National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
3e Technologies International
CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network
Security Devices
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11080-2020
Dated: July 14 2020
Version: 0.4
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jean Petty, Senior Validator
John Butterworth, Lead Validator
Jenn Dotson, ECR Team
Randy Heimann, ECR Team
Lisa Mitchell, ECR Team
Clare Olin, ECR Team
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
John Messiha
Edward Morris
Khai Van
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 2
3.1 TOE Description....................................................................................................... 3
3.2 Physical Boundaries.................................................................................................. 3
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 3
4.1 Security Audit........................................................................................................... 4
4. 2 Cryptographic support ............................................................................................. 4
4.3 Identification and authentication............................................................................... 4
4.4 Security management................................................................................................ 4
4.5 Protection of the TSF................................................................................................ 5
4.6 TOE access................................................................................................................ 5
4.7 Trusted path/channels ............................................................................................... 5
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 5
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 5
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 6
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 6
8.1 Developer Testing..................................................................................................... 6
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ..................................................................... 6
9 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 6
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 7
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)................................................................ 7
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) .................................................................. 7
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ..................................................... 7
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ......................................... 8
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ..................... 8
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)............................................................. 8
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.............................................................................. 8
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................... 9
12 Annexes....................................................................................................................... 9
13 Security Target............................................................................................................ 9
14 Glossary ...................................................................................................................... 9
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 10
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) Validation Team of the evaluation of CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security
Devices solution provided by 3e Technologies International. It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in July 2020. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 11 March 2019
(NDcPP21).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security
Devices.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The Validation Team monitored the activities of the Evaluation Team, provided guidance
on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation Team found that the evaluation showed
that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements
stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation Team concludes that the
testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance
results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the CyberFence 3e-636
Series Network Security Devices (NDcPP21) Security Target, Version 0.8, 07/06/2020
and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices
PP
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 11 March 2019
(NDcPP21)
ST CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices (NDcPP21) Security Target,
Version 0.8, 07/06/2020
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security
Devices, Version 0.4, July 6, 2020
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor 3e Technologies International
Developer 3e Technologies International
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Jean Petty, John Butterworth, Jenn Dotson, Randy Heimann, Lisa Mitchell, Clare
Olin (all of The MITRE Corporation)
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
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The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices.
The CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices TOE is a combination of
hardware and software. All devices run software version 5.2.0. The evaluated hardware
models are:
 3e-636L3 EtherGuard
 3e-636L2 Darknode
 3e-636H Ultracrypt
 3e-636A EtherWatch
3eTI’s 636 Series Network Security Devices offer the multiple capabilities necessary for
protecting embedded devices and safety-critical industrial control systems (ICS) against
internal and external attacks. The core capabilities include: network access control, OSI
Layer 2 and Layer 3 packet filtering, industrial control protocols packet inspection and
secured application data transportation (via encryption).
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is composed of both hardware and firmware. All four factory configurations of
the 3e-636 series devices share identical hardware and a single firmware image. The
firmware contains modules, that when activated through manufacture settings, can provide
additional functionality specific to each individual device configuration. The 3e-636 runs
firmware with naming convention: “signed_dual_636N.5.2.0.00.9.bin”. The software
version is 5.2.0.
All devices operate in the same operation environment. IPsec tunnels are used to secure the
communication between device and external servers such as NTP server and Audit log
server. All devices offer the same HTTPS/TLS based GUI interface for device
configuration and management
3.2 Physical Boundaries
The TOE physical boundary defines all hardware and firmware that is required to support
the TOE’s logical boundary and the TOE’s security functions. The TOE hardware platform
uses FreeScale MPC8378E CPU and the TOE’s firmware contains an embedded Linux
Kernel customized by 3eTI based on kernel version 4.6. In short, the TOE’s physical
boundary is the physical device for all models. The TOE provides a dedicated Ethernet
interface for local administration as well as additional ports for data traffic.
4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security Audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
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6. TOE Access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates auditable events for actions on the TOE with the capability of selective
audit record generation. The records of these events can be viewed within the TOE
Management Interface or they can be exported to audit systems in the Operational
Environment. The TOE generates records for its own actions, containing information about
the user/process associated with the event, the success or failure of the event, and the time
that the event occurred. Additionally, all administrator actions relating to the management
of TSF data and configuration data are logged by the TOE’s audit generation functionality.
4. 2 Cryptographic support
The TOE uses NIST SP 800-90 DRBG random bits generator and the following
cryptographic algorithms: AES, RSA, ECDSA, SHA, HMAC to secure the trusted channel
and trusted path communication. The TOE is designed to zeroize Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs) to mitigate the possibility of disclosure or modification.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE provides Identification and Authentication security functionality to ensure that all
users are properly identified and authenticated before accessing TOE functionality. The
TOE enforces a password-based authentication mechanism to perform administrative user
authentication. Passwords are obscured when being displayed during any attempted login.
Administrative users can be authenticated via the TOE’s local user database. The TOE also
authenticates its IPsec peers; the authentication is performed over IKEv2 SA phase of
mutual authentication between IPsec peers.
4.4 Security management
The Web Management Application of the TOE provides the capabilities for configuration
and administration. The Web Management Application can be accessed via the dedicated
local Ethernet port configured for “out-of-band” management. There is no local access such
as a serial console port. Therefore, the local and remote management is considered the
same for this evaluation.
An authorized administrator can modify, edit, and delete security parameters such as audit
data, configuration data, and user authentication data. The Web Management Application
also offers an authorized administrator the capability to manage how security functions
behave. For example, an administrator can enable/disable certain audit functions query and
set encryption/decryption algorithms used for network packets.
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4.5 Protection of the TSF
Internal testing of the TOE hardware, software, and software updates against tampering
ensures that all security functions are running and available before the TOE accepts any
communications. The TSF prevents reading of pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, private
keys, and passwords. The TOE uses electronic signature verification before any
firmware/software updates are installed.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE provides the following TOE Access functionality:
 TSF-initiated session termination when a connection (remote or local) is idle for a
configurable time period
 Administrative termination of own session
 TOE Access Banners
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using TLS/HTTPS, both
integrity and disclosure protection is ensured. The TOE uses IPsec to protect
communication with network entities, such as a log server and NTP server. This prevents
unintended disclosure or modification of logs and management information.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 11 March 2019
(NDcPP21)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP21 should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP21 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
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 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the NDcPP21 and performed by the Evaluation Team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
7 Documentation
The following document was available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Ultra Electronics 3eTI 636-Series User’s Guide, April 2020, 29000533-002,
Revision F
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for CyberFence
3e-636 Series Network Security Devices, Version 0.3, July 6, 2020 (DTR), as summarized
in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation Team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP21 including the tests associated with
optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 and 3.4.1, lists the tested devices, provides
a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
9 Evaluated Configuration
See Section 3.1.
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10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the
CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to
meet the SARs contained in the NDcPP21.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation Team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the
ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a
statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the CyberFence 3e-636 Series
Network Security Devices products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and
product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The Evaluation Team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation Team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF
provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the
Evaluation Team performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP21 related to
the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation Team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation Team ensured
the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the Evaluation Team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
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evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation Team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation Team found that
the TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation Team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation Team ran the set
of tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP21 and recorded the results in a
Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The Evaluation Team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The evaluator searched the
National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search), Vulnerability
Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 7/6/2020 with the following search
terms: "ultra electronics", "3eti", "darknode", "etherwatch", "etherguard", "ultracrypt",
"3e-636", "3e-636L3", "3e-636L2", "3e-636H", "3e-636A", "mpc8378e", "openssl", "Linux
Kernel 4.6". No residual vulnerabilities exist in the TOE.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation Team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation Team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The Validation Team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation Team is that
it demonstrates that the Evaluation Team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the installation guidance
to ensure the product is placed into the evaluated configuration.
As was noted in the Clarification of Scope section of this report, the product provides more
functionality than was covered by the evaluation. Only the functionality claimed in the SFR’s in the
Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the product needs to be assessed
separately and no further conclusions should be drawn as to effectiveness, nor can any claims be
made relative to their security based upon this evaluation.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices
(NDcPP21) Security Target, Version 0.8, 07/06/2020.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
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 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 11 March 2019
(NDcPP21)
[5] CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices (NDcPP21) Security Target,
Version 0.8, 07/06/2020 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP21) for CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network
Security Devices, Version 0.4, July 6, 2020 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report for CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security Devices,
Version 0.3, July 6, 2020 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for CyberFence 3e-636 Series Network Security
Devices, Version 0.4, July 6, 2020 (ETR).