BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
for
Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh,
IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h,
IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h,
IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah,
IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design
step G12 and including optional software libraries
and dedicated firmware
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021(*)
Smartcard Controller
Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h,
IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh,
IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12 and including optional
software libraries and dedicated firmware
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 12 November 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication..................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................18
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................18
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................20
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................20
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................20
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................21
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................21
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................30
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................31
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................32
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................32
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................34
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................36
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................37
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
6 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h,
IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12 and
including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V2-
2020. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V2-2020 were re-
used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh,
IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h,
IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the
design step G12 and including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 10
November 2021. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 12
November 2021 is valid until 11 November 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
6. Publication
The product Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h,
IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12 and
including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware, has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
10 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh,
IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h,
IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the
design step G12 and including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware
The Security Target [6] and [9] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management:
The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases following a defined
sequence. Different operation modes with appropriate restrictions help to
protect the TOE during each phase of its lifecycle. This also includes the
permanent deactivation of the flash loader.
SF_PS Protection against Snooping:
The TOE is equipped with various countermeasures against snooping.
Amongst other countermeasures, the TOE implements complete
encryption of the memories in combination with a complex key
management, topological measures and dynamic masking of the
peripheral bus.
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks:
This TOE is equipped with various countermeasures against modifying
attacks. Amongst other countermeasures, the TOE implements, error
detection and correction in the memories, program flow protection and
backwards calculation in the SCP.
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks:
The memory access control of the TOE uses a memory management unit
(MMU) to control the access to the available physical memory by using
virtual memory addresses and to segregate the code and data to a
privilege level model. The MMU controls the address permissions of up to
seven privileged levels and gives the software the possibility to define
different access rights.
12 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_CS Cryptographic Support:
The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software
modules to support the standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic
operations like RSA, EC, TDES, and AES. Additionally the TOE is
equipped with a Hybrid Random Number Generator providing four different
modes of operation: Hybrid random number generation, true random
number generation, deterministic random number generation and key
stream generation. Furthermore, a hash crypto library provides SHA-1 and
SHA-2 generation.
The TOE is further equipped with an optional CIPURSE library which can
be used by the IC embedded software to set up a CIPURSE V2
conformant protocol.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a different
random number generators.
The RSA library is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high-level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks. The optional Hash Crypto Library provides a high-level interface for performing
cryptographic hash functions and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA
attacks.
Furthermore, the TOE also contains the optional CIPURSE Cryptographic Library (CCL),
which can be used to implement a CIPURSE V2 conformant protocol in the IC embedded
software.
Besides that, the TOE can come with the optional Hardware Support Library (HSL), which
provides a simplified interface for NVM management and provides the possibility to write
tearing safe into the NVM.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h,
IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah,
IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12 and including optional
software libraries and dedicated firmware,
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1. HW IFX_CCI_00000Fh,
IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h,
IFX_CCI_000027h,
IFX_CCI_000028h,
IFX_CCI_000029h,
IFX_CCI_00002Ah,
IFX_CCI_00002Bh,
IFX_CCI_00002Ch
G12 Postal transfer in locked cages or metal boxes
as plain wafers, bare dies, complete modules,
IC cases, with or without antenna mounting,
with or without inlay mounting, or in any
package
2. FW Boot Software (BOS) 80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered hardware
3. Flash Loader (FL)
(optional)
80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered hardware
4. NRG ROM part
(not part of the TSF)
80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered hardware
5. Radio Frequency
Application Interface
(RFAPI)
(not part of the TSF)
80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered hardware
6. Resource Management
System (RMS)
80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered hardware
7. SW RSA2048 Libraries
(optional)
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v3.33.003
Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
8. RSA4096 Libraries
(optional)
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v3.33.003
Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
9. EC Libraries
(optional)
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v3.33.003
Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
10. Toolbox Libraries
(optional, not part of the
TSF)
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v3.33.003
Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
11. Base Libraries
(optional)
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v3.33.003
Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
12. Symmetric Cryptographic
Libraries (SCL)
(optional)
v2.04.002 or
v2.13.001
Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
13. Hash Cryptographic
Library (HCL)
(optional)
v1.12.001 Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
14. CIPURSE™ library (CCL)
(optional)
v02.00.0004 Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
15. Hardware Support
Libraries (HSL)
(optional)
v03.11.8339 or
v03.12.8812
Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
16. NRG Software Library
(NRGS)
(optional, not part of the
TSF)
v02.03.3446 Secure download (precompiled object code –
L251 file) via ishare.
17 DOC 16-bit Security Controller
Family – V05, Hardware
Reference Manual
5.0
2019-06-14
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
18 Production and
Personalization, 16-bit
Security Controller
3.6
2019-06-24
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
19 16-bit Security Controller,
65nm-Technology,
Programmer’s Reference
Manual
9.14
2019-12-03
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
20 16-bit Security Controller
– V05, Security Guidelines
1.01-2597
2020-08-20
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
21 16-bit Security Controller
– V05, Errata Sheet
10.0
2021-02-25
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
22 CL52 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T,
RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface, Version
2.07.003
(optional)
2.07.003
2021-09-17
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
23 ACL52-Crypto2304T-C65
Asymmetric Crypto
Library, RSA / ECC /
Toolbox, 16-bit Security
Controller, User Interface,
Version 2.08.007
(optional)
2.08.007
2021-09-17
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
24 ACL52-Crypto2304T-C65
Asymmetric Crypto Library
for Crypto2304T
RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface, Version
3.33.003
(optional)
3.33.003
2021-09-17
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
25 Hardware Support Library
for SLCx2 Version
03.12.8812
(optional)
1.1
2019-07-08
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
26 Hardware Support Library
for SLCx2 Version
03.11.8839
(optional)
1.0
2018-07-12
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
27 SCL52-SCP-v4-C65
Symmetric Crypto Library
for SCP-v4 DES / AES 16-
bit Security Controller,
User Interface, Version
2.04.002
(optional)
2.04.002
2018-05-22
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
28 SCL52-SCP-v4-C65
Symmetric Cryptographic
Library for SCP-v4
AES/DES/MAC, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface, Version
2.13.001
(optional)
2.13.001
2020-11-05
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
29 HCL52-CPU-C65 Hash
Crypto Library for CPU
SHA 16-bit Security
Controller, User interface
manual
(optional)
1.12.001
2020-01-14
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
30 CIPURSE Crypto Library,
CCLX2xCIP v02.00.0004,
CIPURSE™ V2,Compliant
to OSPT™ Alliance
CIPURSE™ V2
Cryptographic Protocol,
User Interface
(optional)
1.6
2018-02-02
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
31 16-bit Security Controller,
Crypto@2304T V3, User
Manual
(optional)
1.4.1
2014-11-10
Secured download (personalized PDF) via
ishare or on demand via encrypted email.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by its Common Criteria Identifiers (CCI)
IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh,
IFX_CCI_00002Ch and the design step G12. The complete chip identification data is
accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) or dedicated RMS
functionality.
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE Manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
(developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
In detail, regarding identification:
The GCIM outputs a variety of identifiers, besides the Common Criteria Identifiers (CCI).
The interpretation of the other chip identification data (besides CCI) is described in [12],
section 6.5.
The optional software parts of the TOE are identified by their unique version numbers. The
user can verify that he received the correct version by calculating the hash signatures of
the provided library files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the version numbers is
provided in the ST [6] and [9] chapter 10.
In detail, regarding delivery:
TOE Delivery is uniquely used to indicate
● after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn
wafers (dice) or,
● after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.
The TOE or parts of it are delivered between the following three parties([6],[9] chapter
1.2.3):
● IC Embedded Software Developer,
● TOE Manufacturer (compromises all roles before TOE delivery),
● Composite Product Manufacturer (compromises all roles after TOE delivery except the
end consumer).
Therefore, three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:
1. Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance)
from the TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
2. Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer.
3. Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers,
after phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
The TOE is delivered via the logistics sites:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
● DHL Singapore (Distribution Center Asia),
● KWE Shanghai,
● K&N Großostheim (Distribution Center Europe).
3. Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a different
random number generators.
The RSA library is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high-level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks. The optional Hash Crypto Library provides a high-level interface for performing
cryptographic hash functions and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA
attacks.
Furthermore, the TOE also contains the optional CIPURSE Cryptographic Library (CCL),
which can be used to implement a CIPURSE V2 conformant protocol in the IC embedded
software.
Besides that, the TOE can come with the optional Hardware Support Library (HSL), which
provides a simplified interface for NVM management and provides the possibility to write
tearing safe into the NVM.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE,
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 and 8 of the Security Target (ST).
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance:
The ST includes the following security objective for the IC embedded software developer:
OE.Resp-Appl.
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC embedded software developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) of the composite product appropriately. The IC embedded
software developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequately in
the security guidelines [15].
The ST includes the following security objectives for the operational environment, which
are relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer: OE.Process-Sec-IC7
,
OE.Lim_Block_Loader7
, OE.Loader_Usage7
, and OE.TOE_Auth7
.
The objective OE.Process-Sec-IC7
requires the protection of the TOE, as well as of its
manufacturing and test data up to the delivery to the end-consumer. As defined in [6],[9]
section 2.2.5, the TOE can be delivered to the composite product manufacturer after
phase 3 or after phase 4. However, the single chips are identical in all cases. This means
that the test mode is deactivated and the TOE is locked in the user mode. Therefore, it is
not necessary to distinguish between these forms of delivery. Since Infineon has no
information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software, it
is not possible to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the
composite product manufacturer.
The objective OE.TOE_Auth7
requires that the environment has to support the
authentication and verification mechanism and has to know the corresponding
authentication reference data. The composite product manufacturer receives sufficient
information with regard to the authentication mechanism in the Production and
Personalization Manual [13] section 3.2.2.
The objective OE.Loader_Usage7
requires that the authorised user has to support the
trusted communication with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the
loaded data and he has to meet the access conditions defined by the flash loader. The the
Production and Personalization Manual [13] section 3 provides sufficient information
regarding this topic.
The objective OE.Lim_Block_Loader7
requires the composite product manufacturer to
protect the loader against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader, and to terminate the
loader irreversibly after the intended usage. The permanent deactivation of the flash loader
is described in the Production and Personalization Manual [13] section 3.5.3. This
objective for the environment originates from the “Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage
in secured environment only”. However, this TOE also implements “Package 2: Loader
dedicated for usage by authorized users only” and thus the flash loader can also be used
in an unsecure environment and is able to protect itself against misuse if the authentication
and download keys are handled appropriately.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.3.
7
These objectives are only valid if the TOE is delivered with active Flash Loader.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
5. Architectural Information
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251
architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central
Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit), and the MED (Memory
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using
either the contact based or the contactless interface.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particular security relevant applications
and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard
embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded
software.
Further, more detailed information is readily available in the Security Target [6] and [9].
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer performed five categories of tests:
● Simulation Tests (Design Verification),
● Qualification Tests,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Test,
● Production Tests SF_CS: Cryptographic Support.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluator was able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment, and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests, repeated by the evaluators, other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing, the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks that do not modify the TOE physically.
The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack
potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h,
IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah,
IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch G12 (Tainan).
Depending on the blocking configuration a product can have different user available
configuration by order or by BPU (please refer to [6] and [9] section 1.1, for an
identification of the components, which can be blocked via BPU).
As stated and detailed in the ETR [7], developer and evaluator tested the TOE in those
configurations/identifiers in which the TOE is delivered and which are described in the
Security Target [6] and [9].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1, Durchführung
der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 2017-
10-11,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach
CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Herausgeber: Zertifizierungsstelle des
BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23,
Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 25, Anwendungen der
CC auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10, 2017-07-
03,
● Special Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.4, 2011-06-08,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 32, CC-
Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 2011-06-08,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 36,
Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37, Terminologie
und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-17,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation
results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 41, Guidelines for PPs
and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46, Informationen
zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die
Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47, Regelungen zu
Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04
are considered.
Additionally the CC Supporting Mandatory Technical Documents
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
● Joint Interpretation Library – The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0,
February 2009,
● Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.9,
2013-01 and
Joint Interpretation Library – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.1, August 2015
are considered.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V2-2020, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on penetration test
updates, changes to the software, security claims and guidance. As a result, guidance
documentation has been updated ([23][19][24][15],[18],[16]).
The evaluation has confirmed:
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8]
for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
Note in particular:
● RSA encryption is only in the scope of the evaluation up to 2112 bits.
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Cryptographic Primitive
1. TDES in [NIST SP800-
67_2017],
|k| = 112
ECB mode
(SCP, SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] no
CBC mode
(SCP, SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] no
CTR mode
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001) ,
[NIST SP800-38A] no
CFB mode
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] no
CBC-MAC
(SCP),
[ISO_9797-1] no
CBC-MAC-ELB
(SCP),
[ISO_9797-1] no
PCBC
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
[Schneier] no
BLD (blinding) and
Recrypt
(SCP)
proprietary
implementation
no
CMAC
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
[NIST SP800-38B] no
Retail-MAC [ISO_9797-1] no
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
(SCL v2.13.001)
2. TDES in [NIST SP800-
67_2017],
|k| = 168
ECB mode
(SCP, SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] no
CBC mode
(SCP, SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] yes
CTR mode
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] yes
CFB mode
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] yes
CBC-MAC
(SCP),
[ISO_9797-1]
CBC-MAC-ELB
(SCP),
[ISO_9797-1]
PCBC
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
[Schneier] yes
BLD (blinding) and
Recrypt
(SCP)
proprietary
implementation
no
CMAC
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
[NIST SP800-38B] yes
3. AES in, [FIPS197] |k| = 128, 192, 256 -
ECB mode
(SCP, SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] no
CBC mode
(SCP, SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] yes
CTR mode
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] yes
CFB mode
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001),
[NIST SP800-38A] yes
CBC-MAC
(SCP)
[ISO_9797-1] no
CBC-MAC-ELB
(SCP)
[ISO_9797-1] no
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
PCBC
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
[Schneier] Encryption: Yes
Authenticated
Encryption: No
BLD (blinding) and
Recrypt (SCP)
proprietary
implementation
no
CMAC
(SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
[NIST SP800-38B] yes
4. RSA encryption /
decryption / signature
generation / verification
(only modular
exponentiation part)
[PKCS-1], [IEEE_P1363]
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v3.33.003)
[PKCS-1],
[IEEE_P1363]
Modulus length8
=
1976 – 4224
RSA encryption is only in the scope of
the evaluation up to 2112 bits.
yes
5. ECDSA signature
generation
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v3.33.003)
[ANS X9.62],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_14888-3]
Key sizes corresponding to the used
elliptic curves
NIST:
P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521},
K-{163, 233, 283, 409},
B-{233, 283, 409} [FIPS186-4];
brainpool:
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1
[RFC5639]
Key sizes
< 250: no
Key sizes
>= 250 : yes
6. ECDSA signature
verification
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v3.33.003)
[ANS X9.62],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_14888-3]
Key sizes corresponding to the used
elliptic curves
NIST:
P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521},
K-{163, 233, 283, 409},
B-{233, 283, 409} [FIPS186-4];
brainpool:
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1
[RFC5639]
Key sizes
< 250: no
Key sizes
>= 250 : yes
7. Physical True RNG
PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A n/a
8. Hybrid Random Number
Generator PTG.3
[AIS31] N/A n/a
9. Deterministic Random
Number Generation
DRG.3
[AIS31] N/A n/a
8
Please note that the RSA library supports key lengths from 65 to 4224 bits; however, key lengths below
1976 bits are not included in the certificate.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 Certification Report
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
10. Key Stream Generation
DRG.2
[AIS31] N/A n/a
Key agreement
11. ECDH
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v3.33.003)
[ANS X9.62],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_14888-3]
Key sizes corresponding to the used
elliptic curves
NIST:
P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521},
K-{163, 233, 283, 409},
B-{233, 283, 409}
[FIPS186-4];
brainpool:
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1
[RFC5639]
Key sizes
< 250: no
Key sizes
>= 250 : yes
12. CIPURSE™ Session Key
Agreement
(using AES)
(CCL v02.00.0004)
[CIPURSE-1, 5.3],
[FIPS197],
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 128 yes
Key generation
13. RSA key generation
using
CryptoGeneratePrime
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v3.33.003)
Proprietary
The generated keys
meet [PKCS #1],
Sections 3.1 and
3.2 and
[IEEE_P1363],
Section 8.1.3.1.
1976 – 4096
(note: TOE supports larger and smaller
key sizes, which are generally out of
scope of evaluation in BSI scheme)
yes
14. RSA key generation
using
CryptoGeneratePrimeMa
sk
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007)
Proprietary
The generated keys
meet [PKCS #1],
Sections 3.1 and
3.2 and
[IEEE_P1363],
Section 8.1.3.1.
1976 – 4096 Not rated by BSI
15. RSA key generation
using
CryptoRsaKeyGenMask_
PQ
(v3.33.003)
The generated keys
meet [PKCS #1],
Sections 3.1 and
3.2 and
[IEEE_P1363],
Section 8.1.3.1.
1976 – 4096
(note: TOE supports larger and smaller
key sizes, which are generally out of
scope of evaluation in BSI scheme)
yes
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
16. EC key generation using
ECC_ECDSAKeyGen
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007)
[ANS X9.62],
Section A 4.3
[ISO_14888-3],
Section 6.4.2
[IEEE_P1363],
Section A.16.9
Key sizes corresponding to the used
elliptic curves
NIST: P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521},
K-{163, 233, 283, 409},
B-{233, 283, 409}
[FIPS186-4];
brainpool:
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1
[RFC5639]
Key sizes
< 250: no
Key sizes
>= 250 : yes
17. EC key generation using
ECC_ECDSAKeyGenMa
sk
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v3.33.003)
[ANS X9.62],
Section A 4.3
[ISO_14888-3],
Section 6.4.2
[IEEE_P1363],
Section A.16.9
Key sizes corresponding to the used
elliptic curves
NIST:
P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521},
K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-{233, 283,
409}
[FIPS186-4];
brainpool:
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1
[RFC5639]
Key sizes
< 250: no
Key sizes
>= 250 : yes
Authentication
18. CIPURSE™
Authentication
(using AES)
(CCL v02.00.0004)
[CIPURSE-1, 5.3 /
6.3],
[FIPS197],
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 128 yes
Confidential communication
19. CIPURSE™ Secure
Messaging for
Confidentiality
(using AES)
(CCL v02.00.0004)
[CIPURSE-1, 6.4],
[FIPS197],
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 128 yes
Integrity protected communication
20. CIPURSE™ Secure
Messaging for Integrity
(using AES)
(CCL v02.00.0004)
[CIPURSE-1, 6.3],
[CIPURSE-2, P.2],
[FIPS197],
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 128 no
Digest computation
21. SHA-1
(HCL v1.12.001)
[FIPS180-4] N/A n/a (keyless
operation)
22. SHA-2
(HCL v1.12.001)
[FIPS180-4] N/A n/a (keyless
operation)
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
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For the Cryptographic Functionality
● CryptoGeneratePrimeMask(), which might be used in conjunction with RSA Key Generation
in ACL v2.07.003 and v2.08.007,
no statement on the respective cryptographic strength can be given.
The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was not assessed by BSI. However, the evaluation
according to the TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any implementation
weaknesses.
Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 100-Bit-
Level assessment was given. Consequently, the targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has
been achieved for those functionalities as well. Detailed results on conformance have been
compiled into the report [22].
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation
for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher,
November 2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce.
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST SP 800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for Authentication,
2005-05, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), November 2001,
U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) –
AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[ANS X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-
2005, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry,
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November
16, 2005, American National Standards Institute.
[ANS X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key
Agreement and key transport using Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
2011-12-21, American National Standards Institute.
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[IEEE_P1363] IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography.
IEEE, 2000.
[ISO_11770-3] International Standard ISO/IEC 11770-3: 2008, Technical
Corrigendum 1, Information technology - Security techniques –
Key management Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric
techniques, 2009-09-15.
[CIPURSE-1] CIPURSETM
V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by OSPTTM
Alliance,
2012-09-28
[CIPURSE-2] CIPURSETM
V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by OSPTTM
Alliance,
2014-09-18 (with errata and precision list)
[ISO_18033-3] ISO/IEC 18033-3: Information technology -- Security techniques --
Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers, 2005.
[ISO_9797-1] Information technology – Security techniques – Message
Authentication Codes (MACs), Part 1: Mechanisms using a block
cipher, 2011-03-01, ISO/IEC.
[Schneier] Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, B. Schneier, John Wiley &
Sons, 1996
[PKCS-1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, 2012-10-27,
RSA Cryptographic Standard, RSA Laboratories.
[ISO_14888-3] International Standard ISO/IEC 14888-3: 2006, Technical
Corrigendum 2: Information technology – Security techniques –
Digital signatures with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based
mechanisms, 2009-02-15.
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS),
AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
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top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
Furthermore:
The TOE is delivered to the composite product manufacturer and to the security IC
embedded software developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
composite product issuer together with the application that runs on the TOE.
The security IC embedded software developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [15], [12], [14], [26], [16], [22],
[23] [18], [19], [20], [24], [20], [21], and [25] have to be considered.
The composite product manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to
develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [13] have to be considered.
In addition, the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect
has to be considered:
● The security IC embedded software developer can deliver his software either to Infineon
to let them implement it in the TOE (in the Flash memory) or to the composite product
manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the security IC embedded software developer to the
composite product manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is
required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
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12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
3DES / TDES Triple DES
ACL Asymmetric Cryptographic Library
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office
for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-bases Message Authentication Code
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRNG Deterministic RNG
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HSL Hardware Support Library
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MED Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit
MMU Memory Management Unit
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PP Protection Profile
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PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PTRNG Physical True Random Number Generator
RMS Resource Management System
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read-Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman Public Key Encryption
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021, Version 1.5, 2021-11-05, Confidential
Security Target Common Criteria v3.1 – EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
IFX_CCI_00000Fh IFX_CCI_000010h IFX_CCI_000026h IFX_CCI_000027h
IFX_CCI_000028h IFX_CCI_000029h IFX_CCI_00002Ah IFX_CCI_00002Bh
IFX_CCI_00002Ch G12, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 6, 2021-11-05, EVALUATION TECHNICAL
REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021, Version 1.5, 2021-11-05, Public
Security Target Common Criteria v3.1 – EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
IFX_CCI_00000Fh IFX_CCI_000010h IFX_CCI_000026h IFX_CCI_000027h
IFX_CCI_000028h IFX_CCI_000029h IFX_CCI_00002Ah IFX_CCI_00002Bh
IFX_CCI_00002Ch G12, Infineon Technology AG (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
1079-V3-2021, Version 6, 2021-11-05, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR
COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR COMP), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
9
See section 9.1 for detailed list of used AIS.
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[11] Configuration list for the TOE, 0.8, 2021-05-06, “Life Cycle Support Configuration
Management for Common Criteria with Evaluation Assurance Level EAL6
augmented (EAL6+) IFX_CCI_00000Fh with options Including optional Software
Libraries Flash Loader – 3x ACL – 2xHSL –2x SCL HCL - – CCL – NRG”, Infineon
Technologies AG (confidential document)
[12] 16-bit Security Controller Family – V05, Hardware Reference Manual, Version 5.0 ,
2019-06-14, Infineon Technologies AG
[13] Production and Personalization, 16-bit Security Controller, Version 3.6, 2019-06-24,
Infineon Technologies AG
[14] 16-bit Security Controller, 65nm-Technology, Programmer’s Reference Manual,
Version 9.14, 2019-12-03, Infineon Technologies AG
[15] 16-bit Security Controller – V05, Security Guidelines, Version 1.01-2597, 2020-08-
20, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] 16-bit Security Controller – V05, Errata Sheet, Version 10.0, 2021-02-25, Infineon
Technologies AG
[17] CL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T, RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User Interface, Version 2.07.003, 2021-09-17, Infineon
Technologies AG
[18] ACL52-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library, RSA / ECC / Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User Interface, Version 2.08.007, 2021-09-17, Infineon
Technologies AG
[19] ACL52-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto2304T
RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit Security Controller, User Interface, Version 3.33.003,
2021-09-17, Infineon Technologies AG
[20] Hardware Support Library for SLCx2 Version 03.12.8812, 2019-07-08, Infineon
Technologies AG
[21] Hardware Support Library for SLCx2 Version 03.11.8839, 2018-07-12, Infineon
Technologies AG
[22] SCL52-SCP-v4-C65 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v4 DES / AES 16-bit
Security Controller, User Interface, Version 2.04.002, 2018-05-22, Infineon
Technologies AG
[23] SCL52-SCP-v4-C65 Symmetric Cryptographic Library for SCP-v4 AES/DES/MAC,
16-bit Security Controller, User Interface, Version 2.13.001, 2020-11-05, Infineon
Technologies AG
[24] HCL52-CPU-C65 Hash Crypto Library for CPU SHA 16-bit Security Controller, User
interface manual, Version 1.12.001, 2020-01-14, Infineon Technologies AG
[25] CIPURSETM
Crypto Library, CCLX2xCIP v02.00.0004, CIPURSETM
V2,Compliant to
OSPTTM
Alliance CIPURSETM
V2 Cryptographic Protocol, User Interface, Version
1.6, 2018-02-02, Infineon Technologies AG
[26] 16-bit Security Controller, Crypto@2304T V3, User Manual, Version 1.4.1, 2014-11-
10, Infineon Technologies AG
[27] Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification, Version 1, 2020-04-07, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h,
IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12 and
including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware, (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice
of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 12 November 2021, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5X,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the distribution sites of the TOE listed below:
Site ID Company name and address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
K&N Großostheim Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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