BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
for
Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with
optional RSA2048 v2.03.008, SHA-2 V1.01, Toolbox
v2.03.008 and with specific IC dedicated software
(firmware)
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022 (*)
Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048
v2.03.008, SHA-2 V1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware)
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP strictly conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 19 October 2022
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................26
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................27
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048 v2.03.008,
SHA-2 V1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware), has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-0879-V4-2020. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V4-
2020 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional
RSA2048 v2.03.008, SHA-2 V1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 and with specific IC dedicated
software (firmware), was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 2 September 2022. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 19 October
2022 is valid until 18 October 2027. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048 v2.03.008,
SHA-2 V1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware), has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Melli-Beese-Str. 9
86159 Augsburg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional
Software Library RSA2048 v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01, and Toolbox v2.03.008, as well as
with specific IC dedicated software (firmware). The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-
architecture and is compatible to the 80251 microcontroller architecture. The major
components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), acting as
one, the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption
Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based
or the contactless interface.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management:
The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases. Different
operation modes help to protect the TOE during each phase of its
lifecycle.
SF_PS Protection against Snooping:
The TOE uses various means to protect from snooping of memories
and busses and prevents single stepping.
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks:
This TOE implements protection against modifying attacks of
memories, alarm lines and sensors.
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks:
The memory access control of the TOE uses a memory management
unit (MMU) to control the access to the available physical memory by
using virtual memory addresses and to segregate the code and data
to a privilege level model. The MMU controls the address
permissions of up seven privileged levels and gives the software the
possibility to define different access rights. The address permissions
of the privilege levels are controlled by the MMU. In case of an
access violation the MMU will trigger a reset and then a trap service
routine can react on the access violation.
SF_CS Cryptographic Support:
The TOE is equipped with hardware accelerators and software
modules to support standard symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic operations. The components are a symmetric
coprocessor supporting the DES and AES algorithms (note that AES
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
is not in scope of the evaluation) and a combination of a coprocessor
and software modules to support RSA cryptography. Furthermore,
the TOE is equipped with an optional SHA-2 library and HASH
module as well as an AIS31 conformant TRNG that meets the
functionality class PTG.2.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022 Certification Report
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048 v2.03.008, SHA-2
V1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW M7893 Smart Card IC B11 (produced in
Dresden)
Complete modules, with or
without inlay mounting, with or
without inlay antenna mounting,
in form of plain wafers, in an IC
case or in bare dies
2 SW RSA library (optional) RSA2048
v2.03.008
Object code in electronic
form
3 SW SHA-2 library (optional) SHA-2 v1.01 Object code in electronic
form
4 SW Toolbox library (optional) Toolbox
v2.03.008
Object code in electronic
form
5 FW STS Self Test Software (the IC
Dedicated Test Software)
FW-identifier
78.019.03.4
Stored in test ROM on the IC
(patch in SOLID FLASH)
6 FW RMS Resource Management
System (the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
FW-identifier
78.019.03.4
Stored in reserved area of
user ROM on the IC (patch in
SOLID FLASH)
7 FW Service Algorithm (SA) FW-identifier
78.019.03.4
Stored in reserved area of
user ROM on the IC (patch in
SOLID FLASH)
8 FW Flash Loader FW-identifier
78.019.03.4
Stored in reserved area of
user ROM and parts of it in
SOLID FLASH on the IC
(patch in SOLID FLASH)
9 SW7
ROM code (including Embedded
Software and crypto libraries)
– Stored in User ROM on the
IC
10 SW8
NVM image (including Embedded
Software and crypto libraries)
– Stored in Flash memory on
the IC
11 DOC SLx 70 Family Production and
Personalization User’ Manual
2015-04-01 Personalized pdf-file
12 DOC M7893 Hardware Reference
Manual
Version 3.0,
2019-06-24
Personalized pdf-file
13 DOC M7893 Errata Sheet Version 5.0,
2020-05-07
Personalized pdf-file
14 DOC M7893 Security Guidelines 2022-08-18 Personalized pdf-file
15 DOC 16-bit Security Controller Family
SLE 70 Programmer’s Reference
Manual
Version 9.14,
2019-12-03
Personalized pdf-file
7
Only in case the IC Embedded Software Developer provides Infineon with code for ROM.
8
Only in case the IC Embedded Software Developer provides Infineon with code for Flash memory.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
16 DOC SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library
for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC /
Toolbox User Interface (2.03.008)
2021-07-27 Personalized pdf-file (optional)
17 DOC Crypto@2304T User Manual 2010-03-23 Personalized pdf-file
18 DOC SLx70 Family Secure Hash
Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224,
SHA 512/384) Library Version V1.01
2020-08-19 Personalized pdf-file (optional)
19 DOC AMM Advanced Mode NRG SAM
Addendum
Version 2.0,
2019-10-22
Personalized pdf-file (optional)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various procedures
and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any discrepancies
between the TOE respective parts of it send by the TOE Manufacturer and the version
received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.
Furthermore,the delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various
procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any
discrepancies between the TOE respective parts of it send by the TOE Manufacturer and
the version received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.
Three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
● Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalization data, Bundle Business package) from the IC Embedded Software
Developer to the TOE Manufacturer.
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see below).
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The
identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the
chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus
assigned to the entire development and production process.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified as M7893 B11. Another characteristic of the
TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via the
Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) see [16] chapter 7.10.3.
The firmware part of the TOE is also identified also via the GCIM for all of the firmware
parts.
The RSA (optional), SHA-2 (optional), Toolbox (optional), and Base library (optional), as
separate software parts of the TOE, are also identified by their unique version numbers.
The user can identify these versions by calculating the hash signatures of the provided
library files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the version numbers is provided in
the Security Target [6] and [9] section 10.
For further, detailed information regarding TOE identification see [6] and [9], section 1.2.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022 Certification Report
Please also note that as the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE
Manufacturer can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the
responsibility of the Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the
implemented software (developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows
detection of modifications after the delivery.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE implements a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm (TDES) to ensure
the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a True Random Number Generator (TRNG).
The RSA library is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The SHA-2 library provides the
calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during TDES and RSA cryptographic functions performed by the TOE),
against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against
abuse of functionality.
Hence, the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE,
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform), OE.Resp-Appl (Treatment of
User Data) and OE.Process-Sec-IC (Protection during Composite product manufacturing).
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a platform for an operating sytem and
application software used in smartcards but also in any other device or form factor
requiring a high level of resistance against attackers. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 2.1.
The TOE consists of a core system, memories, computing peripherals, system peripherals,
standard peripherals, an analogue module and the connecting busses. The major
components of the core system are the double CPU (Central Processing Units) including
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
the internal encryption leaving no plain data, the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and
MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The Block diagram provides a simplified
overview upon the hardware subsystems in the Security Target [6] and [9], figure 1.
The symmetric co-processor (SCP) combines both AES ( note that AES is not in scope of
evaluation) and Triple-DES with dual-key or triple-key hardware acceleration. The
Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor is called Crypto2304T and provides hardware support
for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and EC (EC is not part of evaluation).
The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic RSA library and the SHA-2
libraries and the supporting Toolbox and Base libraries. If RSA or Toolbox or combinations
hereof are part of the shipment, automatically the Base Library of the same version is
included.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer performed five categories of tests:
● Simulation Tests (design verification): In the course of the development of the TOE
simulation tests are carried out. These simulation tests yield CRC sums, which are used
in the further testing.
● Qualification Tests: For each mask version a qualification test is performed. Via the
results of these tests a qualification report is generated. The positive result of the
qualification is one part of the necessary testing results documented with the
qualification report. The qualification report is completed after the verification testing
(see below) and the security evaluation (see below) are performed successfully. The
tests performed and their results are listed in the qualification report. The results of the
tests are the basis on which it is decided, whether the TOE is released to production.
● Verification Tests: With these tests in user mode the functionality of the end user
environment is checked.
● Security Evaluation Tests: In the context of security evaluation testing the security
mechanisms is tested again in the user mode only focusing on security. Here is not only
verified that the security functionality is working as this was already tested on every
single TOE during production, but also it is tested how well the security functionality is
working and the effectiveness is calculated. This step is necessary as the mechanisms
work together and that must be evaluated in the user mode.
● Production Tests: Before delivery on every chip production tests are performed. These
tests use the CRC checksums attained by the simulation tests. The aim of these tests is
to check whether each chip is functioning correctly.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022 Certification Report
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks, which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC M7893 B11.
Depending on the blocking configuration, a M7893 product can have a different user
available configuration as described in Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 1.1. The M7893
B11 allows for a maximum of configuration possibilities defined by the customer order
following the market needs. For example, a M7893 B11 product can come in one project
with the fully available ROM and SOLID FLASH™ Non Volatile Memory (NVM) or in
another project without any user available ROM and with any other SOLID FLASH™ NVM-
size below the physical implementation size, or with a different RAM size. Even more, the
user has the free choice, whether he needs the symmetric co-processor SCP, or the
asymmetric co-processor Crypto2304T, or both, or none of them. In addition, the user
decides, whether the TOE comes with a combination of software libraries or without any.
And, to be even more flexible, various interface options can be chosen as well.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
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(iii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators,
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V4-2020, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the removal of the
CRT-based RSA signature generation and decryption (RSA-v2.03.008), the RSA4096
library removal, the removal of Elliptic Curve Cryptography library and SCL library.
Beside the changes above, the scope of the evaluation is reduced as the following SFRs
(and the associated functionality) are removed:
● FCS_COP.1/AES,
● FCS_CKM.4/AES,
● FCS_CKM.1/RSA-v2.03.008.
Further, the block cipher modes for FCS_COP.1/TDES were reduced to ECB, and the
CRT-based RSA signature generation / decryption was removed from scope
(FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008), the Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/RSA-
v2.03.008)is removed from the scope.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP strictly conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
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security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
Conformance evaluation and assessment to claimed cryptographic functionality standards
is documented in the confidential report “Cryptographic Standards Compliance
Verification” [21]. For a list of standards see annex C of part D.
The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was also not assessed by BSI. However, the
evaluation according to the TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any
implementation weaknesses.
Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 100-Bit-
Level assessment was given. Consequently, the targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has
been achieved for those functionalities as well.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software using the TOE.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of
the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been
correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the
evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as
outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
● The TOE is delivered to the Composite Product Manufacturer and to the Security IC
Embedded Software Developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
Composite Product Issuer together with the application, which runs on the TOE.
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The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [19], [16], [17], [15], [14], [18],
[13], and [12], especially the recommendations for secure usage in [19] and [16, 2.11 /
9.1] have to be considered.
● The SHA-2 implementation is not intended to be used on confidential input data. For
such use cases, specific security improvements and side channel analysis are
recommended (see [18, 2.3.2] and [19, 10.4]).
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [20] have to be considered.
In addition the following hints resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect
has to be considered:
● The Security IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to
Infineon to let them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory or ROM) or to the
Composite Product Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the Security IC Embedded Software Developer to the
Composite Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is
required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target lite [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE)
is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version
of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APB™ Advanced Peripheral Bus
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
AXI™ Advanced eXtensible Interface Bus Protocol
BPU Bill Per Use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office
for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
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BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
CI Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CIM Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
Crypto2304T Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
CRT Chinese Reminder Theorem
DCLB Digital Contactless Bridge
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC Error Correction Code
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EDC Error Detection Code
EDU Error Detection Unit
EEPROM Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro Magnetic Analysis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
Flash EEPROM Flash Memory
FL Flash Loader software
FW Firmware
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ICO Internal Clock Oscillator
ID Identification
IMM Interface Management Module
IRAM Internal Random Access Memory
IT Information Technology
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ITP Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
I/O Input/Output
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU Memory Management Unit
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OS Operating system
ST Security Target
PEC Peripheral Event Channel
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
RAM Random Access Memory
RMS Resource Management System
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rives-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAM Service Algorithm Minimal
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SF Security Feature
SFR Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional
Requirement, the specific meaning is given in the context
SO Security Objective
SOLID FLASH™ An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
STS Self Test Software
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TM Test Mode (STS)
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSC TOE Security Functions Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM User Mode (STS)
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UmSLC User Mode Security Life Control
WDT Watch Dog Timer
3DES Triple DES Encryption Standards
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022, Version 4.6, 2022-08-18, Public
Security Target M7893 B11, Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2022-10-13, EVALUATION TECHNICAL
REPORT (ETR Summary) Common Criteria CC 3.1 (EAL6 augmented with
ALC_FLR.1) , TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022, Version 4.6, 2022-08-18, Confidential
Security Target M7893 B11, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
0879-V5-2022, Version 2, 2022-10-13, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR
COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR COMP), Common Criteria CC 3.1 (EAL6
augmented with ALC_FLR.1), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
9
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an den Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical
Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 41, Version 2, Anleitungen zur Erstellung von Protection Profiles and Security Targets
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 47, Version 1.1, Regelungen zur Zertifizierung von Entwicklungs- und Produktionsstandorten
nach Common Criteria (Site Certification)
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[11] Configuration list for the TOE of BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022, Version 3.1, 2022-06-
14, Chipcard and Security, Configuration Management Scope ALC, M7893 B11,
Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[12] SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (2.03.008),v2.03.008,2021-07-27, Infineon Technologies AG
[13] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG
[14] 16-bit Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer’s Reference Manual, v9.14, 2019-12-
03, Infineon Technologies AG
[15] M7893 Errata Sheet, v5, 2020-05-07, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] M7893 Hardware Reference Manual, v3.0, 2019-06-24, Infineon Technologies AG
[17] AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM Addendum to M7893 Hardware Reference
Manual, v2.0, 2019-10-22, Infineon Technologies AG
[18] SLx70 Family Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224, SHA 512/384) Library
Version V1.01, 2020-08-19, Infineon Technologies AG
[19] M7893 Security Guidelines, 2022-08-18, Infineon Technologies AG
[20] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’ Manual, 2015-04-01, Infineon
Technologies AG
[21] Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification Report, Version 2, 2022-05-30,
SINGLE EVALUATION REPORT ADDENDUM to ETR-Part ASE Cryptographic
Standards Compliance Verification , TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048 v2.03.008,
SHA-2 V1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware),
(Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 19 October 2022, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE.
Beside the production and development sites, the relevant TOE distribution centres are as
follows:
Distribution Center name Company name and address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
IFX Morgan Hill Infineon Technologies North America Corp.
18275 Serene Drive
Morgan Hill, CA 95037
USA
K&N Großostheim Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V5-2022
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level above
100 Bits
1 Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-67] |k| = 112, 168 No
2 Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES in ECB
mode
[NIST SP800-67],
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 112, 168 No
3 Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA encryption/
decryption/
signature
generation/
verification (only
modular
exponentiation
part)
[PKCS #1],
[IEEE_P1363]
Modulus
length = 1976
- 2048
Yes
4 Physical True RNG
PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A N/A
5 SHA-{256, 512}
(SW)
[FIPS180-4] None N/A
6 SHA-256 (HW) [FIPS180-4] None N/A
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Referenced documents in Table 3:
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher – Revised November 2017, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, 2001-12, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[FIPS180-4] FIPS BUB 180-4 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015, U.S. department of
Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[IEEE_P1363] IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography, January 2000,
Microprocessor and Microcomputer Standards Committee of the IEEE Computer
Society.
[PKCS #1] RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2, November 2016, Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF).
Note: End of report
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