TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y

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• 15.02.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'report': {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.DocumentState', 'download_ok': True, 'convert_garbage': False, 'convert_ok': True, 'extract_ok': True, 'pdf_hash': '15e9f66c16b5ff16ed1351c9b0a20aa2f6a87b81a8f58c5db99814b80fde5f4c', 'txt_hash': '0e1f03fbf39b2908d077448714daf4ec2730fdab1df90650819dd2854a74afb1'}, 'st': {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.DocumentState', 'download_ok': True, 'convert_garbage': False, 'convert_ok': True, 'extract_ok': True, 'pdf_hash': '850d0b28f1137ea8f42c8f85cd93e1a26d5b4c0d15e76c78665273c928efb56e', 'txt_hash': 'eea7a9cd534d1a5c852c7f94a5d2f18aaff8a1ec76edd4fa18c225c1f5521a85'}, 'cert': {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.DocumentState', 'download_ok': True, 'convert_garbage': False, 'convert_ok': True, 'extract_ok': True, 'pdf_hash': 'b6a2bcda120f4e1259dea73d14dc96b7ee53d2eb44d57269c21e18bcddbfb0e5', 'txt_hash': 'af7417605e89931ab20425aec13cfd46702046df6943a2d38d4a9599e5f68d9c'}}.
  • The following properties were deleted: ['st_download_ok', 'report_download_ok', 'st_convert_garbage', 'report_convert_garbage', 'st_convert_ok', 'report_convert_ok', 'st_extract_ok', 'report_extract_ok', 'st_pdf_hash', 'report_pdf_hash', 'st_txt_hash', 'report_txt_hash'].

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'cert_metadata': {'pdf_file_size_bytes': 890508, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 1, '/Author': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik', '/CreationDate': "D:20190906101618+02'00'", '/Creator': 'Writer', '/Keywords': '"Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, Family Concept, MR.ED-PP, MR.ED-ON-PP, SSCD-PP"', '/ModDate': "D:20190906101901+02'00'", '/Producer': 'LibreOffice 6.1', '/Subject': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1/P6022y from T-Systems International GmbH', '/Title': 'Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': []}}, 'cert_frontpage': None, 'cert_keywords': {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019': 1}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-2016-MA-01': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL 4': 1, 'EAL 5': 1, 'EAL 2': 1, 'EAL 4 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_DPT.2': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {}, 'cc_claims': {}, 'vendor': {}, 'eval_facility': {'TSystems': {'T-Systems International': 1}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {}, 'crypto_scheme': {}, 'crypto_protocol': {}, 'randomness': {}, 'cipher_mode': {}, 'ecc_curve': {}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {}, 'technical_report_id': {}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 15408': 2, 'ISO/IEC 18045': 2}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {}}, 'cert_filename': '1078c_pdf.pdf'}.
  • The report_frontpage property was set to {'DE': {'match_rules': ['(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)'], 'cert_id': 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019', 'cert_item': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y', 'developer': 'T-Systems International GmbH', 'cert_lab': 'BSI', 'ref_protection_profiles': 'Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine- Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR- 03110 for Official Use [MR.ED-PP], Version 2.0.3, 18 July 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-2016-MA-01 Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents – Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP], Version 0.9.2, 18 August 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016 Functionality: PP conformant Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5 The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045. (*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 30 August 2019 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski L.S. Head of Division Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 SOGIS Recognition Agreement Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 only Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report Contents A. Certification......................................................................................................................6 1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6 3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8 5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8 6. Publication....................................................................................................................9 B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10 1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11 2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................14 3. Security Policy............................................................................................................16 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................17 5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................18 6. Documentation...........................................................................................................19 7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................19 8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................20 9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................21 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................23 11. Security Target..........................................................................................................23 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................24 13. Definitions.................................................................................................................25 14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................28 C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................31 D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................32 5 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 A. Certification 1. Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: ● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1 ● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2 ● BSI Schedule of Costs3 ● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) ● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard ● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC- Produkte) [3] ● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3] 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 2 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231 3 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 6 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report ● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14 [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408. ● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045 ● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 3. Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu. The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected. 3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA) The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP). The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. 4 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730 7 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2 components. 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 31 July 2019. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: T-Systems International GmbH. The product was developed by: T-Systems International GmbH. The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 5. Validity of the Certification Result This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that ● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, ● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target. If the product certified is being used as National ID-Card or National Document the operational instructions and limitations as outlined in ‘Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116, Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 2: eID-Karten und hoheitliche Dokumente’ (TR-03116-2) have to be followed when issuing and using the product. This includes the restrictions related to cryptographic algorithms and related parameters. Cryptographic algorithms and related parameters not covered by the certificate (see Security Target and this certification report) must not be used. The latest published version of TR-03116-2 has to be followed (see https://www.bsi.bund.de/). For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation 5 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user\'s risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re- assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the product’s resistance to state-of-the-art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 30 August 2019 is valid until 29 August 2024. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification. The owner of the certificate is obliged: 1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product\'s certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product, 2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate, 3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 6. Publication The product TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 6 T-Systems International GmbH Untere Industriestraße 20 57250 Netphen Germany 9 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 B. Certification Results The following results represent a summary of ● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, ● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and ● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 10 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report 1. Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y provided by T-Systems International GmbH and based on the hardware platform P6022y (P60D145) by NXP Semiconductors GmbH. It is an electronic Identity Card (ID_Card) representing a smart card with contact based and contactless interface programmed according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110 [26] and the ICAO specifications [28], [29] and [30]. The smart card provides the following authentication mechanisms: ● Passive Authentication ● Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) ● Chip Authentication version 1, 2 and version 3 ● Terminal Authentication version 1 and version 2 Additionally, the TOE meets the requirements of the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03116-2 [27] as part of the qualification for the use within electronic ID card projects of the Federal Republic of Germany. Please note that the security mechanisms Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) and Extended Access Control (EAC) are in focus of this evaluation process. The further security mechanism Basic Access Control (BAC) is subject of a separate evaluation process (refer to BSI-DSZ-CC-1103). The smart card contains at least one of the following applications that are all subject of the TOE’s evaluation: ● ePassport Application: With this application the TOE is intended to be used as a machine readable travel document (MRTD). The application contains the related user data (including biometric data) as well as the data needed for authentication (including MRZ). ● eID Application: This application is intended to be used for accessing official and commercial services, which require access to the user data stored in the context of this application. The application includes the related user data and the data needed for authentication. ● eSign Application: This application is intended to be used in the context of official and commercial services, where a qualified electronic signature of the ID_Card Holder is required. The application contains the data needed for generating qualified electronic signatures on behalf of the ID_Card Holder as well as for user authentication. The application is optional, i.e. it can optionally be activated on the ID_Card by a Certification Service Provider authorized by the ID_Card Issuer. The user data of the eSign Application are protected by PACE/EAC2. Three different major configurations of the TOE exist, that only differ in the installed file system or applications respectively: ● Passport: ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]) with user data protection by PACE and EAC1 (hereby, EAC1 is used only for data groups 3 and 4). 11 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 ● Residence Permit: ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]) with user data protection by PACE and EAC1/EAC2. eID Application compliant to [26], Part 2 and eSign Application compliant to [9] with user data protection by PACE and EAC2. ● Electronic Document (e.g. nPA): ePassport Application non-compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]) with user data protection by PACE and EAC2. eID Application compliant to [26], Part 2 and eSign Application compliant to [9] with user data protection by PACE and EAC2. The TOE provides the so-called Update-in-Field mechanism. This secure update mechanism allows to install code-signed updates of the TOE Embedded Software (operating system part) by authorized staff during operational use. The TOE only installs update packages that are encrypted, integrity-protected and signed by the authority in charge of delivering and installing updates. The TOE allows only authenticated update terminals to upload an update package to the TOE and to initiate the update procedure. Refer to the TOE’s user guidance documentation ([15] to [21]). The TOE’s evaluation only covers the Update-in-Field mechanism itself, but does not cover any update packages. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following certified PP and PP Configuration and claims strict conformance to them: ● Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use [MR.ED-PP], Version 2.0.3, 18 July 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-2016-MA-01 [7] ● Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents – Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP], Version 0.9.2, 18 August 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016 [8] The PP [7] claims itself strict conformance to the following Protection Profiles: ● Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key generation, EN 419211-2:2013, CEN/ISSS, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 (June 2016) [9] ● Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 05 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 [10] ● Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Document implementing Extended Access Control Version 2 defined in BSI TR-03110 [EAC2-PP], Version 1.01, 20 May 2015, BSI-CC-PP-0086 [11] Hereby, the PPs [10] and [11] claim themselves strict conformance to the following Protection Profile: ● Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01 [12] All in all, this means in result that the TOE is conformant to all the Protection Profiles [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] and [12] listed above. Please note that in consistency to the claimed Protection Profiles the security mechanisms Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) and Extended Access Control (EAC) are in focus of this evaluation process. The further security mechanism Basic 12 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report Access Control (BAC) is subject of a separate evaluation process (refer to BSI-DSZ-CC- 1103). The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality: TOE Security Functionality / Addressed Issue General Protection of User Data and TSF Data Identification and Authentication Access Control Cryptographic Functions Protection of Communication Accuracy of the TOE Security Functionality /Self-protection Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities The following TOE security features are the most significant for the TOE’s operational use. The TOE ensures that ● only authenticated terminals can get access to the user data stored on the TOE and use security functionality of the card according to the access rights of the terminal, ● the card holder can control access by consciously presenting his card and/or by entering his secret PIN, ● authenticity and integrity of user data can be verified, ● confidentiality of user data in the communication channel between the TOE and the connected terminal is provided, ● inconspicuous tracing of the card is averted, ● its security functionality and the data stored inside are self-protected, and ● digital signatures can be created. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7, in particular 7.1 to 7.6. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). 13 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2. Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1 HW/SW NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB including its IC Dedicated Support Software embedded into modules7 Hardware platform: P6022y (P60D145)8 ROM mask: Id- Card_01BD_ID2.0_RO M_Daten_02.hex Delivery type: Module: MOB6, U52 Inlay: Inlay SOM 20, SOM 21 (only for \'Electronic Document\' and \'Resi- dence Permit\') and Inlay SOM 30 and SOM 31 (only for \'Passport\') 2 SW TOE Embedded Software / Operating System and File System: TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1/P6022y in the three different major configurations Passport, Residence Permit and Electronic Document (containing at least the ePassport, eID or eSign Application with its dedicated files for the respective application in a file system) OS Version: ‘01 BD’ Completion Code Version: ‘01’ File System Version: ‘81’ Implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the IC 3 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Guidance Document - Common Part, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/ SAC and EAC/PSA protocol Version 1.0.1 29 July 2019 [15] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 4 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Operational Guidance - Residence Permit, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with ePassport, eID and eSign Application Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [16] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 7 For details on the MRTD chip and the IC Dedicated Software see Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1059- V2-2019. 8 Please note that in comparison to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.3, para 19 only the HW platform NXP P60D145 (and not P60D081) was in the scope of the TOE‘s present evaluation. 14 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 5 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Operational Guidance - Passport, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/ SAC and EAC protocol Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [17] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 6 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Operational Guidance – Electronic Document, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with ePassport, eID and eSign Application Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [18] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 7 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Administrator\'s Guidance - Residence Permit, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC/PSA protocol Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [19] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 8 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Administrator\'s Guidance - Passport, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/ SAC and EAC/PSA protocol Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [20] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 9 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Administrator\'s Guidance – Electronic Document, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with PACE/SAC and EAC/PSA protocol Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [21] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 10 Text Files Activation command APDUs and authentication key Activation command to open life-cycle phase 5, 6 or 7 and corresponding authentication keys Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE The customer specific ROM mask for the TOE is labelled and identified by NXP Semiconductors GmbH as IdentityCard_01BD_ID2.0. The name of the ROM file transferred from T-Systems International GmbH to NXP Semiconductors GmbH is IdCard_01BD_ID2.0_ROM_Daten_02.hex. The initialization of the TOE based on the NXP hardware platform P6022y (P60D145) takes place by using the following scripts: ● Patch-Code: PatchCodeROM-ID_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01.txt ● File systems / TOE major configurations: Passport: FileSystemcode-ID_ePass_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01_FSV81_PKV02.txt Residence Permit: FileSystemcode-ID_eAT_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01_FSV81_PKV02.txt Electronic Document: FileSystemcode-ID_nPA_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01_FSV81_PKV02.txt 15 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 The certified file systems for the TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y have the file system version \'81\'. The TOE Embedded Software consists of the operating system TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y (including the related completion data) and the different file systems for its three major configurations (Passport, Residence Permit, Electronic Document). The Initialization Agent and Personalization Agent can use the FORMAT command (CLA = ‘B0’ / INS = ‘50’) as described in the user guidance [15], chapter 8.4.1.1 to read out the chip information and identify the chip and the TOE Embedded Software embedded in the chip (only available during life-cycle phases 4 to 6). To open production phases for personalization a mutual authentication via the FORMAT command as described in the user guidance [15], chapter 8.4.1.4 is necessary, therefore the authenticity of the TOE is verified before further usage of the TOE. The following identification data can be retrieved within a 16 Byte string responded by the FORMAT command: Byte # Product Information 1 Chip Manufacturer 2 Chip Type 3 - 8 Unique identification number for the chip 9 Card Type 10-11 OS version (ROM mask version) 12 (Pre-) completion code version 13 File System Version 14 \'00\' (RFU) 15 \'00\' (RFU) 16 Authentication key identifier 17-32 Production logistic data Table 3: TOE Identification Note that Bytes 3 – 8 (unique identification number for the chip) are chip specific data which differ for each chip used in the TOE. The TOE is finalized after the initialization phase or pre-personalization phase respectively. Delivery is performed from the initialization facility to the personalization facility by a secured transport to a specific person of contact at the personalization site. Furthermore, the Personalization Agent receives information about the personalization commands and process requirements. To ensure that the Personalization Agent receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the personalization process as described in the Administrator’s guidance documents [19] - [21] have to be followed. 3. Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the Protection Profiles [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] and [12] by the Security Objectives and Requirements for the chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of 16 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy addresses the advanced security methods for authentication and secure communication, which are described in detail in the Security Target [6]. The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user data stored and operated on the smart card when used in a hostile environment. Hence, the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories and the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access and for integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore, the TOE’s overall policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage, physical manipulation and probing. Besides, the TOE\'s life-cycle is supported as well as the user identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore, specific cryptographic services including crypto routines, random number generation and key management functionality are being provided to be securely used by the smart card embedded software. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: ● OE.Lim_Block_Loader ● OE.Legislative_Compliance: Issuing of the travel document ● OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document: Travel document Authentication Key ● OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data: Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data ● OE.Exam_Travel_Document: Examination of the physical part of the travel document ● OE.Ext_Insp_Systems: Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems ● OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document: Protection of data from the logical travel document ● OE.RestrictedIdentity: Restricted Identity and Sector’s Static Key Pairs ● OE.Personalization: Personalization of travel document ● OE.Travel_Document_Holder: Travel document holder Obligations ● OE.Passive_Auth_Sign: Authentication of travel document by Signature ● OE.Chip_Auth_Key: Key Pairs needed for Chip Authentication and Restricted Identification ● OE.Terminal_Authentication: Key pairs needed for Terminal Authentication ● OE.Terminal: Terminal operating ● OE.Code_Confidentiality 17 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 ● OE.Secure_Environment ● OE.Eligible_Terminals_Only ● OE.SVD_Auth: Authenticity of the SVD ● OE.CGA_Qcert: Generation of qualified certificates ● OE.SSCD_Prov_Service: Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisioning Service ● OE.HID_VAD: Protection of the VAD ● OE.DTBS_Intend: SCA sends data intended to be signed ● OE.DTBS_Protect: SCA protects the data intended to be signed ● OE.Signatory: Security obligation of the Signatory Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2 as well as in the Protection Profiles [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] and [12]. 5. Architectural Information The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC) and the TOE Embedded Software that contains the operating system TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y (including the related completion data) and the different file systems for its three major configurations (Passport, Residence Permit, Electronic Document). Hereby, the TOE Embedded Software includes at least the ePassport, the eID or the eSign Application (depending on the chosen major configuration). For details concerning the underlying IC and its certification refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019 [22]. The Security Functions of the TOE are: ● General Protection of User Data and TSF Data ● Identification and Authentication ● Access Control ● Cryptographic Functions ● Protection of Communication ● Accuracy of the TOE Security Functionality / Self-protection According to the TOE Design these Security Functions are enforced by the following subsystems: ● Hardware (COMP_CH): Hardware Platform ● Kernel (COMP_KL): manages the interfaces between all components ● Crypto Component (COMP_CR): processes the cryptographic functions ● Admin Component (COMP_AD): processes administrative base functions ● IO Component (COMP_IO): controls the input and output ● ROM TCOS-Type Task (COMP_TT): APDU processing (system, applications) 18 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report 6. Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 7. IT Product Testing The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with simulator tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate the expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby, a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set was tested, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of developer tests was performed during the independent evaluator tests. Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 [26] APDU command sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality. Furthermore, penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered: ● testing APDU commands related to General Protection of User Data and TSF Data, ● testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication, ● testing APDU commands related to Access Control, ● testing APDU commands related to Cryptographic Functions (including Generation of a Key Pair and Creation of Digital Signatures), ● testing APDU commands related to the Protection of Communication (Secure Messaging Channel), ● testing APDU commands related to the Update in the Field mechanism, ● penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE, ● source code analysis performed by the evaluators, ● testing the commands which are used to execute the different PACE, CA and TA protocols, ● side channel analysis for SHA and ECC (including ECC key generation), ● using machine learning and deep learning methods for side channel analysis, ● fault injection attacks (laser attacks and EM Glitches), ● testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase, ● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms. The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during their penetration testing. 19 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results. 8. Evaluated Configuration This certification covers the following TOE: The TOE TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y under certification is composed from: ● Integrated Circuit (IC) NXP P6022y (P60D145) including its IC Dedicated Support Software ● TOE Embedded Software that contains the operating system TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y (including the related completion data) and the different file systems for its three major configurations ● Guidance documentation (see Table 2, rows 3 to 9, i.e. [15] to [21]) ● Authentication key material (see Table 2, row 10) Hereby, this certification covers the following three major configurations of the TOE: ● Passport: ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]) ● Residence Permit: ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]), eID Application compliant to [26], Part 2 and eSign Application compliant to [9] ● Electronic Document (e.g. nPA): ePassport Application non-compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]), eID Application compliant to [26], Part 2 and eSign Application compliant to [9] The Initialization Agent and Personalization Agent can use the FORMAT command as described in chapter 2 above to read out the chip information and identify the chip and the TOE Embedded Software embedded in the chip during life-cycle phases 4 to 6. The following table describes the evaluated TOE configurations with their respective identifiers: Byte # Data type Data 1 Chip Manufacturer (NXP) ‘04’ 2 Chip Type ‘30’ 9 Card Type ‘0D’ or ‘0A’ or ‘02’ (corresponding to the respective TOE major configuration, i.e. Passport, Residence Permit, Electronic Document) 10-11 OS / ROM Mask Version ’01 BD’ 12 (Pre-) completion code version ‘01’ 13 File System Version ‘81’ 16 Authentication key identifier ‘01’ Table 4: Evaluated TOE configurations and identifier The FORMAT command and related parameters are described in the user guidance [15], chapter 8.4.1.1. 20 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report The identification data as outlined in Table 4 and retrieved from the product must comply with the data given in Annex B of the user guidances [19] - [21] in order for the TOE to be verified as a certified version. The TOE’s evaluation only covers its Update-in-Field mechanism itself, but does not cover any update packages. 9. Results of the Evaluation 9.1. CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: (i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices according to AIS 36 (see [4]). On base of this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying IC platform (refer to [22]) and the document ETR for composite evaluation from the IC’s evaluation ([24]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation. (ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (AIS 37, see [4]). (iii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (AIS 26, see [4]). (iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (AIS 26, see [4]). (v) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (AIS 25, see [4]). (vi) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices (AIS 25, see [4]). (vii) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6 (AIS 34, see [4]) (viii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic random number generators (AIS 20 and AIS 31, see [4]). (ix) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (AIS 46, see [4]). For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34, AIS 36, AIS 37 and AIS 46 (see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]). The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE. As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: ● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report). ● The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. 21 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 The evaluation has confirmed: ● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use [MR.ED-PP], Version 2.0.3, 18 July 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2- 2016-MA-01 [7] Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents – Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post- Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP], Version 0.9.2, 18 August 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016 [8] Indirectly conformance to the following Protection Profiles is given: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key generation, EN 419211-2:2013, CEN/ISSS, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 (June 2016) [9] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 05 December 2012, BSI- CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 [10] Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Document implementing Extended Access Control Version 2 defined in BSI TR-03110 [EAC2-PP], Version 1.01, 20 May 2015, BSI-CC- PP-0086 [11] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2- 2011-MA-01 [12] ● for the', 'cc_version': 'PP conformant Common Criteria Part 2 extended ● for the', 'cc_security_level': 'Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5 Additionally, the requirements of the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03116-2 [27] are met by the TOE. This is part of the qualification of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y for the use within electronic passport card projects of the Federal Republic of Germany. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. 9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy. For the TOE’s cryptographic functionalities, this table outlines - where applicable - the standard of application where their specific appropriateness is stated, and otherwise their security level as a kind of rating from cryptographic point of view. 22 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report According to [26], [27], [28], [29] and [30] the algorithms are suitable for authentication, key agreement, authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and trusted channel. An explicit validity period is not given. Please take into account that cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related cryptographic operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the document ‘Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102-1 Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen’ (refer to https://www.bsi.bund.de). The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product, in particular the card issuing organisation and the national organisation responsible for the risk management, shall consider the results of the certification within the system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too. As the TOE provides the so-called Update-in-Field mechanism: If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or take additional measures in order to maintain system security. In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE: If the product certified is being used as National ID-Card or National Document the operational instructions and limitations as outlined in ‘Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116, Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 2: eID-Karten und hoheitliche Dokumente’ [27] (TR-03116-2) have to be followed when issuing and using the product. This includes the restrictions related to cryptographic algorithms and related parameters. Cryptographic algorithms and related parameters not covered by the certificate (see ST [6] and this certification report) must not be used. The latest published version of TR-03116-2 has to be followed (see https://www.bsi.bund.de/). 11. Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. 23 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES) In [31] the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union has codified the conceptional requirements for qualified electronic signature devices used in the European Union. This regulation is clarified in the Commission Implementing Decision [32]. In this decision the requirements are stated an electronic signature device must fulfil to be compliant to [31] (Article 1 and Annex'}}.
  • The st_frontpage property was set to None.
  • The report_keywords property was updated, with the {'cc_cert_id': {'__update__': {'DE': {'__insert__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1103': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018': 2}, '__update__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019': 25, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 3}, '__delete__': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2']}}}} data.
  • The st_keywords property was updated, with the {'cc_cert_id': {'__update__': {'DE': {'__insert__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1078': 1}, '__update__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 2}}}}} data.
• 13.02.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The report_keywords property was updated, with the {'cc_cert_id': {'__update__': {'DE': {'__insert__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2': 3}, '__update__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019': 50, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 6}, '__delete__': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1103', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018']}}}} data.
  • The st_keywords property was updated, with the {'cc_cert_id': {'__update__': {'DE': {'__update__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 4}, '__delete__': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1078']}}}} data.
• 07.02.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The report_keywords property was updated, with the {'cc_cert_id': {'__update__': {'DE': {'__insert__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1103': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018': 2}, '__update__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019': 25, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 3}, '__delete__': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2']}}}} data.
  • The st_keywords property was updated, with the {'cc_cert_id': {'__update__': {'DE': {'__insert__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1078': 1}, '__update__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 2}}}}} data.
• 04.01.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'annotated_references': None}.
• 26.04.2023 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'scheme_data': None}.
• 11.02.2023 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The _type was updated.

  • The new value is sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.

  The Maintenance Updates of the certificate were updated.

  • The new value is {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.MaintenanceReport', 'maintenance_date': '2022-11-29', 'maintenance_title': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y', 'maintenance_report_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078ra2a_pdf.pdf', 'maintenance_st_link': None}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.MaintenanceReport', 'maintenance_date': '2021-06-15', 'maintenance_title': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y', 'maintenance_report_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078ra1a_pdf.pdf', 'maintenance_st_link': None}]}.

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The _type property was set to sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.InternalState.
  • The following properties were deleted: ['errors'].

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The _type property was set to sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.PdfData.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'direct_transitive_cves': None, 'indirect_transitive_cves': None}.
  • The _type property was set to sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.Heuristics.
  • The following properties were deleted: ['direct_dependency_cves', 'indirect_dependency_cves'].
• 05.02.2023 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The Maintenance Updates of the certificate were updated.

  • The following values were added: {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.common_criteria.CommonCriteriaCert.MaintenanceReport', 'maintenance_date': '2022-11-29', 'maintenance_title': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y', 'maintenance_report_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078ra2a_pdf.pdf', 'maintenance_st_link': None}]}.
• 25.12.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The st_download_ok property was set to True.
  • The st_convert_ok property was set to True.
  • The st_extract_ok property was set to True.
  • The errors property was set to [].
  • The st_pdf_hash property was set to 850d0b28f1137ea8f42c8f85cd93e1a26d5b4c0d15e76c78665273c928efb56e.
  • The st_txt_hash property was set to eea7a9cd534d1a5c852c7f94a5d2f18aaff8a1ec76edd4fa18c225c1f5521a85.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The st_metadata property was set to {'pdf_file_size_bytes': 2491900, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 151, '/Title': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 (NXP)', '/Author': 'T-Systems International GmbH', '/Subject': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1', '/Keywords': 'Electronic Identity Card, Residence Permit Card, eID, eIDAS, Passport', '/Creator': 'Microsoft® Word für Office 365', '/CreationDate': "D:20190726125329+02'00'", '/ModDate': "D:20190726125329+02'00'", '/Producer': 'Microsoft® Word für Office 365', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder/dieharder-3.31.0.tgz', 'http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/documents/sts-2.1.1.zip']}}.
  • The st_frontpage property was set to {'anssi': {}, 'bsi': {}, 'nscib': {}, 'niap': {}, 'canada': {}}.
  • The st_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 4}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-MA-01': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP- 0086': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP0035': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP0082': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014': 1, 'BSI-PP-0087': 1, 'BSI-PP-0055-2009': 1, 'BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA02': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0086-2015': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA01': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL4': 10, 'EAL 6+': 1, 'EAL 4': 1, 'EAL 6': 1, 'EAL4 augmented': 3, 'EAL 4 augmented': 1, 'EAL 6 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ADV': {'ADV_ARC.1': 4, 'ADV_TDS.3': 3, 'ADV_FUN.1': 1, 'ADV_FSP.4': 2, 'ADV_IMP.1': 2, 'ADV_ARC': 1, 'ADV_FSP': 1}, 'AGD': {'AGD_PRE.1': 3, 'AGD_OPE.1': 2, 'AGD_OPE': 1}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 7, 'ALC_DEL.1': 2, 'ALC_DEL': 1, 'ALC_DVS': 1, 'ALC_CMS': 1, 'ALC_CMC': 1, 'ALC_FLR.1': 1, 'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.4': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.1': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_DPT.2': 5, 'ATE_DPT.1': 1, 'ATE_COV': 1, 'ATE_FUN': 1, 'ATE_IND': 1, 'ATE_DPT.3': 1, 'ATE_COV.2': 1, 'ATE_FUN.1': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 8, 'AVA_VAN': 1}, 'ASE': {'ASE_TSS.2': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FAU': {'FAU_SAS': 21, 'FAU_SAS.1': 7, 'FAU_SAS.1.1': 1}, 'FCS': {'FCS_RND': 13, 'FCS_RND.1': 7, 'FCS_RND.1.1': 1, 'FCS_CKM': 61, 'FCS_COP': 88, 'FCS_CKM.1': 29, 'FCS_CKM.2': 9, 'FCS_COP.1': 34, 'FCS_CKM.4': 32, 'FCS_RNG.1': 2}, 'FDP': {'FDP_ACF': 57, 'FDP_ACF.1': 52, 'FDP_RIP': 17, 'FDP_SDI': 13, 'FDP_ITC.1': 18, 'FDP_ITC.2': 19, 'FDP_RIP.1': 12, 'FDP_ACC': 40, 'FDP_UCT': 6, 'FDP_UIT': 6, 'FDP_IFC': 5, 'FDP_IFF': 6, 'FDP_ACC.1': 22, 'FDP_IFC.1': 8, 'FDP_UCT.1': 3, 'FDP_UIT.1': 4, 'FDP_IFF.1': 5, 'FDP_SDI.1': 4, 'FDP_SDI.2': 4, 'FDP_SDC.1': 1, 'FDP_ITT.1': 1}, 'FIA': {'FIA_API': 30, 'FIA_UAU': 86, 'FIA_API.1': 10, 'FIA_API.1.1': 1, 'FIA_AFL': 34, 'FIA_UID': 38, 'FIA_UIA': 1, 'FIA_UAU.1': 16, 'FIA_AFL.1': 11, 'FIA_UID.1': 18, 'FIA_UAU.4': 3, 'FIA_UAU.5': 8, 'FIA_UAU.6': 5}, 'FMT': {'FMT_LIM': 29, 'FMT_SMR.1': 39, 'FMT_LIM.1': 21, 'FMT_LIM.2': 17, 'FMT_LIM.1.1': 1, 'FMT_LIM.2.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR': 12, 'FMT_MTD': 123, 'FMT_MTD.3': 5, 'FMT_MSA.3': 9, 'FMT_MSA.1': 7, 'FMT_SMF.1.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA': 33, 'FMT_SMR.1.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR.1.2': 1, 'FMT_SMF': 24, 'FMT_MOF': 5, 'FMT_SMF.1': 36, 'FMT_MTD.1': 18, 'FMT_MOF.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA.4': 1}, 'FPT': {'FPT_EMS': 23, 'FPT_EMS.1': 17, 'FPT_EMS.1.1': 3, 'FPT_EMS.1.2': 4, 'FPT_FLS.1': 7, 'FPT_TST': 13, 'FPT_TST.1': 11, 'FPT_FLS': 16, 'FPT_PHP': 15, 'FPT_FPT_TST': 1, 'FPT_PHP.3': 5, 'FPT_PHP.1': 2, 'FPT_ITT.1': 1}, 'FRU': {'FRU_FLT.2': 1}, 'FTP': {'FTP_ITC': 32, 'FTP_ITC.1': 20, 'FTP_TRP.1': 4}}, 'cc_claims': {'O': {'O.RND': 3, 'O.TDES': 1, 'O.AES': 1, 'O.CUST_RECONF_PLAIN': 1, 'O.EEPROM_INTEGRITY': 1, 'O.FM_FW': 1, 'O.MEM_ACCESS': 1, 'O.SFR_ACCESS': 1, 'O.PUF': 1}, 'T': {'T.RND': 1}, 'A': {'A.CGA': 2, 'A.SCA': 2}, 'OE': {'OE.HID_VAD': 4}}, 'vendor': {'NXP': {'NXP': 3, 'NXP Semiconductors': 2}}, 'eval_facility': {'TSystems': {'T-Systems International': 157}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 20, 'AES-256': 1}}, 'DES': {'3DES': {'3DES': 5, 'Triple-DES': 4, 'TDES': 6, 'TDEA': 1}}, 'constructions': {'MAC': {'KMAC': 4, 'CMAC': 5}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'ECC': {'ECDH': {'ECDH': 15}, 'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 2}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 3}}, 'FF': {'DH': {'Diffie-Hellman': 9, 'DH': 4}, 'DSA': {'DSA': 1}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA1': {'SHA-1': 1}, 'SHA2': {'SHA-224': 1, 'SHA-256': 1, 'SHA-384': 1, 'SHA-512': 1}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 9}, 'KA': {'Key Agreement': 2}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 167}}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RND': 4, 'RNG': 8}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 3}, 'CTR': {'CTR': 1}, 'OFB': {'OFB': 1}}, 'ecc_curve': {'NIST': {'P-256': 3, 'P-192': 2, 'P-384': 2, 'NIST P-256': 1}, 'Brainpool': {'brainpoolP192r1': 1, 'brainpoolP192t1': 1, 'brainpoolP224r1': 1, 'brainpoolP224t1': 1, 'brainpoolP256r1': 2, 'brainpoolP256t1': 1, 'brainpoolP320r1': 1, 'brainpoolP320t1': 1, 'brainpoolP384r1': 2, 'brainpoolP384t1': 1, 'brainpoolP512r1': 2, 'brainpoolP512t1': 1}}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'SCA': {'Leak-Inherent': 4, 'physical probing': 3, 'DPA': 1}, 'FI': {'Physical Tampering': 2, 'Physical tampering': 2, 'physical tampering': 5, 'Malfunction': 6, 'malfunction': 5, 'fault injection': 1}, 'other': {'reverse engineering': 1}}, 'technical_report_id': {'BSI': {'BSI TR-03110': 4}}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {'EF': {'EF.DG3': 5, 'EF.DG4': 5, 'EF.DG14': 3, 'EF.DG1': 3, 'EF.DG16': 2, 'EF.DG2': 1, 'EF.SOD': 2, 'EF.ChipSecurity': 1}}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS186': 5, 'FIPS 180-4': 1, 'FIPS180': 2, 'FIPS197': 3, 'FIPS PUB 180-4': 1, 'FIPS PUB 186-4': 1}, 'PKCS': {'PKCS#3': 8}, 'BSI': {'AIS36': 2, 'AIS31': 2, 'AIS 31': 1, 'AIS 36': 1}, 'RFC': {'RFC5639': 27, 'RFC 2631': 1, 'RFC 5639': 1}, 'ICAO': {'ICAO': 6}, 'CC': {'CCMB-2017-04-001': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-002': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-003': 2, 'CCMB-2012-09-004': 1, 'CCMB-2017-04-004': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'OutOfScope': {'out of scope': 2, ' For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf': 1, ' For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf. [EACTR Part 3, B.7]). 13 For the ePass Application, the': 1, 'by these terminals was given already in chapter 1.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST. In particular, terminals using Basic Access Control (BAC) may be functionally supported': 1}}}.
  • The st_filename property was set to 1078b_pdf.pdf.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FUN', 'level': 1}]} values added.
• 24.12.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The st_download_ok property was set to False.
  • The st_convert_ok property was set to False.
  • The st_extract_ok property was set to False.
  • The errors property was set to ['failed to download ST from https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078b_pdf.pdf, code: nok'].
  • The st_pdf_hash property was set to None.
  • The st_txt_hash property was set to None.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The st_metadata property was set to None.
  • The st_frontpage property was set to None.
  • The st_keywords property was set to None.
  • The st_filename property was set to None.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': None, 'indirectly_referencing': None} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FUN', 'level': 1}]} values discarded.
• 24.12.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The cert_link was updated.

  • The new value is https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078c_pdf.pdf.

  The manufacturer_web was updated.

  • The new value is https://www.t-systems.de/.

  The Protection profiles of the certificate were updated.

  • The new value is {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use', 'pp_eal': 'EAL4+', 'pp_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0087V2b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_ids': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['MR.ED-PP_V2.2']}}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (O...', 'pp_eal': None, 'pp_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0090b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_ids': None}]}.

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The st_download_ok property was set to True.
  • The st_convert_ok property was set to True.
  • The st_extract_ok property was set to True.
  • The errors property was set to [].
  • The st_pdf_hash property was set to 850d0b28f1137ea8f42c8f85cd93e1a26d5b4c0d15e76c78665273c928efb56e.
  • The st_txt_hash property was set to eea7a9cd534d1a5c852c7f94a5d2f18aaff8a1ec76edd4fa18c225c1f5521a85.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The st_metadata property was set to {'pdf_file_size_bytes': 2491900, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 151, '/Title': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 (NXP)', '/Author': 'T-Systems International GmbH', '/Subject': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1', '/Keywords': 'Electronic Identity Card, Residence Permit Card, eID, eIDAS, Passport', '/Creator': 'Microsoft® Word für Office 365', '/CreationDate': "D:20190726125329+02'00'", '/ModDate': "D:20190726125329+02'00'", '/Producer': 'Microsoft® Word für Office 365', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder/dieharder-3.31.0.tgz', 'http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/documents/sts-2.1.1.zip']}}.
  • The st_frontpage property was set to {'anssi': {}, 'bsi': {}, 'nscib': {}, 'niap': {}, 'canada': {}}.
  • The st_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 4}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-MA-01': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP- 0086': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP0035': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP0082': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014': 1, 'BSI-PP-0087': 1, 'BSI-PP-0055-2009': 1, 'BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA02': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0086-2015': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA01': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL4': 10, 'EAL 6+': 1, 'EAL 4': 1, 'EAL 6': 1, 'EAL4 augmented': 3, 'EAL 4 augmented': 1, 'EAL 6 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ADV': {'ADV_ARC.1': 4, 'ADV_TDS.3': 3, 'ADV_FUN.1': 1, 'ADV_FSP.4': 2, 'ADV_IMP.1': 2, 'ADV_ARC': 1, 'ADV_FSP': 1}, 'AGD': {'AGD_PRE.1': 3, 'AGD_OPE.1': 2, 'AGD_OPE': 1}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 7, 'ALC_DEL.1': 2, 'ALC_DEL': 1, 'ALC_DVS': 1, 'ALC_CMS': 1, 'ALC_CMC': 1, 'ALC_FLR.1': 1, 'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.4': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.1': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_DPT.2': 5, 'ATE_DPT.1': 1, 'ATE_COV': 1, 'ATE_FUN': 1, 'ATE_IND': 1, 'ATE_DPT.3': 1, 'ATE_COV.2': 1, 'ATE_FUN.1': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 8, 'AVA_VAN': 1}, 'ASE': {'ASE_TSS.2': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FAU': {'FAU_SAS': 21, 'FAU_SAS.1': 7, 'FAU_SAS.1.1': 1}, 'FCS': {'FCS_RND': 13, 'FCS_RND.1': 7, 'FCS_RND.1.1': 1, 'FCS_CKM': 61, 'FCS_COP': 88, 'FCS_CKM.1': 29, 'FCS_CKM.2': 9, 'FCS_COP.1': 34, 'FCS_CKM.4': 32, 'FCS_RNG.1': 2}, 'FDP': {'FDP_ACF': 57, 'FDP_ACF.1': 52, 'FDP_RIP': 17, 'FDP_SDI': 13, 'FDP_ITC.1': 18, 'FDP_ITC.2': 19, 'FDP_RIP.1': 12, 'FDP_ACC': 40, 'FDP_UCT': 6, 'FDP_UIT': 6, 'FDP_IFC': 5, 'FDP_IFF': 6, 'FDP_ACC.1': 22, 'FDP_IFC.1': 8, 'FDP_UCT.1': 3, 'FDP_UIT.1': 4, 'FDP_IFF.1': 5, 'FDP_SDI.1': 4, 'FDP_SDI.2': 4, 'FDP_SDC.1': 1, 'FDP_ITT.1': 1}, 'FIA': {'FIA_API': 30, 'FIA_UAU': 86, 'FIA_API.1': 10, 'FIA_API.1.1': 1, 'FIA_AFL': 34, 'FIA_UID': 38, 'FIA_UIA': 1, 'FIA_UAU.1': 16, 'FIA_AFL.1': 11, 'FIA_UID.1': 18, 'FIA_UAU.4': 3, 'FIA_UAU.5': 8, 'FIA_UAU.6': 5}, 'FMT': {'FMT_LIM': 29, 'FMT_SMR.1': 39, 'FMT_LIM.1': 21, 'FMT_LIM.2': 17, 'FMT_LIM.1.1': 1, 'FMT_LIM.2.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR': 12, 'FMT_MTD': 123, 'FMT_MTD.3': 5, 'FMT_MSA.3': 9, 'FMT_MSA.1': 7, 'FMT_SMF.1.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA': 33, 'FMT_SMR.1.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR.1.2': 1, 'FMT_SMF': 24, 'FMT_MOF': 5, 'FMT_SMF.1': 36, 'FMT_MTD.1': 18, 'FMT_MOF.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA.4': 1}, 'FPT': {'FPT_EMS': 23, 'FPT_EMS.1': 17, 'FPT_EMS.1.1': 3, 'FPT_EMS.1.2': 4, 'FPT_FLS.1': 7, 'FPT_TST': 13, 'FPT_TST.1': 11, 'FPT_FLS': 16, 'FPT_PHP': 15, 'FPT_FPT_TST': 1, 'FPT_PHP.3': 5, 'FPT_PHP.1': 2, 'FPT_ITT.1': 1}, 'FRU': {'FRU_FLT.2': 1}, 'FTP': {'FTP_ITC': 32, 'FTP_ITC.1': 20, 'FTP_TRP.1': 4}}, 'cc_claims': {'O': {'O.RND': 3, 'O.TDES': 1, 'O.AES': 1, 'O.CUST_RECONF_PLAIN': 1, 'O.EEPROM_INTEGRITY': 1, 'O.FM_FW': 1, 'O.MEM_ACCESS': 1, 'O.SFR_ACCESS': 1, 'O.PUF': 1}, 'T': {'T.RND': 1}, 'A': {'A.CGA': 2, 'A.SCA': 2}, 'OE': {'OE.HID_VAD': 4}}, 'vendor': {'NXP': {'NXP': 3, 'NXP Semiconductors': 2}}, 'eval_facility': {'TSystems': {'T-Systems International': 157}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 20, 'AES-256': 1}}, 'DES': {'3DES': {'3DES': 5, 'Triple-DES': 4, 'TDES': 6, 'TDEA': 1}}, 'constructions': {'MAC': {'KMAC': 4, 'CMAC': 5}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'ECC': {'ECDH': {'ECDH': 15}, 'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 2}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 3}}, 'FF': {'DH': {'Diffie-Hellman': 9, 'DH': 4}, 'DSA': {'DSA': 1}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA1': {'SHA-1': 1}, 'SHA2': {'SHA-224': 1, 'SHA-256': 1, 'SHA-384': 1, 'SHA-512': 1}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 9}, 'KA': {'Key Agreement': 2}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 167}}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RND': 4, 'RNG': 8}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 3}, 'CTR': {'CTR': 1}, 'OFB': {'OFB': 1}}, 'ecc_curve': {'NIST': {'P-256': 3, 'P-192': 2, 'P-384': 2, 'NIST P-256': 1}, 'Brainpool': {'brainpoolP192r1': 1, 'brainpoolP192t1': 1, 'brainpoolP224r1': 1, 'brainpoolP224t1': 1, 'brainpoolP256r1': 2, 'brainpoolP256t1': 1, 'brainpoolP320r1': 1, 'brainpoolP320t1': 1, 'brainpoolP384r1': 2, 'brainpoolP384t1': 1, 'brainpoolP512r1': 2, 'brainpoolP512t1': 1}}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'SCA': {'Leak-Inherent': 4, 'physical probing': 3, 'DPA': 1}, 'FI': {'Physical Tampering': 2, 'Physical tampering': 2, 'physical tampering': 5, 'Malfunction': 6, 'malfunction': 5, 'fault injection': 1}, 'other': {'reverse engineering': 1}}, 'technical_report_id': {'BSI': {'BSI TR-03110': 4}}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {'EF': {'EF.DG3': 5, 'EF.DG4': 5, 'EF.DG14': 3, 'EF.DG1': 3, 'EF.DG16': 2, 'EF.DG2': 1, 'EF.SOD': 2, 'EF.ChipSecurity': 1}}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS186': 5, 'FIPS 180-4': 1, 'FIPS180': 2, 'FIPS197': 3, 'FIPS PUB 180-4': 1, 'FIPS PUB 186-4': 1}, 'PKCS': {'PKCS#3': 8}, 'BSI': {'AIS36': 2, 'AIS31': 2, 'AIS 31': 1, 'AIS 36': 1}, 'RFC': {'RFC5639': 27, 'RFC 2631': 1, 'RFC 5639': 1}, 'ICAO': {'ICAO': 6}, 'CC': {'CCMB-2017-04-001': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-002': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-003': 2, 'CCMB-2012-09-004': 1, 'CCMB-2017-04-004': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'OutOfScope': {'out of scope': 2, ' For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf': 1, ' For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf. [EACTR Part 3, B.7]). 13 For the ePass Application, the': 1, 'by these terminals was given already in chapter 1.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST. In particular, terminals using Basic Access Control (BAC) may be functionally supported': 1}}}.
  • The st_filename property was set to 1078b_pdf.pdf.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FUN', 'level': 1}]} values added.
• 23.12.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The cert_link was updated.

  • The new value is None.

  The manufacturer_web was updated.

  • The new value is None.

  The Protection profiles of the certificate were updated.

  • The new value is {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'MR.ED-ON-PP', 'pp_eal': None, 'pp_link': None, 'pp_ids': None}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'MR.ED-PP_V2.2', 'pp_eal': None, 'pp_link': None, 'pp_ids': None}]}.

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The st_download_ok property was set to False.
  • The st_convert_ok property was set to False.
  • The st_extract_ok property was set to False.
  • The errors property was set to ['failed to download ST from https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078b_pdf.pdf, code: 408'].
  • The st_pdf_hash property was set to None.
  • The st_txt_hash property was set to None.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The st_metadata property was set to None.
  • The st_frontpage property was set to None.
  • The st_keywords property was set to None.
  • The st_filename property was set to None.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': None, 'indirectly_referencing': None} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FUN', 'level': 1}]} values discarded.
• 23.12.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The st_download_ok property was set to True.
  • The st_convert_ok property was set to True.
  • The st_extract_ok property was set to True.
  • The errors property was set to [].
  • The st_pdf_hash property was set to 850d0b28f1137ea8f42c8f85cd93e1a26d5b4c0d15e76c78665273c928efb56e.
  • The st_txt_hash property was set to eea7a9cd534d1a5c852c7f94a5d2f18aaff8a1ec76edd4fa18c225c1f5521a85.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The st_metadata property was set to {'pdf_file_size_bytes': 2491900, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 151, '/Title': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 (NXP)', '/Author': 'T-Systems International GmbH', '/Subject': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1', '/Keywords': 'Electronic Identity Card, Residence Permit Card, eID, eIDAS, Passport', '/Creator': 'Microsoft® Word für Office 365', '/CreationDate': "D:20190726125329+02'00'", '/ModDate': "D:20190726125329+02'00'", '/Producer': 'Microsoft® Word für Office 365', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder/dieharder-3.31.0.tgz', 'http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/documents/sts-2.1.1.zip']}}.
  • The st_frontpage property was set to {'anssi': {}, 'bsi': {}, 'nscib': {}, 'niap': {}, 'canada': {}}.
  • The st_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 4}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-MA-01': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP- 0086': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP0035': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP0082': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014': 1, 'BSI-PP-0087': 1, 'BSI-PP-0055-2009': 1, 'BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA02': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0086-2015': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA01': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL4': 10, 'EAL 6+': 1, 'EAL 4': 1, 'EAL 6': 1, 'EAL4 augmented': 3, 'EAL 4 augmented': 1, 'EAL 6 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ADV': {'ADV_ARC.1': 4, 'ADV_TDS.3': 3, 'ADV_FUN.1': 1, 'ADV_FSP.4': 2, 'ADV_IMP.1': 2, 'ADV_ARC': 1, 'ADV_FSP': 1}, 'AGD': {'AGD_PRE.1': 3, 'AGD_OPE.1': 2, 'AGD_OPE': 1}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 7, 'ALC_DEL.1': 2, 'ALC_DEL': 1, 'ALC_DVS': 1, 'ALC_CMS': 1, 'ALC_CMC': 1, 'ALC_FLR.1': 1, 'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.4': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.1': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_DPT.2': 5, 'ATE_DPT.1': 1, 'ATE_COV': 1, 'ATE_FUN': 1, 'ATE_IND': 1, 'ATE_DPT.3': 1, 'ATE_COV.2': 1, 'ATE_FUN.1': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 8, 'AVA_VAN': 1}, 'ASE': {'ASE_TSS.2': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FAU': {'FAU_SAS': 21, 'FAU_SAS.1': 7, 'FAU_SAS.1.1': 1}, 'FCS': {'FCS_RND': 13, 'FCS_RND.1': 7, 'FCS_RND.1.1': 1, 'FCS_CKM': 61, 'FCS_COP': 88, 'FCS_CKM.1': 29, 'FCS_CKM.2': 9, 'FCS_COP.1': 34, 'FCS_CKM.4': 32, 'FCS_RNG.1': 2}, 'FDP': {'FDP_ACF': 57, 'FDP_ACF.1': 52, 'FDP_RIP': 17, 'FDP_SDI': 13, 'FDP_ITC.1': 18, 'FDP_ITC.2': 19, 'FDP_RIP.1': 12, 'FDP_ACC': 40, 'FDP_UCT': 6, 'FDP_UIT': 6, 'FDP_IFC': 5, 'FDP_IFF': 6, 'FDP_ACC.1': 22, 'FDP_IFC.1': 8, 'FDP_UCT.1': 3, 'FDP_UIT.1': 4, 'FDP_IFF.1': 5, 'FDP_SDI.1': 4, 'FDP_SDI.2': 4, 'FDP_SDC.1': 1, 'FDP_ITT.1': 1}, 'FIA': {'FIA_API': 30, 'FIA_UAU': 86, 'FIA_API.1': 10, 'FIA_API.1.1': 1, 'FIA_AFL': 34, 'FIA_UID': 38, 'FIA_UIA': 1, 'FIA_UAU.1': 16, 'FIA_AFL.1': 11, 'FIA_UID.1': 18, 'FIA_UAU.4': 3, 'FIA_UAU.5': 8, 'FIA_UAU.6': 5}, 'FMT': {'FMT_LIM': 29, 'FMT_SMR.1': 39, 'FMT_LIM.1': 21, 'FMT_LIM.2': 17, 'FMT_LIM.1.1': 1, 'FMT_LIM.2.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR': 12, 'FMT_MTD': 123, 'FMT_MTD.3': 5, 'FMT_MSA.3': 9, 'FMT_MSA.1': 7, 'FMT_SMF.1.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA': 33, 'FMT_SMR.1.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR.1.2': 1, 'FMT_SMF': 24, 'FMT_MOF': 5, 'FMT_SMF.1': 36, 'FMT_MTD.1': 18, 'FMT_MOF.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA.4': 1}, 'FPT': {'FPT_EMS': 23, 'FPT_EMS.1': 17, 'FPT_EMS.1.1': 3, 'FPT_EMS.1.2': 4, 'FPT_FLS.1': 7, 'FPT_TST': 13, 'FPT_TST.1': 11, 'FPT_FLS': 16, 'FPT_PHP': 15, 'FPT_FPT_TST': 1, 'FPT_PHP.3': 5, 'FPT_PHP.1': 2, 'FPT_ITT.1': 1}, 'FRU': {'FRU_FLT.2': 1}, 'FTP': {'FTP_ITC': 32, 'FTP_ITC.1': 20, 'FTP_TRP.1': 4}}, 'cc_claims': {'O': {'O.RND': 3, 'O.TDES': 1, 'O.AES': 1, 'O.CUST_RECONF_PLAIN': 1, 'O.EEPROM_INTEGRITY': 1, 'O.FM_FW': 1, 'O.MEM_ACCESS': 1, 'O.SFR_ACCESS': 1, 'O.PUF': 1}, 'T': {'T.RND': 1}, 'A': {'A.CGA': 2, 'A.SCA': 2}, 'OE': {'OE.HID_VAD': 4}}, 'vendor': {'NXP': {'NXP': 3, 'NXP Semiconductors': 2}}, 'eval_facility': {'TSystems': {'T-Systems International': 157}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 20, 'AES-256': 1}}, 'DES': {'3DES': {'3DES': 5, 'Triple-DES': 4, 'TDES': 6, 'TDEA': 1}}, 'constructions': {'MAC': {'KMAC': 4, 'CMAC': 5}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'ECC': {'ECDH': {'ECDH': 15}, 'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 2}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 3}}, 'FF': {'DH': {'Diffie-Hellman': 9, 'DH': 4}, 'DSA': {'DSA': 1}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA1': {'SHA-1': 1}, 'SHA2': {'SHA-224': 1, 'SHA-256': 1, 'SHA-384': 1, 'SHA-512': 1}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 9}, 'KA': {'Key Agreement': 2}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 167}}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RND': 4, 'RNG': 8}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 3}, 'CTR': {'CTR': 1}, 'OFB': {'OFB': 1}}, 'ecc_curve': {'NIST': {'P-256': 3, 'P-192': 2, 'P-384': 2, 'NIST P-256': 1}, 'Brainpool': {'brainpoolP192r1': 1, 'brainpoolP192t1': 1, 'brainpoolP224r1': 1, 'brainpoolP224t1': 1, 'brainpoolP256r1': 2, 'brainpoolP256t1': 1, 'brainpoolP320r1': 1, 'brainpoolP320t1': 1, 'brainpoolP384r1': 2, 'brainpoolP384t1': 1, 'brainpoolP512r1': 2, 'brainpoolP512t1': 1}}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'SCA': {'Leak-Inherent': 4, 'physical probing': 3, 'DPA': 1}, 'FI': {'Physical Tampering': 2, 'Physical tampering': 2, 'physical tampering': 5, 'Malfunction': 6, 'malfunction': 5, 'fault injection': 1}, 'other': {'reverse engineering': 1}}, 'technical_report_id': {'BSI': {'BSI TR-03110': 4}}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {'EF': {'EF.DG3': 5, 'EF.DG4': 5, 'EF.DG14': 3, 'EF.DG1': 3, 'EF.DG16': 2, 'EF.DG2': 1, 'EF.SOD': 2, 'EF.ChipSecurity': 1}}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS186': 5, 'FIPS 180-4': 1, 'FIPS180': 2, 'FIPS197': 3, 'FIPS PUB 180-4': 1, 'FIPS PUB 186-4': 1}, 'PKCS': {'PKCS#3': 8}, 'BSI': {'AIS36': 2, 'AIS31': 2, 'AIS 31': 1, 'AIS 36': 1}, 'RFC': {'RFC5639': 27, 'RFC 2631': 1, 'RFC 5639': 1}, 'ICAO': {'ICAO': 6}, 'CC': {'CCMB-2017-04-001': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-002': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-003': 2, 'CCMB-2012-09-004': 1, 'CCMB-2017-04-004': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'OutOfScope': {'out of scope': 2, ' For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf': 1, ' For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf. [EACTR Part 3, B.7]). 13 For the ePass Application, the': 1, 'by these terminals was given already in chapter 1.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST. In particular, terminals using Basic Access Control (BAC) may be functionally supported': 1}}}.
  • The st_filename property was set to 1078b_pdf.pdf.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}} data.
  • The report_references property was updated, with the {'indirectly_referencing': {'__add__': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016']}}} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FUN', 'level': 1}]} values added.
• 21.12.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The st_download_ok property was set to False.
  • The st_convert_ok property was set to False.
  • The st_extract_ok property was set to False.
  • The errors property was set to ['failed to download ST from https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078b_pdf.pdf, code: nok'].
  • The st_pdf_hash property was set to None.
  • The st_txt_hash property was set to None.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The st_metadata property was set to None.
  • The st_frontpage property was set to None.
  • The st_keywords property was set to None.
  • The st_filename property was set to None.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': None, 'indirectly_referencing': None} data.
  • The report_references property was updated, with the {'indirectly_referencing': {'__discard__': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016']}}} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FUN', 'level': 1}]} values discarded.
• 05.10.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The Protection profiles of the certificate were updated.

  • The new value is {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use', 'pp_eal': 'EAL4+', 'pp_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0087V2b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_ids': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['MR.ED-PP_V2.2']}}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (O...', 'pp_eal': None, 'pp_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0090b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_ids': None}]}.

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'st_convert_garbage': False, 'report_convert_garbage': False}.
• 04.10.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The Protection profiles of the certificate were updated.

  • The new value is {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use', 'pp_eal': 'http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0087V2b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_link': None, 'pp_ids': None}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (O...', 'pp_eal': 'http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0090b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_link': None, 'pp_ids': None}]}.
• 28.09.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The report_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': {'__discard__': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2']}}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'__discard__': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2']}}} data.
• 24.09.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'report_filename': '1078a_pdf.pdf', 'st_filename': '1078b_pdf.pdf'}.
  • The report_keywords property was updated, with the {'cc_cert_id': {'__update__': {'DE': {'__update__': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019': 50}}}}, 'cc_security_level': {'__update__': {'EAL': {'__update__': {'EAL 4': 5}}}}, 'cc_sar': {'__update__': {'AVA': {'__update__': {'AVA_VAN.5': 4}}}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FCS': {'FCS_COP': 26, 'FCS_CKM': 22, 'FCS_RND': 1, 'FCS_COP.1': 1}, 'FIA': {'FIA_UAU': 6}, 'FTP': {'FTP_ITC': 6}}, 'cc_claims': {}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'__update__': {'DES': {'__update__': {'DES': {'__update__': {'DES': 4}}}}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'__update__': {'FF': {'__update__': {'DH': {'__delete__': ['DH']}}, '__delete__': ['DSA']}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'__update__': {'MAC': {'__update__': {'MAC': 3}}, 'KA': {'__delete__': ['KA']}}}, 'cipher_mode': {'__delete__': ['CTR']}, 'tee_name': {}, 'standard_id': {'__update__': {'ISO': {'__update__': {'ISO/IEC 15408': 6, 'ISO/IEC 18045': 6}}, 'ICAO': {'__update__': {'ICAO': 19}}}}, 'certification_process': {'__update__': {'ConfidentialDocument': {'__insert__': {'being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification': 1, 'Version 1.2, 29 July 2019, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document) [15] TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Guidance Document - Common Part, Guidance Documentation of': 1, 'ETR-COMP- ADD), BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2, Version 2, 29 April 2019, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) [25] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018 for Bundesdruckerei GmbH manufacturing site for': 1, 'RNG] Zufallszahlengenerierung in TCOS, Version 0.8, 15 January 2019, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document) [UiF] Update im Feld unter TCOS iD, Version 0.1, 02 October 2018, T-Systems International GmbH': 1}, '__delete__': ['identiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification', 'Release1/P6022y, Version 1.2, 29 July 2019, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document) [15] TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Guidance Document - Common Part, Guidance Documentation of', 'dendum (ETR-COMP- ADD), BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2, Version 2, 29 April 2019, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) [25] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018 for Bundesdruckerei GmbH manufacturing site for', 'RNG] Zufallszahlengenerierung in TCOS, Version 0.8, 15 January 2019, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document) [UiF] Update im Feld unter TCOS iD, Version 0.1, 02 October 2018, T-Systems International GmbH ', 'confidential document) 39 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Note: End of report 40 / 40']}}}} data.
  • The st_keywords property was updated, with the {'cc_security_level': {'__update__': {'EAL': {'__insert__': {'EAL 6+': 1}, '__update__': {'EAL4': 10, 'EAL4 augmented': 3}}}}, 'cc_sar': {'__insert__': {'ASE': {'ASE_TSS.2': 1}}, '__update__': {'ADV': {'__insert__': {'ADV_FUN.1': 1}}, 'AGD': {'__update__': {'AGD_PRE.1': 3}}, 'ATE': {'__insert__': {'ATE_DPT.1': 1, 'ATE_IND': 1}}, 'AVA': {'__update__': {'AVA_VAN.5': 8}}}, '__delete__': ['ACE']}, 'cc_sfr': {'__update__': {'FAU': {'__update__': {'FAU_SAS': 21, 'FAU_SAS.1': 7}}, 'FCS': {'__insert__': {'FCS_CKM': 61, 'FCS_COP': 88}, '__update__': {'FCS_RND': 13, 'FCS_RND.1': 7, 'FCS_COP.1': 34, 'FCS_CKM.4': 32, 'FCS_CKM.1': 29, 'FCS_RNG.1': 2}}, 'FDP': {'__insert__': {'FDP_SDI': 13, 'FDP_ACC': 40, 'FDP_UCT': 6, 'FDP_UIT': 6, 'FDP_IFC': 5, 'FDP_IFF': 6, 'FDP_IFF.1': 5, 'FDP_SDI.2': 4}, '__update__': {'FDP_ACF.1': 52, 'FDP_ACF': 57, 'FDP_ACC.1': 22, 'FDP_RIP.1': 12, 'FDP_IFC.1': 8, 'FDP_UCT.1': 3, 'FDP_UIT.1': 4, 'FDP_RIP': 17, 'FDP_SDI.1': 4}}, 'FIA': {'__insert__': {'FIA_UAU': 86, 'FIA_AFL': 34, 'FIA_UID': 38, 'FIA_UIA': 1}, '__update__': {'FIA_API': 30, 'FIA_API.1': 10, 'FIA_UAU.1': 16, 'FIA_UID.1': 18, 'FIA_UAU.5': 8, 'FIA_UAU.4': 3, 'FIA_UAU.6': 5, 'FIA_AFL.1': 11}}, 'FMT': {'__insert__': {'FMT_SMR': 12, 'FMT_MTD': 123, 'FMT_MSA': 33, 'FMT_SMF': 24, 'FMT_MOF': 5, 'FMT_MOF.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA.4': 1}, '__update__': {'FMT_LIM': 29, 'FMT_SMR.1': 39, 'FMT_LIM.1': 21, 'FMT_LIM.2': 17, 'FMT_MTD.3': 5, 'FMT_MSA.3': 9, 'FMT_MSA.1': 7, 'FMT_SMF.1': 36, 'FMT_MTD.1': 18}}, 'FPT': {'__insert__': {'FPT_FPT_TST': 1, 'FPT_PHP.1': 2}, '__update__': {'FPT_EMS': 23, 'FPT_EMS.1': 17, 'FPT_EMS.1.2': 4, 'FPT_TST.1': 11, 'FPT_FLS.1': 7, 'FPT_PHP.3': 5, 'FPT_FLS': 16, 'FPT_PHP': 15, 'FPT_TST': 13}}, 'FTP': {'__insert__': {'FTP_ITC': 32}, '__update__': {'FTP_ITC.1': 20}}}}, 'cc_claims': {'__update__': {'OE': {'__delete__': ['OE']}}, '__delete__': ['D', 'R']}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'__update__': {'AES_competition': {'__update__': {'AES': {'__update__': {'AES': 20}}}}, 'DES': {'__delete__': ['DES']}, 'constructions': {'__update__': {'MAC': {'__update__': {'KMAC': 4, 'CMAC': 5}}}}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'__update__': {'FF': {'__update__': {'DH': {'__update__': {'Diffie-Hellman': 9, 'DH': 4}}, 'DSA': {'__update__': {'DSA': 1}}}}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'__update__': {'MAC': {'__update__': {'MAC': 9}}, 'KA': {'__delete__': ['KA']}}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'__update__': {'PACE': {'__update__': {'PACE': 167}}}}, 'randomness': {'__update__': {'RNG': {'__update__': {'RND': 4, 'RNG': 8}}}, '__delete__': ['TRNG']}, 'cipher_mode': {'__update__': {'CTR': {'__update__': {'CTR': 1}}}}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'__update__': {'SCA': {'__update__': {'physical probing': 3}}, 'FI': {'__update__': {'Malfunction': 6}}}}, 'tee_name': {}, 'standard_id': {'__update__': {'ICAO': {'__update__': {'ICAO': 6}}}}, 'certification_process': {'__update__': {'OutOfScope': {'__insert__': {' For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf': 1, ' For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf. [EACTR Part 3, B.7]). 13 For the ePass Application, the': 1, 'by these terminals was given already in chapter 1.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST. In particular, terminals using Basic Access Control (BAC) may be functionally supported': 1}, '__delete__': ['. For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf', '.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST', 'ACTR]. For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf. [EACTR Part 3, B.7]). 13 For the ePass Application, the', 'le by these terminals was given already in chapter 1.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST. In particular, terminals using Basic Access Control (BAC) may be functionally supported']}}}} data.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FUN', 'level': 1}]} values added.
• 02.09.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The st_download_ok property was set to True.
  • The errors property was set to [].
  • The st_pdf_hash property was set to 850d0b28f1137ea8f42c8f85cd93e1a26d5b4c0d15e76c78665273c928efb56e.
  • The st_txt_hash property was set to eea7a9cd534d1a5c852c7f94a5d2f18aaff8a1ec76edd4fa18c225c1f5521a85.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The st_metadata property was set to {'pdf_file_size_bytes': 2491900, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 151, '/Title': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 (NXP)', '/Author': 'T-Systems International GmbH', '/Subject': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1', '/Keywords': 'Electronic Identity Card, Residence Permit Card, eID, eIDAS, Passport', '/Creator': 'Microsoft® Word für Office 365', '/CreationDate': "D:20190726125329+02'00'", '/ModDate': "D:20190726125329+02'00'", '/Producer': 'Microsoft® Word für Office 365', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder/dieharder-3.31.0.tgz', 'http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/documents/sts-2.1.1.zip']}}.
  • The st_frontpage property was set to {'anssi': {}, 'bsi': {}, 'nscib': {}, 'niap': {}, 'canada': {}}.
  • The st_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 4}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-MA-01': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP- 0086': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP0035': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP0082': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014': 1, 'BSI-PP-0087': 1, 'BSI-PP-0055-2009': 1, 'BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA02': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0086-2015': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA01': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL4': 9, 'EAL 4': 1, 'EAL 6': 1, 'EAL4 augmented': 2, 'EAL 4 augmented': 1, 'EAL 6 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ACE': {'ACE_CAM': 11, 'ACE_MAC': 1}, 'ADV': {'ADV_ARC.1': 4, 'ADV_TDS.3': 3, 'ADV_FSP.4': 2, 'ADV_IMP.1': 2, 'ADV_ARC': 1, 'ADV_FSP': 1}, 'AGD': {'AGD_OPE.1': 2, 'AGD_PRE.1': 2, 'AGD_OPE': 1}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 7, 'ALC_DEL.1': 2, 'ALC_DEL': 1, 'ALC_DVS': 1, 'ALC_CMS': 1, 'ALC_CMC': 1, 'ALC_FLR.1': 1, 'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.4': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.1': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_DPT.2': 5, 'ATE_COV': 1, 'ATE_FUN': 1, 'ATE_DPT.3': 1, 'ATE_COV.2': 1, 'ATE_FUN.1': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 6, 'AVA_VAN': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FAU': {'FAU_SAS': 5, 'FAU_SAS.1': 5, 'FAU_SAS.1.1': 1}, 'FCS': {'FCS_RND': 5, 'FCS_RND.1': 6, 'FCS_RND.1.1': 1, 'FCS_CKM.2': 9, 'FCS_COP.1': 10, 'FCS_CKM.4': 27, 'FCS_CKM.1': 18, 'FCS_RNG.1': 1}, 'FDP': {'FDP_ACF.1': 13, 'FDP_ACF': 1, 'FDP_ITC.1': 18, 'FDP_ITC.2': 19, 'FDP_ACC.1': 17, 'FDP_RIP.1': 4, 'FDP_IFC.1': 7, 'FDP_UCT.1': 2, 'FDP_UIT.1': 1, 'FDP_RIP': 2, 'FDP_SDI.1': 3, 'FDP_SDC.1': 1, 'FDP_ITT.1': 1}, 'FIA': {'FIA_API': 5, 'FIA_API.1': 5, 'FIA_API.1.1': 1, 'FIA_UAU.1': 6, 'FIA_UID.1': 7, 'FIA_UAU.5': 3, 'FIA_UAU.4': 1, 'FIA_UAU.6': 1, 'FIA_AFL.1': 1}, 'FMT': {'FMT_LIM': 5, 'FMT_SMR.1': 41, 'FMT_LIM.1': 15, 'FMT_LIM.2': 13, 'FMT_LIM.1.1': 1, 'FMT_LIM.2.1': 1, 'FMT_MTD.3': 3, 'FMT_MSA.3': 8, 'FMT_MSA.1': 5, 'FMT_SMF.1.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR.1.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR.1.2': 1, 'FMT_SMF.1': 30, 'FMT_MTD.1': 3}, 'FPT': {'FPT_EMS': 6, 'FPT_EMS.1': 9, 'FPT_EMS.1.1': 3, 'FPT_EMS.1.2': 3, 'FPT_TST.1': 5, 'FPT_FLS.1': 4, 'FPT_PHP.3': 4, 'FPT_FLS': 1, 'FPT_PHP': 1, 'FPT_TST': 1, 'FPT_ITT.1': 1}, 'FRU': {'FRU_FLT.2': 1}, 'FTP': {'FTP_ITC.1': 4, 'FTP_TRP.1': 4}}, 'cc_claims': {'D': {'D.TCOS.ASE': 1}, 'O': {'O.RND': 3, 'O.TDES': 1, 'O.AES': 1, 'O.CUST_RECONF_PLAIN': 1, 'O.EEPROM_INTEGRITY': 1, 'O.FM_FW': 1, 'O.MEM_ACCESS': 1, 'O.SFR_ACCESS': 1, 'O.PUF': 1}, 'T': {'T.RND': 1}, 'A': {'A.CGA': 2, 'A.SCA': 2}, 'R': {'R.ED-PP': 1, 'R.ED-ON-PP': 1}, 'OE': {'OE': 2, 'OE.HID_VAD': 4}}, 'vendor': {'NXP': {'NXP': 3, 'NXP Semiconductors': 2}}, 'eval_facility': {'TSystems': {'T-Systems International': 157}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 22, 'AES-256': 1}}, 'DES': {'DES': {'DES': 15, 'DEA': 1}, '3DES': {'3DES': 5, 'Triple-DES': 4, 'TDES': 6, 'TDEA': 1}}, 'constructions': {'MAC': {'KMAC': 19, 'CMAC': 12}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'ECC': {'ECDH': {'ECDH': 15}, 'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 2}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 3}}, 'FF': {'DH': {'Diffie-Hellman': 18, 'DH': 19}, 'DSA': {'DSA': 4}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA1': {'SHA-1': 1}, 'SHA2': {'SHA-224': 1, 'SHA-256': 1, 'SHA-384': 1, 'SHA-512': 1}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 38}, 'KA': {'Key Agreement': 2, 'KA': 4}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 185}}, 'randomness': {'TRNG': {'TRNG': 3}, 'RNG': {'RND': 9, 'RNG': 10}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 3}, 'CTR': {'CTR': 49}, 'OFB': {'OFB': 1}}, 'ecc_curve': {'NIST': {'P-256': 3, 'P-192': 2, 'P-384': 2, 'NIST P-256': 1}, 'Brainpool': {'brainpoolP192r1': 1, 'brainpoolP192t1': 1, 'brainpoolP224r1': 1, 'brainpoolP224t1': 1, 'brainpoolP256r1': 2, 'brainpoolP256t1': 1, 'brainpoolP320r1': 1, 'brainpoolP320t1': 1, 'brainpoolP384r1': 2, 'brainpoolP384t1': 1, 'brainpoolP512r1': 2, 'brainpoolP512t1': 1}}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'SCA': {'Leak-Inherent': 4, 'physical probing': 2, 'DPA': 1}, 'FI': {'Physical Tampering': 2, 'Physical tampering': 2, 'physical tampering': 5, 'Malfunction': 15, 'malfunction': 5, 'fault injection': 1}, 'other': {'reverse engineering': 1}}, 'technical_report_id': {'BSI': {'BSI TR-03110': 4}}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {'IBM': {'SE': 2}}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {'EF': {'EF.DG3': 5, 'EF.DG4': 5, 'EF.DG14': 3, 'EF.DG1': 3, 'EF.DG16': 2, 'EF.DG2': 1, 'EF.SOD': 2, 'EF.ChipSecurity': 1}}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS186': 5, 'FIPS 180-4': 1, 'FIPS180': 2, 'FIPS197': 3, 'FIPS PUB 180-4': 1, 'FIPS PUB 186-4': 1}, 'PKCS': {'PKCS#3': 8}, 'BSI': {'AIS36': 2, 'AIS31': 2, 'AIS 31': 1, 'AIS 36': 1}, 'RFC': {'RFC5639': 27, 'RFC 2631': 1, 'RFC 5639': 1}, 'ICAO': {'ICAO': 10}, 'CC': {'CCMB-2017-04-001': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-002': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-003': 2, 'CCMB-2012-09-004': 1, 'CCMB-2017-04-004': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'OutOfScope': {'out of scope': 2, '. For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf': 1, '.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST': 1, 'ACTR]. For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf. [EACTR Part 3, B.7]). 13 For the ePass Application, the': 1, 'le by these terminals was given already in chapter 1.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST. In particular, terminals using Basic Access Control (BAC) may be functionally supported': 1}}}.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}]} values added.
• 01.09.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The st_download_ok property was set to False.
  • The errors property was set to ['failed to download ST from https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078a_pdf.pdf, code: 408'].
  • The st_pdf_hash property was set to None.
  • The st_txt_hash property was set to None.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The st_metadata property was set to None.
  • The st_frontpage property was set to None.
  • The st_keywords property was set to None.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': None, 'indirectly_referencing': None} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}]} values discarded.
• 18.07.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The _type was updated.

  • The new value is sec_certs.sample.common_criteria.CommonCriteriaCert.

  The Protection profiles of the certificate were updated.

  • The new value is {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (O...', 'pp_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0090b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_ids': None}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use', 'pp_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0087V2b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_ids': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['MR.ED-PP_V2.2']}}]}.

  The Maintenance Updates of the certificate were updated.

  • The new value is {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.common_criteria.CommonCriteriaCert.MaintenanceReport', 'maintenance_date': '2021-06-15', 'maintenance_title': 'TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y', 'maintenance_report_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078ra1a_pdf.pdf', 'maintenance_st_link': None}]}.

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The _type property was set to sec_certs.sample.common_criteria.CommonCriteriaCert.InternalState.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The _type property was set to sec_certs.sample.common_criteria.CommonCriteriaCert.PdfData.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The _type property was set to sec_certs.sample.common_criteria.CommonCriteriaCert.Heuristics.
  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.certificate.References'} data.
  • The report_references property was updated, with the {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.certificate.References'} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was set to {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AVA_VAN', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DEL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_TAT', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_LCD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMC', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DVS', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_DPT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMS', 'level': 4}]}.
• 17.07.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The report_metadata property was updated, with the {'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte', 'http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/', 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/', 'http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/', 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung', 'http://www.sogisportal.eu/', 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS']}} values inserted.
  • The st_metadata property was updated, with the {'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder/dieharder-3.31.0.tgz', 'http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/documents/sts-2.1.1.zip']}} values inserted.
  • The report_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019': 88, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 6, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2': 3}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-2016-MA-01': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016': 4, 'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 4, 'BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP-0086': 3, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL 4': 4, 'EAL 5': 4, 'EAL 2': 3, 'EAL 1': 1, 'EAL5+': 2, 'EAL6': 1, 'EAL 4 augmented': 3}}, 'cc_sar': {'ADV': {'ADV_ARC': 1}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 5, 'ALC_FLR': 1, 'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.4': 1, 'ALC_DEL.1': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.1': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_DPT.2': 4}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 3}}, 'cc_sfr': {}, 'cc_claims': {'R': {'R.ED-PP': 4, 'R.ED-ON-PP': 4}}, 'vendor': {'NXP': {'NXP Semiconductors': 5, 'NXP': 7}}, 'eval_facility': {'TUV': {'TÜV Informationstechnik': 1}, 'SRC': {'SRC Security Research & Consulting': 3}, 'TSystems': {'T-Systems International': 19}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 12, 'AES-256': 1}}, 'DES': {'DES': {'DES': 6}, '3DES': {'3DES': 2}}, 'constructions': {'MAC': {'CMAC': 4}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'ECC': {'ECDH': {'ECDH': 8}, 'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 6}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 8}}, 'FF': {'DH': {'DH': 8, 'Diffie-Hellman': 1}, 'DSA': {'DSA': 6}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA2': {'SHA-512': 1, 'SHA-256': 2}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 11}, 'KA': {'Key Agreement': 4, 'KA': 1}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 25}}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RNG': 6}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 4}, 'CTR': {'CTR': 43}, 'OFB': {'OFB': 2}}, 'ecc_curve': {'Brainpool': {'brainpoolP512t1': 2}}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'SCA': {'side channel': 2}, 'FI': {'malfunction': 1, 'fault injection': 1}, 'other': {'deep learning': 1, 'JIL': 4}}, 'technical_report_id': {'BSI': {'BSI TR-03116': 4, 'BSI TR-03110': 8, 'BSI TR-03116-2': 2, 'BSI TR-02102-1': 1, 'BSI 7148': 1}}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {'IBM': {'SE': 2}}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS186': 14, 'FIPS46-3': 3, 'FIPS197': 4, 'FIPS180': 3, 'FIPS PUB 46-3': 1, 'FIPS PUB 180-4': 1}, 'BSI': {'AIS 34': 4, 'AIS 36': 3, 'AIS 37': 3, 'AIS 26': 4, 'AIS 25': 4, 'AIS 20': 3, 'AIS 31': 3, 'AIS 46': 3, 'AIS 1': 1, 'AIS 32': 1, 'AIS 38': 1, 'AIS31': 2, 'AIS20': 2}, 'RFC': {'RFC 5639': 17}, 'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 15408': 4, 'ISO/IEC 17065': 2, 'ISO/IEC 18045': 4}, 'ICAO': {'ICAO': 22}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'ConfidentialDocument': {'identiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification': 1, 'Version 2.0 Release 1/P60D145, Version 1.3, 31 July 2019, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document) [14] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019, Konfigurationsliste von TCOS ID Version 2.0': 1, 'Release1/P6022y, Version 1.2, 29 July 2019, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document) [15] TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Guidance Document - Common Part, Guidance Documentation of': 1, 'dendum (ETR-COMP- ADD), BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2, Version 2, 29 April 2019, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) [25] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018 for Bundesdruckerei GmbH manufacturing site for': 1, 'RNG] Zufallszahlengenerierung in TCOS, Version 0.8, 15 January 2019, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document) [UiF] Update im Feld unter TCOS iD, Version 0.1, 02 October 2018, T-Systems International GmbH ': 1, 'confidential document) 39 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Note: End of report 40 / 40': 1}}}.
  • The st_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019': 4}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-MA-01': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP- 0086': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 2, 'BSI-CC-PP0035': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP0082': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014': 1, 'BSI-PP-0087': 1, 'BSI-PP-0055-2009': 1, 'BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA02': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0086-2015': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA01': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL4': 9, 'EAL 4': 1, 'EAL 6': 1, 'EAL4 augmented': 2, 'EAL 4 augmented': 1, 'EAL 6 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ACE': {'ACE_CAM': 11, 'ACE_MAC': 1}, 'ADV': {'ADV_ARC.1': 4, 'ADV_TDS.3': 3, 'ADV_FSP.4': 2, 'ADV_IMP.1': 2, 'ADV_ARC': 1, 'ADV_FSP': 1}, 'AGD': {'AGD_OPE.1': 2, 'AGD_PRE.1': 2, 'AGD_OPE': 1}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 7, 'ALC_DEL.1': 2, 'ALC_DEL': 1, 'ALC_DVS': 1, 'ALC_CMS': 1, 'ALC_CMC': 1, 'ALC_FLR.1': 1, 'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.4': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.1': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_DPT.2': 5, 'ATE_COV': 1, 'ATE_FUN': 1, 'ATE_DPT.3': 1, 'ATE_COV.2': 1, 'ATE_FUN.1': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 6, 'AVA_VAN': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FAU': {'FAU_SAS': 5, 'FAU_SAS.1': 5, 'FAU_SAS.1.1': 1}, 'FCS': {'FCS_RND': 5, 'FCS_RND.1': 6, 'FCS_RND.1.1': 1, 'FCS_CKM.2': 9, 'FCS_COP.1': 10, 'FCS_CKM.4': 27, 'FCS_CKM.1': 18, 'FCS_RNG.1': 1}, 'FDP': {'FDP_ACF.1': 13, 'FDP_ACF': 1, 'FDP_ITC.1': 18, 'FDP_ITC.2': 19, 'FDP_ACC.1': 17, 'FDP_RIP.1': 4, 'FDP_IFC.1': 7, 'FDP_UCT.1': 2, 'FDP_UIT.1': 1, 'FDP_RIP': 2, 'FDP_SDI.1': 3, 'FDP_SDC.1': 1, 'FDP_ITT.1': 1}, 'FIA': {'FIA_API': 5, 'FIA_API.1': 5, 'FIA_API.1.1': 1, 'FIA_UAU.1': 6, 'FIA_UID.1': 7, 'FIA_UAU.5': 3, 'FIA_UAU.4': 1, 'FIA_UAU.6': 1, 'FIA_AFL.1': 1}, 'FMT': {'FMT_LIM': 5, 'FMT_SMR.1': 41, 'FMT_LIM.1': 15, 'FMT_LIM.2': 13, 'FMT_LIM.1.1': 1, 'FMT_LIM.2.1': 1, 'FMT_MTD.3': 3, 'FMT_MSA.3': 8, 'FMT_MSA.1': 5, 'FMT_SMF.1.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR.1.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR.1.2': 1, 'FMT_SMF.1': 30, 'FMT_MTD.1': 3}, 'FPT': {'FPT_EMS': 6, 'FPT_EMS.1': 9, 'FPT_EMS.1.1': 3, 'FPT_EMS.1.2': 3, 'FPT_TST.1': 5, 'FPT_FLS.1': 4, 'FPT_PHP.3': 4, 'FPT_FLS': 1, 'FPT_PHP': 1, 'FPT_TST': 1, 'FPT_ITT.1': 1}, 'FRU': {'FRU_FLT.2': 1}, 'FTP': {'FTP_ITC.1': 4, 'FTP_TRP.1': 4}}, 'cc_claims': {'D': {'D.TCOS.ASE': 1}, 'O': {'O.RND': 3, 'O.TDES': 1, 'O.AES': 1, 'O.CUST_RECONF_PLAIN': 1, 'O.EEPROM_INTEGRITY': 1, 'O.FM_FW': 1, 'O.MEM_ACCESS': 1, 'O.SFR_ACCESS': 1, 'O.PUF': 1}, 'T': {'T.RND': 1}, 'A': {'A.CGA': 2, 'A.SCA': 2}, 'R': {'R.ED-PP': 1, 'R.ED-ON-PP': 1}, 'OE': {'OE': 2, 'OE.HID_VAD': 4}}, 'vendor': {'NXP': {'NXP': 3, 'NXP Semiconductors': 2}}, 'eval_facility': {'TSystems': {'T-Systems International': 157}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 22, 'AES-256': 1}}, 'DES': {'DES': {'DES': 15, 'DEA': 1}, '3DES': {'3DES': 5, 'Triple-DES': 4, 'TDES': 6, 'TDEA': 1}}, 'constructions': {'MAC': {'KMAC': 19, 'CMAC': 12}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'ECC': {'ECDH': {'ECDH': 15}, 'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 2}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 3}}, 'FF': {'DH': {'Diffie-Hellman': 18, 'DH': 19}, 'DSA': {'DSA': 4}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA1': {'SHA-1': 1}, 'SHA2': {'SHA-224': 1, 'SHA-256': 1, 'SHA-384': 1, 'SHA-512': 1}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 38}, 'KA': {'Key Agreement': 2, 'KA': 4}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 185}}, 'randomness': {'TRNG': {'TRNG': 3}, 'RNG': {'RND': 9, 'RNG': 10}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 3}, 'CTR': {'CTR': 49}, 'OFB': {'OFB': 1}}, 'ecc_curve': {'NIST': {'P-256': 3, 'P-192': 2, 'P-384': 2, 'NIST P-256': 1}, 'Brainpool': {'brainpoolP192r1': 1, 'brainpoolP192t1': 1, 'brainpoolP224r1': 1, 'brainpoolP224t1': 1, 'brainpoolP256r1': 2, 'brainpoolP256t1': 1, 'brainpoolP320r1': 1, 'brainpoolP320t1': 1, 'brainpoolP384r1': 2, 'brainpoolP384t1': 1, 'brainpoolP512r1': 2, 'brainpoolP512t1': 1}}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'SCA': {'Leak-Inherent': 4, 'physical probing': 2, 'DPA': 1}, 'FI': {'Physical Tampering': 2, 'Physical tampering': 2, 'physical tampering': 5, 'Malfunction': 15, 'malfunction': 5, 'fault injection': 1}, 'other': {'reverse engineering': 1}}, 'technical_report_id': {'BSI': {'BSI TR-03110': 4}}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {'IBM': {'SE': 2}}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {'EF': {'EF.DG3': 5, 'EF.DG4': 5, 'EF.DG14': 3, 'EF.DG1': 3, 'EF.DG16': 2, 'EF.DG2': 1, 'EF.SOD': 2, 'EF.ChipSecurity': 1}}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS186': 5, 'FIPS 180-4': 1, 'FIPS180': 2, 'FIPS197': 3, 'FIPS PUB 180-4': 1, 'FIPS PUB 186-4': 1}, 'PKCS': {'PKCS#3': 8}, 'BSI': {'AIS36': 2, 'AIS31': 2, 'AIS 31': 1, 'AIS 36': 1}, 'RFC': {'RFC5639': 27, 'RFC 2631': 1, 'RFC 5639': 1}, 'ICAO': {'ICAO': 10}, 'CC': {'CCMB-2017-04-001': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-002': 2, 'CCMB-2017-04-003': 2, 'CCMB-2012-09-004': 1, 'CCMB-2017-04-004': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'OutOfScope': {'out of scope': 2, '. For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf': 1, '.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST': 1, 'ACTR]. For the eSign Application the interface is not specified in the SSCD PP ([SSCDPP]) and it is out of scope of the Technical Guideline TR-03110 (cf. [EACTR Part 3, B.7]). 13 For the ePass Application, the': 1, 'le by these terminals was given already in chapter 1.3.3. 66 Others than above listed terminals are out of scope of this ST. In particular, terminals using Basic Access Control (BAC) may be functionally supported': 1}}}.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The _type property was set to Heuristics.
• 14.06.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'report_pdf_hash': '15e9f66c16b5ff16ed1351c9b0a20aa2f6a87b81a8f58c5db99814b80fde5f4c', 'st_pdf_hash': '850d0b28f1137ea8f42c8f85cd93e1a26d5b4c0d15e76c78665273c928efb56e', 'report_txt_hash': '0e1f03fbf39b2908d077448714daf4ec2730fdab1df90650819dd2854a74afb1', 'st_txt_hash': 'eea7a9cd534d1a5c852c7f94a5d2f18aaff8a1ec76edd4fa18c225c1f5521a85'}.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The report_keywords property was updated, with the {'rules_symmetric_crypto': {'AES': 12, 'AES-256': 1, 'DES': 4, '3DES': 2}, 'rules_asymmetric_crypto': {'ECDH': 8, 'ECDSA': 6, 'ECC': 8, 'DH': 8, 'Diffie-Hellman': 1, 'DSA': 6}, 'rules_pq_crypto': {}, 'rules_hashes': {'SHA-512': 1, 'SHA-256': 2}, 'rules_crypto_schemes': {'PACE': 25, 'MAC': 11}, 'rules_randomness': {'RNG': 6}, 'rules_tee': {'SE': 2}, 'rules_side_channels': {'malfunction': 1, 'side channel': 2, 'fault injection': 1, 'deep learning': 1}} values inserted.
  • The st_keywords property was updated, with the {'rules_ecc_curves': {'__insert__': {'NIST P-256': 1}, '__update__': {'P-256': 1}}} data.
• 13.05.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'extracted_sars': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DEL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'AVA_VAN', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMS', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DVS', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ALC_FLR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMC', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ATE_DPT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ALC_LCD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ALC_TAT', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 4}]}}.
• 24.04.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'direct_dependency_cves': None, 'indirect_dependency_cves': None}.
• 08.03.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'st_references': {'_type': 'References', 'directly_referenced_by': None, 'indirectly_referenced_by': None, 'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019']}}, 'report_references': {'_type': 'References', 'directly_referenced_by': None, 'indirectly_referenced_by': None, 'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-2018', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2']}}}.
  • The following properties were deleted: ['directly_affected_by', 'indirectly_affected_by', 'directly_affecting', 'indirectly_affecting'].
• 18.02.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The report_frontpage property was updated, with the {'nscib': {}, 'niap': {}, 'canada': {}} values inserted.
  • The st_frontpage property was updated, with the {'nscib': {}, 'niap': {}, 'canada': {}} values inserted.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The extracted_versions property was set to {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['2.0']}.
• 01.02.2022 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The Protection profiles of the certificate were updated.

  • The following values were removed: {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use', 'pp_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0087V2b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_ids': None}]}.
  • The following values were added: {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'ProtectionProfile', 'pp_name': 'Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use', 'pp_link': 'https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp0087V2b_pdf.pdf', 'pp_ids': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['MR.ED-PP_V2.2']}}]}.
• 28.01.2022 The certificate was first processed. Show diff

  New certificate

  A new Common Criteria certificate with the product name TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y was processed.

Raw data

{
  "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate",
  "category": "ICs, Smart Cards and Smart Card-Related Devices and Systems",
  "cert_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078c_pdf.pdf",
  "dgst": "65af80e5c6538215",
  "heuristics": {
    "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.Heuristics",
    "annotated_references": null,
    "cert_id": "BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019",
    "cert_lab": [
      "BSI"
    ],
    "cpe_matches": null,
    "direct_transitive_cves": null,
    "extracted_sars": {
      "_type": "Set",
      "elements": [
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "AGD_PRE",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_DVS",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_IMP",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_DEL",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_ARC",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ATE_COV",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ATE_DPT",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_CMC",
          "level": 4
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_FSP",
          "level": 4
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_TSS",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ATE_FUN",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "AVA_VAN",
          "level": 5
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "AGD_OPE",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_LCD",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_TAT",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_FLR",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_TDS",
          "level": 3
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_CMS",
          "level": 4
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_FUN",
          "level": 1
        }
      ]
    },
    "extracted_versions": {
      "_type": "Set",
      "elements": [
        "2.0"
      ]
    },
    "indirect_transitive_cves": null,
    "related_cves": null,
    "report_references": {
      "_type": "sec_certs.sample.certificate.References",
      "directly_referenced_by": null,
      "directly_referencing": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019"
        ]
      },
      "indirectly_referenced_by": null,
      "indirectly_referencing": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-2018"
        ]
      }
    },
    "scheme_data": null,
    "st_references": {
      "_type": "sec_certs.sample.certificate.References",
      "directly_referenced_by": null,
      "directly_referencing": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019"
        ]
      },
      "indirectly_referenced_by": null,
      "indirectly_referencing": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019"
        ]
      }
    },
    "verified_cpe_matches": null
  },
  "maintenance_updates": {
    "_type": "Set",
    "elements": [
      {
        "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.MaintenanceReport",
        "maintenance_date": "2022-11-29",
        "maintenance_report_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078ra2a_pdf.pdf",
        "maintenance_st_link": null,
        "maintenance_title": "TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y"
      },
      {
        "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.MaintenanceReport",
        "maintenance_date": "2021-06-15",
        "maintenance_report_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/1078ra1a_pdf.pdf",
        "maintenance_st_link": null,
        "maintenance_title": "TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y"
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  "manufacturer": "T-Systems International GMBH",
  "manufacturer_web": "https://www.t-systems.de/",
  "name": "TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y",
  "not_valid_after": "2024-08-30",
  "not_valid_before": "2019-08-30",
  "pdf_data": {
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    "cert_metadata": {
      "/Author": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik",
      "/CreationDate": "D:20190906101618+02\u002700\u0027",
      "/Creator": "Writer",
      "/Keywords": "\"Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, Family Concept, MR.ED-PP, MR.ED-ON-PP, SSCD-PP\"",
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      "/Producer": "LibreOffice 6.1",
      "/Subject": "TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1/P6022y from T-Systems International GmbH",
      "/Title": "Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019",
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      "DE": {
        "cc_security_level": "Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5 Additionally, the requirements of the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03116-2 [27] are met by the TOE. This is part of the qualification of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y for the use within electronic passport card projects of the Federal Republic of Germany. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. 9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy. For the TOE\u2019s cryptographic functionalities, this table outlines - where applicable - the standard of application where their specific appropriateness is stated, and otherwise their security level as a kind of rating from cryptographic point of view. 22 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report According to [26], [27], [28], [29] and [30] the algorithms are suitable for authentication, key agreement, authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and trusted channel. An explicit validity period is not given. Please take into account that cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related cryptographic operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the document \u2018Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102-1 Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schl\u00fcssell\u00e4ngen\u2019 (refer to https://www.bsi.bund.de). The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product, in particular the card issuing organisation and the national organisation responsible for the risk management, shall consider the results of the certification within the system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too. As the TOE provides the so-called Update-in-Field mechanism: If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or take additional measures in order to maintain system security. In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE: If the product certified is being used as National ID-Card or National Document the operational instructions and limitations as outlined in \u2018Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116, Kryptographische Vorgaben f\u00fcr Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 2: eID-Karten und hoheitliche Dokumente\u2019 [27] (TR-03116-2) have to be followed when issuing and using the product. This includes the restrictions related to cryptographic algorithms and related parameters. Cryptographic algorithms and related parameters not covered by the certificate (see ST [6] and this certification report) must not be used. The latest published version of TR-03116-2 has to be followed (see https://www.bsi.bund.de/). 11. Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. 23 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES) In [31] the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union has codified the conceptional requirements for qualified electronic signature devices used in the European Union. This regulation is clarified in the Commission Implementing Decision [32]. In this decision the requirements are stated an electronic signature device must fulfil to be compliant to [31] (Article 1 and Annex",
        "cc_version": "PP conformant Common Criteria Part 2 extended \u25cf for the",
        "cert_id": "BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019",
        "cert_item": "TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y",
        "cert_lab": "BSI",
        "developer": "T-Systems International GmbH",
        "match_rules": [
          "(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)"
        ],
        "ref_protection_profiles": "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine- Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR- 03110 for Official Use [MR.ED-PP], Version 2.0.3, 18 July 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-2016-MA-01 Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents \u2013 Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP], Version 0.9.2, 18 August 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016 Functionality: PP conformant Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5 The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045. (*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 30 August 2019 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski L.S. Head of Division Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 SOGIS Recognition Agreement Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 only Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report Contents A. Certification......................................................................................................................6 1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6 3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8 5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8 6. Publication....................................................................................................................9 B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10 1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11 2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................14 3. Security Policy............................................................................................................16 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................17 5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................18 6. Documentation...........................................................................................................19 7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................19 8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................20 9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................21 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................23 11. Security Target..........................................................................................................23 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................24 13. Definitions.................................................................................................................25 14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................28 C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................31 D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................32 5 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 A. Certification 1. Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: \u25cf Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1 \u25cf BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2 \u25cf BSI Schedule of Costs3 \u25cf Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) \u25cf DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard \u25cf BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC- Produkte) [3] \u25cf BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3] 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 2 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231 3 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 6 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report \u25cf Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14 [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408. \u25cf Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045 \u25cf BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 3. Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 3.1. European Recognition of CC \u2013 Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For \"Smartcards and similar devices\" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For \"HW Devices with Security Boxes\" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu. The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected. 3.2. International Recognition of CC \u2013 Certificates (CCRA) The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP). The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. 4 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730 7 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2 components. 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y was conducted by SRC Security Research \u0026 Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 31 July 2019. SRC Security Research \u0026 Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: T-Systems International GmbH. The product was developed by: T-Systems International GmbH. The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 5. Validity of the Certification Result This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that \u25cf all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, \u25cf the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target. If the product certified is being used as National ID-Card or National Document the operational instructions and limitations as outlined in \u2018Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116, Kryptographische Vorgaben f\u00fcr Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 2: eID-Karten und hoheitliche Dokumente\u2019 (TR-03116-2) have to be followed when issuing and using the product. This includes the restrictions related to cryptographic algorithms and related parameters. Cryptographic algorithms and related parameters not covered by the certificate (see Security Target and this certification report) must not be used. The latest published version of TR-03116-2 has to be followed (see https://www.bsi.bund.de/). For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation 5 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user\u0027s risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re- assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the product\u2019s resistance to state-of-the-art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 30 August 2019 is valid until 29 August 2024. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification. The owner of the certificate is obliged: 1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product\u0027s certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product, 2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate, 3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 6. Publication The product TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 6 T-Systems International GmbH Untere Industriestra\u00dfe 20 57250 Netphen Germany 9 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 B. Certification Results The following results represent a summary of \u25cf the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, \u25cf the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and \u25cf complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 10 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report 1. Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y provided by T-Systems International GmbH and based on the hardware platform P6022y (P60D145) by NXP Semiconductors GmbH. It is an electronic Identity Card (ID_Card) representing a smart card with contact based and contactless interface programmed according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110 [26] and the ICAO specifications [28], [29] and [30]. The smart card provides the following authentication mechanisms: \u25cf Passive Authentication \u25cf Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) \u25cf Chip Authentication version 1, 2 and version 3 \u25cf Terminal Authentication version 1 and version 2 Additionally, the TOE meets the requirements of the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03116-2 [27] as part of the qualification for the use within electronic ID card projects of the Federal Republic of Germany. Please note that the security mechanisms Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) and Extended Access Control (EAC) are in focus of this evaluation process. The further security mechanism Basic Access Control (BAC) is subject of a separate evaluation process (refer to BSI-DSZ-CC-1103). The smart card contains at least one of the following applications that are all subject of the TOE\u2019s evaluation: \u25cf ePassport Application: With this application the TOE is intended to be used as a machine readable travel document (MRTD). The application contains the related user data (including biometric data) as well as the data needed for authentication (including MRZ). \u25cf eID Application: This application is intended to be used for accessing official and commercial services, which require access to the user data stored in the context of this application. The application includes the related user data and the data needed for authentication. \u25cf eSign Application: This application is intended to be used in the context of official and commercial services, where a qualified electronic signature of the ID_Card Holder is required. The application contains the data needed for generating qualified electronic signatures on behalf of the ID_Card Holder as well as for user authentication. The application is optional, i.e. it can optionally be activated on the ID_Card by a Certification Service Provider authorized by the ID_Card Issuer. The user data of the eSign Application are protected by PACE/EAC2. Three different major configurations of the TOE exist, that only differ in the installed file system or applications respectively: \u25cf Passport: ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]) with user data protection by PACE and EAC1 (hereby, EAC1 is used only for data groups 3 and 4). 11 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 \u25cf Residence Permit: ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]) with user data protection by PACE and EAC1/EAC2. eID Application compliant to [26], Part 2 and eSign Application compliant to [9] with user data protection by PACE and EAC2. \u25cf Electronic Document (e.g. nPA): ePassport Application non-compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]) with user data protection by PACE and EAC2. eID Application compliant to [26], Part 2 and eSign Application compliant to [9] with user data protection by PACE and EAC2. The TOE provides the so-called Update-in-Field mechanism. This secure update mechanism allows to install code-signed updates of the TOE Embedded Software (operating system part) by authorized staff during operational use. The TOE only installs update packages that are encrypted, integrity-protected and signed by the authority in charge of delivering and installing updates. The TOE allows only authenticated update terminals to upload an update package to the TOE and to initiate the update procedure. Refer to the TOE\u2019s user guidance documentation ([15] to [21]). The TOE\u2019s evaluation only covers the Update-in-Field mechanism itself, but does not cover any update packages. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following certified PP and PP Configuration and claims strict conformance to them: \u25cf Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use [MR.ED-PP], Version 2.0.3, 18 July 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-2016-MA-01 [7] \u25cf Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents \u2013 Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP], Version 0.9.2, 18 August 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016 [8] The PP [7] claims itself strict conformance to the following Protection Profiles: \u25cf Protection profiles for secure signature creation device \u2013 Part 2: Device with key generation, EN 419211-2:2013, CEN/ISSS, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 (June 2016) [9] \u25cf Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with \u201eICAO Application\u201d, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 05 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 [10] \u25cf Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Document implementing Extended Access Control Version 2 defined in BSI TR-03110 [EAC2-PP], Version 1.01, 20 May 2015, BSI-CC-PP-0086 [11] Hereby, the PPs [10] and [11] claim themselves strict conformance to the following Protection Profile: \u25cf Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01 [12] All in all, this means in result that the TOE is conformant to all the Protection Profiles [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] and [12] listed above. Please note that in consistency to the claimed Protection Profiles the security mechanisms Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) and Extended Access Control (EAC) are in focus of this evaluation process. The further security mechanism Basic 12 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report Access Control (BAC) is subject of a separate evaluation process (refer to BSI-DSZ-CC- 1103). The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality: TOE Security Functionality / Addressed Issue General Protection of User Data and TSF Data Identification and Authentication Access Control Cryptographic Functions Protection of Communication Accuracy of the TOE Security Functionality /Self-protection Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities The following TOE security features are the most significant for the TOE\u2019s operational use. The TOE ensures that \u25cf only authenticated terminals can get access to the user data stored on the TOE and use security functionality of the card according to the access rights of the terminal, \u25cf the card holder can control access by consciously presenting his card and/or by entering his secret PIN, \u25cf authenticity and integrity of user data can be verified, \u25cf confidentiality of user data in the communication channel between the TOE and the connected terminal is provided, \u25cf inconspicuous tracing of the card is averted, \u25cf its security functionality and the data stored inside are self-protected, and \u25cf digital signatures can be created. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7, in particular 7.1 to 7.6. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). 13 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2. Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1 HW/SW NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB including its IC Dedicated Support Software embedded into modules7 Hardware platform: P6022y (P60D145)8 ROM mask: Id- Card_01BD_ID2.0_RO M_Daten_02.hex Delivery type: Module: MOB6, U52 Inlay: Inlay SOM 20, SOM 21 (only for \u0027Electronic Document\u0027 and \u0027Resi- dence Permit\u0027) and Inlay SOM 30 and SOM 31 (only for \u0027Passport\u0027) 2 SW TOE Embedded Software / Operating System and File System: TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1/P6022y in the three different major configurations Passport, Residence Permit and Electronic Document (containing at least the ePassport, eID or eSign Application with its dedicated files for the respective application in a file system) OS Version: \u201801 BD\u2019 Completion Code Version: \u201801\u2019 File System Version: \u201881\u2019 Implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the IC 3 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Guidance Document - Common Part, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/ SAC and EAC/PSA protocol Version 1.0.1 29 July 2019 [15] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 4 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Operational Guidance - Residence Permit, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with ePassport, eID and eSign Application Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [16] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 7 For details on the MRTD chip and the IC Dedicated Software see Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1059- V2-2019. 8 Please note that in comparison to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.3, para 19 only the HW platform NXP P60D145 (and not P60D081) was in the scope of the TOE\u2018s present evaluation. 14 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 5 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Operational Guidance - Passport, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/ SAC and EAC protocol Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [17] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 6 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Operational Guidance \u2013 Electronic Document, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with ePassport, eID and eSign Application Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [18] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 7 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Administrator\u0027s Guidance - Residence Permit, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC/PSA protocol Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [19] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 8 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Administrator\u0027s Guidance - Passport, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/ SAC and EAC/PSA protocol Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [20] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 9 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Administrator\u0027s Guidance \u2013 Electronic Document, Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with PACE/SAC and EAC/PSA protocol Version 1.0.1 14 May 2019 [21] Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) 10 Text Files Activation command APDUs and authentication key Activation command to open life-cycle phase 5, 6 or 7 and corresponding authentication keys Document in electronic form (encrypted and signed) Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE The customer specific ROM mask for the TOE is labelled and identified by NXP Semiconductors GmbH as IdentityCard_01BD_ID2.0. The name of the ROM file transferred from T-Systems International GmbH to NXP Semiconductors GmbH is IdCard_01BD_ID2.0_ROM_Daten_02.hex. The initialization of the TOE based on the NXP hardware platform P6022y (P60D145) takes place by using the following scripts: \u25cf Patch-Code: PatchCodeROM-ID_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01.txt \u25cf File systems / TOE major configurations:  Passport: FileSystemcode-ID_ePass_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01_FSV81_PKV02.txt  Residence Permit: FileSystemcode-ID_eAT_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01_FSV81_PKV02.txt  Electronic Document: FileSystemcode-ID_nPA_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01_FSV81_PKV02.txt 15 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 The certified file systems for the TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y have the file system version \u002781\u0027. The TOE Embedded Software consists of the operating system TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y (including the related completion data) and the different file systems for its three major configurations (Passport, Residence Permit, Electronic Document). The Initialization Agent and Personalization Agent can use the FORMAT command (CLA = \u2018B0\u2019 / INS = \u201850\u2019) as described in the user guidance [15], chapter 8.4.1.1 to read out the chip information and identify the chip and the TOE Embedded Software embedded in the chip (only available during life-cycle phases 4 to 6). To open production phases for personalization a mutual authentication via the FORMAT command as described in the user guidance [15], chapter 8.4.1.4 is necessary, therefore the authenticity of the TOE is verified before further usage of the TOE. The following identification data can be retrieved within a 16 Byte string responded by the FORMAT command: Byte # Product Information 1 Chip Manufacturer 2 Chip Type 3 - 8 Unique identification number for the chip 9 Card Type 10-11 OS version (ROM mask version) 12 (Pre-) completion code version 13 File System Version 14 \u002700\u0027 (RFU) 15 \u002700\u0027 (RFU) 16 Authentication key identifier 17-32 Production logistic data Table 3: TOE Identification Note that Bytes 3 \u2013 8 (unique identification number for the chip) are chip specific data which differ for each chip used in the TOE. The TOE is finalized after the initialization phase or pre-personalization phase respectively. Delivery is performed from the initialization facility to the personalization facility by a secured transport to a specific person of contact at the personalization site. Furthermore, the Personalization Agent receives information about the personalization commands and process requirements. To ensure that the Personalization Agent receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the personalization process as described in the Administrator\u2019s guidance documents [19] - [21] have to be followed. 3. Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the Protection Profiles [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] and [12] by the Security Objectives and Requirements for the chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of 16 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy addresses the advanced security methods for authentication and secure communication, which are described in detail in the Security Target [6]. The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user data stored and operated on the smart card when used in a hostile environment. Hence, the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories and the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access and for integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore, the TOE\u2019s overall policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage, physical manipulation and probing. Besides, the TOE\u0027s life-cycle is supported as well as the user identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore, specific cryptographic services including crypto routines, random number generation and key management functionality are being provided to be securely used by the smart card embedded software. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: \u25cf OE.Lim_Block_Loader \u25cf OE.Legislative_Compliance: Issuing of the travel document \u25cf OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document: Travel document Authentication Key \u25cf OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data: Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data \u25cf OE.Exam_Travel_Document: Examination of the physical part of the travel document \u25cf OE.Ext_Insp_Systems: Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems \u25cf OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document: Protection of data from the logical travel document \u25cf OE.RestrictedIdentity: Restricted Identity and Sector\u2019s Static Key Pairs \u25cf OE.Personalization: Personalization of travel document \u25cf OE.Travel_Document_Holder: Travel document holder Obligations \u25cf OE.Passive_Auth_Sign: Authentication of travel document by Signature \u25cf OE.Chip_Auth_Key: Key Pairs needed for Chip Authentication and Restricted Identification \u25cf OE.Terminal_Authentication: Key pairs needed for Terminal Authentication \u25cf OE.Terminal: Terminal operating \u25cf OE.Code_Confidentiality 17 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 \u25cf OE.Secure_Environment \u25cf OE.Eligible_Terminals_Only \u25cf OE.SVD_Auth: Authenticity of the SVD \u25cf OE.CGA_Qcert: Generation of qualified certificates \u25cf OE.SSCD_Prov_Service: Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisioning Service \u25cf OE.HID_VAD: Protection of the VAD \u25cf OE.DTBS_Intend: SCA sends data intended to be signed \u25cf OE.DTBS_Protect: SCA protects the data intended to be signed \u25cf OE.Signatory: Security obligation of the Signatory Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2 as well as in the Protection Profiles [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] and [12]. 5. Architectural Information The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC) and the TOE Embedded Software that contains the operating system TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y (including the related completion data) and the different file systems for its three major configurations (Passport, Residence Permit, Electronic Document). Hereby, the TOE Embedded Software includes at least the ePassport, the eID or the eSign Application (depending on the chosen major configuration). For details concerning the underlying IC and its certification refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019 [22]. The Security Functions of the TOE are: \u25cf General Protection of User Data and TSF Data \u25cf Identification and Authentication \u25cf Access Control \u25cf Cryptographic Functions \u25cf Protection of Communication \u25cf Accuracy of the TOE Security Functionality / Self-protection According to the TOE Design these Security Functions are enforced by the following subsystems: \u25cf Hardware (COMP_CH): Hardware Platform \u25cf Kernel (COMP_KL): manages the interfaces between all components \u25cf Crypto Component (COMP_CR): processes the cryptographic functions \u25cf Admin Component (COMP_AD): processes administrative base functions \u25cf IO Component (COMP_IO): controls the input and output \u25cf ROM TCOS-Type Task (COMP_TT): APDU processing (system, applications) 18 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report 6. Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 7. IT Product Testing The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with simulator tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate the expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby, a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set was tested, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of developer tests was performed during the independent evaluator tests. Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 [26] APDU command sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality. Furthermore, penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered: \u25cf testing APDU commands related to General Protection of User Data and TSF Data, \u25cf testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication, \u25cf testing APDU commands related to Access Control, \u25cf testing APDU commands related to Cryptographic Functions (including Generation of a Key Pair and Creation of Digital Signatures), \u25cf testing APDU commands related to the Protection of Communication (Secure Messaging Channel), \u25cf testing APDU commands related to the Update in the Field mechanism, \u25cf penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE, \u25cf source code analysis performed by the evaluators, \u25cf testing the commands which are used to execute the different PACE, CA and TA protocols, \u25cf side channel analysis for SHA and ECC (including ECC key generation), \u25cf using machine learning and deep learning methods for side channel analysis, \u25cf fault injection attacks (laser attacks and EM Glitches), \u25cf testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase, \u25cf testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms. The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during their penetration testing. 19 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results. 8. Evaluated Configuration This certification covers the following TOE: The TOE TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y under certification is composed from: \u25cf Integrated Circuit (IC) NXP P6022y (P60D145) including its IC Dedicated Support Software \u25cf TOE Embedded Software that contains the operating system TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release1/P6022y (including the related completion data) and the different file systems for its three major configurations \u25cf Guidance documentation (see Table 2, rows 3 to 9, i.e. [15] to [21]) \u25cf Authentication key material (see Table 2, row 10) Hereby, this certification covers the following three major configurations of the TOE: \u25cf Passport: ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]) \u25cf Residence Permit: ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]), eID Application compliant to [26], Part 2 and eSign Application compliant to [9] \u25cf Electronic Document (e.g. nPA): ePassport Application non-compliant to ICAO ([28], [29]), eID Application compliant to [26], Part 2 and eSign Application compliant to [9] The Initialization Agent and Personalization Agent can use the FORMAT command as described in chapter 2 above to read out the chip information and identify the chip and the TOE Embedded Software embedded in the chip during life-cycle phases 4 to 6. The following table describes the evaluated TOE configurations with their respective identifiers: Byte # Data type Data 1 Chip Manufacturer (NXP) \u201804\u2019 2 Chip Type \u201830\u2019 9 Card Type \u20180D\u2019 or \u20180A\u2019 or \u201802\u2019 (corresponding to the respective TOE major configuration, i.e. Passport, Residence Permit, Electronic Document) 10-11 OS / ROM Mask Version \u201901 BD\u2019 12 (Pre-) completion code version \u201801\u2019 13 File System Version \u201881\u2019 16 Authentication key identifier \u201801\u2019 Table 4: Evaluated TOE configurations and identifier The FORMAT command and related parameters are described in the user guidance [15], chapter 8.4.1.1. 20 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 Certification Report The identification data as outlined in Table 4 and retrieved from the product must comply with the data given in Annex B of the user guidances [19] - [21] in order for the TOE to be verified as a certified version. The TOE\u2019s evaluation only covers its Update-in-Field mechanism itself, but does not cover any update packages. 9. Results of the Evaluation 9.1. CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: (i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices according to AIS 36 (see [4]). On base of this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying IC platform (refer to [22]) and the document ETR for composite evaluation from the IC\u2019s evaluation ([24]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation. (ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (AIS 37, see [4]). (iii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (AIS 26, see [4]). (iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (AIS 26, see [4]). (v) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (AIS 25, see [4]). (vi) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices (AIS 25, see [4]). (vii) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6 (AIS 34, see [4]) (viii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic random number generators (AIS 20 and AIS 31, see [4]). (ix) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (AIS 46, see [4]). For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34, AIS 36, AIS 37 and AIS 46 (see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]). The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE. As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: \u25cf All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report). \u25cf The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. 21 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019 The evaluation has confirmed: \u25cf PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use [MR.ED-PP], Version 2.0.3, 18 July 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2- 2016-MA-01 [7] Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents \u2013 Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post- Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP], Version 0.9.2, 18 August 2016, BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016 [8] Indirectly conformance to the following Protection Profiles is given: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device \u2013 Part 2: Device with key generation, EN 419211-2:2013, CEN/ISSS, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 (June 2016) [9] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with \u201eICAO Application\u201d, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 05 December 2012, BSI- CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 [10] Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Document implementing Extended Access Control Version 2 defined in BSI TR-03110 [EAC2-PP], Version 1.01, 20 May 2015, BSI-CC- PP-0086 [11] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2- 2011-MA-01 [12] \u25cf for the"
      }
    },
    "report_keywords": {
      "asymmetric_crypto": {
        "ECC": {
          "ECC": {
            "ECC": 8
          },
          "ECDH": {
            "ECDH": 8
          },
          "ECDSA": {
            "ECDSA": 6
          }
        },
        "FF": {
          "DH": {
            "Diffie-Hellman": 1
          }
        }
      },
      "cc_cert_id": {
        "DE": {
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-": 1,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019": 3,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019": 25,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1103": 1,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018": 2
        }
      },
      "cc_claims": {},
      "cc_protection_profile_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012": 2,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02": 4,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-": 1,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01": 2,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0086": 3,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-": 1,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-2016-MA-01": 2,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016": 4
        }
      },
      "cc_sar": {
        "ADV": {
          "ADV_ARC": 1
        },
        "ALC": {
          "ALC_CMC.4": 1,
          "ALC_CMS.4": 1,
          "ALC_DEL.1": 1,
          "ALC_DVS.2": 5,
          "ALC_FLR": 1,
          "ALC_LCD.1": 1,
          "ALC_TAT.1": 1
        },
        "ATE": {
          "ATE_DPT.2": 4
        },
        "AVA": {
          "AVA_VAN.5": 4
        }
      },
      "cc_security_level": {
        "EAL": {
          "EAL 1": 1,
          "EAL 2": 3,
          "EAL 4": 5,
          "EAL 4 augmented": 3,
          "EAL 5": 4,
          "EAL5+": 2,
          "EAL6": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_sfr": {
        "FCS": {
          "FCS_CKM": 22,
          "FCS_COP": 26,
          "FCS_COP.1": 1,
          "FCS_RND": 1
        },
        "FIA": {
          "FIA_UAU": 6
        },
        "FTP": {
          "FTP_ITC": 6
        }
      },
      "certification_process": {
        "ConfidentialDocument": {
          "ETR-COMP- ADD), BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2, Version 2, 29 April 2019, T\u00dcV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) [25] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018 for Bundesdruckerei GmbH manufacturing site for": 1,
          "RNG] Zufallszahlengenerierung in TCOS, Version 0.8, 15 January 2019, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document) [UiF] Update im Feld unter TCOS iD, Version 0.1, 02 October 2018, T-Systems International GmbH": 1,
          "Version 1.2, 29 July 2019, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document) [15] TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Guidance Document - Common Part, Guidance Documentation of": 1,
          "Version 2.0 Release 1/P60D145, Version 1.3, 31 July 2019, SRC Security Research \u0026 Consulting GmbH (confidential document) [14] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019, Konfigurationsliste von TCOS ID Version 2.0": 1,
          "being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification": 1
        }
      },
      "cipher_mode": {
        "CBC": {
          "CBC": 4
        },
        "OFB": {
          "OFB": 2
        }
      },
      "cplc_data": {},
      "crypto_engine": {},
      "crypto_library": {},
      "crypto_protocol": {
        "PACE": {
          "PACE": 25
        }
      },
      "crypto_scheme": {
        "KA": {
          "Key Agreement": 4
        },
        "MAC": {
          "MAC": 3
        }
      },
      "device_model": {},
      "ecc_curve": {
        "Brainpool": {
          "brainpoolP512t1": 2
        }
      },
      "eval_facility": {
        "SRC": {
          "SRC Security Research \u0026 Consulting": 3
        },
        "TSystems": {
          "T-Systems International": 19
        },
        "TUV": {
          "T\u00dcV Informationstechnik": 1
        }
      },
      "hash_function": {
        "SHA": {
          "SHA2": {
            "SHA-256": 2,
            "SHA-512": 1
          }
        }
      },
      "ic_data_group": {},
      "javacard_api_const": {},
      "javacard_packages": {},
      "javacard_version": {},
      "os_name": {},
      "pq_crypto": {},
      "randomness": {
        "RNG": {
          "RNG": 6
        }
      },
      "side_channel_analysis": {
        "FI": {
          "fault injection": 1,
          "malfunction": 1
        },
        "SCA": {
          "side channel": 2
        },
        "other": {
          "JIL": 4,
          "deep learning": 1
        }
      },
      "standard_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "AIS 1": 1,
          "AIS 20": 3,
          "AIS 25": 4,
          "AIS 26": 4,
          "AIS 31": 3,
          "AIS 32": 1,
          "AIS 34": 4,
          "AIS 36": 3,
          "AIS 37": 3,
          "AIS 38": 1,
          "AIS 46": 3,
          "AIS20": 2,
          "AIS31": 2
        },
        "FIPS": {
          "FIPS PUB 180-4": 1,
          "FIPS PUB 46-3": 1,
          "FIPS180": 3,
          "FIPS186": 14,
          "FIPS197": 4,
          "FIPS46-3": 3
        },
        "ICAO": {
          "ICAO": 19
        },
        "ISO": {
          "ISO/IEC 15408": 6,
          "ISO/IEC 17065": 2,
          "ISO/IEC 18045": 6
        },
        "RFC": {
          "RFC 5639": 17
        }
      },
      "symmetric_crypto": {
        "AES_competition": {
          "AES": {
            "AES": 12,
            "AES-256": 1
          }
        },
        "DES": {
          "3DES": {
            "3DES": 2
          },
          "DES": {
            "DES": 4
          }
        },
        "constructions": {
          "MAC": {
            "CMAC": 4
          }
        }
      },
      "technical_report_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "BSI 7148": 1,
          "BSI TR-02102-1": 1,
          "BSI TR-03110": 8,
          "BSI TR-03116": 4,
          "BSI TR-03116-2": 2
        }
      },
      "tee_name": {},
      "tls_cipher_suite": {},
      "vendor": {
        "NXP": {
          "NXP": 7,
          "NXP Semiconductors": 5
        }
      },
      "vulnerability": {}
    },
    "report_metadata": {
      "/Author": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik",
      "/CreationDate": "D:20190906095522+02\u002700\u0027",
      "/Creator": "Writer",
      "/Keywords": "\"Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, Family Concept, MR.ED-PP, MR.ED-ON-PP, SSCD-PP\"",
      "/ModDate": "D:20190906101439+02\u002700\u0027",
      "/Producer": "LibreOffice 6.1",
      "/Subject": "TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1/P6022y from T-Systems International GmbH",
      "/Title": "Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1078-2019",
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