BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017
for
Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791
B12 and G11 with specific IC-dedicated firmware
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017 (*)
Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 and G11 with
specific IC-dedicated firmware
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 22 February 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11. Security Target............................................................................................................20
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................21
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................28
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this
certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including CC
part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ALC_DVS.2,
AVA_VAN.5, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 and
ATE_DPT.3 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 and G11 with specific
IC-dedicated firmware has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-2015. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-2015 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 and
G11 with specific IC-dedicated firmware was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 9 February 2017. TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 22 February
2017 is valid until 21 February 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 and G11 with specific
IC-dedicated firmware has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791
B12 and G11 with specific IC-dedicated firmware. The TOE consists of a core system,
memories, coprocessor, peripherals, security modules and analog peripherals. The major
components of the core system are the CPU, the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and
MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The μSCP co-processor supports (but not
implements) 3DES and AES processing, while the peripheral block contains the random
number generation and the external interfaces service. The peripheral block also contains
timers and a watchdog. All data of the memory block is encrypted, RAM and ROM are
equipped with an error detection code and the NVM is equipped with an error correction
code (ECC). Security modules manage the alarms. Alarms may be triggered when the
environmental conditions are outside the specified operational range. The block diagram of
the TOE is shown in [6] and [9], Figure 1. The TOE comprises as one part the hardware of
the smart card security controller in various configurations.
The TOE is able to communicate using its contactless interface. The interface provides the
flexibility to use different communication protocols: e.g. ISO 14443 Type A and Type B,
ISO/IEC 18092 passive mode can be chosen and configured.
This TOE is intended to be used in smartcards and for its previous use as a development
platform for smartcard operating systems according to the lifecycle model in [8]. The term
Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and
applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard
Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE.
This TOE is represented by various configurations called products. The degree of freedom
for configuring the TOE is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG. For more details
please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.2.7.
The micro Symmetric Cryptographic Processor (μSCP) supports (but not implements)
calculation of dual-key or triple-key triple-DES and AES. Note that the μSCP can be
blocked and does not contribute to any SFRs. The blocking depends on the user’s choice
prior to the production of the hardware.
The entire firmware of the TOE consists of different parts. One part comprises the RMS
and SAM routines for NVM programming, security functional test, and random number
online testing. The RMS and SAM routines are stored by Infineon Technologies in ROM.
The second part is the STS, consisting of test and initialization routines. The STS routines
are stored in a specially protected test ROM and are not accessible by user software. The
third part is the Flash Loader, a piece of software located in ROM and NVM. It supports
download of user software or parts of it to NVM. After completion of the download the
Flash Loader can be deactivated permanently by the user. The fourth part is the Mifare
compatible software interface, accessible via RMS routines, if the Mifare compatible
interface option is active. Note that the Mifare compatible Interface portion is always
present but deactivated in case of non-Mifare compatible Interface derivatives.
Compared to the previous certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-2015, one has:
● Introduction of the G11 TOE version (new, additional production site),
● removal of the (optional) Symmetric Cryptographic Library (SCL).
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The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9]. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapters 4.2 and 4.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 and G11 with specific
IC-dedicated firmware.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/S
W
M7791 Smart Card IC B12 (produced in
Dresden)
G11 (produced
by TSMC in
Tainan, Taiwan)
Complete modules, as plain
wafers in an IC case or in bare
dies.
2 FW Flash Loader FW identifier
77.014.11.2 or
77.014.12.1.
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
3 FW STS Self Test Software (the
IC Dedicated Test Software)
FW identifier
77.014.11.2 or
77.014.12.1.
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
4 FW RMS Resource
Management System (the IC
Dedicated Support
Software)
FW identifier
77.014.11.2 or
77.014.12.1.
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
5 FW SAM library FW identifier
77.014.11.2 or
77.014.12.1.
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
6 SW NVM image (including
Embedded Software and
crypto libraries)
-- Stored in Flash memory on the
IC
7 DOC M7791 SOLID FLASHTM
Controller for Contactless
Transport, Payment and
Basic ID Applications
Hardware Reference
Manual
2012-05 Hardcopy or pdf-file
8 DOC AMM Advanced Mode for
Mifare-Compatible
Technology Addendum to
M7791 Hardware Reference
Manual (optional)
2012-03 Hardcopy or pdf-file
9 DOC SLx 70 Family Production
and Personalization User's
Manual
2015-04 Hardcopy or pdf-file
10 DOC SLE 70 Family
Programmer’s Reference
User’s Manual
2015-09 Hardcopy or pdf-file
11 DOC M7791 Security Guidelines
User's manual
2014-11-26 Hardcopy or pdf-file
12 DOC SLE 77 Controller Family
Solid Flash Controller for
Security Applications Errata
Sheet
2016-04-18 Hardcopy or pdf-file
13 DOC Option 2 for Fast Startup 2014-11 Hardcopy or pdf-file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
A processing step during production testing incorporates the chip-individual features into
the hardware of the TOE. The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its serial
number.
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As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE Manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
(developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
Another characteristic of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification
data is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). This GCIM outputs
amongst others a chip identifier byte, design step, firmware identifier, metal configuration
identifier, temperature range and system frequency. Additionally, dedicated RMS functions
allow a customer to extract the present hardware configuration.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE.
It provides basic security functionalities to be used by the smart card operating system and
the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information, against physical probing, against
malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the
TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance:
The ST only includes security objective for the IC Embedded Software Developer, the
objective OE.Resp-Appl.
The main implications of the objectives are that the IC Embedded Software Developer
shall design his software so that the requirements from the data sheet ([15] and [16]), the
TOE application notes [17], other guidance documents ([11] – [14] and [18]) and findings of
the TOE evaluation report are implemented. All these documents are identified as parts of
the TOE and delivered to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) appropriately. The IC Embedded Software Developer gets
sufficient information on how to protect user data adequate in the security guidelines [17].
The ST further defines OE.Process-Sec-IC for the operational environment which states
that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to
delivery to the end-consumer. This is necessary to maintain confidentiality and integrity of
the TOE, and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).
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In the context of the flash loader implemented in the TOE, the ST defines
OE.Lim_Block_Loader which requires the composite product manufacturer to protect the
loader functionality against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader and to terminate the
loader after its intended usage.
Please note that only two options are available regarding the Flash Loader (see [6] and [9],
chapter 2.2.8, table3). The first option is that the TOE is delivered with blocked Flash
Loader. In this case, the Flash Loader is used by Infineon at a certified site. The other
option is that the customer provides a reactivation procedure for the Flash Loader. This
procedure, however, is not part of the evaluation but has to be considered in a composite
evaluation.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating
system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target Lite [9], chapter
2.1. The TOE is manufactured by Infineon Technologies in a 90 nm CMOS technology. The
term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and
applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard
Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE.
The TOE consists of a core system, memories, coprocessor, peripherals, security modules
and analog peripherals. The major components of the core system are the CPU, the MMU
(Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The μSCP
co-processor supports (but not implements) 3DES and AES processing, while the
peripheral block contains the random number generation and the external interfaces
service. The peripheral block also contains timers and a watchdog. All data of the memory
block is encrypted, RAM and ROM are equipped with an error detection code and the
NVM is equipped with an error correction code (ECC). Security modules manage the
alarms. Alarms may be triggered when the environmental conditions are outside the
specified operational range.
The CPU accesses memory via the integrated Memory Encryption and Decryption unit
(MED). The access rights of the application to the memories can be controlled with the
memory management unit (MMU). Errors in RAM and ROM are automatically detected
(EDC, Error Detection Code) in terms of the NVM 1-Bit-errors are also corrected (ECC,
Error Correction Code).
The controller of this TOE stores both code and data in a linear 16-Mbyte memory space,
allowing direct access without the need to swap memory segments in and out of memory
using a memory management unit.
The cache is a high-speed memory buffer located between the CPU and (external) main
memories holding a copy of some of the memory contents to enable access.
The TRNG (True Random Number Gerenator) is specially designed for smartcard
applications. The TRNG fulfils the requirements of the functionality class PTG.2 and
produces genuine random numbers which then can be used directly or as seed for the
PRNG (Pseudo Random Number gerenator). The PRNG is not in the scope of the
evaluation.
The low-power HALT mode is used to reduce the overall power consumption during data
transfer between peripherals and volatile memories. The timer can be used to implement
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017 Certification Report
timing critical communication protocols. The RF interface is a contactless interface
compliant to ISO14443.
The Clock Unit (CLKU) supplies the clocks for all components of the TOE. The Clock Unit
can work in an internal and external clock mode.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into five categories:
● Simulation tests (design verification),
● Qualification tests,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests,
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were in part repeated by the
ITSEF. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were
used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific
design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections
both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
In the broadest sense, the production of the mask sets for the chip production may be
looked upon as the procedure for the system generation. The TOE can be delivered in the
following configuration:
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● Smartcard IC M7791 B12 (Dresden) and
● Smartcard IC M7791 G11 (Tainan).
Depending on the blocking configuration a M7791 B12 and G11 product can have e.g.
different user available memory sizes and can come with or without individual accessible
cryptographic co-processor. The following table (which is an excerpt of table 2 of the
Security Target [6] and [9]) lists the main configuration options:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Solid Flash Up to 100 kByte
RAM Up to 4 kByte
µSCP Available/unavailable
System Frequency 33MHz up to maximal
RFI input capacity 27pF, 56pF, 78pF
FW package V77.014.11.2 or V77.014.12.1
Table 3: TOE configurations
The Bill-Per-Use (BPU) method enables a customer to use tailored products of the TOE
within the TOE´s configuration options (see Table 3). BPU allows a customer to block chips
on demand at the customer´s premises. Customers who intend to use this feature receive
the TOEs in a predefined configuration. The blocking information is part of a chip
configuration area. Dedicated blocking information can be modified by customers using
specific APDUs. Once final blocking is done, further modifications are disabled. the user is
free to choose prior to production, whether he needs the symmetric co-processor μSCP or
not. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.2.7.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
● Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
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platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-2015, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on assessing
differences in the vulnerability analysis behaviour between the B12 and G11 versions.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014,
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant / extended
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Providing AIS 31
conformant
random number
Physical True
RNG PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A N/A
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
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[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [11] to [17] have to be
considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [18] have to be considered.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has
to be considered:
● In case the customer decides to provide a reactivation procedure for the Flash Loader,
this procedure has to be addressed in a composite evaluation.
● The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
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the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS31 “Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zu ITSEC und CC
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren”
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
BPU Bill Per Use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CI Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CIM Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CPU Central Processing Unit
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Error Correction Code
EDC Error Detection Code
EDU Error Detection Unit
EEPROM Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro Magnetic Analysis
Flash EEPROM Flash Memory
FL Flash Loader software
FW Firmware
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
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HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ICO Internal Clock Oscillator
ID Identification
IMM Interface Management Module
IT Information Technology
ITP Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
I/O Input/Output
IRAM Internal Random Access Memory
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU Memory Management Unit
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OS Operating system
ST Security Target
PEC Peripheral Event Channel
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
RAM Random Access Memory
RMS Resource Management System
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SAM Service Algorithm Minimal
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SF Security Feature
SFR Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional Requirement,
the specific meaning is given in the context
SOLID FLASH™ An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology
SPA Simple Power Analysis
STS Self Test Software
SW Software
SO Security Objective
TOE Target of Evaluation
TM Test Mode (STS)
TSF TOE Security Functions
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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TSC TOE Security Functions Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM User Mode (STS)
UmSLC User Mode Security Life Control
WDT Watch Dog Timer
XRAM eXtended Random Access Memory
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
8
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Verbindlich Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR
(Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 23, Version 3, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017, Version 1.4, 2017-01-24, Confidential
Security Target - M7791 B12 and G11, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, 2017-01-24, Evaluation Technical Report
Summary, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017, Version 1.4, 2017-01-24, Security
Target Lite – M7791 B12 and G11, Infineon Technologies (sanitised public
document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the product M7791 B12 and
G11, Version 1, 2017-01-27, Evaluation Technical Report for Composite evaluation,
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Configuration Management Scope M7791 B12 and G11, Version 1.1, 2016-04-27,
Infineon Technologies (confidential document)
[12] Option 2 for Fast Startup, 2014-11-20, Infineon Technologies AG
[13] SLE 70 Programmer’s Reference Manual, Version 9.0, 2015-09-28, Infineon
Technologies AG
[14] SLE 77 Controller Family Solid Flash Controller for Security Applications Errata
Sheet, Version 2.7, 2016-04-18, Infineon Technologies AG
[15] M7791 SOLID FLASH Controller for Contactless Transport Payment and Basic ID
Applications Hardware Reference Manual, Version 1.0, 2012-05-03, Infineon
Technologies
[16] AMM Advanced Mode for Mifare-Compatible Technology Addendum to M7791
Hardware Reference Manual, Rev.1.0, 2012-03-26, Infineon Technologies
[17] M7791 Security Guidelines User’s Manual, 2014-11-26, Infineon Technologies
[18] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual, 2015-04-01, Infineon
Technologies
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
Table 5: APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
Table 6: ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Table 7: Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 8: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 and G11 with
specific IC-dedicated firmware (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 22 February 2017, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites of the TOE listed below:
Company name and address Functions of site
Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
Kalyani Platina, Sy. No. 6 & 24
Kundanahalli Village
Krishnaraja Puram Hobli
Bangalore
India – 560066 India
Development
Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6
Sector 2
020335 Bucharest
Romania
Development
Infineon Technologies AG
Chip Card and Security
640 North McCarthy Blvd
Milpitas, CA 95035
Development
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Development,
IT
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Company name and address Functions of site
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
Development
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
IT
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
IT
Infineon Technologies Sdn. Bhd.
Batu Berendam FTZ
75350, Melaka
Malaysia
IT
Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philippines
Pre-assembly,
Module assembly,
Module test
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philippines
Pre-assembly,
Module assembly,
Module test
Ardentec Corporation
T site
No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd.,
Hsin-Chu Industrial Park, Hu-Kou,
Hsin-Chu Hsien
Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
Wafer test
Ardentec Singapore Pte. Ltd.
12 Woodlands Loop #02-00
Singapore 738283
Wafer test
ASK-intTag, LLC
Building 966
1000 River St., Essex Junction,
Vermont 05452
Inlay assembly
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Company name and address Functions of site
USA
DHL Exel Supply Chain
Richland Business Centre
11 Bedok North Ave 4, Level 3,
Singapore 489949
Distribution Center Asia
DISCO HI-TEC EUROPE GmbH
Liebigstrasse 8
D-85551 Kirchheim
Germany
Pre-assembly
DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A.
Via C. Olivetti 2/A
20041 Agrate Brianza
Italy
Mask production
Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia, s.r.o.
Dolné Hony 11
94901 Nitra
Slovakia
Distribution Center
HID Global Ireland Teoranta
Pairc Tionscail na Tullaigh
Baile na hAbhann
Co. Galway
Ireland
Inlay assembly,
Inlay test
Infineon Technologies Dresden
GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
Wafer production,
Wafer test
Infineon Technologies North America
Corp.
18275 Serene Drive
Morgan Hill, CA 95037
USA
Inlay test,
Distribution
Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Pre-assembly,
Assembly,
Module test,
Scrap,
IT
Infineon Technologies Asia Pacific
PTE Ltd.
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module test
Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd. Module assembly,
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Company name and address Functions of site
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
Module test,
Distribution Center China
Infineon Technology AG
Distribution Center Europe (DCE)
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building
8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Distribution Center Europe
Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
USA
Distribution Center USA
Smartrac Technology Ltd.
142/121/115 Moo
Hi-Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban Laean
Amphor Bang-Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya
Thailand
Inlay assembly,
Inlay test
Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Mask production
Toppan Printing Co., Ltd.
Ranzan Plant
6-2, Hanami-Dai, Ranzan-Machi,
Hiki-Gun, Saitama 355-0204
Japan
Inlay assembly
Toppan Printing Company America,
Inc.
Round Rock Site
2175 Greenhill Drive
Round Rock, Texas 78664
USA
Inlay assembly,
IT (Toppan)
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company Ltd.
1, Nan-Ke North Rd.
Tainan Science Park
Mask production,
Wafer production
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Company name and address Functions of site
Tainan 741-44
Taiwan
Table 9: List of relevant production and development sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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