
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
13 Secure Messaging in ENC
MAC mode established
during Chip Authentication
after PACE
[BSI_TR-03110]
additionally
cf. lines 2, 4-11
- [ICAO_9303],
[BSI_TR-03110]
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FCS_CKM.1/CA
14 Cryptographic
Primitive
PTG.2 Random
number generator
[BSI_AIS31] - [BSI_TR-03116-2] -
15 SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
[FIPS_180-2]
chapter 6
- [BSI_TR-03110] Signature Verification
Key Derivation
Table A.1: Overview Cryptographic Algorithms
According to [ICAO_9303], [ICAO_SAC], [BSI_TR-03110], and [BSI_TR-03116-2] the
algorithms are suitable for authenticity, authentication, key agreement, confidentiality and in-
tegrity. An explicit validity period is not given.
107