BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA
including IC Dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021 (*)
Smartcard Controller
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA including IC Dedicated
Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 24 February 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................16
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................22
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................23
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................23
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................23
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................28
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................29
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA including IC Dedicated
Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based
on BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V2-2019. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-
0977-V2-2019 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA including IC
Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 10 February 2021. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 24 February
2021 is valid until 23 February 2026. Validity can be renewed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA including IC Dedicated
Software has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IC hardware platform “NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7021 VA with IC Dedicated Software” and documentation describing
instruction set and usage of the TOE. The TOE does not include a customer-specific
Security IC Embedded Software.
The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and
IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of the Boot
Software, which controls the boot process of the hardware platform. Furthermore, it
provides a Firmware Interface and optionally a Library Interface, simplifying access to the
hardware for the Security IC Embedded Software. A System Mode OS is available
(optional), offering ready-to-use resource and access management for customer
applications that do not want to be exposed to the more low-level features of the TOE. The
Flashloader OS (optional) supports download of code and data to Flash by the Composite
Product Manufacturer before Operational Usage (e.g. during development). The
Symmetric Crypto Library (optional) provides simplified access to frequently used
symmetric cryptography algorithms.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile “Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014” [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Security Services
SS.RNG Random Number Generator
SS.SW_RNG Hybrid Deterministic/Hybrid Physical Random Number Generator
SS.HW_TDES Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.SW_DES Triple-DES Software Support
SS.HW_AES AES coprocessor
SS.SW_AES AES Software Support
SS.Loader Loader
SS.SELF_TEST Self Test
SS.RESET Reset Functionality
SS. RECONFIG Post Delivery Configuration
Security Features
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Acess Control
SF.Object_Reuse Reuse of Memory
SF.PUF PUF
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 6.2. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA including IC Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
Deliverables for all configurations of the TOE
1 IC Hardware N7021 VA VA Wafer, modules and
package
2 IC Dedicated
Test Software
Test software 20.0 On-chip software
3 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
Boot software 20.0 On-chip software
4 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
Firmware interface 20.0 On-chip software
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
5 Document SmartMX3 family P71D320
Overview, pinning and electrical
characteristics Product data
sheet [11]
3.1 / 2019-06-04 PDF via NXP DocStore
6 Document SmartMX3 N7021 Instruction Set
Manual Objective data sheet
addendum [12]
1.4 / 2016-09-29 PDF via NXP DocStore
7 Document SmartMX3 family N7021 Wafer
and delivery specification
Objective wafer specification [13]
1.3 / 2018-05-15 PDF via NXP DocStore
8 Document SmartMX3 N7021 Post Delivery
Configuration Post Delivery
Configuration Objective data
sheet addendum [14]
1.1 / 2017-03-22 PDF via NXP DocStore
9 Document SmartMX3 N7021 Chip Health
Mode Chip Health Mode
Objective data sheet addendum
[15]
1.0 / 2016-12-06 PDF via NXP DocStore
10 Document SmartMX3 N7021 Peripheral
Configuration and Use,
Peripheral Configuration and
Use on the N7021, Objective
data sheet addendum [16]
1.5 / 2019-12-12 PDF via NXP DocStore
11 Document SmartMX3 N7021 MMU
configuration & FW interface,
Access / resource management
and security configuration, Data
Sheet addendum [17]
1.5 / 2017-11-03 PDF via NXP DocStore
12 Document SmartMX3 N7021 N7021 – Inter-
Card Communication, Inter-Card
Communication Functionality
and additional APIs on the
N7021, Objective data sheet
addendum [18]
1.1 / 2017-03-09 PDF via NXP DocStore
13 Document SmartMX3 N7021 N7021 – NVM
Operate Function NVM Operate
Function, Use on the N7021,
Objective data sheet addendum
[19]
1.0 / 2017-01-13 PDF via NXP DocStore
14 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7021, Information on
Guidance and Operation,
Guidance and Operation Manual
[20]
1.4 / 2019-06-04 PDF via NXP DocStore
Deliverables of the Flashloader OS
15 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
Flashloader OS 20.0 On-chip software
16 Document SmartMX3 N7021 FlashLoader,
FlashLoader for N7021: Protocol
and Application Objective data
sheet addendum [21]
1.3 / 2018-08-24 PDF via NXP DocStore
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
Deliverables of the Library Interface
17 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
Library Interface 20.0 On-chip software
18 Library File libComm 20.0 SDK installer via NXP
DocStore
19 Library File libCrc 20.0 SDK installer via NXP
DocStore
20 Library File libMem 20.0 SDK installer via NXP
DocStore
21 Library File libFL 20.0 SDK installer via NXP
DocStore
22 Document SmartMX3 N7021 Shared OS
Libraries Memory,
communication and CRC,
including guidance and
operation, Objective data sheet
addendum [22]
1.2 / 2017-11-03 PDF via NXP DocStore
Deliverables of the System Mode OS
23 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
System Mode OS 20.0 On-chip software
24 Document SmartMX3 N7021 NXP System
Mode OS Interface, UM
configuration and applications,
Objective data sheet addendum
[23]
1.6 / 2017-11-03 PDF via NXP DocStore
Deliverables of the Crypto Library Iron
25 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
Crypto Library Iron 2.0.6-01 On-chip software
26 Library Files Crypto Library Iron 2.0.6-01 SDK installer via NXP
DocStore
27 Document Crypto Library V1.0 on N7021
VA, Symmetric Cipher Library
(SymCfg), User manual [24]
1.2 / 2017-02-13 PDF via NXP DocStore
28 Document N7021 Crypto Library RNG
Library, Product user manual
[25]
1.3 / 2017-03-27 PDF via NXP DocStore
29 Document N7021 Crypto Library, Utils
Library, User manual [26]
1.1 / 2016-11-28 PDF via NXP DocStore
30 Document Crypto Library Iron on N7021
VA, Information on Guidance
and Operation, User manual [27]
2.1 / 2020-09-24 PDF via NXP DocStore
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021 Certification Report
The requirements for the delivery of the TOE are described in chapter 31 of the “Product
Data Sheet” [11]. For each delivery form of the hardware platform NXP offers two ways of
delivery of the TOE:
1. The customer collects the product himself at the NXP site (see table 4).
2. The product is sent to the customer by NXP with special protective measures.
The TOE documentation and related software (items are marked in Table 2) are delivered
in electronic form by the document control centre of NXP.
The hardware version can be identified by a coded nameplate as described in [13]
chapters 2.9.2 and 3.2.
The TOE further provides the FabKey which can be configured by the customer to hold
128 bytes for batch, wafer or die individual data and can be read out by the configuration
interface (see GetFabKey API in [17], chapter 5 and [23], chapter 5.2). The process of
FabKey submission is described in [11], chapter 26.
Only the configurations defined in [17], chapter 5.6.3.2, Tab. 5.40 and in [23], chapter
5.8.3.2, Tab. 5.57 are evaluated options.
The ST references the version of the Crypto Library. This version number is also noted in
the [27], chapter 2 thus the TOE components listed in the guidance are traceable to the
reference given in the Security Target [6] and [9]. Furthermore, [27], chapter 2 describes
the integrity and confidentiality check of files associated with the crypto library. It lists SHA-
256 values for each library file for identification purposes. In addition to identifying the
delivered components, the library identifies itself via its “GetVersion” command.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional
Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement the symmetric
cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by
encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG) and Deterministic Random Number Generator
(DRNG).
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical
probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of
functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE, and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 of the Security Target [6].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.Resp-Appl, OE.Process-Sec-IC, OE.Lim_Block_Loader,
OE.Loader_Usage, OE.Check-Init. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5. Architectural Information
The IC hardware is a microcontroller incorporating a central processing unit (CPU),
memories accessible via a Memory Management Unit (MMU), cryptographic
coprocessors, other security components and several electrical communication interfaces.
The central processing unit supports a 32-/16-bit instruction set optimized for smart card
applications. The first and in some cases the second byte of an instruction are used for
operation encoding. On-chip memories are ROM, RAM and Flash. The Flash can be used
as data or program memory. It consists of highly reliable memory cells, which are designed
to provide data integrity. Flash is optimized for applications that require reliable non-volatile
data storage for data and program code. Dedicated security functionality protects the
contents of all memories.
The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and
IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of the Boot
Software, which controls the boot process of the hardware platform. Furthermore, it
provides a Firmware Interface and optionally a Library Interface, simplifying access to the
hardware for the Security IC Embedded Software. A System Mode OS is available
(optional), offering ready-to-use resource and access management for customer
applications that do not want to be exposed to the more low-level features of the TOE. The
Flashloader OS (optional) supports download of code and data to Flash by the Composite
Product Manufacturer before Operational Usage (e.g. during development). The
Symmetric Crypto Library (optional) provides simplified access to frequently used
symmetric cryptography algorithms. More Information can be found in chapter 1.3.1 of [6]
and [9].
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer’s testing approach:
• All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in
order to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
• Different classes of tests are performed to test the TOE in a sufficient manner
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021 Certification Report
◦ Functional Module Verification: For the functional verification, black-box testing
and white-box testing is performed to ensure the correct functionality as
specified in the functional specification and customer specifications (ordering
options).
◦ Security Verification: This test category addresses the security mechanisms
described in the Security Architecture description. Two main categories of
security module verification are defined, i.e., integrity protection module
verification (fault injection) and DPA module verification (side-channel analysis).
This also includes black-box and white-box testing.
◦ Characterization: This mostly addresses production tests to measure varying
parameters in post-silicon verification while all parameters are within the
specified limits. The developer performs a Matrix Characterization Run to
measure parameters using varying processes (corner material) and different
temperatures.
◦ Qualification: This test category ensures that a developed IC is production ready
and has the expected quality. This addresses
▪ Electrostatic discharge due to electrostatic stress in the field (contactless
communication),
▪ Fast aging of the device due to high temperatures to guarantee the life time
of the product,
▪ Flash qualification to ensure that features like anti-tearing and wear levelling
work as specified,
▪ Package qualification to ensure that the IC can be placed in the final delivery
form (package) under industrial environments and the final product quality is
achieved, and
▪ PUF qualification to ensure that the promised PUF properties hold in field
conditions.
◦ Validation: Execution of all customer-visible use cases to ensure that the entire
system works as defined for customer-visible operation. This includes:
▪ on-chip test framework developed to use each officially released product
variant and execute each public available API,
▪ a Java Card OS is used to execute reference transactions for banking and
e-government, and
▪ MIFARE tests.
Elevator’s testing approach:
• The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the
TOE as described in the ST and to verify the developer’s test results by repeating
developer’s tests and additionally add independent tests.
• In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were
carried out:
◦ Module tests,
◦ Simulation tests,
◦ Tests in User Mode of logical card B,
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◦ Tests in System Mode of card A and B,
◦ Tests in Test Mode,
◦ Hardware tests, and
◦ Cryptographic library tests.
• With this kind of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The N7021 VA can be delivered with various configuration options as described in chapter
1.4.2 of [6] and [9]. The configuration options are divided into two groups: major
configuration options and minor configuration options.
Three major configurations can be chosen by the customer during the ordering process:
• Configuration based on 320 kBytes of Flash memory as code space,
• Configuration based on 240 kBytes of Flash memory as code space,
• Configuration based on 144 kBytes of ROM memory as code space.
Each major configuration is provided with several minor configuration options. These minor
configuration options (and all others) for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA can
be selected by the customer via Order Entry Form (see [28]). The Order Entry Form
identifies all the minor configuration options, which are supported by the major
configuration.
The N7021 VA hardware platform was tested including all minor configuration options that
can be selected based on Table 1.2 in chapter 1.4.2.2 of [6] and [9]. All minor
configurations were available to the evaluator. The major configuration does not have
dependencies to security features. All minor configuration options that are part of the
evaluation were tested. The minor configuration options behave as specified and
described in [11] and [20]. Therefore the results described in this document are applicable
for all minor configurations described in [6] and [9].
The TOE does not include a customer-specific Security IC Embedded Software.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
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(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V2-2019, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the life cycle and
updates in the documentation of the TOE.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Hardware
1 Cryptographic
primitive
3-key Triple DES [NIST SP800-67] |k| = 168 Yes
AES [FIPS197] |k| = 128 /
192 / 256
Yes
2 Confidentiality 3-key Triple DES
in ECB mode without
padding
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 128 /
192 / 256
No
AES
in ECB mode without
padding
[ADV_ATE, 6.8.3.7.1] |k| = 128 No
3 Key derivation Proprietary PUF key
derivation
[ADV_ATE, 6.8.3.7.1] |k| = 128 Yes
4 Integrity AES
in CBC-MAC mode for
MAC generation and
verification
based on PUF
[FIPS197]
[ISO/IEC 9797-1]
[ADV_ATE, 6.8.3.7.1]
|k| = 128 No
5 Confidentiality AES
in CBC mode
based on PUF
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP800-38A]
[ADV_ATE, 6.8.3.7.1]
|k| = 128 Yes
6 Random
number
generation
Physical RNG PTG.2 [AIS31] N/A N/A
Crypto Library (optional)
7 Cryptographic
primitives
3-key Triple DES [NIST SP800-67] |k| = 168 Yes
AES [FIPS197] |k| = 128 /
192 / 256
Yes
8 Confidentiality 3-key Triple DES
in CBC mode
[NIST SP800-67]
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 168 Yes
AES
in CBC mode
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 128 /
192 / 256
Yes
9 Authenticity 3-key Triple DES
in CBC-MAC mode
[NIST SP 800-67]
[ISO_9797-1]
|k| = 168 No
3-key Triple DES
in Retail-MAC mode
[NIST SP 800-67]
[ISO_9797-1]
|k| = 168 Yes
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
3-key Triple DES
in CMAC mode
[NIST SP 800-67]
[NIST SP800-38B]
|k| = 168 Yes
AES
in CBC-MAC mode
[FIPS197]
[ISO_9797-1]
|k| = 128 /
192 / 256
No
AES
in CMAC mode
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP800-38B]
|k| = 128 /
192 / 256
Yes
10 Random
number
generation
Hybrid-Physical PTG.3
based on
CTR_DRBG with
AES-128/192/256
[AIS31]
[NIST SP800-90A]
[FIPS197]
(see [AGD_CL_RNG])
N/A Yes
Hybrid-Physical PTG.3
based on
CTR_DRBG with
TDES
[AIS31]
[NIST SP800-90A]
[NIST SP800-67]
(see [AGD_CL_RNG])
N/A Yes
Hybrid-Deterministic
DRG.4 based on
CTR_DRBG with
AES-128/192/256
[AIS31]
[NIST SP800-90A]
[FIPS197]
(see [AGD_CL_RNG])
N/A Yes
Hybrid-Deterministic
DRG.4 based on
CTR_DRBG with
TDES
[AIS31]
[NIST SP800-90A]
[NIST SP800-67]
(see [AGD_CL_RNG])
N/A Yes
Flash Loader (optional, depends on crypto library)
11 Confidentiality AES
in CBC mode with
constant IV
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 128 Yes
12 Authenticity AES
in CMAC mode for MAC
verification
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP800-38B]
|k| = 128 Yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
13 Key derivation KBKDF based on
AES
in CMAC mode
[NIST SP800-108]
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP800-38B]
[ADV_ATE,
6.12.3.4.1.2.6])
|k| = 128 Yes
14 Authentication Mutual authentication
protocol based on MAC
generation and
verification with
AES
in CMAC mode
[ADV_ATE,
6.12.3.4.1.2.8]
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP800-38B]
|k| = 128 Yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
[FIPS 197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Announcing the
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), 2001-11-26, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[ISO_9797-1] ISO 9797-1: Information technology – Security techniques - Message Authentication
Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 1999-12, ISO/IEC.
[NIST SP 800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for BlockCipher Modes of
Operation, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[NIST SP 800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for BlockCipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005, National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
[NIST SP 800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 –Revision 2, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher – Revised January 2017, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce
[NIST SP 800-90a] NIST Special Publication 800-67 –Revision 2, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher – Revised January 2017, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce..
[NIST SP800-108] NIST SP 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions (Revised), October 2009, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[ADV_ATE] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 Classes ADV and ATE – Sys.P4,
Version 1.7, 2020-04-09, NXP Semiconductors
[AGD_CL_RNG] N7021 Crypto Library RNG Library, Product user manual, Version 1.3, 2017-03-27,
NXP Semiconductors
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
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Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software using the TOE.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of
the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been
correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the
evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as
outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
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EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
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Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021, Version 2.6, 2020-08-07, NXP Secure
Smart Card Controller N7021 VA, Security Target, NXP Semiconductors
(confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3.0, 2021-02-01, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR Summary), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security,
(confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers,
Version 14, 11.10.2017
• AIS14, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 03.08.2010
• AIS19, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical
Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC, Version 9, 03.11.2014
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document, 15.03.2017
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document, 03.07.2017
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, 15.05.2013
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, 08.06.2011
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1), 03.09.2009
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies, 12.11.2007
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document,
15.03.2017
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results, 28,09,2007
• AIS 39, Formal Methods, Version 3.0, 24.10.2008
• AIS 46, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 04.12.2013
• AIS 47, Details for the structure and content of the ETR for Site Certification, Version 1.0, 15.10.2010
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[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021, Version 2.6, 2020-08-07, NXP Secure
Smart Card Controller N7021 VA, Security Target Lite, NXP Semiconductors
(sanitised public document).
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the N7021 VA,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3 Version 3, 2021-02-01, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
[11] SmartMX3 family P71D320 Overview, pinning and electrical characteristics Product
data sheet, Version 3.1, 2019-06-04, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[12] SmartMX3 N7021 Instruction Set Manual Objective data sheet addendum, Version
1.4, 2016-09-29, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[13] SmartMX3 family N7021 Wafer and delivery specification Objective wafer
specification, Version 1.3, 2018-05-15, NXP Semiconductors (confidential
document)
[14] SmartMX3 N7021 Post Delivery Configuration Post Delivery Configuration Objective
data sheet addendum, Version 1.1, 2017-03-22, NXP Semiconductors (confidential
document)
[15] SmartMX3 N7021 Chip Health Mode Chip Health Mode Objective data sheet
addendum, Version 1.0, 2016-12-06, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[16] SmartMX3 N7021 Peripheral Configuration and Use, Peripheral Configuration and
Use on the N7021, Objective data sheet addendum, Version 1.5, 2019-12-12,
NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[17] SmartMX3 N7021 MMU configuration & FW interface, Access / resource
management and security configuration, Data Sheet addendum, Version 1.5,
2017-11-03, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[18] SmartMX3 N7021 N7021 – Inter-Card Communication, Inter-Card Communication
Functionality and additional APIs on the N7021, Objective data sheet addendum,
Version 1.1, 2017-03-09, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[19] SmartMX3 N7021 N7021 – NVM Operate Function NVM Operate Function, Use on
the N7021, Objective data sheet addendum, Version 1.0, 2017-01-13,
NXP Semiconductor (confidential document)
[20] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021, Information on Guidance and Operation,
Guidance and Operation Manual, Version 1.4, 2019-06-04, NXP Semiconductors
(confidential document)
[21] SmartMX3 N7021 FlashLoader, FlashLoader for N7021: Protocol and Application
Objective data sheet addendum, Version 1.3, 2018-08-24, NXP Semiconductors
(confidential document)
[22] SmartMX3 N7021 Shared OS Libraries Memory, communication and CRC, including
guidance and operation, Objective data sheet addendum, Version 1.2, 2017-11-03,
NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[23] SmartMX3 N7021 NXP System Mode OS Interface, UM configuration and
applications, Objective data sheet addendum, Version 1.6, 2017-11-03,
NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
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[24] Crypto Library V1.0 on N7021 VA, Symmetric Cipher Library (SymCfg), User
manual, Version 1.2, 2017-02-13, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[25] N7021 Crypto Library RNG Library, Product user manual, Version 1.3, 2017-03-27,
NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[26] N7021 Crypto Library, Utils Library, User manual, Version 1.1, 2016-11-28,
NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[27] Crypto Library Iron on N7021 VA, Information on Guidance and Operation, User
manual, Version 2.1, 2020-09-24, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[28] Order Entry Form, Version 1.9, 2017-03-27, NXP Semiconductors
[29] SITE TECHNICAL AUDIT REPORT (STAR), Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd.,
Icheon, Korea, Version 1, 13-10-2020, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[30] SITE TECHNICAL AUDIT REPORT (STAR), DISCO HI-TEC EUROPE GmbH,
Kirchheim (for NXP), Version 4, 15.12.2020, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[31] SITE TECHNICAL AUDIT REPORT (STAR), Firma C. Weber,
Leiterplattenverarbeitung, Verion 2, 15-12-2020, TÜF Informationstechnik GmbH
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V3-2021
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA including IC Dedicated
Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 24 February 2021, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site /
Company name
Adress Function
Development Sites
NXP Hamburg NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH
Troplowitzstr. 20
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Project management, central design database,
HW/FW/SW development and verification,
security architecture and evaluation, flaw
remediation, trust provisioning, and customer
support.
NXP Gratkorn NXP Semiconductors Austria
GmbH
Mikronweg 1
8101 Gratkorn
Austria
Project management, HW/FW/SW
development and verification, security
architecture and evaluation, trust provisioning,
and document control system (DocStore).
NXP Eindhoven
Development
NXP Semiconductors
Building 46, High Tech Campus
HTC-46.3-west
5656 AE Eindhoven
The Netherlands
HW/FW/SW development, security
architecture.
NXP Glasgow 2 NXP Glasgow EK
Pegasus House, Scottish
Enterprise Technology Park,
Bramah Ave
East Kilbride, Glasgow G75 0RD
Hardware development, security architecture
and reviews.
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Scotland, UK
NXP Leuven NXP Semiconductors
Interleuvenlaan 80
B-3001 Leuven
Belgium
Hardware development, security reviews.
NXP Munich North NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH
Schatzbogen 7
81829 Munich
Germany
SW development.
NXP Nijmegen NXP Semiconductors Nijmegen
B.V.
Gerstweg 2
6534AE Nijmegen
The Netherlands
Verification of design data and mask data,
sample preparation.
GlobalLogic Wroclaw GlobalLogic REC sp. z o.o.
Strzegomska 56B Street
53-611 Wroclaw
Poland
SW development and verification.
Sii Gdansk 2 SII
Olivia Prime Building, 10th floor,
Grunwaldzka 472E
80-309 Gdansk
Poland
SW development and verification.
NXP Eindhoven IT NXP Semiconductors
Netherlands B.V.
Building 60, High Tech Campus
HTC60, Secure Room (rooms
131, 133)
5656 AG Eindhoven
The Netherlands
IT engineering and generic support.
NXP Bangalore NXP India Private Limited
Manyata Technology Park,
Nagawara Village, Kasaba Hobli
Bangalore 560 045
India
Data center.
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Colt Datacenter
Hamburg
Colt Datacenter Hamburg
Obenhauptstrasse
22335 Hamburg
Germany
Data center.
Akquniet Datacenter
Hamburg
Akquinet Datacenter Hamburg
Ulzburger Strasse 201
22850 Norderstedt
Germany
Data center.
Digital Reality Phoenix Digital Realty Data Center
120 E Van Buren St, Phoenix
AZ 85004
U.S.A.
Data center.
Equinix Singapore EQUINIX
20 Ayer Rajah Crescent, IBX
SG1, Level 5 Unit 5, Ayer Rajah
Industrial Park
139964 Singapore
Data center.
NXP Bucharest NXP Semiconductors Romania
Campus 6, Bulevardul Iuliu Maniu
6L, 061103 Bucureşti
Romania
IT engineering and support.
NXP Guadalajara NXP Guadalajara
Periferico Sur #8110 Col. El
Mante JALISCO,
45609 Tlaquepaque
Mexico
IT engineering and support.
Production Sites
TSMC Hsinchu Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company Limited
Fab 2/5, Fab 8, Fab 14A
Mask data preparation, Mask and wafer
production.
Chipbond Hsinchu Chipbond Technology
Corporation
No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V Science
Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Bumping.
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NXP ATBK NXP Semiconductors Thailand
(ATBK)
303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd.,
Laksi
Bangkok 10210
Thailand
Test centre, wafer treatment, module
assembly, (pre-) personalization, delivery, and
test program engineering (TPE).
NXP ATKH NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd
(ATKH)
#10, Chin 5th Road, N.E.P.Z
Kaohsiung 81170
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Test centre, wafer treatment, module
assembly, (pre-) personalization, and delivery.
NXP Hamburg See NXP Hamburg. Test Centre, personalization, and delivery.
Table 4: Relevant development/production sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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