BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
for
Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1
from
Continental Automotive GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.72
BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1
from Continental Automotive GmbH
PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version
1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 and guidance specific for the
technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1 and according to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1360/2002 Annex 1(B) adapting to Council Regulation
(EC) No. 3821/85 amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 432/2004 of 5 March 2004, Council
Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2009 of 23
January 2009, Commission Regulation (EU) No 1266/2009 of 16 December 2009 on recording equipment in
road transport.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 25 April 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................19
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................21
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
22uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0559-2012. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0559-2012 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1 was conducted
by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 28 May 2013. The T-Systems
GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Continental Automotive
GmbH.
The product was developed by: Continental Automotive GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1 has been included in the BSI list
of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Continental Automotive GmbH
Heinrich-Hertz-Strasse 45
78052 Villingen-Schwenningen
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1 is a vehicle
unit (VU) in the sense of Annex IB of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3821/85 amended by
CR (EC) No.10 1360/2002 and last amended by CR (EU) No. 1266/2009 intended to be
installed in road transport vehicles. Its purpose is to record, store, display, print and output
data related to driver activities. It is connected to a motion sensor with which it exchanges
vehicle’s motion data.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 9. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Services:
TOE Security Services Addressed issue
TOE_SS.Identification_Authentication Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides this security service of identification and
authentication of the motion sensor, of users by monitoring
the tachograph cards.
TOE_SS.Access Security Service of Access Control
The TOE provides this security service of access control for
access to functions and data of the TOE according to the
mode of operation selection rules.
TOE_SS.Accountability Security Service of Accountability
The TOE provides this security service of accountability for
collection of accurate data in the TOE.
TOE_SS.Audit Service of Audit
The TOE provides this security service of audit related to
attempts to undermine the security of the TOE and provides
the traceability to associated users.
TOE_SS.Object_Reuse Service of Object Reuse
The TOE provides this security service of object reuse to
ensure that temporarily stored sensitive objects are
destroyed.
TOE_SS.Reliability Service of Reliability of Service
The TOE provides this security service of reliability of
service: self-tests, no way to analyse or debug software in
the field, detection of specified hardware sabotage and
deviations from the specified voltage values including cut-off
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
TOE Security Services Addressed issue
of the power supply
TOE_SS.Accuracy Security Service of Accuracy of stored Data
The TOE provides this security service of accuracy of stored
data in the TOE.
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange Security Service of Data Exchange
The TOE provides this security service of data exchange
with the motion senor and tachograph cards and connected
entities for downloading.
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support Security Service of Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides this security service of cryptographic
support using standard cryptographic algorithms and
procedures.
Table 1: TOE Security Services
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 10.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 6.2 to 6.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Digital Tachograph DTCO
1381, Release 2.1. For details refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Item
No.
Delivery Part Version Date Form of
Delivery
1 Digital
Tachograph
DTCO 1381,
Release 2.1
entire device as
Vehicle Unit
(Manufacturing
option)
a) SW-Version of
the Tachograph
Application:
02.01.10,
- separate unit
in a closed
case
(Manufacturin
g option)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
Item
No.
Delivery Part Version Date Form of
Delivery
displayed as:
02.01.10 on
display,
2110 on print out,
2110 in download
file, 021.010 -> via
diagnostic
interface;
b) SW-Version of
the Software
Upgrade Module
(SWUM): 01.20;
displayed as :
01.20 on display;
d) HW Version
(Type plate):
1381 Rel. 2.1
2 Documentation:
Technical
Description
Manual [13]
(manufacturing
option as well as
SW-Upgrade
option)
Digitaler
Tachograph –
DTCO 1381,
Release 2.1,
Technische
Beschreibung,
TD00.1381.21 100
101 – 40621407
OPM 000 AB,
Ausgabe 04/2013
TD00.1381.21 100
101 – 40621407
OPM 000 AB
Edition
04/2013
Paper or
PDF-file
3 Documentation:
Operating
Instructions for
drivers /
co-drivers and
forwarding
companies [14]
(manufacturing
option as well as
SW-Upgrade
option)
Digitaler
Tachograph –
DTCO 1381,
Release 2.0 – 2.1,
Betriebsanleitung
Unternehmer &
Fahrer,
BA00.1381.21 100
101 – 40619647
BA00.1381.21 100
101 – 40619647
OPM 000 AB
Edition
04/2013
Paper or
PDF-file
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
Item
No.
Delivery Part Version Date Form of
Delivery
OPM 000 AB
Ausgabe 04/2013
4 Documentation:
Operating
Instructions for
the control
authorities and
control officers
[15]
(manufacturing
option as well as
SW-Upgrade
option)
Digitaler
Tachograph –
DTCO 1381,
Release 2.0 – 2.1,
Leitfaden für die
Kontrollorgane,
BA00.1381.21 201
101 - 40634690
OPM 000 AA,
Ausgabe 04/2013
BA00.1381.21 201
101 - 40634690 OPM
000 AA
Edition
04/2013
Paper or
PDF-file
5 Documentation:
Software
Upgrade
Manual [16]
Digitaler
Tachograph –
DTCO 1381 ab
Release 2.0,
Software Upgrade,
TD00.1381.20 600
101 – 40507251
OPM 000 AA,
Ausgabe 04/2012
TD00.1381.20 600
101 – 40507251
OPM 000 AA
Edition
04/2012
Paper or
PDF-file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The version number and the authenticity of the delivered TOE can be checked after start
up. All necessary information will be shown on the display integrated. For this reason
please refer to table 2.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The main security of the VU aims to protect
● the data recorded and stored in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to and
manipulation of the data and detecting any such attempts,
● the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor and the
vehicle unit,
● the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the recording equipment and
the tachograph cards, and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
● the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded (locally and remotely).
For detailed information please refer to ST [6, chapter 9.3.1]
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The Generic Security
Target [14] does not define any dedicated assumption, but measures; these measures will
be reflected in the current ST in form of the security objectives for the TOE environment
below. Hence, it is to define some assumptions in the current ST being sensible and
necessary from the formal point of view (to reflect those environmental measures from
[14].
A.Activation Vehicle manufacturers and fitters or workshops activate the TOE
after its installation before the vehicle leaves the premises where
installation took place.
A.Approved_Workshops The Member States approve, regularly control and certify trusted
fitters and workshops to carry out installations, calibrations,
checks, inspections, repairs.
A.Card_Availability Tachograph cards are available to the TOE users and delivered
by Member State authorities to authorised persons only.
A.Card_Traceability
Card delivery is traceable (white lists, black lists), and black lists
are used during security audits.
A.Controls Law enforcement controls will be performed regularly and ran-
domly, and must include security audits and (as well as visual
inspection of the equipment).
A.Driver_Card_Uniqueness Drivers possess, at one time, one valid driver card only.
A.Faithful_Calibration Approved fitters and workshops enter proper vehicle parameters
in recording equipment during calibration.
A.Faithful_Drivers
Drivers play by the rules and act responsibly (e.g. use their
driver cards; properly select their activity for those that are
manually selected)8
A.Regular_Inspections
Recording equipment will be periodically inspected and cali-
brated.
5 Architectural Information
The whole Vehicle Unit, as defined in [10], is the TOE, as claimed in [12]. The software
which includes the whole tachograph application and the software upgrade module is
running in a distributed environment of three microcontrollers. Firstly this is the
SLE88CFX4001P (DSO-20, A1, DSO20, EPROM, 32bit) produced by Infineon, secondly it
is the microcontroller ST10F273M produced by STMicroelectronics and thirdly it is the
microcontroller PIC16F689 produced by Microchip. The SFR enforcing parts of the system
8
The assumption A.Faithful_Drivers taken from the Generic Security Target seems not to be realistic and
enforceable, because the driver is the person, who has to be controlled and surveyed (see the Council
Regulation. This assumption is made in the current ST only for the sake of compatibility with the GST and is
necessary from functional point of view.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
are exclusively implemented on the secure microcontroller SLE88CFX4001P produced by
Infineon. There is only one configuration of the vehicle unit that is delivered to the
approved workshops. For more details about the architectural structure please refer to the
ST [6, chapter 4.3.4].
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The evaluated configuration of the TOE is:
● Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381,Release 2.1 (with its application version 02.00.30),
● Software Update Module, Version 01.20
The evaluators spent adequate testing effort for the desired resistance of the TOE against
attackers with a high attack potential. The evaluators spent several days each for
analysing the test specification and ensuring that the specification has been correctly
implemented in the test scripts,
● for creating ideas for independent evaluator tests,
● for ensuring that the test environment delivers correct test results, and
● for repeating developer tests as well as carrying out independent tests.
The following tests and penetration tests have been performed by the Evaluators:
Independent Tests: The evaluators conducted independent testing at the developer's site.
The evaluator tests have been carried out against the following TOE configurations: The
TOE was brought in every production control state. A simulator for the motion sensor was
used. Furthermore every card type (Driver card, workshop card, control card, and
company card). For the company card also the remote authentication was in the focus of
the tests.
Penetration Tests: The penetration testing was performed using the developer’s testing
environment. All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current
evaluation were tested. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between
the expected and the actual test results. On the basis of the methodical vulnerability
analysis some potential vulnerabilities have been identified by the evaluator. These
potential vulnerabilities have been analysed, if they are exploitable in the planned
operational environment. For every potential vulnerability which was identified to be a
candidate to be exploitable in the planned operational environment the evaluator devised
and conducted penetration tests. The side channel attacks like power, timing, fault analysis
haven been performed on 3DES. All other side channel attacks have been taken from the
hardware certification procedure on Infineon chip (see certification procedure
BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011 at the BSI website).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE Digital
Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1 is an electronic device, consisting of hardware and
software, and additionally of documentations (see table 2). The TOE was tested with the
following software versions:
● Tachograph application, version 02.01.10 and
● Software Update Module, version 01.20
The software which includes the whole tachograph application and the software upgrade
module is running in a distributed environment of three microcontrollers. Firstly this is the
SLE88CFX4001P (DSO-20, A1, DSO20, EPROM, 32bit) produced by Infineon, secondly it
is the microcontroller ST10F273M produced by STMicroelectronics and thirdly it is the
microcontroller PIC16F689 produced by Microchip. The SFR-enforcing parts of the system
are implemented exclusively on the secure microcontroller SLE88CFX4001P produced by
Infineon. There is only one configuration of the vehicle unit that is delivered to the
approved workshops. The configurations at delivery, as well as the further steps to be
taken in order to activate and calibrate the TOE in a vehicle are described in [13]. The
correct input of the calibration parameters is guaranteed by the trustworthiness of the
accredited work shops.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 32, AIS 34, AIS 36) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0559-2012, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on software
improvement and small hardware changes.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July
2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [7]
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The evaluation facility has examined that the analysis of used cryptographic algorithm
(Triple and RSA) and SHA-1 meets all the requirements with regard to the specification of
Annex 1B defined by the European Commission [10]. The cryptographic algorithms,
mentioned above, are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The operator of the digital tachograph system has to make sure, that the organisational
measures being relevant for him and defined in [12, chapter 4.2] there are adequately
implemented. These are at least the following measures:
OE.Sec_Data_Generation9
,
OE.Sec_Data_Transport10
,
OE.Sec_Data_Strong11
OE.Card_Availability12
,
OE.Card_Traceability13
,
OE.Approved_Workshops14
, and
9
Security data generation algorithms must be accessible to authorised and trusted persons only.
10
Security data must be generated, transported, and inserted into the VU, in such a way to preserve its
appropriate confidentiality and integrity.
11
Security data inserted into the TOE shall be cryptographically strong as required by [1].
12
Tachograph cards must be available and delivered to authorised persons only.
13
Card delivery must be traceable (white lists, black lists), and black lists must be used during security
audits.
14
Installation, calibration and repair of recording equipment must be carried by trusted and approved fitters
or workshops.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
OE.SW_Upgrate15
Such measures could be defined e.g. by the National Policy (MSA Policy) and enforced by
accreditation and audit procedures.
It must be assured by organisational measures that the certificates and key pairs
respectively for a successful device authentication are only granted to trustworthy
tachograph cards. Furthermore this tachograph cards must be able to protect these
secrets in a sufficient manner and be evaluated and certified in accordance with [12] and
[11].
It must be assured by organisational measures that the necessary data for the pairing
process are only granted to trustworthy motion sensors. Furthermore the motion sensors
must be able to protect these data in a sufficient manner and they must be evaluated and
certified in accordance with [12] and [11].
The evaluator advises the operator of the digital tachograph system, that the control
officers will be fit out with equipment, which can download data from the tachograph and
then analyse it efficiently. Such automated data analysis will remarkably facilitate the
search of important events.
The evaluator advises the operator of the digital tachograph system, that he should
recommend to forwarding companies using of such Fleet Management Systems which
ensure completeness of the 'Company Activity Data’ in their own event logs at the remote
data download. The background of this recommendation is the fact that the current
specification [Digital Tachograph, Specification for remote company card authentication
and remote data downloading, Index H, Heavy Truck Electronic Interfaces Working Group
– DTCO, 31.01.2008] does not arrange either for reading the ‘Card Identification’ from the
remotely connected Company Card with subsequent storing the 'Company Activity Data’ in
the Vehicle Unit event log or for writing the 'Company Activity Data’ back to the remotely
connected Company Card at the remote data download.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
Please refer for the definitions in ST [6, chapter 3.1].
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
15
Software revisions shall be granted security certification before they can be implemented in the TOE.
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BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
VU Vehicle Unit
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE16
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target DTCO 1381, Release 2.1, Digital Tachograph – Vehicle Unit, Rev.
1.12, Continental Automotive GmbH, 15.11.2012
[7] Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1
Continental VDO, Version 2.01 from 11 April 2013 (confidential document)
[9] Digitaler Tachograph DTCO 1381, Rel. 2.1, Konfigurationsliste (Stückliste), Rev.
1.13, Continental Automotive GmbH, 10 April 2013 (confidential document)
[10] Annex IB of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3821/85 amended by CR (EC) No.
1360/2002 and last amended by CR (EU) No. 1266/2009
[11] Joint Interpretation Library (JIL): Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital
Tachographs, JIL interpretation of the Security Certification according to
Commission Regulation (EC) 1360/2002, Annex 1B, Version 1.12, June 2003
[12] Appendix 10 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 - Generic
Security Targets
[13] Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381, Release 2.1, Technische Beschreibung,
TD00.1381.21 100 101 – 40621407 OPM 000 AB, Ausgabe 04/2013
[14] Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 – 2.1, Betriebsanleitung
Unternehmer & Fahrer, BA00.1381.21 100 101 – 40619647 OPM 000 AB Ausgabe
04/2013
16
specifically
• AIS25: Joint Interpretation Library -Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen, Version 7,
30.06.2011, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• AIS26: Joint Interpretation Library -Evaluations Methodologie für in Hardware Integrierte
Schaltungen, Version 8, 08.06.2011,Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• AIS 32: CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7,08.06.2011, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
[15] Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 – 2.1, Leitfaden für die
Kontrollorgane, BA00.1381.21 201 101 - 40634690 OPM 000 AA, Ausgabe 04/2013
[16] Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381 ab Release 2.0, Software Upgrade,
TD00.1381.20 600 101 – 40507251 OPM 000 AA, Ausgabe 04/2012
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (Release 3 = chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
CC Part 3:
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Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 37
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by guidance specific for the
technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 25 April 2013, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Company Site Activity
Continental
Automotive GmbH
78052 Villingen,
Heinrich-Hertz-Str. 45
HW development
SW development
HW and SW tests
Manufacturing the final TOE
Delivery of the final TOE
Continental
Automotive GmbH
300724 Timisoara, Calea
Martirilor 1989 Nr. 1, Romania
Specification
Implementation
Module tests
Continental
Technical Center
India ab 1.1.2013
AtoS India (AI)
(ehemals Siemens
Information Systems
Ltd. (SISL))
Ozone Manay Tech Park, 56/18 &
55/9, Garvebhavipalya, Hosur
Main Road, Bangalore - 560 068,
India
SW tests
Siemens CT IC 3 81730 München, Otto-Hahn-Ring
6, Geb. 10, Flur 3
SW development
Tieto Corporation Ul. Legnicka 55F, 54203 Wroclaw,
Polen
or Wroclaw (2nd
address for same
building)
SW development
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0878-2013 Certification Report
Company Site Activity
Ul. Rysia 1a, 53656 Wroclaw,
Polen
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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