eTravel Essential 1.2 - BAC, EAC and AA activated
Common Criteria
Security Target – Public version
EAL 5+
Public Security Target eTravel Essential 1.2 – BAC, EAC and AA activated
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UPDATES
Rel Date Author Modification
1.1p 26/03/2021 THALES Created from evaluated ST (V1.1p)
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CONTENT
1. ST INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION ................................................................................................................................. 5
1.2 TOE IDENTIFICATION .............................................................................................................................. 5
1.3 ST OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................................................... 6
1.4 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................ 7
1.4.1 External References......................................................................................................................... 7
1.4.2 Internal References ......................................................................................................................... 9
1.5 TOE OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 10
1.5.1 TOE definition............................................................................................................................... 10
1.5.2 TOE boundaries ............................................................................................................................ 10
1.5.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use ................................................................... 12
1.5.3.1 MRTD application..................................................................................................................................... 12
1.5.3.2 ES Update concept..................................................................................................................................... 14
1.5.4 TOE Life-cycle .............................................................................................................................. 14
1.5.4.1 Four phases................................................................................................................................................ 14
1.5.4.2 Actors ........................................................................................................................................................ 15
1.5.4.3 Thales is in charge of ES loading/initialization/pre-personalization.......................................................... 17
1.5.4.4 IC manufacturer is in charge of ES loading/initialization/pre-personalization .......................................... 18
1.5.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE....................................................... 19
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ..................................................................................................................... 20
2.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM .................................................................................................................... 20
2.2 PP CLAIM............................................................................................................................................... 20
2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM.................................................................................................................................... 20
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.................................................................................................... 21
3.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 21
3.1.1 Assets............................................................................................................................................. 21
3.1.1.1 MRTD assets ............................................................................................................................................. 21
3.1.1.2 ES Update assets........................................................................................................................................ 21
3.1.2 Subjects ......................................................................................................................................... 23
3.1.2.1 MRTD subjects.......................................................................................................................................... 23
3.1.2.2 ES Update external entities and subjects ................................................................................................... 24
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 25
3.2.1.1 MRTD assumptions................................................................................................................................... 25
3.2.1.2 ES Update assumptions ............................................................................................................................. 26
3.3 THREATS................................................................................................................................................ 27
3.3.1.1 MRTD threats............................................................................................................................................ 27
3.3.1.2 ES Update threats ...................................................................................................................................... 29
3.4 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................. 30
3.4.1.1 MRTD OSP ............................................................................................................................................... 30
3.4.1.2 ES Update OSP......................................................................................................................................... 30
3.5 COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS OF [ST_BAC_EAC] AND [ST-IC] ..................... 31
3.5.1 Compatibility between threats of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC]................................................... 31
3.5.2 Compatibility between OSP of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC]....................................................... 31
3.5.3 Compatibility between assumptions of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] .......................................... 31
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES........................................................................................................................ 32
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.................................................................................................... 32
4.1.1 MRTD Security objectives............................................................................................................. 32
4.1.2 ES Update Security objectives....................................................................................................... 34
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................................................ 35
4.2.1 MRTD Security objectives for operational environment............................................................... 35
4.2.2 ES Update Security objectives for operational environment......................................................... 37
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE......................................................................................................... 39
4.3.1 Rationale between objectives and threats, assumptions, OSP ...................................................... 39
4.3.2 Compatibility between objectives of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] .............................................. 43
4.3.2.1 Compatibility between objectives for the TOE.......................................................................................... 43
4.3.2.2 Compatibility between objectives for the environment ............................................................................. 43
4.3.3 Justifications for adding objectives on the environment ............................................................... 43
4.3.3.1 Additions to [PP-MRTD-EAC] ................................................................................................................. 43
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4.3.3.2 Addition for ES Update feature ................................................................................................................. 43
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION.......................................................................................... 44
5.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS................................................................................................. 44
5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND................................................................................................. 45
5.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API ................................................................................................... 46
5.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM................................................................................................. 47
5.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS................................................................................................. 49
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................................ 50
6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE......................................................................... 52
6.1.1 SFR for MRTD application ........................................................................................................... 52
6.1.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit ......................................................................................................................... 52
6.1.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) .......................................................................................................... 52
6.1.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication ............................................................................................. 57
6.1.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection................................................................................................................ 61
6.1.1.5 Class FMT Security Management ............................................................................................................. 63
6.1.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ........................................................................................ 68
6.1.2 SFR for ES Update........................................................................................................................ 70
6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE.......................................................................... 74
6.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ................................................................................................. 75
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale................................................................................ 75
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale................................................................................................................... 80
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale................................................................................. 82
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual support and internal consistency .............................................. 83
6.3.5 Compatibility between SFR of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] ....................................................... 83
6.3.6 Compatibility between SAR of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] ....................................................... 85
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ....................................................................................................... 86
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS ................................................................................................................... 86
7.1.1 TSFs provided by the Etravel Essential 1.2 Software for MRTD Application............................... 86
7.1.2 TSFs provided by the Etravel Essential 1.2 Software for ES Update............................................ 87
7.1.3 TSFs provided by the IC................................................................................................................ 89
8. RATIONALES ............................................................................................................................................ 90
8.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE .......................................................................................... 90
8.1.1 TOE security functions rationale .................................................................................................. 90
9. GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS............................................................................................................... 96
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FIGURES
Figure 1: TOE Boundary....................................................................................................................................... 11
Figure 2: Life cycle where Thales is in charge of ES loading/initialization/pre-personalization.......................... 17
Figure 3: LC where IC manufacturer is in charge of ES loading/initialization/pre-personalization ..................... 18
TABLES
Table 1: Identification of the actors ...................................................................................................................... 16
Table 2: Security Objective for MRTD Application Rationale............................................................................. 39
Table 3: Security Objective for ES Update Rationale........................................................................................... 42
Table 4: MRTD security attributes........................................................................................................................ 50
Table 5: MRTD Keys and Certificates.................................................................................................................. 51
Table 6: FCS_CKM.1/CA refinement .................................................................................................................. 52
Table 7: FCS_CKM.1/AA&CA refinement.......................................................................................................... 53
Table 8: FCS_CKM.1/PERSO refinement............................................................................................................ 53
Table 9: FCS_COP.1/SYM refinements ............................................................................................................... 54
Table 10: FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER refinements ..................................................................................................... 55
Table 11: FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC refinements ..................................................................................................... 55
Table 12: FCS_COP.1/ PERSO refinements ........................................................................................................ 55
Table 13: FCS_COP.1/AA refinements ................................................................................................................ 56
Table 14: Overview on authentication SFR .......................................................................................................... 57
Table 15: FIA_AFL.1/PERSO refinements .......................................................................................................... 57
Table 16: FPT_TST refinements........................................................................................................................... 69
Table 17: FPT_TST refinements........................................................................................................................... 73
Table 18: Security Functional Requirement rationale for MRTD application ...................................................... 76
Table 19: Security Functional Requirement rationale for ES update.................................................................... 78
Table 20: Security Functional Requirement dependencies for MRTD application............................................... 81
Table 21: Security Functional Requirement dependencies for ES Update............................................................ 82
Table 22: SAR Dependencies ............................................................................................................................... 82
Table 23: Compatibility between SFR of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] ....................................................... 84
Table 24: Security Functions for MRTD Application provided by eTravel Essential 1.2 Software ..................... 86
Table 25: Security Functions for ES Update......................................................................................................... 87
Table 26: Security Functions provided by the PEGASUS_CB_05 chip.............................................................. 89
Table 27: Rationale table of SFR and security functions of MRTD application................................................... 91
Table 28: Rationale table of SFR and security functions of ES Update................................................................ 94
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1. ST INTRODUCTION
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION
Title: Public Security Target eTravel Essential 1.2 – BAC, EAC and AA
activated
Version: 1.1p
ST reference: D1521485
PP reference [PP-MRTD-EAC].
Origin: Thales
Product identification: eTravel Essential 1.2 (release A)
Security Controller: PEGASUS_CB_05
TOE Reference: eTravel Essential 1.2 (release ‘0300’) including TOE documentation
(release A.1)
TOE Configuration: Configuration with EAC on BAC + AA application
TOE documentation:
TOE documentation set (release A.1) with
 Operational User Guidance [OPE_MRTD] version 0.5
 Preparative procedures [PRE_MRTD] version 0.5
IT Security Evaluation
scheme:
Serma Safety & Security
IT Security Certification
scheme:
Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information
(ANSSI)
1.2 TOE IDENTIFICATION
The TOE identification is obtained by comparison of the Card Production Life Cycle Data (CPLCD) of
the TOE, located in non-volatile memory with information provided in guidance. Identification data and
dedicated command are described in the §1.1 of TOE guidance [AGD_OPE].
The TOE and the product differ, as further explained in §1.5.1 TOE definition.
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1.3 ST OVERVIEW
Thales has developed an eTravel application with all the mandatory features for ePassport specified by
ICAO and EU, as well as e-Driving licence specified by [ISO 18013-3] and EU regulation 383/2012,
resident permit as specified in EU regulation 2017/1954, identity card as specified in EU regulation
2019/1157.
The ST is based on Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”,
Extended Access Control [PP-MRTD-EAC].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact/contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable
travel documents (MRTD’s chip) based on the requirements of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). More specifically the TOE consists of operating system of MRTD’s chip with ICAO
application. The TOE is programmed according to Logical Data Structure as defined in [ICAO-9303].
This Security Target defines the security requirements for the TOE. The main security objective is to
provide the secure enforcing functions and mechanisms to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of
the MRTD application and data during its life cycle.
The main objectives of this ST are:
 To introduce TOE and the MRTD application,
 To define the scope of the TOE and its security features,
 To describe the security environment of the TOE, including the assets to be protected
and the threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment during the product
development, production and usage.
 To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its environment supporting in terms
of integrity and confidentiality of application data and programs and of protection of the
TOE.
 To specify the security requirements which includes the TOE security functional
requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and
 To describe the TOE security features answering to such requirements.
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1.4 REFERENCES
1.4.1 External References
[ANSI X9.42] ANSI X9.42 Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
[ASM-EAC] Technical Guideline – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents
– Extended Access Control (EAC),
Version 1.0, TR-03110
[BIO] BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
Technical Report, Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric
Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel
Documents,
Version 2.0, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 21 May 2004
[CC-1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
[CC-2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 2: Security functional components,
CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
[CC-3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 3: Security assurance components,
CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Methodology
CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
[JIL_SRCL] Joint Interpretation Library – Security requirements for post-delivery code loading – Version 1.0,
February 2016
[RGS-B1] Référentiel général de sécurité version 2.0
Annexe B1 Mécanismes cryptographiques…version 2.03 du 21 février 2014
[ST-IC] [ST-IC-PEGASUS_CB_05]
[ST-IC-
PEGASUS_C
B_05]
PEGASUS_CB_05_ST_Security_Target_Lite – Rev 0.4 – 29th October 2020
[CR-IC] [CR-IC-PEGASUS_CB_05]
[CR-IC-
PEGASUS_C
B_05]
Certification Report, ANSSI-CC-2020/34-M01 (18-02-2021)
[FIPS180-2] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH STANDARD
(+Change Notice to include SHA-224),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2002 August 1
[FIPS46-3] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (DES),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Reaffirmed 1999 October 25
[FIPS_197] FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB 197), Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)
[FIPS 186-4] FIPS 186-4, FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION (FIPS
PUB 186-4), Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.4.1
[ICAO-9303] 9303 ICAO Machine Readable Travel Document
7th edition, 2015 Part 1-12
[ISO15946-1] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based
on elliptic curves – Part 1: General,
2002
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[ISO15946-2] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based
on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital Signatures,
2002
[ISO15946-3] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based
on elliptic curves – Part 3: Key establishment,
2002
[ISO7816] ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4: Organization,
security and commands for interchange, FDIS2004
[ISO9796-2] ISO/IEC 9797: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital Signature Schemes giving
message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms, 2002
[ISO9797-1] ISO/IEC 9797: Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher,1999
[IEEE-P1363] IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography IEEE Std 1363-2000
[NIST SP800-
38A]
NIST Special Publication 800-38A
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques
2001 Edition
[NIST SP800-
38B]
NIST Special Publication 800-38B
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, The CMAC Mode for Authentication
October 6, 2016
[PKCS#3] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard,
An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
[PKI] MRTD Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only
Access
International Civil Aviation Organization
Version 1.1, October 01 2004
[PP-IC-0084] Smartcard IC Platform protection Profile
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[PP-MRTD-
EAC]
Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-CC-PP-0056, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009
[PP-MRTD-
EACv2]
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with
PACE (EAC PP)
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 (Version 1.3.2, 05th December 2012)
[PP-MRTD-
SAC]
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE
PP)
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01, Version 1.01, 22th July 2014
[PP-MRTD-
BAC]
Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application, Basic Access
Control
BSI-CC-PP-0055, version 1.10, 25th March 2009
[SP 800-90] NIST Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, Recommendation for the Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, June 2015
[TR-ECC] Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946, Technical Guideline, TR-ECC, BSI, 2006
[TR-EAC-1] TR-03110 Technical Guideline – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents and eIDAS Token, Version 2.2 February 2015
[TR-SAC] ICAO TR – Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Document, Version 1.1,
April 15, 2014.
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1.4.2 Internal References
[ST_BAC_AA] eTravel Essential 1.2 – BAC and AA activated Public Security Target
Ref. D1521484
[ST_BAC_EA
C]
eTravel Essential 1.2 – BAC, EAC and AA activated Public Security Target
Ref. D1521485
[ST_PACE_E
AC]
eTravel Essential 1.2 – PACE, EAC and AA activated Public Security Target
Ref. D1521486
[PRE_MRTD] eTravel Essential 1.2 AGD_PRE Document
Ref. D1521507
[OPE_MRTD] eTravel Essential 1.2 AGD_OPE Document
Ref. D1521508
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1.5 TOE OVERVIEW
This Security Target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contact/contactless chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic
Access Control and Extended Access Control as well as the advanced authentication mechanisms Chip
Authentication and Active Authentication.
The TOE embeds an optional functionality to update the embedded software when it is in operation on
the field, details are given in § ES Update concept.
1.5.1 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact/contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable
travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [ICAO-
9303] and providing the Basic Access Control and Extended Access Control according to the ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [ICAO-9303] and BSI TR-03110 [TR-EAC-1], respectively.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) can also be programmed according to the electronic Driving License
Logical Data Structure (LDS) [ISO 18013-3] and providing Extended Access Control according to the
BSI TR-03110 [TR-EAC-1].
In addition to [PP-MRTD-EAC], the TOE supports the active authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303].
The TOE comprises at least:
 the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software
 the IC Embedded Software (operating system)
 the MRTD application
 a cryptographic library developed by Thales (the cryptographic library proposed by the chip
supplier is not used),
 the associated guidance documentation for preparation phase and administration phase,
 the associated guidance documentation for patch development and management.
1.5.2 TOE boundaries
Application note: The TOE is the module designed to be the core of an MRTD passport. The TOE is a
contact/contactless integrated circuit. The IC is connected to an antenna and capacitors and is mounted
on a plastic film. This inlay is then embedded in the coversheet or datapage of the MRTD passport and
provides a contactless interface for the passport holder identification.
The TOE is programmed according to the Logical Data Structure [ICAO-9303] and [TR-EAC-1] and
providing:
 the Basic Access Control (BAC) according to the ICAO document [PKI]
 the Active Authentication (AA) mechanism according to the ICAO document [ICAO-9303]
 the Extended Access Control according to the BSI document [TR-EAC-1]
Application note: Additionally to the [PP-MRTD-EAC], the TOE has a set of administrative commands
for the management of the product during the product life.
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Application note: Components within the TOE boundary are defined in the following manner:
 the Integrated Circuit (IC),
 the IC Dedicated Test Software,
 the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Rom Software),
 the eTravel Essential 1.2 Embedded Software (ES) including MRTD application, Perso
application and low level modules as OS agility,
 part of the MRTD Logical Data Structure,
 the guidance documentation of the eTravel Essential 1.2 product:
o the preparation guide (assurance family AGD-PRE),
o the operational guide (assurance family AGD-OPE).
The eTravel Essential 1.2 Embedded Software (ES) is implemented in the NVM memory (flash
technology) of the chip.
The TOE is delivered to the Personalization Agent with data and guidance documentation in order to
perform the personalization of the product. In addition the Personalization Key is delivered from the
MRTD Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent or from the Personalization Agent to the MRTD
Manufacturer.
Figure 1: TOE Boundary
TOE Boundary
Memory
Manager
Communication Cryptography
RESET MEM COM SEC CRY Drivers
eTravel Essential 1.2 Application
EAC/SAC/BAC/BAP/AA
Perso
IC
Hardware
OS Agility
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1.5.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use
1.5.3.1 MRTD application
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveller
presents an MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this
security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a
separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine
readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless
machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD
personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii)
biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving
State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure
[ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both,
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity
and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the MRTD’s chip is
uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO-9303]. These security measures include
the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document
signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip,
Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security
measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [ICAO-9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data
Encryption are performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-only-once
access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control
Mechanism. This security target addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [TR-EAC-1]
as an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO-9303].
The confidentiality by Basic Access Control is a mandatory security feature that shall be implemented
by the TOE, too. Nevertheless this is not explicitly covered by this ST as there are known weaknesses
in the quality (i.e. entropy) of the BAC keys generated by the environment. Therefore, the MRTD has
additionally to fulfil the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [PP-BAC-MRTD]. Due to the fact that [PP-BAC-MRTD] does
only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3)
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the MRTD has been evaluated and certified separately according to [ST_BAC_AA], claiming [PP-BAC-
MRTD].
For BAC, the inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection
system by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection
system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication
(secure messaging) with this inspection system [ICAO-9303], normative appendix 5.
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication defined in [TR-EAC-1]. The
Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [ICAO-9303], informative appendix 7, A7.3.3. The
Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps: (i) the inspection system communicates by means
of secure messaging established by Basic Access Control, (ii) the inspection system reads and verifies
by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key
using the Document Security Object, (iii) the inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair, (iv)
the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC
mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and (v) the inspection system verifies by means of
received message authentication codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol
properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding
to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the session keys). The Chip Authentication
requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in [TR-EAC-
1]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol version 1 and
(ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1). The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i)
authenticates the MRTD’s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is
used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric
reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal
Authentication v.1 can only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed.
The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as
entity authorized by the receiving State or Organization through the issuing State, and (ii) an access
control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully
authenticated authorized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the receiving
State by means of certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create
Inspection System Certificates.
The security target also requires the TOE to implement Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303].
Keys for Chip authentication and Active Authentication can be generated in the card or loaded into it.
These operations take place at personalization time.
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1.5.3.2 ES Update concept
The etravel Essential 1.2 product embeds an optional functionality to update the embedded software
when it is in operation on the field. This functionality of Embedded Software update is also named OS
Agility and it is consistent with [JIL_SRCL].
The mechanism will allow to correct product issues or to add a feature requested by issuer when the
product is already deployed. The updates are done through a dedicated module (OS-Agility) dealing
with a set of update instructions received from trusted environment.
The update instructions are packaged into a block protected in confidentiality and integrity by keys
known only by Thales DIS. The block can be transmitted and executed by the TOE only after a
successful authentication done with keys only known by the issuer. With such features, Thales DIS is
able to load some contents only with the consent of the issuer and the issuer also cannot load a content
without the consent of Thales DIS.
Prior to the execution of the instructions of the patch, some prerequisites are verified to confirm ability
to perform the correct execution of the instructions. At the end of the execution, the traceability elements
are also updated to allow a complete identification of the product (platform version and current patch
version). The patch loading mechanism ensures also the atomicity of the updates with change in
identification of the TOE.
1.5.4 TOE Life-cycle
1.5.4.1 Four phases
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases. (With respect to the [PP-IC-0084],
the TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
Phase 1 “Development”:
(Step1)
The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated
Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2)
The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance
documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the MRTD application and
the guidance documentation associated. In addition, the software developer may optionally develops
some update of MRTD application. Such update is loaded in replacement of part of already installed
MRTD application with authorization of issuer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”:
(Step3)
The TOE integrated circuit is produced by the IC manufacturer conforming with Thales requirements.
The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from
the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer or to the Inlay Manufacturer.
(Step4)
The MRTD manufacturer initializes the IC/inlay by loading the MRTD application in the IC flash memory.
(Step5)
The MRTD manufacturer (i) creates the MRTD application and (ii) equips MRTD’s chips with pre-
personalization Data.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier are securely delivered from the MRTD
manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of
the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”:
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(Step6)
The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data, (ii) the
enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional
biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the
writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) configuration of the TSF if
necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document
security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [5] finalizes the personalization of
the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance
for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7)
The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use”
phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization
and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.
The TOE can be updated by agent acting on the behalf of the issuer to load the OS patch on the TOE
under control of Thales DIS and issuer.
Application note: In this ST, the role of the Personalization Agents is strictly limited to the phase 3
Personalization. In the phase 4 Operational Use updating and addition of the data groups of the MRTD
application is forbidden.
Application note: the functionality to update the embedded software when it is in operation on the field
and has no direct impact on life cycle phases and activities. It just introduces ability to perform additional
code loading and activation in phase 2 step 5 and/or in phase 4 step 7.
1.5.4.2 Actors
The following table list the different actors and associated role.
Actors Identification
Integrated Circuit (IC) Developer Thales |ST-IC]
Embedded Software Developer Thales
Integrated Circuit (IC) Manufacturer Thales or Thales supplier |ST-IC]
Module manufacturer Thales or Thales supplier |ST-IC]
Pre-personalizer Thales or Thales supplier |ST-IC]
Inlay manufacturer Thales or another Inlay manufacturer
Booklet manufacturer Thales or another printer
Personalization Agent The agent who is acting on the behalf of the issuing
State or Organization and personalize the MRTD for the
holder by activities establishing the identity of the holder
with biographic data.
Additional code loader Agent who is acting on the behalf of the issuer to load
the Additional code on the TOE.
Issuer The Issuer is the actual owner of the TOE. As such, no
TOE Update operation shall be made without his
consent.
MRTD Holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing
State or Organization personalizes the MRTD.
Country Verifying Certification Authority The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)
enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or
Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive
biometric reference data stored in the MRTD.
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Actors Identification
Document Verifier The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy
of the receiving State with respect to the protection of
sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the
Extended Inspection Systems.
Domestic Extended Inspection System A technical system operated by a governmental
organization located in MRTD country and examining
an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its
authenticity and verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
Foreign Extended Inspection System A technical system used by the border control officer of
the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as
MRTD holder.
Deployment Additional code Agent The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or
Organization to deploy the additional code for the post-
Issuance loading.
Post-Issuance Additional code Agent /
Terminal
The agent or terminal is acting on behalf of the issuing
State or Organization to perform the loading of additional
code at post-Issuance.
Table 1: Identification of the actors
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1.5.4.3 Thales is in charge of ES loading/initialization/pre-personalization
The following figure represents life cycle where Thales is in charge of ES loading/initialization/pre-
personalization in Thales premises.
Step Description / comments Who Where
Phase 1 - Development
1
eTravel Essential
1.2 software
development
Patch development
(optional)
Thales
R&D team
- secure environment -
Thales development
sites
2 IC development
IC development IC developer - Thales
- Secure environment
Thales development
sites
Phase 2 - Manufacturing
3 IC manufacturing
Manufacturing of virgin IC
embedding a flash loader.
IC manufacturer
- Secure environment
-
IC manufacturing sites
4a
Contactless module
assembly (optional)
Assembly of the chip on a
contactless module
Contactless module
manufacturer:
Thales or 3rd
Party
Thales manufacturing
sites or
3rd
party manufacturing
sites.
4b
Combi or contact
module assembly
(optional)
Assembly of the chip on a
combi or contact module.
Contact or
contactless module
manufacturer:
Thales
Thales manufacturing
sites
4c
Inlay manufacturing
(optional)
Assembly of the
contactless module on an
inlay.
Inlay manufacturer:
Thales or 3rd
party
Thales manufacturing
sites or
3rd
party manufacturing
sites.
5c
IC/Inlay
Initialization and
Pre-personalization
 Loading of the Thales ES
with flash loader
 Application initialization.
 SC initialization (profile
building, loading of data
needed for card pre-
personalization…).
Basic File System creation.
MRTD module
manufacturer:
Thales
Thales manufacturing
sites
4d Embedding
Chip/Inlay embedded on a
card body or Inlay
assembled on a booklet.
MRTD module
manufacturer:
Thales
Thales manufacturing
sites or
3rd
party manufacturing
sites.
Phase 3 – Personalization of the travel document
6 Personalization
- File System creation
finalization (ePassport
data structure).
- Loading of end-user
data.
- Switched to operational
mode.
Personalizer
Personalizer site
Phase 4 – Operational use
7 End-usage
End-usage for SC issuer SC Issuer Field
End-usage for cardholder Cardholder Field
Figure 2: Life cycle where Thales is in charge of ES loading/initialization/pre-personalization
Evaluation scope: life-cycle boundary
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1.5.4.4 IC manufacturer is in charge of ES loading/initialization/pre-personalization
The following figure represents life cycle where IC manufacturer is in charge of ES
loading/initialization/pre-personalization in its own premises.
Step Description / comments Who Where
Phase 1 - Development
1
eTravel Essential
1.2 software
development
- Applet development
- Applet tests
Thales
R&D team
- secure environment -
Thales development
sites
2 IC development
IC development IC developer - Thales
- Secure environment -
Thales development
sites
Phase 2 - Manufacturing
3
and
5
IC manufacturing
and Initialization
 Manufacturing of virgin
integrated circuits
embedding a flash loader.
 Loading of the Thales OS
 Application initialization.
 SC initialization (profile
building, loading of data
needed for card pre-
personalization…).
Basic File System creation.
IC manufacturer
- Secure environment -
IC manufacturing sites
4a
Contactless module
assembly (optional)
Assembly of the chip on a
contactless module
Contactless module
manufacturer: Thales
or 3rd
Party
Thales manufacturing
sites or
3rd
party
manufacturing sites.
4b
Combi or contact
module assembly
(optional)
Assembly of the chip on a
combi or contact module.
Contact or contactless
module manufacturer:
Thales
Thales manufacturing
sites
4c
Inlay manufacturing
(optional)
Assembly of the
contactless module on an
inlay.
Inlay manufacturer:
Thales or 3rd
party
Thales manufacturing
sites or
3rd
party
manufacturing sites.
4d Embedding
Chip/Inlay embedded on a
card body or Inlay
assembled on a booklet.
MRTD module
manufacturer: Thales
Thales manufacturing
sites or
3rd
party
manufacturing sites.
Phase 3 – Personalization of the travel document
6 Personalization
- File System creation
finalization (ePassport
data structure).
- Loading of end-user
data.
- Switched to operational
mode.
Personalizer
Personalizer site
Phase 4 – Operational use
7 End-usage
End-usage for SC issuer SC Issuer Field
End-usage for cardholder Cardholder Field
Figure 3: LC where IC manufacturer is in charge of ES loading/initialization/pre-personalization
Evaluation scope: life-cycle boundary
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LC2 describes the Life Cycle when Thales wishes to receive inlays instead of modules. In this case, the
founder ships the module to the Inlay manufacturer.
Note: transport is secured using OS authentication since after OS loading flash loader security cannot
be used anymore.
1.5.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
According to [TR-EAC-1], TOE is able to perform its claimed security features when it communicates
with a terminal or an Inspection System using a PCD (Proximity Coupling Device) with a RF (Radio
Frequency) reading module and an antenna. It is used for the wireless communication with the electronic
identity document's chip in order to establish a connection based on the [ISO/IEC 14443] protocol and
optionally [ISO/IEC 7816] protocol.
TOE security features of MRTD application are accessible only for devices having privileges to perform
MRTD sensitive operations.
TOE security features of personalization application are accessible only for devices having privileges to
perform such personalization operations.
TOE security features of ES update are accessible only for devices having privileges to perform loading
and activation of additional code.
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2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria (CC) version 3.1 revision 5.
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance Claim
Part 1 [CC-1] Strict conformance
Part 2 [CC-2] Conformance with extensions
due to [PP-MRTD-EAC]:
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
due to composite evaluation with IC from [PP-IC-0084]:
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
Part 3 [CC-3] Conformance with package EAL5 augmented with:
ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” defined in [CC-3],
AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” defined in [CC-3]
The [CEM] has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP CLAIM
The eTravel Essential 1.2 – BAC, EAC and AA activated Public Security Target [ST_BAC_EAC]
claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [PP-MRTD-EAC].
This security target is a composite security target, including the IC security target [ST-IC]. However the
security problem definition, the objectives, and the SFR of the IC are not described in this document.
The TOE provides several security mechanisms to be activated by administration.
Such way to proceed allows to the TOE is consistent with different ST that claims conformance to other
Protection Profiles according to activated security mechanisms.
Such ability of this TOE is described in other Security Targets:
The eTravel Essential 1.2 – PACE, EAC and AA activated Public Security Target [ST_PACE_EAC]
claims strict conformance to [PP-MRTD-SAC] and [PP-MRTD-EACv2].
The eTravel Essential 1.2 – BAC and AA activated Public Security Target [ST_BAC_AA] claims
strict conformance to [PP-MRTD-BAC].
2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 as
defined in CC part 3 [CC-3].
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3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.1.1 Assets
3.1.1.1 MRTD assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Application note: Due to interoperability reasons the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] requires that Basic
Inspection Systems must have access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16. As the BAC
mechanisms may not resist attacks with high attack potential, security of other Data Groups of the logical
MRTD are covered by another ST (cf. [ST_BAC_AA]).
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD
holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
3.1.1.2 ES Update assets
The following assets are related to ES Update feature usable in post-issuance in phase 3 step 6
(personalisation) or phase 4 step 7 (usage). There is no patch associated to the present TOE, however
the ES Update feature is within the evaluation scope.
D.ACODE Additional Code to be added to the TOE code after TOE issuance.
In order to be loaded, it has to be ciphered and signed and then it
becomes D.ACODE_CIPHEREDSIGNED. After loading and
installation, only D.ACODE remains present and active in TOE.
D.ACODE_CIPHEREDSIGNED Additional Code is in a ciphered form stored in a container with a
certificate format also including its signature from Embedded Software
Developer.
D.ACODE is ciphered and signed by Embedded Software Developer
and stored and delivered as D.ACODE_CIPHEREDSIGNED which is
loaded in the TOE by Issuer and after successful verification of the
signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is deciphered and
installed/activated through an atomic activation.
D.ACODE-ID Identification data associated to the additional code.
It is loaded and/or updated in the same atomic operation as additional
code loading.
To be protected from unauthorized modification.
D.ACODE_DEC-KEY Thales DIS keys used for the decryption of the additional code in TOE.
It is a Thales DIS cryptographic key (KDEC), owned by the Embedded
Software Developer, imported in TOE and used by the TOE to decrypt
the additional code to be loaded.
As a symmetric key: To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and
modification.
D.ACODE_ENC-KEY Thales DIS keys used for the encryption of the additional code in TOE.
It is a Thales DIS cryptographic key (KENC), stored in TOE environment
and owned by the Embedded Software Developer, and used to encrypt
the additional code prior to be delivered.
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As a symmetric key: to be protected from unauthorized disclosure and
modification.
D.ACODE_SGNVER-KEY Thales DIS keys used for the verification of the signature of the
additional code.
It is a Thales DIS cryptographic key (KMACV), owned by the Embedded
Software Developer, imported in TOE and used by the TOE to verify
the signature of the additional code to be loaded.
As a symmetric key: to be protected from unauthorized disclosure and
modification.
D.ACODE_SGNGEN-KEY Thales DIS keys used for the generation of the signature of the
additional code.
It is a Thales DIS cryptographic key (KMACG), stored in TOE
environment and owned by the Embedded Software Developer, and
used to generate the signature of the additional code prior to be
delivered.
As a symmetric key: to be protected from unauthorized disclosure and
modification.
Note: D.ACODE_ENC-KEY and D.ACODE_SGNGEN-KEY are protected by TOE environment not by
the TOE.
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3.1.2 Subjects
This security target considers the following external entities and subjects:
3.1.2.1 MRTD subjects
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer
completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase
2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD
Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder
by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data
in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded
finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD
for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF
data and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO-9303].
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or
Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD.
The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed
in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The
Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data
of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in the form of the Document
Verifier Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the
MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets
the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD
or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS)
is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The
Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the
Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security
attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive
biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4) or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
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Application note: Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD) is not considered by this PP since
this can only be averted by the BAC mechanism using the “weak” Document Basic Access Keys that is
covered by [PP-MRTD-BAC]. The same holds for the confidentiality of the user data EF.DG1, EF.DG2,
EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 as well as EF.SOD and EF.COM.
Application note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent
on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful
attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.1.2.2 ES Update external entities and subjects
Embedded Software Developer
The entity developing the additional code, signing and encrypting the additional code and then delivering
the additional code to the entity responsible to its deployment. It is represented in TOE by D.ACODE_
SGNVER-KEY and invoked during verification of signature of additional code.
Deployment Additional code Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to deploy the additional code for the
post-Issuance loading. It is at delivery point the entity authorized to receive the additional code from
Embedded Software Developer to produce the CVCA Link certificate including the additional code. This
actor is represented in TOE by a key used to verify the certificate including the additional code.
Post-Issuance Additional code Agent / Terminal
The agent or terminal is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to perform the loading of
additional code at post-Issuance. It is represented in TOE by authentication key used to perform
authentication required prior additional code loading.
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3.2 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
3.2.1.1 MRTD assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security
procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity
of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification,
retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its
objectives:
- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD
holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored
on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip).
The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the
Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key
and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication
Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports
the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
A.Signature_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country
Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to
distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The
Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer
Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses
securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs.
The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are
distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable
certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the
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Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for
their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of
the issuing States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the
Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country
Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD’s chip.
3.2.1.2 ES Update assumptions
Find here the assumptions associated to ES Update.
A.ACODE-EVIDENCE
For additional code loaded post-issuance, it is assumed that the Embedded Software Developer
provides digital evidence to the TOE in order to prove the following:
o (1) the additional code has been developed by a genuine ES developer and
o (2) the additional code has not been modified since it was issued by the genuine ES
developer.
o (3) the additional code has been authorized to be installed by Issuer.
A.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT
It is assumed that:
o The key management process related to the TOE code update capability takes place in a
secure and audited environment.
o The cryptographic keys used by the cryptographic operations are of strong quality and
appropriately secured to ensure confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of those keys.
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3.3 THREATS
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT
environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the
assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
3.3.1.1 MRTD threats
Application note: The threats T.Chip_ID and T.Skimming (cf. [PP-MRTD-BAC]) are averted by the
mechanisms described in the BAC PP [PP-MRTD-BAC] (cf. P.BAC-PP) which cannot withstand an
attack with high attack potential thus these are not addressed here. T.Chip_ID addresses the threat of
tracing the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening
to communications through the contactless communication interface. T.Skimming addresses the threat
of imitating the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless
communication channel of the TOE. Both attacks are conducted by an attacker who cannot read the
MRZ or who does not know the physical MRTD in advance.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRTD’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [PP-MRTD-
BAC]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get
data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack
(sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data),
the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible
attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the
MRTD’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait
are visually readable on the physical MRTD as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data,
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means
of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter
the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed
MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveller. The attacker may
alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of
the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may
combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the
attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read
from the logical MRTD of a traveller into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ
unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy
the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent:having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
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T.Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction
of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of
a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this
genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent:having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in “Operational Use”
phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass,
deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to
manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent:having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the
normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely
related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from
measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by
contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to
the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic
Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may
try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault
Analysis).
Threat agent:having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An
attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of
TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF
Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the
TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct
interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure
analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware
security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may
also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security
function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
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Threat agent:having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software
by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or
functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information
about the functional operation.
Threat agent:having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
3.3.1.2 ES Update threats
The following threats are related to the ES Update in post-issuance.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ES_UPDATE
An attacker attempts to update the TOE code with a malicious update without detection by the TOE.
Such unwanted event may compromise the security features of the TOE.
Asset(s): D.ACODE, D.ACODE_CIPHEREDSIGNED.
T.FAKE-SGNVER-KEY
An attacker modifies the signature verification key used by the TOE to verify the signature of the
additional code. Hence, he is able to sign and successfully load malicious additional code inside the
TOE.
Asset(s): D.ACODE_SGNVER-KEY, D.ACODE_CIPHEREDSIGNED.
T.WRONG-UPDATE-STATE
An attacker prevents the TOE update operation (code and TOE identification) to be performed
atomically, resulting in an inconsistency between the resulting TOE code and the identification data:
o The additional code is not loaded within the TOE, but the identification data is updated to
mention that the additional code is present;
o The additional code is partially or fully loaded within the TOE, but the identification data is
not updated to indicate the change.
Asset(s): D.ACODE-ID, D.ACODE.
T.INTEG-ACODE_LOAD
The attacker modifies (part of) the additional code when it is transmitted to the TOE for installation
without detection by the TOE.
Asset(s): D.ACODE_CIPHEREDSIGNED.
T.CONFID-ACODE_LOAD
The attacker discloses (part of) the additional code when it is transmitted to the TOE for installation or
has ability to decipher it due to unauthorized access to the key.
Asset(s): D.ACODE_CIPHEREDSIGNED, D.ACODE_DEC-KEY.
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3.4 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations (see CC part 1,
sec. 3.2).
3.4.1.1 MRTD OSP
P.BAC-PP Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile.
The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems
have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] as
well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and certified
in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [PP-MRTD-BAC] in order to ensure the confidentiality of
standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.
Application note: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[ICAO-9303] is addressed by the [PP-MRTD-BAC] (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the personal
data other than EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms
may not resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [PP-MRTD-BAC]). The TOE shall protect the
sensitive biometric reference data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 against attacks with high attack potential.
Due to the different resistance the protection of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the other EF.SOD,
EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 are addressed separated protection profiles,
which is assumed to result in technically separated evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN) and
certificates.
P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by
inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the
Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the
limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection
System after Chip Authentication.
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with
respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent
authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Activ_Auth Active Authentication
The TOE implements the active authentication protocol as described in [ICAO-9303].
3.4.1.2 ES Update OSP
P.ATOMIC_ACTIVATION
Additional code has to be loaded and installed on the TOE through an atomic activation.
Each additional code shall be identified with unique Identification Data. During such atomic activation,
identification Data of the TOE have to be updated to clearly identify the Updated TOE.
In case of interruption or incident during activation, the TOE shall remain in its initial state or set in a
failed secure state.
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P.TOE_IDENTIFICATION
Identification Data of the resulting Updated TOE shall identify the Initial TOE and the activated additional
code. Identification Data shall be protected in integrity.
P.ACODE_SIGNING
The additional code has to be signed with a cryptographic key pair according to relevant standard and
the generated signature is associated to the additional code.
The additional code signature must be checked during loading to assure its authenticity and integrity
and to assure that loading is authorized on the TOE.
The cryptographic key used to sign the additional code shall be of sufficient quality and the process for
key generation and storage shall be appropriately secured to ensure the authenticity, integrity and
confidentiality of the key. The process to deliver the key for signature verification shall be appropriately
secured to ensure the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the key (not applicable if public key).
P.ACODE_ENCRYPTION
The additional code has to be encrypted according to relevant standard in order to ensure its
confidentiality when it is transmitted to the TOE for loading and installation.
The encryption key shall be of sufficient quality and the process for key generation and storage shall be
appropriately secured to ensure the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the key.
3.5 COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS OF [ST_BAC_EAC] AND [ST-IC]
3.5.1 Compatibility between threats of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC]
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, is included in T.Phys-Probing.
T.Forgery is included in T.Phys-Manipulation.
T.Counterfeit is specific to the Java Card platform and they do no conflict with the threats of [ST-IC].
T.Abuse-Func of [ST_BAC_EAC] is included in T.Abuse-Func of [ST-IC].
T.Information_Leakage is included in T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced.
T.Phys-Tamper is included in T.Phys-Manipulation
T.Malfunction of [ST_BAC_EAC] is included in T.Malfunction of [ST-IC].
We can therefore conclude that the threats of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] are consistent.
3.5.2 Compatibility between OSP of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC]
P.BAC-PP, P.Sensitive_Data, P.Manufact, P.Personalization and P.Activ_Auth are specific to the
MRTD and they do no conflict with the OSP of [ST-IC].
We can therefore conclude that the OSP of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] are consistent.
3.5.3 Compatibility between assumptions of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC]
A.MRTD_Manufact and A.MRTD_Delivery are included in A.Process-Sec-IC.
A.Pers_Agent, A.Insp_Sys, A.Signature_PKI, and A.Auth_PKI are assumptions specific to
[ST_BAC_EAC] and they do no conflict with the assumptions of [ST-IC].
We can therefore conclude that the assumptions for the environment of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] are
consistent.
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4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for
the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be met by the TOE.
4.1.1 MRTD Security objectives
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object
according to LDS [ICAO-9303] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents
only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and
cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note:The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1
and EF.DG2) cannot be changed by write access after personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and
(ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in
the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4)
by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the
inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication
and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the
certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The
TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Extended
Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected
against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
“Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of the Pre-Personalization
data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [ASM-EAC]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application note: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the MRTD’s chip to have (i) a unique identity as
given by the MRTD’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private
authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The
terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate
for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD’s
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chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [ICAO-
9303] and (ii) the hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object
signed by the Document Signer.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip independent
of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data
of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass,
deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features
provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed
in the MRTD’s chip
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines
and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing
due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details correspond to an
analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and
the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high attack potential
by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields,
voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements
on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
OT.Activ_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity through AA
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active
Authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip
shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
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4.1.2 ES Update Security objectives
TOE including ES Update feature shall fulfill the next security objectives.
O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE
The TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the additional code to be loaded.
The TOE enforces that only an allowed version of the additional code can be loaded. The TOE shall
forbid the loading of an additional code not intended to be assembled with the TOE.
During the loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE shall remain secure.
O.SECURE_ACTIVATION_ACODE
Activation of the additional code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed in an atomic
way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Updated TOE shall be
completed before activation.
If the atomic activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Updated TOE, otherwise (in case
of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Updated TOE), the TOE shall preserve a
secure state.
O.TOE_IDENTIFICATION
The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the
integrity of these data.
After atomic activation of the additional code, the Identification Data of the Updated TOE allows
identifications of both the Initial TOE and additional code.
The user must be able to read the unique identifiers of Initial TOE and additional code(s) which are
embedded in the Updated TOE.
O.CONFID-LOAD_ACODE
The TOE shall decrypt the additional code prior installation.
Application Note: Confidentiality protection must be enforced when the additional code is transmitted to
the TOE for loading (See OE.ENCRYPTION_ACODE). Confidentiality protection can be achieved either
through direct encryption of the additional code, or by means of a trusted path ensuring the confidentiality
of the communication to the TOE.
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4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
4.2.1 MRTD Security objectives for operational environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5
and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following
objectives:
- non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
- identification of the element under delivery,
- meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
- physical protection to prevent external damage,
- secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
- traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery
process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all
non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with
the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure
requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the
issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data
for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded
finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together
with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key
Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer
Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing
CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The
issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and
ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine
MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer
Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object
relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [ICAO-9303].
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD MRTD Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i)
generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public
Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of
receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD
by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
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The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to
limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized receiving States
or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization
generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.BAC_PP Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile.
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully
evaluated and certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [PP-MRTD-BAC]. This is necessary to
cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the
traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential the
addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the
traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes
the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303]. Additionally
General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip Authentication
Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveller as
MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document
Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving
States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol.
Application note: The figure 2.1 in [ASM-EAC] supposes that the GIS and the EIS follow the order (i)
running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD
that are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication Mechanism (i.e. Document Security Object and
Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip Authentication Protocol, and (iv) reading and
verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical MRTD after Chip Authentication. The supposed sequence
has the advantage that the less-sensitive data are protected by secure messaging with cryptographic
keys based on the Chip Authentication Protocol which quality is under control of the TOE. The inspection
system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure
messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol. Note that reading the
less sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as
threat in this PP. But the TOE ensures that reading of sensitive data is possible after successful Chip
Authentication and Terminal Authentication Protocol only.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by
creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical
MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip for access to
the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection
System Certificate.
OE.Active_Auth_Sign Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
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The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i)
generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Active
Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or
organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the
Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Active_Auth_Verif Verification by Active Authentication
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification
by active authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.
4.2.2 ES Update Security objectives for operational environment
TOE including ES Update feature shall use an environment that answer to the next security objectives.
OE.ACODE_SECURE_LOAD
The additional code can be loaded from a terminal at border control
 CVCA entity generates new CVCA link certificates signed by the current CVCA key and DV
certificates signed by the new CVCA key to propagate the new certificate chain to all the border
controls.
 At border control the EAC mechanism is enforced on the Inspection System with the use of the
new certificate chain.
 TOE application is updated during the document verification (Terminal Authentication).
The additional code can be loaded from a terminal as the user mobile
 CVCA entity or Thales generates new CVCA link certificates signed by the current CVCA key
and embed it with a mobile application
 The mobile application is provided to the citizen from an application store.
 Citizen uses the mobile application and scans the MRZ of the document with the camera of the
smartphone
 BAC/SAC followed by at least partial EAC is performed. TOE application is updated. Citizen is
informed that the TOE application has been updated by mobile application.
The additional code can be loaded using a tool in personalization phase
 TOE application is updated during the document personalization (Issuer Authentication).
OE.ACODE-VERIFICATION
All the additional code shall be verified at least once, during development or before the loading
depending on the TOE capabilities, in order to ensure that additional code is valid at execution time.
OE.ACODE-EVIDENCE
For additional code loaded post-issuance, evaluated technical measures implemented by the TOE or
audited organizational measures must ensure that loaded additional code has not been changed since
the code verification required in OE.CODE-VERIFICATION.
OE.ACODE-TRUSTED-DEVELOPER
The additional code developer shall be a trusted actor that provides additional code where correct usage
of the TOE has been verified applying a secure development process in a secure development
environment.
OE.ACODE-ENCRYPTION
For additional code loaded post-issuance, the additional code developer shall encrypt the additional
code so that its confidentiality is ensured when it is transmitted to the TOE for loading and installation.
OE.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT
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Key management process related to the ES Update shall take place in a secure and audited
environment. The key generation process shall guarantee that cryptographic keys are of sufficient
quality and appropriately secured to ensure confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the keys. Code
delivery and deployment process related to the ES Update shall be done rules defined in administration
guidance.
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4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE
4.3.1 Rationale between objectives and threats, assumptions, OSP
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage for MRTD application.
Table and following explanations are copied from [PP-MRTD-EAC]. Only the shaded parts are added.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Activ_Auth_Proof
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.BAC-PP
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OE.Activ.Auth_Sign
OE.Active_Auth_Verif
T.Read_Sensitive_Data X X X
T.Forgery X X X X X X
T.Counterfeit X X X
T.Abuse-Func X
T.Information_Leakage X
T.Phys-Tamper X
T.Malfunction X
P.BAC-PP X
P.Sensitive_Data X X X
P.Manufact X
P.Personalization X X X
P.Activ_Auth X X X
A.MRTD_Manufact X
A.MRTD_Delivery X
A.Pers_Agent X
A.Insp_Sys X X
A.Signature_PKI X X
A.Auth_PKI X X
Table 2: Security Objective for MRTD Application Rationale
The OSP P. BAC-PP is directly addressed by the OE.BAC-PP.
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of the IC by
means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as being fulfilled by
OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only”
addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and
(ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers
“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the
Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the
TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and the management of
TSF to the Personalization Agent.
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and the threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered by the TOE-
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objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that read
access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to
authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures
the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing
State or Organization as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive
biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended
Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive
biometric reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended
Inspection Systems”.
The OSP P.Activ_Auth “Active Authentication” addresses the active authentication protocol as
described in [ICAO-9303]. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means
of digital signature which will be created according to OE.Active_Auth_Sign “Active Authentication of
logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Active_Auth_Verif
“Verification by Active Authentication”. This is possible only because genuine TOE enforce AA as
specified in OT.Activ_Auth_Proof.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of the
complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the
trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the
stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented
MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall
ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete
unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means
of digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
“Verification by Passive Authentication
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of
the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required
by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentication” using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written
into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”. According to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the
MRTD passport book” the General
Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip. ”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s functionality
to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection
against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of functions which may not be used in the
“Operational Use” phase is effectively prevented. Therefore attacks intending to abuse functionality in
order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect the TOE in such a way that security
features or TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated, changed or explored shall be effectively
countered.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-Tamper
“Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical for
integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the
TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
“Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity through AA” using an authentication key
pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Active Authentication Key has to
be written into EF.DG15
The TOE environment will also detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature
which will be created according to OE.Active_Auth_Sign “Active Authentication of logical MRTD by
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Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Active_Auth_Verif “Verification by
Active Authentication”.
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that
requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
The assumption A.MRTD_ Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires
to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” including the
enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspection
Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” which requires the inspection system to
examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and
the General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the
Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. The security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD”
require the Inspection System to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal
handling.
The assumption A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature”
covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key
Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD
“Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security objective for the
TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data”
requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier
certificates for authorized receiving States or Organizations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving
State is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to
authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
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The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage for ES Update feature.
Table and following explanations are associated only to ES Update feature
O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE
O.SECURE_ACTIVATION_ACODE
O.TOE_IDENTIFICATION
O.CONFID_LOAD_ACODE
OE.ACODE-SECURE_LOAD
OE.ACODE-VERIFICATION
OE.ACODE-EVIDENCE
OE.ACODE-TRUSTED-DEVELOPER
OE.ACODE-ENCRYPTION
OE.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ES_UPDATE X X X X
T.FAKE-SGNVER-KEY X X
T.WRONG-UPDATE-STATE X X
T.INTEG- ACODE_LOAD X
T.CONFID- ACODE_LOAD X X X
P.ATOMIC_ACTIVATION X
P.TOE_IDENTIFICATION X
P.ACODE_SIGNING X X X
P.ACODE_ENCRYPTION X X
A.ACODE-EVIDENCE X X
A.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT X
Table 3: Security Objective for ES Update Rationale
The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_ES_UPDATE is addressed by the O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE and by
OE.ACODE_SECURE_LOAD, OE.ACODE-VERIFICATION and OE.ACODE-TRUSTED-
DEVELOPER.
The threat T.FAKE-SGNVER-KEY is addressed by the O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE and by
OE.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT.
The threat T.WRONG-UPDATE-STATE is addressed by the O.SECURE_ACTIVATION_ACODE and
O.TOE_IDENTIFICATION.
The threat T.INTEG-ACODE_LOAD is addressed by the O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE.
The threat T.CONFID-ACODE_LOAD is addressed by the O.CONFID-LOAD_ACODE and by
OE.ACODE-ENCRYPTION and OE.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT.
The OSP P.ATOMIC_ACTIVATION is directly addressed by O.SECURE_ACTIVATION_ACODE.
The OSP P.TOE_IDENTIFICATION is directly addressed by O.TOE_IDENTIFICATION.
The OSP P.ACODE_SIGNING is directly addressed by O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE and OE.ACODE-
VERIFICATION and OE.ACODE-TRUSTED-DEVELOPER.
The OSP P.ACODE_ENCRYPTION is directly addressed by O.CONFID-LOAD_ACODE and
OE.ACODE-ENCRYPTION.
The assumption A.ACODE-EVIDENCE is directly addressed by the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.ACODE-EVIDENCE, and OE.ACODE-TRUSTED-DEVELOPER.
The assumption A.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT is directly addressed by the security objective for the
TOE environment OE.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT.
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4.3.2 Compatibility between objectives of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC]
4.3.2.1 Compatibility between objectives for the TOE
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.AC_Pers, and OT.Activ_Auth_Proof are specific to
[ST_BAC_EAC] and they do no conflict with the objectives of [ST-IC].
OT.Data_Int is included in O.Phys-Manipulation.
OT.Identification is included in O.Identification.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func is included in O.Abuse-Func.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak is included in O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper is included in O.Phys-Manipulation.
OT.Prot_Malfunction is included in O.Malfunction.
O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE, O.SECURE_ACTIVATION_ACODE, O.CONFID-LOAD_ACODE are
partially covered by O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Abuse-Func, O.Leak-Inherent, O.Leak-Forced, and
O.Malfunction but also by O.RND, O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality and O.Mem-Access.
O.TOE_IDENTIFICATION is partially covered by O.Identification but also by O.Mem-Access.
We can therefore conclude that the objectives for the TOE of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] are consistent.
4.3.2.2 Compatibility between objectives for the environment
OE.MRTD_Manufact, OE.MRTD_ Delivery, OE.Personalization are included in OE.ProcessSec-IC.
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.BAC_PP, OE.Exam_MRTD,
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Passive_Auth_Verif,
OE.Active_Auth_Sign, and OE.Active_Auth_Verif, are specific to [ST_BAC_EAC] and they do no
conflict with the objectives of [ST-IC].
OE.ACODE_SECURE_LOAD is partially covered by OE.Process-Sec-IC.
OE.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT is partially covered by OE.Resp-Appl.
OE.ACODE-VERIFICATION, OE.ACODE-EVIDENCE, OE.ACODE-TRUSTED-DEVELOPER,
OE.ACODE-ENCRYPTION are specific to [ST_BAC_EAC] and they do no conflict with the objectives
of [ST-IC].
We can therefore conclude that the objectives for the environment of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] are
consistent.
4.3.3 Justifications for adding objectives on the environment
4.3.3.1 Additions to [PP-MRTD-EAC]
The only additional objectives on the environment for MRTD application are OE.Active_Auth_Sign and
OE.Active_Auth_Verif. These objectives request the environment to support Active Authentication. AA
is an operation outside [PP-MRTD-EAC]. Therefore the added objectives on the environment do not
weaken the TOE.
4.3.3.2 Addition for ES Update feature
The additional objectives on the environment for ES update are:
 OE.ACODE_SECURE_LOAD,
 OE.ACODE-VERIFICATION,
 OE.ACODE-EVIDENCE,
 OE.ACODE-TRUSTED-DEVELOPER,
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 OE.ACODE-ENCRYPTION,
 OE.ACODE-KEY-MANAGEMENT.
These additional objectives on the environment for ES update does not directly interact with objectives
on the environment for MRTD application.
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components
are defined in protection profile [PP-IC-0084]; others are defined in the protection profile [PP-MRTD-
EAC].
5.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the Class
FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage
of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require
the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content
of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
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5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND) of the
Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not
limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar
component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to
be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined
quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
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5.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the Class
FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the
other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an external
entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of
the [assignment: authorized user or role].
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5.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management
of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other
class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the
capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined
manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this
family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling:
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of the Class
FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the
Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this
class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism
used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the
abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
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FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Application note: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two
types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide protection
in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities
are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in,
the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
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5.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS
The sensitive family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined
here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks
against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical
phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation,
simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes
the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed
by any other component of CC part 2 [CC-2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows:
FPT_EMS TOE emanation
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data
or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
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6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Pre-personalization Agent”, “Personalization Agent”,
“Extended Inspection System”, “Country Verifying Certification Authority”, “Document Verifier” and
“Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1. Note, that all these subjects are acting
for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either in section 7 or in the following
table. The operations “write”, “modify”, “read” and “disable read access” are used in accordance with
the general linguistic usage. The operations “store”, “create”, “transmit”, “receive”, “establish
communication channel”, “authenticate” and “re-authenticate” are originally taken from [CC-2]. The
operation “load” is synonymous to “import” used in [CC-2].
Definition of security attributes:
security attribute values meaning
terminal
authentication status
none (any
Terminal)
default role (i.e. without authorisation after start-up)
CVCA roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as Country
Verifying Certification Authority after successful CA and TA
DV (domestic) roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as domestic
Document Verifier after successful CA and TA
DV (foreign) roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as foreign
Document Verifier after successful CA and TA
IS roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as Extended
Inspection System after successful CA and TA
Terminal
Authorization
none
DG4 (Iris) Read access to DG4: (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1)
DG3
(Fingerprint)
Read access to DG3: (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1)
DG3 (Iris) / DG4
(Fingerprint)
Read access to DG3 and DG4: (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1)
Table 4: MRTD security attributes
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Name Data
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Private Key (SKCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a private key
(SKCVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Public Key (PKCVCA)
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
(PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the Document Verifier
Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security attribute Current Date as the
most recent valid effective date of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Certificate (CCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a self-
signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [TR-EAC-1] and Glossary). It
contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
(PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access
control rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the
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Name Data
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security
attributes.
Document Verifier
Certificate (CDV)
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document Verifier
Public Key (PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii) identification as
domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded access control rights of
the Document Verifier, the Certificate
Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Inspection System
Certificate (CIS)
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document
Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the Inspection
System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded access control rights of the
Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication
Public Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used for
Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC 2631 or
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO 15946.
Chip Authentication
Public Key (PKICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the EF.DG14
Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD and used by
the inspection system for Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. It is
part of the user data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
Chip Authentication
Private Key (SKICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to
authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF data.
Country Signing
Certification Authority
Key Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate with the
Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key and the signature will
be verified by receiving State or Organization (e.g. a Basic Inspection
System) with the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key.
Document Signer Key
Pairs
Document Signer of the issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Security Object of the logical MRTD with the Document
Signer Private Key and the signature will be verified by a Basic
Inspection Systems of the receiving State or Organization with the
Document Signer Public Key.
Document Basic Access
Keys
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization
Agent, loaded to the TOE, and used for mutual authentication and key
agreement for secure messaging between the Basic Inspection System
and the MRTD’s chip.
BAC Session Keys Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between
the TOE and a BIS in result of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Protocol.
Chip Session Key Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between
the TOE and a GIS in result of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Table 5: MRTD Keys and Certificates
Application note 20: The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as
“domestic” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same State as the Country Verifying
Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as
“foreign” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to the same State as the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. From MRTD’s point of view the domestic Document Verifier belongs to
the issuing State or Organization.
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6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the
main security functionality.
Refinements in this section are in underline font when the SFR’s refinement is already present in [PP-
MRTD-EAC], and in bold font when the refinement is done in this ST. When the SFR is refined in the
[PP-MRTD-EAC] and additionally refined in this ST then the font is bold and underline.
6.1.1 SFR for MRTD application
6.1.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
6.1.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation algorithms
to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for Chip Authentication session
keys
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] ]: fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1
/CA
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation
algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key
sizes] that meet the following: [selection: based on the Diffie-Hellman key derivation
protocol compliant to [PKCS#3] and [TR-EAC-1] , based on an ECDH protocol
compliant to [TR-ECC] ].
iteration algorithm Key size
/TDESsession-DH DH Key Agreement Algorithm - PKCS#3 –
1024, 1280, 1536, 2048 and 3072 bits
112 bits
/AESsession-DH DH Key Agreement Algorithm - PKCS#3 –
1024, 1280, 1536, 2048 and 3072 bits
128, 192, and
256 bits
/TDESsession-ECDH ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm - ISO 15946 –
160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits
112 bits
/AESsession-ECDH ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm - ISO 15946 –
160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits
128, 192, and
256 bits
Table 6: FCS_CKM.1/CA refinement
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FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair Cryptographic key generation for AA and CA Key Pair
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/AA,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC and FCS_COP.1/SYM
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: not fulfilled, see application note
FCS_CKM.1.1
/KeyPair
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation
algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key
sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
iteration algorithm Key size standard
AA/RSA RSA CRT
Key
generation
1280, 1536, 2048, 3072 and
4096 bits
none (generation of random numbers
and Miller- Rabin primality testing)
AA/ECC ECC Key
generation
160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384,
512 and 521 bits
[FIPS 186-4] Appendix B.4.1
CA/DH DH key
generation
1024, 1280, 1536, 2048 and
3072 bits
[ANSI X9.42]
CA/ECDH ECDH Key
generation
160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384,
512 and 521 bits
[IEEE-P1363]
Table 7: FCS_CKM.1/AA&CA refinement
Application notes:
 The dependency of FCS_CKM1/KeyPair on FCS_COP.1 is partly fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC and FCS_COP.1/SYM. This dependence is not direct:
FCS_CKM1/KeyPair generates a static key which in turn generate session keys, via
FCS_CKM1/CA. These session keys then use FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC and FCS_COP.1/SYM.
 The dependency of FCS_CKM1/KeyPair on FCS_CKM.4 is not fulfilled as these are permanent
keys used on the card during its life-time.
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO Cryptographic key generation for Session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/PERSO
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation
algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key
sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
iteration algorithm Key size standard
/TDES TDES ISK key derivation 112 bits [ICAO-9303] normative appendix 5
/AES AES ISK key derivation 256 bits [ICAO-9303] normative appendix 5
Table 8: FCS_CKM.1/PERSO refinement
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by, FCS_CKM.1/CA, and
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO.
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method Secure erasing of the value that meets the
following: None.
Application note: Secure erasing of data is performed by overwriting the data with random numbers.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and cryptographic key
sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1
/SYM
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Table 9: algorithm and
cryptographic key sizes Table 9: Key size that meet the following: Table 9: list
of standards.
iteration algorithm Key size List of standards
/ENC_TDES TDES in CBC mode 112 bits TR-03110
/ENC_AES AES in CBC mode 128, 192, 256 ISO 10116
Table 9: FCS_COP.1/SYM refinements
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
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FCS_COP.1.1
/SIG_VER
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Table 10: algorithm and cryptographic key sizes Table
10: Key size that meet the following: Table 10: list of standards.
iteration algorithm Key size List of standards
/RSA_VER RSA (STD) 1024, 1280, 1536, 2048,
3072, 4096 bits
RSA SHA PKCS#1
RSA SHA PKCS#1 PSS
/ECC_VER ECC 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384,
512, 521
[TR-ECC] ECDSA SHA
Table 10: FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER refinements
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1
/CA_MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Table 11 algorithm and
cryptographic key sizes Table 11 Key size that meet the following: Table 11 list
of standards.
iteration algorithm Key size List of standards
/MAC_TDES TDES Retail MAC 112 bits TR-03110
/MAC_AES AES CMAC 128, 192, 256 [NIST-800-38B]
Table 11: FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC refinements
Remark: this SFR is renamed FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC instead of FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_COP.1/PERSO Cryptographic operation – Symmetric encryption, decryption, and MAC
during manufacturing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/PERSO.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption and decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES, AES and cryptographic key
sizes See Table 12
iteration algorithm Key size List of standards
/ENC_TDES TDES encryption and decryption 112 bits [SP 800-67]
/ENC_AES AES encryption and decryption 256 [FIPS 197]
/MAC_TDES TDES Retail MAC 112 bits ISO 9797-1
/MAC_AES AES CMAC 256 [NIST-800-38B]
Table 12: FCS_COP.1/ PERSO refinements
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FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: not fulfilled, see application note.
FCS_COP.1.1
/AA
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Table 13 algorithm and cryptographic key sizes Table
13 Key size that meet the following: Table 13 List of standards.
iteration algorithm Key size List of standards
/AA_RSA RSA 1024, 1280, 1536, 2048, 3072,
and 4096 bits
ISO9796-2
/AA_ECDSA ECDSA 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512
and 521 bits
[TR-ECC]
Table 13: FCS_COP.1/AA refinements
Application note:
 The dependency of FCS_COP.1/AA on FCS_CKM.4 is not fulfilled as these are permanent keys
used on the card during its life-time.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet RGS
[RGS-B1] and [SP 800-90] with seed entropy at least 128 bits.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the authentication
protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4/MRTD.
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6.1.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Table 14 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
Chip Authentication Protocol FIA_API.1, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
Terminal Authentication Protocol FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
Table 14: Overview on authentication SFR
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in this protection profile19 includes
 the BAC authentication protocol as defined in ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] in order to gain
access to the Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
 the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys between the
TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and the Terminal Public
Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol,
 the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code with
the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The BAC mechanism does not provide a security function on their own. The Chip Authentication Protocol
may be used independent of the Terminal Authentication Protocol. But if the Terminal Authentication
Protocol is used the terminal shall use the same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication
Protocol.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_AFL.1/PERSO)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO Authentication failure handling during pre-personalization and
personalization phases
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication: fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1/PERSO
FIA_AFL.1.1
/Perso
The TSF shall detect when [Number in Table 15] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occurs related to authentication attempts using
ISK key.
FIA_AFL.1.2
/Perso
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met, the TSF shall [Actions in Table 15].
Auth type Number Actions
ISK key 3 Block ISK Key.
Table 15: FIA_AFL.1/PERSO refinements
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FIA_UID.1/PERSO Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. to carry out the mutual authentication with ISK
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
/PERSO
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1/MRTD)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1/MRTD Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1/MRTD The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/MRTD The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note in addition to the PP, the TSF shall allow:
1) to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key,
2) to carry out the Active Authentication Protocol,
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PERSO
FIA_UAU.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. to carry out the mutual authentication with ISK
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
/PERSO
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note:
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 FIA_AFL.1/PERSO and FIA_UID.1/PERSO are extensions to [PP-MRTD-EAC], in order to deal
with identification and authentication in pre-personalisation and personalisation phases.
FIA_UAU.1/MRTD Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/MRTD
FIA_UAU.1.1
/MRTD
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3.to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
4,to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
/MRTD
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note in addition to the PP, the TSF shall allow:
1) to carry out the Active Authentication Protocol,
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.4.1
/MRTD
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Terminal authenticate protocol,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES, AES
Application note: The authentication mechanisms use a challenge freshly and randomly generated by
the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication attempt.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5.1
/MRTD
The TSF shall provide
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
3. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES, AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
/MRTD
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following
rules:
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1. TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Pre-personalization Agent by
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Pre-personalization
Agent Key.
2. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication mechanism..
3. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented
during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established
by the Chip Authentication Mechanism
4. the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6.1
/MRTD
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent
to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall be verified
as being sent by the GIS.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity – Chip Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-EAC-
1] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication Mechanism
specified in [TR-EAC-1]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using the Diffie-Hellman
Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to
[ICAO-9303], normative appendix 5, A5.1. The terminal verifies by means of secure messaging
whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication
Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity – Active Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Protocol according to [ICAO-
9303] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Active Authentication Mechanism
specified in [ICAO-9303]. The terminal generates a challenge then verifies whether the MRTD’s chip
was able or not to sign it properly using its Active Authentication private key corresponding to the
Active Authentication public key (EF.DG15).
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6.1.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control: fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read
and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control; fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Extended Inspection System
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16,
of the logical MRTD
b. data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
c. data in EF.COM,
d. data in EF.SOD
3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminal,
b. Terminal Authorization
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to
write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with
the Read access to DG3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative
certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the
data of the EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with
the Read access to DG4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate
holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data of the
EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG3,
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2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG4,
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection
System is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical
MRTD.
Application note: Note the BAC mechanism controls the read access of the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. These security features of the MRTD are
not subject of this ST.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip
Authentication.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay
errors after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication.
Rationale for Refinement: Note that the Access Control SFP (cf. FDP_ACF.1.2) allows the Extended
Inspection System (as of [ICAO-9303] and [PP-MRTD-BAC]) to access the data EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. Nevertheless there is explicitly no rule
for preventing access to these data. More over their data integrity (cf. FDP_UIT.1) and confidentiality
(cf. FDP_UCT.1) is ensured by the BAC mechanism being addressed and covered by [PP-MRTD-BAC].
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The fact that the BAC mechanism is not part of the ST in hand is addressed by the refinement “after
Chip Authentication”.
6.1.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
Application note: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the
management of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization ,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
4. Document Verifier,
5. Domestic Extended Inspection System,
6. Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note: The MRTD also maintains the role Basic Inspection System due to a direct
consequence of P.BAC-PP resp. OE.BAC-PP. Nevertheless this role is not explicitly listed in
FMT_SMR.1.1, above since the TSF cannot maintain the role with respect to the assumed high attack
potential due to the known weaknesses of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Application note: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and
TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities: fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be manipulated,
2. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
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4. software to be reconstructed and
5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities: fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be manipulated,
2. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
4. software to be reconstructed and
5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks.
Application note: The term “software” in item 4 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC
Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
Application note: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data
(FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF
data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization
Data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Application note: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication
reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization
Agent Key.
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FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate and Current
Date
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_INI
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifying Certification
Authority
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_UPD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1/
DATE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System.
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FMT_MTD.1/ KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys to the
Personalisation Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the Chip Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AAK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1/
AAK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the Active Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. Document Basic Access Keys,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Active Authentication Private Key
4. Personalization Agent Keys
to none.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Secure TSF data (FMT_MTD.3)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2):
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data: fulfilled by FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted
for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control.
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Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
(1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the
Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
(2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the
expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the
TOE,
(3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can
be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended
Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated
Extended Inspection System.
Application note: The Terminal Authentication is used for Extended Inspection System as required by
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_UAU.5/MRTD. The Terminal Authorization is used as TSF data for access
control required by FDP_ACF.1.
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6.1.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The
security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the forced
leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements “Failure
with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and
“Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)”
together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation
and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended):
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit electromagnetic and current emissions in excess of
intelligible threshold enabling access to Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip
Authentication Private Key and Active Authentication Key, EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart card
circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip
Authentication Private Key and Active Authentication Key, EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information
leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction
could occurs.
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests Conditions under which self-test should
occur to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
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Conditions under which self-test should occur Description of the self-test
During initial start-up RNG live test, sensor test, FA detection
Periodically RNG monitoring, FA detection
After cryptographic computation FA detection
Before any use or update of TSF data FA detection, Integrity Check of related TSF data
Table 16: FPT_TST refinements
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Application note: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE
can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these
attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response”
means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided
at any time.
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6.1.2 SFR for ES Update
The following SFR are associated to the ES Update feature.
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-DEC Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
ES-UPDATE-
DEC
The TSF shall perform decryption of the additional code prior installation in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CBC] and cryptographic
key sizes [AES-256] that meet the following: [assignment: AES-CBC ISO9797-M2
from [NIST SP800-38A]].
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-VER Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
ES-UPDATE-
VER
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification of the additional code to be
loaded in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CMAC] and
cryptographic key sizes [AES-256] that meet the following: [assignment: [NIST
SP800-38B]].
Application note: FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER already described §6.1.1.2 is used to verify certificate validity
containing additional code.
FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall enforce the ES Update Access Control Policy on the following list
of subjects, objects and operations:
 Subjects: S.ES-Developer is the representative of the Embedded
Software Developer within the TOE, who is responsible for verifying
the signature and decrypting the additional code before authorizing
its loading, installation and activation,
 Objects: additional code and associated cryptographic signature
 Operations: loading, installation and activation of additional code
FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_ACF.1.1/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall enforce the ES Update Access Control Policy to objects based on
the following:
 Security Attributes:
o The additional code cryptographic signature verification
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status
o The Identification Data verification status (between the TOE
and the additional code)
FDP_ACF.1.2/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
 The verification of the additional code cryptographic signature (using
D.ACODE_SGNVER-KEY) by S.ES-Developer is successful.
 The decryption of the additional code prior installation (using D.
ACODE_DEC-KEY) by S.ES-Developer is successful.
 The comparison between the identification data of both the TOE and
the additional code demonstrates that the ES Update operation can be
performed.
 [None]
FDP_ACF.1.3/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [None].
FDP_ACF.1.3/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [None].
FDP_ACF.1.4/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [None].
Application Note:
Identification data verification is necessary to ensure that the received additional code is actually
targeting the TOE and that its version is compatible with the TOE version.
FIA_UID.1/ ES-UPDATE Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. to load the additional code (but not yet verified)
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified
FIA_UID.1.2/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_ATD.1/ User attribute definition
ES-UPDATE
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_ATD.1.1/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall maintain the following list security attributes belonging to individual
users
[assignment: additional code ID for each activated additional code]
Refinement: "Individual users" stands for additional code.
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FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE Security attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall enforce the ES Update Access Control Policy to provide
restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall allow the Embedded Software Developer to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Application Note:
The additional code signature verification status must be set to “Fail” by default, therefore preventing
any additional code from being installed until the additional code signature is actually successfully
verified by the TOE.
FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMR.1.1/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1) Embedded Software Developer,
2) Additional code Agent*,
3) Issuer.
FMT_SMR.1.2/
ES-UPDATE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note: Additional code Agent is a generic entity referring to agent used for post-Issuance
operations on additional code.
FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. activation of additional code.
Application Note:
Once verified and installed, additional code is activated and becomes immediately effective.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FPT_EMS.1/ES-UPDATE TOE Emanation during ES update
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit electromagnetic and current emissions in excess of intelligible
threshold enabling access to D.ACODE and D.ACODE_DEC-KEY and
D.ACODE_SGNVER-KEY.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit
contacts to gain access to D.ACODE and D.ACODE_DEC-KEY and D.ACODE_SGNVER-
KEY.
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1.1/
ES-UPDATE
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
[assignment: interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the
Updated TOE.]
Application Note: The ES Update operation (containing one or several pieces of additional code in the
same certificate) must be either completely or partially successful, or fail securely. The TOE code and
identification data must be updated in an atomic way in order to always be consistent. Each piece (with
its identification data) is processed separately in atomic way, in sequence of transactions. If the
processing is interrupted, the last on-going transaction is rolled back. Therefore, the terminal will be
aware that update has not been performed completely. The request of update is performed again and
TSF restarts the processing with the first not-done piece of additional code. The pieces of additional
code already committed are skipped, and the others will be processed.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2).
FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE TSF testing associated to ES_Update
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests conditions under which self-test should
occur to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
Conditions under which self-test should occur Description of the self-test
During initial start-up Atomicity check of operations on D.ACODE and
D.ACODE-ID as loading or activation
Table 17: FPT_TST refinements
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6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
The SAR for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those
taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by taking the following
components: ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
Application note: The TOE shall protect the assets against high attack potential under the
assumption that the inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the
TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol
(OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD). Otherwise the confidentiality of the standard data shall be protected against
attacker with at least Enhanced-Basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).
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6.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The rationale in this paragraph comes from [PP-MRTD-EAC] §6.3.1. Additions due to Active
Authentication and secure messaging in personalisation are shaded.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Activ_Auth_Proof
FAU_SAS.1 X
FCS.CKM.1/CA X X X X
FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair X X
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SYM X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER X X
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC X X X X
FCS_COP.1/PERSO X X
FCS_COP.1/AA X
FCS_RND.1 X X
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO X X
FIA_UID.1/PERSO X X
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO X X
FIA_UID.1/MRTD X X X
FIA_UAU.1/MRTD X X X
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD X X X
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD X X X
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD X X X
FIA_API.1/CA X
FIA_API.1/AA X
FDP_ACC.1 X X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X X
FDP_UCT.1 X
FDP_UIT.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X
FMT_LIM.1 X
FMT_LIM.2 X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD X
FMT_MTD.1/DATE X
FMT_MTD.1/ KEY_WRITE X
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK X X X
FMT_MTD.1/AAK X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ X X X X X
FMT_MTD.3 X
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OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Activ_Auth_Proof
FPT_EMS.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X
FPT_TST.1 X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
Table 18: Security Functional Requirement rationale for MRTD application
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” addresses
the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined
by the SFR FIA_UID.1/MRTD, FIA_UAU.1/MRTD, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only
the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys according to the
SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for Basic Access Control.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to
SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_UAU.5/MRTD. If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate
itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the
Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of
the challenge), FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip
Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/ CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself
to the TOE by means of the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the
TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and
FCS_COP.1/SYM (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to
FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent
Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMS.1 the confidentially of these keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity
of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing.
The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the
same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent must identify and
authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1/MRTD and FIA_UAU.1/MRTD before accessing these
data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management
functions.
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data
after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed
by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD. The SFR
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1 requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after chip
authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1 (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new
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session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key
cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
In pre-personalisation, the SFR FCS_CKM.1/PERSO and FCS_COP.1/PERSO ensure the authenticity
of data transfers after successful authentication of the pre-personalisation agent according to
FIA_UID.1/PERSO and FIA_UAU.1/PERSO, with the support of FIA_AFL.1/PERSO.
The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” is
enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing the data of
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being
authorized by a validly verifiable certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFR FIA_UID.1/MRTD and FIA_UAU.1/MRTD requires the identification and authentication of the
inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA)
before any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected communication
following the CA the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4/MRTD. The SFR
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and FDP_UCT.1 requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after
chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions
according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1 (for
the generation of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session
keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or
read afterwards.
In pre-personalisation, the SFR FCS_CKM.1/PERSO and FCS_COP.1/PERSO ensure the
confidentiality of data transfers after successful authentication of the pre-personalisation agent
according to FIA_UID.1/PERSO and FIA_UAU.1/PERSO, with the support of FIA_AFL.1/PERSO.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and certificate
as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address the
storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory.
This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows
the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use”
violates the security objective OT.Identification.
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is ensured by the Chip
Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1 proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication
Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1 is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as
required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [26]
requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the session keys),
FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by
the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other
features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the TOE to
protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the travel document’s chip against disclosure
- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines
which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1,
and/or
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- by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is covered by
the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfuntion “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR
FPT_TST.1 which requires self-tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users
to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure
state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
The security objective OT.Activ_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity through AA” is covered
by FIA_API.1/AA that proves the identity of the TOE. FCS_COP.1/AA provides the signature.
FMT_MTD.1/AAK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ participate to confidentiality of AA private key.
The following table is dedicated to Security Functional Requirement rationale for ES update.
O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE
O.SECURE_ACTIVATION_ACODE
O.TOE_IDENTIFICATION
O.CONFID-LOAD_ACODE
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-DEC X
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-VER X
FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE X X X X
FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE X X X X
FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE X X X X
FIA_ATD.1/ES-UPDATE X
FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE X X X X
FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE X X X X
FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE X
FPT_EMS.1/ES-UPDATE X X
FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE X X X X
FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE X X X X
Table 19: Security Functional Requirement rationale for ES update
O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE This security objective specifies that the TOE shall check the authenticity
and the integrity of the additional code to be loaded. This is covered by FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE,
FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE, FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE, FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE, FMT_SMR.1/ES-
UPDATE, FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-VER, FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE and FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE that
define the different access control policies for the authenticity and the integrity. It is also covered by
FPT_EMS.1/ES-UPDATE avoiding disclosure of keys required for access control.
O.SECURE_AC_ACTIVATION This security objective specifies that the activation of the additional code
and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an atomic way. This is
covered by FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE, FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE, FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE,
FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE, FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE, FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE, FPT_TST.1/ES-
UPDATE and FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE that define the different access control policies.
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O.TOE_IDENTIFICATION This security objective specifies the identifications of both the Initial TOE and
additional code. This is covered by FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE, FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE,
FIA_ATD.1/ES-UPDATE, FIA_ATD.1/ES-UPDATE, FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE, FMT_SMR.1/ES-
UPDATE, FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE and FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE.
O.CONFID-ES-UPDATE.LOAD This security objective specifies that the TOE shall decrypt the
additional code prior installation. This is covered by FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE, FDP_ACF.1/ES-
UPDATE, FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE, FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE, FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE,
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-DEC, FPT_EMS.1/ES-UPDATE, FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE and
FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE to cover this confidentiality objective.
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6.3.2 Dependency Rationale
The rationale in this paragraph comes from [PP-MRTD-EAC] §6.3.2. Additions due to Active
Authentication are shaded.
SFR Dependencies Support of the dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/CA [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
Not fulfilled, see note 1
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PERSO,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO
FCS_COP.1/SHA [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SYM [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PERSO [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair
Not fulfilled: see note 1
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1/PERSO
FIA_UID.1/PERSO No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1/PERSO
FIA_UID.1/MRTD No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1/MRTD FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD No dependencies
FIA_API.1/CA No dependencies
FIA_API.1/AA No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1,
Not fulfilled: see note 3
FDP_UCT.1 [FTP_ITC.1, or FTP_TRP.1],
[FDP_IFC.1 or FDP_ACC.1]
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
FDP_ACC.1
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SFR Dependencies Support of the dependencies
FDP_UIT.1
[FTP_ITC.1, or FTP_TRP.1],
[FDP_IFC.1 or FDP_ACC.1]
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/DATE FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/ KEY_WRITE FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AAK FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.3 FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies
Table 20: Security Functional Requirement dependencies for MRTD application
Notes:
No. 1: The dependency between FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_CKM.4 is not fulfilled because the key is
permanently stored on the card.
No. 2: The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key material.
Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary
No. 3: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes having been defined
during the personalisation and fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these
security attributes (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
No. 4: The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the MRTD
and the GIS. There is no need for the SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE
does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable
here.
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The following table expresses the dependencies of SFR for ES update feature.
SFR Dependencies Support of the dependencies
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-
DEC
[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
Note 1: justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-
VER
[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
Note 2: justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE
FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE No dependencies
FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE No dependencies
FIA_ATD.1/ES-UPDATE FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE
FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
Note 3: justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE
FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE
FPT_EMS.1/ES-UPDATE No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE No dependencies
FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE No dependencies
Table 21: Security Functional Requirement dependencies for ES Update
Note 1: FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 concerns import of user data and there is no user data (only TSF
code) imported by such operation. There is no key generation FCS_CKM.1 or deletion FCS_CKM.4 for
ES update. Keys are imported in Pre-Personalisation and are never erased.
Note 2: idem to note 1.
Note 3: FMT_MSA.1 is not necessary here as there is no management of these security attributes.
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL5 was chosen because it provides a high level of independently assured security in a planned
development. It requires a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs
attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s
development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s material.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by vulnerability
analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high
attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfil the security objectives
OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
For these additional assurance components, all dependencies are met or exceeded in the EAL5
assurance package:
Component Dependencies required by
CC Part 3 or ASE_ECD
Dependency fulfilled by
TOE security assurance requirements (only additional to EAL5)
ALC_DVS.2 no dependencies -
AVA_VAN.5 ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4 ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.1 ATE_DPT.3
Table 22: SAR Dependencies
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6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual support and internal consistency
Cf [PP-MRTD-EAC] §6.3.4
6.3.5 Compatibility between SFR of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC]
The following table lists the SFRs that are declared on the [ST-IC] Integrated Circuit Security Target
[ST-IC] and separates them in:
IP_SFR: Irrelevant Platform-SFRs not being used by the Composite-ST.
RP_SFR-SERV: Relevant Platform-SFRs being used by the Composite-ST to implement a
security service with associated TSFI.
MRP_SFR-MECH: Relevant Platform-SFRs being used by the Composite-ST because of its
security properties providing protection against attacks to the TOE as a whole and are
addressed in ADV_ARC. These required security properties are a result of the security
mechanisms and services that are implemented in the Platform TOE, as specified in [JIL_CPE].
These definitions are according to the [JIL_CPE] on which the Platform TOE on our case is the relaying
IC, the [ST-IC] Integrated Circuit.
The first column lists the [ST-IC] and the next columns indicate their classification according to the
paragraph above. The SFR’s on the cells of the classification belong the TOE described in this
document. If there is no SFR on each cell is because not all CC class families have a corresponding
match on both sides, but all SFRs from the [ST-IC] have been classified. Moreover, no contradictions
have been found between the Platform-SFRs set and the SFRs related to the composite product
IC
SFR's
IP_SFR (I) RP_SFR-SERV (S) RP_SFR-MECH (M)
FAU_SAS.1
X
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2
X
FCS_RND.1
FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair
FCS.CKM.1/PERSO
FCS.CKM.1/CA
FDP_ACC.1/Loader X
FDP_ACC.1/Memory
X
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1/Loader X
FDP_ACF.1/Memory
X
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_IFC.1
X
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ITT.1
X
FPT_EMS.1
FDP_SDC.1
X
FDP_ACF.1
X
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_EMS.1
FDP_SDI.2
X
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_UCT.1 X
FDP_UIT.1 X
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IC
SFR's
IP_SFR (I) RP_SFR-SERV (S) RP_SFR-MECH (M)
FIA_API.1 X
FMT_LIM.1
X
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.1/Loader X
FMT_LIM.2
X
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2/Loader X
FMT_MSA.1
X
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3
X
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1
X
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE
FPT_FLS.1
X
FPT_FLS.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-DEC
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-VER
FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE
FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE
FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE
FPT_ITT.1
X
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_PHP.3
X
FPT_PHP.3
FRU_FLT.2
X
FPT_FLS.1
FTP_ITC.1 X
Table 23: Compatibility between SFR of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC]
FAU_SAS.1 of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FAU_SAS.1 of [ST-IC].
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair, FCS_CKM.1/PERSO and FCS_RND.1 are supported by
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2 of [ST-IC].
FPT_EMS.1 of [ST_BAC_EAC] are supported by FDP_SDC.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_ITT.1 of [ST-IC].
FPT_PHP.3 of [ST_BAC_EAC] are supported by FPT_PHP.3, FDP_SDC.1 and FPT_ITT.1 of [ST-IC].
FPT_FLS.1 of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FPT_FLS.1 and FRU_FLT.2 of [ST-IC].
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 of [ST_BAC_EAC] are supported by FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 of [ST-IC].
FDP_ACC.1 of [ST_BAC_EAC] are supported by FDP_ACC.1/Memory
FDP_ACF.1 of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FDP_ACF.1/Memory, FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_SDC.1 of
[ST-IC].
FMT_SMF.1 of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3 of [ST-IC].
FDP_UIT.1 of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FDP_SDI.2 of [ST-IC].
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1 of [ST_BAC_EAC] are supported by FPT_FLS.1 of [ST-IC].
FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1/MRTD, FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD, FIA_UAU.6/MRTD,
FIA_API.1, FDP_UCT.1, FMT_SMR.1, all FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MTD.3, FPT_TST.1 are specific to
[ST_BAC_EAC] and they do not conflict with [ST-IC].
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FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-DEC of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FPT_FLS.1 of [ST-IC].
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-VER of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FPT_FLS.1 of [ST-IC].
FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FPT_FLS.1 of [ST-IC].
FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FPT_FLS.1 of [ST-IC].
FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FMT_SMF.1 of [ST-IC].
FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FPT_FLS.1 of [ST-IC].
FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE of [ST_BAC_EAC] is supported by FPT_FLS.1 of [ST-IC].
FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE, FIA_ATD.1/ES-UPDATE, FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE, FPT_EMS.1/ES-
UPDATE, FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE are specific to [ST_BAC_EAC] and they do not conflict with [ST-
IC].
We can therefore conclude that the SFR of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] are consistent.
6.3.6 Compatibility between SAR of [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC]
The assurance level for [ST_BAC_EAC] is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 when
the assurance level for the Integrated Circuit Security Target [ST-IC] is EAL6 augmented with
ASE_TSS.2.
Therefore SAR for [ST_BAC_EAC] and [ST-IC] are compatible as all components of [ST_BAC_EAC]
are covered by equivalent or higher in [ST-IC].
We can therefore conclude that the SAR of [ST_PACE_EAC] and [ST-IC] are consistent.
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7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
TOE security functions are provided by the eTravel Essential 1.2 software and by the chip.
7.1.1 TSFs provided by the Etravel Essential 1.2 Software for MRTD Application
SF Description
SF.REL Protection of data
SF.AC Access control
SF.SYM_AUTH Symmetric authentication
SF.SM Secure messaging
SF.CA Chip Authentication
SF.TA_CER Validity of the Certificate Chain
SF.TA_AUT Terminal Authentication Mechanism
SF.AA Active Authentication
SF.KEYGEN Key Generation
Table 24: Security Functions for MRTD Application provided by eTravel Essential 1.2 Software
The SF.REL function provides the protection of data on the TOE. It encompasses:
 physical protection of the TOE as defined in FPT_PHP.3, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1,
 the test mechanisms as defined in FPT_TST.1,
 protection against misuse of tests as defined in FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2,
The SF.AC function provides the access control of the TOE. It encompasses:
 the access control by the terminal as defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1,
 the access control to specific data as defined in FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,FMT_MTD.1/CAPK; FMT_MTD.1/AAK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
 the role management as defined in FMT_SMR.1 ,
 the management functions linked to the different states of the TOE as defined in FMT_SMF.1.
The SF.SYM_AUTH function provides the symmetric authentication functions to the TOE. It
encompasses:
 the identification and authentication as defined in FIA_UID.1/MRTD, FIA_UAU.1/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD,
 the identification and authentication in personalisation phase as defined in FIA_AFL.1/PERSO,
FIA_UID.1/PERSO, and FIA_UAU.1/PERSO,
The role authentication as requested by FMT_SMR.1
The SF.SM function provides the secure messaging of the TOE. It encompasses:
 the secure transfer of data through SM as defined in FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1,
 the cryptographic mechanisms used for the authentication and the SM, as defined in
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_CKM.1/PERSO, FCS_COP.1/PERSO, and FCS_RND.1. Some
cryptographic mechanisms are used for both authentication and secure messaging. For
convenience, they are grouped in this function.
 the erasure of session keys as defined in FCS_CKM.4.
The SF.CA function provides the chip Authentication. It encompasses:
 the CA authentication as defined in FIA_API.1/CA, FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
 the CA cryptographic algorithm as defined in FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SHA, and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
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 the generation and input of CA keys, as defined in FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair and
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
 The role authentication as requested by FMT_SMR.1 .
The SF.TA_CER function provides the validity of the Certificate Chain. It encompasses:
 the initialisation and update of data used for the validation, as defined in
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, and FMT_MTD.3.
The SF.TA_AUT function provides the TA Mechanism. It encompasses:
 the cryptographic mechanisms used for the authentication, as defined in FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
and FCS_COP.1/SHA,
 The role authentication as requested by FMT_SMR.1 .
The SF.AA function provides the active authentication. It encompasses:
 the AA protocol itself as defined in FIA_API.1/AA,
 the AA cryptographic algorithm as defined in FCS_COP.1/AA,
 the generation and input of AA keys, as defined in FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair and FMT_MTD.1/AAK.
The SF.KEYGEN function provides the key generation of the TOE. It encompasses:
 the key generation as defined in FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair using random generation FCS_RND.1.
It is also linked to FCS_CKM.4 erasing private key from volatile memory.
7.1.2 TSFs provided by the Etravel Essential 1.2 Software for ES Update
SF Description
SF.ES_LOAD Loading and verification of Additional Code
SF.ES_ACTIVATE Activation of Additional Code
SF.ES_ATOMIC Atomic ES Update transactions
Table 25: Security Functions for ES Update
The SF.ES_LOAD function performs the loading, deciphering and verification of authenticity of
Additional code and compatibility with TOE version.
It encompasses: protection of the TOE as defined in
 FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-DEC deciphering code,
 FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-VER verifying the authenticity of code,
 FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE, FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE authorizing code loading,
 FIA_UID.1.1/ ES-UPDATE identifying user for code loading,
 FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE managing role for code loading,
 FPT_EMS.1/ES-UPDATE managing confidentiality of keys for code loading,
 FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE managing error for code loading.
The SF.ES_ACTIVATE function performs the activation and identification of Additional code is an atomic
operation. It encompasses: protection of the TOE as defined in
 FIA_ATD.1/ES-UPDATE maintain the security attributes for code activation,
 FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE managing values for security attributes for code activation,
 FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE managing feature for code activation,
 FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE managing role for code activation,
 FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE managing error for code activation.
The SF.ES_ATOMIC function performs the single ES Update operation, consisting of the code changes
and the identification update, in atomic manner. Either the complete operation is fully performed, or not
performed at all. It allows to remain in a secure state even in case of interruption. It encompasses:
protection of the TOE as defined in
 FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE managing feature for code update atomicity,
 FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE, FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE authorizing code update atomicity,
 FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE managing error for code rollback,
 FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE managing check of atomicity of operation.
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7.1.3 TSFs provided by the IC
The evaluation is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC evaluation provided by [CR-
IC]. The IC and its primary embedded software have been evaluated at level EAL 6+.
SF Description
SF_PMODE Product Mode
SF_AUDIT_STORAGE Audit storage
SF_AUTHENT Authentication
SF_CONF_INT Confidentiality and integrity
SF_EXEC Correct Execution
SF_MEM_ACCESS Memory Access Control
SF_PHY_PRO Physical Protection
SF_ALARM Alarm Management
SF_RANDOM Randomization
SF_RNG Random Number Generator
SF_SEC_LOAD Secure Loading
Table 26: Security Functions provided by the PEGASUS_CB_05 chip
These SF are described in [ST-IC].
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8. RATIONALES
8.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE
8.1.1 TOE security functions rationale
SF.REL
SF.AC
SF.SYM_AUT
SF.SM
SF.CA
SF.TA_CER
SF.TA_AUT
SF.AA
SF.KEYGEN
SF_PMODE
SF_AUDIT_STORAGE
SF_AUTHENT
SF_CONF_INT
SF_EXEC
SF_MEM_ACCESS
SF_PHY_PRO
SF_ALARM
SF_RANDOM
SF_RNG
SF_SEC_LOAD
FAU_SAS.1 X X X
FCS_CKM.1/CA X X X
FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair X X X X X
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO X X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA X X X
FCS_COP.1/SYM X X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER X X
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC X X
FCS_COP.1/PERSO X X
FCS_COP.1/AA X X
FCS_RND.1 X X X
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO X
FIA_UID.1/PERSO X
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO X
FIA_UID.1/MRTD X
FIA_UAU.1/MRTD X
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD X
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD X
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD X
FIA_API.1/CA X
FIA_API.1/AA X
FDP_ACC.1 X X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X X
FDP_UCT.1 X
FDP_UIT.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X X X X
FMT_LIM.1 X X
FMT_LIM.2 X X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA X X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS X X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI X X X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD X X X
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SF.REL
SF.AC
SF.SYM_AUT
SF.SM
SF.CA
SF.TA_CER
SF.TA_AUT
SF.AA
SF.KEYGEN
SF_PMODE
SF_AUDIT_STORAGE
SF_AUTHENT
SF_CONF_INT
SF_EXEC
SF_MEM_ACCESS
SF_PHY_PRO
SF_ALARM
SF_RANDOM
SF_RNG
SF_SEC_LOAD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE X X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE X X
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK X X X
FMT_MTD.1/AAK X X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ X X
FMT_MTD.3 X
FPT_EMS.1 X X X
FPT_TST.1 X X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X X X X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X X
Table 27: Rationale table of SFR and security functions of MRTD application
The security functional requirement FAU_SAS.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security functions SF.AC “Access
Control” and IC security function SF_PMODE “Product mode” which provide initialization data
accessible for reading and writing action for initialisation and to the pre-personaliser and the
personaliser. IC security function SF_AUDIT_STORAGE “Audit Storage” allows to store specific data in
NVM as the unique identification of the product.
The security functional requirement FCS_CKM.1/CA is fulfilled by TOE security function SF.CA “Chip
Authentication” which enforces CA SM cryptographic mechanisms. It is also enforced by the IC security
function SF_RNG “Random Number Generator “generating random and SF_EXEC “Correct Execution”
which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair is fulfilled by TOE security functions
SF.KEYGEN which enforce key pair generation and SF.CA “Chip Authentication” which enforces CA
SM cryptographic mechanisms and SF.AA “Active Authentication” which enforces AA mechanisms. It is
also enforced by the IC security function SF_RNG “Random Number Generator “generating random
and SF_EXEC “Correct Execution” which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FCS_CKM.1/PERSO is fulfilled by TOE security function SF.SM
“Secure Messaging” which enforces PERSO SM cryptographic mechanisms. It is also enforced by the
IC security function SF_RNG “Random Number Generator “generating random and SF_EXEC “Correct
Execution” which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FCS_CKM.4 is fulfilled by TOE security functions SF.KEYGEN
erasing private key from volatile memory at end of generation and SF.SM “Secure Messaging” which
enforces the erasure of session keys. It is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct
Execution” which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/SHA is fulfilled by the TOE security functions SF_CA
“Chip Authentication” and SF.TA_AUT “Asymmetric Authentication Mechanism”. It is also enforced by
the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution” which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirements FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/PERSO, and FCS_RND.1 are
fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.SM “Secure Messaging” which enforces BAC SM cryptographic
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mechanisms. It is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution” which
provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FCS_RND.1 is also enforced by the IC security function SF_RNG
“Random Number Generator” which provides random number. It is used by SF.KEYGEN.
The security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER is fulfilled by TOE security function
SF.TA_AUT “Terminal Authentication” which enforces Terminal Authentication mechanisms. It is also
enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution” which provides control on IC
execution.
The security functional requirements and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC are fulfilled by TOE security function
SF.CA “Chip Authentication” which enforces CA SM cryptographic mechanisms. It is also enforced by
the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution” which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/AA is fulfilled by TOE security function SF.AA “Active
Authentication” which enforces AA mechanisms. It is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC
“Correct Execution” which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirements FIA_AFL.1/PERSO, FIA_UID.1/PERSO, FIA_UAU.1/PERSO,
FIA_UID.1/MRTD, FIA_UAU.1/MRTD, FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD are fulfilled by the TOE
security function SF.SYM_AUTH “Symmetric authentication” which manages symmetric authentication
functions.
The security functional requirements FIA_API.1/CA and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD is fulfilled by TOE security
function SF.CA “Chip Authentication” which enforces CA mechanism.
The security functional requirement FIA_API.1/AA is fulfilled by TOE security function SF.AA “Active
Authentication” which enforces AA mechanisms.
The security functional requirements FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 are fulfilled by TOE security function
SF.AC “Access Control” and IC security function SF_PMODE “Product mode” and SF_MEM_ACCESS
“Memory Access Control” which provide initialization data accessible for reading and writing action for
initialisation.
The security functional requirements FDP_UCT.1 and
FDP_UIT.1 are fulfilled by TOE security function SF.SM “Secure Messaging” which ensures the
confidentiality and integrity of data transfers.
The security functional requirement FMT_SMF.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.AC “Access
Control” and IC security function SF_MEM_ACCESS “Memory Access Control“ which ensures the
management functions in the different life cycle status and access to TSF data.
The security functional requirement FMT_SMR.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.AC “Access
Control” which maintains the different roles according to the life cycle status. It is also fulfilled by
SF.SYM_AUTH “Symmetric authentication”, SF.CA “Chip Authentication”, and SF.TA_AUT “Terminal
Authentication Mechanism” which authenticate roles.
The security functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 are fulfilled by TOE security function
SF.REL ”Reliability and IC security function SF_PMODE “Product mode” which limit the capabilities and
availability of the TSF after TOE delivery.
The security functional requirements FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/KET_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ are fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.AC
“Access Control” which manages the access control and IC security function SF_MEM_ACCESS
“Memory Access Control“ managing access to access to TSF data.
The security functional requirements FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
FMT_MTD.1/DATE are fulfilled by the TOE security functions SF.AC “Access Control” which
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manages the access control and IC security function SF_MEM_ACCESS “Memory Access Control“
managing access to access to TSF data and SF.TA_CER “Validity of the Certificate Chain” which
initialises and updates data used for the validation.
The security functional requirement FMT_MTD.1/AAK is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.AC
“Access Control” which manages the access control and IC security function SF_MEM_ACCESS
“Memory Access Control“ managing access to access to TSF data and SF.CA “Chip Authentication”
which enforces CA mechanisms.
The security functional requirement FMT_MTD.1/AAK is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.AC
“Access Control” which manages the access control and IC security function SF_MEM_ACCESS
“Memory Access Control“ managing access to access to TSF data and SF.AA “Active Authentication”
which enforces AA mechanisms.
The security functional requirement FMT_MTD.1/AAK is fulfilled by the TOE security function
SF.TA_CER “Validity of the Certificate Chain” which initialises and updates data used for the validation
of the certificate.
The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.REL
”Reliability” and IC security function SF_CONF_INT “Confidentiality and integrity “ and SF_RANDOM
“Randomization” which implement measures to limit information contained in electromagnetic and
current emissions.
The security functional requirement FPT_TST.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.REL
”Reliability” and IC security function SF_PHY_PRO “Physical Protection”, SF_EXEC “Correct Execution”
which implement tests to protect the TOE.
The security functional requirement FPT_FLS.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.REL
“Reliability” and the IC security functions SF_PHY_PRO “Physical Protection”, SF_EXEC “Correct
Execution”, SF_ALARM “Alarm Management” and SF_CONF_INT “Confidentiality and integrity “ and
SF_MEM_ACCESS “Memory Access Control”, which preserve secure states.
The security functional requirement FPT_PHP.3 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.REL
“Reliability” and the IC security functions SF_PHY_PRO “Physical Protection” and SF_CONF_INT
“Confidentiality and Integrity” which protect the TOE against physical attacks.
The IC security functions SF_AUTHENT and SF_SEC_LOAD are not directly used.
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The next table is dedicated to rationale of SFR with security functions of ES Update.
SF.ES_LOAD
SF.ES_ACTIVATE
SF.ES_ATOMIC
SF_PMODE
SF_AUDIT_STORAGE
SF_AUTHENT
SF_CONF_INT
SF_EXEC
SF_MEM_ACCESS
SF_PHY_PRO
SF_ALARM
SF_RANDOM
SF_RNG
SF_SEC_LOAD
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-DEC X X
FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-VER X X
FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE X X X X X
FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE X X X X X
FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE X X
FIA_ATD.1/ES-UPDATE X X
FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE X X
FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE X X X
FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE X X X
FPT_EMS.1/ES-UPDATE X X X
FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE X X X X
FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE X X
Table 28: Rationale table of SFR and security functions of ES Update
The security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-DEC is fulfilled by the TOE security
functions SF.ES_LOAD and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution”
which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/ES-UPDATE-VER is fulfilled by the TOE security
functions SF.ES_LOAD and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution”
which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FDP_ACC.1/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_LOAD, SF.ES_ATOMIC and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct
Execution” which provides control on IC execution and SF_PMODE and SF_MEM_ACCESS
contributing to memory access control.
The security functional requirement FDP_ACF.1/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_LOAD, SF.ES_ATOMIC and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct
Execution” which provides control on IC execution and SF_PMODE and SF_MEM_ACCESS
contributing to memory access control.
The security functional requirement FIA_UID.1/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_LOAD and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution” which
provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FIA_ATD.1/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_ACTIVATE and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution”
which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FMT_MSA.3/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_ACTIVATE and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution”
which provides control on IC execution.
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The security functional requirement FMT_SMF.1/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_ACTIVATE, SF.ES_ATOMIC and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC
“Correct Execution” which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FMT_SMR.1/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_LOAD, SF.ES_ACTIVATE and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct
Execution” which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_LOAD and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_CONF_INT “Confidentiality and
integrity “ and SF_RANDOM “Randomization” which implement measures to limit information contained
in electromagnetic and current emissions.
The security functional requirement FPT_FLS.1/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_LOAD and SF.ES_ACTIVATE and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC
“Correct Execution” which provides control on IC execution.
The security functional requirement FPT_TST.1/ES-UPDATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.ES_ROLLBACK and it is also enforced by the IC security function SF_EXEC “Correct Execution”
which provides control on IC execution
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9. GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
Glossary
Term Definition
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [PKI] option by which means the MTRD’s chip
proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the
MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of
organization.
Agreement This term is used in the current PP in order to reflect an appropriate relationship
between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Application note Optional informative part of the ST containing sensitive supporting information
that is considered relevant or useful for the evaluation or use of the TOE.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document’s chip to store
the Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm that the travel document itself and the data elements stored in
were issued by the travel document Issuer
Basic Access Control
(BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [PKI] by which means the travel document’s chip
proves and the basic inspection system (with BAC) protects their communication
by means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access Keys (see there)
based on MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data stored on
travel document’s chip according to LDS.
Basic Inspection System
with Basic Access
Control protocol (BIS-
BAC)
A technical system being used by an official organisation1 and operated by a
governmental organisation and verifying correspondence between the stored
and printed MRZ.
BIS-BAC implements the terminal’s part of the Basic Access Control protocol
and authenticates itself to the travel document using the Document Basic Access
Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the less-sensitive data (travel
document details data and biographical data) stored on the travel document.
See also par. 1.2.5; also [PKI].
Basic Inspection System
with PACE protocol
(BIS-PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority2 and verifying the travel
document presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing
the real biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored
biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder).
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and
authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE
password) and supports Passive Authentication. A technical system being used
by an inspecting authority and verifying the ePass presenter as the ePass holder
(for ePassport: by comparing the real biometrical data (face) of the ePass
presenter with the stored biometrical data (DG2) of the ePass holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PCT additionally
supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalised details of the travel document holder appearing as text in the
visual and machine readable zones of and electronically stored in the travel
document. The biographical data are less-sensitive data.
Biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder in the
travel document as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data
(e.g. finger and iris).
Card Access Number
(CAN)
A short password that is printed or displayed on the document. The CAN is a
non-blocking password. The CAN may be static (printed on the Passport), semi-
static (e.g. printed on a label on the Passport) or dynamic (randomly chosen by
the electronic travel document and displayed by it using e.g. ePaper, OLED or
similar technologies), see [ICAO-TR-SAC]
1
an inspecting authority; concretely, by a control officer
2
concretely, by a control officer
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Term Definition
Counterfeit An unauthorised copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means [PKI].
Country Signing CertA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by Country Signing Certification Authority and stored in the rightful
terminals.
Country Signing
Certification Authority
(CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the ePass Issuer with respect to
confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the ePass. The CSCA
represents the country specific root of the PKI for the ePasss and creates the
Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be
distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [PKI], 5.5.1.
Document Basic Access
Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with
encryption (key KBENC) and message authentication (key KBMAC) of data
transmitted between the TOE and an inspection system using BAC [PKI]. They
are derived from the MRZ and used within BAC to authenticate an entity able to
read the printed MRZ of the passport book; see [PKI].
Document Details Data Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document representing the
document details like document type, issuing state, document number, date of
issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The document details data are less-
sensitive data.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC 3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS).
Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups: A hash for each Data Group
in use shall be stored in the Security Data. It is stored in the ePassport
application (EF.SOD) of the travel document. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS); see [PKI], sec. A.10.4.
Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document
Security Object stored on the ePass for passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document
Signer Certificate (CDS)(CDS), see [PKI]. This role is usually delegated to a
Personalisation Agent.
Eavesdropper A threat agent reading the communication between the travel document and the
terminal to gain the data on the travel document.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that
person's identity; see [PKI].
ePassport application A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl.
biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this
application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a machine
readable travel document (MRTD). See [ICAO-TR-SAC].
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the
biographical data or portrait; see [PKI].
Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilise that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardised
specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in
all travel documents; see [PKI].
IC Dedicated Software Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC manufacturer.
Such software might support special functionality of the IC hardware and be
used, amongst other, for implementing delivery procedures between different
players. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to
certain life cycle phases.
IC Embedded Software Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer. The
IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life cycle phase and embedded
into the IC in the manufacturing life cycle phase of the TOE.
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Term Definition
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent
himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s
document; see [PKI].
Improperly documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document
or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa; (c)
someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if
required; see [PKI].
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the travel document manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer. These data are, for
instance, used for traceability and for IC identification as travel document
material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of an official organisation (inspection authority) examining an travel
document presented to it by an travel document presenter and verifying its
authenticity as the travel document holder. See also [PKI].
Inspection system see BIS-PACE for this PP.
see also BIS-BAC for general information
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements stored upon have
not been altered from that created by the travel document Issuer.
Issuing Organisation Organisation authorised to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organisation, issuer of the Laissez-passer); see [PKI].
Issuing State The country issuing the travel document; see [PKI].
Logical Data Structure
(LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology [PKI]. The capacity expansion technology used is the
travel document’s chip.
Machine readable zone
(MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document or MRP Data
Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel document, containing
mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods; see
[PKI].
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from the
machine readable zone and may be used for both PACE and BAC.
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint
or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read
and verified by machine; see [PKI].
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel
document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The
Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life-cycle
phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and
travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
OTP One Time Programming. It is applied to non-volatile memory you program once
and it cannot be change.
PACE password A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
PACE Terminal (PCT) A technical system verifying correspondence between the password stored in
the travel document and the related value presented to the terminal by the travel
document presenter.
PCT implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself
to the ePass using a shared password (CAN or MRZ).
Passive authentication Security mechanism implementing (i) verification of the digital signature of the
Card/Chip or Document Security Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of
the read data fields with the hash values contained in the Card/Chip or Document
Security Object. See [PKI].
Passport (physical and
electronic)
An optically and electronically readable document in form of a paper/plastic
cover and an integrated smart card. The Passport is used in order to verify that
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Term Definition
identity claimed by the Passport presenter is commensurate with the identity of
the Passport holder stored on/in the card.
Password Authenticated
Connection
Establishment (PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO-TR-SAC]. The PACE
Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
providing implicit password-based authentication of the communication partners
(e.g. smart card and the terminal connected): i.e. PACE provides a verification,
whether the communication partners share the same value of a password π).
Based on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure communication,
whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data transferred within this
communication channel are maintained.
Personalisation The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document.
Personalisation Agent An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the
travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following
activities:
(i)establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data
in the travel document,
(ii)enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
(iii)writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic
personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [PKI],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [PKI] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among
several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document
Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this role.
Personalisation Data A set of data incl. (i) individual-related data (biographic and biometric data,) of
the travel document holder, (ii) dedicated document details data and (iii)
dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Card/Chip Security Object, if installed, and
the Document Security Object). Personalisation data are gathered and then
written into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in
the life cycle phase card issuing.
Pre-personalisation
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
Manufacturer for traceability of the non-personalised travel document and/or to
secure shipment within or between the life cycle phases manufacturing and card
issuing.
Pre-personalised travel
document’s chip
travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique
Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State The Country to which the travel document holder is applying for entry; see [PKI].
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication
attempt.
RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according to
ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443]
Rightful equipment
(rightful terminal or
rightful Card)
A technical device being expected and possessing a valid, certified key pair for
its authentication, whereby the validity of the related certificate is verifiable up to
the respective root CertA. A rightful terminal can be either BIS-PACE (see
Inspection System).
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document
by whatever means; see [PKI].
Secure messaging in
combined mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
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Term Definition
Skimming Imitation of a rightful terminal to read the travel document or parts of it via the
contactless/contact communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of
the printed MRZ and CAN dataPACE password.
Standard Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and a
terminal as required by [ICAO-TR-SAC], namely (i) PACE and (ii) Passive
Authentication with SOD. SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-
BAC.
Supplemental Access
Control
A Technical Report which specifies PACE v2 as an access control mechanism
that is supplemental to Basic Access Control.
Terminal A Terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through a
contactless / contact interface.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel
document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document holder)
recognising the travel document
Travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the holder
for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and
which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory
data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements
capable of being machine read; see [PKI] (there “Machine readable travel
document”).
Travel document
(electronic)
The contactless/contact smart card integrated into the plastic or paper, optical
readable cover and providing the following application: ePassport.
Travel document holder A person for whom the ePass Issuer has personalised the travel document.
Travel document Issuer
(issuing authority)
Organisation authorised to issue an electronic Passport to the travel document
holder
Travel document
presenter
A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity
of the travel document holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC
part 1 [CC-1]).
Unpersonalised travel
document
travel document material prepared to produce a personalised travel document
containing an initialised and pre-personalised travel document’s chip.
User Data All data (being not authentication data)
(i)stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel document as
defined in [PKI]and
(ii)being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as
Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO-TR-SAC]).
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF
(CC part 1 [CC-1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated
upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no
special meaning (CC part 2 [CC-2]).
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to
the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference
data known for the claimed identity.
Public Security Target eTravel Essential 1.2 – BAC, EAC and AA activated
ST Applicable on: 26/03/2021 Ref: D1521485 Rev: 1.1p Page : 101 / 101
Acronyms
Acronym Term
AA Active Authentication
BAC Basic Access Control
BIS-BAC Basic Inspection System with BAC (equivalent to Basic Inspection System as used in [9])
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
CertA Certification Authority
MRZ Machine readable zone
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organisational security policy
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PP Protection Profile
RF Radio Frequency
SAC Supplemental Access Control
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure, see [ICAO-TR-SAC]
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functionality
TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)
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