Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
for
MICARDO Tachograph
Version 1.0 R1.0
from
Sagem Orga GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
Smart Card mit Tachograph Application
MICARDO Tachograph
Version 1.0 R1.0
from
Sagem Orga GmbH
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target according to Appendix 10 of Annex
1(B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3821/85 amended by Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1360/2002 and last amended by CR (EC) No.
432/2004 on recording equipment in road transport;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4 augmented by
ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VLA.4;
equivalent to ITSEC E3 high as required by Appendix 10
of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 06. September 2006
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.2
and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the
provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these
assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0 was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by
BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is:
Sagem Orga GmbH
Am Hoppenhof 33
33104 Paderborn
Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 06. September 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-26 and D1 to D-6.
The product MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0 has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Sagem Orga GmbH
Am Hoppenhof 33
33104 Paderborn
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 13
3 Security Policy 15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 15
5 Architectural Information 16
6 Documentation 17
7 IT Product Testing 17
8 Evaluated Configuration 18
9 Results of the Evaluation 19
10 Comments/Recommendations 21
11 Annexes 21
12 Security Target 22
13 Definitions 22
14 Bibliography 24
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] and [7] is
the smart card product “MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0”.
The TOE will be employed within the Tachograph System as a security medium
which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use with the
recording equipment. A Tachograph Card allows for identification of the identity
(or identity group) of the cardholder by the recording equipment and allows for
data transfer and storage. A Tachograph Card may be of the type Driver Card,
Control Card, Workshop Card or Company Card.
The TOE comprises the following components:
• Integrated Circuit (IC) "Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card
Controller with Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software"
provided by Philips Semiconductors GmbH,
• Smartcard Embedded Software (based on a native implementation) with a
specific Tachograph Application provided by Sagem Orga GmbH.
The basic functions of the Tachograph Card are:
• to store card identification and card holder identification data. These data
are used by the vehicle unit to identify the cardholder, provide accordingly
functions and data access rights, and ensure cardholder accountability for
his activities,
• to store cardholder activities data, events and faults data and control
activities data, related to the cardholder.
The Tachograph Application consists of a configurable software part for the
Tachograph Card´s file system. The configuration of the Tachograph Card
concerns the following points:
• Choice of the card type: A complete Driver Card, Control Card, Workshop
Card or Company Card with complete file system as defined in the
Tachograph Card Specification /TachAn1B/, main body, Appendix 2, chap. 4
is produced. Alternatively, a General Tachograph Card set up for the
different types Driver Card, Control Card, Workshop Card and Company
Card is generated. In this case, after initialisation resp. prior to the
personalisation of the card, one of the four prepared card types as desired
by the customer has to be created up by using a specific card command.
• Choice of the personalisation scheme: Securing the transfer of
personalisation data can be done on base of a dynamic scheme (Secure
Messaging with a session key) or alternatively on base of a static scheme
(Secure Messaging with a static key).
The TOE is configured by Sagem Orga GmbH according to the different
possibilities for configuration described before. The configuration of the product
is defined prior to its delivery and cannot be changed after delivery.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
The TOE is developed and constructed in full accordance with the Tachograph
Card Specification [8], Annex 1B main body, Appendix 2, Appendix 10 (Tacho-
graph Card Generic Security Target) and Appendix 11. In particular, this implies
the conformance of the Tachograph Card with the following standards: ISO/IEC
7810 Identification cards – Physical characteristics, ISO/IEC 7816 Identification
cards - Integrated circuits with contacts: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4 and part 8;
ISO/IEC 10373 Identification cards – Test methods.
In order to achieve the required system security, the Tachograph Card and the
corresponding ST [6] and [7] meet all the security requirements and evaluation
conditions defined in the Tachograph Card’s “Generic Security Target” in [8],
Appendix 10 under consideration of the interpretations in [9].
The life-cycle of the TOE conforms to the smart card life cycle described in
Appendix 10 of [8] referring to PP/9911 [13]. The following table outlines this
life-cycle for the TOE:
Phase Description
Phase 1 Smart Card Embedded
Software Development
The Smart Card Embedded Software Developer (Sagem
Orga GmbH, Paderborn) is in charge of the Smart Card
Embedded Software (Basic Software, Application
Software) development and the specification of IC
initialisation and pre-personalisation requirements.
Phase 2 IC Development The IC Designer (Philips Semiconductors GmbH) designs
the IC, develops IC Dedicated Software, provides informa-
tion, software or tools to the Smart Card Embedded Soft-
ware Developer, and receives the Smart Card Embedded
Software (only Basic Software) from the developer through
trusted delivery and verification procedures.
The IC Designer constructs the smart card IC database,
necessary for the IC photo mask fabrication.
Phase 3 IC Manufacturing and
Testing
The IC Manufacturer (Philips Semiconductors GmbH)
generates the masks for the IC manufacturing based upon
an output from the smart card IC database.
He is responsible for producing the IC through three main
steps: IC manufacturing, IC testing, and IC pre-
personalisation.
Phase 4 IC Packaging and
Testing
The IC Packaging Manufacturer (Sagem Orga GmbH,
Flintbek) is responsible for the IC packaging (production of
modules) and testing.
Phase 5 Smart Card Product
Finishing Process
The Smart Card Product Manufacturer (Sagem Orga
GmbH, Flintbek) is responsible for the initialisation of the
TOE (in form of initialisation of the modules of phase 4)
and its testing.
The smart card product finishing process comprises the
embedding of the initialised modules for the TOE and the
card production what is done alternatively by Sagem Orga
GmbH or by the customer.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Phase Description
Delivery of the TOE Two different ways for delivery are established:
(i) The TOE is delivered to the customer in form of a
complete (initialised) smart card.
(ii) Alternatively, the TOE is delivered to the customer
in form of an initialised module. In this case, the
smart card finishing process (embedding, final card
tests) is task of the customer.
Phase 6 Smart Card
Personalisation
The Personaliser is responsible for the smart card
personalisation and final tests.
Phase 7 Smart Card End-Usage The Smart Card Issuer is responsible for the smart card
product delivery to the smart card end-user, and the end of
life process.
Table 1: Life cycle of the TOE
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation making
use of the platform evaluation results of the CC evaluation of the underlying
semiconductor "Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller
with Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software" provided by
Philips Semiconductors GmbH [19].
The IC with its IC Dedicated Software were evaluated according to Common
Criteria EAL 4 augmented with a minimum strength level for its security
functions of SOF-high based on the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 [12]. These
platform evaluations were performed by T-Systems GEI GmbH.
The Embedded Software of the MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0 and
the overall composition was evaluated by SRC Security Research & Consulting
GmbH.
The concept for composition as outlined in CC Supporting Document [4, AIS 36]
was used.
The IT product MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0 evaluated by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 03.
August 2006. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is
Sagem Orga GmbH
Am Hoppenhof 33
33104 Paderborn
Germany
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Part C or [1], part 3
for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows the
augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ADO_IGS.2 Delivery and operation - Generation log
+: ADV_IMP.2 Development - Implementation of the TSF
+: ATE_DPT.2 Tests - Testing: low-level design
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant
Table 2: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
The level of assurance and the augmentations are chosen in order to allow the
confirmation of equivalence to ITSEC [10] E3 high as required by Appendix 10
of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8] and outlined in JIL Security
Evaluation and Certification of Digital Tachographs [9].
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) and TOE Security Functions
are based on Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8]
specified in the document JIL Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital
Tachographs [9].
The TOE Security Functional Requirements selected in the Security Target are
Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table (for the
Security Functional Requirements for the IC part of the TOE please refer to the
Security Target of the underlying Hardware [19]):
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FAU_SAA.1-1 Potential Violation Analysis
FCO_NRO.1-1 Selective Proof of Origin
FCS_CKM.1-1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2-1 Cryptographic Key Distribution
FCS_CKM.2-2 Cryptographic Key Distribution
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FCS_CKM.2-3 Cryptographic Key Distribution
FCS_CKM.3-1 Cryptographic Key Access
FCS_CKM.3-2 Cryptographic Key Access
FCS_CKM.3-3 Cryptographic Key Access
FCS_CKM.3-4 Cryptographic Key Access
FCS_CKM.3-5 Cryptographic Key Access
FCS_CKM.4-1 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4-2 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1-1 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1-2 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1-3 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1-4 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1-5 Cryptographic Operation
FDP_ACC.2-1 Complete Access Control
FDP_ACC.2-2 Complete Access Control
FDP_ACF.1-1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
FDP_ACF.1-2 Security Attribute Based Access Control
FDP_DAU.1-1 Basic Data Authentication
FDP_ETC.1-1 Export of User Data without Security Attributes
FDP_ETC.2-1 Export of User Data with Security Attributes
FDP_ITC.1-1 Import of User Data without Security Attributes
FDP_RIP.1-1 Subset Residual Information Protection
FDP_SDI.2-1 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
FIA_AFL.1-1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_AFL.1-2 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_ATD.1-1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_UAU.1-1 Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU.3-1 Unforgeable Authentication
FIA_UAU.4-1 Single-use Authentication Mechanisms
FIA_UID.1-1 Timing of Identification
FIA_USB.1-1 User-Subject Binding
FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPR_UNO.1-1 Unobservability
FPR_UNO.1-2 Unobservability
FPR_UNO.1-3 Unobservability
FPT_FLS.1-1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
FPT_PHP.3-1 Resistance to Physical Attack
FPT_SEP.1-1 TSF Domain Separation
FPT_TDC.1-1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency
FPT_TST.1-1 TSF Testing
FTP_ITC.1-1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Table 3: Security Functional Requirements for the Embedded SW part of the TOE
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions.
The TSFs defined for the TOE-IC cover the following functions which are
relevant for the TOE: F.RNG, F.HW_DES, F.OPC, F.PHY, F.LOG, F.COMP,
F.MEM_ACC, F.SFR_ACC, F.DES, F.RSA, F.SHA-1, F.RNG_Access,
F.Object_Reuse, F.LOG (for details please refer to the Security Target of the
underlying Hardware [19]).
Identifier Security Function
F.ACS Security Attribute Based Access Control
F.IA_KEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication
F.IA_PWD Password Based User Authentication (only relevant for the Tachograph
Card type Workshop Card)
F.DATA_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
F.EX_CONF Confidentiality of Data Exchange
F.EX_INT Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
F.RIP Residual Information Protection
F.FAIL_PROT Hardware and Software Failure Protection
F.SIDE_CHAN Side Channel Analysis Control
F.SELFTEST Self Test
F.GEN_SES Generation of Session Keys
F.GEN_DIGSIG Generation of Digital Signatures
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Identifier Security Function
F.VER_DIGSIG Verification of Digital Signatures
F.ENC Encryption
F.DEC Decryption
Table 4: TOE Security Functions of the Embedded SW part of the TOE
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements and of the TOE
Security Functions are provided. For more details please refer to the Security
Target [7], chapter 5.1.1 and 6.1.
All TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE delivery to phase 7 of the
smart card life cycle model.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is rated ‘high’ (SOF-high) for the following
functions:
• The generation of random numbers by the hardware RNG within the TSF
F.RNG resp. by the software RNG within the TSF F.RNG_Access can be
analysed with probabilistic methods.
• The quality of the mechanisms contributing to the resistance against leakage
attacks of the TSF F.LOG, especially for the TSF F.HW_DES can be
analysed using permutational or probabilistic methods on power
consumption of the TOE.
• The implementations of the algorithms for F.DES, F.RSA (only decryption
part), F.GEN_DIGSIG and F.DEC are resistant to Simple Power Analysis
(SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Differential Fault Analysis (DFA)
and timing attacks. This concerns as well all security critical mechanisms of
the TSF F.IA_KEY. The quality of these mechanisms against leakage
attacks can be analysed using permutational or probabilistic methods.
• The implementation of the password based authentication mechanism as
used within the TSF F.IA_PWD can be analysed with permutational
methods.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats are subdivided into three groups affecting the IC, the general, or the
Tachograph Card specific Embedded Software.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
For the threats of IC and IC dedicated SW parts of the TOE please refer to the
hardware security target [19].
Name Definition
Threats on all Phases
T.CLON Cloning of the TOE
Threats on Phase 1
T.DIS_INFO Disclosure of IC Assets
T.DIS_DEL Disclosure of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data during Delivery
T.DIS_ES1 Disclosure of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data within the Development Environment
T.DIS_TEST_ES Disclosure of Smart Card Embedded Software Test Programs /
Information
T.T_DEL Theft of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application Data
during Delivery
T.T_TOOLS Theft or Unauthorised Use of the Smart Card Embedded
Software Development Tools
T.T_SAMPLE2 Theft or Unauthorised Use of TOE Samples
T_MOD_DEL Modification of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data during Delivery
T.MOD Modification of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data within the Development Environment
Threats on Delivery from
Phase 1 to Phases 4 / 5 / 6
T.DIS_DEL1 Disclosure of Application Data during Delivery
T.DIS_DEL2 Disclosure of Delivered Application Data
T.MOD_DEL1 Modification of Application Data during Delivery
T.MOD_DEL2 Modification of Delivered Application Data
Threats on Phases 4 to 7
T.DIS_ES2 Disclosure of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data
T.T_ES Theft or Unauthorised Use of TOE
T.T_CMD Use of TOE Command-Set
T.MOD_LOAD Program Loading
T.MOD_EXE Program Execution
T.MOD_SHARE Modification of Program Behaviour
T.MOD_SOFT Modification of Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data
Table 5: Threats of the TOE-ES (Basic Software) parts of the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Name Definition
T.Ident_Data Modification of Identification Data
T.Activity_Data Modification of Activity Data
T.Data_exchange Modification of Activity Data during Data Transfer
T.Pers_Data Authentication for Personalisation
T.Pers_exchange Modification or Disclosure of Personalisation Data during Data
Transfer
Table 6: Threats of the TOE-ES (Tachograph Card Specific Threats)
The Organisational Security Policies for the TOE are defined as:
Name Definition
P.Process-Card Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
P.Design-Software Design of the Smart Card Embedded Software
Table 7: OSPs for the TOE
Note: Only the titles of the threats and OSPs are provided. For more details
please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 3.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE is delivered at the end of phase 5 in form of complete cards, i.e. after
the initialisation process of the TOE has been successfully finished, final tests
have been successfully conducted and the card production has been finished.
Alternatively, the TOE is delivered in form of initialised and tested modules. In
this case, the smart card finishing process (embedding of the delivered
modules, final card tests) is task of the customer.
A Tachograph Card may be of the following types: Driver Card, Control Card,
Workshop Card or Company Card as defined in [8] depending on the
application consisting of a configurable software part for the Tachograph Card’s
file system. Alternatively, in case of the card type General Tachograph Card,
after initialisation resp. prior to the personalisation of the card, one of the four
prepared card types as desired by the customer has to be created up by using a
specific card command.
Two personalisation schemes are provided by the Tachograph Card:
• Dynamic scheme with Secure Messaging using a session key:
The Tachograph Card allows a personalisation only after a successful
preceding mutual authentication between the TOE and the external world
with agreement of a session key and send sequence counter and makes
use of asymmetric keys. The keys necessary on the card for the
authentication procedure are part of the Application Software and are loaded
onto the card in the framework of the initialisation. The following data
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
transfer of the personalisation data has to be conducted with Secure
Messaging.
• Static scheme with Secure Messaging using a static key:
the TOE allows a personalisation only under usage of a static symmetric
personalisation key which is stored on the card during the initialisation of the
card or later within an additional pre-personalisation phase. In the latter
case, the symmetric key has to be loaded with a specific card command in
encrypted form.
In each case, the personalisation of the Tachograph Card requires a preceding
authentication of the external world (personalisation unit). At the end of the
personalisation process, the card is switched to the end-user operational phase.
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the TOE has to be used under the well-defined operating
conditions and that the requirements on the personalisation and usage have to
be applied as described in the user documentation [15], [16] and [17].
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The TOE is intended to be used within the Tachograph System as a security
medium which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use
with the recording equipment as specified in [8].
There do not exist any Tachograph Card specific assumptions for the environ-
ment of the TOE. The following general assumptions are made based on the
PP/9911 [13] and PP/9806 [14] referenced in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of
Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8] (Generic Security Target).
Name Definition
Assumptions on Phase 1 to 5:
A.DEV_ORG Protection of the TOE under Development and Production
Assumptions on the TOE Delivery
Process (Phases 4 to 7)
A.DLV_PROTECT Protection of the TOE under Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_AUDIT Audit of Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_RESP Responsibility within Delivery
Assumptions on Phases 4 to 6
A.USE_TEST Testing of the TOE
A.USE_PROD Protection of the TOE under Testing and Manufacturing
Assumptions on Phase 6
A.PERS Secure Personalisation Process
Assumptions on Phase 7
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Name Definition
A.USE_DIAG Secure Communication
Table 8: General assumptions for the TOE
Note: The additional assumption A.PERS is made because the establishment of
a secure environment for the personalisation process with adequate personnel,
organisational and technical security measures is in the responsibility of the
personalisation centre itself. The security of the personalisation process of the
TOE is supported by the TOE itself.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
TOE
component
Designation Type Transfer Form
TOE-IC Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card
Controller (incl. its IC Dedicated Software, covering
in particular the Crypto Library)
HW / SW ---
TOE-
ES/BS
Smartcard Embedded Software / Part Basic
Software (implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the
microcontroller)
ROM-Maske:
MICARDO_TACHOGRAPH_R1.1
SW Source Code
(implemented
in ROM and
EEPROM of
the
microcontroller)
TOE-
ES/AS
Smartcard Embedded Software / Part Application
Software (depending on the TOE´s configuration
resp. card type, implemented in the EEPROM of the
microcontroller)
Driver Card: MICARDO_TACHOGRAPH_
R1.1_DRIVER_334_TACHOGRAPH_0100
Control Card:MICARDO_TACHOGRAPH_
R1.1_CONTROL_334_TACHOGRAPH_0100
Company Card: MICARDO_TACHOGRAPH_
SW Source Code
(implemented
in ROM and
EEPROM of
the
microcontroller)
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TOE
component
Designation Type Transfer Form
R1.1_COMPANY_334_TACHOGRAPH_0100
Workshop Card: MICARDO_TACHOGRAPH_
R1.1_WORKSHOP_334_TACHOGRAPH_0100
General Tachograph Card: MICARDO_
TACHOGRAPH_R1.1_GENERAL_CC_090_
ORGA_0100
User
Guide
Persona-
liser
User Guidance for the Personaliser of the
Tachograph Card - MICARDO Tachograph Version
1.0 R1.0, Version V1.00, Sagem Orga GmbH,
19.06.2006, see [15].
DOC Document in
paper /
electronic form
User
Guide
Issuer
User Guidance for the Issuer of the Tachograph
Card - MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0,
Version V1.00, Sagem Orga GmbH, 13.06.2006,
see [17].
DOC Document in
paper /
electronic form
User
Guide VU
Developer
User Guidance for the Vehicle Unit Developer -
MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0, Version
V1.00, Sagem Orga GmbH, 19.06.2006, see [16].
DOC Document in
paper /
electronic form
Identificati
on Data
Sheet of
the Tacho-
graph
Card
Data Sheet with information on the actual
identification data and configuration of the
Tachograph Card delivered to the customer:
MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0, Data
Sheet V1.01, Sagem Orga GmbH, 19.06.2006, see
[20].
DOC Document in
paper /
electronic form
Aut-Key of
the Tacho-
graph
Card
Public part of the authentication key pair relevant for
the authenticity of the Tachograph Card
KEY Document in
paper /
electronic form
Pers-Key
of the
Tacho-
graph
Card
Public part of the personalisation key pair of the
Tachograph Card necessary for the personalisation
process at the personaliser
KEY Document in
paper /
electronic form
Pers-Key
Pair of the
Personalis
ation Unit
(if
applicable)
Personalisation key pair for the personalisation unit
necessary for the personalisation of the Tachograph
Card delivered to the personaliser
KEY
PAIR
Document in
paper /
electronic form
Static
Pers-Key
(if
applicable)
Static personalisation key for the personalisation unit
necessary for the personalisation of the Tachograph
Card delivered to the personaliser
KEY Document in
paper /
electronic form
Table 9: Deliverables of the TOE
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AID of MF: d276000028ff81
AID of DF_CardManager: d276000028ff80
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery pro-
cedures described in the User documentation for personalisation [15] have to
be followed. The MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0 Data Sheet includes
File Control Information (FCI) which can be used for identification of the five
different card types.
3 Security Policy
The TOE will be employed within the Tachograph System as a security medium
which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use with the
recording equipment.
The TOE is the composition of the IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card
Embedded Software. The security policy is to provide:
• protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidential-ity
of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE),
against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations, against access for code and data memory and against abuse
of functionality
• secure storage of user data and TSF data
• access control to user data and TSF data according to the specified rules
• secure communication to the vehicle unit of the Tachograph System
• as specified in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002
[8].
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The TOE is intended to be used within the Tachograph System as a security
medium which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use
with the recording equipment as specified in [8].
There do not exist any Tachograph Card specific assumptions for the
environment of the TOE as the definition of the card type is done before the
TOE personalisation in phase 6 before delivery.
General assumptions are made based on the PP/9911 [13] and PP/9806 [14]
referenced in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8]
(Generic Security Target). These general assumptions are structured according
to the phases of the life cycle. Some of these assumptions are related to
procedures in phases 1 to 5. These phases were part of the TOE evaluation. As
delivery of the TOE is defined within or at the end of phase 5 of the life cycle.
(see table 1), the phases 6 and 7 are the usage phases of the TOE. Procedures
related to assumptions on these phases and the additional assumption A.PERS
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on secure generation and handling of personalisation data are outlined in the
user documentation.
The TOE is the MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0 providing security
functions as required in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no.
1360/2002 [8] (Generic Security Target). Threats on the overall Tachograph
System which are not related to the Tachograph Smart Cards were not
addressed by this product evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC) with its
proprietary IC Dedicated Software (TOE-IC) and a Smartcard Embedded
Software (TOE-ES), consisting of Basic Software (TOE-ES/BS) and Application
Software (TOE-ES/AS). As all these parts of software are running inside the IC,
the external interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the
external interface of this IC, microcontroller "Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D
Secure Smart Card Controller with Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated
Support Software" provided by Philips Semiconductors GmbH.
The security functions of the TOE are enforced by the following subsystems :
• Native Platform: This subsystem implements the TSF "Stored Data Integrity
Monitoring and Action", "Residual Information Protection", "Side Channel
Analysis Control", "Generation of Session Keys", "Generation of Digital
Signatures", "Verification of Digital Signatures", "Decryption" and
"Encryption", "Hardware and Software Failure Protection", "Self Test".
• Initialisation Module (INI): This subsystem implements the TSF "Hardware
and Software Failure Protection" and "Self Test".
• MICARDO V3.0 Operating System Platform (MIC): This subsystem
implements the TSF "Security Attribute Based Access Control", "Key Based
User / TOE Authentication", "Password Based User Authentication", "Stored
Data Integrity Monitoring and Action", "Confidentiality of Data Exchange",
"Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange", "Residual Information
Protection", "Hardware and Software Failure Protection", "Self Test",
"Generation of Session Keys", "Generation of Digital Signatures",
"Verification of Digital Signatures", "Encryption" and "Decryption", "Side
Channel Analysis Control".
• Application Software (AS): This subsystem implements the TSF "Security
Attribute Based Access Control", "Key Based User / TOE Authentication",
"Password Based User Authentication", "Stored Data Integrity Monitoring
and Action", "Confidentiality of Data Exchange", "Integrity and Authenticity of
Data Exchange", "Residual Information Protection", "Hardware and Software
Failure Protection", "Self Test", "Generation of Session Keys", "Generation
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
of Digital Signatures", "Verification of Digital Signatures", "Encryption" and
"Decryption".
Please see also the figure in chapter 2.1.1, Overview of the security target [7].
The TOE Summary Specification (chapter 6 of the ST [7]) describes the TOE
Security Functions with relation to the IC and Cryptographic Library and to the
Embedded Software.
6 Documentation
The user of the TOE is
• the developer of a vehicle unit who needs information how the TOE interacts
with the vehicle unit,
• the personaliser of the Tachograph Cards who needs information about
security procedures and how the TOE supports the personalisation process,
• the issuer of the Tachograph Cards who needs information how to use the 4
different card types after personalisation, information on specific aspects of
the issuance of the Tachograph Cards and information to be passed to the
end-user of the Tachograph Cards (card-holder, e.g. the driver).
For these three types of users separate user documentation is provided (see
[15], [16] and [17]). Additionally, the MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0
Data Sheet [20] is provided by Sagrm Orga GmbH. It contains Answer To Reset
(ATR) information and File Control Information (FCI) as identification
information for the Tachograph Cards. As some data contained in the Data
Sheet can be customer specific, it will be provided individually for specific
customers.
7 IT Product Testing
Tests of the TOE were done (i) with real cards using a card reader and a PC
and (ii) in an emulator test environment.
For those tests, where real cards are used, the specified method was used to
identify the Tachograph Card version and the correct card configuration for
every test. The real cards used for testing were either in initialised state (i. e.
ready for personalisation) or in operational state (i. e. personalisation
completed). Using specific commands for reading FCI-data, the life cycle state
of the application and the type of the card could be determined.
For identification of the correct versions of the electronic data used for tests in
the emulator test environment, and to determine whether the initial condition of
each test is satisfied, the methods of the evaluated Configuration Management
System were used. The version control mechanism can guarantee that the
design files and the initial data used for testing are those provided by the
developers for the specific version of the TOE under evaluation.
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As specific subsystems are the same in all card types and others are different,
some tests had to be performed on all four card types, others could be re-used.
Tests after modifications of the TOE during the evaluation process were re-
done as necessary depending on the specific change.
Developer tests:
For developer tests, the test cases were mapped to Security Functions. All
Security Functions with their security properties and their interfaces were
covered. In addition, the test cases were mapped to subsystems of the High-
Level Design and to modules of the Low-Level Design. All subsystems and
modules with their security properties and their interfaces were covered. The
developer tested each property of the design specification. All command APDU
with valid and invalid inputs are tested and all functions are tested with valid and
invalid inputs. All test results were documented in log-files. All security functions
were tested with overall positive results.
Independent evaluator tests:
Most tests of the evaluator were done by ISO-7816 APDU command sequences
using a real card. Tests with emulators were chosen by the evaluators only for
those security functions, where internal resources of the card needed to be
modified or observed during the test (e.g. Anti-DPA-Measures and Residual
Information protection).
Several issues have been checked extensively by functional tests and by
source code analysis.
Side channel attacks on Triple-DES and RSA (SPA/DPA, timing attacks, fault
injection attacks) were tested and analysed during the evaluation and showed
that secret keys could not be extracted.
In addition, tests according to Appendix 9 of the EU Tachograph Card Commis-
sion Regulation [8] have been performed. Preliminary, the personalisation
process of the cards has been carried out and thereby tested. The tests have
been performed for all four different types of Sagem Orga Tachograph Cards.
For the Appendix 9 tests, cards with the final ROM mask and the actual
Tachograph application have been used. The achieved test results correspond
to the expected test results (see Annex B of this report).
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered within or at the end of phase 5 in form of initialised and
tested complete cards or in form of initialised and tested modules (see table 1).
A Tachograph Card may be of the following types: Driver Card, Control Card,
Workshop Card or Company Card depending on the specific application and
data loaded into the card. Additionally, a General Tachograph Card is available
that can be irreversibly converted into one of the different card types by using a
specific card command after initialisation resp. prior to the personalisation of the
card. These five different card types are considered as different configurations
of the TOE.
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All procedures for personalisation and configuration for the end-user necessary
after delivery are described in the user documentation [15].
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [11] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [11] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation
activities in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition: Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36].
The ETR [11] builds up on the ETR-lite for Composition documents of the
evaluations of the underlying „Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure Smart
Card Controller with Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software".
These ETR-lite for Composition documents were provided by the ITSEF
T-Systems GEI GmbH according to CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition ([4, AIS 36]).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii) ETR-lite – for Composition and
ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36]) were used. The evaluation was performed
as a composite evaluation process based on the concepts defined (see [4, AIS
36]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summa-
rised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Generation log ADO_IGS.2 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
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Table 10: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• the Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended,
• the TOE provides the functionality according to Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of
Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8] and stated more precisely in the
document JIL Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital Tachographs
[9],
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VLA.4,
• the assurance of the TOE is equivalent to ITSEC [10] E3 high as required by
Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8],
• the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function SOF-high for the functions as
outlined in chapter 1.3. The rating of the strength of functions does not
include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see
BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for F.LOG, F.RSA, F.RNG,
and F.RNG_Access of the underlying hardware,
• specific tests required by Appendix 9 of the EU Tachograph Card
Commission Regulation [8] are fulfilled (see Annex B of this report).
The underlying hardware had been successfully assessed by T-Systems GEI
GmbH.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the MICARDO Tachograph
Version 1.0 R1.0.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6) contains necessary
information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage
of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into
account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these
documents.
11 Annexes
none.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitised version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AID Application Identifier
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
ATR Answer to Reset
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
CM Card Manager
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DF Dedicated file, directory on a smart card file system according to
ISO/IEC 7816
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FCI File Control Information
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
MF Master file, top level directory (root) on a smart card file system
according to ISO/IEC 7816
OS Operating System
PIN Personal Identification Number
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PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SM Secure Messaging
SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
VU Vehicle Unit
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
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Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), especially
- AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
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- AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for:
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1,
July 2002 and CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation, Version
1.2 March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] BSI-DSZ-0358-2006, Security Target - MICARDO Tachograph Version
1.0 R1.0, Version V1.00, Sagem ORGA GmbH, 12.06.2006 (confidential
document)
[7] BSI-DSZ-0358-2006, Security Target - MICARDO Tachograph Version
1.0 R1.0, Version V1.00, Sagem ORGA GmbH, 21.06.2006 (sanitised
public document)
[8] Annex 1B of Commission Regulation (EC) No.1360/2002 on recording
equipment in road transport: Requirements for Construction, Testing,
Installation and Inspection (in: Official Journal of the European
Communities, L 207 / 1 ff.), 05.08.2002, Commission of the European
Communities
Appendix 2 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 –
Tachograph Cards Specification
Appendix 7 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 -
Data downloading protocols
Appendix 9 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 –
Type Approval – List of Minimum Required Tests
Appendix 10 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 -
Generic Security Targets
Appendix 11 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 -
Common Security Mechanisms
[9] Joint Interpretation Library (JIL) - Security Evaluation and Certification of
Digital Tachographs, Version 1.12, June 2003, JIL Working Group (BSI,
CESG, DCSSI, NLNCSA)
[10] Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), CEC,
Version 1.2, June 1991
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[11] Evaluation Report - Evaluation Technical Report (ETR); Version: 1.1;
Date: 02.08.2006; Product: MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0
(confidential document)
[12] Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
registered at the German Certification Body under number BSI-PP-0002-
2001
[13] Smart Card Integrated Circuit With Embedded Software Protection
Profile - version 2.0 - issue June 99. Registered at French certification
body under the number PP/9911
[14] Smartcard Integrated Circuit Protection Profile - version 2.0 - issue
September 1998. Registered at French certification body under the
number PP/9806
[15] User Guidance for the Personaliser of the Tachograph Card - MICARDO
Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0, Version V1.00, Sagem ORGA GmbH,
19.06.2006
[16] User Guidance for the Vehicle Unit Developer - MICARDO Tachograph
Version 1.0 R1.0, Version V1.00, Sagem ORGA GmbH, 19.06.2006
[17] User Guidance for the Issuer of the Tachograph Card - MICARDO
Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0, Version V1.00, Sagem ORGA GmbH,
13.06.2006
[18] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 for the "Philips SmartMX
P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with Cryptographic Library
as IC Dedicated Support Software" from Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification, 13. March 2006, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik
[19] Security Target Lite – Evaluation of the Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D, Version 2.2.0, Philips Semiconductors GmbH, January
30th 2006, registered by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-DSZ-CC-0368
(sanitised public document)
[20] MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0, Data Sheet V1.01, Sagem
ORGA GmbH, 19.06.2006
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
Annex B: Functional Tests according to Appendix 9 of Annex I (B)
of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 D-5
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D-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MICARDO Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0 (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005), extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC15408:
2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 06. September 2006, the following
results regarding the development and production environment apply. The
Common Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.2) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
• Sagem Orga GmbH, Am Hoppenhof 33, 33104 Paderborn (embedded
software development)
• Sagem Orga GmbH, Konrad-Zuse-Ring 1, 24220 Flintbek (card production
and initialisation site)
For development and productions sites regarding the "Philips SmartMX
P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with Cryptographic Library as IC
Dedicated Support Software" refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-
2006.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-0358-2006, MICARDO
Tachograph Version 1.0 R1.0, Version V1.00, Sagem Orga GmbH, 12.06.2006
[7].
The evaluators verified, that the threats, policies and security objective for the
life cycle phases 1 to 5 up to delivery within or at the end of phase 5 as stated in
the TOE Security Target [7] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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D-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006:
Functional Tests according to Appendix 9 of Annex I (B) of
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002
In addition to the ordinary evaluator tasks of the Common Criteria evaluation at
level EAL4+ (equivalent to ITSEC E3 high), functional tests according to
Appendix 9 of the EU Tachograph Card Commission Regulation [8] have been
performed.
The following list shows the results of these tests:
No
Test Description Related
requirements
Result
1 Administrative examination
1.1 Docu-
menta-
tion
Correctness of documentation - Confirmed
4 Protocol tests The evaluators have
assured themselves in
detail of the fact that the
functional tests have
been performed
successfully.
4.1 ATR Check that the ATR is
compliant.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 304, 307, 308
Confirmed
4.2 T=0 Check that T=0 protocol is
compliant.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 302, 303, 305
Confirmed
4.3 PTS Check that the PTS command
is compliant by setting T=1
from T=0.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 309 to 311
Confirmed
4.4 T=1 Check that T=1 protocol is
compliant.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 303, / 306
Confirmed
5 Card Structure
5.1 Test that the file structure of
the card is compliant by
checking the presence of the
mandatory files in the card
and their Access Conditions.
TCS 312
TCS 400*, 401,
402, 403*, 404,
405*, 406, 407,
408*, 409, 410*,
411, 412, 413*,
414, 415*, 416,
417, 418*, 419
Confirmed
6 Functional tests
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006
No
Test Description Related
requirements
Result
6.1 Normal
Pro-
cessing
Test at least once each
allowed usage of each
command
(ex: test the UPDATE
BINARY command with CLA
= '00', CLA = '0C' and with
different P1,P2 and Lc
parameters).
Check that the operations
have actually been performed
in the card (ex: by reading the
file the command has been
performed on).
Confirmed
6.2 Error
Messa-
ges
Test at least once each error
message (as specified in
Appendix 2) for each
command.
Test at least once every
generic error (except ‘6400’
integrity errors checked during
security certification).
TCS 313
to
TCS 379
Confirmed
D-6