BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
for
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP2
from
SUSE LLC
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 (*)
Operating Systems
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server
Version 15 SP2
from SUSE LLC
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating
Systems Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019, CCEVS-VR-
PP-0047, NIAP,
Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version
1.0, 19 February 2016, CCEVS-VR-PP-0039, NIAP
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 11 November 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................24
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the extended component
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 that is not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
SOGIS MRA.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP2 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP2 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 10
November 2021. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: SUSE LLC.
The product was developed by: SUSE LLC.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 11 November
2021 is valid until 10. November 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP2 has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
SUSE LLC
10 Canal Park, Suite 200
Cambridge, MA 02141
USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, a highly-configurable
Linux-based operating system which has been developed to provide a good level of
security as required in commercial environments.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019,
CCEVS-VR-PP-0047, NIAP [8] and an Extended Package [11]:
● Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016, CCEVS-VR-
PP-0039, NIAP.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.3. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 3 and there
is one additional Extended Component defined in the Protection Profile. Thus the TOE is
CC Part 3 extended. The TOE meets the assurance requirements defined in the Protection
Profile.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Audit The Linux kernel implements the core of the LAF functionality.
It gathers all audit events, analyses these events based on the
audit rules and forwards the audit events that are requested to
be audited to the audit daemon executing in user space.
Audit events are generated in various places of the kernel. In
addition, a user space application can create audit records
which needs to be fed to the kernel for further processing.
Cryptographic support The TOE provides cryptographically secured network
communication channels to allow remote users to interact with
the TOE. Using one of the following cryptographically secured
network channels, a user can request the following services:
● OpenSSH: The OpenSSH application provides access to the
command line interface of the TOE. Users may employ
OpenSSH for interactive sessions as well as for non-interactive
sessions. The console provided via OpenSSH provides the
same environment as a local console. OpenSSH implements
the SSHv2 protocol.
● dm_crypt: the TOE provides confidentiality protected data
storage using the device mapper target dm_crypt. Using this
device mapper target, the Linux operating system offers
administrators and users cryptographically protected block
device storage space.
● OpenSSL: the TOE offers the TLS protocol to protect
network links to remote systems. The TLS protocol stack can
be used as TLS client.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
The cryptographic primitives for implementing the above
mentioned cryptographic communication protocols are
provided by OpenSSL.
Identification and Authentication User identification and authentication in the TOE includes all
forms of interactive login (e.g. using the SSH protocol or log in
at the local console) as well as identity changes through the su
or sudo command. These all rely on explicit authentication
information provided interactively by a user.
The authentication security function allows password-based
authentication. For SSH access, public-key-based
authentication is also supported.
Password quality enforcement mechanisms are offered by the
TOE which are enforced at the time when the password is
changed.
Discretionary Access Control DAC allows owners of named objects to control the access
permissions to these objects. These owners can permit or
deny access for other users based on the configured
permission settings. The DAC mechanism is also used to
ensure that untrusted users cannot tamper with the TOE
mechanisms.
In addition to the standard Unix-type permission bits for file
system objects as well as IPC objects, the TOE implements
POSIX access control lists. These ACLs allow the specification
of the access to individual file system objects down to the
granularity of a single user.
Security Management The security management facilities provided by the TOE are
usable by authorized users and/or authorized administrators to
modify the configuration of TSF.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions and
Threats. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] chapters 3.1 and 3.2.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP2
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW/
ISO
Image
SLE-15-SP2-Full-x86_64-QU1-Media1.iso
(SHA256:
64aea562b5f51381b57f0c295fdd96c49b64c5f076
0f2b62752fca54f4d999fd )
SLES 15 SP2 D/L
2 SW/
ISO
Image
SLE-15-SP2-Full-aarch64-QU1-Media1.iso
(SHA256:
f04da5cf32448d2fafb5920175add0a42bfbacd0b6f
f20303c793d46ee07dd4b
SLES 15 SP2 D/L
3 SW/
ISO
Image
SLE-15-SP2-Full-s390x-QU1-Media1.iso
(SHA256:
00f6d37fcf910ebf039bf9b13ef85243610443a418
3a3817a9ede8d389f0cee9
SLES 15 SP2 D/L
4 DOC Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide
for SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server 15 SP2
(NIAP)
(SHA256:
73dd8a8d47228838d65e9a4440dc6267d634a05
1d9befec4abd72c3e5968da39)
SLES 15 SP2,
Document version
0.16
D/L
5 SW openssh 8.1p1-5.18.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
6 SW openssh-helpers 8.1p1-5.18.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
7 SW openssh-fips 8.1p1-5.18.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
8 SW openssl-1_1 1.1.1d-11.20.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
9 SW sudo 1.8.22-4.15.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
10 SW dnsmasq 2.78-7.6.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
11 SW permissions 20181224-23.3.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
12 SW kernel-default 5.3.18-24.78.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
13 SW audit 2.8.1-12.3.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
14 SW libaudit1 2.8.1-12.3.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
15 SW libauparse0 2.8.1-12.3.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
No. Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
16 SW python3-audit 2.8.1-12.3.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
17 SW audit-audispd-plugins 2.8.1-12.3.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
18 SW screen 4.6.2-5.3.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
19 SW libxml2-tools 2.9.7-3.34.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
20 SW libxml2-2 2.9.7-3.34.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
21 SW python3-libxml2-python 2.9.7-3.34.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
22 SW grub2 2.04-9.45.2 D/L and verification
through TOE
23 SW grub2-systemd-sleep-plugin 2.04-9.45.2 D/L and verification
through TOE
24 SW grub2-snapper-plugin 2.04-9.45.2 D/L and verification
through TOE
25 SW libaudit1-32bit 2.8.1-12.3.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
26 SW shim 15.4-3.20.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
27 SW grub2-x86_64-efi 2.04-9.45.2 D/L and verification
through TOE
28 SW grub2-i386-pc 2.04-9.45.2 D/L and verification
through TOE
29 SW s390-tools 2.11.0-9.31.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
30 SW grub2-s390x-emu 2.04-9.45.2 D/L and verification
through TOE
31 SW grub2-arm64-efi 2.04-9.45.2 D/L and verification
through TOE
32 SW cpio cpio-2.12-3.9.1 D/L and verification
through TOE
33 SW polkit polkit-0.116-
3.3.1
D/L and verification
through TOE
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
The delivery of the TOE is electronic download only in the form of ISO-Images and
additional rpm packages. The packages that make up the TOE are digitally signed using
GPG. The key of the developer is contained on the installation ISO, as described in ECG
[9].
The developer provides and operates the download site and provides checksums for the
downloaded images that enable the user to verify the integrity of the download.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Auditing, Cryptographic Support,
Identification and Authentication, Discretionary Access Control and Security Management.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.
● The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are
provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of
access should have a separate account dedicated for that use.
● The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
SLES is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking Linux based operating system. It
provides a platform for a variety of applications.
The SLES evaluation covers a potentially distributed network of systems running the
evaluated versions and configurations of SLES as well as other peer systems operating
within the same management domain. The hardware platforms selected for the evaluation
consist of machines which are available when the evaluation has completed and to remain
available for a substantial period of time afterwards.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) consist of functions of SLES that run in kernel mode
plus a set of trusted processes. These are the functions that enforce the security policy as
defined in this Security Target. Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used
by an administrative user need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way.
But as with other operating system evaluations they are not considered to be part of this
TSF.
The hardware, the BIOS firmware and potentially other firmware layers between the
hardware and the TOE are considered to be part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, including applications allowing access
of the TOE via cryptographically protected communication channels, such as SSH.
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System administration tools include the standard command line tools. A graphical user
interface for system administration or any other operation is not included in the evaluated
configuration.
5.1. TOE Structure and Security Functions
The TOE is structured in much the same way as many other operating systems, especially
Unix-type operating systems. It consists of a kernel, which runs in the privileged state of
the processor and provides services to applications (which can be used by calling kernel
services via the system call interface). Direct access to the hardware is restricted to the
kernel, so whenever an application wants to access hardware like disk drives, network
interfaces or other peripheral devices, it has to call kernel services. The kernel then checks
if the application has the required access rights and privileges and either performs the
service or rejects the request.
The kernel is also responsible for separating the different user processes. This is done by
the management of the virtual and real memory of the TOE which ensures that processes
executing with different attributes cannot directly access memory areas of other processes
but have to do so using the inter-process communication mechanism provided by the
kernel as part of its system call interface.
The TSF of the TOE also includes a set of trusted processes, which when called by a user,
operate with extended privileges. The programs that represent those trusted processes on
the file system are protected by the file system discretionary access control security
function enforced by the kernel.
In addition, the execution of the TOE is controlled by a set of configuration files, which are
also called the TSF database. Those configuration files are also protected by the file
system discretionary access control security function enforced by the kernel.
The TOE includes a secure system initialization function which brings the TOE into a
secure state after it is powered on or after a reset. This function ensures that user
interaction with the TOE can only occur after the TOE is securely initialized and in a secure
state.
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
Auditing
The Lightweight Audit Framework (LAF) is designed to be an audit system making Linux
compliant with the requirements from Common Criteria. LAF is able to intercept all system
calls as well as retrieving audit log entries from privileged user space applications. The
subsystem allows configuring the events to be actually audited from the set of all events
that are possible to be audited.
Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptographically secured communication to allow remote entities to
log into the TOE. For interactive usage, the SSHv2 protocol is provided. The TOE provides
the server side as well as the client side applications. Using OpenSSH, password-based
and public-key-based authentication are allowed.
In addition, the TOE provides confidentiality protected data storage using the device
mapper target dm_crypt.
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Identification and Authentication
User identification and authentication in the TOE includes all forms of interactive login
(e.g. using the SSH protocol or log in at the local console) as well as identity changes.
The authentication security function allows password-based authentication. For SSH
access, public-key-based authentication is also supported.
Discretionary Access Control
DAC allows owners of named objects to control the access permissions to these objects.
These owners can permit or deny access for other users based on the configured
permission settings. In addition to the standard Unix-type permission bits for file system
objects as well as IPC objects, the TOE implements POSIX access control lists.
Security Management
The security management facilities provided by the TOE are usable by authorized users
and/or authorized administrators to modify the configuration of TSF.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The evaluator tested on hardware setup defined in the ST:
● x86 64bit Intel Xeon processors: Delta D20x-M1-PC-32-8-96GB-1TB-2x1G
● x86 64bit AMD processors: AMD EPYC DP Server R181-Z90
● ARM processors: Gigabyte R181-T90
● IBM based on System z: IBM Z System z15
All tests were performed on all hardware platforms. The evaluated configuration is
specified in chapter 8 of this report.
7.1. Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator performed all the tests defined in the PP [8] and SSH-EP [11], which makes
it around 100 tests. For the test requirements on crypto primitives and RNG, the CACS
ACVP tests were performed on all applicable cryptographic algorithms. The evaluator tests
are partly manual tests, and partly automated. The evaluator executed tests on the TOE,
most notably kernel version 5.3.18-24.78-default.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
Three types of tests were performed - independent testing as defined by the Protection
Profile [8] and the Extended Package [11], entropy tests, and CAVS algorithm testing:
Independent testing
The tests mainly comprised of tests that test the external interfaces, but there were also
tests that target TOE security behaviour that is normally hidden from the outside:
● key destruction test: this test includes the modification of a test client to determine the
used keys, with a subsequent search through the TOE physical memory.
● stack protection: a tool has been used that analyses the binary file meta data to
determine whether stack protection is enforced
● communication modification: proxy setups where deployed in order to modify live-traffic
to exercise the TOE behavior for situations where the TLS protocol is violated
Algorithm testing
Multiple algorithm testing is required to be performed by the Protection Profile and the
Extended Package. The ACVP parser tool was used to trigger the cryptographic interfaces
with the given test vectors for validation.
Entropy tests
A modified version of the kernel with an additional interface was used to be able to gather
raw entropy data from the kernel.
No deviation from the expected results have been encountered.
7.2. Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator performed 10 test cases.
Linux standard tools (strace, GNU C compiler, nmap) have been used as part of the
testing.
The evaluator used the MITRE CVE portal, SUSE support center, and Google searches to
find publicly documented vulnerabilities. This lead to some tests in the areas of CPU
checks and external network interfaces.
In summary, the following aspects were subject to testing:
1. Unmitigated OS-relevant CPU vulnerabilities
2. Potentially inappropriately controlled DBus services
3. Potentially insecure netlink message processing
4. Undocumented security-relevant programs
5. Potentially inappropriate access control to configuration files
6. Unexpected network interfaces
7. Potential chrony vulnerability
8. General privilege escalation scan
No deviation from the expected results have been found.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE listed in the Evaluated
Configuration Guide (ECG) [9] section 1.3.1 as well as in ST [6], section 1.4.4:
● x86 64bit Intel Xeon processors: Delta D20x-M1-PC-32-8-96GB-1TB-2x1G
● x86 64bit AMD processors: AMD EPYC DP Server R181-Z90
● ARM processors: Gigabyte R181-T90
● IBM based on System z: IBM Z System z15
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components claimed in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.3 and defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems
Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019, CCEVS-VR-PP-0047, NIAP,
Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19
February 2016, CCEVS-VR-PP-0039, NIAP
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
19 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The tables in annex C of part D of this report give an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the tables in annex C of part D with 'no' achieves a
security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ACVP Automated Cryptographic Validation Program
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
20 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECG Evaluated Configuration Guide
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TLS Transport Layer Security
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
21 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021, Version 0.15, 2021-08-27, Security Target
for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP2 NIAP OSPP Compliance, SUSE LLC
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 5, 2021-11-09, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems Version 4.2.1, 22 April
2019, CCEVS-VR-PP-0047, NIAP
[9] Common Criteria NIAP Evaluated Configuration Guide for SUSE LINUX Enterprise
Server 15 SP2 (NIAP), Version 0.16, 2021-09-22
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, 2021-10-01, MASTER CM List (confidential
document)
[11] Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016,
CCEVS-VR-PP-0039, NIAP
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 23, Version 9, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler (Collection of Developer
Evidence)
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
22 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
0 Authentication The client authenticates either with UserID & password (#3) or by cryptographic
means as shown in #1 and#2 and verified by the server respectively.
1 RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-PKC-
S1-v1.5 using
SHA-2
(rsa-sha2-256 or
rsa-sha2-512)
[RFC3447],
PKCS#1
v2.1sec.8.2(RSA)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
[RFC4253] (SSH-
TRANS) for host
authentication
[RFC4252], sec.
7(SSH-AUTH) for
user
authentication
Modulus
length: 2048,
3072and
4096
yes Pubkeys are
exchanged
trustworthily
out of band,
e.g. checking
fingerprints.
Authenticity is
not part of the
TOE.
(no
certificates
are used)
2 ECDSA signature
generation and
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512} on nistp-
{256, 384, 521}
(ecdsa-sha2-
nistp256, ecdsa-
sha2-
nistp384,ecdsa-
sha2-nistp521)
[ANSIX9.62]
(ECDSA),
[ FIPS180-4 ]
(SHA),
NIST curves
[FIPS186-4]
identifiers
analogous to
[RFC5903], sec 5
[RFC5656]
secp{256,384,52
1}r1 [SEC2]
[RFC4253] (SSH-
TRANS) for host
authentication
[RFC4252], sec.
7
(SSH-AUTH) for
plength=256,
384, 521
depends on
selected
curve
yes
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
user
authentication
3 User name and
password-based
authentication
[RFC4252], sec.
5
(SSH-AUTH) for
user
authentication
Guess
success prob.
ε ≤ 2 -20
yes PAM is used
centrally.
Thus if the
authen-
tication is
aborted the
counter for
failed logins is
increased and
remains as is
for the next
login.
4 Key agreement
(key exchange)
DH with diffie-
hellman-group-
exchange-sha256
[RFC4253](SSH-
TRANS)supporte
d by [RFC4419]
(DH-Group
Exchange)
[FIPS-180-4]
(SHA)
plength=
2K, 3K, 4K,
etc.
yes As of /etc/ssh/
moduli
5 ECDH with ecdh-
sha2-nistp256,
ecdh-sha2-
nistp384, ecdh-
sha2-nistp521
(ecdh-sha2-
nistp256,ecdh-
sha2-nistp384,
ecdh-sha2-
nistp521)
[RFC4253] (SSH-
TRANS)
[FIPS-180-4]
(SHA)
supported by
[RFC5656] (ECC
in SSH)
secp{256,384,52
1}r1 [SEC2]
NIST curves
[FIPS186-4]
identifiers
analogous to
[RFC5903], sec 5
plength=256,
384, 521
depends on
selected
curve
yes
6 Confidentiality AES in CBC
mode, and CTR
mode
(aes128-cbc,
aes192-cbc,
aes256-cbc)
(aes128-ctr,
aes192-ctr,
aes256-ctr);
[FIPS197] (AES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC),
[RFC 4253]
(SSH-TRANS
using AES with
CBC mode),
[RFC4344] (SSH-
2 using AES with
CTR mode)
|k|=128, 192,
256
yes
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
7 Integrity and
Authenticity
HMAC-SHA-
2(hmac-sha2-256,
hmac-sha2-512)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
[RFC2104]
(HMAC),
[RFC4251] /
[RFC4253] (SSH
HMAC support)
|k|= 256, 512 yes BPP:
Message
authentication
8 Authenticated
encryption
(encrypt-then
authenticate)
HMAC-SHA-
1(hmac-sha1-
etm@openssh.co
m)
HMAC-SHA-2
(hmac-sha2-256-
etm@openssh.co
m, hmac-sha2-
512-
etm@openssh.co
m)
+ CBC-AES
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
[RFC2104]
(HMAC),
[RFC4251] /
[RFC4253] (SSH
HMAC support),
[RFC6668] (SHA-
2 in SSH)
|k|=160, 256,
512
yes etm =
encrypt-then-
MAC(OpenS
SH 6.2)
9 AES in GCM
mode(aes128-
gcm@openssh.co
m, aes256-
gcm@openssh.co
m)
[RFC5647] |k|=128, 256 yes
10 Key generation
for host and
user keys
RSA key
generation with
key size: 2048,
3072, 4096 bits
[FIPS 186-4],
B.3.3 and
C.3 for Miller
Rabin primality
tests.
n/a n/a Using
FCS_RNG.1(
SSL)
11 ECDSA key
generation based
on NIST curves:
P-256, P-384, and
P-521
[FIPS 186-4],B.4 n/a n/a
12 Key generation
for diffie-
hellman key
agreement
DSA key
generation with
key size:
2048, 3072, 4096,
6144, 8192 bits
[SP800-56A-
Rev3], sec.
5.6.1.1.4
[RFC4253]
[RFC4306]
n/a n/a Using
FCS_RNG.1(
SSL)
13 ECDSA key
generation based
on the NIST
curves:
[SP800-56A-
Rev.3], sec.
5.6.1.2.2
[RFC4253]
n/a n/a
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
P-256, P-384, and
P-521
[RFC4306]
14 Trusted
channel
FTP_ITC.1 a)
[ST], sec. 6.2.1.45
for SSHv2.0
Cf. all lines above See above yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality for SSH
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Confidentiality Cipher: AES
Modes: CBC,
GCM
CBC: [RFC5246],
SP800-38A
GCM:
[RFC5288],
[SP800-38D]
128, 256 yes -
2 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC SHA-1
HMAC SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
AES GMAC used
by GCM
[RFC5246]
FIPS180-4 (SHA)
[FIPS198]
(HMAC)
SP800-38D
(GCM / GMAC)
Key length
equal to
digest
yes -
3 Key Agreement DH with PQG:
MODP Group 14,
MODP Group 15,
MODP Group 16,
MODP Group 17,
MODP Group 18
ECDH with curves
NIST P-256, NIST
P- 384, NIST P-
521
RFC5246,
SP800-56A rev 3
Keys size as
defined by
PQG
parameters /
curves
n/a -
4 IV / Key
derivation
PRF
MD-5/SHA-1,
SHA-2 with hash
type chosen by
TLS cipher suite
RFC5246
FIPS 180-4
FIPS 198
Depending on
chosen
cipher,
compliant to
RFC5246
yes -
5 Peer
authentication
RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1.5 using
SHA-1 and SHA-2
RFC 5246
FIPS 186-4
FIPS 180-4
RFC3447,
(PKCS#1v2.1)
Sec. 8 (RSA)
Modulus >=
2048 bits
Keys size as
defined by
curves
yes -
RSA signature
generation and
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
verification
RSASSA- PSS
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2
ECDSA with
signature
generation and
verification using
SHA- 1 and SHA-
2 with NIST P-
256, P-384, P-521
RFC5246
Sec1-v2
(ECDSA) ([SEC2
])
FIPS180-4 (SHA)
6 Key generation
for
authentication
ECDSA using
NIST P-256, P-
384, P-521
FIPS 186-4, B.4 Modulus >=
2048 bits
Keys size as
defined by
curves
yes -
RSA with 1024,
2048, 3072, 4096
bits
5 (2048 bits and
lower), 4 (larger
key sizes) rounds
of Miller-Rabin
FIPS 186-4, B.3.3
and C.3 for Miller
primality tests
7 Key generation
for DH / ECDH
DSA using PQG
parameter set
defined for DH
operation
SP800-56A rev. 3
section 5.6.1.1.4
RFC5246
Keys size as
defined by
PQG
parameters
n/a -
ECDSA with NIST
P-256, P-384, P-
521
SP800-56A rev. 3
section 5.6.1.2.2
RFC5246
Keys size as
defined by
curves
8 Trusted
channel
FTP_ITC.1
ST, Section
6.1.1.10
TLS
See listed above - n/a -
9 Random
number
generator
CTR DRBG with
AES- 256, with
DF, without PR
[SP800-90A-
Rev1]
- n/a -
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality for TLS
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Key derivation
with
authentication
(access
control,
Password based
key derivation
using PBKDF2
with PRF HMAC
using SHA-1,
[SP800-132]
[CFLUKS]6
Please note that
the master key of
Guessing
prob. 2 -20
Salt 32 byte
(LUKS_SALSI
ZE)
yes
29 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
protection /
recovery
mode)
SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512
[CFLUKS] is
called DPK in
[SP800-132]. And
in [SP800-132]
the Master key is
called the key
which is derived
from the user
password.
[RFC2898]
(PBKDF2]
[FIPS198-1]
(HMAC),
[FIPS180-4]
( SHA)
iteration count
1000 ms
2 Confidentiality
(bulk data &
key access /
key wrapping)
AES in XTS mode
IV-handling
mechanism:
XTS-plain64
XTS-benbi
[FIPS197]
[SP800-38E]
(XTS)
|k|= 2*128,
2*192, 2*256
yes
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality for dm-crypt
References for Table 3 to 5:
ANSIX9.62 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
Date 16 November 2005
Location https://standards.globalspec.com/std/1955141/ANSI%20X9.62
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
Date 2015-08-04
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/180/4/final
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Date 2013-07-19
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/186/4/final
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Date 2001-11-26
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/197/final
FIPS198 FIPS PUB 198-1 - The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
Date July 2008
File name adv/NIST.FIPS.198-1.pdf
30 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021 Certification Report
RFC0768 User Datagram Protocol
Author(s) J. Postel
Date 1980-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0768.txt
RFC0791 Internet Protocol
Author(s) J. Postel
Date 1981-09-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0791.txt
RFC0792 Internet Control Message Protocol
Author(s) J. Postel
Date 1981-09-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0792.txt
RFC0793 Transmission Control Protocol
Author(s) J. Postel
Date 1981-09-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0793.txt
RFC0826 An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or Converting Network Protocol Addresses to
48.bit Ethernet Address for Transmission on Ethernet Hardware
Author(s) D. Plummer
Date 1982-11-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0826.txt
RFC0903 A Reverse Address Resolution Protocol
Author(s) R. Finlayson, T. Mann, J.C. Mogul, M. Theimer
Date 1984-06-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0903.txt
RFC2104 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
Author(s) H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti
Date 1997-02-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
RFC2119 Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels
Author(s) S. Bradner
Date 1997-03-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
RFC2367 PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2
Author(s) D. McDonald, C. Metz, B. Phan
Date 1998-07-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2367.txt
RFC2401 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol
Author(s) S. Kent, R. Atkinson
Date 1998-11-01
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1168-2021
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2401.txt
RFC2460 Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
Author(s) S. Deering, R. Hinden
Date 1998-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt
RFC3376 Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3
Author(s) B. Cain, S. Deering, I. Kouvelas, B. Fenner, A. Thyagarajan
Date 2002-10-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3376.txt
RFC3447 Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version
2.1
Author(s) J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski
Date 2003-02-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC4252 The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4252.txt
RFC4253 The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4253.txt
RFC4301 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol
Author(s) S. Kent, K. Seo
Date 2005-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4301.txt
RFC4306 Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol
Author(s) C. Kaufman
Date 2005-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4306.txt
RFC4344 The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes
Author(s) M. Bellare, T. Kohno, C. Namprempre
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4344.txt
RFC4419 Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) M. Friedl, N. Provos, W. Simpson
Date 2006-03-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4419.txt
RFC5246 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
Author(s) T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
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Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt
RFC5288 AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS
Author(s) J. Salowey, A. Choudhury, D. McGrew
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt
RFC5647 AES Galois Counter Mode for the Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) K. Igoe, J. Solinas
Date 2009-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5647.txt
RFC5656 Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
Author(s) D. Stebila, J. Green
Date 2009-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5656.txt
RFC5903 Elliptic Curve Groups modulo a Prime (ECP Groups) for IKE and IKEv2
Author(s) D. Fu, J. Solinas
Date 2010-06-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5903.txt
RFC6668 SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) D. Bider, M. Baushke
Date 2012-07-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6668.txt
SP800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques
Date 2001-12-01
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final
SP800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and
GMAC
Date 2007-11-28
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38d/final
SP800-38E Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices
Date 2010-01-18
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38e/final
SP800-56A-
Rev3
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
Date 2018-04-16
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56a/rev-3/final
SP800-90A-
Rev1
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators
Date 2015-06-24
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-90a/rev-1/final
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Note: End of report
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